A Critique of "Humanism" (and Raya Dunayevskaya's "Marxist Humanism")

From 'The Study of Scientific Communism' No.14 Jan, 1966

Written
by
Translated by Roy West

Hiroyoshi

Hayashi

Contents
I.

The Birth of Humanism

II.

18th Century French Humanism

III.

[Humanism] and Marx

IV.

Critique of Humanism

I. The Birth of Humanism

Seven or eight years ago, in the period prior to the so-called Anpo struggle (the movement
against the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty), the New Left appeared as subjectivists
(shutaiseishugisha), politically this was represented by a radical position, and the struggle
carried out against Anpo was dependent on students. Subsequently the New Left
dissolved, broadly speaking, into two trends: radical political sects dependent on students,
and economist groups tailing the natural growth of the workers movement. The former of
these two trends (Revolutionary Communist League-Kakukyodo) defends humanism
(ningenshugi). Just as they explained Marxism in a subjective (shutaiseironteki) and
existential manner, now they are attempting to confuse Marxism with humanism, and
explain Marxism in a humanistic fashion. This is exactly what we must now attempt to
criticize. We must elucidate the essence and limitations of humanism, reveal how it is
ultimately an ideology of bourgeois society, and carry out a firm criticism of the New Left's
glorification of humanism in the name of Marxism, and the attempt to replace Marxism
with humanism.
The concept of humanism is something which arose in the consciousness of humanity
along with the Renaissance. The Renaissance itself was a product of bourgeois
development. The cities around Florence were the area in which the Renaissance
flourished. One reason the Renaissance developed here this was the direct succession of
the traditions of classic Greek and Roman civilization. Another reason was that following
the Crusades this area had begun to trade with countries to the east and commercial
capitalism had developed more rapidly than other countries, therefore the modern
bourgeois class had already developed and the feudal aristocratic class had been
overpowered.

What concerned the burgher class living in the bourgeois-like Italian city states were
secular and worldy things, not a divine afterworld. They hoped to replace the theological
and scholastic education of the middle ages with a liberated education, and searched for
this within Roman culture. Here they discovered things which were worldly and affirmed
the value of nature rather than that which is God-centered and denies humanity. With this
spirit as their base, modern people for the first time acquired a conscious awareness of
humanity and individuality.
Renaissance humanism repudiated transcendentalism which was the basis of feudalistic
thought. The feudal system and its theological thought had become a fetter to the
development and creative power of human beings. Humanism envisaged a free
autonomous individual-harmony between exterior and interior instead of conflict, an end to
the split between society and individual as well as the individual's internal split, and the full
cultivation of all aspects of human ability rather than a one dimensionality. It stressed the
necessity of cultivating both humanistic learning and art, and didn't hesitate to struggle for
human and social relations that would be suitable to this humanity. Humanism pursued
humanity, the human ideal, and the form of what the human being should be. The
prototype for this was found in the cultured person in ancient Greece.
The influence of Renaissance humanism grew stronger in Europe and throughout the
whole world as capitalism grew increasingly stronger and became dominant. Humanism
provided the burgher class with a tremendous weapon in their struggle against medieval
elements. (The analysis of the concept of humanism will be left for a later section where
we will evaluate the limits and significance of renaissance humanism.) Since that time the
spirit of the Renaissance has become universalized in European thought and has come to
fruition. The Renaissance is significant in that it repudiated medieval theology and
irrational mysticism, while championing secular rationality. Marxism was formed in this
space thoroughly transformed by the modern spirit. On the one hand, the greatest
weakness of this humanism was the abstract defense of humanity. This weakness
pertains to the essence of all humanism. The Renaissance rejected the medieval system
and its ideology (theology and scholasticism) which restrained and suppressed humanity,
and championed human nature. This human nature itself comes from the classic spirit.
However, human nature according to the classical spirit is vague. In the classical age,
human nature could be viewed either as something natural and unchanging, or something
cultivated. The bourgeoisie fought to introduce the idea of a natural man as one means of
struggle against the darkness of the middle ages where God reigned above man as a
transcendental force ruling human beings. This can be seen in Rousseau. The idea that
human nature can only be achieved through cultivation turned into bourgeois aristocraticlike cultivation, and can be found in its most thorough form in the rationalism of the French
enlightenment. The limits of renaissance humanism are the limits of humanism in general,
and thus the limits of bourgeois ideology in general.
II. 18th Century French Humanism
The spirit of the development of individualism and liberation of human nature, which
began in the Renaissance, reached a period of full bloom in the 18th century. This was the
age of the French Enlightenment. The source of this movement was the economic

philosophy and democratic political theory represented by John Locke, and others,
coming from England, which had more rapidly achieved bourgeois development. This
emerged as a completely revolutionary thought, and its impact spread to the thought of
the European continent which was still under the old system. The basis of this stance was
to uphold reason against every type of authority and superstition. In France, inevitably,
this movement opposed the authority of the Church, and then developed further into a
struggle against the rule of absolutism. In this movement, there was a distrust of the noble
and priestly classes, and a struggle against religious superstition, as well as a
philosophical movement of atheism and materialism. This was an attempt, with the newly
emergent bourgeois class and the rapidly developing natural science as the backbone, to
destroy a variety of old religious prejudice and conventions, throw the light of the rational
intellect on the darkness of the old society's irrational delusions, and liberate humanity
from its unenlightened state to build a bright society. The slogans of this struggle were
"nature", "reason" and "felicity". In place of the felicity of heaven, they sought happiness
on earth based on their confidence in humanity and the triumph of science. Today, only
Marxism has inherited and superseded the deep-rooted dream of the French materialiststhat is, the dream of a new century of new human beings bound by interconnected
relations in which all illusions would be tossed aside, and actions would be judged, and
nature and society managed, through the exercise of reason based on deep scientific
knowledge and insight.
Marx highly esteemed French materialism, and recognized its profound relation with the
socialist and communist movement. On Condillac: "he expounded Locke's ideas and
proved that not only the soul, but the senses too, not only the art of creating ideas, but
also the art of sensuous perception, are matters of experience and habit. The whole
development of man therefore depends on education and external circumstances." (The
Holy Family, Marx/Engels Coll. Works Vol. 4., p.129). On Helvetius: He "conceived it
[materialism] immediately in its application to social life. The sensory qualities and selflove, enjoyment and correctly understood personal interest are the basis of all morality.
The natural equality of human intelligences, the unity of progress of reason and progress
of industry, the natural goodness of man, and the omnipotence of education, are the main
features in his system." (Ibid.,p.130) After discussing the thought of Condillac and
Hevetius in The Holy Family, Marx gave the following summary of French materialism:
"Just as Cartesian materialism passes into natural science proper, the other trend of
French materialism leads directly to socialism and communism.
There is no need for any great penetration to see from the teaching of materialism on the
original goodness and equal intellectual endowment of men, the omnipotence of
experience, habit and education, and the influence of environment on man, the great
significance of industry, the justification of enjoyment, etc., how necessarily materialism is
connected with communism and socialism. If man draws all his knowledge, sensation,
etc., from the world of the senses and the experience gained in it, then what has to be
done is to arrange the empirical world in such a way that man experiences and becomes
accustomed to what is truly human in it and that he becomes aware of himself as man. If
correctly understood interest is the principle of all morality, man's private interest must be
made to coincide with the interest of humanity. If man is unfree in the materialistic sense,

i.e., is free not through the negative power to avoid this or that, but through the positive
power to assert his true individuality, crime must not be punished in the individual, but the
anti-social sources of crime must be destroyed, and each man must be given social scope
for the vital manifestation of his being. If man is shaped by environment, his environment
must be made human. If man is social by nature, he will develop his true nature only in
society, and the power of his nature must be measured not by the power of the separate
individual but by the power of society. (Ibid., pp. 130-31)
Eighteenth century French enlightenment, and consequently the French Revolution,
loudly proclaimed the remaking of society in accordance to human reason, because they
grasped the essence of man as reason. However, the French Revolution exposed the
limits of this thought. The French Revolution which was to usher an ideal society based on
human reason, gave birth to bourgeois society governed by the rational of money. The
defect in the ideology of the French Enlightenment is clear, and this precisely represents
the defect of humanism. The Enlightenment was tinged with natural-scientific materialism.
Their goal was to spread knowledge and deepen rationalism, and their means were not
the revolutionizing of society, but education. They were lacking social science and the
materialist conception of history-in other words, their materialism stopped at the stage of
natural-scientific materialism, and lacked a materialistic understanding of man and human
society. To borrow an expression from Marx it "disliked human beings". The attempt to
thoroughly apply human nature was limited to the field of natural science, while the field of
social science fell into idealism and an abstract rationalism. Education thus took
precedence over revolutionizing society, and the goal became merely the diffusion of
knowledge and rationalistic ways of thinking. Therefore, it is natural that in response to the
Enlightenment becoming idealistic and undialectical, Marx would have to stress praxis, in
other words, production and industry (refer to Marx's criticism of Feuerbach). The French
Enlightenment is clearly one type of humanism, and in the following part we will examine
this humanism and the similar humanism of Feuerbach, and Marx's critical assimilation of
them. Marxism is definitely not thought for the sake of dispersing knowledge. Marxism,
more than any other thought, consistently and firmly has sought the realization and
spread of scientific and rational ways of thinking. However, for Marxism this achievement
is dependent upon social revolution. Marxism places the priority, not on the business of
education, but on the revolutionary change of this bourgeois society in which people are
cut off from thoroughly rational scientific thinking. The period of the revolutionary
movement will at the same time be the period of the victory of scientific thought. Marxism
stands on the brilliant legacy of the Enlightenment, and fights against all delusions, but we
should never forget that Marxism is definitely not the same thing as the Enlightenment.
Marxism's insistence on praxis was greatly opposed to the tradition and lineage of the
French Enlightenment which posited reason as the very first principle of human nature.
Certainly, instead of spirit and ideas, Marxism gave first consideration to self-movement
and developing matter, and therefore gave precedence to practice over theory. However,
this certainly does not mean that Marxism is purely activism or vulgar practical thought or
philosophy. Marxism regards practice rather than theory as the primary consideration, but
at the same time firmly insists that this practice should be guided by science and reason,
in other words by purposeful consciousness. This is precisely what sets Marxism apart

from all bourgeois or fascistic ideas of practice, such as: religious philosophy, 'value'
philosophy (neo-Kantism and sokagakkai), philosophy of action and life, existentialism,
pragmatism, and so on. Those philosophers who say that theory lacking practice is empty,
and practice without theory is blind are correct (New Leftists: pay attention to this!).
Marxism is the map, the compass and the rudder to guide the revolutionary practice of the
working class. It is not through theories of subjectivity, humanism, or religious passionbasically subjectivist theories-but through scientific purposeful consciousness that this
practice will be supported for the first time, and become a truly strong, indomitable and
durable thing.
The New Leftists, radicals, and trade unionists who understand Marxism as a purely
practical philosophy are fundamentally wrong. The philosopher Kan'ichi Kuroda has made
great efforts to replace Marxism with a philosophy of praxis. However, the distance
between Marxism and praxical philosophy-the term itself is completely without content-is
far and away greater than the distance separating praxical philosophy, fascist philosophy
and religious philosophy. In fact, praxical philosophy (i.e. the theory of subjectivity or
humanism) essentially stands on the same foundation as bourgeois or fascistic
philosophy. They don't understand the question of practice in the same way as the Marxist
meaning. They emphasize that Marxism places practice as the first principle. However,
they don't even see that Marxism also demands that this practice be based on science
and knowledge. They don't believe that it is a condition of decisive importance for the
success and victory of the revolutionary practice of the working class that this practice be
backed up and founded on Marxism-the only comprehensive social science. In What Is To
Be Done? Lenin writes, "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary
movement. This idea cannot be insisted upon too strongly at a time when the fashionable
preaching of opportunism go hand in hand with an infatuation for the narrowest forms of
practical activity." Lenin insists that even the slightest belittlement of Marxist theory means
to draw close to bourgeois thought, because there is no middle course.
Returning to our original subject, the 18th century French Enlightenment grew as a
struggle against the unenlightened state of the people caused by the feudalistic state
power and the religious spirit connected to it. This represented the rational, critical and
revolutionary spirit which struggled against the savage rule of absolutism and the
accompanying rule of irrational thought in general. However, in regards to human history
and society, the reason of the French Revolution stopped at a form that was completely
abstract and lacking in content. The French Revolution held up the slogans freedom and
equality, but as bourgeois society develops, equality becomes merely equality as a
commodity owner, and is soon transformed into the "equality" of capital and labor;
freedom becomes the freedom of profitable activity, and before long is transformed into
the freedom of capital's despotism. In this sense, the French Revolution, which was
supposed to have marked the beginning of the victory and rule of reason, was a
miscarriage. As a consequence, a kind of reaction occurred in which pessimism and
nihilism arose against the idea of natural reason and the human nature founded upon it.
With Schopenauer, Kierkegaard, and Nietzche, and even lower in the age of monopoly
capitalism with Bergson, Existentialism, philosophy of 'value' as well as Freud, the world
and human beings were grasped as irrational things. They insisted that man was definitely

not a rational animal, and expressed a distrust in human nature. This reaction came from
a disappointment in the French Enlightenment's view of human beings as rational
animals. It is not necessary to say what an enormous influence philosophers such as
Schopenhauer had on the irrational, reactionary and semi-fascistic philosophy of the age
of monopoly capital.
Marxism sublimated the French Enlightenment. However, their view that the human being
is a rational animal is expressed inside Marxism in a higher form. The French Revolution
clarified that the construction of an ideal society is a not a problem that is solved through
the demands of human reason. This human reason was understood in precisely a
humanistic way in regards to social problems. Since the French Revolution it has been
brought to consciousness that the appropriate society for human beings cannot be
anticipated only through a deduction from humanistic science. Rather, this appropriate
society must be discovered within the necessary development of the actual socioeconomic system. One person from this period was the positivist Comte, who thought the
essence of society and history-like mathematics, physics, etc.-was something which
required demonstration through mental science, and attempted to construct this science
(sociology) which was to hold the highest rank of all sciences. On the other hand, the
study of history developed, as did economics as the bourgeoisie's self-cognition of their
own society. Going beyond human subjectivity (or what could also be called the reason of
the Enlightened), the awareness emerged of history and society as an objective
existence. After the French Revolution, nihilistic philosophy was gripped by a disbelief in
man as a rational animal, and wandered in a useless and reactionary direction, while
Marxism advanced through the critical assimilation of the developing historical and social
sciences. For Marxism, society and history should not merely be demonstrated through
the exercise of reason, but rather must be understood materialistically as the reciprocal
relationship between productive power and production relations. Marxism elucidated that
communist society is not merely something based on human reason, but is something
which is formed and which must be created within this inevitable process of history.
Marxism does not explain history and society from the standpoint of a human essence,
but rather explains it objectively as the development and reciprocal relationship between
humans and nature and humans themselves.
In the next section we will look at how Marxist thought was formed, and how Marxism
critically sublated humanism.
III. [Humanism] and Marx
Dunayevskaya interprets Marxism as being first and foremost humanism. Her basis for
this rests on two or three works written by Marx in the period before he had overcome
Hegelian philosophy and arrived at the materialist conception of history (The Holy Family,
Economic Philosophical Manuscripts, etc.). She declares that the most serious problem
which "anti-imperialist anti-Stalinist" revolutionary Marxism is faced with today is
philosophy. Therefore, we are going to find out more about the nature of her philosophy.
She holds up Hegel's Absolutes, in other words human freedom, as well as the struggle
for spirit and the total human being, as the fundamental ideas of her humanism.

In the process of his intellectual development from German idealistic liberalism to

communism and materialism, Marx certainly did for a period of time advocate a "real
humanism=naturalism" under the influence of Feuerbach. However, Marx emphasis on
humanism was intended to establish a critical standpoint from which he could oppose the
neglect of real human beings by German Idealism, on the one hand, and the "dislike of
human beings" into which previous materialism had fallen, on the other hand. This sort of
idealism and materialism grasped human beings as an abstract thing, and were both very
much 18th century-like approaches. Marx, using Feuerbach as a temporary lever, began
to overcome these 18th century limitations. Even though the expressions of Marx's
humanism=naturalism sound very Feuerbach-like, this is the direct bridge to the
materialist conception of history. This is clear to any one who reads the Economic
Philosophical Manuscripts. Even during the time of Marx's humanism, already this
definitely did not mean the abstract humanism of German Idealism, the Feuerbach-like
anthropological materialism, or a biological humanism. Rather, this meant a concrete and
real human being as a social and unique existence. Thus, the establishment of the
materialist conception of history is at the same time necessarily the criticism of German
Idealism (obviously), Feuerbach, as well as True Socialism.
Next, we will look at how Marx criticized German idealistic liberalism and biological
humanism, and how he overcame these types of humanism to establish the foundation of
Marxism.
Dunayevskaya is very fond of, and glorifies, Hegel's Absolutes. She chooses to praise this
concept based on her interpretation of the present time as a transformational period from
"absolute despotism to absolute freedom". She locates the meaning of Hegel in his
recognition of the Absolute, for example absolute freedom.
However, for Marx and Engels the problem was exactly the opposite. In Hegel's method,
everything was understood as a constant process of creation and extinction, and a
limitless rising process from lower to higher forms. Even though Hegel employed this
method in an idealistic way, it became possible to paint a systematic and total picture of
human history. Hegel's system was this kind of revolutionary thing, but on the other hand,
his system was also conservative. First of all, for example, the system of totality became
the process whereby his so-called "absolute spirit" is externalized and becomes nature,
and then in spirit, in other words, in thought and history, it once again returns to itself. The
absolute spirit became the metaphysical thing which he had denied. Hegel's system
became absolutized and proclaimed that history had ended. His philosophy which had
refused all dogmas and fixed notion, was itself turned into a dogma. Secondly, Hegel
emphasized dialectics, but this was above all the self-movement of the Spirit, and the selfdevelopment of categories. Marx and Engels judged these to be the defects and
conservative side of Hegel. However, Dunayevskaya, in sharp contrast, seems to think
that the metaphysical, idealistic and absolutist side of Hegel should not be rejected, but
glorified.
Marx also carried out a struggle against German idealistic liberalism with his criticism of
Bauer. Bauer took up the question of Jewish emancipation as a purely religious problem,
and argued that the German Christian feudalistic state could not liberate the Jews in the

essential sense, and that the Jews also essentially could not be freed. For this liberation,
it was first necessary that this religious opposition be abandoned. In other words, in order
for the Jews to be liberated as human beings, they must first be freed from religion. While
posing the problem of political liberation (read: bourgeois liberation from feudalistic
relations), Bauer, on the other hand, raises the question of the Jews ultimate liberation,
their human emancipation (read: communist liberation from bourgeois society). In this
way, he confounds and confuses bourgeois liberation and communist liberation, and thus
offers an incorrect solution. Marx, by contrast, studied the difference between political
liberation and human liberation, and examined various categories such as the Jewish
problem, state, religion, private property, human rights, and freedom. Marx writes,
"Therefore we do not say to the Jews as Bauer does: You cannot be emancipated
politically without emancipating yourselves radically from Judaism. On the contrary, we tell
them: Because you can be emancipated politically without renouncing Judaism
completely and incontrovertibly, political emancipation itself is not human emancipation. If
you Jews want to be emancipated politically without emancipating yourselves humanly,
the half-hearted approach and contradiction is not in you alone, it is inherent in the nature
and category of political emancipation." (On the Jewish Question; Marx Engels Collected
Works Vol. 3, p. 160)
In response to Bauer who argues that the Jews can receive the rights as the citizens, but
not the rights of man, Marx shows that the rights of the citizen and the rights of man are
the same, and that liberty "is the right to do everything that harms no one else." (ibid. p.
162) and "The right of man to private property is, therefore, the right to enjoy one's
property and to dispose of it at one's discretion (a son gre), without regard to other men,
independently of society, the right of self-interest. This individual liberty and its application
form the basis of civil society." (ibid. p. 163)
We will just simply mention the fact that Marx was able to grasp the essence of human
rights, private property, civil society, religion and the state through the analysis of some
declarations of the rights of man, before turning our attention to the question of how Marx
understood the problem of freedom which Dunayevskaya raises. Unlike Bauer who
generally brandishes "edifying words" such as "freedom", "recognition of free humanity"
and "special privilege", Marx shows that the emergence of a social consciousness of
liberty is inseparably linked to the birth of bourgeois society.
"Liberty, therefore, is the right to do everything that harms no one else. The limits within
which anyone can act without harming someone else are defined by law, just as the
boundary between two fields is determined by a boundary post. It is a question of the
liberty of man as an isolated monad, withdrawn into himself." (Ibid. p. 162)
Marx further writes:
"Recognition of free humanity? 'Free humanity', recognition of which the Jews did not
merely think they wanted, but really did want, is the same 'free humanity' which found
classic recognition in the so-called universal rights of man. Herr Bauer himself explicitly
treated the Jews' efforts for recognition of their free humanity as their efforts to obtain the
universal rights of man.

In the Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbucher it was demonstrated to Herr Bauer that this 'free
humanity' and the 'recognition' of it are nothing but the recognition of the egoistic civil
individual and of the unrestrained movement of the spiritual and material elements which
are the content of his life situation, the content of present-day civil life; that the rights of
man do not, therefore, free man from property, but procure for him freedom of property;
that they do not free him from the filth of gain, but rather give him freedom of gainful
occupation.
It was shown that the recognition of the rights of man by the modern state has no other
meaning that the recognition of slavery by the state of antiquity had. In other words, just
as the ancient state had slavery as its natural basis, the modern state has as its natural
basis civil society and the man of civil society, i.e., the independent man linked with other
men only by the ties of private interest and unconscious natural necessity, the slave of
labour for gain and of his own as well as other men's selfish need. The modern state has
recognized this its natural basis as such in the universal rights of man." (The Holy Family,
Marx Engels Collected Works Vol. 4. p. 113)
This is the way Marx analyzed the concept of freedom in modern civil society. He shows
that this concept is historical, inseparably related to the generation of civil society, and is
the direct intellectual expression of selfishness and greed for personal profit. Freedom,
which humanists abstract and glorify, is a reflection of the independent individual
bourgeois activity within bourgeois society. Marxism without denying freedom in general,
insists that this word emerged from fixed historical and societal conditions, and is a
reflection of these conditions. This word should not be absolutized in the manner of
Dunayevskaya, nor should it be considered the fundamental principle guiding the struggle
for socialism. To abstract and glorify thought that reflects life in bourgeois society, and
then declare that it should be the guiding idea of the socialist movement is nothing but idle
talk, nonsense, and reactionary confusion, and is no different than the Communist Party's
idea of a "new" democratic revolution.
Marx presented the classic criticism of so-called "liberals" (i.e. German Liberalism since
Kant) in The German Ideology.
Marx writes: "The conditions in Germany at the end of the past century are perfectly
reflected in Kant's critique of practical reason. Whereas the French bourgeoisie leaped to
power through a historically unprecedented revolution and then conquered the European
continent, and the already politically emancipated English bourgeoisie revolutionized
industry, and subordinated India politically and the whole world commercially, the
powerless German burghers were only left with 'good intentions'." (translated from
Japanese) In the miserable, backward conditions of Germany, the bourgeois slogans of
the French bourgeoisie were turned into an a priori abstract demand of "practical reason".
"French liberalism based on real class interests can be found in Germany in a special
form in the philosophy of Kant. He and the German citizens he represented, did not
realize that the theoretical ideas of the bourgeoisie were based on intentions limited and
determined by the material relations of interest and production. Thus, Kant separated
every theoretical expression from the relations of interest it expressed, and turned the
various determinations of the material motives of the French bourgeoisie into the pure self

expression of "free will", will as itself or for itself, and human will. In this way, this will was
turned into a pure ideological conceptual definition or moralistic request. For this reason,
the German petty bourgeoisie hesitated in the face of the fearful politics and shameless
profit making that appeared in relation to the energetic practice of bourgeois liberalism.
Marx uncovers the mysteries of German liberalism and "rationalistic" philosophy in the
following way:
"Through the July Revolution the political forms corresponding to the developed
bourgeoisie pushed against German from the outside. However, since Germany's
economic relations had not yet reached the developmental stage to correspond to these
political forms, the burghers inherited these forms as abstract ideas, an sich or fur sich
principles, pious words and wishes, or Kant's so-called will and human self definition.
Thus their manner was much more ethical and disinterested than other countries." "Every
type of liberal cliche was nothing but an idealistic expression of the real interests of the
bourgeoisie." (translated from the Japanese)
This is the manner in which Marx elucidated the mysteries of German liberal and idealist
philosophy. Whereas Dunayevskaya depends on German idealist liberals, and champions
their abstract freedom, for Marx this was only the conceptualization and mystification of
French bourgeois reality and bourgeois liberalism. Dunayevskaya makes use of the name
Marxism, but her fundamental standpoint does not advance one step beyond German
idealist liberalism.
In all of her works, Dunayevskaya calls for socialism and the sublation of capitalism in the
name of absolute freedom and "humanism". However, on this point as well, there is a
sharp contrast between Marxism and Dunayevskaya. Marxism calls upon the working
class to fight for socialism (communism), not for "absolute freedom" or "humanism".
Marxism calls for a struggle for socialism because it is necessary, inescapable, and
because human liberation demands that the bourgeois limitations be overcome. Socialism
is the logical outcome of the objective position of the working class and the conditions
created by capitalism. Marxism is based on historical and societal necessity (historicoscientific consciousness), not upon some sort of abstract morality or a spirit of absolute
freedom. Marxism poses the question of the ultimate liberation of mankind. The
consciousness of human liberation was raised by the struggle of the power of civil society
against feudalistic power. However, civil society stopped with the political liberation of
humankind. It didn't bring about the social liberation of humankind. Marxism employs the
words "human liberation" in the sense of the social liberation of humankind which can only
be achieved with the revolutionary change of the actual socio-historical conditions, and
does not depend upon any sort of morality. Marxism is not based on an awareness of
morality, universal reason, or what Dunayevksaya calls absolute freedom. The search for
socialism through reason, justice or "humanism" is the position of utopian socialism, not
Marxism. These apostles of metaphysics start out from a theory of "human nature" as
eternal and unchanging; a completed social system would have to be one which
corresponds to this unchanging "human nature". This is why Marx and Engels called them
utopian socialists. In a later period, Duhring lectured about socialism in the name of
justice and reason. The socialism of the Neo-Kantians, who were deeply connected with

the traitors of the Second International, was an ethical socialism, and is identical to that of
present day democratic socialists. The humanism of Sokagakukai (a religious-political
group in Japan) is extremely close to that of Dunayevskaya. There is also a close internal
relationship between Dunayevskaya and the morality of anarchism. When these pseudosocialists (in truth simply humanists) see social contradictions and the oppression of
workers, they are outraged that this goes against justice, morality, and "humanism", and
with these concepts they seek socialism. They haven't given the slightest thought to the
fact that the ideology they wave about is nothing but an abstract, sublimated form of an
ideology which reflects the activity of bourgeois society. They call this liberalism,
humanism or individualism. It is evident that Dunayevskaya's standpoint is essentially the
same as all of this pseudo-socialist rabble. This essence is identical to that of German
idealism, and metaphysical liberalism.
(2) Next, let's look at Marx's criticism of Feuerbach. Feuerbach is one model of
humanism. He attacked religion and speculation, and held up man. He argued that
religion externalized the essence of man, and he explained religion from the essence of
man, reversing the previous relationship between religion and man. He proposed a
human centered philosophy in which man is the fundamental principle. He raised the
question of human relations, but didn't go beyond simply stressing human universality-for
example, relations are formed through love. He didn't pose the question in terms of social
relationships. In the end, his humanism was a humanistic materialism in which man was
dissolved into nature. What he called the human being was the same abstract thing as it
was for 18th century materialists.
How did Marx criticize Feuerbach? His criticism of Feuerbach in The German Ideology is
the same as it was during the establishment of the materialist view of history. In DeutschFranzosische Jahrbucher, The Holy Family, as well as The Economic Philosophical
Manuscripts he gave "burning praise" for Feuerbach. The criticism of Hegel and idealism
thoroughly carried out by Feuerbach extinguished "the divine struggles of the dialectics of
concepts only known by philosophers." (translated from the Japanese)
Marx thought that it was necessary to critically overcome Feuerbach because he saw that
with the dissolution of the Hegelian School, a sentimental humanistic socialism based on
Feuerbach's philosophy (true socialism) was spreading like an epidemic throughout
Germany. True Socialism occupied itself with "idle speculation concerning realization of
the human essence" (Communist Manifesto) and based on "humanism" criticized French
socialism and communism.
The fact that Marx's "real humanism-naturalism" is different than the humanism of
Feuerbach should be clear if one reads through the Economic Philosophical Manuscripts.
In this work, human beings are considered, not only in a humanistic way, but as a social
entity, and he already carried out a sharp critical analysis of "national economics"
(classical school of economics). According to this critical analysis, human beings are
"alienated" by bourgeois relations of production. Communism as naturalism and
humanism, is the sublimation of this "human self-estrangement" and the "genuine
resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man-the true
resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectivication and self-

confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species."
(Marx Engels Collected Works Vol. 3). The criticism of Feuerbach was necessary for
Marx, and Marxism cannot be regarded as simply Feuerbach's humanism and naturalism.
Nevertheless, the thought expressed in the Economic Philosophical Manuscripts, and
other places, is still essentially Feuerbach-like. Marx's own position was a human
centered one, and the problem of human liberation was handled in an abstract manner,
rather than historically. The question of proletariat revolution was also considered as the
realization of humanism. He abstractly said that the actual possibility of liberation in
Germany depends on the proclamation of Man as the highest existence. This is precisely
a humanistic view. He saw communism as simply the road or means of completing
humanism. He placed the principle of humanism above communism. He still didn't refer to
himself as a communist or a practical materialist, but rather as natural humanist. It is clear
that he started from humanism, but on the other hand, even before The German Ideology
he distinguished between "political emancipation" (bourgeois emancipation) and human
emancipation. From this standpoint he criticized bourgeois democracy, liberalism and the
limits of bourgeois revolution, exposed the bourgeois essence of classical economics, and
stressed that bourgeois society was an inverted society and religion was a reflection of
this topsy-turvy society. Marx started from humanism and used it to idealistically oppose
bourgeois society, even though humanism is an idea from bourgeois society. This is
because before Marxism there was not total system of thought with which to oppose
bourgeois society.
As Marx and Engels pointed out, Feuerbach does not know any "human relations" outside
of love and friendship. Moreover, he abstractly glorifies these two things. Marx, by
contrast, considers the social relations of human beings. Marx thought that social relations
were more important than the natural relation of love between blood relations and family.
Prior to The German Ideology, Marx dealt with human social relations in a humanistic
manner, rather than from the standpoint of a materialistic view of history. For this reason,
many liberals and existentialists deal with the works from this stage of Marxism, and
declare their own position to be identical. However, dealing with human social relations
humanistically involves a contradiction: social relations themselves are historical. Thus,
with the end of the humanistic criticism of human social relations, comes the appearance
of real Marxism in which human social relations are criticized historically. Socialism and
Communism no longer look to moralism and human nature or humanism as tools, but
rather are proven to be historical inevitable. The concept of society first appeared with the
beginning modern civil society. In Ancient Greece there was the word polis, but this had
the meaning of city state, and was not the same concept as modern society. In the middle
ages there was no such concept. The concept "society" appeared as a concept which
couldn't be separated from bourgeois society. However, civil society couldn't capture the
essence or foundation of human society. Like Rousseau, the formation of society was
looked for in a contract. The concept "society" emerged along with bourgeois society. This
is because in this society with the break up and sublation of the dispersed and narrow
self-sufficient production of the middle ages, each person came to occupy a space within
the social division of labor in commodity production and labor which had developed. As
Marx wrote to Feuerbach, "In these writings you have provided-I don't know whether

intentionally-a philosophical basis for socialism and the Communists have immediately
understood them in this way. The unity of man with man, which is based on the real
differences between men, the concept of the human species brought down from the
heaven of abstraction to the real earth, what is this but the concept of society!"
(Marx/Engels Collected Works Vol. 3)
However, Feuerbach didn't understand humanism in the same sense that Marx did. Marx
grasped the real human being from the beginning as a social human being or existence,
and envisaged a recovery or return to a man's true humanity. Marx had yet to grasp the
problem historically. Man is essentially a social essence, but becomes individualistic and
selfish under bourgeois society. Thus, at this stage in his thought, Marx pursued the
revolutionary praxis to overturn this bourgeois society in the name of humanism. The
concept of society itself is the product of modern bourgeois society. If we think about how
the wide social relations between people first emerged with bourgeois commodity
production, Marx's criticism is humanistic, one-sided, and un-historical. At the same time,
Marx was revolutionary and critical in the sense that he didn't grasp bourgeois society as
the true society, and saw that in the end this would fall into individualism, egoism, and
liberalism. Unlike Feuerbach, Marx's humanism was part of the move towards the
materialist conception of history and scientific communism. Herein lies the difference
between Marx's humanism and that of Feuerbach. Today only within socialism and the
revolutionary movement of the proletariat has the modern consciousness of Man as a
social existence been sublated. At its core, this movement is opposed to bourgeois
individualism and liberalism. For Marx, moreover, human beings as a social existence or
as a life species are dependent upon labor and productive activity; and production cannot
be understood as the activity of the individual grasped independently, but rather as being
essentially a social process with labor with the development of labor forming the base of
human progress. Marx was indeed standing at the threshold of the materialist conception
of history.
The fundamental trait of Feuerbach's humanism was its biological or naturalistic view of
human beings. In the same manner as the French materialists, he viewed human beings
as the product of circumstances and education, and human thought as the reflection of
nature. According to Marx's criticism, he grasped human beings only "in the form of the
object or contemplation". Marx criticized this view: "The materialistic doctrine concerning
the changing of circumstances and education forgets that circumstances are changed by
men and that the educator must be educated." Against Feuerbach who resolves the
essence of religion into the essence of Man, Marx argues that "the essence of man is no
abstraction inherent in each separate individual. In its reality it is the ensemble (aggregate
of social relations." "Feuerbach therefore does not see that the 'religious temperament"
itself is a social product and that the abstract individual whom he analyses belongs to a
particular form of society. In response to Feuerbach's contemplative approach, Marx
posits "sensuous human activity, praxis" and states that "all social life is essentially
practical". Finally, Marx declares that "the highest point to which contemplative
materialism can attain, i.e. that materialism which does not comprehend our sensuous
nature as practical activity, is the contemplation of separate individuals and of civil
society"; and that this old 18th century Feuerbach style materialistic standpoint is civil

society, while the new materialism (the standpoint of Marxism) is "human society or social
humanity". Whereas Feuerebach's contemplative standpoint "only interpreted the world" in
the mind Marx stressed that "the point is to change it". (All of the quotes above are taken
from Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach", International Publishers.)
Marx stressed in The German Ideology that human beings are not solely the product of
nature, but also exert their practice on nature (productive activity) and depend on this
development. Human beings change nature by working on it, and revolutionize the
conditions of their own existence thereby also revolutionizing themselves. In his "These
on Feuerbach" Marx says that man is the "ensemble of social relations", but this content
unfolds within the materialistic design of history. Marx also shows that human beings are
changed and progress through human sensuous activity, i.e. trade and industry.
In the German Ideology Marx essentially summarized his criticism of Feuerbach. He
presented his conclusion in the following manner:
"Certainly Feuerbach has a great advantage over the 'pure' materialists in that he realizes
how man too is an 'object of the senses.' But apart from the fact that he only conceives
him as a 'sensuous object', not as 'sensuous activity', because he still remains in the
realm of theory and conceives of men not in their given social connection, not under their
existing conditions of life, which have made them what they are, he never arrives at the
really existing active men, but stops at the abstraction 'man', and gets no further than
recognizing 'the true, individual, corporeal man' emotionally, i.e. he knows no other
'human relationships' 'of man to man' than love and friendship, and even then idealized.
He gives no criticism of the present conditions of life. Thus he never manages to conceive
the sensuous world as the total living sensuous activity of the individuals composing it;
and therefore when, for example, he sees instead of healthy men a crowd of scrofulous,
over-worked and consumptive starvelings, he is compelled to take refuge in the 'higher
perception' and in the ideal 'compensation in the species', and thus to relapse into
idealism at the very point where the communist materialist sees the necessity, and at the
same time the condition, of a transformation both of industry and of the social structure.
As far as Feuerbach is a materialist he does not deal with history, and as far as he
considers history he is not a materialist. With him materialism and history diverge
completely, a fact which explains itself from what has been said." (International
Publishers, pp. 37-8)
Against Feuerbach's humanism and naturalism which sought to understand man from the
standpoint of a human essence, Marx considered the real, living human being within
history and society, who makes history and society while also being limited and up to now
ruled by them. He proposed a new view of human beings as changing and progressing
with the development of history. Marx stressed that human beings are ruled by the
environment, but at the same time the sensuous world which surrounds us is not an
identical thing posited directly from the eternal past, but rather is the product of industry
and social conditions. A new world view does not emerge from the "human being". Social
and historical changes are the motive force of a new world view. Man is not simply a
biological human being-bourgeois society assumes this sort of independent human, that is

the abstract individual being severed from all social ties. The human being for Marx is the
human being within history and society which makes history and society; the real human
being as the social product of progress and development formed on the social basis
marked by certain class divisions. Instead of the individualistic selfish human being
(bourgeois human being), Marx offers the social type of human being. According to Marx
this view of humanity is based on real materialism. For Marx there can be no such thing
as an abstract "human nature" or "human entity", and he stresses that this "human nature"
itself is the product of history and society and is alterable.
For a criticism of the views of Raya Dunayevskaya one should look at Marx's criticism of
true socialism in The German Ideology. The petty bourgeois true socialists used phrases
like "unconditional freedom", "free human activity", "absolutely pure activity", "human
essence", "pure, true human being", and then claimed that these empty petty bourgeois
words were in fact socialism.
IV. Critique of Humanism
Seen historically, humanism appeared as a slogan in the bourgeois revolt and struggle
against the feudalistic production relations. When at first it sought to replace feudalistic
human relations with bourgeois ones it did not ignore social relations but demanded a
society of "liberty, equality and fraternity". The revolutionary thought of the bourgeoisie
was humanism. This was the watchword in the struggle against the "inhuman" feudalistic
society and the ruling ecclesiastical thought. At that time humanism had revolutionary
content as a cry for human emancipation from feudalism and absolutism.
It was only in modern bourgeois society after the breakdown of the middle ages that the
"human being" itself became a problem. For the first time, the "citizens" of bourgeois
society were called human beings. In medieval feudal society there was no question of
human beings themselves; they were usually bound to some absolute supra-human thing.
The question of the human being coincided with bourgeois society, and humanism was
born. The emancipation from religion and the ecclesiastical state connected to it couldn't
help being more or less secular, worldy, and human. However, for socialists this is just the
beginning of the problem. This is the beginning of a revolutionary criticism of the "human
being" proclaimed by bourgeois society. This "human being" is the individual cut off from
society who is only social by means of his own selfish profit-making activity, and whose
selfishness and individualism is covered by the name humanity, freedom, equality, etc.
Humanism essentially is nothing but a defense of the abstract and meaningless "human
nature" of this bourgeois human being
Humanism as a bourgeois ideology begins to become increasingly reactionary with the
generalization of bourgeois society, and its idealistic essence becomes more and more
evident, and it appears in contemplative, corrupted or illogical forms of thought such as
individualism, personalism, existentialism, neo-Kantian moralism, or pragmatism. These
philosophies are separated from history and society and do nothing more than involve
themselves subjectively and illogically with the "human being" and amuse themselves by
stringing together all sorts of flowery words about "human nature". Humanism has
become a corrupted and reactionary ideology. Modern "humanism" is not the revolutionary

ideology it was when the bourgeoisie was seeking the independence and emancipation of
the individual. In the society of monopoly capital it has been transformed into the
conservative and cautious individualism and personalism of those who seek to protect
themselves and pay attention to their own little life-even the proletariat has been partially
infected by this trend.
Individualism, selfishness and humanism form an inseparably close relation. Individualism
regards the individual, before society, as the first principle. Society is understood as
nothing more than the quantitative total of individuals. In the end the individual is the
objective, and society is seen as only a means for individuals. At best, the position of
humanism on the harmony between the individual and society never goes beyond a
general and abstract emphasis on the importance of the individual. In other words, in a
form that contains no social criticism.
Individualism is a historical ideology that corresponds to bourgeois society and was given
birth to by capitalist commodity production. As a result of the development of the
productive power within the feudalistic means of production-the feudalistic society based
on the paternalistic, despotic, subsistence peasant system-labor appeared in the form of a
commodity, and along with the appearance of free labor which more or less removed the
feudal restraints there appeared the power of the individual to pursue his profit-making
activity. Along with this the ideology appeared of the freedom and dignity and character
and education of the individual. Clearly this is a reflection of capitalist production in which
the individual labors for the individual, and labor is for individual acquisition through
exchange value (currency). The consciousness individualism, liberalism and humanism
emerged in countries in which the demand for bourgeois power conflicted with the former
power. The essence of bourgeois commodity production is that it is only indirect or
mediated social production. It is not social production Directly or consciously, but rather
appears to be production for the individual. Rousseau's idea that the formation of society
is based on a contract of individuals and established on individuality is one ideological
reflection of the bourgeois struggle against feudalistic power.
Individualism or humanism is the social and historical consciousness of the growth of
bourgeois power in the struggle against feudalistic society-i.e. against one self sufficient
exploitative class society whose rule centered on the will and thought of the feudal lords.
The ideology of feudalism was God, or country and king under absolutism. Under this
system of religion and morality, the living, concrete human being (the individual according
to bourgeois ideology) had to be neglected or sacrificed, and the social consciousness
that this was unjust did not emerge. With the beginning of the development of commodity
production and the rise in productive power, it began to be felt that the feudal society was
an inhuman, despotic society which was restricting the rise of bourgeois power. The social
consciousness began to spread that in this feudal society individual activity was
repressed, individuality was missing, and freedom was stolen. This consciousness
emerged throughout the world in every country in which the development of commodity
production and free labor in opposition to medieval feudal society commenced. The rising
bourgeoisie attempted to express their consciousness this in thought. This was the
formation of liberalism.

The human being who was emancipated from medieval feudal society was a capitalistic
human being. These human beings were unable to overcome capitalistic production either
in reality or in their consciousness. They were restricted by these limits, and were able to
free themselves only from feudalistic society. Even though capitalism freed human beings
from feudalistic restraints, they were immediately bound to the oppression and
exploitation of capital. The free human being became synonymous with the human being
under the despotism of capital. Not only have the bourgeois slogans of the free individual,
and the personality and character of the individual become hollow and abstract today,
these meaningless flowery words are used to support bourgeois society.
Individualism in bourgeois society has absolutely no consciousness of the base of
objective and social mutual relations-in bourgeois society, on the whole in a wide range of
labor this appears as the social division of labor. In order for this consciousness to appear
it is necessary to recognize that each person's labor is qualitatively identical and equal as
abstract human labor. However, in bourgeois society this cannot be held (because of
class fantasies). After the war (especially since the collapse of the JCP in the wake of the
February 1st strike) bourgeois individualism took deep root in Japanese society, and
became the vulgar and reactionary thought of the petty bourgeoisie who search for
burgher safety and happiness and only pursue their own lifestyle plans. This ideology has
also had a large influence on the working class. Liberal labor critics have criticized these
workers as "the model of nook happiness". The workers movement itself is being adorned
with an individualistic and selfish ideology.
Let's now consider selfishness. Humanists begin with the notion of unchanging human
nature, and then argue in the following manner. That is, they say that as long as the
nature of man is selfishness, the construction of socialism and communism is not
possible, or the movement itself is in fact based on selfishness. Illogical and reactionary
thinkers like Nietzche and Shopenhauer, as well as Freud, argued in the same thing. In
postwar Japan it was Hajime Tanabe who argued this way. In response to the upswell of
the workers movement after the First World War, Abe depicted the struggles between
workers and management as "an offensive and defensive struggle between those
absorbed in their own wealth, and those who are envious of this wealth and insist that
they have a right to it", and he criticized this for being "corrupt". In order to oppose
communism they try to argue that human nature is essentially selfish and thus there is no
point in reshaping society. Selfishness is a human instinct, and with this instinct human
beings will never be able to build communism. As long as human beings remain human
beings all of the inhuman, dark human relations based on this selfishness will remain.
They tried to douse the movement for communism with pessimism. Humanists should
reflect on the fact this kind of humanism also exists.
Is human selfishness really an unchanging eternal human quality?-But this is not a
problem at all. Selfishness most certainly is not an unchanging eternal human quality, but
merely one quality of human beings in one stage of the historical development of human
society. Just like other animals, human beings have an instinct to live and for selfpreservation. However, this instinct doesn't take the form of social cooperation (communal
labor), but rather selfishness, that is the sacrificing of other people and the search for a
better life for oneself alone. Already this cannot be explained solely through human

instinct because through the social communal labor of everyone the human instinct for life
and self-preservation could be fully satisfied. Not only is the attempt to explain human
instinct from selfishness unsuccessful, it is directly connected to fascist philosophy.
Selfishness is inseparable from bourgeois society, and is in fact a product of this society.
The root causes of this selfishness are production carried out by disconnected individuals
whose goal is exchange value, production by anarchic, free individuals, labor which must
be verified for the first time as social labor as the result of private labor, and above all the
exploitation of the labor of others, that is the character of production with profit as a goal.
It is laughable that some people would insist that selfishness and individualism are two
separate things. Conceptually this distinction can probably be made somehow, but in fact
no distinction can be made. Individualism must actually appear as selfishness. Socialism
can only be constructed through the sublation of individualism, and its intensification does
not signify socialism. There are those who defend individualism or glorify it, but we
communists expose the egoistic essence of individualism and carry out a firm struggle
against it.
It is certainly no mere coincidence that the Japanese left wing which was so enthusiastic
about subjectivist philosophy just a few years ago, has now accepted humanist
philosophy. During the subjectivity debate of 1947-8, the subjectivity theorists chased after
something called "subjectivity" which could not be prescribed biologically, socially or
historically. It could be said that what human beings do not know is infinite, but what they
called subjectivity was not what is still unknown, but that which has been unknown from
the beginning, that is mysterious things which have always been impossible for humans to
understand or define such as religious consciousness, spirit, or an a priori "sense of
value". This is religion in a different form.
Needless to say, the subjectivity debate was connected to the neo-Kantian school's idea
of a priori "value". They searched for subjectivity in a fixed a priori value consciousness or
an ideal. They didn't grasp value consciousness or the ideal materialistically. In other
words, the proletariat's ideal=communistic ideal is something that is born out of actual
history and socio-economic relations, but according to the subjectivity theorists this ideal
is born from people's absolute and transcendental sense of value.
Like the New Left, Masao Maruyama foolishly says that not his own illogical thought, but
rather the "tendency towards objectivism is dangerous". He argues that petty bourgeois
intellectuals are drawn to theories of subjectivity and humanism not because they are
petty bourgeois, but because Marxism is lacking something, or Marxists have not clearly
articulated the sense of value at the basis of Marxism, or because Idealist philosophy, not
Marxism, has thoroughly investigated the question of ideals and praxis. The petty
bourgeois humanists, basing the construction of socialism (whether they are seriously
thinking about this is another question) on an ideal and an appeal to human nature, can
only offer this nonsensical, off the mark criticism of Marxism. Idealists and subjectivists
criticize Marxism's fundamental defect as being the slip into objectivism-materialismscientism. But they don't consider that "value" or ideals are not an a priori thing for human
beings, but are rather an idealistic form born from the contradictions of human society,

from human critical consciousness in response to its inequality and class prejudice (this is
true from the case of Christianity to utopian socialism). Marxism, however, denies theories
of human emancipation arising from societal contradictions in an idealized or fantastic
form (which today have already become sentimental, impotent chatter). Their arguments
are completely misdirected. The subjectivists, as we have seen, were humanists, and
indeed this was inevitable. What they did was to abstract from the bourgeoisie's image of
man, and make it into a universal image of man. For the revolutionary movement of the
working class humanism is essentially reactionary and impotent. What Dunayevskaya
calls the spirit of absolute human freedom is also nothing but an abstract idealization of a
bourgeois ideal. The connection between subjectivity theorists and the humanistic
Dunayevskaya is easy to see because Dunayevskaya raises the abstraction of human
essence and proclaims that it is absolute freedom.
How the subjectivity debate a few years ago affected intellectuals and students interest in
Marxism is a subject that merits investigation. Now it can be seen that the New Left
movement which climaxed in 1960 (and subsequently became inert) did not strengthen
Marxism, but instead advanced its dissolution, deepened the ideological void caused by
Stalinism, and led to a strengthening of bourgeois ideology. Although subjectivity theorists
(as well as Kozo Uno's economics) claimed to reinforce and develop Marxism and correct
its one-sidedness, in fact their ideas are used to ??????Intellectuals and students made
their way to bourgeois ideology by way of the theory of subjectivity. Their subjectivity
theory is indistinguishable from the Communist party's philosophy of praxis or Fascist
behaviorism.
Now they have begun to sing the praises of humanism! Humanism has become one of the
slogans they flourish in the name of "anti-imperialism/anti-Stalinism". It appears that
Marxism is an insufficient word for the scientific theory of the social emancipation of the
proletariat. Dunayevskaya claims that Marxism is above all humanism, but objectively
speaking this is used to cool the passion of the masses for Marxism. To cool down or
divert the growing interest of the masses in Marxism is precisely the objective role of the
theories of humanism and subjectivity of the New Left and intellectuals. If Marxism is
humanism, that is the championing of an abstract human being, then what is the use of
seriously studying it. This kind of humanism can be found anywhere from bourgeois
constitutions to university philosophy. If Marxism is merely one kind of humanism there is
nothing particularly unique about Marxism. In fact, existentialism and pragmatism, the
classic ideological representation of monopoly capitalism, are today pawning their own
thought off as humanism. Sogakukai (religious group) claim that up to now socialism has
not had a true understanding of humanity, and that the ideal society of the kingdom of
God is true humanistic socialism.
In their intended struggle against imperialism and Stalinism, the New Left looked first to
the theory of subjectivity, and then to humanism for help. We will expose their fantasy of
struggling against monopoly capitalism with humanism and subjectivity theory. Regardless
of their subjective intentions, introducing humanism, and interpreting Marxism
subjectively, humanistically, or existentially are in fact steps towards the twisting of
Marxism, and uprooting its true influence among the people which in the end opens the
path to the dominance of purely bourgeois or fascist thought. This is the objective function

carried out by the New Left's humanism, and for this reason it is a very dangerous and
reactionary thing. The thought of working class emancipation today is called Marxism.
Humanism, that is the glorification of an abstract man, in a sense is the exact opposite
standpoint. In the fight against capitalism humanism is thoroughly impotent. This is
because this is essentially the ideological expression of the very capitalist society that
they hope to struggle against. With just a shallow understanding of working class politics,
the New Left camp compromises Marxism with humanism and frantically attempts to
inscribe this on the banner of the workers movement. The political expression of
humanism at best is a politics for petty bourgeois freedom and democracy, and this was
already realized in Japan some twenty years ago (i.e. through the end of the war).
Humanism or "Marxist" humanism do not develop the revolutionary struggles of the
working class, but rather slacken and dissolve them. Scientific communism (Marxism) and
humanism are essentially different things. As the thought of the proletariat, the former is
opposed to all humanism as bourgeois or petty bourgeois thought. Marxism doesn't
criticize humanism's denunciation of capitalism for oppressing human beings, but it does
criticize it for its idealistic critique of capitalism in the name of the human being (as well as
for being a completely insufficient and shallow capitalist critique). To solve the
contradictions of capitalism humanism appeals to humanity, or proposes subjective
means such as education. Marxism, conversely, is based on reality, on the inevitable
movement of history and economy, as well as the unavoidable development of the class
struggle. On this essential level of changing reality humanism is powerless. In the end this
inevitably falls into mere chattering and amusement. Humanism today represents one part
of the illogical philosophy peculiar to monopoly capitalism. The attempt to compromise
Marxism with this is extremely reactionary and unpardonable.
The dull fantasy of attaching the words "socialism" or "Marxism" to bourgeois ideology and
passing it off as the ideology of the proletariat is gaining ground. For instance, the idea
that humanism becomes socialistic by attaching socialism to humanism, and calling it
socialistic humanism. Marx and Lenin severely criticized this line of thought, but it has
been applied and generalized by the Second International and the Stalinist camp. This
resembles the Japanese Stalinists who attach the adjective "new" to democracy and think
that modern democracy thus loses its bourgeois content. In fact, however, this approach
essentially signifies cowardly concession, mean submission, and hypocritical passivity in
the face of humanism and democracy which are the class ideology of the suddenly
emergent bourgeoisie, and are more or less the basic ideology of bourgeois society. This
is the dream that if the fox wears the lion's fur it becomes a lion. But even in a lion's
clothing a fox is a fox.
The Marxist humanism (Dunayevskya-ism) of the New Left is essentially the timid "soft
mood" of the Second International and Stalinism, and is in the same rut. This signifies
nothing more than a hypocritical and timid concession to the bourgeois ideologies of
humanism and liberalism. Dunayevskaya either doesn't notice or ignores the fact that
humanism and Marxism are essentially different class ideologies. Instead of clarifying the
principles of Marxism, she follows and flatters bourgeois ideology and attempts to
confound proletariat ideology with bourgeois ideology. Moreover, she presents the
extraordinarily stupid argument that this represents the reconstruction of Marxism. This

approach is a common one for revisionists of Marxism. Today wherever one turns people
are introducing bourgeois ideology through a variety of methods and then blathering about
their "creative" development of Marxism.
The New Left's current enthusiastic praise of Dunayevskaya's ideas, that is humanism in
the guise of Marxism, reveals their petty bourgeois and anti-proletarian essence. No
matter how much they talk about Marxism, the working class or the revolutionary
movement, their essence is unmistakably clear. Let's sweep away New Left opportunism
and confusion! We must fight against any concession to bourgeois ideology no matter
how small, and drive this out of our movement.