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Third argument against armchair philosophy and intuition as its method: this
argument derives from the above mentioned critique. The objection is that
intuitions are untestable or insufficiently testable as sources of armchair
philosophy. They do not possess the status of scientific observations. if
they are untesable how could they have/gain any epistemic standing
(position).
There two ideas on how beliefs are structured: 1. the foundationalist idea is
that one belief supports the other in an asymmetry (one-sided) support.
2. The coherentist idea is that there is mutual support among the beliefs,
i.e. each belief gets all its epistemic justification from its own place in the
structure. But Sosa thinks this mutual or multilateral cannot go (continue)
for ever, i.e. there must be something else other than beliefs. Here he
presupposes perception and introspection. Because they are not based on
other beliefs, in other words, they do not need to be based on justification
or unjustification.
The relation between belief and experience: 1. B(p) gets its justification from
being based on E(p)-experiential state-. This is for perceptual justification:
i.e. relation between Subject and something Perceptible. 2. Introspective
justification works in a different way: E (an ache suffered by S) might itself
amount or come to the fact the p (S ached in a certain way).
Sosa criticizes it on the ground that in neither cases the subitizing limits of
the subjects are taken into account. Only through subitizing based on
concurrence (reason-involving) one can form certain
perceptual/introspective beliefs which are thereby justifiable.
Then Sosa questions: how does one gain access to facts in basic
arithmetic and geometry and logic? Does visual sensory experience have
any role? Sosas answer is No. According to him the simplest beliefs of
math and logic have no discernable (distinguishable) basis, the only basis
they have in ones inclination or attraction to assent (to approve). Hence
Sosa concludes: So we lead to a conception of intuition as inclination and
attraction to show our approving intuition are nothing but a sheer
understanding of the questions any assenting or approving requires
(needs, asks for) understanding, and understanding requires concepts.
Henceforth intuitions are conceptual (i.e. properly influenced by reason).
Does this conceptual definition of intuitions lead to the facts that all
intuitions are rationally justifiable? In other words, what is that which
distinct justifiable from unjustifiable intuitive seemings (intuitions)? Sosa
answers this way: Rational intuition may enable us to distinguish the true
from the false in the related abstract subject matter, they show an
epistemic competence, a rational ability to distinguish the true from the the
false.
But Sosa still believes early astronomy was helpful in enabling the
development of the science, so intuition based philosophy also can be
helpful in developing philosophy and its methodology.
What is the real problem for intuition? 1. The disagreement between experts
and street-corner respondent (ordinary people). 2. The disagreement
among professional or expert philosophers. This disagreement not only
concerns one component (part) of armchair methodology, but it also
concerns the most complete and carefully conducted methodology in the
field: i.e. intuition, inference (conclusion), dialectical discussion. The
disagreement originates from the fact that there is nothing accepted as
In the last part of the paper Sosa agrees that the experimentalist critiques
uncover unhealthy parts of intuitive responses.