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Jean-Jacques FICTION
Mommys Cookies
Rousseau is 300! 6 My
Courtney Gibbons tells us the true source of Platos inspiration
on 28th June. See page 32
News
My Mommys Cookies
By Plato, aged 4
The general consensus is that Platos philosophy of Forms was
a natural by-product of his friendship with Socrates and his
upbringing in an environment conducive to philosophical
thought. However, a newly recovered dialogue shows that
Platos first brush with Forms was in his moms kitchen:
Mommy, why do we have to cut each cookie into a crescent?
Because, Plato, all kourabiedes are crescent-shaped.
Why?
So that people will know theyre eating a kourabiede and not an
amygthalota.
Why?
You tell me. What do all these cookies have in common?
They all have the same shape.
Why do they have the same shape, Plato?
Because they come from the same cutter?
Thats right.
So everybody knows they're all kourabiedes because they come
from the same cookie cutter?
Yes. Pass the cloves, please.
Why?
Because I said so! Now please stop eating the sugar, you know it
makes you hyperactive.
COURTNEY GIBBONS 2012
Who are the special people who can recognise the Forms? For
Plato the answer is straightforward: the ideal ruler is a philosopher-king, because only philosophers have the ability to discern the Forms. Plato goes on to say that it is only when such a
person comes to power that the citizens of the state will have
the opportunity to step out of the cave and see the light.
DAVID MACINTOSH 2012
enquire into what they have forgotten. Since this will include all
knowledge, enquiry is secured in very general terms.
In defence of his position, Socrates refers to what he describes
as a glorious truth namely, that the soul of man is immortal.
It might die and be reborn, but it is never destroyed. He reasons
that, since the soul is immortal and has been born again many
times, it must have seen all things that exist in this world or in
the world below or in the world of the Forms and has knowledge
of them all. In this way, the soul has learned everything that
there is to know (i.e., everything that can be enquired into).
Although everything the soul has learnt has been forgotten,
during the process of enquiry someone might come to recollect
something that they had previously known, thereby relearning
some piece of knowledge say of the nature of virtue.
Socrates provides a demonstration. An uneducated slave boy
of Menos is shown to be capable of recognising the right
answer to a mathematical problem that he has never (in this
life) heard before (Meno 81a-86b). Socrates is keen to stress
that the boy arrives at the right answer by himself through a
series of questions. Since the boy was not taught the right
answer, Socrates proposes that he expressed an opinion that
was already in him. He argues on these grounds that the soul
already contains an array of true opinions, gathered, as it were,
from a previous life, which can be newly aroused though
simple questioning. In this respect, one can enquire into what
one is ignorant of in virtue of the fact that the true opinions are
stirred up into your mind through questioning.
Circular Knowledge
I do not intend to argue that Socrates theory of recollection
does not work as a solution to the paradox of enquiry. Instead I
intend to demonstrate that the theory of recollection doesnt
work generally. To do this I shall make three claims:
1.) That in order for his theory of recollection to be coherent
and therefore potentially resolve Menos paradox of enquiry,
Socrates must be able to demonstrate that the slave boy is in
fact recollecting some previous true opinions rather than learning new knowledge by using general reasoning.
2.) That Socrates attempts to establish recollection by employing the notion of what I shall describe as an immortal and
knowledge-giving soul.
3.) That the reasoning he uses to promote his immortal and
knowledge-giving soul is circular.
The first of my claims is obviously a requirement for
Socrates. His theory turns on whether or not the slave boy learns
anything new. In particular, Socrates needs to show that the true
opinions arrived at were already-learned forgotten truths.
The second claim seems equally uncontroversial. Socrates is
able to take the slave boy to have arrived at true relearned opinions because he has already introduced the notion of an immor-
Platos Allegory of the Cave, as told in the Republic, Book VII, is a fable related by Socrates to illustrate the gap Plato perceives
between the transient world as it appears to us, and the unchanging world of the Forms, which exists behind or beyond appearances.
In an extended metaphor, Plato/Socrates considers dwellers in a cave. All their lives theyve been chained up so that they cannot
move their heads to look around. The entrance to the cave the exit to the daylight of truth is behind them, and so is a fire, with a
walkway in front of it. People walk along this path, or things are paraded on it, and the shadows of these people and things are cast
by the fire onto the wall in front of the prisoners. Because they have no experience which might suggest a different interpretation, the
cave-dwellers assume that the shadows they see moving on the cave wall are the reality of the people and things. This idea seems to
be confirmed by the whispers of voices or other noises they hear echoing around the cave in time with the movements or gestures
of the shadows. In an analogous way (the argument goes), we assume that the world we experience is absolute reality, never imagining that there might be a hidden reality which is the source of our flickering experiences, but which is quite different from them.
Socrates goes on to relate how one day one of the dwellers in darkness is dragged up out of the cave to the light of truth. Plato clearly is
referring to himself here, as going beyond appearances to perceive the world of the Forms the highest of which, the dazzling sun of the
Forms, is the Form of (the) Good. He has Socrates say of this Form Once [the Good] is perceived, the conclusion must follow that, for all
things, this is the cause of whatever is right and good: in
real things/people
daylight
fire
shadows
the visible world it gives birth to light and to the lord of
light, while it is itself sovereign in the intelligible world [of
Forms], and the parent of intelligence and truth. Without
having had a vision of this Form no one can act with wisdom, either in his own life or in matters of the state.
Plato tells us that the freed man, having seen the truth,
will return to tell his former companions what he has
experienced. Plato also thinks they wont believe him, will
abuse him for his foolishness, and will kill him if he tries to
free others. Nevertheless, for Plato it is the duty of the
enlightened to try and convince the endarkened of the
philosophers
deception they suffer under; and he goes on to explain
prisoners
why the philosopher, who has knowledge of the Good,
should rule over those who do not have such knowledge.
is the having and doing of ones own and what belongs to oneself (434a). Excess and deficiency of any kind are unjust. In
this formulation the Platonic definition of justice seems plausible. A thief, for example, is unjust because he wants to have
what is not his own. A doctor who does not care about curing
his patients of illnesses can be called unjust because he is disregarding his proper role. A murderer acts unjustly since he
deprives his victim of that which rightly belongs to him, namely
his life. In general, unjust people either do not realize the
virtues and duties proper to their situation in life, or treat someone worse than he deserves. Similarly, an unjust state fails to
accomplish the functions of a state. According to Plato, these
functions of the state include making possible the conditions
under which everyone can feed, clothe and shelter themselves,
as well as seek the Good.
Platos conception of justice is informed by his conviction
that everything in nature is part of a hierarchy, and that nature
is ideally a vast harmony, a cosmic symphony, every species and
every individual serving a purpose. In this vision, anarchy is the
supreme vice, the most unnatural and unjust state of affairs.
The just state, then, like nature, is hierarchical: individuals are
ranked according to their aptitudes, and definitively placed in
the social hierarchy.
The individual soul, too, is hierarchical: the appetitive part is
inferior to the spirited part, which is inferior to the rational. Yet
each has a necessary role to play. Reason should govern the individual, but the appetites must also to an extent be heeded if the
persons soul is to be harmonious
and not in conflict with itself.
And if every aspect of the soul
accomplishes its task well, or
fittingly, the result is necessarily a moderate and
ordered state of affairs. The
virtuous individual has a wellordered soul, which is to say that
he knows what justice is and
acts according to his knowledge. He knows his place
in the state; he knows
what his aptitudes are
and he puts them into
practice. He also
adheres to the dictates of reason, doing
everything in moderation.
The Platonic
worldview is
quite foreign to
the modern liberal democratic
world. We are
accustomed to
mote anarchy and prevent his subjects from seeking the Good
and living in harmony with themselves and the community.
The tyrant upsets the natural order of things.
Another illustration of the difference in our outlooks is in
our conceptions of the ideal or just person. According to Plato,
the ideal person is a philosopher, since his wisdom means his
soul is in complete harmony with itself. The philosophers
rational faculty governs his passions and appetites, never allowing them free rein, but still respecting their claims on him and
indulging them when expedient. He has knowledge of himself
and society; he knows what it is to be virtuous; he has a certain
amount of equanimity, and he never loses control over himself.
By contrast, Platos unjust person is divided against himself,
torn between his passions and appetites, and has no respect for
reason, which alone could unify his soul such that he would be
an individual in the literal sense of the word in-dividual.
Our notion of the ideal person is far less specific than
Platos. Like Platos, it does, to an extent, incorporate the
notion of virtue; but for us virtue is conceived as treating
others well rather than as functioning healthily within a community. Our ideal can be called more
relational, in that it emphasizes how
others should be treated rather than
emphasizing the character of ones
psyche.
Given these differences, one
obvious ques-
tion is
which concept
of justice (or
more fundamentally, which worldview) is
better, Platos or ours? I have
elaborated on neither, merely
sketching them. Still, let me
suggest an answer: neither
Platos nor our own is totally satisfactory, but each has its
strengths. The most defensible notion of justice,
socially or individually, would be a combination of the
two, selecting the strengths from each and reconciling
them. It would emphasize both the importance of community
and the importance of the individual, while succumbing neither
to the potential totalitarianism of the Republic, nor to the excessive individualism of modern culture. In the following Ill briefly
describe Platos utopia, then consider if it would be desirable to
put it into practice.
Platos Ideal State
Every reader of the Republic is told that Platos intention in
discussing the just state is to illuminate the nature of the just
soul, for he argues that they are analogous. The state is the
soul writ large, so to speak. For example, the divisions of the
May/June 2012 Philosophy Now 11
secret which only the rulers know, or there will be a further danger of our
herd, as they may be termed, breaking out into rebellion.
Addicts, Mythmakers
and Philosophers
Alan Brody explains Platos/Socrates understanding of habitually bad behavior
ELL
Socrates on Self-Mastery
Although Socrates holds that when we know the good we
will choose to do it, he attributes to temptation a power to distort what we think is good. He then informs us of a way to
defeat this Sirens call: knowledge can provide a means of circumventing temptations distorting influence. This special
knowledge is a kind of know-how in discerning what is good,
like an artistic skill, or practical expertise. Socrates describes
this skill/knowledge somewhat vaguely, as being some kind of
measuring ability (Protagoras, 357b). Such knowledge allows its
possessor to avoid being deceived about what is really best, and
so to succeed in pursuing the true good. In this way, Socrates
maintains, knowing how to discern the good leads to doing the
good, despite temptations deceptions. It means having the
right kind of ability to both choose and do what is best, and this is
what having self-mastery means. In Xenophons Symposion
(2.10), a romantic strategy is reported by Xenophon which
emphasizes Socrates point about developing skills to improve
self-mastery. Here Socrates tells us that for his wife he has
chosen Xanthippe, a woman with spirit, so that he can develop
the ease he wants to have in conversing with everyone!
By linking the experience of willingly choosing what
appears best with a description of how that choice can be the
outcome of a process deceiving us about what is best, the
Socratic analysis of temptation goes beyond a simple willingness model of choice. In my interpretation, on the Socratic
model, one fails to choose to do the good one previously preferred because one doesnt have the ability (the know-how) to
see it as the better alternative (perhaps only momentarily). To
do what is best one must therefore develop this ability/knowhow. This model thus allows that someone might not have the
16 Philosophy Now May/June 2012
WWW.CHRISMADDEN.CO.UK
Simplicity Itself
The willingness model of addiction has been presented as a
simple way to capture the nature of addiction, how it motivates, and how it manifests experientially and behaviorally. But
is its simplicity a good reason to believe it?
In From A Logical Point Of View (1953), the philosopher
W.V.O. Quine beautifully articulates the rationale involved
when he states that we adopt, at least insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged
(p.16). The simplicity of the willingness model, then, might
appear to give it a big advantage over any analysis of addiction
in terms of a compulsive condition or other disability (for
example, as an illness or disease). But we are in danger of being
seduced by a love of theoretical sparseness, misleading us into
violating another important methodological maxim, attributed
to Einstein, namely, that a theory should be as simple as possible, but no simpler. To avoid us being misled by over-simplification, then, I will show why we have good reason to make our
explanation more complex, by viewing addiction as a condition
arising from a compulsion which undermines the ability to
self-regulate. To begin this explanation, lets look more deeply
into the Socratic understanding of self-mastery or self-control.
to do, even when the urges are intense. Urges incline but do
not necessitate, to use an expression of Leibnizs.
Platos Neurobiology
Elizabeth Laidlaw explores some parallels between a modern picture of the brain
and Platos description of the psyche.
neocortex
or rational brain
limbic or emotional
brain
brain stem or
reptilian/
survival brain
Galahad vs Odysseus
Emrys Westacott on honour codes and strategic thinking in sport and beyond.
prefer? We have seen that appealing to the definition of cheating or to a principle of consistency doesnt help. These are
dead ends that dont take us beyond the impasse of the original
opposition between the two perspectives. So how might we get
beyond this impasse? In my view, the most fruitful approach is
to ask which we would prefer: a world in which soccer is played
in an Odyssian spirit, or one in which Galahadian attitudes prevail. If we prefer the former, then we have no reason to criticize Suarez; we might even applaud him. If we prefer the
latter, then it makes sense to disapprove of his action.
Notice, this is a thoroughly pragmatist way of addressing the
issue. It doesnt assume there is any objective way of judging the
morality of Suarezs hand-ball. Instead, it holds that moral positions should be adopted or rejected according to how well they
further our purposes and help us realize our ideals. It also assumes
that our expressions of approval or disapproval may help nudge
the ethos of a sport and perhaps also of other sports, and ultimately, the culture at large toward our preferred ideal.
There has been little systematic research on this, but it
seems reasonable to suppose that if they adopt this approach,
most people involved with soccer or any other sport will be led
to disapprove of Suarezs hand-ball, since there are good reasons
to prefer a sports culture in which Galahadian norms prevail.
Odysseus: On
the head, son!
(Never mind
the hands)
Choosing Sides
Lets return to our original question. In the debate over
Suarezs hand-ball, two competing outlooks emerged: the
Odyssian and the Galahadian. How should we decide which to
May/June 2012 Philosophy Now 21
For match officials and administrators, the question is a nobrainer. Matches would be easier to officiate, and referees
would spend less time wiping egg off their faces after video
replays proved that they had once again been duped by some
cunning piece of gamesmanship. Most players, one supposes,
would also favor this environment. Competitors in sports
where thoroughly sporting attitudes are the norm certainly
dont seem to enjoy themselves less. On the contrary, where
cheating and gamesmanship abound, there tends to be more
anger, bitterness, and even occasional violence. Also significant
are studies showing that most athletes support drug testing as a
deterrent against the use of performance-enhancing drugs in
sport. While doping isnt quite the same as pretending to have
been fouled, using drugs to gain an advantage obviously reflects
an Odyssian attitude. (The hero of the Odyssey generally relies
on Athena rather than amphetamines to enhance his performance, but the principle is similar.) Yet even those who have
adopted the Odyssian attitude usually wish things were otherwise. They would prefer to operate in a drug-free environment,
and if they take drugs themselves, they do so because they
believe they must in order to compete in a wicked world.
No doubt there are some players and coaches who thrive in
a Machiavellian atmosphere, who pride themselves on their
ruthless, unsentimental natures, and relish the need for the
keener wits that an Odyssian contest requires. According to
them, Winning isnt everything its the only thing. According to them, nice guys and Galahad is unquestionably one of
these finish last. (Its not true that Galahad finished last: one
could even say he won the cup! But mythic figures dont make
good counterexamples.) But we should not assume that feisty
Machiavellians represent the norm in sport. The majority of
participants would surely prefer to compete in a setting where
a strong honor code is in place and they dont have to worry
about anyones dirty tricks.
What about the largest group of those involved the spectators? If a Galahadian attitude prevailed, would soccer be more
enjoyable to watch, or less? Some might argue that soccer
played in a spirit of unblemished sportsmanship would be
anemic. After all, the players that reach the highest levels are
fiercely competitive individuals; if they werent, they wouldnt
have made it to the top. In a physically-demanding, fast-moving,
full-of-passion contact sport, this competitiveness is not easily
held in check. Inevitably, at times it spills over into rule-bending, rule-breaking, gamesmanship, and physical aggression.
Moreover, part of the appeal of soccer is the drama of the
game. Competitive intensity and passion fuel this drama; and
sometimes decidedly unGalahadian episodes can enhance the
spectacle. Games have a narrative, and sometimes the story is
that old favorite, the battle between good and evil, with certain
players, or even whole teams, playing the despised but necessary role of villain. The disputed penalty, the flourishing of a
red card, the controversies surrounding subtle bits of gamesmanship, the pleasurable experience of hurling abuse at wicked
opponents and gullible officials, all add to the theatricality.
Drain away these elements and soccer might certainly be more
sporting, but wouldnt it also lose some of its color and excitement? So might say the Odyssians, and they could probably
count on tabloid editors for support.
22 Philosophy Now May/June 2012
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Wider Fields
Whether the Galahadian attitude should be extended to
moral issues beyond sport is an interesting question. Certainly, there are controversies that are strikingly parallel in
form to the debate over Suarezs hand-ball, and sometimes, an
analysis of one debate can usefully illuminate an issue in a
quite different sphere. To take just one example: is it unethical
for homeowners to default on their mortgages simply because
it is in their financial interest to do so?
With the sharp decline in house prices in many countries
which began in 2006, this question has arisen for millions of
people who have found themselves underwater. If you are
making payments on a $200,000 mortgage to buy a house that
is now worth $100,000, you may be better off walking away
from the loan. Continuing with your monthly payments is like
buying stock for $20 a share when its current market value is
$10 a share. Its a bad investment. From a strictly financial
point of view, a strategic default may be the best option.
As with the Suarez controversy, there are two main schools
of thought. On the one hand, there are the moralists disciples
of Galahad who see strategic defaulting as unethical. Signing
a mortgage contract, they argue, is like making a promise. And
just as it is dishonorable to break a promise for self-serving reasons, so it is wrong to renege on a contract unless breaking it is
unavoidable. This is the view taken by a majority of Americans
in 2010 according to a Pew Research Center study.
On the other hand, there are the legalists who point out that
the contract signed by the bank and the homeowner stipulates
what will happen if the borrower stops making payments. Typically, in that case, the bank is entitled to foreclose on the property. To the business mentality, the question of whether one
should strategically default on a loan is entirely a financial
matter. Morality doesnt come into it. One looks at the terms
of the contract and calculates the bottom line. Obviously, this
way of thinking parallels the Odyssian view of Suarezs handball: there are times when it is makes sense to break the rules
and pay the prescribed penalty. If the other party feels
aggrieved, the appropriate course of action isnt for them to
scream Cheat! or Swindler! but to lobby for a change in
the rules. In soccer, the referees could be allowed to award
penalty goals, just as in rugby they can award penalty tries. In
banking, the penalties for defaulting on loans could be made so
severe that it would never be an attractive option.
Acts of reasoning are not interlocked with the total interlocking system of
Nature as all its other items are interlocked with one another. They are
connected with it in a different way; as the understanding of a machine is
certainly connected with the machine, but not in the way the parts of the
machine are connected with each other. The knowledge of the thing is not
one of the things parts. In this sense something beyond Nature operates whenever we reason. (pp.37-38; my italics)
And so he decides that the distinction between the supernatural and the natural is actually between Reason and Nature,
the frontier coming not where the outer world ends and
what I would ordinarily call myself begins, but between
reason and the whole mass of non-rational events, whether
physical or psychological. (p.38)
To justify this conclusion, Lewis needs to prove that if all
events, including crucially mental events (acts of thinking),
were in fact causally determined, then we could never decide
anything by logical reasoning. We could never do so, he says,
because rational judgements do not depend on a causal relation
between causes and their effects, but on a logical relation
between premises and the conclusions we infer from them.
Lewis will then need a further argument to prove that logical
reasoning is not itself a natural capacity in the same way that
eyesight and hearing are definitely natural, since if reasoning
was natural in the same way, it would be subject to natural
causes in the way our senses are. He believes our power of reasoning did not come about in the same way as our five senses:
it was not evolved in us by a process of natural selection. But
why should anyone believe that the power of reason is not
simply a product of natural selection?
May/June 2012 G Philosophy Now 29
Supernatural Reasoning
Lewis begins his argument by claiming that all possible
knowledge of what is true depends on the validity of reasoning:
Unless human reasoning is valid no science can be true he
says in Miracles on p.21.
Now a train of reasoning is valid, that is, has value as a
means of finding truth, only if each step is connected with
what went before in a ground-consequent relation. The easiest
way of illustrating this relation, Lewis suggests, is to notice
two distinct senses of the word because. We can say, Grandfather is ill today because he ate lobster yesterday. We can also
say, Grandfather must be ill today because he hasnt got up
yet (and we know he is an invariably early riser when he is
well). In the first sentence because indicates the causal relation
of cause and effect: the eating made him ill. In the second, it
indicates the logical relation of ground and consequent: the old
mans late rising is the reason why we believe him to be unwell.
One indicates a connection between events or state of affairs,
the other a logical relation between beliefs or assertions.
Unless a conclusion is the logical consequent from a ground, it
will be worthless and could be true only by a fluke. Thus conclusions depend on logic rather than on physical causes for
their validity, even if those physical causes are, for example,
previous states of the brain.
Although Lewis never refers to it, Immanuel Kant had
advanced precisely this argument 160 years earlier in his
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). There Kant
wrote, We cannot possibly conceive of a reason as being consciously directed from outside in regard to its judgements. If a
rational being were conscious of any such external influence,
he would regard his judgements as determined, not by reason,
but by impulse. Reason must if it to be reason at all regard
itself as the author of its own principles independently of
external influences. (p.448) If every judgement which is the
conclusion of an argument was caused (i.e., determined) solely
by previous mental/brain events and yet was not a rational
insight into a connection between premises and conclusion,
there would be no difference between valid and invalid inferences, and ultimately there could be no truth. In that case a
doctrine of naturalism which entailed causal determinism
Cherubim
by Michelangelo
Conclusions
We granted earlier that Lewiss primary argument is
logically valid, but doubted the truth of its second premise.
Isnt it possible, we asked, even if naturalism is true, that an
ability to think rationally could be the product of natural selection, or even of experience? Lewiss answer is firmly negative.
Evolution and/or experience equipped us to foresee causal connections between events, but not to see how things outside our
own minds logically must be. The power of reason is therefore not part of the system of nature.
Did Lewis succeed in producing possibly the first ever logically sound proof of the supernatural something beyond
Nature which operates whenever we reason? Almost by definition, a sound argument is one that persuades or convinces
you to believe that its conclusion is true. Are you persuaded?
It comes down to an essentially personal judgement.
If, as I believe, Lewis is right that human reason wasnt made
by either natural selection or experience, then is it a given, just
as the fundamental physical constants are givens? Both the
constants and reason seem to be distinct from nature. Like the
constants, reason is a prerequisite of science: it is its most basic
tool for without rational inference there could be no truth,
and so no science could be true. And reason is not only as necessary as the physical constants; it is also again like them universal and constant. It is certainly true that without the combination of the physical constants and human reason, life as we
now know it on this planet could not have come into being.
STUART GREENSTREET 2012
Brief Lives
A Man of Paradoxes
Rousseau once described himself as a man of paradoxes,
which is not difficult to believe of someone who famously
claimed that it is sometimes necessary to force men to be free.
Other evidence concurs. He wrote an influential treatise on
education of the young, yet put all five of his children into a
foundling home as soon as they were born (where probably
most of them died). He claimed to have the greatest aversion
to revolutions, yet inspired the leaders of the French Revolution, such as Robespierre and Saint-Just, who hailed him as
their hero. Rousseau is commonly included among the leading
32 Philosophy Now May/June 2012
philosophes of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, and contributed to the Encyclopdie, yet in his first major work he
praised ignorance and argued that the cultivation of the arts
and sciences is detrimental to morals. He is famous as a proponent of democracy, yet claimed in his main political work, The
Social Contract (1762) that the only place where democracy had
any realistic prospect in contemporary Europe was in remote
Corsica. Many of his most fervent and devoted admirers while
he was alive were women and aristocrats, yet he was deeply
misogynistic, and professed to dislike and disapprove of
wealthy grandees (I hate their rank, their hardness, their
prejudices, their pettiness, and all their vices). He was one of
the most admired and mesmerisingly eloquent writers of his
age, yet he had little formal education and married an illiterate
seamstress. He was a best-selling author and composer, yet he
wrote that books are good for nothing and admired ancient
Sparta, which tolerated neither writing nor music.
Rousseaus most successful opera, Le Devin du Village (The
Village Soothsayer), was a huge hit when it was premiered in
Paris in 1752, but it is almost never performed now. (Louis
XV loved it, and wanted to offer its composer a lifetime pension, but Rousseau had fled, fearing that he might wet himself
in the kings presence owing to a disease of his bladder.) And
Rousseaus writings on music, extolling the virtues of Italian
opera over French, are today known to only a few scholars.
While his sentimental epistolary novel, Julie, or the New Hlose
(1761), was probably the biggest best-seller of the eighteenth
century, it is now little read. Emile, which Rousseau described
as the best as well as the most important of the works I have
written, had a vast influence on the theory and practice of
education. However, its controversial assumptions and prescriptions have long since been superceded by rival pedagogies.
Yet Rousseaus relevance endures despite all the changes which
have made so much of what he did unfashionable to contemporary tastes. Many of his other works, above all in cultural
anthropology and political philosophy, are classics that continue to resonate very powerfully with readers.
One such example is Rousseaus Discourse on the Origins of
Inequality (1755). Although it was not awarded first prize by
the Academy of Dijon, for which it was written, it caused a sensation when it was published, and has had a huge and lasting
impact on natural and social science. It begins with an account
of man in a pre-social state of nature. This account, while
speculative and hypothetical, was enormously influential on
debates about human nature and the origins of social and political life at a time when there was very little empirical evidence
on these subjects and the gap between science and political
philosophy was far less broad than it is today. The Discourses
idyllic picture of the original human beings as innocent,
simple, happy, peaceful, isolated and benignly selfish prompted
Voltaire sarcastically to thank Rousseau for his new book
against the human species. The second part of the book
sketches the advent of society, and with it the emergence of an
aggressive form of selfishness (amour-propre) that has led to a
Brief Lives
Rousseau in a
solitary reverie
Hobbesian war of all against all dominated by inequality, injustice and exploitation.
The Social Contract
Rousseaus Social Contract, published 250 years ago in April
1762, sets out a solution to the dilemma of civilisation posed in
the Discourse. It was immediately condemned by the Paris Parlement, and placed on the Vaticans Index of Forbidden Books,
next to works by fellow philosophes such as Voltaire, Hume,
Diderot, Montesquieu, and dAlembert. (This did not prevent
Voltaire from declaring that the monster had brought all
these troubles on himself.) No one was surprised by any of
this, least of all Rousseau. But Rousseau was shocked and dismayed when the book was banned in his native Geneva. The
authorities ordered it burned and its author arrested if he ever
dared to set foot in the city again. This wounded Rousseau
deeply, since he had always been a proud citizen of Geneva
he signed his books (including The Social Contract) Citoyen de
Genve, and said to the Genovese that I took your constitution as my model. Rousseau blamed Voltaire, then resident in
Geneva, for whipping up opposition to him in an unholy
alliance with the religious bigots who dominated the city.
The Social Contract was even proscribed in relatively liberal,
tolerant Amsterdam. It seemed as though all of continental
Europe Catholics and Protestants, secularists and religious
fanatics, Jesuits and Jansenists, philosophes and anti-philosophes
had united against Jean-Jacques, who was forced to flee. He
even considered suicide. Rousseaus desperation was so great
that he actually moved to England, a nation he despised: I
Brief Lives
rary conditions. He thought they were only applicable in relatively small, cohesive city-states of the
Mostly armless:
kind commonly found in ancient Greece; not the
Jean-Jacques Rousseau
large, sophisticated nation-states of modern
Europe. That is why it is very unlikely he would
have endorsed the French Revolutionary attempt
to implement his theories, had he lived to see it
even though he correctly predicted a coming age of
revolutions which would engulf Europe.
Whereas Thomas Jefferson believed that the government that governs least governs best, Rousseau
set out to legitimate strong government rather than
to limit it. Indeed, for Rousseau, to limit a legitimate government would be to limit political right
itself, which is contrary to justice. His objection to
Thomas Hobbes was not that Hobbes defended an
absolute sovereign, it is that he defended an illegitimate sovereign. Yet the American Founding Fathers
fundamentally mistrusted government, and therefore designed a political system that was deliberately
weak and limited by checks and balances. This is
why John Locke was a more important influence on
the American Revolution than Rousseau, who
inspired the French Revolutionaries.
The alienation Rousseau experienced from the
enlightened civilisation in which he was immersed
appears to have become complete in the last decade
of his life, when he sought to escape from the company of men entirely, in an apparent effort to preserve his own integrity in an age of utter corruption.
He
had
finally concluded that there is no hope of remeformed when citizens ask themselves what is in the common
dies and that the words fatherland and citizen should be
interest rather than what is good for them specifically as indieffaced from modern languages. He ended his days in total
viduals. However, Rousseau believed that such public-spiritresignation and pessimism. His last work, the unfinished
edness is wholly unnatural, since we are naturally selfish creaReveries of a Solitary Walker, was written in the two years before
tures. It must therefore be cultivated artificially, by means of a
he died, and suggests his conclusion that escape from civilisaset of institutions and practices whose purpose is to promote
tion into rustic isolation is the only real option for the man of
sentiments of sociability. The most notorious of these provirtue. His strong identification with Socrates is also best
posed institutions is what Rousseau calls the civil religion,
understood in terms of his self-conception as a good man
which makes each individual love his duty to the polity more
living in a wicked age, attacked and vilified by contemporaries
than to himself. Rousseau believed that Christianity is comblinded to his goodness by their own vice. In his late best-sellpletely unsuited to this role, since it preaches only servitude
ing masterpiece The Confessions, a cry from the heart written
and submission. In fact, he says that he knows nothing more
during the troubled and difficult years following the publicacontrary to the social spirit and favourable to tyranny than
tion of his Social Contract and Emile, Rousseau offers readers an
Christianity. Little wonder that The Social Contract was banned
irresistibly endearing and often shockingly frank self-portrait
both in Calvinist Geneva and in Catholic Paris.
which inspired an entire generation of romantic writers when
Another device that Rousseau says is necessary to induce
it was published posthumously.
naturally selfish individuals to think of the public good is what
It is a very grave mistake to dismiss Rousseaus ideas as the
he calls the legislator. Such rare individuals (he mentions
ravings of a lunatic, as so many of his enemies and detractors
Moses and Lycurgus as examples) invoke the divine to perhave done over the centuries. He was undoubtedly an eccentric
suade people to subordinate their particular interests to the
and often very difficult character, prone to bouts of paranoia
common interest, this being a precondition for the soveralthough he was a paranoiac with many powerful enemies who
eignty of the general will.
actively persecuted him. But the power and eloquence of his
writing have inspired many generations of the rebels, malconLegacies
tents, misfits and outsiders who share his profound disquiet
Despite his reputation as a nave idealist with both feet
about the place of the individual in the modern age.
planted firmly in the clouds, Rousseau was keenly aware of just
how unlikely it was that the political principles he prescribed
DR GRAEME GARRARD 2012
in The Social Contract would ever be adopted under contempoGraeme Garrard is Senior Lecturer in Politics at Cardiff University.
34 Philosophy Now May/June 2012
Emily Bront
Food for Philosopher
Thought
Tim Madigan philosophizes poetically
s one who has spent many a summers day reading philosophy in chambers drear, I can empathize with
Emily Bronts poem. For several years now I have
made use of her poetry when teaching Introduction to Philosophy classes, in order to show that some of the deepest issues
in this discipline can best be expressed in non-prosaic terms.
One of the questions we consider in class is why there have
been so few female philosophers until fairly recent times. We
first read Platos arguments in The Republic as to why there
cannot be a truly just society until all citizens, both male and
female, are given equal opportunity to excel; then we study
Aristotles rejoinder that such a policy would be folly, since
women are by nature inferior to men, intellectually and physically. This point is reiterated later in the course by selections
from the writings of Arthur Schopenhauer, a vociferous
misogynist, who argued that women were really just big children, unable to understand abstract thought. (Ironically, his
mother was one of the first female novelists to publish under
her own name. Understandably, she did not get along very
well with her son.) To balance these arguments for womens
inherent inferiority, I then have the class read several poems
by Emily Bront, including The Old Stoic (below), I See
Around Me Tombstones Grey, and the above-quoted The
Philosopher. I ask the students to discuss their personal
interpretations of these works and how these might relate to
the views of Aristotle and Schopenhauer. Following this, I
have them read a selection from Virginia Woolfs seminal
essay, A Room of Ones Own. In this, Woolf, the daughter of
prominent Victorian philosopher Leslie Stephen, argued that
women had been systematically banned from all academic
fields and denied a proper education. She also made several
references to the Bront sisters, Charlotte, Emily and Anne,
and gave them credit for transcending their own limited horizons and for addressing issues previously thought to be offlimits to members of the fairer sex.
Most of my students (although not as many as I would
wish) are already familiar with Emily Bronts Wuthering
Heights from their high school English classes a familiarity
they do not have with the philosophers I introduce them to.
They also seem to be interested in the personal story of the
Bront sisters and their struggle to express their unique
portrait of
points-of-view. This bioEmily by
graphical information helps
them to better understand the Branwell
points made by Woolf, that
thoughtful writers need not
only time to reflect, but also
suitable space in which to do their
work conditions that until quite
recently were generally denied to
female members of society. In this sense,
Emily Bront represents the triumph of the
imagination over stultifying social conditions. She was obviously touched by the diverse philosophical movements sweeping England during her lifetime (which her father, the Reverend Patrick Bront, avidly discussed with her, his favored
child), and in her own way she commented upon these movements through her creative fiction (see below for a vivid example of her personal credo).
The American philosopher John Dewey once remarked that
when women philosophers became prominent, the very notion
of what constitutes philosophical inquiry would be greatly
expanded. By insisting on their right to be heard, and by
demonstrating their keen powers of observation, the Bront
sisters have had a powerful and enduring impact on the history
of thought. It is a pleasure for me to be able to introduce my
students to their writings, and in particular to Emilys poetry,
which ably demonstrates the folly of claiming that women
cannot understand or write metaphysical works.
Letters
When inspiration strikes, dont bottle it up!
Write to me at: Philosophy Now
43a Jerningham Road London SE14 5NQ, U.K.
or email rick.lewis@philosophynow.org
Keep them short and keep them coming!
Dont Let Life Drag On
DEAR EDITOR: Surfing on my iPad last
week, a lucky wave carried me to Philosophy Now, a lode of gold for me to plunder, ponder and enjoy. Oh how we love
to tie ourselves up in linguistic tangles of
Humpty-Dumpty verbiage defining
what other words really mean in
attempts to express ideas!
I am impelled to offer my thoughts on
Nick Bostroms The Fable of the
Dragon-Tyrant in the last issue, where
the dragon represents death. Aged 91, I
havent long before boarding my own
dragon train. I am hoping my trip will
be easy, and not horribly prolonged. I
wish that booking a ticket on a high
speed Pullman Car were possible in that
country ideal for one who believes that
death is absolute and ends in utter oblivion, and therefore sees no point in
enduring an arduous journey. (Since
1993 I have been a member of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, which has, in
these days of catchy sound-bites, been
renamed Dignity in Dying. They lobby
for legal rational alternative ways to deal
with our mortality.) But as the late marvellous Joyce Grenfell says, in the character of a professors wife giving tea and
a sympathetic ear to an anarchist college
student: Yes... but I DO worry about
who will look after the drains a nugget
of philosophy in a few words.
The moral of my Dragon-Tyrant
Fable is: good quality far outstrips quantity in life, but youth or physical good
health are no guarantee of comfort and
happiness. They of themselves do not
provide purpose, nor remove dullness,
drudgery, sometimes even degradation
unhappily experienced by probably the
large majority, with at best brief windows of pleasure and satisfaction, as we
scramble in the Darwinian battle of life.
ARTHUR MORRIS, EASTBOURNE
DEAR EDITOR: Concerning Nick
Bostroms and Mary Midgleys somewhat opposing viewpoints on mortality:
36 Philosophy Now G May/June 2012
it will not be sufficient that our descendants extend their lives indefinitely the
advance of technology must continue,
eventually to recreate the past and all the
people who previously perished.
If the materialists are correct, and my
self-awareness can be mapped to physical
phenomena in this universe, then it must
be possible to recreate this system artificially. It follows then that I not a
replica or simulacrum, but the actual me
could thus with sufficiently advanced
technology be restored to being. It is
interesting to note that if such technology were possible, then the End Times
stories of major religions the idea of
the resurrection of the dead and a Judgement Day would actually come to pass,
for we would not resurrect all previous
human beings, save perhaps just long
enough to tell some that for the evil they
committed in their lives, they will be
denied the opportunity for life extension.
(This also eliminates the urgency for
overcoming death Bostrom discusses.)
If all generations are given the option
of extending life, perhaps indefinitely,
then the issue of what to do with ones
life becomes universal. I suggest that a
new culture of extended living would
then emerge, and so some of the issues
Midgley discusses would become for the
most part moot. I can imagine any number of ways I would spend multiple lifetimes. We could evolve societies that
allow individuals to work in one career
for 25 years, say, then train for another
for five years. We could witness many
major historical events first-hand, perhaps recreate prehistoric times, and so
on. There would be no reason to be bored.
THOMAS E. DELANEY, HOUSTON, TX
DEAR EDITOR: I read with interest Nick
Bostroms article The Fable of the
Dragon-Tyrant in Issue 89. But does he
not miss the main benefit of death, i.e.,
disposing of tyrants when all else fails?
Imagine if the dragon people had perfected a way to bring dead dragon-
Letters
nature, yet such is humanitys capability
to think and create, that this can alter our
relationship with nature. We also seem
on the way to altering human nature. The
common use of the term sustainability
cannot sustain such lines of thought. The
debased current meaning seems to evoke
this line of thinking only: Can we protect
the status quo of material wealth and comfort and continue to spend so much, consume so much, etc? No wonder politicians speechwriters everywhere junk
their speeches with such terms.
I keep wondering why the discipline
philosophy of nature is on the ropes.
Could it be that popular language use is
diverting philosophers reflection from
the substance of the matter?
CHRISTOPHER GILL, NOVA SCOTIA
DEAR EDITOR: In Three Challenges For
Environmental Philosophy, in Issue 88,
Jim Moran makes reference to Albert
Schweitzers doctrine of Reverence for
Life. I have some doubt as to whether
Schweitzer would refer to his foundational ethic as a doctrine, since it was
meant as a broad guide to behaviour
rather than as a formal principle. The
ethic is also rather vapid unless understood in relation to Schweitzers worldview, which saw nature as a stark arena of
competition and violence and without
revelation as to its ultimate meaning, at
least in human terms. Allied to this
weltanschauung is the idea of the will-tolive as being universal in all living things,
enabling human beings to find common
ground with other species. Schweitzers
project encapsulated in the aphorism
Reverence for Life is at one level practical, in terms of kindness to all life, and at
another mystical, in its being symbolic of
deference to and sharing in the common
experience of life. It is a shame that this
great thinker is not better known in our
time, for his philosophy is sorely needed.
PETER MARSTIN, CANBERRA
Aping Tallis
DEAR EDITOR: Daryn Greens review in
PN 88 of Aping Mankind by Raymond
Tallis reminded me of the ancient Greek
philosophers obsession with finding out
what stuff is made of, even though they
didnt have the tools to find out. Democritus secured his place in history by
nailing his name to his atomic theory,
but that was a fluke, a lucky guess. For
knowledge we had to wait until science
and we would all agree) it is impermissible, in fact repulsive, for monsters like
Mengele to do the same to a person?
The problem is that if I choose to
draw my ethical circle with a certain
diameter, uninfluenced by a possible victims capacity to suffer, what answer do I
have for someone who chooses to draw
their circle even smaller around their
race, gender, religion, sexuality, ablebodiedness, inner-city gang membership,
even? As Bentham famously wrote: The
question is not Can they reason? nor Can
they talk? but Can they suffer? He said
that about animals, but it could equally
have been about people with advanced
dementia. Including all humans in our
ethical ambit is logical because we have
shared interests; but including only
humans is not self-evidently correct. It
needs justification based on ethical
principle, not on self-interest, or on mere
solidarity with ones own. Should we
teach our children that causing pain, even
great pain, to others of perceived lesser
value can be acceptable if our group
stands to benefit in other words, that
might is right? If so, where do we draw
the line? And how does this fit into traditional ethical frameworks, under which
might is assuredly not right? Armed with
the developed consciousness which Professor Tallis so champions, one would
hope that humankind can do better, both
ethically and scientifically.
DAVID THOMAS, CHOBHAM, SURREY
Meaningful, Meaningful,
Everything Is Meaningful
DEAR EDITOR: Steven Andersons article,
The Meaning of Meaning (Issue 88),
was excellent. Yet I believe there is even
more to say than Anderson wrote of.
The question is: Is there is an objective meaning to existence which can be
revealed through logical analysis? I occasionally use freedom and happiness as
being synonymous with meaning. So, is
meaning (happiness) a function of logic?
As Kant once said, Happiness is an
ideal, not of reason, but of imagination.
There is no one objectively correct
meaning. Consequently, I must proceed
with relativism. Dr Andersons students
presupposed that meaning must refer to
existence as a whole. The logical conclusion was then that a divine source gives
meaning to the world. But I will use two
characters, David and Jake, to demonstrate a sense of meaning that goes
May/June 2012 G Philosophy Now 37
Letters
beyond this impasse of cold logic.
David is a linguistic philosopher who
feels that meaning is only a concept.
He cannot get past the word. But Daves
friend Jake does not believe that. However, Jakes situation is not good. He
does not have a steady job: hes a downand-out writer who makes some money
by translating novels into English for a
French writer. He doesnt make commitments to women, and is always trying
to find places to live rent-free. He glides
through life in a fantasy world. Hes lazy
yet feels that his lack of discipline and
his neglect of his talents are a real source
of freedom, and hence meaning. However, as Jake loses his bearings, he begins
to see that his life lacks meaning, that is,
authentic happiness. Thus a crack forms
in his armor a crack large enough to
let in a few shafts of light. Jake begins to
see that hes made some bad assumptions about his activities; but he still has
enough insight to disagree with Dave
that meaning is only an idea.
Jakes true freedom is hard won. Here
gaining meaning involves a humbling
knowledge of ourselves. When he finds
this, unlike Dave, Jake absolutely knows
that meaning is more than just a word.
Thus Dr Anderson has not fully
answered to my satisfaction the real
problem with finding meaning; but I feel
that some shafts of light have been
encountered. Meaning evidently
involves both the use of analysis, such as
Dr Anderson employed, and the inner
experience. If we could only fuse the two
aspects, then perhaps goodness and freedom could become twin aspects of
meaning, all moving on the same path.
PATRICIA HERRON, SALEM, OREGON
DEAR EDITOR: I enjoyed Stephen
Andersons discussion of the Meaning
of Meaning in Issue 88. But he appears
to conclude that there are only two possibilities, which are polarised, which is a
bit like saying there are only two possibilities concerning consciousness: materialism or dualism. The polarised views
are that there is either no meaning to
existence, or meaning requires a supreme
being. The problem is that the only purpose this supreme being serves in the
argument is to give us meaning. In other
words, the argument is a bit circular.
However, the fact that the universe
gave birth to life and consciousness,
even if only on one lonely planet, makes
38 Philosophy Now G May/June 2012
???
The following answers to the question of linguistic meaning each win a random book
The human vocal tract can make a wide range of sounds,
which allows us to move beyond the grunts and shrieks of our
primate cousins, at least some of the time. As many as fifty
regions in the human brain are involved in language, controlling the complex movements needed to produce speech, translating vibrations in the air into neural activity in the brain to
hear, and manipulating the symbols that make up the thoughts
and ideas of our minds to reason. These adaptations of the
individual are all necessary for full language use, but language
isnt much use to a solitary individual, and would never have
arisen were we not a social species.
Sounds alone, of course, are not enough to create meaning,
since a non-English speaker wont understand the word cat
although they hear the sound. Language works by attaching a
symbol e.g. cat to the idea of a cat, which itself is produced by
the reality to which it refers (ie, a cat). When language doesnt
work, we can sometimes revert to pointing say, at a cat. But
this also requires shared intentionality, ie, a common recognition that the pointing is about something. This perhaps tells us
something about the origins of language, and how language
works at a very basic level. The small bands of hunter-gatherers who first developed language would have first pointed to
animals and objects in their environment. But given that making physical movements in the line of sight of a predator is
dangerous, its far better to represent that action with a sound
that can be whispered, like Lion!
JON WAINWRIGHT, BY EMAIL
Fish swim, birds fly, and people talk. How do we display this
talent for language? As Noam Chomsky argued, for language to
work, there must be an innate biological linguistic capacity. We
are born with a universal grammar in our brains, which is the
initial condition through which the grammars of specific languages arise, and which allows us to learn particular languages.
This is the prime mover for all language. There are many
other essential components in how language works: phonetics,
morphology, etymology, pragmatics, graphology, lexicography
and semiotics, to name but a few. I will look at what I consider
to be the two most essential elements, philosophically speaking.
Firstly, syntax, which encompasses the structure or form of a language its grammar, rules of language and what generally goes
to make up a well-formed sentence. Sounds not following the
syntactical rules for structuring sentences are not words, for
they follow no pattern which can allow us to derive any significance from them. However, if, as Ludwig Wittgenstein argued,
syntax is simply pure logic logic being the foundation of
meaning in any language and is essential to language, then by
itself syntax is senseless or meaningless (sinnlos). For instance,
saying all bachelors are bachelors doesnt explain anything,
even if it does display logical form (its a tautology). This also
applies to contradictions, which are meaningless.
Syntax defines the structure upon which meaning is built.
the bleeif taht you are the olny mnid and the etnrie uinevsre,
and eevyrhtnig in it is a fgiemnt of yuor iamignitaoin.)
The way we laern lnagugae has been udner dbetae for cneutires. Smoe agrue we hvae an inntae konlwdege of lnagugae
ptaetnrs. One of the key peieces of eivedcne for tihs iade is taht
cihdlern, wehn laenrnig to sepak, use wrods or prhsaes scuh as
I did-ed it as oppsoed to Ive done it. If tehre is no inntae
konewelgde of lnagugae and we laern lnagugae pulyre trhuogh
epxrinece, tihs sguegtss taht tehy hvae haerd lnagugae uesd in
taht way bferoe, wihch celraly isnt ture.
Wtigtnetsien condisread the cnoecpt of a piravte lnagugae: a
lnagugae olny you can udnretsnad. Hwoveer, its esay to ciriticse
taht cnoecpt, as weve arlaedy siad taht for a lnagugae to fnutcoin as a lnauagge, tehre has to be an itnrecaiton bteewen at
laest two poelpe one to tlak, one to lsietn and addtinolaly an
udnretsnaidng. If lnagugae wree to ohtres jsut a sreeis of maeinlgses nioess or lteetrs, cmouminaciton wuold be ipmsoislbe.
ISABEL CULLENS, SANDBACH, CHESHIRE
The basic answer is that language works if the people
engaged are members of the same interpretive community or
network. But it is useful to ask: When does language not work?
Two people using the same language can misunderstand one
another. Indeed, Person A and Person B may not even grasp
the fact they do not fully understand one another. But if it
becomes obvious to them, then A may think that B is using
words (such as God) incorrectly. A may say that B is making a
semantic mistake. A neo-pragmatist linguist influenced by
C.S. Peirce might correct A, and say that B is making a pragmatic mistake. The linguist will argue that every sign requires
both an interpretive community (the interpretant) and an operational definition of the meaning and applicability of that sign
(the representant). Hence, there is a triadic (three-way) relationship between a sign, its semantics (its commonly understood
meaning) and its pragmatics (the ways in which people use the
sign). This triad can then constitute a dialectical progression,
where what was once the interpretant may become the representant, and so forth.
J.I. HANS BAKKER, SEMIOTICSIGNS.COM, CANADA
Language works by virtue of the relationships between it, us,
our minds, and the world. The philosophies of the later
Wittgenstein and of John Searle underpin this idea. We invest
language with meaning by using the various representational
functions of words strung together through the application of
grammar, punctuation and syntax. As for the meaning of representation, it is helpful to borrow from the vocabulary of semiotics, the science of signs. Ferdinand de Saussure, a founder of
semiotics, points out that a signifier, say the word horse, when
used, brings to mind the concept horse the signified. The
horse itself, the thing that can kick you, is the referent.
However, within language there are many occasions when
there is no referent: for instance, with abstract nouns, prepositions, conjunctions and interjections. So with conspicuous,
before, in, and, but, and cheers!, etc, we cannot point to
what the words mean (as we may think we can with a horse in
the world) although we typically do give example of a words
use, as tools with particular functions in the language.
The separation of signifier, signified and referent may be misleading. This is brought out where referents are absent. Take
abstract words such as, contrary and mitigation. There is noth40 Philosophy Now G May/June 2012
??
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Books
it depends, as I said, on the initial move,
which defines moral as that which concerns well-being (and not just human wellbeing, but that of all conscious creatures:
maximizing the well-being of conscious
creatures... [is] the only thing we can reasonably value (p.11)). To say that morality
is exclusively concerned with well-being is
a strong claim, and one which Harris does
not quite pull off.
The Well-Being of the Argument
Harris certainly recognizes that it is an
issue. His argument goes like this:
1) Talk about value makes sense only for
conscious creatures.
2) Well-being is all that we can intelligibly
value.
3) Hence the only sense the concept of
value has, is the well-being of conscious
creatures, and that is what morality should
be concerned with.
He starts by claiming that consciousness
is the only intelligible domain of value. But
he does not so much argue for this proposition as deny its contrary: I invite you to try
to think of a source of value that has absolutely nothing to do with the (actual or
potential) experience of conscious beings.
(p.12) Whatever such a source would be, it
would by definition have no effect on the
experience of any creature, and hence would
be the least interesting thing in the universe.
This first premise is problematic, but the
problems are not fatal for his argument.
Are plants conscious creatures? No? But
adequate sunlight, water and nutrients are
good for plants, and hence could be consid-
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Books
A more problematic passage is: physicians have a moral obligation to handle
medical statistics in ways that minimize
unconscious bias (p.143). How does he
get from the observable fact that minimizing bias has good effects, to saying the we
have a moral obligation to do so? Unless we
radically redefine what we mean by obligation, we are not morally obliged to minimize harm on Harriss view. Instead, we
are merely better advised to do so. Harris
wants to redefine the concept of moral
obligation in terms of probable benefits
and harms, but he does not make the argument for doing so clearly enough.
It is certainly easy to confuse the
notions of Right and Good because both
are used to evaluate, recommend, command or prohibit policies or courses of
action. Despite his best efforts, Harris here
falls into that confusion and strays from
the paradigm in which his argument makes
the most sense the Goodness paradigm.
Even within the Goodness paradigm, he
does not successfully make the move he
wants to make to the value of a concern,
not just for ones own self, or for all
humans, but for conscious beings generally.
It is clear that a thoughtful and intelligent concern for ones own well-being
would lead one to take actions intended to
increase that well-being, and careful observation of what works and what doesnt
would tend to increase ones skill in doing
so. One of the things we observe is that we
do not live in isolation: Our own happiness requires that we extend the circle of
our self-interest to others to family,
friends, and even to perfect strangers
whose pleasures and pains matter to us
(p.57). But what about perfect strangers
whose pleasures and pains do not matter to
us? And what about dolphins, whales,
chimps, elephants, dogs and cats, ants, termites and microbes? (Again, where do we
draw the line about which ones are conscious?) It is not at all clear why, starting
from a moral desire to enhance ones own
well-being, we should move to a concern
for the well-being of conscious creatures
generally. A crucial premise is missing.
The missing premise might be something like an assertion of connectedness
among all beings, such that an injury to
one is in some sense an injury to all. But
Harris does not assert such a premise.
Instead he universalizes the concern for
ones own well-being, presumably because
of the Kantian belief that moral premises
should be consistent and generalizable. But
he does not make that move explicit either.
44 Philosophy Now May/June 2012
The Philosopher
and the Wolf
by Mark Rowlands
HUMANS OFTEN
wonder how other animals think or feel. I
often wonder: do nonhuman animals wonder how humans feel?
For Mark Rowlands, a philosophy professor and author of The Philosopher and the
Wolf, the answer to this question is No.
The Philosopher and the Wolf is a philosophical memoir about a mans life and
what he learned about it by living with a
wolf for over a decade. Ultimately, however, the book is a philosophical reflection
on the human condition. As such, its main
purpose, I think, is to examine how what we
call social intelligence affects how we
think about and engage with the world.
Social intelligence is the characteristic
which allows humans to empathize, and it
is a large part of what makes humans distinctive. It also allows us to live in civilized
societies. Wolves are intelligent; but
according to Rowlands, wolves have
mechanical intelligence, not social intelligence: they know how to do a wide range
Books
Allegory of Time
Governed by
Prudence
Titian, 1565
Reflections of the
Philosopher as a
Young Wolf
A significant part of this
book is about the philosophical and personal
lessons Rowlands learned
from Brenin. Rowlands
also borrows from the
philosophies of Sartre,
Heidegger and Nietzsche,
and philosophical
vignettes are intertwined
throughout the book.
Rowlands makes no
attempt to hide the failings
and unhappiness of his
younger self. Although in
his twenties he appeared
to be a gregarious fellow,
he informs readers that his
socialization with other
humans then was largely
lubricated by alcohol. He
makes perfectly clear that at heart he was a
misanthropic loner. However, during the
drunken haze in which he spent his young
adulthood, Rowlands was not acting
authentically. He was not being true to
himself.
One of the most notable philosophicallyfocused chapters in the book
is called Times Arrow. In
it Rowlands offers a powerful argument as to why
humans struggle to
find happiness. For
starters, he thinks our
notions of happiness
smack of dire
misunderstanding. To
Rowlands,
enjoying specific moments is
the one thing that
can make us happy.
Yet humans naturally
tend to think of life in
terms of a linear progression towards some desirable
goal. This is in order to
help us make sense of our
lives in narrative terms.
However, on this way of
thinking, the moments are
always slipping away. Our
way of understanding time,
then, is a curse which distracts
us from experiencing happiness: The human search for
Greg Linster is a writer and a graduate student studying the branch of applied philosophy
called Economics at the University of Denver.
He blogs at www.coffeetheory.com
The Philosopher & The Wolf: Lessons from the
Wild on Love, Death & Happiness by Mark
Rowlands, Granta, 2008,
256 pages, 8.99 pb,
ISBN 978-1847080592.
Lupus Homini Homo,
or, one mans
best friend
A LICE IN
Films
W ONDERLAND
Films
when she perceives it as harmful. However, a woman has to go beyond that: she
needs to knows why she doesnt like a situation, in order to make the proper decision. Thats discernment at work: it distinguishes and separates. It turns strong but
unclear feelings into crystal clear ideas and
a vivid vision about life. In doing this, Alice
will finally find her true identity and a philosophy to live by. So with the sword Alice
fights the monster. The monster represents everything Alice hates: boundaries,
the rules holding her back, and the
destruction of creativity. Off with your
head! Alice shouts at the final stroke, slicing through the Jabberwockys neck.
The battle now won, Alice is finally
free. To do what? Alice is now free to say
no to conventional roles, and free to
depart on her redirected lifes journey. So
Alice refuses to marry the man arranged
for her. She will instead set out on a new
adventure and start her own business. Creative, unique, sweet, brave and independent, the metamorphosis of Alice is now
complete.
HEATHER RIVERA 2012
allis
T
in
Wonderland
And strangers were as brothers to his clocks
W.H. Auden
allis
T
in
Wonderland
municate more electronically, we seem to
communicate less. This paradox symptomatizes what is happening more generally:
that, as we travel faster and our journeys are
increasingly effortless, so we seem to travel
lighter, indeed to become lighter. We are
attenuated or, as I have described it, ettenuated. The inability fully to experience
our experiences, except when those experiences are unpleasant (hunger, cold, pain,
terror, grief) becomes ever more evident.
Future Continuous
The tyranny of the clock extends to our
future. The calendar on the wall prescribes
what is going to (or ought to) happen. Our
days are mortgaged weeks, months and
years ahead. A phone call on the morning
of November 12th 2010 commits the
afternoon of July 14th 2012. The future
we may not even live to see is populated
with constraining possibilities, with shared
intentions that are mutual obligations.
The newer forms of communication not
only permit an instantaneity of response,
they seem to demand it. Others expect
immediate or continuous availability, and
we expect this of others. We are electronically skewered by emails, texts, cellphone
calls. Our lives are co-ordinated, shaped,
even filled, by the heavens not by the
stars, but by orbiting satellites. As we com-
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A is for Assumption
Joel Marks on why the world needs philosophy.
& other
ETHICAL EPISODES
May/June 2012