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XII*-ARISTOTELIAN
INFINITY
by Jonathan Lear
Philosophershave traditionallyconcerned themselves with two
quite disparatetasks: they have, on the one hand, tried to give
an account of the origin and structureof the world and, on the
other hand, they have tried to provide a critique of thought.
With the concept of the infinite, both tasks are united. Since the
time of Anaximanderthe apeiron has been invoked as a basic
cosmologicalprinciple.' And the conceptual change that occurs
as the apeiron of the Presocraticsis refined and criticized by
Plato and Aristotle, to the development of Cantor's theory of
the transfiniteand its critique by Brouwer, is one of the great
histories of a critique of pure reason. For whether or not the
world is infinitely extended in space or time would, for all we
know, make no differenceto the quality of our local experience
of the world. Nor, for all we know, are we able to distinguish
on the basis of how our movement seems to us whether we are
moving througha continuousor a discreteworld. "The infinite",
says Aristotle, "first manifests itself in the continuous",2for
instance, in motion, time and magnitude. But he does not rely
on our experienceof a continuousworld to establishthe world's
continuity. In Physics VI. 1, 2, he offers a series of theoretical
argumentsto show that a magnitude must be infinitelydivisible
and that if a magnitude is continuous so too must be motion
and time. To provide a critique of the infinite, Aristotlehad to
provide a critique of thought concerning the infinite; yet the
result of such a critique was supposed to provide insight into
the nature and structureof the world in which we live.
The infinite needs to be invoked, according to Aristotle, to
explain three distinct phenomena: the infinite divisibility of
magnitudes, the infinity of numbers and the infinity of time
(Physics206ag-I 2). Yet an understandingof Aristotle'saccount
of magnitude, number and time is hinderedby the fact that his
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heat death of the universe. But then (to use a familiar phrase)
what can the intuitionists'assertionthat the sentence is in principle decidable consist in? If the intuitionistscannot show that
their claims of possibilityare well founded, then they are faced
with one of two equally grave consequences.Either they must
content themselveswith a small fragment of finite mathematics;
i.e. their position collapses into some variant of strict finitism.
Or they must concede to the realists that they too have an
epistemicallytranscendentnotion of truth and that the disagreement with the realistsis one of degree, not of kind.
Aristotle was able to offer at least a partial solution to his
'problemof potentiality'but, unfortunatelyfor the intuitionists,
his solutionis not one of which they can take advantage. To see
this we must first recognizethat a commonly accepted interpretation of Aristotle is unacceptable.
I
Hintikka has argued that, for Aristotle, every genuine possibility is at some time actualized.7Aristotle'stheory of the infinite
seems to provide a counterexample,since it appears that the
infinite has merely potential existence and is never actualized.
However, according to Hintikka, the alleged counterexample
is only apparent; he resolves the tension as follows.8 Though
the claim that 'the infinite is potential'may appearodd, Aristotle
denies that 'potential'is being used in a deviant way: he says,
rather, that 'to be' has many senses (2o6ai6-27). A lump of
bronze may at one time potentially be a statue and at a later
time actually be a statue, because the processof sculpting it is
one that can be completed. The result of the sculpting process
is an individual statue, a tode ti. By contrast, the infinite is in
the same sense in which a day is or a contest is (2o6a21-25).
The point is that there is no moment at which the day exists
as an individual entity (tode ti). Rather, one moment of the
day occurs after another. Similarly with the infinite: if one
begins dividing a line, there is no moment at which the infinite
exists as a completed entity. One can continue the process of
division without end. But Aristotleallowed that when a process
is occurring, whether it be the passing of a day, the Olympic
Games or the division of a line, we may say that it is actually
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206bI 2-I6) because the actual process can only reveal the
length to be potentiallyinfinite.
Hintikka cites a passage from MetaphysicsVIII. 6 which he
thinks supportshis interpretation.
Hin-
tikka's translation)
The central claim of this passage is that the infinite does not
exist as a separate,individual entity. The problem for Hintikka
is to explain how the potential existence of a mental activity
could guarantee that the processof division never comes to an
end. Hintikka's responseis to invoke the so-called principle of
plenitude: that, for Aristotle, no potentiality goes forever unactualized. Thus, Hintikka concludes, not only does Aristotle's
theory of the infinite not constitute a counterexampleto the
principle of plenitude, the principle is in fact required in the
exposition of the theory. This conclusionis, I think, unjustified.
Whetheror not Aristotlesubscribedto the principleof plenitude
is extremelycontentious.That does not mean one should never
invoke the principle. Indeed its invocation might lend the principle support if it helped significantlyto harmonize the data,
preserve the appearances. But Hintikka invokes the principle
in an instance where it is incredible that it should hold. Are
we really supposed to believe that the potential existence of a
mental activity ensuresthat the processof division never comes
to an end because,in the fullnessof time, there will be an actual
mental activity that will ensure that the activity never comes
to an end? Hintikka acknowledgesthat the translationof the
second sentence quoted is disputed. The Greek sentence is:
to gar mg hypoleipein ten diairesin apodidosi to einai dunamei
tautenten energeian,to de chorizesthaiou. (I 048b 14-17) Hintikka
has had to take to einai dunameitauten ten energeianas the subject, while I would agreewith Ross that it is more naturalto take
to gar me hypoleipeinten diairesinas the subject."4The sentence
would then be translated:
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207a33-bI5).
One might
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IV
Aristotleis attempting a revolutionin philosophicalperspective.
This is a revolutionwhich cannot be appreciatedif one thinks
that, for him, every possibility must be actualized. Aristotle
wants to remove the infinite from its position of majesty. The
infinite traditionallyderived its dignity from being thought of
as a whole in which everything is contained (207aI5-2i).
But
the view that the infinite contains everything arises, Aristotle
argues, from a conceptual confusion.
The infinite turns out to be the opposite of what they say.
The infinite is not that of which nothing is outside, but
that of which there is always something outside . . . That
of which nothing is outside is complete and whole, for
we define the whole as that of which nothing is absent,
for example, a whole man or a wooden box. . . . By contrast, that of which something, whatever it might be, is
absent is not everlasting. Whole and complete are either
altogether the same or of a similar nature. Nothing is
complete (teleion)which has no end (telos),and the end is
a limit (peras)"(2o6b33-207aI5).
Aristotle here presents an argument to show that the infinite
is imperfect and incomplete: I. The infinite is that from which
it is always possible to take something from outside (2o7ai-2).
2. That of which nothing is outside is said to be complete and
whole (207a8-9). The examples Aristotle gives are paradigms
of finite self-containedobjects; they are individual entities, substance or artifact. 3. The whole = the complete (aI3-14).
But 4. Every complete thing has an end (a14). And 5. An end
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Cf. also Met. M3 I078a30-I). The infinite exists only potentially as matter does (2o6bl4ff). Due at least in part to its
potentiality, the infinite, like matter, is unknowable. (Cf.
207a24-26,
a3o-32).
ARISTOTELIANINFINITY
(kinesis)
(22ob32-22Ia7,
2I9bI-2).24
203
by motion, why does not the infinity of time bear witnessto the
existence of an infinitely extended magnitude?
The obvious responseis that the only motion which Aristotle
thought could be regular, continuous and eternal was circular
motion (Physics VIII. 8-9). And circular motion is not truly
infinitary (206b33-207a8). While traversingthe circumference
of a circle, one can always continue one's motion, but one
cannot properly call the circle "infinite". For the circle to be
infinite, it would be necessary that each part traversed be
different from any part that had been traversed or could be
traversed again. And this necessary condition is not fulfilled.
So although the heavens have always moved and always will
move in a regular circularmotion and thus provide a measure
against which the time of other changes can be measured,they
do not themselvestraversean infinitely extended magnitude.
This response, as it stands, is inadequate, for although the
sphereof the heavensmay be finite, the path the heavensdescribe
through all time must be infinite. Aristotle himself admits that
if time is infinitely extended then length must be infinitely
extended (233aI 7-2o). To avoid the problem one must somehow
sever the tie between the passageof time and the path described
by a moving body. And this is preciselywhat Aristotledid.
But he did not do it by as simple a sleight of tense as
Simplicius ascribes to him.26Simplicius draws our attention to
206a25-b3 at which Aristotle contrasts the passage of time
with the successivedivisions of a length: while the parts of a
line that are divided remain in existence, in the case of time
the moments cease to exist; past time has perished. Though
the contrast is genuine, it does not of itself embody a solution
to the problem. For Aristotle clearly says that a moving body
moves acrossa spatial magnitude, and thus there is a magnitude
that is traversedby a moving body, even though at any one
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moment the moving body is in only one place. That the time
at which a body moved has 'perished' does not imply that
the magnitude or path it traversed has perished. Thus one is
still faced with the problem of why the path traversedby the
heavens through all past time is not infinitelyextended.
I would like briefly to suggest that Aristotle developed an
anti-realistaccount of time, which enabled him both to show
how time could be potentially and not actually infinite and
to avoid 'spatializing'time.
To claim that Aristotle was an anti-realist with respect to
time is not say that he succumbed to the sceptical aporiai of
Physics IV.Io and concluded that time did not exist. It is only
to say that, in companywith McTaggart and Dummett, Aristotle
did not believe one could give an observer-independentdescription of time.27Time seemed to Aristotle essentially to involve
change (2i 8b2ff), and it is to this aspect of time that a static,
observer-independentdescriptionof the sequence of events cannot do justice. The claim that Aristotle thought time unreal
amounts to no more than that he thought an adequate description of time must include a consciousness that is existing
through time aware of the distinction between present, past
and future. In a famous passage which, because it comes at
the conclusion of his extended discussion of time, I take to
contain his mature thoughts on the nature of time, Aristotle
says:
It is worth investigating how time is related to the soul
and why time seems to be in everythingboth in earth, in
sea and in heaven . . . Someone might well ask whether
time would exist or not if there were no soul. If it is
impossible for there to be someone who counts, then it
is impossiblethat something be countable, so it is evident
that neither is there number, for number is either the
thing counted or the countable. If there is nothing capable
of counting, either soul or the mind of soul, it is impossible
that time should exist, with the soul not existing, but only
the substratum of time [sc. change], if it is possible for
change to exist without soul. (Physics IV.I4, 223aI 6-28,
my emphasis)
Time is above all a measure and, as such, could not exist were
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The supposition that these things existed always but unchanged appearsunreasonableimmediately,but even more
unreasonableif one goes on to investigatethe consequences.
For if, among the things that are changeable and capable
of producingchange, there will at some time be something
first producing change and something changing, while at
another time there is nothing but something resting, then
this thing must have previouslybeen changing. For there
was some cause of rest: rest being a privation of change.
Therefore before this first change there will be a previous
change. (25 I ag-28)
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NOTES
* I would like to thank: M. F. Burnyeat, C. Farrar, T. J. Smiley, and
R. R. K. Sorabji for offering valuable criticisms of an earlier draft; the
President, Deans and Librarian of The Rockefeller University for their
hospitality during the summer, 1979, when this paper was written; Ian
Spence, who at age five asked me a question to which this paper is a
partial response.
1 Cf. C. H. Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology,
New York, Columbia University Press, I960; P. Seligman, The Apeiron of
Anaximander, London, The Athelone Press, I962.
2 Physics, III.1, 200bI7.
3 D. Bostock, 'Aristotle, Zeno and the Potential Infinite', Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society, 73, 1972-3. Cf. W. D. Hart, 'The Potential
Infinite', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 76, 1975-6; J. Thomson,
'Infinity in Mathematics and Logic', Encyclopedia of Philosophy, New
York, The Macmillan Company, I967.
4 Cf. e.g. Michael Dummett, Elements of Intuitionism, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1977; 'The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionist Logic', 'Platonism',
'Realism', in Truth and Other Enigmas, London, Duckworth, 1978.
6 Cf. A. S. Yesinin-Volpin, 'The Ultra-intuitionistic Criticism and the
Antitraditional Program for the Foundations of Mathematics', in A. Kino,
J. Myhill, R. Vesley (eds.), Intuitionism and Proof Theory, Amsterdam,
North Holland, I970.
6 Michael Dummett, 'Wang's Paradox', Truth and Other Enigmas, op.
cit. Cf. Crispin Wright, 'Language Mastery and the Sorites Paradox,'
ARISTOTELIANINFINITY
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9 Ibid. ii6.
10 David Furley, Two Studies in the Greek Atomists, Study I. 'Indivisible
Magnitudes', Princeton, Princeton University Press, I967.
Hintikka
(1973)
Op. cit.,
iI6.
and
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