KASHMIR ISSUE:

Generally, Kashmir issue is considered as an inter-state conflict between India and

Pakistan .Its centrality in Pakistans foreign as well as in domestic policy, has
assigned this issue a very prominent place in the national politics and interprovincial governmental relations. The issue lost its unanimous place very soon
after the establishment of Pakistan. It has been argued that Kashmir dispute
instrumentally utilized to legitimize the centralized state structure for the
ascendency of civil- military bureaucratic oligarchy dominated by Punjab.

INTRODUCTION:
Since early days of independence, Kashmir issue has been considered as one major
cause of the multiplicity of tensions and conflicts between India and Pakistan, along
with the ensure of the evacuee properties settlement, the distribution of Indus Basin
Water, the sharing of armed forces and war equipment and the distribution of
treasury money, etc. This long standing tension is aggravated by the later extension
of the disputes to Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek Border and the Wular Barrage. Of all
contentious issues between India and Pakistan, Kashmir was and still remains by far
the most crucial one and considered as the core issue.
At the time of the liquidation of British Empire in 1947, two fifth of the subcontinent
was ruled by princes over whom Britain had juridically been suzerain. In the
liquidation plan of third June 1947, states were expected to join India or Pakistan,
following the geographical position of their state as well as wishes of the people of
state. The overwhelming majority some 550 out of 560- were Hindu potentates
ruling Hindu population and were swiftly rounded up for India by Lord Mountbatten
at the time of independence. Kashmir, the largest princely state with a
predominantly Muslim population under a Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh, was expected
to join Pakistan as ninety percent of the population of the state was Muslim and it
was geographically, culturally, religiously and economically was linked the areas
constituting Pakistan. But contrary to the wishes of the people of Kashmir, through a
forged declaration of accession to India by the Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir,
Kashmir was annexed to India on 26 September 1947 and armed forces were
deployed in Kashmir. Since then Kashmir remains the main dispute to directly
impact the relations between India and Pakistan.
Both countries have fought two wars specifically over the question of title to
Kashmir territory in 1948 and 1965. However, the war of 1971 started in East
Pakistan ended in Kashmir. Kargil operation in 1999, further strained the relations
between India and Pakistan.

RECENT EVENTS:
In June 2008, the government - consisting of the Kashmiri People's Democratic Party
ruling with Congress - collapsed after its decision to cede land in Kashmir to Hindu
pilgrims. This sparked mass protests against Indian rule and resulted in two months
of uproar and the largest anti-Indian demonstrations since the early 1990s.
Similarly, tensions between India and Pakistan escalated after the Mumbai attacks
in November 26-28, 2008 when it became clear that Pakistan-based militants were
involved via the Kashmiri group Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. India was then at war-level
security. On November 30 Pakistani President Zardari urged India to adopt a joint
approach to fighting the militants. Prior to the attacks, on November 22, Zardari had
hinted at a "no first use" nuclear weapons policy and proposed closer contact across
the LOC by lowering visa restrictions.
After the Mumbai attacks Pakistan cut back its support for Pakistani Islamist
militants fighting in Kashmir. This caused the insurgency to decline: it claimed
approximately 540 lives in 2008 compared with 4,500 in 2001. But the stand-off
between India and Pakistan, resulting from the terrorist attacks instigated by those
very Pakistani militants, is threatening to undermine this progress.

CONTEXT:
GEOGRAPHIC:
Kashmir has borders in India, Pakistan and China. Two of its regions are controlled
by Pakistan - Azad and the mountainous northern territories - while three regions Jammu, Ladakh and the Kashmir valley - are controlled by India. Of the three regions
India controls, it is only the Kashmir valley that has a majority Muslim population.
Ladakh is predominantly Buddhist, while Jammu once had a Muslim majority, but
due to communal violence in 1947 and 1948, today has a Dogra Hindu majority.
Both countries want control over Jammu and Kashmir in its entirety.

ECONOMY:
Kashmir is heavily dependent on subsidies from the Indian government - needing
subsidies even to pay official salaries - and therefore economic development is
untenable. Due to the on-going crisis and the economic blockade imposed by the
Jammu agitation, the local economy is in shatters and tourism, which has otherwise
been important for generating incomes, has dwindled. Also, Kashmir's natural
resources are exploited and the benefits are reaped by other parts of India.

Hydroelectric plants in Kashmir, for instance, generate a large amount of electricity

that is exported to other Indian states, while Kashmir itself suffers from debilitating
power shortages. The large deployment of troops further impacts economic
activities as it restricts crucial movement between fields and the market.

POLITICS:
India and Pakistan both believe that they have a rightful claim to Kashmir.
Kashmiri's themselves are divided between being pro-India, pro-Pakistan and
wanting to be independent from both countries. Hindu Fundamentalists have used
terrorist attacks by Kashmiri militants to retaliate against Muslims all over India, via
incidents such as those that took place in Mumbai in 1992 and Gujarat in 2002.

PARTIES:
The primary parties involved in this conflict are India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri
people (some pro-Pakistan, some pro-independence, some pro-India). Secondary
actors include the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the U.K.
at the time of partition, China - which supports Pakistan in an attempt to balance
against India - and Islamist fighters from various countries who have declared the
conflict a Muslim cause. Third parties to this conflict include the United Nations, the
World Bank and at times the United States, though all three have maintained a
distance from the conflict in recent years.
Overall there is very little third party intervention in this conflict, especially due to
India's aversion to 'outside interference'.[18] In fact, the international community
enters the issue mainly as a result of the UN resolutions of 1948-49 and also
because of the water treaty that the World Bank helped implement.

ISSUES:
INTEREST BASED:
At the heart of this conflict is a confrontation between two nationalisms. For
Pakistan, the belief is that Muslims will be oppressed under Hindu rule and therefore
need their own state. Since Kashmir is predominantly Muslim, Pakistan believes it
should belong to them. Moreover, Kashmir has to be won to justify the religious
moral significance of Pakistan's nationhood.
India's identity, in contrast, hinges on a strong belief in secularism. Kashmir is seen
as a smaller Pakistan, and therefore the government believes that having Kashmir
under its control will give credence to its secular beliefs. Kashmir has thus "become
hostage to these bitterly contending nationalities".

IDENTITY BASED:
This conflict is also rooted in identity, based on geographic location, religion,
language and culture. It is the clash of these enduring identities that makes the
conflict so persistent. There is a confrontation between Hindus and Muslims,
spiritual Islam, radical Islam and secularism and central government control versus
self Government.

RIGHTS BASED:
The demand for rights is also central to this dispute. The political autonomy that
Kashmir did enjoy early on was destroyed by the central government which has
instead imposed a hegemonic control on the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Hence,
the current demand is for a three choice referendum which would include
independence, apart from the choice of acceding to Pakistan or India. Due to the
large scale presence of Indian troops in Kashmir the local people's public and
private lives are heavily controlled and regulated, impinging on their freedom of
movement and their ability to carry out daily activities. Currently, civil rights and
political liberties are virtually non-existent. Past elections have been plagued by
fraud and intimidation and democratic institutions and processes have repeatedly
been "subverted and permanently retarded".
In addition, Kashmiris are struggling to meet their basic needs, such as healthcare,
education and water, the lack of which breeds further resentment and desperation.
Finally, human rights violations by insurgents and also by the Indian army are
widespread. War crimes and crimes against humanity are common, while redress for
these abuses is severely lacking or non-existent.

RESOURCE BASED:
Water is one of the most contested resources in Kashmir. As per the Indus Water
Treaty (IWT) of 1960 signed between India and Pakistan - at a time when both
countries directly ruled their occupied areas - the three rivers which traverse J&K
were given to Pakistan. As a result, Pakistan is entirely dependent on water basins
which are in India held areas. Last year Pakistan complained that water flow was
reduced by India in order to fill water for a dam India was constructing in its held
area called the Baglihar project. The matter went to the World Bank and was
resolved, but problems remain. As a consequence of the treaty, people of J&K, as
upper riparians, were denied the right to water.
Also, numerous restrictions were placed on the use of water for irrigation and for
harnessing power by the IWT. So despite having significant hydroelectric potential,
Kashmir lags behind the rest of India in its energy production. Thus, even where the
state has a real advantage it is paradoxically dependent on outside sources to meet
80 percent of its requirements. And while some hydroelectric projects are being

taken on, their high cost could compel the state to export power to service the debt,
resulting in little improvement for J&K.
Similarly, land is of critical importance in Kashmir. Currently, the law in J&K restricts
ownership of land by non-state subjects. In order to circumvent this rule, others
claim that in order to strengthen the tourism sector, this law should be removed.
This is despite the fact that the tourism sector is not the backbone of the economy
that these opponents claim it to be. Furthermore, land rights have been heavily
impinged upon as civilian land has been occupied by the Indian security forces.
Approximately 250,000 acres of state land have been encroached on with a market
value of Rs 25,000 crore. When this was regularized, it was done so at a fraction of
its actual value.

Conflict regulation potential:

There is potential for change in regards to Kashmir, but this is hindered by several
internal and external factors that escalate the conflict.

INTERNAL FACTORS:
First, stereotyping has given rise to perception and expectations that place India
and Pakistan at opposite ends of the spectrum with little chance of finding common
ground. Instead, Hindu fundamentalists are gaining ground using the insurgency as
an excuse to carry out prejudiced actions, such as using that the Amarnath Yatra to
promote religious tourism, while in reality it was a way to acquire land and promote
nationalism. Also, political parties and extremists, such as Shiv Sena, continue to
demonize Muslims and Pakistanis creating a rift between the public in both
countries. This is further exacerbated by the strict visa rules that prevent travel
between the countries and the fact that there is very little contact between people
from both countries as well as with people from Kashmir. Hence dialogue across
conflict lines is greatly restricted, impinging transformation.
In addition, the process of negotiation is limited. Indo-Pak talks continue to exclude
Kashmiris from the discussion table despite their clear role in the process. The
current peace process will therefore continue to be seen as illegitimate, as it doesn't
address the issue of the presence of hostile security forces among civilians. In terms
of the Kashmiris, they lack clear leadership, and so there is no concerted, political
effort that can balance against the Indian and Pakistani governments. Much of this
is rooted in the fact that while Kashmiris are tired of violence, there are few legal or
political alternatives available to them. Moreover, discussions are restricted to talks
between government officials and elites, disregarding middle-level and grassroots
actors altogether.

The current situation in Kashmir is such that grievances and problems are not met
constructively leaving them to fester and grow into desperation and bitterness. The
legal and administrative systems are incompetent and hence justice is greatly
restricted. There is also a lack of government transparency which breeds suspicion
and frustration.. As non-state actors, the abuses carried out by the insurgents go
unchecked and the Indian security forces in turn, though they are answerable, are
given special powers and immunity by the government, essentially ridding them of
responsibility of their actions. Indeed, India is not a signatory to Geneva Protocol .
Finally, for Pakistan as well as for India, the cost-benefit analysis favors inertia. The
issue is so intransigent that exerting resources, time and effort on resolving it, is far
more costly than letting it continue but under a certain degree of control. Moreover,
India is complacent, because militancy strengthens the central government's control
over Kashmir. As long as militants continue to instigate violent resistance, the
government can justify the heavy security force presence in Kashmir. Thus, despite
the volatility of the situation, its continuation ensures central government control
over Kashmir, which would be more questionable if a peace settlement was
reached.

EXTERNAL FACTORS:
As mentioned, earlier, there are several external factors that further complicate the
conflict in Kashmir. First, the conflict has now stretched beyond Kashmir and beyond
India and Pakistan and become a central cause for Islamists. Islamic
fundamentalists in almost every part of the world are working to promote the
spread of Islamism. Hence militants in Kashmir are increasingly neither Indian nor
Pakistani and instead consist of Islamists from various countries. This has expanded
the conflict, and it has also heightened violence as these fighters have brought with
them tenets of Jihadi warfare. Because these are non-state actors, there is little
possibility to hold them accountable for their actions.
In addition, Pakistan is itself vulnerable to activities of radical militant groups. The
government is heavily reliant on the military to withstand pressures from these
groups, yet the Pakistani military and intelligence agency are often also
collaborating with some of these groups. So it is questionable whether they will be
able to curb militant activities in Kashmir.
External influence is in itself often intrusive and destructive. China is, for instance,
exploiting Indo-Pak enmity. The Chinese government is aligned with Pakistan,
providing Pakistan with military wherewithal, as a strategic and economic
investment to put pressure on India. China sees India as a peer competitor and
major strategic rival in Asia and is hence manipulating the conflict in Kashmir to
further its own economic and strategic goals. The Chinese government is
particularly alarmed at U.S. talks of using India as counterweight to China,
increasing its eagerness to limit Indian advancement.

The U.S. role has thus far been fairly noncommittal. U.S. interest in the Kashmir
conflict goes beyond Kashmir itself. Washington is concerned about nuclear
nonproliferation, controlling the Taliban and general peace between India and
Pakistan. However, due to the high stakes involved if the U.S. were to take too
active a role in South Asia - in terms of Pakistan being an important military ally and
India an important trade partner - the government has tended to refrain from taking
on an active mediating role.

AVAILABLE THIRD PARTIES:

As mentioned previously, India maintains that Kashmir is a bilateral issue that
precludes third party intervention.[73] External actors are also hesitant to get
involved due to the intensity of the situation and the risks that involvement could
imply for their own economic or political system. Moreover, the conflict in Kashmir
does not represent the typical peacebuilding scenario for many reasons. First, it is
both intrastate and interstate in its nature. Second, India is already a democratic
country, so introducing democracy or market economy, which are otherwise
common strategies, are not useful in this situation. And lastly, both countries have
nuclear weapons, making the situation highly volatile.
Nevertheless, external actors could play a significant role in alleviating this conflict.
At a basic level they could observe and monitor elections to ensure that they are
fair and reliable. In addition, third parties could facilitate Track II and Track III talks.
Currently, talks occur mainly at the elite level, but these are limited in their scope
and as is clear by their progress thus far, they have not been very successful. By
including retired bureaucrats and civil society, however, it is more likely that the
negative stereotype sunderlying the animosity between parties to the conflict can
be broken down, initiating a more sustainable dialogue towards transformation.
Clearly, however, no viable solution to this conflict will be reached unless Pakistan,
India and the Kashmiris are involved in the process and satisfied with the solution.

CURRENT SITUATION:
The recent elections in Kashmir for the state legislature play a small role in
instigating change, especially in terms of the demilitarization of the state. But as
the Kashmiris themselves recognized, which is evidenced by a voter turnout of 60
percent, participating in this election does offer a critical venue for tackling practical
grievances. The state legislature, though limited in its reach, does have the power
to build roads, schools, health centres and to create jobs and can restrain the
harassment and brutality of the security forces. Hence, this process "provides
material succor to a population which has suffered immensely for over 2 decades".

The elections themselves were, however, flawed. A total of 1354 candidates stood
for just 87 seats, making voting by the public arduous and the process
unnecessarily complex. Also, despite the fact that militants halted all activities
obstructing people from voting, the government had still sent 538 companies of
central para-military forces and 60-70 companies of the Central Reserve Police
Force for election duty. The army presence was hence grossly disproportionate to
the need for security and hence merely served to curtail movement and actions by
imposing curfews and patrolling the streets.
It is believed by some that these recent elections could be catalyst for a shift in the
equation. The Kashmiri people's nonviolent assertion for a azadi (independence)
persuaded militants to silence their guns and their use of a legal venue to address
their concerns, despite years of exploitation, could sow the seeds for a less violent
approach to the conflict. Fittingly, this would be a counter balance to the 1987
elections which was a catalyst for militancy.
This will, of course, depend on whether public concerns and aspirations are
adequately addressed. This includes not just basic needs - such as schools and
health care - but also integral needs including the use of water resources and
access to land. If there is to be constructive and positive change, public support is
integral.

CONCLUSION:
The conflict in Kashmir is complex and it is entrenched in the very identity of the
parties involved. After 60 years, with little progress and several highly volatile
situations, a solution to the problem appears distant. But transformation does not.
Despite continued tension, it has become apparent that both India and Pakistan are
growing more concerned with finding a peaceful way to tackle this dispute and
realizing the critical importance that this will have for their own self-interests. The
Kashmiris themselves are becoming increasingly exhausted with the situation,
longing for an end to their suffering, and yet they are still able to turn to legal
avenues for weathering their grievances despite the disappointments of such efforts
in the past. They still believe in the possibility of instigating change through nonviolent means. The situation is hence ripe for a change of course.
By setting numerous incremental goals rather than merely focusing on the ultimate
end goal of peace, which in itself is far from static, the peace building process
becomes more manageable and its success more realistic. The goals and methods
to achieve them that are mentioned above are neither conclusive nor full-proof;
they are merely a few critical stepping stones in this long-term venture. Importantly,
however, whether these goals are reached or not, the process of striving for these
goals itself impacts the course of the dispute and creates lasting change in the
foundations for building peace. Due to the networks and partnerships that are

created a stable basis for further progress is established. Ultimately, the most
important tool for peace building and reconciliation is the building and
strengthening of relationships.[108] In pursuing dialogue, collaboration and the
spread of information, this is likely to occur regardless of whether the goals
themselves are fulfilled or not.

REFERENCES:
http://www.beyondintractability.org/casestudy/navlakha-kashmir
http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/Artical-4_v15_no2_14.pdf
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_wars_and_conflicts
http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/kashmir-dispute-affects-security-southasia/p19805
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/most-dangerous-place-pakistan
%E2%80%99s-past-pakistan%E2%80%99s-future
https://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1439.pdf