DOMINGO v.

RAYALA
G.R. No. 155831, etc.
February 18, 2008
Ma.
Lourdes
T.
Domingo, et al.
petitioners
responden Rogelio I. Ralaya, et al.

J. Nachura

Cadorna

ts
summary NLRC Chairman is charged for sexual harassment because of certain acts he

committed against his stenographic reporter. He was found guilty of having

committed the acts complained of, and first penalized with suspension for
6mos1day; however this was later modified to dismissal, and later, to
suspension for 1yr. SC held that the acts indeed constituted sexual
harassment, albeit of the administrative kind, and that the proper penalty to be
imposed was only 1yr and not dismissal since it was just his first offense. In
ruling in such manner, SC says that the disciplining authority, the President in
this case bec. the NLRC Chairman is a presidential appointee, does not have
unfettered discretion in imposing penalties, since the latter should always be in
accordance with the law and rules.

facts of the case

Petitioner Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a complaint
for sexual harassment against Respondent Rayala (Rayala) before the SOLE. At the time, Rayala
was the NLRC Chairman and Domingo was working directly under him.
Domingos complaint was predicated on AO 250, the IRR of RA 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment
in Employment, etc.). To support her complaint, she executed an affidavit narrating the
incidences of sexual harassment complained of. (A/N: medyo mahaba kaya di ko na nilagay,
basahin niyo na lang juicy naman eh haha) of
SOLE referred the complaint to the OP, Rayala being a presidential appointee. After an
investigation ordered by the OP where the parties were heard and their respective evidence
received, Rayala was found guilty of the offense charged, with the recommendation that a
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day, in accordance with AO 250, be imposed
upon him.
Upon receiving the recommendation of the SOLE, the OP issued AO 119, which affirmed the
finding of Rayalas guilt. However, the penalty was modified into one of dismissal,
considering the gravity of the offense and the nature of Rayalas office.
The case reached the CA, which affirmed the OP, pointing out that Rayala was dismissed for
disgraceful and immoral conduct in violation of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees). Upon Rayalas MR however, the CA modified its decision
by deleting the order dismissing Rayala from service and substituting it with one
penalizing him with suspension for the maximum period of one (1) year.
This led to the filing of the three instant petitions for review where: (1) Domingo questions the
downgrading of the penalty; (2) Rayala contests the finding of guilt and prays that he be totally
exonerated; and (3) the Republic also questions the downgrading.

issue

(1) WON Rayala is guilty of sexual harassment YES.

(2) WON he could be dismissed on that basis NO.

ratio

1. Rayala is guilty of sexual harassment

1

Substantial evidence exist to prove that Rayala committed the acts complained of
All three independent bodies (the Committee formed by SOLE, OP and CA) found that Rayala committed the acts
complained of. These findings, supported by substantial evidence are accorded great respect and even finality by the
courts, there being no valid ground calling for their review.

The acts complained of constitute sexual harassment

Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the
wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and
administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently of the others. This rule
applies with full force to sexual harassment.
RA 7877 defines work-related sexual harassment under Sec. 3 thereof, and states that a
demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor is necessary in order for sexual harassment to
be deemed to have been committed. This section, in relation to Sec. 7 on penalties, defines the
criminal aspect of the unlawful act of sexual harassment. Meanwhile, in relation to Sec. 6, said
Sec. 3 authorizes the institution of an independent civil action for damages and other affirmative
relief. Finally, Sec. 3, in relation to Sec. 4, governs the procedure for administrative cases.
Thus, contrary to Rayalas contention, his culpability is not to be determined solely on
the basis of Sec. 3, because he is charged with the administrative offense, not the
criminal infraction, of sexual harassment. It should be enough that the CA, along with
the Investigating Committee and the Office of the President, found substantial evidence to
support the administrative charge.
Nevertheless, even if Sec. 3 were to be solely applied, it must be pointed out that the
demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor required therein need to be
articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal
certitude, from the acts of the offender. In this case, Rayalas acts (simpleng manyak moves,
sugar daddy moves and inappropriate convos) clearly belie the unspoken request for a
sexual favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayalas claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or
requirement be made as a condition for continued employment or for promotion to a
higher position. It is enough that his acts resulted in creating an intimidating, hostile
or offensive environment for Domingo.
Intent is immaterial because Rayala is being charged for an administrative offense
Rayala faults that CA for holding that sexual harassment is an offense malum prohibitum, arguing that intent is an
essential element in sexual harassment, and since he did not commit the acts imputed with malice, he should be
absolved of the charges against him. However, what Rayala forgets is that the instant case involves an administrative
charge for sexual harassment. Thus, whether the crime of sexual harassment is malum in se or malum prohibitum is
immaterial.
No political persecution and no violation of due process
Rayala wasnt able to prove his allegations that the charges were filed because of a conspiracy to get him out of
office and thus constitute merely political harassment. Rayala was also properly accorded due process based on the
records, and although in the beginning he questioned the authority of the Committee to try him, he appeared,
personally and with counsel, and participated in the proceedings. Finally, the fact that Domingos complaint charged
Rayala with sexual harassment, whereas Rayala was penalized for disgraceful and immoral conduct, does not affect
the conclusion in this case. Under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to disgraceful and immoral conduct. Thus, any
finding of liability for sexual harassment may also be the basis of culpability for disgraceful and immoral conduct.

2. The proper penalty is suspension for the maximum period of one (1) year
Applicable penalty is only suspension because this is Rayalas first offense
Under AO 250, Sec. 22(o), Rule XVI of the IRR of Revised Administrative Code, and Sec. 52
A(15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the penalty for
the first offense is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, while
the penalty for the second offense is dismissal.
2

Presidents discretion as disciplining authority not unfettered

It is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority, who would determine
whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power, however,
is qualified by the phrase for cause as provided by law. Thus, when the President found that
Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did
not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by
law for such offense.
The imposable penalty for the first offense of either the administrative offense of sexual
harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1)
day to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to impose upon
Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a penalty which can only be imposed upon
commission of a second offense.
Aggravating circumstance consisting of Rayalas office only ground for imposing
maximum penalty of suspension not of dismissal, which is only applicable for second
offense
Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took advantage of his high
government position, it still could not validly dismiss him from the service. Under the Rules,
taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an aggravating circumstance,
and where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed. Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on Rayala is suspension for
one (1) year.