A.C. No.

932

June 21, 1940

In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent,

Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta as petitioner-complainant.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an administrative case initiated upon complaint of the Solicitor-General against the
respondent Roque Santiago, charging the latter with malpractice and praying that disciplinary action
be taken against him.
It appears that one Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife Soledad Colares
for some nine consecutive years and who was bent on contracting a second marriage, sought the
legal advice of the respondent, who was at the time a practicing and notary public in the Province of
Occidental Negros. The respondent, after hearing Baniquit's side of the case, assured the latter that
he could secure a separation from his wife and marry again, and asked him to bring his wife on the
afternoon of the same day, May 29, 1939. This was done and the respondent right then and there
prepared the document Exhibit A in which it was stipulated, among other things, that the contracting
parties, who are husband and wife authorized each other to marry again, at the same time
renouncing or waiving whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying. After
the execution and acknowledgment of Exhibit A by the parties, the respondent asked the spouses to
shake hands and assured them that they were single and as such could contract another and
subsequent marriage. Baniquit then remarked, "Would there be no trouble?" Upon hearing it the
respondent stood up and, pointing to his diploma hanging on the wall, said: "I would tear that off if
this document turns out not to be valid." Relying on the validity of Exhibit A, Ernesto Baniquit, on
June 11, 1939, contracted a second marriage with Trinidad Aurelio. There is also evidence to show
that the respondent tried to collect for this service the sum of P50, but as the evidence on this point
is not clear and the same is not material in the resolution of the present case, we do not find it
necessary to make any express finding as to whether the full amount or any portion thereof was paid
or, as contended by the respondent, the service were rendered free of charge.
The respondent did not deny the preparation of Exhibit A, put up the defense that he had the idea
that seven years separation of husband and wife would entitle either of them to contract a second
marriage and for that reason prepared Exhibit A, but immediately after the execution of said
document he realized that he had made a mistake and for that reason immediately sent for the
contracting parties who, on June 30, 1939, came to his office and signed the deed of cancellation
Exhibit A.
There is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed by and between the spouses Ernesto Baniquit
and Soledad Colares upon the advice of the respondent and prepared by the latter as a lawyer and
acknowledged by him as a notary public is contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital
foundation of the family. The advice given by the respondent, the preparation and acknowledgment
by him of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law. The
admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued
enjoyment of the privilege conferred is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to

society. When it appears that he, by recklessness or sheer ignorance of the law, is unfit or unsafe to
be entrusted with the responsibilities and obligations of a lawyer, his right to continue in the
enjoyment of this professional privilege should be declared terminated. In the present case,
respondent was either ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly negligent in giving
the complainant legal advice. Drastic action should lead to his disbarment and this is the opinion of
some members of the court. The majority, however, have inclined to follow the recommendation of
the investigator, the Honorable Sotero Rodas, in view of the circumstances stated in the report of
said investigator and the fact that immediately after discovering his mistakes, respondent
endeavored to correct it by making the parties sign another document cancelling the previous one.
The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one year. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 104

January 28, 1954

BENITA S. BALINON, petitioner,

vs.
CELESTINO M. DE LEON, ET AL., respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag, First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr.
and Solicitor Juan T. Alano for petitioner.
Celestino M. de Leon in his own behalf.
Justo T. Velayo in his own behalf.
PARAS, C.J.:
The Solicitor General has filed a complaint against the respondent Celestino M. de Leon and Justo
T. Velayo, duly qualified members of the bar in active practice, alleging that, since December, 1948,
respondent de Leon, still legally married to Vertudes Marquez, lived as husband and wife with
Regina S. Balinon; the said respondent prepared and subscribed on February 4, 1948, before
respondent Velayo, a notary public, an affidavit which reads as follows:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
I, Celestino de Leon, of legal age, married, Filipino citizen, after having been duly sworn to
according to law depose and say:
That there exists a contract of separation executed and perfected between my wife, Vertudes
Marquez and myself;
That said contract states among other things that each of us is at liberty and free to take for
himself and herself a lifetime partner with the full consent and authorization of each other;
That by the same contract our conjugal partnership was dissolved and our existing property,
rights and interests were divided and apportioned;

That in the said contract my wife shall have full control, care and custody of the children, and
as such all of our conjugal property rights and interests were apportioned to her with the
exception of my private personal belongings and things pertaining to my law profession;
That, besides the dissolution and the apportionment, said contract further states about my
wife's and also my children's share to my current income by way of alimony and support;
Now, therefore, by virtue of the said contract of separation, I now by these presents take my
new found life-partner Regina S. Balinon, as my true and lawful wife;
That in order to protect her rights and interests with regards to her personality and future
property rights, I, hereby voluntarily and of my own free will solemnly swear under oath;
That I will uphold and defend her honor and dignity and prestige as a woman of the weaker
sex as well as any and all members of her family arising by reasons of said relationship;
That I will remain loyal and faithful to her as a lawful and devoted loving husband for the rest
of my life at all costs;
That I will maintain and preserve the new existing companionship, the love, respect and
goodwill prevailing among the members of her family of which I am now a member as well as
equally mine;
That I will not do any act that may tend to degrade or dishonor her or any member of her
family unbecoming the dignity of said relationship but would rather take and respect her as
my true and lawful wife;
That in case of intentional desertion on my part thereby frustrating the true and honest intent
of my affirmations, the same may be sufficient ground for my perpetual disbarment upon her
instance or any third party in interest;
That except for such minor dues and allowances by way of alimony and support mentioned
above, any and all such future properties, rights and interests that we shall acquire during
such relationship shall exclusively appertain and belong to her as her due share and shall
bear her name in all such titles and documents thereto, subject to her legal share as such;
That any offspring that we shall bear by reason of said companionship and relationship shall
be acknowledged by me as my true and legal child with all the rights and privileges accorded
by law pertaining to that of a legitimate child;
That this contract of companionship is done of my own accord, freely and voluntarily without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, So help me God.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my signature this 4th day of February 1949.

(Sgd.) CELESTINO M. DE LEON

Signed in the Presence of :

...................................................................................................
.......................................................................................

............

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES s.s.

City of Bacolod
Personally appeared before me this 4th day of February 1949, Celestino de Leon with
Residence Certificate No. ............ issued at ................ on ............... 1949 who executed the
foregoing affidavit with contract of companionship consisting of two pages, and
acknowledged by me that the same is his own free and voluntary act and deed.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal on the place and date first
written above.

(Sgd.) CELESTINO M. DE LEON

Notary Public
Until December 31, 1948

Doc. No. 484

Page No. 97
Book No. XVI
Series of 1949.
The complaint also alleges that, notwithstanding the unlawful and immoral purposes of the foregoing
affidavit, respondent Velayo knowingly signed the same in violation of his oath of office as attorney
and notary public.
Respondent De Leon admits his continuous cohabitation with Regina S. Balinon during his
subsisting marriage with Vertudes Marquez and the fact the he prepared and subscribed the affidavit
above quoted, but contends that he has not been finally convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude; that while the affidavit may be illicit, it is not an agreement but a mere innocent unilateral
declaration of facts; and that while the execution of said affidavit may be illegal and void ab initio, no
specific law has been violated so as to give rise to an action. Respondent Velayo alleges, on the
other hand, that his participation was limited to the task of notarizing the affidavit, as a matter of
courtesy to a brother lawyer and without knowing its contents, and this allegation is corroborated by
respondent De Leon who further stated that no consideration whatsoever passed to the former.
This court had heretofore imposed the penalty of suspension upon an attorney who prepared a
document stipulating, among others, that the contracting parties, who are husband and wife,
authorized each other to marry again and that each renounced whatever right of action one might
have against the party so marrying (In re Roque Santiago, 40 Off. Gaz. [7th Supp.] p. 208). In effect
the affidavit prepared and signed by respondent De Leon has similar implication, in that although it
did not bluntly authorize said respondent to marry another during his subsisting wedlock with
Vertudes Marquez, he made it appear that he could take in another woman as a lifetime partner to
whom he would remain loyal and faithful as a lawful and devoted loving husband and whom he could
take and respect as his true and lawful wife; thereby virtually permitting himself to commit the crime

of concubinage. It is true, as respondent De Leon argues, that the consent or pardon of either
spouse constitutes a bar to a criminal prosecution for adultery and concubinage, but, as the Solicitor
General observes, said crimes are not thereby legalized, the result being merely that prosecution in
such cases would not lie. The contention that the affidavit is only a unilateral declaration of facts is of
no moment, since it undoubtedly enabled respondent De Leon to attain his purpose of winning over
Regina S. Balinon with some degree of permanence.
It is likewise insisted that the acts imputed to respondent De Leon had no relation with his
professional duties and therefore cannot serve as a basis for suspension or disbarment under
section 25 of Rule 127. It should be remembered, however, that a member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from office as a lawyer on grounds other than those enumerated by said
provision (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil., 567). Moreover, we can even state that respondent De Leon was
able to prepare the affidavit in question because he is a lawyer, and has rendered professional
service to himself as a client. He surely employed his knowledge of the law and skill as an attorney
to his advantage. (Manalo vs. Gan, Adm. Case No. 72, May 13, 1953.)
With reference with respondent Velayo, there is no question that he did nothing except to affix his
signature to the affidavit in question as a notary public. While, as contended by his counsel, the duty
of a notary public is principally to ascertain the identity of the affiant and the voluntariness of the
declaration, it is nevertheless incumbent upon him at least to guard against having anything to do
with an illegal or immoral arrangement. In the present case respondent Velayo was somewhat
negligent in just affixing his signature to the affidavit, although his fault is mitigated by the fact the he
had relied on the good faith of his co-respondent.
Wherefore, we hereby decree the suspension from the practice of law of respondent Celestino M. de
Leon for three years from the date of promulgation of this decision. Respondent Justo T. Velayo is
hereby merely reprimanded. So ordered.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

GIOVANI
M.
IGUAL, complainant,
JAVIER, respondent.

vs. ATTY.

ROLANDO

S.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In the instant case, this Court has found occasion to again remind members of the
Bar to observe honesty in their dealings with clients and the public alike, and fidelity to
the cause entrusted to them.
This case stemmed from a Complaint-Affidavit filed by complainant with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on September 23, 1991 to initiate disbarment
proceedings against the respondent, for malpractice, deceit, dishonesty, (and) gross
misconduct in his office as attorney and/or for violation of his lawyers oath x x x.

Respondent was accused of having unlawfully withheld and misappropriated

complaints money in the amount of P7,000.00, allegedly paid by way of acceptance fee
for a matter which respondent never performed any work on.
[1]

The IBPs Committee on Bar Discipline, through its investigating Commissioner

Vicente Q. Roxas, required respondent to answer the charges and thereafter held
several hearings, during which the parties were able to present their respective
witnesses and documentary evidence. After the parties had filed their respective formal
offer of evidence as well as memoranda, the case was considered submitted for
resolution. Subsequently, the commissioner rendered his Commissioners Report
dated January 30, 1995, which became the basis for the Resolution passed by the IBP
Board of Governors on February 18, 1995, which reads as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XI-95-288

CBD Case No. 174
Giovani M. Igual vs.
Atty. Rolando S. Javier
RESOLVED to RECOMMEND to the Supreme Court that the respondent be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) month and restitution of the
SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P7,000.00) acceptance fee.
The Antecedent Facts
Inasmuch as the findings of fact made by Commissioner Roxas in his report are
substantiated by the evidence on record, the same are herein adopted, to wit:

The complaint dated September 23, 1991 alleges that complainant met respondent
attorney thru complainants tennis partner, one Sergio Dorado, sometime April 1,
1991. Complainant asked Sergio Dorado to make it possible for complainant to meet
respondent at the latters house regarding the possibility of hiring respondent to handle
Civil Case No. 2 188-LRC No. 215, pending with the Regional Trial Court of Aklan.
A decision favorable to complainants mother had just been rendered but this decision
was appealed by the adverse party to the Court of Appeals, consolidated and docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 32592 [1(a) Complaint-Affidavit].Complainant said respondent is
being hired because complainants mother wanted the appeal expedited.

That very night, when Atty. Javier offered to collaborate in the appealed case [1(c)
Complaint-Affidavit] because Atty. Javier through sweet talk and pretense of influence to
several justices of the Court of Appeals x x x that he could be of great help in expediting
the speedy disposition of the case [1(b) Complaint-Affidavit] complainant gave
respondent P10,000.00 which money he intended to buy a refrigerator with.
Complainant alleged that he gave the money with the understanding that the money is
for safekeeping and as proof, according to him, x x x promising to return my money
should my mother and her lawyer Atty. Ibadlit disagree in his collaborating in the case
[1(c) Complaint-Affidavit] - covered by receipt which provides: Received the amount of
Ten Thousand (P 10,000.00) Pesos from Mr. Giovani M. Igual as Legal Fees and Filing
Fees (Civil Case No. 2188). April 1, 1991 signed by respondent Atty. Rolando S. Javier.
[Exhibit A and Annex A to Complaint-Affidavit].
Respondent thus entered his formal appearance as collaborating counsel
dated April 3, 1991 [Annex B to Complaint-Affidavit]. Then complainant wrote
respondent on June 27, 1991 stating that he is demanding P7,000.00 balance since
P3,000.00 had already been refunded by respondent. [Exhibit B and Annex C,
Complaint-Affidavit].
Instead of filing an Answer, respondent filed an Affidavit dated April 20, 1992,
alleging that: he gave back the P3,000.00 not as a settlement because complainant said
his child was hospitalized and gravely ill [par. 22, Affidavit-Javier] and that the reason
why complainant wanted a refund of the remaining P7,000.00 is because it is not the
fault of the affiant if Giovani M. Igual had quarreled with his mother or his brother or his
sister as to the reimbursement or sharing of the Legal Fees - because the truth was that
Igual wanted to secure double or bigger reimbursement. [par. 30, Affidavit-Javier].
Complainant denied the allegation of respondent in a Reply-Affidavit dated May 21,
1992.
Respondent presented Exhibit 4 which is certified xerox copy of the Decision
dated March 19, 1991 in Civil Case No. 2188 and LRC 215, Regional Trial Court of
Aklan, Province.
Respondents declared purpose in the Formal Offer of Evidence was to show that
Atty. Rolando S. Javier had accepted the appealed cases and had obtained pertinent
records or pleadings to work on it [page 2 number (4) exhibit, Formal Offer
dated February 6, 1993].
From the evidence, however, the decision is dated February 25, 1991 and
the March 19, 1991 is the date of the RTCs Order stating that the appeal had been
perfected.

Complainant testified that he went back on April 3, 1991, to claim back the P
10,000.00 given last April 1, 1991. [TSN, page 15, July 8, 1992, Giovani
Igual]. Respondent also reimbursed the P3,000.00 two (2) months after. [TSN, page
19, July 8, 1992].
Respondent testified that he entered as collaborating counsel only and was
promised P20,000.00 if he wins the case and:

A: x x x as collaborating counsel I am going to to (sic) prepare the appeal brief and

that I required Mr. Giovani Igual to get the consent of his brothers, sisters and mother.
[TSN, pages 12-13, September 16, 1992, Atty. Javier]. .
Respondent further testified that:

A: Now as to the agreement as to the fees, about few days after our agreement he
returned and gave me the money. The agreement is that that is my legal fee. That is an
acceptance fee. I do not know where he got that but that is what he paid me. [TSN,
page 15, Sept. 16, 1992, Atty. Javier].
The Commission confronted respondent with the question:

Q: How about the copy of the appeal? (sic) [TSN, page 27, September 16, 1992, Atty.
Javier]
A: It was not finished, Your Honor, because we quarreled. When I am preparing the
brief we quarreled already. [TSN, page 27, September 16, 1992, Atty. Javier].
Then again:

A: This is what I promised him. I told him that upon the arrival of all pertinent records
in the Court of Appeals, I am going to prepare the brief but on the basis of the paper
that I have in my possession(.) I can merely be guided by the decision. [TSN, page
34, September 16, 1992, Atty. Javier]
Question: Did you not ascertain from them when did they receive the appellants brief
because for purposes of prescription there is the reglementary period within which to
file appellees brief?

Answer: I did not ascertain anymore because at that time my thinking was that I have
to study first the case.
Question: Considering that this is the filing of appellees brief, is there a need to pay
filing fee for appellees brief?
Answer: If what you inquired from (sic) is the filing of an appellees brief, there is no
such thing. But if you see, in filing briefs in the appealed cases there are usually
motions for reconsideration, supplement of the appellees brief and if you look on the
Rules of Court, even the motion for reconsideration is payable. Even a motion for
reconsideration on the appealed cases has to be paid. There is a fee so I put there the
legal fees or the filing fees but that does not necessarily mean that I am referring to a
filing fee of an appealed brief. Take note, sir, that in the rule of filing fees even
motions for reconsideration or supplement to the motion for reconsideration there
must be a payment of fees. [TSN, pages 39-40, September 16, 1992, Cross
Examination of Atty. Javier]
Q: And only you did not specify that this is in payment for your professional services,
is that correct?
A: Yes that is true. It is a matter of style. There are lawyers who specified
transportation, fees, etc.
Q: Did you not also issue a receipt that this is only a partial payment?
A: I did not. What I did, Your Honor, is to issue a receipt for P 10,000.00 as my legal
fees and filing fees in a package deal basis with an unwritten agreement that if I will
win the case on the appeal on the basis of my appellees brief in a gentlemans
agreement he will give me additional P 10,000.00. It is not written. [TSN pages 44
to 45, September 16, 1992, Atty. Javiers cross examination] (italics supplied)
Commissioners Evaluation
Commissioner Roxas then rendered the following analysis and evaluation of the
evidene presented:
This would have been a difficult situation had there been no written receipt of
payment of fees. In a lawyer-client relationship, what is governing is the written receipt
dated April 1, 1991.Respondent admits he was hired to prepare an appellees brief

Respondent admits he did not prepare said appellees brief because he and his clients
immediately quarreled after hiring. If that was the situation from the very beginning - that
respondent quarreled with his clients immediately within two days after April 1,
1991 - respondent knew all along he would not get his papers of the case and he knew
all along he will not make the appellees brief.
In such situations, if indeed the lawyer cannot agree with the client, or, as in this
case, the lawyer is quarreling with his client, there are several options for the lawyer to
exit from the relationship instead of merely maintaining a cold war of doing nothing in
the case, such as securing a written and signed notice of withdrawal from the case, or,
manifesting to the court the circumstances why he can no longer proceed in
representing his client. Otherwise, a lawyers act will be interpreted as abandonment.
More than the mere presumption that respondent abandoned his client if he does
not render any service to the case he is handling, there are other positive indications of
why such presumptions may altogether be confirmed as intentional:
FIRST, respondent alleged that he was angry at complainant because he resented
what he testified to as the attitude of the clients in calling him names in the
neighborhood for failing to return the money.
SECOND, despite the fact the April 1, 1991 receipt specified that the money would
be for legal fees and filing fees, yet none of the two materialized.
Respondent claims the money given him is an acceptance fee. But, as known by
respondent, ambiguities in contracts prepared by him, are construed against him, and
thus, if the receipt does not specify that it is such an acceptance fee, it cannot be
treated as such. When it comes to fees, the amount and purpose must be clearly
stated. Otherwise said contracts are interpreted against the lawyer who is presumed to
know better on such legal matters as against his client, as in this case, who is not a
lawyer.
The crucial evidence against respondent is his own admissions that he never really
performed any work in preparing or submitting any appellees brief.
Respondent claims that he was forced to such a situation because of the attitude of
the client which compelled attorney to maintain his ground in refusing to reimburse
money to someone who continues to malign his character - which is the reason why
respondent had acted as he did. This complainant did not refute.

Respondent should have set aside his personal feelings and should have pursued
diligently the cause of his client within the bounds of reason, justice, and fair play. Public
interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or
defense of his clients cause [Cantiller vs. Potenciano, 180 SCRA 246]. It has been held
that such neglect of respondent, his failure to exercise due diligence or his
abandonment of clients cause, renders him unworthy of the trust of his client [Ibid]. The
Supreme Court has pointed out that lawyers have a higher responsibility because they
are an indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this
jurisdiction [Ibid].
Respondents attitude of blaming his client for the latters allegedly maligning him is
not being candid with the Commission. Respondent must be reminded that candor
towards the court is a cardinal requirement of a practicing lawyer [Paluwagan ng Bayan
Savings Bank vs. King, 172 SCRA 60].
For it has been held that a lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of
the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of
dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society [Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166 SCRA
316], and not contribute to propagating more disputes. (italics supplied)
Commissioner Roxas then made the following recommendation, to wit:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended to the Board of Governors, that the

penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS
be meted on respondent in view of the circumstances.
which recommended penalty, as indicated above, was reduced by the IBP Board of
Governors to a suspension of one (1) month, but with the addition that respondent be
required to restitute the P7,000.00 (balance) he received from complainant.
The Courts Ruling
We are in agreement with Commissioner Roxas findings and conclusions, as
-approved by the IBP Board of Governors. In addition, we note that respondent not only
unjustifiably refused to return the complainants money upon demand, but he stubbornly
persisted in clinging to what was not his and to which he absolutely had no right. Such
lack of delicadeza and absence of integrity was further highlighted by respondents halfbaked excuses, hoary pretenses and blatant lies in his testimony before the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline represented by Commissioner Roxas.The sad thing is, he
was not fooling anyone at all. He only ended up making a fool of himself in the process.

Respondent, like all other members of the Bar, was and is expected to always live
up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the
following Canons,viz:

CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings
and transactions with his client.
CANON 16- A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that
may come into his possession.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 20 - A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
for the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and
demands utmost fidelity and good faith.
It goes without saying that respondent, by his deceitful actuations constituting
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, must be subjected to disciplinary
measures for his own good, as well as for the good of the entire membership of the Bar
as a whole.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, and consistent with the recommendation of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent ROLANDO S. JAVIER is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) MONTH, effective upon
notice hereof, and ORDERED to restitute to the complainant the amount of SEVEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P7,000.00) within thirty (30) days from notice. Let copies of this
Decision be spread upon his record in the Bar Confidants Office and furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, ISABELO ONGTENGCO, ACHILLES BARTOLOME, AND ST. LUKES

MEDICAL CENTER, complainants,
vs.
ATTORNEY BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondent.

Norberto Gonzales for Fernandez.

Bu Castro for Ongtengco & Bartolome.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Pea & Nolasco for St. Luke's Hospital.
Joaquin P. Yuseco for respondent Benjamin Grecia.

PER CURIAM:
This disbarment complaint against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia was filed on August 20, 1991 by
Doctors Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco and Achilles Bartolome and the St. Luke's Medical
Center (hereafter "St. Luke's" for brevity) where they are accredited medical practitioners. The
respondent is charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection with the theft of some
pages from a medical chart which was material evidence in a damage suit filed by his clients against
the aforenamed doctors and St. Luke's.
Disciplinary proceedings like this one are in a class by themselves. As we observed in In Re
Almacen, 31 SCRA 562,600, they are neither purely civil nor purely criminal. "Public interests is the
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such." The purpose is "to protect the court and the public from
the misconduct of officers of the court" (In Re Montagne & Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577, 588), or to
remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney (Ledesma vs. Climaco, 57 SCRA
473; Atienza vs. Evangelista, 80 SCRA 338).
Disbarment is nothing new to respondent Grecia. On November 12, 1987, he was disbarred for his
immoral complicity or "unholy alliance" with a judge in Quezon City to rip off banks and Chinese
business firms which had the misfortune to be sued in the latter's court (Prudential Bank vs. Judge
Jose P. Castro and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia [Adm. Case No. 2756], 155 SCRA 604).
Three years later, on December 18, 1990, the Court, heeding his pleas for compassions and his
promise to mend his ways, reinstated him in the profession. Only eight (8) months later, on August
20, 1991, he was back before the court facing another charge of dishonesty and unethical practice.
Apparently, the earlier disciplinary action that the Court took against him did not effectively reform
him.
The complaint of St. Luke's against Attorney Grecia was referred by the Court to Deputy Court of
Administrator Juanito A. Bernad for investigation, report and recommendation. The following are
Judge Bernad's findings:
The late Fe Linda Aves was seven (7) months pregnant when she was admitted as a patient at St.
Luke's Hospital on December 20, 1990. She complained of dizziness, hypertension, and abdominal
pains with vaginal bleeding. Dr. Fernandez, head of the OB-GYNE Department of St. Luke's, Dr.

Ongtengco, Jr., a cardiologist, and Dr. Bartolome, a urologist, examined Mrs. Aves and diagnosed
her problem as mild pre-eclampsia (p. 63, Rollo). Five (5) days later, on Christmas day, December
25, 1990, Mrs. Aves was discharged from the hospital, to celebrate Christmas with her family.
However, she was rushed back to the hospital the next day, December 26, 1990. On December 27,
1990, she died together with her unborn child.
Blaming the doctors of St. Luke's for his wife's demise, Attorney Damaso B. Aves, along with his
three (3) minor children, brought an action for damages against the hospital and the attending
physicians of his wife. Their counsel, respondent Attorney Benjamin Grecia, filed a complaint
entitled: "Attorney Damaso B. Aves, et al. vs. St. Luke's Medical Center, Drs. Alberto Fernandez,
Isabelo Ongtengco, Jr. and Achilles Bartolome" in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Bulacan,
where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3548-V and assigned to Branch 172, presided over by
Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong.
On July 4, 1991, the medical records of Fe Linda Aves were produced in court by St. Luke's, as
requested by Attorney Grecia. The records were entrusted to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court,
Avelina Robles.
On July 16, 1991, between 8:30-9:00 o' clock in the morning, upon arriving in court for another
hearing of the case, Attorney Grecia borrowed from Mrs. Robles the folder containing the medical
records of Mrs. Aves.
While leafing through the folder, Grecia surreptitiously tore off two (2) pages of the medical records.
The respondent's act was notified by Mrs. Robles and Maria Arnet Sandico, a clerk. They saw
Grecia crumple the papers and place them inside the right pocket of his coat. He immediately
returned the folder to Mrs. Roblesa (who was momentarily rendered speechless by his audacious
act) and left the office.
Mrs. Robles examined the medical chart and found pages "72" and "73" missing. She ordered
Sandico to follow the respondent. Sandico saw Grecia near the canteen at the end of the building,
calling a man (presumably his driver) who was leaning against a parked car (presumably Grecia's
car). When the man approached, Grecia gave him the crumpled papers which he took from his
coatpocket. Sandico returned to the office and reported what she had seen to Mrs. Robles. The latter
in turn reported it to Judge Capulong. The three of
them Judge Capulong, Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico went downstairs. Ms. Sandico pointed to
Judge Capulong the man to whom Grecia had given the papers which he had filched from medical
folder of Linda Aves. Judge Capulong told Sandico to bring the man to her chamber. On the way
back to chamber, Judge Capulong saw the plaintiff, Attorney Damaso Aves, and St. Luke's counsel,
Attorney Melanie Limson. She requested them to come to her office.
In the presence of Attorneys Aves and Limson, Mrs. Robles, Ms. Sandico, and a visitor, Judge
Capulong confronted the man and ordered him to give her the papers which Grecia had passed on
to him. The man at first denied that he had the papers in his possession. However, when Sandico
declared that she saw Grecia hand over the papers to him, the man sheepishly took them from his
pants pocket and gave them to Judge Capulong. When the crumpled pages "72" and "73" of the

medical folder were shown to Sandico, she identified them as the same papers that she saw Grecia
hand over to the man.
After the confrontation, Sandicio and Robles went back to their office. Mrs. Robles collapsed in a
dead faint and was rushed to the Fatima Hospital where she later regained consciousness.
In the ensuing excitement and confusion of recovering the stolen exhibits, no one thought of
ascertaining the identity of the man from whom they were recovered. Judge Capulong belatedly
realized this, so she directed the Valenzuela Police to find out who he was. She also ordered
Sandico to submit a formal report of the theft of the exhibits to the police.
A police investigator, PO3 Arnold Alabastro, tried to ascertain the name of Grecia's driver who was
known only as "SID." He located Grecia's house in Quezon City. Although he was not allowed to
enter the premises, he was able to talk with a house maid. He pretended to be a cousin of "SID" and
asked for the latter. The housemaid informed him that "SID" was sent home to his province by
Grecia.
He talked with Grecia himself but the latter denied that he had a driver named "SID."
PO3 Alabastro also talked wit one of Grecia's neighbors across the street. The neighbor confirmed
that Grecia's driver was a fellow named "SID".
The incident caused enormous emotional strain to the personnel of Judge Capulong's court, so
much so that the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina Robles, was hospitalized. Because of the
incident, Judge Capulong inhibited herself from conducting the trial of Civil Case No. 3548-V.
On August 20, 1991, St. Luke's failed this disbarment case against Grecia.
At the investigation of the case by Judge Bernad, Attorney Damaso Aves, the surviving spouse of
the late Fe Linda Aves and plaintiff in Civil case No. 3548-V, testified that it was Attorney Bu Castro,
counsel of the defendants in said Civil Case No. 3548-V, who lifted two pages from the medical
folder which lay among some papers on top of the table of Acting Branch Clerk of Court Robles.
When he allegedly went outside the courthouse to wait for Attorney Grecia to arrive, he noticed
Attorney Castro come out of the building and walk toward a man in the parking lot to whom he
handed a piece of paper. Afterward, Attorney Castro reentered the courthouse.
Respondent Grecia denied any knowledge of the theft of the exhibits in the Aves case. He alleged
that the person who was caught in possession of the detached pages of the medical record was
actually "planted" by his adversaries to discredit him and destroy his reputation.
He denied that he had a driver. He alleged that his car was out of order on July 16, 1991, so he was
fetched by the driver of Attorney Aves in the latter's "Maxima" car. He arrived in the courthouse at
exactly 9:15 in the morning and went straight to the courtroom on the second floor of the building. He
did not leave the place until his case was called at 9:40. Since it was allegedly a very warm day, he
wore a dark blue barong tagalog, not a business suit. He branded the testimony of Ms. Sandico as
an absolute falsehood. He alleged that he would not have done the act imputed to him, because the

medical chart was the very foundation of the civil case which he filed against St. Luke's and its
doctors. He wondered why the man, alleged to be his driver, to whom he supposedly gave the
detached pages of the medical chart, was neither held nor arrested. His identity was not even
established.
He likewise branded the testimony of Police Investigator Alabastro as a fabrication for he had never
seen him before.
He underscored the fact that none of the lawyers in the courthouse, nor any of the court personnel,
accosted him about the purloined pages of the medical record and he alleged that the unidentified
man remained in the courtroom even after the confrontation in the Judge's chamber.
In evaluating the testimonies of the witnesses, Judge Bernad found the court employee, Maria Arnie
Sandico, and Acting branch Clerk of Court Avelina Robles entirely credible and "without any
noticeable guile nor attempt at fabrication, remaining constant even under pressure of cross
examination" (p. 11, Judge Bernad's Report).
That the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Mrs. Robles, who is not even a lawyer, and her lowly clerk,
Ms. Sandico, did not promptly raise a hue and cry on seeing Grecia tear off two pages of the medical
record, was understandable for they hesitated to confront a man of his stature. Nevertheless, they
had the presence of mind to immediately report the matter to their Judge who forthwith took
appropriate steps to recover the exhibits. Robles, Sandico and PO3 Alabastro had absolutely no
motive to testify falsely against the respondent.
While Judge Capulong took the blame for failing to ascertain the identity of Attorney Grecia's "driver,"
her swift action in summoning and confronting him led to the recovery of the stolen pages of the
medical chart.
Unfortunately, the inquiry made by Police Investigation Arnold Alabastro into identity of the man was
fruitless for he was never seen again.
Attorney Aves' allegation that it was St. Luke's counsel, Attorney Castro, not Grecia, who stole the
pages from the medical folder and slipped them to an unidentified man, is an incredible fabrication.
Not only is it directly contradicted by Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico, but, significantly, Attorney Aves
failed to mention it during the confrontation with the man inside Judge Capulong's chamber where he
(Attorney Aves) was present.
His other allegation that he saw the man inside the courtroom afterwards, is not credible for he
would have called the attention of Judge Capulong who, he knew, had been looking for the man to
ascertain his identity.
In view of his obvious bias for his counsel, Aves' testimony was properly disregarded by the
investigator, Judge Bernad. Likewise wanting in truth and candor was Grecia's testimony. Judge
Bernad noted that while Grecia was punctilious when testifying on the hour of his arrival in court
(9:15 A.M.) on July 16, 1991, and he even remembered that on that day he wore a dark blue barong
tagalog (an apparel that has no pockets), his memory was not sharp when he was cross-examined

regarding more recent events. For instance, he insisted that Judge Bernad was absent on August 4,
1992, but the truth is that a hearing was held on that date as shown by the transcript.
When he was confronted with exhibits "A" and "B," Grecia tried to make an issue of the absence of a
court order to deposit Linda Aves' medical chart in court. He forgot that it was he who asked that the
chart be left with the clerk of court.
His allegation that he would be the last person to remove pages 72 and 73 of the medical chart for
the entries therein are favorable to his client's cause is specious. As a matter of fact, the entries
show that after Mrs. Aves was readmitted to the hospital on December 26, 1990, the doctors were
able to stabilize her blood pressure with a normal reading of 120/80.
On the basis of the evidence presented before Judge Bernad, the Court is convinced that the charge
against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia is true. By stealing two pages from Linda Aves' medical chart
and passing them on to his driver, he violated Rule 1.01, canon 1 of the Rules of Professional
Responsibility as well as canon 7 thereof which provide that:
Canon 1. . . .
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful
conduct.
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the
ends of justice" (People ex rel Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855). An incorrigible practitioner of
"dirty tricks," like Grecia would be ill-suited to discharge the role of "an instrument to advance the
ends of justice."
The importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer's equipment in the practice
of his profession has been stressed by this Court repeatedly.
. . . The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty
and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession
by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity
which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity,
honesty and integrity of the profession. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248,
September 18, 1992, pp. 13-14.)
. . . . The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person
of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of members of the Bar.
Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge of

professional duties as a member of the bar, which puts his moral character in serious
doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. (Melendrez vs. Decena,
176 SCRA 662, 676.)
. . . public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should
be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn to
observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, a s well as being subject for
judicial disciplinary control for the protection of court, clients and the public. (Phil.
Association of Free Labor Unions [PAFLU] vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company,
42 SCRA 302, 305.)
By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and disgraced the
legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable
fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the BAR.
Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court, or an unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the privileges and to manage
the business of others in the capacity of an attorney, or for conduct which tends to
bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the
public. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248, September 18, 1992, p. 15.)
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Attorney Benjamin Grecia guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and
grossly unethical behavior as a lawyer. Considering that this is his second offense against the
canons of the profession, the Court resolved to impose upon him once more the supreme penalty of
DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is hereby CANCELLED and the Bar
Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and
Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., took no part.
Padilla, J., is on leave.

EDUARDO L. NUEZ, EUGENIO O. NUEZ, ELISA NUEZ-ALVARICO and

IMELDA L. NUEZ, complainants, vs. Atty. ARTURO B.
ASTORGA, respondent.
DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Disbarment and suspension of an attorney are the most severe forms of

disciplinary action; thus, they should be imposed with great caution. They
should be meted out only for duly proven serious administrative charges.
[1]

The Case and the Facts

This administrative case stems from a Complaint-Affidavit filed with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by
Eduardo L. Nuez, Eugenio O. Nuez, Eliza Nuez-Alvarico and Imelda L. Nuez.
Atty. Arturo B. Astorga was charged therein with conduct unbecoming a
member of the bar. The material averments of the Complaint are summarized
by the IBP-CBD as follows:
[2]

Complainants allege that sometime on June 5, 1968, the late Maria Ortega Vda. De
Nu[]ez executed a Sale with Right to Repurchase in favor of Eugenio O. Nu[]ez Lot
No. 106 covered by OCT No. 2651 (now TCT No. 8955) containing an area of 384 sq.
ms. for a consideration of P400.00. In the said contract, the stipulated time of
repurchase was ten (10) years from the date of execution thereof or until June 5, 1978.
That said period of vendors right to repurchase expired without any agreement of
extending said period of repurchase. To date, even the heirs of the late Maria Ortega
Vda. de Nu[]ez have not exercised[d] their right of repurchase. A year after the
execution of the said pacto de ret[r]o sale, the late Maria Ortega Vda. de Nu[]ez and
her son Ricardo Nu[]ez, as the surviving heirs of the late Eleuterio Nu[]ez,
extrajudicially partitioned his estate, among others, the subject [L]ot No. 106 was
adjudicated to Ricardo Nu[]ez which eventually was the basis for the issuance of TCT
No. 8955 in the name of Ricardo Nu[]ez. Eugenio O. Nu[]ez [has] occupied and
possessed said Lot No. 106 for more than 40 years up to the present and it is also
where his children, Eduardo, Elisa and Imelda, all surnamed Nu[]ez, grew and [are]
presently residing.
By virtue of a power of attorney executed sometime in 1982 by the late spouses
Ricardo Nu[]ez and Paterna Nu[]ez appointing respondent as administrator, as well as
on the alleged judicial confirmation of respondents wife, as acknowledged natural
child of Ricardo Nu[]ez, respondent, on the pretext of administering the properties of
the late spouses, had been disturbing the peaceful occupation and possession of

complainants of Lot No. 106 claiming that complainants have no right over the same.
With our desire to peaceably settle the controversy, complainants agreed to buy Lot
No. 106, and respondent, who, without being appointed by the court as administrator
of the intestate estate of the late spouses Ricardo Nu[]ez and Paterna Nu[]ez, sold and
conveyed to Imelda Nu[]ez and Elisa Nu[]ez-Alvarico the portions of Lot No. 106
they were occupying. After which Elisa Nu[]ez-Alvarico filed a criminal complaint
for Estafa against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte
docketed as Criminal Case No. R-4013-A.
Sometime on 29 March 2001 at around 7:30 in the evening, respondent went to the
house of Eduardo L. Nu[]ez at corner J.P. Laurel and M.L. Quezon Sts., Baybay,
Leyte and threatened to kill Eduardo Nu[]ez by uttering the words ipaposil ta ka
which means Ill have you shot. A complaint for Grave Threats docketed as Case No.
R-4012-A was filed by Eduardo L. Nu[]ez before Municipal Trial Court of Baybay,
Leyte.
[3]

In a hearing held on June 5, 2002, complainants appeared with their

counsel, while respondent was represented by Atty. Arnold Logares. As
respondent had not yet filed his answer to the Complaint despite a previous
Order dated December 7, 2001, he was granted a period of fifteen (15) days
within which to do so. The hearing was thus reset to June 26, 2002.
[4]

On June 26, 2002, only respondents counsel, Atty. Arnold Logares, was
present. Respondent filed a Motion seeking a cancellation of the scheduled
hearing and another extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file his
answer. He was thus granted a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days
within which to do so.
[5]

On July 18, 2002, Atty. Astorga finally submitted his Answer. He denied
that he had utilized his profession to circumvent the law and averred that there
were already several pending cases involving the same issues raised by
complainants in the present administrative action:
[6]

2. That the Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase executed by the late Maria Ortega
Vda. De Nuez on June 5, 1968 is more civil in nature and can be best threshed out in
the amended complaint of Civil Case No. B-2001-10-27, entitled []The Intestate
Estate of the late Spouses Ricardo O. Nuez, et al versus Spouses Bonito D. Alvarico,

et al[] for Rescission of Contract[.] [T]he original complaint was filed in October
2001 at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte; an amended complaint of
which is filed where one of the issues is the declaration of invalidity of the foregoing
questioned deed of sale with right to repurchase because if this document is really
valid and existing then why did complainant Eugenio Nuez [affix] his signature as one
of the instrumental witnesses in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition among Maria
Ortega Vda. De Nuez and Ricardo O. Nuez on May 19, 1969 otherwise he would have
protested at the time of the execution thereof because he is the temporary owner of
Lot No. 106, one of the properties subject of partition. Why did he allow the late
Ricardo O. Nuez to take control and full possession and ownership of Lot 106 to his
exclusion after the partition in 1969?
xxxxxxxxx
[3] b) It is not only the authority of the Spouses Ricardo O. Nuez and Paterna Baltazar
that herein respondent is relying as administrator of the said intestate estate but the
same had been duly confirmed by the judicially declared daughter of Ricardo O.
Nuez, namely, respondents wife Dr. Linda Teresa Tan-Nuez who confirmed
undersign[ed]s authority as administrator of the aforenamed estate;
[3] c) With the discovery of the aforenamed deed of sale with the right to repurchase
only recently, the complainants were emboldened to actively [question] [the] estate as
they now [refuse] to recognize the ownership and long time possession of the real
properties forming part of the aforenamed [estate] to belong to the offspring of the late
Ricardo O. Nuez;
[3] d) Undersigned respondent did not utilize his profession to circumvent the law.
Complainants Elisa L. Nuez and Imelda L. Nuez are actually renting the cornermost
portion of the consolidated Lot Nos. 106 and 107 of the Baybay Cadastre with an area
only of 201 square meters, more or less, and when respondent was trying to eject
them, complainants negotiated with the respondent to buy their area of Lot No. 106
they rented and in fact actually advanced part of the agreed consideration until their
father Eugenio Nuez discovered an existing document of sale with right to repurchase
when they, ill-advised by their counsel [started] filing [a] series of criminal, civil and
administrative cases against respondent and his wife at the instigation of their lawyers,
the late Atty. Jose C. Modina and their current counsel, Atty. Norjue I. Juego as a way
of pressuring respondent and wife to give up [the] portion they are occupying [of] Lot

No. 106[,] including [the] portion which complainant Eduardo Nuez is now renting of
Lot No. 89;
4. That respondent in response to paragraph 7 of the complaint hereby admit the
pendency of Criminal Case No. R-4013-A which was personally filed by Elisa L.
Nuez without the intervention from any government prosecutor but said case is no
longer pending in the Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte when then same was
recommended for dismissal x x x. Later it was ordered dismissed by the Asst.
Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero and approved by Provincial Prosecutor
Teresita S. Lopez on February 22, 2001 x x x but complainants elevated the case for
review to the Department of Justice x x x. Because of the pendency of this criminal
case with the Department of Justice[,] a prejudicial question now exist[s] whereby this
administrative case should be suspended until the resolution of that petition for review
by the Department of Justice;
5. That respondent specifically denies the material allegations of paragraph 8, 9 and
10 of the complaint, the truth of the matter is that Amado Caballes at the instigation of
the complain[an]ts and their counsel filed Criminal Case No. R-4011-A with the
Municipal Trial Court, Baybay, Leyte which is pending pre-trial. Like Criminal Case
No. R-4013-A, the same was filed at the instance of Amado Caballes, x x x. But
before the filing of this present action initiated by Mr. Caballess counsel and
complainants Eduardo Nuez and Eugenio Nuez required Mr. Caballes to execute a
document of resale on August 14, 2001 despite knowing that the same has already
been long redeemed by respondent x x x. Despite legal redemption, and despite
Amado Caballes having executed x x x a Deed of Resale which was witnessed by
complainant Eugenio Nuez x x x, the complainants convinced Amado Caballes to file
Crim. Case No. R-4011-A[.] x x x. That by virtue of the pendency of Criminal Case
No. R-4011-A, there exist[s] a prejudicial question and that further hearing of the
present administrative action should be suspended until the outcome of this criminal
case;
6. That respondent is duly authorized to negotiate for the disposal of any part of the
Intestate Estate of the late Spouses Ricardo O. Nuez and Paterna Baltazar x x x.
7. That regarding paragraph 12 and 13 of the complaint[,] this is a matter of existence
and pend[ing] with [the IBP-CBD] and need not be a part of this complaint because

this will be threshed out in another hearing[.] [T]he truth of the matter is that
respondent had been already acquitted in Crim. Case No. CBU-29395 x x x.
8. That similar to other cases filed at the instance of the Nuezes, there is also filed
Crim. Case No. R-4012-A for Grave Threats by complainant Eduardo Nuez and now
pending in the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte despite the lack of witnesses x x x.
Again, the pendency of this case will constitute a prejudicial question which
necessarily will suspend further hearing of the present administrative action until the
final outcome of the aforesaid Crim. Case No. R-4011-A;
x x x x x x x x x.

[7]

On August 8, 2002, complainants submitted their Reply. Thereafter, IBPCPD Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala scheduled the case for
hearing on December 11, 2002. On this date, respondent requested and was
a granted a period of fifteen (15) days to file his rejoinder. The parties agreed
to file simultaneous memoranda on January 15, 2003, after which the case
was to be considered submitted for resolution.
[8]

[9]

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In her Report, Commissioner Villanueva-Maala found respondent guilty
of serious misconduct. Thus, the investigating commissioner recommended
his suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year.
[10]

In Resolution No. XV-2003-346 dated June 21, 2003, the Board of

Governors of the IBP adopted the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Villanueva-Maala.
The Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to
this Court for final action, pursuant to Section 12(b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court. Respondent also filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, to set aside Resolution No. XV-2003-346 of the IBP Board of
Governors.
The Courts Ruling

We disagree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP, but find
respondents offensive language against complainants and their counsel
unbecoming an attorney.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
The legal profession exacts a high standard from its members. Lawyers
shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on their fitness to practice
law. Neither shall they, whether in public or in private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. In Gonzaga v.
Villanueva, this Court, citing Tucay v. Tucay, held thus:
[11]

[12]

[13]

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent
disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the
grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit;
malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature even as they are
broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or
commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be
wanting in probity and moral fiber, which are not only conditions precedent to his
entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership
therein.
[14]

However, the penalties of disbarment and suspension are severe forms of

disciplinary action and must be imposed with great caution. The allegations
in the Complaint were not substantiated by clear evidence; they were bereft of
convincing proof of respondents deceit and gross misconduct.
[15]

The admission of respondent that there are various cases filed or pending
against him does not ipso facto constitute serious misconduct. His contention
that the pending cases against him pose a prejudicial question that will bar the
instant administrative case is untenable. Likewise bereft of merit, however, is
the finding of the IBP investigating commissioner that the mere existenceof

the same pending cases constitute serious misconduct on the part of

respondent.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138, conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. Suspension or disbarment
may follow as a matter of course, upon a finding that the crime a lawyer has
been convicted of involves moral turpitude. By such conviction, such lawyer
has become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and is no longer
possessed of good moral character. In the present case, however, while
respondent has been charged with several criminal cases involving moral
turpitude, he has yet to be convicted of any of them.
[16]

Without clear and convincing evidence that he committed acts that

allegedly constituted serious misconduct, the mere existence of pending
criminal charges cannot be a ground for disbarment or suspension of
respondent. To hold otherwise would open the door to harassment of
attorneys through the mere filing of numerous criminal cases against them.
Respondent contends that his right to due process was violated when the
IBP investigating commissioner failed to conduct a formal investigation. As
borne by the records, Investigating Commissioner Villanueva-Maala
conducted hearings on the case on June 5 and June 26, 2002, during which
counsel for respondent, Atty. Logares, appeared. Respondent was allowed to
file his Answer, as well as his Rejoinder. And, more important, he himself
appeared at the December 11, 2002 hearing when the parties agreed to file
simultaneous memoranda, after which the case was deemed submitted for
resolution. Records show that respondent filed his Memorandum on January
29, 2003. Hence, he cannot claim that he was not given ample opportunity to
rebut the charges filed against him.
[17]

While we are not convinced that complainants have clearly and

convincingly proven the charges of serious misconduct, we do, however, note
the use of offensive language in respondents pleadings. The Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
In his Memorandum dated January 15, 2003, the opposing counsel, Atty.
Norjue I. Juego, points out the manner and tenor of the language in the
Answer and the Rejoinder of respondent. The latter suggested that
complainants and their counsel had caused the filing of several baseless
suits, including the present charge, merely to harass and place him in a bad
light. He hurled insulting language in describing the opposing counsel and
cast doubts on the latters integrity by implying that the lawyer had instigated
the filing of the so-called baseless suits, violated the rules on non-forum
shopping and committed malpractice.
[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

[22]

[23]

Indeed, these statements, particularly the words who he is despite x x x

his shortness not only in size but in arrogance, constitute conduct unbecoming
a member of the legal profession and cannot be countenanced by this Court.
A lawyers language may be forceful, but should always be dignified;
emphatic, but respectful as befitting an advocate. Arguments, whether written
or oral, should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should
use such language as may be properly addressed by one gentleperson to
another.
[24]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Arturo B. Astorga is ACQUITTED of the charge of

serious misconduct, but is held liable for conduct unbecoming an attorney and
is FINED two thousand pesos.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.

PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

REP. DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, Pablo C. Villaber, petitioner, seeks the nullification of two
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA-01-058. The first one was
issued by its Second Division on April 30, 2001, disqualifying him as a candidate for the position
of Congressman in the First District of the Province of Davao del Sur in the last May 14, 2001
elections, and cancelling his certificate of candidacy; and the second is the en banc Resolution
dated May 10, 2001 denying his motion for reconsideration.
Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a
congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001
elections. Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy for Congressman on February 19, 2001,
[1]
while Cagas filed his on February 28, 2001.[2]
On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor,
Commission On Elections (COMELEC), Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition [3] to disqualify
Villaber and to cancel the latters certificate of candidacy. Cagas alleged in the said consolidated
petition that on March 2, 1990, Villaber was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 86-46197 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and was
sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum of
P100,000.00.[4] Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals (Tenth Division), in its Decision dated April 23, 1992 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 09017,[5] affirmed the RTC Decision. Undaunted, Villaber filed with this Court a petition
for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision, docketed as G.R. No.
106709. However, in its Resolution[6] of October 26, 1992, this Court (Third Division) dismissed
the petition. On February 2, 1993, our Resolution became final and executory.[7] Cagas also
asserted that Villaber made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy that he
is Eligible for the office I seek to be elected which false statement is a ground to deny due course
or cancel the said certificate pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In his answer[8] to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly that his conviction has
not become final and executory because the affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial
court for promulgation in his presence.[9] Furthermore, even if the judgment of conviction was
already final and executory, it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude.

After the opposing parties submitted their respective position papers, the case was forwarded
to the COMELEC, Manila, for resolution.
On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division), finding merit in Cagas petition,
issued the challenged Resolution[10] in SPA 01-058 declaring Villaber disqualified as a candidate
for and from holding any elective public office and canceling his certificate of candidacy. The
COMELEC ruled that a conviction for violation of B.P Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude
following the ruling of this Court en banc in the administrative case ofPeople vs. Atty. Fe
Tuanda.[11]
Villaber filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC en banc in a
Resolution[12] dated May 10, 2001.
Hence, this petition.
The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral
turpitude.
The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner Villaber from being a candidate for
Congressman, the COMELEC applied Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced
to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral
turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he
has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon
the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis ours)
As to the meaning of moral turpitude, we have consistently adopted the definition in Blacks
Law Dictionary as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.[13]

In In re Vinzon,[14] the term moral turpitude is considered as encompassing everything which

is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.
We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections[15] that not every criminal
act involves moral turpitude, and that as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the
Supreme Court to determine.[16] We further pronounced therein that:

in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC (221 SCRA 760 [1993]), the
Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or
does not exist by merely classifying a crime asmalum in se or as malum
prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral
turpitude, and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala
prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral
turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. (Emphasis ours)
We reiterate here our ruling in Dela Torre[17] that the determination of whether a crime
involves moral turpitude is a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances
surrounding the violation of the statute.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was
convicted. At any rate, the question of whether or not the crime involves moral turpitude can be
resolved by analyzing its elements alone, as we did in Dela Torre which involves the crime of
fencing punishable by a special law.[18]
Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the following Information:

That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and
issue to Efren D. Sawal to apply on account or for value Bank of Philippine Islands
(Plaza Cervantes, Manila) Check No. 958214 dated February 13, 1986 payable to
Efren D. Sawal in the amount of P100,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the
time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check, when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Efren D.

Sawal the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the
same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice. (Emphasis ours)
He was convicted for violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 which provides:

SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and
issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered
the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty
days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than
double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court. (Emphasis ours).
The elements of the offense under the above provision are:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient
funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit,
or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.[19]

The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. In People vs. Atty. Fe
Tuanda[20] we held that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imports deceit and certainly
relates to and affects the good moral character of a person.[21] The effects of the issuance of a
worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano vs. Martinez,[22] through Justice
Pedro L. Yap, transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction
and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to
the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation of valueless commercial
papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. [23] Thus, paraphrasing Blacks
definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he

owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and
duty, justice, honesty or good morals.
Petitioner contends that this Courts pronouncement in People v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,[24] insofar
as it states that conviction under B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, does not apply to him
since he is not a lawyer.
This argument is erroneous.
In that case, the Court of Appeals affirmed Atty. Fe Tuandas conviction for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 and, in addition, suspended her from the practice of law pursuant to Sections 27 and 28
of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Her motion seeking the lifting of her suspension was
denied by this Court on the ground that the said offense involves moral turpitude. There we said
in part:

We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import
deceit and violation of her attorneys oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility,
under both of which she was bound to obey the laws of the land. Conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it
certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of
such offense. x x x.[25] (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, in Tuanda, this Court did not make a distinction whether the offender is a lawyer or
a non-lawyer. Nor did it declare that such offense constitutes moral turpitude when committed by
a member of the Bar but is not so when committed by a non-member.
We cannot go along with petitioners contention that this Courts ruling in Tuanda has been
abandoned or modified in the recent case of Rosa Lim vs. People of the Philippines, [26] which
reiterated the ruling in Vaca vs. Court of Appeals.[27] In these two latter cases, the penalty of
imprisonment imposed on the accused for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was deleted by this
Court. Only a fine was imposed. Petitioner insists that with the deletion of the prison sentence,
the offense no longer involves moral turpitude. We made no such pronouncement. This is what
we said in Rosa Lim:

In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, we held that in determining the penalty to be imposed for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human material, and to prevent
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard
to the protection of the social order. There we deleted the prison sentence imposed on

petitioners. We imposed on them only a fine double the amount of the check
issued. We considered the fact that petitioners brought the appeal, believing in good
faith, that no violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was committed, otherwise, they would have
simply accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade
prison term. We do the same here. We believe such would best serve the ends of
criminal justice.
In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent COMELEC in
issuing the assailed Resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., no part.

CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO M. RONGCAL, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry, from the usual.
As such, close scrutiny of these claims is called for. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being
the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in
those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. 1
Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine Joie P. Vitug
(complainant) against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent). A classic case of "he said, she said,"
the parties' conflicting versions of the facts as culled from the records are hereinafter presented.
Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000 when she was
looking for a lawyer to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino ("Aquino"), the biological father of her minor
daughter, for support. Her former classmate who was then a Barangay Secretary referred her to
respondent. After several meetings with complainant, respondent sent a demand letter 2 in her behalf
to Aquino wherein he asked for the continuance of the monthly child support Aquino used to give,

plus no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter would need for her
congenital heart ailment.
At around this point, by complainant's own admission, she and respondent started having a sexual
relationship. She narrates that this twist in the events began after respondent started calling on her
shortly after he had sent the demand letter in her behalf. Respondent allegedly started courting her,
giving her financial aid. Soon he had progressed to making sexual advances towards complainant,
to the accompaniment of sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial security for her
daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for support against Aquino.
Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances, assured by respondent's claim
that the lawyer was free to marry her, as his own marriage had already been annulled.
On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of
Disclaimer3 ("Affidavit") categorically stating that even as Aquino was denoted as the father in the
birth certificate4 of her daughter, he was, in truth, not the real father. She was not allowed to read the
contents of the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent supposedly assured her that the document meant
nothing, necessary as it was the only way that Aquino would agree to give her daughter medical and
educational support. Respondent purportedly assured complainant that despite the Affidavit, she
could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future because the Affidavit is not a public document.
Because she completely trusted him at this point, she signed the document "without even taking a
glance at it."5
On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him P150,000.00
cash andP58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical expenses of her
daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent handed her his personal check 6 in the
amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter.
However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her the
said amount because he used it for his political campaign as he was then running for the position of
Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga.
Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that respondent kept part
of the money intended for her daughter, he still failed in his promise to give her a job. Furthermore,
he did not file the case against Aquino and referred her instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr.
("Atty. Tolentino").
Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for child abuse as
well as a civil case against Aquino. While the criminal case was dismissed, the civil case was
decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a compromise agreement. 7 It was only when said cases
were filed that she finally understood the import of the Affidavit.
Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally prepared the
Affidavit and caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to her disadvantage. In making
false promises that all her problems would be solved, aggravated by his assurance that his marriage
had already been annulled, respondent allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires.
Taking advantage of the trust and confidence she had in him as her counsel and paramour, her weak
emotional state, and dire financial need at that time, respondent was able to appropriate for himself

money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues that respondent's aforementioned acts
constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility
("Code"), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7. 8 Hence, she filed
the instant complaint9 dated 2 February 2004.
Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant needed a lawyer
who would file the aforementioned action for support. Complainant's former high school classmate
Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was also his fellow barangay official, referred her to him. He admits
sending a demand letter to her former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the child. 10 Subsequently, he
and Aquino communicated through an emissary. He learned that because of Aquino's infidelity, his
relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle things the spouses were willing to
give complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino is not
the father of her daughter.
Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then advised her to
study the proposal thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He also explained to her the pros and
cons of pursuing the case. After several days, she requested that he negotiate for an out-of-court
settlement of no less than P500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued
until the amount was lowered to P200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to issue four postdated
checks in equal amounts within four months. Complainant disagreed. Aquino then proposed to
rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total of P12,000.00. The resulting amount
was P188,000.00.
Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit that respondent
prepared, the same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies forcing her to sign the document
and strongly refutes her allegation that she did not know what the Affidavit was for and that she
signed it without even reading it, as he gave her the draft before the actual payment was made. He
notes that complainant is a college graduate and a former bank employee who speaks and
understands English. He likewise vehemently denies pocketingP58,000.00 of the settlement
proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed to her the sum
of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could keep the
remainingP38,000.00, not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. Although she did not say why, he
assumed that it was for his attorney's fees.
As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with complainant. He,
however, denies luring her with sweet words and empty promises. According to him, it was more of a
"chemistry of (sic) two consensual (sic) adults,"11 complainant then being in her thirties. He denies
that he tricked her into believing that his marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent
devotes considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant very well knew he was married when
they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital liaison. He points out that, first, they had met
through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school classmate of hers. Second, they
had allegedly first met at his residence where she was actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently,
complainant called his residence several times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so
disturbing to respondent that he had to beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the
Punong Barangay from 1994 to 2002, and was elected President of the Association of Barangay
Council ("ABC") and as such was anex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua,

Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial Board Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his
locality and it was impossible for complainant not to have known of his marital status especially that
she lived no more than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even actively helped him in his
campaign.
Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being worked out,
complainant moved to a rented house in Olongapo City because a suitor had promised her a job in
the Subic Naval Base. But months passed and the promised job never came so that she had to
return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the money she received from Aquino was about to be exhausted,
she allegedly started to pester respondent for financial assistance and urged him to file the Petition
for Support against Aquino. While respondent acceded to her pleas, he also advised her "to look for
the right man"12 and to stop depending on him for financial assistance. He also informed her that he
could not assist her in filing the case, as he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit.
He, however, referred her to Atty. Tolentino.
In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still he agreed to give
her monthly financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since then, they have ceased to
meet and have communicated only through an emissary or by cellphone. In 2003, complainant
begged him to continue the assistance until June when her alleged fianc from the United States
would have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again asked for financial assistance for
the last time, which he turned down. Since then he had stopped communicating to her.
Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent. She told him
that she was in need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting up and she wanted him to
relay the message to respondent. According to this friend, complainant showed him a prepared
complaint against respondent that she would file with the Supreme Court should the latter not
accede to her request. Sensing that he was being blackmailed, respondent ignored her demand.
True enough, he alleges, she filed the instant complaint.
On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") for
investigation, report and recommendation.13 After the parties submitted their respective position
papers and supporting documents, the Investigating Commissioner rendered his Report and
Recommendation14 dated 2 September 2005. After presenting the parties' conflicting factual
versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that of complainant and concluded that
respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting in this wise, to wit:
Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is wanting in good
moral character, putting in doubt his professional reputation as a member of the BAR and
renders him unfit and unworthy of the privileges which the law confers to him. From a lawyer,
are (sic) expected those qualities of truth-speaking, high sense of honor, full candor,
intellectual honesty and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which
throughout the passage of time have been compendiously described as MORAL
CHARACTER.
Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice complainant
to his lascivious hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] respondent kept on calling

complainant and dropped by her house and gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting allegedly
for the reply of (sic) their demand letter for support. It signals the numerous visits and regular
calls all because of [l]ewd design. He took advantage of her seeming financial woes and
emotional dependency.
xxxx
Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the
impositions (sic) of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. x x x 15
It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months
and that he be ordered to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said Report and Recommendation in a
Resolution16 dated 17 December 2005, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and "considering Respondent's obviously taking
advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and the financial and emotional problem of his client and
attempting to mislead the Commission,"17 respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension for
one (1) year with a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was
likewise ordered to return P58,000.00 to complainant.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory
Questioning18 ("Motion") dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for
Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March 2006 with the Supreme Court. He reiterates his own
version of the facts, giving a more detailed account of the events that transpired between him and
complainant. Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd and manipulative woman who
depends on men for financial support and who would stop at nothing to get what she wants. Arguing
that the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainant's bare allegations that she failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened for clarificatory questioning
in order to determine who between them is telling the truth.
In a Resolution19 dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it has no more
jurisdiction over the case as the matter had already been endorsed to the Supreme Court.
While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the IBP has
recommended.
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" 20 in order to merit disciplinary
sanction. We disagree.
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of
law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. 21 As officers
of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the

community.22 The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.23 A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.24 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community.25
While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two
unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior,26 it is not
so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.27 Even if not all forms of extra-marital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. 28
By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. The next question to consider is whether this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful
conduct in luring complainant who was then in low spirits and in dire financial need in order to satisfy
his carnal desires. While the IBP concluded the question in the affirmative, we find otherwise.
Complainant's allegations that she succumbed to respondent's sexual advances due to his promises
of financial security and because of her need for legal assistance in filing a case against her former
lover, are insufficient to conclude that complainant deceived her into having sexual relations with her.
Surely, an educated woman like herself who was of sufficient age and discretion, being at that time
in her thirties, would not be easily fooled into sexual congress by promises of a job and of free legal
assistance, especially when there is no showing that she is suffering from any mental or physical
disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her part. 29Respondent's numerous
visits and regular calls to complainant do not necessarily prove that he took advantage of her. At
best, it proves that he courted her despite being a married man, precisely the fact on which the
finding of immorality is rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid does
not induce belief that he fueled her financial dependence as she never denied pleading with, if not
badgering, him for financial support.
Neither does complainant's allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital status inspire
belief. We find credence in respondent's assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of
his subsisting marriage. She herself admitted that they were introduced by her friend and former
classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow barangay official of respondent. She admitted that she
knew his residence phone number and that she had called him there. She also knew that
respondent is an active barangay official who even ran as Provincial Board Member in 2001.
Curiously, she never refuted respondent's allegations that she had met and talked to his wife on
several occasions, that she lived near his residence, that she helped him in his campaign, or that
she knew a lot of his friends, so as not to have known of his marital status. Considering that she
previously had an affair with Aquino, who was also a married man, it would be unnatural for her to
have just plunged into a sexual relationship with respondent whom she had known for only a short
time without verifying his background, if it were true that she preferred "to change [her] life for the
better,"30 as alleged in her complaint. We believe that her aforementioned allegations of deceit were
not established by clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases. 31 We are left with the

most logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship
with respondent sans any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.
Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and moral control over
her to force her to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her read it and without
explaining to her its repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she alleged that he likewise acted
as counsel for Aquino.
We find complainant's assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial support from Aquino
especially that her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment. We cannot fathom how she could
abandon all cares to respondent who she had met for only a couple of months and thereby risk the
welfare of her child by signing without even reading a document she knew was related to the support
case she intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short sentences contained in a single page. It
is unlikely she was not able to read it before she signed it.
Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the contents of the
Affidavit and the consequences of signing it. She alleged that respondent even urged her "to use her
head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the money for Alexandra's medical and educational support if
she will not sign the said Affidavit of Disclaimer."32 If her own allegation is to be believed, it shows
that she was aware of the on-going negotiation with Aquino for the settlement of her claim for which
the latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to show that she was pondering on
whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny being a college graduate or that she
knows and understands English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that are
understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit
voluntarily and without any coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent.
The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document
disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code. We rule in the negative.
It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after
explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of
pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in court. 33 Moreover, there is no
showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father of complainant's daughter as paternity
remains to be proven. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with
Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Besides, the
record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquino's counsel in the
settlement of the case. Again, we only have complainant's bare allegations that cannot be
considered evidence.34 Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not enough. In the absence of contrary
evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duty in
accordance with his oath.35
Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given by Aquino to
her daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount, he allegedly issued to her his personal
check in the amount ofP150,000.00 and pocketed the remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his
fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.

The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered respondent to return
the amount ofP58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion is in order.
We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in settlement of
complainant's claim for support. The parties are in agreement that complainant received the amount
of P150,000.00. However, complainant insists that she should have received more as there were two
postdated checks amounting toP58,000.00 that respondent never turned over to her. Respondent
essentially agrees that the amount is in fact more than P150,000.00 but only P38,000.00 more
and complainant said he could have it and he assumed it was for his attorney's fees.
We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there existed two
postdated checks issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand, respondent
admits that there is actually an amount of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence of an agreement
for attorney's fees to justify his presumption that he can keep the same. Curiously, there is on record
a photocopy of a check issued by respondent in favor of complainant for P150,000.00. It was only in
his Motion for Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an explanation. He avers that he
cannot recall what the check was for but he supposes that complainant requested for it as she did
not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of money.
We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a finding in favor of
either party in this respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere conjectures. The IBP relied only
on the written assertions of the parties, apparently finding no need to subject the veracity of the
assertions through the question and answer modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a
more in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose favor the substantial evidence level
tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the IBP for further reception of evidence
solely on this aspect.
We also are unable to grant complainant's prayer for respondent to be made liable for the cost of her
child's DNA test absent proof that he misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked for the purpose.
Neither shall we entertain complainant's claim for moral damages and attorney's fees. Suffice it to
state that an administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a
criminal action.36 It is an investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal
profession and be allowed the privileges as such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the
public from the misconduct of its officers with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise
this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men and women in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence.37 As such, it involves no private interest and affords no redress
for private grievance.38 The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
lawyer's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. 39
Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court
meted out the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the
respondent contracted a bigamous marriage,40 abandoned his family to cohabit with his
paramour,41 cohabited with a married woman,42 lured an innocent woman into marriage,43 or was

found to be a womanizer.44 The instant case can be easily differentiated from the foregoing cases.
We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. 45 In Zaguirre v. Castillo,46 respondent was
found to have sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He therein sought
understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of men and that the illicit
relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire. Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral
attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,47 where
respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive evidence that
he sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite
his retirement during the pendency of the case.
We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed remorse over
his indiscretion and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years ago. We take these as signs
that his is not a character of such severe depravity and thus should be taken as mitigating
circumstances in his favor.48 Considering further that this is his first offense, we believe that a fine
of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the outcome of the aspect of this
case involving the alleged misappropriation of funds of the client.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and
impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for further
investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a
member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., J.J., , concur.

JULIETA B. NARAG, complainant, vs. ATTY.

NARAG, respondent.

DOMINADOR

M.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the

bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the
Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law.

On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative complaint [1] for
disbarment against her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, whom she accused of
having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers. [2]
The complainant narrated:

The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services of Atty.

Dominador M. Narag in the early seventies as a full-time college
instructor in the College of Arts and Sciences and as a professor in the
Graduate School. In 1984, Ms. Gina Espita, 17 years old and a first year
college student, enrolled in subjects handled by Atty. Narag. Exerting his
influence as her teacher, and as a prominent member of the legal
profession and then member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuguegarao,
Atty. Narag courted Ms. Espita, gradually lessening her resistance until
the student acceded to his wishes.
They then maintained an illicit relationship known in various circles in
the community, but which they managed to keep from me. It therefore
came as a terrible embar[r]assment to me, with unspeakable grief and
pain when my husband abandoned us, his family, to live with Ms. Espita,
in utterly scandalous circumstances.
It appears that Atty. Narag used his power and influence as a member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan to cause the employment of
Ms. Espita at the Department of Trade and Industry Central Office at
Makati, Metro Manila. Out of gratitude perhaps, for this gesture, Ms.
Espita agreed to live with Atty. Narag, her sense of right[e]ousness and
morals completely corrupted by a member of the Bar.
It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty. Dominador
M. Narag has abandoned us, his family, to live with a 22-year-old
woman, who was his former student in the tertiary level[.][3]
This Court, in a Resolution dated December 18, 1989, referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [4]
On June 26, 1990, the office of then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan received from
complainant another letter seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint. She

alleged therein that (1) she fabricated the allegations in her complaint to humiliate and
spite her husband; (2) all the love letters between the respondent and Gina Espita were
forgeries; and (3) she was suffering from emotional confusion arising from extreme
jealousy. The truth, she stated, was that her husband had remained a faithful and
responsible family man. She further asserted that he had neither entered into an
amorous relationship with one Gina Espita nor abandoned his family. [5] Supporting her
letter were an Affidavit of Desistance [6] and a Motion to Dismiss, [7] attached as Annexes A
and B, which she filed before the IBP commission on bar discipline. [8] In a Decision
dated October 8, 1991, the IBP Board of Governors [9] dismissed the complaint of Mrs.
Narag for failure to prosecute.[10]
The case took an unexpected turn when, on November 25, 1991, this
Court[11] received another letter[12] from the complainant, with her seven children [13] as cosignatories, again appealing for the disbarment of her husband. She explained that she
had earlier dropped the case against him because of his continuous threats against her.
[14]

In his Comment on the complainants letter of November 11, 1991, filed in

compliance with this Courts Resolution issued on July 6, 1992, [15] respondent prayed
that the decision of the Board of Governors be affirmed. Denying that he had
threatened, harassed or intimidated his wife, he alleged that she had voluntarily
executed her Affidavit of Desistance [16] and Motion to Dismiss,[17]even appearing before
the investigating officer, Commissioner Racela, to testify under oath that she prepared
the Motion to Dismiss and Affidavit of Desistance on her own free will and affirmed the
contents thereof.
In addition, he professed his love for his wife and his children and denied
abandoning his family to live with his paramour. However, he described his wife as a
person emotionally disturbed,viz.:

What is pitiable here is the fact that Complainant is an incurably jealous

and possessive woman, and every time the streak of jealousy rears its
head, she fires off letters or complaints against her husband in every
conceivable forum, all without basis, and purely on impulse, just to
satisfy the consuming demands of her loving jealousy. Then, as is her
nature, a few hours afterwards, when her jealousy cools off, she
repents and feels sorry for her acts against the Respondent. Thus,
when she wrote the Letter of November 11, 1991, she was then in the
grips of one of her bouts of jealousy.[18]

On August 24, 1992, this Court issued another Resolution referring the Comment of
respondent to the IBP.[19] In the hearing before IBP Commissioner Plaridel C.
Jose, respondent alleged the following: [20]

2. Your Respondent comes from very poor parents who have left him
not even a square meter of land, but gave him the best legacy in life: a
purposeful and meaningful education.Complainant comes from what
she claims to be very rich parents who value material possession more
than education and the higher and nobler aspirations in
life. Complainant abhors the poor.
3. Your Respondent has a loving upbringing, nurtured in the gentle
ways of love, forgiveness, humility, and concern for the
poor. Complainant was reared and raised in an entirely different
environment. Her value system is the very opposite.
4. Your Respondent loves his family very dearly, and has done all he
could in thirty-eight (38) years of marriage to protect and preserve his
family. He gave his family sustenance, a comfortable home, love,
education, companionship, and most of all, a good and respected
name. He was always gentle and compassionate to his wife and
children. Even in the most trying times, he remained calm and never
inflicted violence on them. His children are all now full-fledged
professionals, mature, and gainfully employed. x x x
xxxxxxxxx
Your Respondent subscribes to the sanctity of marriage as a social
institution.
On the other hand, consumed by insane and unbearable jealousy,
Complainant has been systematically and unceasingly destroying the
very foundations of their marriage and their family.Their marriage has
become a torture chamber in which Your Respondent has been
incessantly BEATEN, BATTERED, BRUTALIZED, TORTURED,
ABUSED, and HUMILIATED, physically, mentally, and emotionally, by
the Complainant, in public and at home. Their marriage has become a
nightmare.

For thirty-eight years, your Respondent suffered in silence and bore the
pain of his misfortune with dignity and with almost infinite patience, if
only to preserve their family and their marriage. But this is not to
be. The Complainant never mellowed and never became gentl[e],
loving, and understanding. In fact, she became more fierce and
predatory.
Hence, at this point in time, the light at the tunnel for Your Respondent
does not seem in sight. The darkness continues to shroud the marital
and familial landscape.
Your Respondent has to undergo a catharsis, a liberation from
enslavement. Paraphrasing Dorfman in Death and the Maiden, can the
torturer and the tortured co-exist and live together?
Hence, faced with an absolutely uncomprehending and
uncompromising mind whose only obsession now is to destroy, destroy,
and destroy, Your Respondent, with perpetual regret and with great
sorrow, filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage, Spl. Proc. No. 566,
RTC, Branch III, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. x x x.
5. Complainant is a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending. But
your Respondent never revealed these destructive qualities to other
people. He preserved the good name and dignity of his wife. This is in
compliance with the marital vow to love, honor or obey your spouse, for
better or for worse, in sickness and in health. . . Even in this case, Your
Respondent never revealed anything derogatory to his wife. It is only
now that he is constrained to reveal all these things to defend himself.
On the other hand, for no reason at all, except a jealous rage,
Complainant tells everyone, everywhere, that her husband is worthless,
good-for-nothing, evil and immoral. She goes to colleges and
universities, professional organizations, religious societies, and all other
sectors of the community to tell them how evil, bad and immoral her
husband is. She tells them not to hire him as professor, as Counsel, or
any other capacity because her husband is evil, bad, and immoral. Is
this love? Since when did love become an instrument to destroy a

mans dearest possession in life - his good name, reputation and

dignity?
Because of Complainants virulent disinformation campaign against her
husband, employing every unethical and immoral means to attain his
ends, Your Respondent has been irreparably and irreversibly
disgraced, shamed, and humiliated. Your Respondent is not a
scandalous man. It is he who has been mercilessly scandalized and
crucified by the Complainant.[21]
To prove the alleged propensity of his wife to file false charges, respondent
presented as evidence the following list of the complaints she had filed against him and
Gina Espita:

3.1 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty x x x

3.2 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty, DILG, Adm. Case No.
P-5-90. x x x
3.3 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutors Office of
Cagayan. I.S No. 89-114. x x x
3.4 Complaint for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and
concubinage. OMBUDSMAN Case No. 1-92-0083. x x x
3.5 Complaint for Civil Support. RTC, Tuguegarao, Civil Case No.
4061. DISMISSED.
3.6 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutors Office of
Cagayan. I.S. No. 92-109. DISMISSED. (x x x). Complainant
filed Motion for Reconsideration. DENIED. (x x x).
3.7 Complaint for Disbarment (x x x) with S[upreme]
C[ourt]. Withdrawn (x x x). DISMISSED by IBP Board of
Governors (x x x). Re-instituted (x x x).
3.8 Complaint for Disbarment, again (x x x). Adm. Case No. 3405.
Pending.

3.9 Complaint for Concubinage, again (x x x). Third MCTC,

Tumauini, Isabela. Pending. x x x[22]
In his desperate effort to exculpate himself, he averred:

I. That all the alleged love letters and envelopes (x x x), picture (x x
x) are inadmissible in evidence as enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Cecilia Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No.
107383, February 20, 1996. (x x x).
xxxxxxxxx

II. That respondent is totally innocent of the charges: He never

courted Gina Espita in the Saint Louis College of Tuguegarao. He
never caused the employment of said woman in the DTI. He never
had or is having any illicit relationship with her anywhere, at any
time. He never lived with her as husband and wife anywhere at any
time, be it in Centro Tumauini or any of its barangays, or in any
other place. He never begot a child or children with her. Finally,
respondent submits that all the other allegations of Mrs. Narag are
false and fabricated, x x x
xxxxxxxxx

III. Respondent never abandoned his family[.] Mrs. Narag and her
two sons forcibly drove respondent Narag out of the conjugal home.
After that, Atty. Narag tried to return to the conjugal home many
times with the help of mutual friends to save the marriage and the
family from collapse. He tried several times to reconcile with Mrs.
Narag. In fact, in one of the hearings of the disbarment case, he
offered to return home and to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. But Mrs.
Narag refused all these efforts of respondent Narag. x x x
IV. Complainant Julieta B. Narag is an unbearably jealous, violent,
vindictive, scandalous, virulent and merciless wife since the
beginning of the marriage, who incessantly beat, battered,
brutalized, tortured, abuse[d], scandalized, and humiliated

respondent Atty. Narag, physically, mentally, emotionally, and

psychologically, x x x.
V. Complainant Julieta Narags claim in her counter-manifestation
dated March 28, 1996, to the effect that the affidavit of Dominador
B. Narag, Jr., dated February 27, 1996 was obtained through force
and intimidation, is not true. Dominador, Jr., executed his affidavit
freely, voluntarily, and absolutely without force or intimidation, as
shown by the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of
Respondent Atty. Narag and Tuguegarao MTC Judge Dominador
Garcia during the trial of Criminal Case No. 12439, People vs.
Dominador M. Narag, et. al., before the Tuguegarao MTC on May
3, 1996. x x x.
xxxxxxxxx

VI. Respondent Atty. Narag is now an old man - a senior citizen of

63 years - sickly, abandoned, disgraced, weakened and debilitated
by progressively degenerative gout and arthritis, and hardly able to
earn his own keep. His very physical, medical, psychological, and
economic conditions render him unfit and unable to do the things
attributed to him by the complainant. Please see the attached
medical certificates, x x x, among many other similar certificates
touching on the same ailments. Respondent is also suffering from
hypertension.[23]
On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer submitted his report, [24] recommending the
indefinite suspension of Atty. Narag from the practice of law. The material portions of
said report read as follows:

Culled from the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence

submitted by the contending parties, two (2) issues are relevant for the
disposition of the case, namely:
a) Whether there was indeed a commission of alleged
abandonment of respondents own family and [whether he
was] living with his paramour, Gina Espita;

b) Whether the denial under oath that his illegitimate

children with Gina Espita (Aurelle Dominic and Kyle
Dominador) as appearing on paragraph 1(g) of respondents
Comment vis-a-vis his handwritten love letters, the due
execution and contents of which, although he objected to
their admissibility for being allegedly forgeries, were never
denied by him on the witness stand much less presented
and offered proof to support otherwise.
Except for the testimonies of respondents witnesses whose testimonies
tend to depict the complaining wife, Mrs. Narag, as an incurably jealous
wife and possessive woman suffering everytime with streaks of
jealousy, respondent did not present himself on the witness stand to
testify and be cross-examined on his sworn comment; much less did he
present his alleged paramour, Gina Espita, to disprove the adulterous
relationship between him and their having begotten their illegitimate
children, namely: Aurelle Dominic N. Espita and Kyle Dominador N.
Espita. Worse, respondents denial that he is the father of the two is a
ground for disciplinary sanction (Morcayda v. Naz, 125 SCRA 467).
Viewed from all the evidence presented, we find the respondent subject
to disciplinary action as a member of the legal profession.[25]
In its Resolution[26] issued on August 23, 1997, the IBP adopted and approved the
investigating commissioners recommendation for the indefinite suspension of the
respondent.[27]Subsequently, the complainant sought the disbarment of her husband in a
Manifestation/Comment she filed on October 20, 1997. The IBP granted this stiffer
penalty and, in its Resolution dated November 30, 1997, denied respondents Motion for
Reconsideration.
After a careful scrutiny of the records of the proceedings and the evidence
presented by the parties, we find that the conduct of respondent warrants the imposition
of the penalty of disbarment.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities
of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Thus, good moral character is not only a condition precedent [28] to the practice of
law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is
found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. [29]
Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of
the community.[30]Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral,
but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree [31] or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.[32]
We explained in Barrientos vs. Daarol[33] that, as officers of the court, lawyers must
not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he
is flouting those moral standards.
Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in order
to live with Gina Espita. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court
will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing
and satisfactory evidence.[34]
Presented by complainant as witnesses, aside from herself, [35] were: Charlie Espita,
[36]
Magdalena Bautista,[37] Bienvenido Eugenio,[38] Alice Carag,[39] Dr. Jervis B. Narag,
[40]
Dominador Narag, Jr.,[41] and Nieves F. Reyes.[42]
Charlie Espita, brother of the alleged paramour Gina Espita, corroborated
complainants charge against respondent in these categorical statements he gave to the
investigating officer:

Q Mr. Witness, do you know Atty. Narag?

A Yes, Your Honor, he is the live-in partner of my sister, Gina Espita.
Q If Atty. Narag is here, can you point [to] him?
A Yes, sir.
(Witness pointed to the respondent, Atty. Dominador Narag)
Q Why do you know Atty. Narag?
ATTY. NARAG:
Already answered. He said I am the live-in partner.
CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECT
A Because he is the live-in partner of my sister and that they are now living together as
husband and wife and that they already have two children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle
Dominador.

x x x x x x x x x [43]
During cross-examination conducted by the respondent himself, Charlie Espita
repeated his account that his sister Gina was living with the respondent, with whom she
had two children:
Q Mr. Espita, you claim that Atty. Narag is now living with your sister as husband and
wife. You claim that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you say that?
A Because at present you are living together as husband and wife and you have already two
children and I know that that is really an immoral act which you cannot just allow me to
follow since my moral values dont allow me that my sister is living with a married man
like you.
Q How do you know that Atty. Narag is living with your sister? Did you see them in the
house?
A Yes, si[r].

xxxxxxxxx
Q You said also that Atty. Narag and your sister have two children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle
Dominador, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q How do you know that they are the children of Atty. Narag?
A Because you are staying together in that house and you have left your family.[44]

In addition, Charlie Espita admitted (1) that it was he who handed to Mrs. Narag the
love letters respondent had sent to his sister, and (2) that Atty. Narag tried to dissuade
him from appearing at the disbarment proceedings. [45]
Witness Bienvenido Eugenio strengthened the testimony of Charlie Espita in this
wise:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know the respondent in this case?
A I know him very well, sir.
Q Could you please tell us why do you know him?
A Because he was always going to the house of my son-in-law by the name of Charlie
Espita.

xxxxxxxxx
Q Mr. Eugenio, do you know the residence of Atty. Dominador M. Narag?
A At that time, he [was] residing in the house of Reynaldo Angubong, sir.
Q And this is located where?
A Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir.
Q And you specifically, categorically state under oath that this is the residence of Atty.
Narag?
A Yes, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Q And under oath this is where Atty. Narag and Gina Espita are allegedly living as husband
and wife, is it not?
A Yes, sir.[46]

Witness Nieves Reyes, a neighbor and friend of the estranged couple, testified that
she learned from the Narag children -- Randy, Bong and Rowena -- that their father left
his family, that she and her husband prodded the complainant to accept the respondent
back, that the Narag couple again separated when the respondent went back to his
woman, and that Atty. Narag had maltreated his wife. [47]
On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant was able to
establish that respondent abandoned his family and lived with another woman. Absent
any evidence showing that these witnesses had an ill motive to testify falsely against the
respondent, their testimonies are deemed worthy of belief.
Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love letters that respondent had
sent to Gina. In these letters, respondent clearly manifested his love for Gina and her
two children, whom he acknowledged as his own. In addition, complainant also
submitted as evidence the cards that she herself had received from him. Guided by the
rule that handwriting may be proved through a comparison of one set of writings with
those admitted or treated by the respondent as genuine, we affirm that the two sets of
evidence were written by one and the same person. [48] Besides, respondent did not
present any evidence to prove that the love letters were not really written by him; he
merely denied that he wrote them.
While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not only
to himself but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the
bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus, when his moral character is assailed, such that
his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, he must meet the
charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and
this Court, that he is morally fit to have his name in the Roll of Attorneys. [49] This he failed
to do.
Respondent adamantly denies abandoning his family to live with Gina Espita. At the
same time, he depicts his wife as a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending, and
as an insanely and pathologically jealous woman, whose only obsession was to destroy,
destroy and destroy him as shown by her filing of a series of allegedly unfounded
charges against him (and Gina Espita).To prove his allegation, he presented ninetyeight (98) pieces of documentary evidence[50] and ten (10) witnesses.[51]

We note, however, that the testimonies of the witnesses of respondent did not
establish the fact that he maintained that moral integrity required by the profession that
would render him fit to continue practicing law. Neither did their testimonies destroy the
fact, as proven by the complainant, that he had abandoned his family and lived with
Gina Espita, with whom he had two children.Some of them testified on matters which
they had no actual knowledge of, but merely relied on information from either
respondent himself or other people, while others were presented to impeach the good
character of his wife.
Respondent may have provided well for his family -- they enjoyed a comfortable life
and his children finished their education. He may have also established himself as a
successful lawyer and a seasoned politician. But these accomplishments are not
sufficient to show his moral fitness to continue being a member of the noble profession
of law.
We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties e.g., to
support, educate and instruct their children according to right precepts and good
example; and to give them love, companionship and understanding, as well as moral
and spiritual guidance.[52] As a husband, he is also obliged to live with his wife; to
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render help and support. [53]
Respondent himself admitted that his work required him to be often away from
home. But the evidence shows that he was away not only because of his work; instead,
he abandoned his family to live with his paramour, who bore him two children. It would
appear, then, that he was hardly in a position to be a good husband or a good
father. His children, who grew up mostly under the care of their mother, must have
scarcely felt the warmth of their fathers love.
Respondents son, Jervis B. Narag, showed his resentment towards his fathers
moral frailties in his testimony:
Q My question is this, is there any sin so grievous that it cannot be forgiven, is there a fault
that is so serious that it is incapable of forgiveness?
A That depends upon the sin or fault, sir, but if the sin or fault is with the emotional part of
myself, I suppose I cannot forgive a person although I am a God-fearing person, but I
h[av]e to give the person a lesson in order for him or her to at least realize his mistakes,
sir.

xxxxxxxxx
COMR. JOSE:

I think it sounds like this. Assuming for the sake of argument that your father is the
worst, hardened criminal on earth, would you send him to jail and have him
disbarred? That is the question.
CONTINUATION.
A With the reputation that he had removed from us, I suppose he has to be given a
lesson. At this point in time, I might just forgive him if he will have to experience all the
pains that we have also suffered for quite sometime.
Q Dr. Narag, your father gave you life, his blood runs in your veins, his flesh is your flesh, his
bones are your bones and you now disown him because he is the worst man on earth, is
that what you are saying.
A Sort of, sir.
Q You are now telling that as far [as] you are concerned because your father has sinned, you
have no more father, am I correct?
A Long before, sir, I did not feel much from my father even when I was still a kid because my
father is not always staying with us at home. So, how can you say that? Yes, he gave
me life, why not? But for sure, sir, you did not give me love.[54]

Another son, Dominador Narag, Jr., narrated before the investigating officer the
trauma he went through:
Q In connection with that affidavit, Mr. Witness, which contains the fact that your father is
maintaining a paramour, could you please tell this Honorable Commission the effect on
you?
A This has a very strong effect on me and this includes my brothers and sisters, especially
my married life, sir. And it also affected my children so much, that I and my wife ha[ve]
parted ways. It hurts to say that I and my wife parted ways. This is one reason that
affected us.
Q Will you please tell us specifically why you and your wife parted ways?
A Because my wife wa[s] ashamed of what happened to my family and that she could not
face the people, our community, especially because my wife belongs to a well-known
family in our community.
Q How about the effect on your brothers and sisters? Please tell us what are those.
A Well, sir, this has also affected the health of my elder sister because she knows so well
that my mother suffered so much and she kept on thinking about my mother.

xxxxxxxxx
Q Why did your wife leave you?
A The truth is because of the things that had happened in our family, Your Honor.
Q In your wifes family?
A In our family, sir.
Q And what do you mean by that?
A What I meant by that is my father had an illicit relationship and that my father went to the
extent of scolding my wife and calling my wife a puta in provincial government, which my
mother-in-law hated him so much for this, which really affected us. And then my wife
knew for a fact that my father has an illicit relationship with Gina Espita, whom he bore
two children by the name of Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador, which I could prove
and I stand firm to this, Your Honor.[55]

Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage, his acts
prove otherwise. A husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage. Rather,
he is a partner who has solemnly sworn to love and respect his wife and remain faithful
to her until death.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova[56] The moral delinquency that affects
the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages
the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which
makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.
In Toledo vs. Toledo,[57] the respondent was disbarred from the practice of law, when
he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a
child.
Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,[58] the respondent was disbarred after the
complainant proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous
relationship with a married woman.This Court declared that respondent failed to
maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.
In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing
evidence, that respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for
members of the law profession. As held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting,[59] a lawyer may be
disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which

shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is hereby DISBARRED and his name
is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Decision be in
the personal record of Respondent Narag; and furnished to all courts of the land, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

DORIS R. RADAZA, Complainant, vs. ROBERTO T. TEJANO, Respondent.

DECISION
BARREDO, J.:
Disbarment case on the ground of immorality, respondent having had sexual intercourse
with complainant resulting in her giving birth to a child, whom respondent readily
recognized, both complainant and he being free to marry, she being about 30 years of age
and he 28. Subsequently, however, respondent married complainants cousin, whom
complainant knew respondent had been courting. Hereunder is the report and
recommendation of the Solicitor General to whom the case was referred for investigation:
Complainant Doris R. Radazas testimony as well as the documentary evidence she
presented tend to show that she and respondent were sweethearts (tsn. May 20,
1975; Exh. G to AAAA, Folder of Exhibits, pp. 11-116). This started when they met
at respondents residence in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte during its town fiesta on
February 1, 1973 (tsn. ibid, p. 24). Respondent began courting complainant on
February 10, 1973. (tsn. pp. 25, 27, 30)
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Complainant was then single, 30 years old and a physical education teacher at the
Butuan City Central Elementary School, while respondent was also single, 28 years
old, and the private secretary to the Mayor of Butuan City.
On February 24, 1973 complainant accepted respondents love (tsn id, p. 26), and
thus marked the beginning of their intimate relationship. On March 11, 1973,
complainant and respondent had their first sexual intercourse at the latters boarding
house. (tsn. pp. 29-30, 82-85). On several occasions after that, complainant visited
respondent at the same boarding house, and there they savored the sweetness of
connubial bliss. As a consequence, complainant became pregnant, and on December
16, 1973, she delivered a baby-boy. Respondent readily acknowledged being the
father of the baby whom he named after him (tsn, ibid, pp. 29-32). Respondent paid
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the medical and hospital expenses of complainant (Exhs. D & E, Folder of Exhibits,
pp. 8-9), and supported the baby financially.
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But, all the while that complainant and respondent were having their relationship,
respondent was also engaged to one Florminda Buque, complainants cousin. This
relationship was known to complainant. In fact, Complainant, at one time (May
1973) confronted Florminda Buque, and told the latter to put an end to her
relationship with respondent, otherwise, complainant will never stop running after
them no matter how even if she will lose in the case. Complainant further threatened
Florminda with injuries the moment she would meet her any place. (tsn
September 6, 1975, p. 14). On September 21, 1974, respondent married Florminda
Buque. Hence, this complaint for disbarment.
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ISSUE
The only issue raised in the instant case is:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SEXUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN COMPLAINANT AND
RESPONDENT, BOTH UNMARRIED AT THE TIME, RESULTING IN HER PREGNANCY
AND SUBSEQUENT DELIVERY, AND THE MARRIAGE OF RESPONDENT TO ANOTHER
WOMAN CONSTITUTE GROSS IMMORAL CONDUCT AS TO WARRANT DISBARMENT
OR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST RESPONDENT AS A MEMBER OF THE BAR.
DISCUSSION
Complainant contends in her testimony that she accepted respondents love and
submitted to his importunings to have sexual relations due to the latters promise to
marry her. On the other hand, respondent, while not denying their intimate
relationship, disclaimed having promised to marry her, and alleged that their sexual
intimacies were motivated by their mutual attraction and desire for each other.
After a judicious assessment of the evidence on record, we find for the respondent.
This Honorable Court, in Soberano v. Villanueva, 6 SCRA, 811, 895, ruled that:
Intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married . . is neither so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal act nor so unprincipled as to warrant disbarment or
disciplinary action against the man as a member of the Bar.
cra

In the case at bar, respondent denied having promised marriage to complainant. In

fact, complainant knew before hand that respondent was also engaged to her cousin,
Florminda Buque, whom he eventually married. Besides, even if marriage had
entered into the plans of complainant and respondent, we could not believe that the
various occasions in which the parties engaged in sexual relations were prompted
solely by the expectancy on her part that before long the marital knot would be tied.
At that time, complainant was already 30 years old and a public school teacher while
respondent was 28 years old and a private secretary to the City Mayor. Thus,
complainant was mature enough to realize the folly of her acts. She could not have
been so naive as to be deceived by such promise. As aptly observed by this
Honorable Court in Montana v. Ruado, 62 SCRA 382, which facts are similar to those
of the case at bar, thus:
. . They were both mature, no longer in the first blush of youth, impelled to
act thus because of the strong physical attraction that each had for the other
and the force of a deeply rooted desire too difficult to resist.
cra

The evidence discloses that complainant voluntarily yielded to the respondent, and
that whatever injury thus inflicted to the good name and reputation of
complainant . . arose from the frailty of flesh, the sociologist MacIver referring to it
cra

as so powerful an appetite, an imperative of life closely associated with the

recklessness and the caprice of desire.
(Montana v. Ruado, supra, pp. 385-386,
citing Barba v. Pedro, Administrative Case No. 545-SBC, Dec. 26, 1974). It may well
be pointed out also that the boarding house of respondent had always been the mute
witness to the sexual encounters between complainant and respondent. On March
11, 1973, the time that they had their first sexual encounter, complainant went
voluntarily to respondents boarding house (tsn. May 22, 1975, p. 38). She testified,
thus:
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ATTY. FAMADOR:
Q . . When you arrived in the house of the Egpalinas which you said is about 3 to 4
oclock in the afternoon, am I right? . .
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A. 2 to 3 oclock.
Q Now, you did not stay in the sala of the residence of the Egpalinas when arrived?
A. I stayed in the sala but I was met by respondent Tejano.
Q And then what happened, you went inside the bedroom of respondent Atty.
Tejano, am I right?
A. Yes, Sir.
xxx
Q. So after you agreed you went inside the bedroom, the two of you, am I right?
A. After he pulled me, sure we already went inside the room.
xxx
Q. Now, did you shout when he forced you or you just keep quiet?
A. No.
Q. What did you mean no?
A. Its my answer no.
Q. You did not shout? . .
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A. No sir.
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Q. You did not shout?
A. I did not shout, Your Honor.
Q. Alright, you did not resist also?
A. No sir.
(tsn., May 22, 1975, pp. 40-42)
Undoubtedly, the cohabition of respondent with petitioner is immoral for lack
of a valid marriage. But to be the basis of a disciplinary action, the act must
not merely be immoral; it must be grossly immoral it must be so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. (Section 27, Rule 138, New Rules of Court;
Soberano vs. Villanueva, 6 SCRA 893, 895; Mortel vs. Aspiras, December 28,
1956, 100 Phil. 587, 591-593; Royong vs. Oblena, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA
869-870; Bolivar vs. Simbol, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 623, 630; and Quingwa
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vs. Puno, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439-440, 444-445). And the same
must be established by clear and convincing proof, disclosing a case that is
free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary
power (Co vs. Candoy, October 23, 1967, 21 SCRA 439, 442). Likewise, the
dubious character of the act done as well as the motivation thereof must be
clearly demonstrated (Co vs. Candoy, supra). The evidence adduced by
petitioner lacks the quantity and quality required by the foregoing criteria.
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All told, because of petitioners active and voluntary participation in her illicit
relationship with respondent, the latters act are not grossly immoral nor
highly reprehensible. (Wong v. Reyes, 63 SCRA 667)
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In the case of Abaigar vs. David Paz, 93 SCRA 91, this Honorable Court exonerated
respondent, a married man, who had an immoral affair, also with a married woman,
but done under discreet circumstances. Thus, this Court said:
From all indications, there is little room for doubt that she filed this disbarment case
not in redress of a wrong, for there was no wrong committed. It was a voluntary act
of indiscretion between two consenting adults who were fully aware of the
consequence of their deed and for which they were responsible only to their own
private consciences.
RECOMMENDATION
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the instant complaint
for disbarment against Atty. Roberto T. Tejano, be dismissed, with a stern warning,
however, that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely by
this Honorable Court. It must likewise be impressed on him that he should comply
with the moral and legal obligations incumbent upon him as the father of the child
born out of wedlock, the result of his relationship with Miss Doris R. Radaza.
Manila, April 29, 1981.
We have reviewed the record and We find the foregoing report sufficiently borne thereby.
While We hold that respondents conduct complained of does not warrant drastic disciplinary
sanction, this is far from saying that it conforms with the highest standard of morality and
propriety or decorum that every lawyer is expected to maintain. More than an ordinary
individual, a lawyer must, in the exercise of his rights and the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
(Article 19,
Civil Code)
chanroble svirtualawlibrary

Accordingly, the instant complaint against respondent is hereby DISMISSED, but he is

sternly admonished that any other misconduct on his part which might reflect unfavorably
on the moral norms of the profession will be dealt with accordingly.
Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.

PATRICIA
FIGUEROA, complainant,
JR., respondent.

vs. SIMEON

RESOLUTION

BARRANCO,

ROMERO, J.:

In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent
Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had
passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in
1966, 1967 and 1968. Before he could take his oath, however, complainant filed the
instant petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out
of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to
marry her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in
June and July 1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay,
Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their teens, they were steadies. Respondent
even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town
fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in
1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. It
was after the child was born, complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he
would marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and
respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave
onlyP10.00 for the child on the latters birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship
ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another woman. Hence, this
petition.
[1]

Upon complainants motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of

witnesses by deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainants failure to comment on
the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid
testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her comment stating that she had
justifiable reasons in failing to file the earlier comment required and that she remains
interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied
respondents motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground
of abandonment filed by respondent on September 17, 1979. Respondents third
motion to dismiss was noted in the Courts Resolution dated September 15, 1982. In
1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic
organizations and good standing in the community as well as the length of time this
case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer.
[2]

[3]

[4]

On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of
complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow
Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyers oath upon payment of the required fees.
[5]

Respondents hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in
response to complainants opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On
June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and
that respondent be allowed to take the lawyers oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyers oath in 1971 because of the
charges of gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an
illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not
fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the
permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in
premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful
moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral
conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained
of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.
[6]

[7]

We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang quite relevant because mere intimacy
between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry,
voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so
corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against
him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.
[8]

[9]

Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were

evidently consensual. We do not find complainants assertions that she had been forced
into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondents girlfriend
even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of
amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have
sexual congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively

pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led
astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently with another
woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for
marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love,
not for any other reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman
scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer
severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be
admitted into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six
years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient
punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion
attributed to him. Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be
allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyers oath.
[10]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon

Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper
fees.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., on leave
IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDING AGAINST ARTURO P. LOPEZ.
VIRGINIA C. ALMIREZ assisted by her father, AGAPITO ALMIREZ complainants,
vs.
ARTURO P. LOPEZ, respondent.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Respondent Arturo P. Lopez is sought to be disbarred upon the ground of immorality. Complainant
Virginia C. Almirez, assisted by her father Agapito Almirez, charges him with having succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of her, under promise of marriage, which he failed and refused to fulfill,
despite a child begotten in consequence thereof.
In his answer, respondent denied having ever had or solicited any sexual relation with the
complainant, but affirmed that they had agreed to be married as soon as he became financially
stable; that he could not carry out his part of the agreement having discovered, on April 4, 1961, that
complainant was pregnant by another man; and that she filed the present charges out of spite for
him, in view of his refusal to marry her.

Upon investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, to whom the matter was referred, the latter
submitted his report finding respondent guilty as charged, and then filed the corresponding complaint
for his disbarment.
In his answer thereto, respondent reiterated, in effect, the allegations and defenses made and set up
in his previous answer. He, moreover, averred that, while the matter was being investigated in the
Office of the Solicitor General, complainant had filed an affidavit stating that he (respondent) is not
the father of her child and a motion withdrawing her complaint.
Respondent having, moreover, expressed the wish to introduce additional evidence, the Court dated
its Legal Officer-Investigator for the reception thereof, after which the latter submitted his report
concurring in the findings of the Solicitor General, although recommending merely the suspension of
respondent herein. After furnishing him with a copy of this report, the case was set for hearing, at
which a representative of the Solicitor General and counsel for respondent appeared and were given
a period to file their respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument.
The record shows that respondent was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1957 and has been
engaged in the practice of law in Manila. After meeting the complainant then about 23 years of age
in Mauban, Quezon of which their families are residents sometime in December, 1958,
respondent courted her by correspondence. Presently, they became sweethearts. Complainant
having come to Manila in November, 1960 and operated therein a store, in partnership with others,
respondent used to visit her. Although he had told the complainant, as early as May 1960, of his
intent to marry her, it was understood that the wedding would take place upon consummation of a
given deal in which he expected to make a big amount of money. From November, 1960 to April,
1961, they had carnal knowledge of each other, several times, in various hotels in Manila,
particularly the Palo Alto Hotel, the Springfield Hotel, and the Shanghai Hotel. On December 31,
1960, complainant informed respondent that her menstruation was overdue, whereupon he caused
her to be examined by a lady physician, who found that she was in the family way. Thereupon, he
gave her some pills, to be taken three (3) times a day, for the alleged purpose of hastening the flow
of her menstruation. Then, he called her up, day and night, to inquire about her menses and, when
the same did not eventually come, he urged her to see another lady doctor, who could perform an
abortion. Complainant was averse thereto, but, respondent was so insistent that she went to the
clinic of said physician. The operation was not performed, however, for neither the latter nor
complainant were agreeable thereto. On August 22, 1961, complainant gave birth to a baby boy,
Francisco Arnold, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital in Manila.
Prior thereto, or late in February, 1961, their respective applications for a marriage license were filed
and their marriage license was issued on March 13, but, the wedding, scheduled for March 18, 1961,
did not take place, owing to the absence of the Mayor who was to solemnize it. On April 6, 1961,
complainant learned, from her sister-in-law, that respondent had confided to the latter his
unwillingness to marry her (complainant). When, soon thereafter, complainant asked him for his
reason therefor, respondent blamed her for refusing to undergo an abortion. Thereupon, or on April
18, 1961, she filed the complaint herein.
It further appears that on September 25, 1962, while this case was pending in the Office of the
Solicitor General a motion signed by the complainant, withdrawing her complaint, was filed with said

office. The reason given was that the complaint was "a result of serious misunderstanding" and had
been filed "in the heat of anger" and that it would be unjustified to proceed further on account of
complainant's belief in his innocence. This motion was, however, withdrawn by her, on November 25,
1963, for the reason that respondent had secured her signature thereto upon the assurance that he
would thereupon marry her and that he did not only fail to do so, but, also, married another woman.
In fact, respondent and one Evelyn Orense were married in January, 1963.
Upon the other hand, respondent would have us believe that complainant had freely and voluntarily
signed her aforesaid motion to withdraw her complaint. In fact, he added, she made the affidavit,
Exhibit 34, stating that he is not the father of her child. In rebuttal, complainant testified, however,
that she signed said motion and a blank sheet of paper, which is now the affidavit Exhibit 34, he
having convinced her that they would be married soon thereafter.
lawphi1.nt

He, likewise, tried to prove, through his testimony that it was complainant who asked him to take her
nightclubbing in Manila, which he did; that it was she who asked him, at the Bayside Nightclub, on
December 31, 1960, to marry her; that she reiterated this request in January, 1961, for fear that her
father may call her back to Mauban; that she having brought up the same subject in February, 1961,
they signed the necessary applications late in February, 1961, and got the corresponding marriage
license sometime later, although the wedding, scheduled for March 18, had to be postponed
indefinitely because of the absence of the officer, who was to solemnize it; that after a drinking spree
in Manila, in the evening of April 4, 1961, he felt it would be unwise for him to drive his car home to
Quezon City, in view of which he decided to spend the night at the Shanghai Hotel; that while there,
he remembered having an appointment with complainant, whom he, accordingly, called by telephone
to apologize to her and informed her of his condition and whereabouts; that soon later, complainant
arrived unexpectedly at the hotel and asked permission to sleep with him there, stating that she had
quarreled with her sister-in-law; that after switching off the light and undressing herself, complainant
started massaging his head, for he had a slight headache; that as complainant kissed him, he
noticed that she was pregnant and told her so; that after saying that she merely had a stomach
ache, complainant eventually confessed that another man had abused her; that angered by this
revelation, respondent dressed up and prepared to step out, but, before he left the hotel, she asked
his forgiveness and promised to behave thereafter; that she went to his office, the next day, but he
refused to talk to her; that as she insisted upon talking with him privately, they went to an ice cream
parlor where she begged him to marry her and save her honor, suggesting that their marriage would
be in name only and that they need not live together, if he did not want to; that complainant even
said that her father 1 would give P5,000 if he married her, but he rejected the offer and volunteered to
prosecute the man responsible for her condition, if she would identify him; and that, when
respondent still refused to marry her, complainant threatened to bring disbarment proceedings
against him.
Upon a review of the record, we agree with the solicitor, who first investigated this case, and the
Legal Officer-Investigator, before whom additional evidence were introduced, that respondent's
version is unworthy of credence. Indeed, despite the averments in his answers to the effect that he
had never solicited or had carnal relations with the complainant, his very testimony shows that they
had met in a hotel room under conditions attesting to a condition of intimacy clearly revealing past
extra-marital relations between them. Then, too, respondent's promise to marry complainant has

been, not only admitted by him, but, also, bolstered up by their applications for a marriage license
and the marriage license actually secured by them.
The breach of such promise on his part is thus patent. What is more, when her pregnancy was
confirmed by a physician, respondent firstly persuaded the complainant to take some pills for the
avowed purpose of hastening the flow of her "menstruation", and, eventually, urged her to have an
abortion, to which she did not agree. Worse still, when this case was pending in the office of the
Solicitor General, respondent prevailed upon her to sign a motion withdrawing her complaint, under
the false allegation that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him, as well as to sign a
blank sheet of paper which now appears to be her aforementioned affidavit Exhibit 34 under
promise to thereupon marry her, without the slightest intention to keep it, because, instead he
married another woman soon later.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arturo P. Lopez is hereby found guilty of gross immoral conduct
rendering him unfit to continue a member of the Bar, 2 for which reason he is hereby barred from the
practice of law, and his name ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and
Barredo, JJ., concur.

SELWYN
F.
LAO, complainant,
MEDEL, respondent.

vs. ATTY.

ROBERT

W.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless
checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned
with one-year suspension from the practice of law.
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case stems from a Complaint-Affidavit filed with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by
Selwyn F. Lao. Atty. Robert W. Medel was charged therein with dishonesty,
grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming an attorney.
[1]

The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-CBD

in this wise:

The Complaint arose from the [respondents] persistent refusal to make good on four
(4) RCBC checks totaling [t]wenty [t]wo [t]housand (P22,000.00) [p]esos. These
dishonored checks were issued by defendant in replacement for previous checks
issued to the complainant. Based on the exchange of letters between the parties, it
appears that [respondent], in a letter dated June 19, 2001, had committed to forthwith
effect immediate settlement of my outstanding obligation of P22,000.00 with Engr.
Lao, at the earliest possible time, preferably, on or before the end of June 2000. Again,
in a letter dated July 3, 2000, the [respondent] made a request for a final extension of
only ten (10) days from June 30, 2000 (or not later than July 10, 2000), within which
to effect payment of P22,000.00 to Engr. Lao. Needless to say, the initiation of this
present complaint proves that contrary to his written promises, Atty. Medel never
made good on his dishonored checks. Neither has he paid his indebtedness.
[2]

In his Answer dated July 30, 2001, Atty. Medel reasons that because all of
his proposals to settle his obligation were rejected, he was unable to comply
with his promise to pay complainant.Respondent maintains that the Complaint
did not constitute a valid ground for disciplinary action because of the
following:
[3]

(a). Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, a member of the Bar, may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wil[l]ful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wil[l]fully
appearing as an attorney for a party to case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice;
(a.1). Applying the afore-cited legal provision to the facts obtaining in the present
case, it is clear that the offense with which the respondent is being charged by the
complainant, is merely a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22, for brevity),
which is a special law, and is not punishable under the Revised Penal Code (RPC, for
brevity). It is self-evident therefore, that the offense is not in the same category as a
violation of Article 315, paragraph 2, (d), RPC, which is issuing a post-dated check or
a check in payment of an obligation, with insufficient funds in the drawee bank,

through false pretenses or fraudulent acts, executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud, which is a crime involving moral turpitude;
(b). If the respondent is to be disciplined by the Supreme Court, under Sec. 27, Rule
138 of the Rules, for the issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22, for
payment of a pre-existing obligation to the complainant, then, verily, the said Rule
138, Sec. 27, would be a cruel and an unjust law, which the Honorable Supreme Court
would not countenance;
(c). A careful examination of the specific grounds enumerated, for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, under Sec. 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules, clearly
shows beyond a shadow of doubt that the alleged issuance of a worthless check, in
violation of B.P. 22, is NOT one of the grounds for disciplinary action against a
member of the Bar, to warrant his disbarment or suspension from his office as
attorney, by the Supreme Court; and
(d). The issuance of a worthless check by a member of the Bar, in violation of B.P. 22,
does NOT constitute dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, under Canon 1 and Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This is because, the door to the law
profession swings on reluctant hinges. Stated otherwise, unless there is a clear,
palpable and unmitigated immoral or deceitful conduct, of a member of the Bar, in
violation of his oath as an attorney, by the mere issuance of a worthless check, in
violation of B.P. 22, the Supreme Court is inclined to give the said attorney, the
benefit of the doubt.
[4]

On August 22, 2001, complainant submitted his Reply. Thereafter, IBPCBD Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan, to whom the case was assigned by
the IBP for investigation and report, scheduled the case for hearing on
October 4, 2001. After several cancellations, the parties finally met on May 29,
2002. In that hearing, respondent acknowledged his obligation and committed
himself to pay a total of P42,000 (P22,000 for his principal debt and P20,000
for attorneys fees). Complainant agreed to give him until July 4, 2002 to settle
the principal debt and to discuss the plan of payment for attorneys fees in the
next hearing.
[5]

On July 4, 2002, both parties appeared before the IBP-CBD for their
scheduled hearing. But, while waiting for the case to be called, respondent

suddenly insisted on leaving, supposedly to attend to a family emergency.

Complainants counsel objected and Commissioner Cunanan, who was still
conducting a hearing in another case, ordered him to wait. He, however,
retorted in a loud voice, Its up to you, this is only disbarment, my family is
more important. And, despite the objection and the warning, he arrogantly
left. He made no effort to comply with his undertaking to settle his
indebtedness before leaving.
[6]

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In his September 19, 2002 Report, Commissioner Cunanan found
respondent guilty of violating the attorneys oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The former explained that, contrary to the latters claim,
violation of BP 22 was a crime that involved moral turpitude. Further, he
observed that [w]hile no criminal case may have been instituted against
[respondent], it is beyond cavil that indeed, [the latter] committed not one (1)
but four counts of violation of BP 22. The refusal [by respondent] to pay his
indebtedness, his broken promises, his arrogant attitude towards
complainants counsel and the [commission sufficiently] warrant the imposition
of sanctions against him. Thus, the investigating commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law.
[7]

[8]

[9]

In Resolution No. XV-2002-598, the Board of Governors of the

adopted the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Cunanan
resolved to suspend respondent from the practice of law for two years.
Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to
Court for final action, pursuant to Rule 139-B Sec. 12(b).
[10]

IBP
and
The
this

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors, but reduce the period of suspension to one year.
Administrative Liability of Respondent
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of
our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but

also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so

doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.
[11]

In the present case, respondent has been brought to this Court for failure
to pay his debts and for issuing worthless checks as payment for his loan from
complainant. While acknowledging the fact that he issued several worthless
checks, he contends that such act constitutes neither a violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility; nor dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The defense proffered by respondent is untenable. It is evident from the
records that he made several promises to pay his debt promptly. However, he
reneged on his obligation despite sufficient time afforded him. Worse, he
refused to recognize any wrongdoing and transferred the blame to
complainant, on the contorted reasoning that the latter had refused to accept
the formers plan of payment. It must be pointed out that complainant had no
obligation to accept it, considering respondents previous failure to comply with
earlier payment plans for the same debt.
Moreover, before the IBP-CBD, respondent had voluntarily committed
himself to the payment of his debts, yet failed again to fulfill his promise. That
he had no real intention to settle them is evident from his unremitting failed
commitments. His cavalier attitude in incurring debts without any intention of
paying for them puts his moral character in serious doubt.
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to
the bar, to the courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must
promptly pay their financial obligations.Their conduct must always reflect the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or
suspend lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor -- or to be
unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.
[12]

It is equally disturbing that respondent remorselessly issued a series of

worthless checks, unmindful of the deleterious effects of such act to public
interest and public order.
[13]

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all members

of the bar to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law. Rule 1.01
of the Code specifically provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. In Co v. Bernardino, the Court
considered the issuance of worthless checks as a violation of this Rule and an
act constituting gross misconduct. It explained thus:
[14]

The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court
may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his nonprofessional or private capacity (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569 [1923]). Where, however,
the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character as
to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege which his
licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or
removing him from the office of attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil. 569 [1923]).
The evidence on record clearly shows respondent's propensity to issue bad
checks. This gross misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional
duties as a member of the bar, puts his moral character in serious doubt. The
Commission, however, does not find him a hopeless case in the light of the fact that
he eventually paid his obligation to the complainant, albeit very much delayed.
While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between complainant and
respondent as the transaction between them did not require the professional legal
services of respondent, nevertheless respondent's abject conduct merits condemnation
from this Court.
As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez [44 Phil.567
(1923)] the principle that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes
which do not involve the relationship of an attorney and client x x x In disciplining the
respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm said: x x x As a general rule, a court will not assume
jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been
committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule with many exceptions x x
x. The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client,
as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rules prescribing the
qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of
good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or
privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential

during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held
that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties,
which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him x x x.
Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo where the erring lawyer was suspended for one year
from the practice of law for attempting to engage in an opium deal, Justice Malcolm
reiterated that an attorney may be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in
his profession, but also for gross misconduct not related to his professional duties
which show him to be an unfit and unworthy lawyer. The courts are not curators of the
morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is not compelled to harbor all
persons whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As
good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice,
when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and
unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to
discipline him x x x Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound
to uphold the law x x x and to that doctrine we give our unqualified support."
We likewise take notice of the high-handed manner in which respondent
dealt with Commissioner Cunanan during the July 4, 2002 hearing, when the
former was expected to settle his obligation with complainant. We cannot
countenance the discourtesy of respondent. He should be reminded that the
IBP has disciplinary authority over him by virtue of his membership therein.
[15]

Thus, it was imperative for him to respect the authority of the officer
assigned to investigate his case. Assuming that he had a very important
personal matter to attend to, he could have politely explained his predicament
to the investigating commissioner and asked permission to leave
immediately. Unfortunately, the former showed dismal behavior by raising his
voice and leaving without the consent of complainant and the investigating
commissioner.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege. It
demands a high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition
precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice
[16]

of law. In this case, respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected
of him as a guardian of law and justice.
[17]

[18]

Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by his gross

misconduct. The IBP Board of Governors recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for two years. However, in line
with Co v. Bernardino, Ducat Jr. v. Villalon Jr. and Saburnido v. Madroo -which also involved gross misconduct of lawyers -- we find the suspension of
one year sufficient in this case.
[19]

[20]

[21]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Robert W. Medel is found guilty of gross misconduct

and is hereby SUSPENDED for one year from the practice of law, effective
upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or
a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and
served on the IBP, as well as on the court administrator who shall circulate it
to all courts for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.
Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.

In re suspension of VICENTE PELAEZ, attorney,

Juan Sumulong for respondent.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:

Following the suspension of Attorney Vicente Pelaez by Judge of First Instance Wislizenus for a
period of one year, the case has been elevated to this court as provided by law, for full investigation
of the facts involved, and for the rendition of the appropriate order.
The respondent Vicente Pelaez is a member of the Philippine Bar, residing at Cebu, Cebu. On
March 20, 1918, he was appointed guardian of the minor Gracia Cabrera. As such guardian, he
came into possession of certain property, including twenty shares of the E. Michael & Co., Inc., and
ten shares of the Philippine Engineering Co. While Pelaez was still the guardian of the minor, he
borrowed P2,800 from the Cebu branch of the Philippine National bank. Shortly thereafter, to
guarantee the loan, Pelaez, without the knowledge or consent of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
deposited with the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank the shares of stock corresponding to
the guardianship. On April 13, 1921, Pelaez executed a written agreement in favor of the Cebu
branch of the Philippine National Bank, pledging, without the authority of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, the shares of stock in question, to guarantee the payment of the loan above referred to.
These are the facts, taken principally from the memorandum filed in this court on behalf of the
respondent, which caused the judge of First Instance to suspend him from the legal profession. To
quote counsel for the respondent, "the misconduct of which the respondent in this case is guilty
consist of having pledged the shares belonging to his ward, to guarantee the payment of his
personal debt."
Two questions present themselves for the resolution. The first question is this: Are the courts in the
Philippines authorized to suspend or disbar a lawyer for causes other than those enumerated in the
statute? The second questions is this: May a lawyer be suspended or disbarred for non-professional
misconduct?
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from this office as lawyer by the Supreme Court for any of the causes therein
enumerated. It will be noticed that our statute merely provides that certain cause shall be deemed
sufficient for the revocation or suspension of an attorney's license. It does not provide that these
shall constitute the only causes for disbarment, or that an attorney may not be disbarred or
suspended for other reasons.
It is a well-settled rule that a statutory enumeration of the grounds of disbarment is not to be taken
as a limitation of the general power of the court in this respect. Even where the Legislature has
specified the grounds for disbarment, the inherent power of the court over its officer is not restricted.
The prior tendency of the decisions of this court has been toward the conclusion that a member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as lawyer for other than statutory grounds.
Indeed, the statute is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a
lawyer.
Passing now to the second point as a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to
discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity.
But this is a general rule with many exceptions. The courts sometimes stress the point that the
attorney has shown, through misconduct outside of his professional dealings, a want of such

professional honesty as render him unworthy of public confidence, and an unfit and unsafe person to
manage the legal business of others. The reason why such a distinction can be drawn is because it
is the court which admits an attorney to the bar, and the court requires for such admission the
possession of good moral character.
The principal authority for the respondent is the case of People ex rel. vs. Appleton ([1883], 105 Ill.,
474). Here it was held, by a divided court, that where property is conveyed to an attorney in trust,
without his professional advice, and he mortgages the same, for the purpose of raising a sum of
money which he claims is due him from the cestui que trust, and the trustee afterwards sells the
property and appropriates the proceeds of the sale to his own use, the relation of client and attorney
not being created by such trust, his conduct, however censurable as an individual occupying the
position of a trustee, is not such as to warrant the summary disbarring of him on motion to the court
to strike his name from the roll of attorneys, but the injured party must be left to his proper remedy by
suit. The Illinois court, however, admits that although the general rule is, that an attorney-at-law will
not be disbarred for misconduct not in his professional capacity, but as an individual, there are cases
forming an exception where his misconduct in his private capacity may be of so gross a character as
to require his disbarment.
The Attorney-General relies principally on the case of In re Smith ([1906], 73 Kan., 743). In the
opinion written by Mr. Chief Justice Johnston, it was said:
It is next contended that some of the charges against Smith do not fall within the cause for
disbarment named in the statute. As will be observed, the statute does not provide that the
only cause for which the license of an attorney may be revoked or suspended are those
specified in it, nor does it undertake to limit the common-law power of the courts to protect
themselves and the public by excluding those who are unfit to assist in the administration of
the law. It merely provides that certain causes shall be deemed sufficient for the revocation
or suspension of an attorney's license. (Gen. Stat., 1901, sec. 398.) In the early case
ofPeyton's Appeal (12 Kan., 398, 404), it was held that this statute is not an enabling act, but
that the power of the court to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is
inherent; that "it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; that it may be
exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases, unless positively
prohibited by statute; and that it may be exercised in any manner that will give the party to be
disbarred a fair trial and a full opportunity to be heard.' If there is authority in the Legislature
to restrict the discretion of the courts as to what shall constitute causes for disbarment, or to
limit the inherent power which they have exercised from time immemorial, it should not be
deemed to have done so unless its purpose is clearly expressed. It is generally held that the
enumeration of the grounds for disbarment in the statute is not to be taken as a limitation on
the general power of the court, but that attorneys may be removed for common-law causes
when the exercise of the privileges and functions of their high office is inimical to the due
administration of justice . . . .
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as
between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorney,
uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. If that
qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the

law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the
exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected
with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
We are of the opinion that the doctrines announced by the Supreme Court of Kansas are sound.
The relation of guardian and ward requires of the guardian the continual maintenance of the utmost
good faith in his dealings with the estate of the ward. The bond and the oath of the guardian require
him to manage the estate of the ward according to law for the best interests of the ward, and
faithfully to discharge his trust in relation thereto. Moreover, it has not escaped our attention that in
the petition by Vicente Pelaez, asking the court to appoint him the guardian of Gracia Cabrera, he
begins his petition in this manner: "El abogado que subscribe, nombrado tutor testamentario, etc."
(The undersigned attorney, appointed testamentary guardian, etc.) which indicates that petitioner
might not have been named the guardian in this particular case had he not at the same time been a
lawyer.
Counsel argues that the misconduct for which the respondent has been suspended by the lower
court is single and isolated. "It forms," he says, "the only blot upon the escutcheon." We feel,
however, that the trial court has been extremely considerate of the respondent, and that were we
sitting in first instance, we would probably incline to a more severe sentence.
Judgment affirmed. So ordered.
Araullo, C. J., Street, Avancea, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS TALENTS POOL, INC., complainant, vs.

ATTY. PRIMO R. NALDOZA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

On April 19, 1993, Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., filed before this Court a
Petition for disbarment against Attorney Primo R. Naldoza. The precursor of this Petition was the
action of respondent, as counsel for complainant, appealing a Decision of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). In relation to the appeal, complainant asserts that
respondent should be disbarred for the following acts:
1. Appealing a decision, knowing that the same was already final and executory
2. Deceitfully obtaining two thousand, five hundred and fifty-five US dollars (US$2,555) from
complainant, allegedly for cash bond in the appealed case
3. Issuing a spurious receipt to conceal his illegal act. [1]

In his Answer,[2] respondent denies that he persuaded complainant to file an appeal. On the
contrary, he asserts that it was the complainant who insisted on appealing the case in order to

delay the execution of the POEA Decision.[3] He also controverts complainants allegation that he
asked for a cash bond and that he issued the fake receipt.[4]
In a Resolution dated May 17, 1993, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The pertinent portions of the complaint were summarized by the IBP in this wise:

Under its petition, complainant alleges that the respondent was given the task to
defend the interest of the complainant corporation in POEA Case No. 8888-06-468,
entitled Olano, et al. versus Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., et al.; that when
the said case was resolved in favor of the complainant therein on October 5, 1992, the
respondent Atty. Naldoza knowing fully well that the said decision had already
become final and unappealable[,] through malpractice in [an] apparent desire to
collect or to bleed his client of several thousand pesos of attorneys fees, convinced the
complainant to appeal the case before the Supreme Court. Thus, on December 14,
1992, the respondent filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Review which was
docketed as G.R. No. 107984 and that two (2) days thereafter misrepresented to the
complainant corporation that the complainant ha[d] to pay, which it did, [a] Cash
Bond in UNITED STATES DOLLAR amounting to TWO THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE (U.S. $2,555.00) to the Supreme Court in order that the said
appealed case could be heard or acted upon by the Supreme Court. The said amount
was given to the respondent.
x x x [S]ubsequently the complainant corporation came to know that the fees to be
paid to the Supreme Court consist[ed] only of normal filing and docket fees for such
kind of appeal but in order to cover up respondents misrepresentation, Atty. Naldoza
presented complainant a fake xerox copy of an alleged Supreme court receipt
representing payment of U.S. $2,555.00.
Subsequent verification from the Supreme Court made by the complainant corporation
revealed that the said receipt issued by the treasurers office of the Supreme Court x x
x [was] spurious, meaning a fake receipt. The said verification revealed that what was
only paid by the respondent to the Supreme court was the amount of P622.00 as
shown by the enumerated legal fees of the Supreme Court Docket-Receiving Section
showing the handwritten name of the respondent for purpose of showing that the said
computation was requested by and addressed to the respondent. [5] (citations omitted)
Meanwhile, a criminal case[6] for estafa based on the same facts was filed against herein
respondent before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 141. Although
acquitted on reasonable doubt, he was declared civilly liable in the amount of US$ 2,555.
Thereafter, respondent filed before the IBP a Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss on July
22, 1996, on the ground that he had already been acquitted in the criminal case for
estafa. Complainant opposed the Motion.[7]

On February 16, 1998, this Court received the IBP Board of Governors Resolution, which
approved the investigating commissioners report[8] and recommendation that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. In his Report, Investigating Commissioner
Plaridel Jose justified his recommendation in this manner:

x x x [R]espondent fails to rebut the position of the complainant that the signature [on
the receipt for the amount of $2,555.00] was his. Hence, respondent anchors his
position on a mere denial that it is not his signature.Likewise, the respondent denies
the check voucher dated December 15, 1992, and the encircled signature of the
respondent, which x x x according to him is falsified and irregular. No evidence,
however, was presented by the respondent that his signature therein was falsified and
irregular. [As to the altered Supreme Court Official Receipt, the respondent denied]
that he ha[d] anything to do with it because it was the complainant who signed the
Petition for Review and tried to explain that his name appear[ed] to be the payee
because he [was] the counsel of record of the petitioner. But while it is true that the
affiant in the said Petition for Review [was] Mr. Rogelio G. Gatchalian, president of
the complainant company, the respondent does not deny that he signed the said
petition as counsel of the petitioner corporation and that he was actually the one who
prepared the same and the notary public before whom the affiant subscribed and
[swore] as the one who caused the preparation of the said petition.
The legal form (Exh. G) of the legal fees for the Petition for Review re G.R. 107984
was denied by the respondent because according to him he was never given a chance
to cross-examine the person who issued the [certification] x x x. However, respondent
does not deny that he is the person referred to by the handwritten name P.R. Naldoza
who paid the legal fees of P622.00.
In addition to the said respondents Formal Offer of Evidence, he submitted to this
Commission as his most important piece of evidence the Decision of acquittal in
Criminal Case No. 93-8748 entitled People of the Philippines versus Primo R.
Naldoza, the copy of which Decision is appended to his Manifestation with Motion to
Dismiss dated July 22, 1996 praying for the dismissal of the present administrative
case in view of his being exonerated in the said criminal case based on the same facts
and evidence.[9] (citations omitted)
Commissioner Jose brushed aside respondents contention that his acquittal in the companion
criminal case should result in the dismissal of this administrative complaint. The commissioner
emphasized that the criminal case for estafa[10] was completely different from the proceedings
before him; acquittal in the former did not exonerate respondent in the latter.[11] He further noted
that the RTC Decision itself hinted at the administrative liability of respondent, since it found
him civilly liable to herein complainant for $2,555.[12]
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be sanctioned. However,
the recommended penalty is not commensurate to the gravity of the wrong perpetrated.

At the outset, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondents Motion to Dismiss should be
denied. In that Motion, he maintains that he should be cleared of administrative liability, because
he has been acquitted of estafa which involved the same facts. He argues that the issue involved
there was the very same issue litigated in this case, [13] and that his exoneration was a result a full
blown trial on the merits of this case.[14]
In a similar case, we have said:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these
[administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of xxx criminal
law. Moreover, this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different
capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases. [15]
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.[16] They are distinct from
and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is necessary;[17] in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, clearly
preponderant evidence is all that is required.[18] Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a
prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings.[19]
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result
in a finding of liability in the administrative case. [20] Conversely, respondents acquittal does not
necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial courts finding of civil
liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative
action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the
administrative liability of the lawyer.[21] The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are
altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not
inevitably govern the third and vice versa. For this reason, it would be well to remember the
Courts ruling in In re Almacen,[22] which we quote:

x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court
motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x (emphasis ours)

We shall now discuss seriatim the specific charges against respondent.

First. Complainant alleges that respondent appealed the POEA Decision, despite knowing
that it had already become final and executory. The IBP investigating commissioner had no
explicit finding on this point.Rogelio G. Gatchalian testified that during the pendency of the
appeal, his company had received from the POEA a Writ of Execution which led him to the
conlcusion that they [had] lost the case before the Supreme Court. [23] This, however, does not
substantiate the charge.
Complainant has failed to present proof regarding the status of the appeal. Neither has there
been any showing that the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the POEA Decision had
become final and executory.Worse, there has been no evidence that respondent knew that the
case was unappealable. Indeed, the records of this Court shows that the Petition for Review was
dismissed for petitioners failure to submit an Affidavit of Service and a legible duplicate of the
assailed Order. Clearly, this charge has no leg to stand on.
Second. Be that as it may, we agree with the IBP that respondent obtained from complainant
the amount of $2,555, on the false representation that it was needed for the appeal before this
Court. According to Gatchalian,[24] respondent explained that the amount would cover all the
expenses to be incurred in the Petition for Review with the Supreme Court and which amount
also will answer for the payment as sort of deposit so that if our case is lost, the money will be
given or paid to the complainant in that case so that our deposit with the bank would not be
garnished.[25] Corroborating Gatchalians testimony, Edna Deles declared that respondent received
the amount on the representation that it would be paid to the Supreme Court in connection with
the Olano case.[26]
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is not convincing. Quite the contrary, when he
paid P10,000 and issued a check to complainant as his moral obligation, he indirectly admitted
the charge. Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the
money of another. This is an admission of misconduct.[27] In his Answer submitted to this Court,
he declared:

(8). That I have no knowledge, information or belief as to truthfulness of the

allegation of the Petitioner, on his allegation no. 8 and no. 9, the truth being that in all
the cases and assignments made by the Petitioner to me, I was made to report to him
personally and to his Board of Directors the progress of the cases both orally and in
writing. I even [went] to the extent of paying him P10,000.00 as my moral obligation
only to find after accounting that he still owes me P180,000.00 as attorneys fee [to]
which I am entitled under rule 130 of the rules of court sec. 24, and under sec. 37 of
the above-cited rules, I have the right to apply the funds received from Gatchalian in
satisfaction of my claim for Professional Services, otherwise known as Attorneys Lien,
as shown in my Service Billings and Statement of Accounts.[28] (emphasis ours)
Contrary to respondents claim, the amount of $2,555 was not a part of his attorneys lien. He
demanded the money from his client on the pretext that it was needed for the Petition before the
Supreme Court, but he actually converted it to his personal gain. This act clearly constitutes
malpractice.[29] The claim that respondent merely applied his lien over the funds of his client is

just an afterthought, the accounting being made after the fact. It is settled that the conversion by
a lawyer of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of
public confidence in the legal profession.[30]
Third. In an effort to conceal his misappropriation of the money entrusted to him,
respondent gave complainant a photocopy of a receipt purportedly showing that the Supreme
Court had received the sum of $2,555 from him. Again, the testimonies of Gatchalian[31] and
Deles[32] were equally clear on this point. After respondent had presented the false receipt,
Gatchalian learned that no such payment was made. Ms Araceli Bayuga of the Supreme Court
Cash Collection and Disbursement Division issued a certification that respondent had paid the
amount of P622 only, not $2,555. In fact, the records of the said case [33] contain no indication at
all the Court has required the payment of the latter sum, or that it has been paid at all.
Juxtaposed to the complainants evidence, the bare denials of respondent cannot overturn the
IBPs findings that he has indeed presented a false receipt to conceal his misappropriation of his
clients money. We agree with the IBP that it is unbelievable that the complainant in the person of
Rogelio Gatchalian, being a layman as he is without any knowledge in the procedure of filing a
case before the Supreme court, could spuriously weave such documents which are denied by the
respondent.[34]
In view of the foregoing, respondent has clearly failed the standards of his noble
profession. As we have stated in Resurrecion v. Sayson:[35]

[L]awyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their
clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach.
Clearly reprehensible are the established facts that he demanded money from his client for a
bogus reason, misappropriated the same, and then issued a fake receipt to hide his
deed. In Dumadag v. Lumaya,[36] the Court ordered the indefinite suspension of a lawyer for not
remitting to his client the amount he had received pursuant to an execution, viz.:

[E]ven as respondent consistently denied liability to Dumadag, his former client, the
records abundantly point to his receipt of and failure to deliver the amount of
P4,344.00 to his client, the herein complainant, a clear breach of the canons of
professional responsibility.
In Obia v. Catimbang,[37] we meted out the same penalty to a lawyer who had
misappropriated the money entrusted to him:

The acts committed by respondent definitely constitute malpractice and gross

misconduct in his office as attorney. These acts are noted with disapproval by the
Court; they are in violation of his duty, as a lawyer, to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession and to engage in no conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law. Such misconduct discredits the legal profession."

Respondents acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money entrusted
to him; he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his money. Worse, he had the gall
to falsify an official receipt of this Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve
to continue being a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, Primo R. Naldoza is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of
Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts of this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA, LEONILA FUERTES and EDGARDO SERVANDO, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE EMMANUEL M. ABAYA, RTC, Br. 51, Puerto Princess City and ANNA BELLE
CARDENAS,respondents.
A.M. No. R-698-P August 23, 1989
JUDGE EMMANUEL M. ABAYA, complainant,
vs.
LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Br. 52, Puerto Princess
City, respondent.
A.M. No. 2909 August 23, 1989
JUDGE EMMANUEL M. ABAYA, complainant,
vs.
LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Br. 52, Puerto Princess
City, respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
In a complaint under oath dated July 21, 1986, docketed as Adm. Matter No. R-705-RTJ, Atty. Ligaya
Gonzales-Austria, then Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Puerto
Princess City 1 Mrs. Leonila Fuertes and Mr. Edgardo Servando charged Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya,
then Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 51, Puerto Princess City 2 with:
1. Estafa through falsification of public or official documents, by verifying official
hours rendered by one employee in the person of Miss Anabelle Cardenas who
never reported for duty from August 1983 to May 1984 by encashing and receiving
salaries of said Miss Cardenas through forgery of payee's signature in the treasury

warrants, thus deceiving the government and defrauding the Government treasury of
a big amount of money;
2. Gross dishonesty and corruption by soliciting, demanding, receiving bribed (sic)
money in exchange for favorable resolutions and decisions from different litigants in
Branch 52, where said Judge was temporarily assigned from November 1984 to April
1986 and of which one of the undersigned complainant (sic), LIGAYA GONZALESAUSTRIA is the Branch Clerk of Court;
3. Illegal exaction of portion of the salaries of his subordinate Edgardo Servando as
part and condition of his continued employment in Branch 51, where Judge Abaya is
the presiding judge.,
Judge Abaya denied all these charges in his comment dated August 29, 1986, filed in compliance
with the Court Resolution of August 12, 1986. He asserted that these charges were concocted in
retaliation against the administrative complaint docketed as Adm. Matter No. 698-P he earlier filed
on July 18,1986 against one of his accusers, Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria for dishonesty and grave
misconduct in having forged his signature in a probation order in Criminal Case No. 4995 of the
RTC, Branch 52, Puerto Princess, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Leonardo Cruz," for
attempted murder. Adm. Matter No. 698-P was followed by a petition dated August 5,1986 docketed
as Adm. Case No. 2909 for the disbarment of Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria based on the same
alleged offense.
After Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria had filed her comment on the charges against her, the Court
resolved to consolidate these related cases.
On October 28, 1986, the Court granted the motion of the complainants in Adm. Matter No. R-705RTJ to amend their complaint by including Annabelle Cardenas as defendant in the charge of Estafa
thru Falsification of Public Documents. It was averred therein that the initial exclusion was due to
oversight and that it was never intended to exclude her as a co-principal.
By resolution of December 11, 1986, the cases were referred to Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M.
Herrera for investigation, report and recommendation. Based on the evidence presented by the
parties, Justice Herrera finds the respondents guilty of the charges against them and thereby
recommends:
1. The FORFEITURE of retirement benefits of Judge Abaya except earned leave
credits;
2. The REMOVAL of Annabelle Cardenas from office as Court Stenographer;
3. A one-year SUSPENSION from office as Attorney of Atty. Ligaya G. Austria in AC2909. 4
We now consider these well-thought out recommendations.

I. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER NO. R-705-RTJ:

a. Estafa thru Falsification of Public or Official Documents by Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas.
The gravamen of this charge is that Annabelle Cardenas who was appointed as Stenographic
Reporter of Branch 51, RTC, Palawan in August 1983 upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya as
Presiding Judge therein, was a ghost employee from August 1983 to May 1984 as she never
reported for work during said period, being then employed at Princess Tours Rafols Hotel as a tourist
guide. Notwithstanding, with her knowledge and consent, Judge Abaya verified as true and correct
her daily time records as stenographic reporter purportedly showing that she rendered service and
incurred no absences or tardiness from August 9 to September 30, 1983 and rendered service for
the period from October 1, 1983 to May 31, 1984 and was granted leave of absence from March 14
to 30, 1984 and from April 23 to 27, 1984. Thus, she was paid her salaries corresponding to the
periods allegedly worked. Some of the Treasury Warrants covering her salaries were, according to
complainants, encashed by Judge Abaya by forging Annabelle Cardenas' signature.
Both Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas vehemently denied the charges, countering that the
latter worked as stenographic reporter from August 1983 to May 31, 1984.
We find the charges against Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas to be supported by substantial
evidence. Especially damaging to the pretensions of the respondents that Annabelle Cardenas
rendered service as stenographic reporter during the period under consideration are the school
records of the Holy Trinity College, showing that Annabelle Cardenas was attending school in the
first semester of school year 1983-1984 from 2:00 P.M. to 8:15 P.M. 5 While she claimed to have been
permitted by her teacher to attend her typing and stenography classes after office hours, the school
records reveal that she has other subjects such as Business Organization and Management (3 units), Ten
Commandments (3 units), Sining ng Pakikipagtalastas (3 units) and Accounting for Single Proprietorship
(3 units), her attendance in which can be safely concluded from the passing grades she received in said
subjects. Equally damaging to respondents' assertion are the Daily Time Records of Princess
Tours 6 showing that Annabelle Cardenas acted as tourist guide on 43 working days when she was
supposedly rendering service as stenographic reporter. Her explanation that her name was placed on the
daily time record as team leader, although she did not actually conduct the tours reflected therein is too
shallow to merit belief.
It is indeed quite intriguing that during the ten-month period under consideration, the court calendar
for Branch 51 never once carried Annabelle Cardenas' name to signify her attendance at a court
session. Moreover, she could not produce any single order, transcript or official stenographic notes
that had been taken by her in any case, civil or criminal. All she presented were so-called practice
notes.
Judge Abaya stated in his comment that it was Annabelle Cardenas who was collecting her salary
"without intervention from your respondent. 7 It was however proved that Judge Abaya collected
Annabelle Cardenas' salaries on several occasions, as in fact, said Annabelle Cardenas even executed a
special power of attorney in his favor authorizing him not only to collect the treasury warrants but to
endorse and negotiate them as well. 8 Be that as it may, we find the evidence insufficient on the one hand
to overthrow the explanation of respondents that Judge Abaya collected Annabelle Cardenas' salaries in
Manila so that he could bring the same to Candon, Ilocos Sur for delivery to her mother, who is a good

friend of the Judge; and on the other hand to support complainants' theory that Judge Abaya appropriated
the money for himself.

b. Charges of Gross Dishonesty and Corruption by Soliciting, Demanding and Receiving Bribe
Money against Judge Abaya. The act complained of was allegedly committed by Judge Abaya
while temporarily assigned to Branch 52, RTC Palawan vice Judge Jose G. Genilo Jr., who was
temporarily assigned to Batangas City. It must be recalled that complainant Atty. Ligaya GonzalesAustria was then Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 52.
It was alleged that Judge Abaya denied the application for bail of the accused in Criminal Case No.
5304 entitled "People vs. Henry Arias and Fernando Oniot for murder, in consideration of the sum of
P 2,000.00 given by Mrs. Leonila Fuertes, complainant and mother of the victim in the aforesaid
case.
Mrs. Leonila Fuertes, a school teacher, testified that she went to Branch 52 at about 5:00 P.M. on
August 13, 1985 in response to a telephone call from court stenographer Nelly Vicente that Judge
Abaya wanted to see her personally. Nelly Vicente referred her to Carmencita P. Baloco, the officerin-charge who then called Judge Abaya from the other branch. Judge Abaya directed her to the
adjoining courtroom where he told her, "Ang kaso ninyo ay medyo tagilid, 50-50 dahil walang
eyewitness." (Your case is shaky with only a 50-50 chance of winning because there is no
eyewitness.) She retorted that there was an eyewitness but the Judge insisted that there was none
because the supposed eyewitness had his back turned when her son was stabbed. Nonetheless, the
Judge assured her that he would be able to do something about it ("Ngunit lahat ay magagawan ko
ng paraan dahil ako ang nakakaalam sa mga decision dito"). When Mrs. Fuertes asked the Judge
what he wanted, he told her that he has a problem. "Kailangan ko ng pera Limang Libo at Ide-deny
ko ang bail na mga acusado" (I need Five Thousand Pesos and I will deny bail to the accused). Mrs.
Fuertes expressed puzzlement on why she had to give money when she was the aggrieved party,
but the Judge cut her off by saying he needed the money badly before he leaves for Manila. Mrs.
Fuertes answered that she would have to consult her brothers-in-law about the matter. The Judge
told her to see him at his house at 7:00 o'clock in the evening.
lwph1.t

Mrs. Fuertes consulted her brothers-in-law as well as the then prosecuting fiscal, now Judge Angel
R. Miclat about the matter. Although they were all against the Idea of her acceding to the Judge's
demand, she delivered the amount of Pl,200.00 to Judge Abaya on August 15,1985 in his chambers,
telling him that was all she could afford. Judge Abaya looked dissatisfied but said "Never mind" and
that he would just contact her at the next trial for the final judgment. 9
Roselyn Teologo, stenographic reporter of Branch 52 corroborated that portion of Mrs. Fuertes'
testimony relating to the phone call of Nelly Vicente to Mrs. Fuertes, the latter's arrival on August 13,
1985 at Branch 52 and Mrs. Fuertes having been closeted with Judge Abaya inside the courtroom
for about 20 minutes. She further testified that Carmen Baloco who eavesdropped on the Judge and
Mrs. Fuertes' conversation remarked, "Grabe ito, nanghihingi ng pera." (This is terrible, he is asking
money.) She added that when Judge Abaya emerged from the courtroom, he instructed her not to
tell anybody that Mrs. Fuertes had been there. 10

Additional corroborative evidence was given by Judge Angel R. Miclat, then acting City Fiscal for
Puerto Princess City handling Criminal Case No. 5304. He testified that Mrs. Fuertes came to him in
August of 1986 to inform him that Judge Abaya was asking P5,000.00 from her so that the bail
application of the accused would be denied. While he advised her to file a complaint against Judge
Abaya, he was informed later on that Mrs. Fuertes gave Judge Abaya not the amount being asked,
but only about P1,200.00. 11
Likewise submitted in evidence by the complainants were the entries in Mrs. Fuertes' diary, thus:
August 13, 1985 called by Judge Abaya to see him after office hours. He asked me
for my case was 50-50. 12
August 15, I went to town to see Baby Francisco, gave P2,000 and I brought the
money to Judge. 13
July 2, 1986 Judge Abaya with companion Rufo Gonzales and Celia Fernandez. Purpose
they convinced me to sign my name in the affidavit stating that I will deny the previous
affidavit I made stated that Judge asked from me certain amount and his request was
granted. But I did not sign and asked me to see him in town at the residence of Menchie
his niece personally nakiusap kay Baby upang mai-deny ang affidavit ko through Atty.
Austria ay nakiusap pa rin. He is talking care Nanette na idinay ko. 13-A

Judge Abaya denied the solicitation as well as the receipt of money from Mrs. Fuertes. He alleged
that the bail application of the accused in Criminal Case No. 5304 was denied, not because of any
outside interference, but because the evidence of guilt was strong. He surmised that Mrs. Fuertes
and Nelly Vicente had been pressured by Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria into testifying against him
out of sheer vindictiveness and that Mrs. Fuertes might have been blaming him for the delay in the
resolution of the criminal case against her son's alleged killers.
We quote with approval Justice Herrera's perceptive reasons for giving full faith and credence to
Mrs. Fuertes' testimony:
We find no improper motive as to why Mrs. Fuertes, a school teacher, would impute
such a serious offense against a judge unless it be the truth. Mrs. Fuertes is not a
disgruntled litigant. Judge Abaya having denied the petition for bail of the suspected
killer of Mrs, Fuertes' son, she should, under normal circumstances be grateful to the
Judge. Yet she charged him with a serious offense, and travelled all the way from
Palawan to Manila to testify against the Judge. Under the circumstances, We cannot
accept Judge Abaya's contention that Mrs. Fuertes perjured herself just to
accommodate the vengeanceful ire of Atty. Austria against Judge Abaya. That would
be contrary to the ordinary prompting of men.
Upon the other hand, the testimony of Mrs. Fuertes is too rich in details brought out
on cross-examination which cannot simply be swept aside as mere fabrications.
They find support in collateral but highly significant circumstances pointed to by Mrs.
Teologo, such as (1) the visible presence of Mrs. Fuertes in the courtroom in

conference with Judge Abaya at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 15, (should
be 13) 1985; and (2) the highly credible testimony of Judge Miclat on the report made
to him by Mrs. Fuertes, as then acting City Fiscal, on the solicitation of Judge Abaya.
It certainly cannot be said that Mrs. Fuertes merely concocted her story at the time
regarding the solicitation of Judge Abaya in connection with the pending case of the
suspected killers of her son. There was absolutely no motive for her to do So. 14
c. Charge of illegal Exaction against Judge Abaya. It is alleged that Judge Abaya exacted portions
of the salaries of two (2) employees in Branch 51 of the Palawan RTC as a condition for their
continued employment. Edgardo Servando, one of the complainants herein, and who was appointed
stenographer on September 3, 1984 upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya, declared that such
recommendation was made in consideration of his agreement to give Judge Abaya Pl,000.00 from
his initial salary and thereafter a monthly amount of P400.00, which undertaking he complied with.
However, in December when the Judge before leaving for Manila for the Christmas vacation asked
him for Pl,000.00 from as fringe benefits, medical allowance and year-end bonus, he was unable to
comply as he did not then have cash, the payment of said benefits having been in checks. A week
later, he received a notice of termination effective at the close of business hours on December 31,
1984 from the Supreme Court upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya. 15
Nilo Jamora, a former stenographer of Branch 51 testified that since his employment in said Branch,
Judge Abaya had been exacting from him P350.00 every payday, which exaction ceased only in
March 1986 when Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria filed her charges against Judge Abaya. He further
stated that when he refused to retract his charges against Judge Abaya before the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan despite the Judge's offer of money, the latter demoted him to process server. 16
Judge Abaya likewise denied this charge, labelling the same as sheer vindictiveness due to
Servando's termination and Jamora's demotion, fanned by Atty. Austria's proddings. He insists that
the personnel action taken on Servando and Jamora was due to their inefficiency.
While the investigating officer, Justice Herrera observed that both Servando and Jamora "testified in
a natural and straightforward, albeit in an angry manner without attempting to conceal their contempt
for Judge Abaya, 17 he concluded that "the evidence in this regard would be unable to withstand judicial
scrutiny for want of ample corroboration. It would simply be the word of one against a judge. 18
We are in accord with this observation, for indeed, the charge if true is so demeaning to an RTC
judge that it requires more than a bare allegation to sustain it. In this regard, we give respondent
Judge the benefit of the doubt.
In summation, we find Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya guilty of grave and serious misconduct affecting
Ms integrity and moral character which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had his
resignation not been accepted.
The office of a judge exists for one solemn end to promote justice by administering it fairly and
impartially. In regarding justice as a commodity to be sold at a price, Judge Abaya betrayed the very
essence of magistracy. In complicity with Annabelle Cardenas, he likewise abused the trust and

confidence of the people, shortchanging them of services undoubtedly vital to the speedy
administration of justice.
The judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice. From him, the people draw their will
and awareness to obey the law. 19 For him then to transgress the highest ideals of justice and public
service for personal gain is indeed a demoralizing example constituting a valid cause for disenchantment
and loss of confidence in the judiciary as well as in the civil service system.
By these acts, Judge Abaya has demonstrated his unfitness and unworthiness of the honor and
requisites attached to his office. As he had previously resigned, we hereby order the forfeiture of his
retirement benefits, except earned leave credits, as recommended by the investigating officer
Justice Herrera.
We further mete out to Annabelle Cardenas in consequence of her grave misconduct as abovedescribed the penalty of removal from office as Court Stenographer with prejudice to her reappointment to the Judiciary.
II. A.M. No. R-698-P and Adm. Case No. 2909
The complaints for dishonesty and grave misconduct in A.M. No. R-698-P and for disbarment in
Adm. Case No. 2909 against Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria, then Clerk of Court of Branch 52, RTC
Palawan, stem from her act of having allegedly forged the signature of Judge Abaya in a probation
order dated April 22, 1986 in Criminal Case No. 4999 of said court entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Leonardo Cruz" for attempted homicide.
Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria admits to having signed the probation order and of having
promulgated it, but explains that these were done with the knowledge and consent of Judge Abaya,
who had asked her to prepare orders and decisions in Branch 52 to ease his load of presiding over
two (2) branches. She adverts to Judge Abaya's order of November 4, 1985 which granted accused
Leonardo Cruz' motion for reconsideration of the order denying probation. This order, which carried
certain conditions, set the promulgation of the probation order on January 16, 1986 at 8:00 o'clock in
the morning. In the meantime, Judge Abaya requested Atty. Austria to prepare the probation order
with the day and month in blank for the signature of the Judge.
On January 16,1986, Judge Abaya was absent so the promulgation was reset to April 16, 1986. On
the latter date, the provincial warden failed to bring the accused to court, hence the promulgation of
the probation order was again reset to June 3, 1986, with Judge Abaya allegedly giving instructions
before he left for Manila to promulgate said order even in his absence should the probationer
Leonardo Cruz arrive in court.
On April 21, 1986, Leonardo Cruz came and begged that the probation order be promulgated the
following day, April 22, 1986 as he had to leave for Coron in the same pumpboat that brought him to
Puerto Princess and he had no money to sustain him up to the time the Judge arrives from Manila.
As requested, the promulgation was set on April 22, 1986, only for Atty. Austria to discover that
Judge Abaya had neglected to sign the probation order. In view of the predicament of Leonardo Cruz

and the authority granted to her by Judge Abaya, Atty. Austria signed Judge Abaya's name to the
probation order and promulgated it.
Atty. Austria justifies her action under the theory of agency (Art. 1881 of the Civil Code) 20 in that
having been granted full authority to promulgate the probation order, she necessarily had the authority to
sign the Judge's name if the need arose. She further maintains that as Judge Abaya never complained
about the alleged forgery, he is deemed to have ratified it and is now estopped from questioning her
authority. Lastly, she compares the probation order to a writ of execution which is usually done by the
Clerk of Court. 21
Respondent's arguments are quite novel but unpersuasive. As thoroughly explained by Justice
Herrera:
.....her explanation that she is the one preparing decisions and orders in Branch 52
with the knowledge and consent of Judge Abaya during the time that the latter was
acting as Presiding Judge of said branch and that she was directed to promulgate
the probation order in favor of Leonardo Cruz only to discover that the judge
overlooked to sign the order, even if true, is not a valid justification for her to simulate
the signature of Judge Abaya in the probation order. This is patently illegal. As a
lawyer and branch clerk of court, she ought to know that under no circumstances is
her act of signing the name of the judge permissible. She could have probably
released the order with the statement that it is upon orders of the judge or by
authority of the judge but she could not under any circumstance make it appear as
she did in this case that the Judge signed the order when in fact he did not. The
duties of the clerk of court in the absence of any express direction of the Judge is
well defined under Section 5, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 5. Duties of the Clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge. In the
absence of the judge, the clerk may perform all the duties of the judge in receiving
applications, petitions, inventories, reports, and the issuance of all orders and notices
that follow as a matter of course under these rules, and may also, when directed so
to do by the judge, receive the accounts of executors, administrators, guardians,
trustees, and receivers, and all evidence relating to them, or to the settlement of the
estates of deceased persons, or to guardianship, trusteeships, or receiverships, and
forthwith transmit such reports, accounts, and evidence to the judge, together with
his findings in relation to the same, if the judge shall direct him to make findings and
include the same in his report.
Signing orders in the name of, and simulating the signature of the judge is not one of
them.
Atty. Austria's theory of agency that she lawfully acted as agent of the Judge is wholly
devoid of merit. The judicial power vested in a judge and its exercise is strictly
personal to the Judge because of, and by reason of his highest qualification, and can
never be the subject of agency. That would not only be contrary to law, but also
subversive of public order and public policy. Nor could her void act in signing the

name of the judge be validly ratified by the latter. Judge Abaya himself is bereft of
any power to authorize the clerk of court to sign his name in his official capacity in a
matter pending adjudication before him. The issuance of the order in question is
strictly judicial and is exclusively vested in the judge which is beyond his authority to
delegate. 22
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of
the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. 23 However, if that
misconduct as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to
show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such ground. 24
We find Atty. Austria's misconduct as Branch Clerk of Court to affect her qualification as a member of
tile Bar, for precisely as a lawyer, she ought to have known the illegality of the act complained of.
WHEREFORE, finding the respondents Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya, Annabelle Cardenas and Atty.
Ligaya Gonzales-Austria guilty as charged, except that of illegal exaction against Judge Abaya, the
Court hereby orders:
1. In Adm. Matter No. R-705-RTJ, the FORFEITURE of the retirement benefits of Judge Emmanuel
M. Abaya, except his earned leave credits; and the DISMISSAL from office of Annabelle Cardenas
as Stenographic Reporter with prejudice to her reappointment to the Judiciary; and,
2. In Adm. Matter No. R-698-P and Adm. Case No. 2909, the resignation of Atty. Ligaya GonzalesAustria as Branch Clerk of Court IS ACCEPTED as of December 31, 1987 and any and all benefits
accruing during her government service are declared forfeited, except her earned leave credits. Her
SUSPENSION as a member of the Bar for a period of one year from the finality of this decision is
further decreed.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Ombudsman for the filing of appropriate criminal
charges against respondents if warranted.
Copies of this resolution shall be attached to the respondents' respective personal records.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Gri;o-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.
OZAETA, J.:

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:
Marriage
license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if
desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the
poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but
subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the
indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the
future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he
alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had
any case at law by reason thereof.
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a
member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers
of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for
a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon
27, Code of Ethics.)
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the
period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular
letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were
repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the
opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.
PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO HERRERA, respondents.

Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.

Abalos, Gatdula & Bermejo for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The case dramatizes the unpleasant spectacle of a lawyer tangling with his own client, more often
than not, in the matter of fees. The lawyer, the petitioner himself, would have his petition decided on
pure questions of procedure, yet, the Court cannot let pass unnoticed the murkier face of the
controversy, wherein the law is corrupted to promote a lawyer's selfseeking ends, and the law
profession, debased into a simple business dealing. Accordingly, we resolve it on the basis not only
of the questions raised by the petitioner pertaining to procedure, but considering its serious ethical
implications, on its merits as well.
We turn to the facts.
The private respondent was the registered owner of eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of
land located in Quezon City. 1 Between 1977 and 1978, 2 he obtained various loans from the L & R
Corporation, a financing institution, in various sums totalling P420,000.00 As security therefor, he
executed deeds of mortgage in favor of the corporation over the parcels aforesaid. On August 28,1979,
and upon the maturing of said loans, the firm caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage following his
failure to pay, as a consequence of which, the said eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of land
were disposed of at public auction, and in which L & R Corporation was itself the highest bidder.
Pending redemption, the private respondent filed a complaint for injunction against L & R
Corporation, to enjoin consolidation of title in its name, in which he succeeded in obtaining
preliminary injunctive relief. He was represented by the petitioner. Two years later, and with no
imminent end to the litigation in sight, the parties entered into a compromise agreement whereby L &
R Corporation accorded the private respondent another year to redeem the foreclosed properties
subject to payment of P600,000.00, with interest thereon at one per cent per month. They likewise
stipulated that the petitioner shall be entitled to attorney's fees of P100,000.00. On November 19,
1982, the court 3 approved the compromise.
The private respondent, however, remained in dire financial straits a fact the petitioner himself
concede 4 for which reason he failed to acquire the finding to repay the loans in question, let alone the
sum of P100,000.00 in attorney's fees demanded by the petitioner. That notwithstanding, the petitioner
moved for execution insofar as his fees were concemed. The court granted execution, although it does
not appear that the sum was actually collected. 5
Sometime thereafter, the petitioner and the private respondent met to discuss relief for the latter with
respect to his liability to L & R Corporation on the one hand, and his obligation to the petitioner on
the other. The petitioner contends that the private respondent "earnestly implored" 6 him to redeem
the said properties; the private respondent maintains that it was the petitioner himself who 'offered to
advance the money," 7 provided that he, the private respondent, executed a "transfer of mortgage" 8 over
the properties in his favor. Who implored whom is a bone of contention, but as we shall see shortly, we

are inclined to agree with the private respondent's version, considering primarily the petitioner's moral
ascendancy over his client and the private respondent's increasing desperation.

The records further show that the parties, pursuant to their agreement, executed a "Deed of Sale
and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a document that enabled the petitioner,
first, to redeem the parcels in question, and secondly, to register the same in his name. The private
respondent alleges that he subsequently filed loan applications with the Family Savings Bank to
finance a wet market project upon the subject premises to find, according to him, and to his dismay,
the properties already registered in the name of the petitioner. He likewise contends that the "Deed
of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem" on file with the Register of Deeds
(for Quezon City) had been falsified as follows:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in
the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Pl00,000.00) I, FRANCISCO
HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R.
Canlas, any and all my rights of the real properties and/or to redeem from the
Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at public
auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subject matter of the above Compromise
Agreement in Civil Case No. Q30679 ... 9
whereas it originally reads:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in
the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), I, FRANCISCO
HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R.
Canlas, any and all my rights of equity of redemption and/or to redeem from the
Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at public
auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subject matter of the above Compromise
Agreement in Civil Case No. Q30679. . . 10
As a consequence, the private respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim upon the
respective certificates of title embracing the properties. Upon learning of the same, the petitioner
moved for the cancellation of the adverse claim and for the issuance of a writ of possession. The
court granted both motions. The private respondent countered with a motion for a temporary
restraining order and later, a motion to recall the writ of possession. He likewise alleges that he
commenced disbarment proceedings before this Court against the petitioner 11 as well as various
criminal complaints for estafa, falsification, and "betrayal of trust" 12 with the Department of Justice. On
December 1, 1983, finally, he instituted an action for reconveyance and reformation of
document, 13 praying that the certificates of title issued in the name of the petitioner be cancelled and that
"the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem dated May 3,
1983 ... be reformed to reflect the true agreement of Francisco Herrera and Paterno R. Canlas, of a
mortgage." 14 He vehemently maintains that the petitioner's "agreement with [him] was that the latter
would lend the money to the former for a year, so that [petitioner] would have time to look for a loan for
the wet market which [the petitioner] intended to put up on said property." 15 Predictably, the petitioner
moved for dismissal.

The trial court, however, denied the private respondent's petition. It held that the alteration
complained of did not change the meaning of the contract since it was "well within [the petitioner's]
rights" 16 "to protect and insure his interest of P654,000.00 which is the redemption price he has
paid;" 17 secondly, that the petitioner himself had acquired an interest in the properties subject of
reconveyance based on the compromise agreement approved by Judge Castro in the injunction case,
pursuant to Section 29(b), of Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, that had, consequently, made him a judgment
creditor in his own right; thirdly, that the private respondent had lost all rights over the same arising from
his failure to redeem them from L & R Corporation within the extended period; and finally, that the
petitioner cannot be said to have violated the ban against sales of properties in custodia legis to lawyers
by their clients pendente lite, since the sale in question took place after judgment in the injunction case
abovesaid had attained finality. The complaint was consequently dismissed, a dismissal that eventually
attained a character of finality.
Undaunted, the private respondent, on December 6, 1985, filed a suit for "Annulment Of
Judgment 18 in the respondent Court of Appeals, 19 praying that the orders of Judge Castro: (1). granting
execution over the portion of the compromise agreement obliging the private respondent to pay the
petitioner P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; (2) denying the private respondent's prayer for a restraining
order directed against the execution: and (3) denying the motion to recall writ of possession, all be set
aside.
The petitioner filed a comment on the petition, but followed it up with a motion to dismiss. On
December 8, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the first of its challenged
resolutions, denying the motion to dismiss. On March 3, 1987, the Appellate Court denied
reconsideration. 20
Hence the instant petition.
As we stated, the petitioner assails these twin resolutions on grounds of improper procedure.
Specifically, he assigns the following errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC
G.R. NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS IN REALITY A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED
OUT OF TIME AND SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN DUE COURSE.
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC
G.R. NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA
III.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT CONSIDERING AC
G. R. 07860 AS MOOT AND ACADEMIC SINCE PETITIONER HAD DISPOSED OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES LONG BEFORE THE FILING OF THIS SUIT.

IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DENYING
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS SOLELY ON THE GROUND THAT THE ARGUMENT
RAISED THEREIN ARE BUT REHASH OF THE ARGUMENTS IN HIS COMMENT TO THE
PETITION. 21
The petitioner argues that the petition pending with the respondent court "is actually a petition for
certiorari," 22disguised as a pleading for annulment of judgment and that in such a case, it faces alleged
legal impediments (1) It had been filed out of time, allegedly two years from the issuance of the assailed
orders, and (2) It was not preceded by a motion for reconsideration. He adds that assuming annulment of
judgment were proper, no judgment allegedly exists for annulment, the aforesaid two orders being in the
nature of interlocutory issuances.
On purely technical grounds, the petitioner's arguments are impressive. Annulment of judgment, we
have had occasion to rule, rests on a single ground: extrinsic fraud. What "extrinsic fraud" means is
explained in Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation : 23
xxx xxx xxx
It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, however,
that can serve as a basis for the annulment of judgment. Fraud has been regarded
as extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule, "where it is one the effect of
which prevents a party from having a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of
his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the
judgment itself, but of the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair
submission of the controversy." In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any
fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the
trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully
his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. 24
A perusal of the petition of therein private respondent Herrera pending before the respondent Court
reveals no cause of action for annulment of judgment. In the first place, and as herein petitioner
Canlas correctly points out, the judgment itself is not assailed, but rather, the orders merely
implementing it. Secondly, there is no showing that extrinsic fraud, as Makabingkil defines it, indeed
vitiated the proceedings presided over by Judge Castro. On the contrary, Herrera's petition in the
respondent court will show that he was privy to the incidents he complains of, and in fact, had
entered timely oppositions and motions to defeat Atty. Canlas' claims under the compromise
agreement.
What he objects to is his suspected collusion between Atty. Canlas and His Honor to expedite the
former's collection of his fees. He alleges that his counsel had deliberately, and with malevolent
designs, postponed execution to force him (Herrera) to agree to sell the properties in controversy to
him (Atty. Canlas) subject to redemption. ("...[I]t was understandable that respondent Atty. Paterno
R. Canlas did not implement the writ of execution, instead he contacted petitioner in order that
petitioner would sign the questioned documents. This was the clincher of the plan of respondent Atty,

Paterno R. Canlas to divest petitioner of his properties. For this purpose, it is obvious that
respondent Atty. Paterno R. Canlas had to conspire with the respondent court judge to achieve his
plan." 25) Aside from being plain speculation, it is no argument to justify annulment. Clearly, it does not
amount to extrinsic fraud as the term is defined in law.
Neither is it proper for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Certiorari presupposes the absence of
an appeal 26and while there is no appeal from execution of judgment, appeal lies in case of irregular
implementation of the writ. 27 In the case at bar, there is no irregular execution to speak of As a rule,
"irregular execution" means the failure of the writ to conform to the decree of the decision executed. 28 In
the instant case, respondent Herrera's charges, to wit, that Judge Castro had erred in denying his
motions for temporary restraining order and to recall writ of possession, or that His Honor had acted
hastily (". . . that respondent court/judge took only one [1) day to resolve petitioner's motion for issuance
of [a] [restraining] order. . ." 29) in denying his twofold motions, do not make out a case for irregular
execution. The orders impugned are conformable to the letter of the judgment approving the
parties'compromise agreement.
The lengths the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, would go to in a last-ditch bid to hold on to
his lands and constraints of economic privation have not been lost on us. It is obvious that he is
uneasy about the judgment on compromise itself, as well as the subsequent contract between him
and his lawyer. In such a case, Article 2038 of the Civil Code applies:
Art. 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence intimidation,
undue influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the provisions of article 1330 of
this Code ...
in relation to Article 1330 thereof:
Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence, or fraud is voidable.
in relation to its provisions on avoidance of'contracts. 30 The court notes that he had, for this purpose,
gone to the Regional Trial Court, a vain effort as we stated, and in which the decision had become final.
We, however, sustain Atty. Canlas' position-on matters of procedure for the enlightenment solely
of the bench and the bar. It does not mean that we find merit in his petition. As we have intimated,
we cannot overlook the unseemlier side of the proceeding, in which a member of the bar would
exploit his mastery of procedural law to score a "technical knockout" over his own client, of all
people. Procedural rules, after all, have for their object assistance unto parties "in obtaining just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." 31 If procedure were to be an
impediment to such an objective, "it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy." 32 It was almost eight decades ago that the Court held:
... A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and
skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It
is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the
court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all

imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon
the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by the a rapier's thrust ... 33
It is a ruling that almost eight decades after it was rendered, holds true as ever.
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no financing
entity was willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged
properties and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in the Compromise Judgment," 34 a
development that should have tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his
interests over and above those of his client, in opposition to his oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ...
with all good fidelity ... to [his] clients." 35 The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a
moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of
judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his
own client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay
no man for money." 36
It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of the fact that the practice of law is not a
commercial enterprise; but that does not furnish an excuse for plain lust for material wealth, more so
at the expense of another. Law advocacy, we reiterate, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it
births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile
pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with a
public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 37Anent attomey's fees, section 24, of Rule
138, of the Rules, provides in part as follows:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation
for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the
attorney... A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor
unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
So also it is decreed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, reproduced in part, as follows:
Art. 2208 ...
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
We do not find the petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the sum of P100,000.00 reasonable. We do
not believe that it satisfies the standards set forth by the Rules. The extent of the services he had
rendered in Civil Case No. 30679, and as far as the records will yield, is not impressive to justify
payment of such a gargantuan amount. The case itself moreover did not involve complex questions
of fact or law that would have required substantial effort as to research or leg work for the petitioner
to warrant his demands. The fact that the properties subject thereof commanded quite handsome
prices in the market should not be a measure of the importance or non-importance of the case. We
are not likewise persuaded that the petitioner's stature warrants the sum claimed.
All things considered, we reduce the petitioner's fees, on a quantum meruit basis, to P20,000.00.

It is futile to invoke the rule granting attorneys a lien upon the things won in litigation similar to that
vested upon redemptioners. 38 To begin with, the rule refers to realty sold as a result of execution in
satisfaction of judgment. In this case, however, redemption was decreed by agreement (on compromise)
between the mortgagor and mortgagee. It did not give the petitioner any right to the properties
themselves, much less the right of redemption, although provisions for his compensation were purportedly
provided. It did not make him a redemptioner for the plain reason that he was not named one in the
amicable settlement. To this extent, we reverse Judge Pedro Santiago's ruling in Civil Case No. 40066,
recognizing Atty. Canlas' "legal right, independent of the questioned deed of sale and transfer which was
executed subsequently on May 3, 1983, to redeem the subject realty from the L & R Corporation pursuant
to Sec. 29 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court." 39Whatever right he had, it was, arguably with respect alone
to his renumeration. It did not extend to the lands.
Secondly, and assuming that such a right exists, it must be in proportion to the "just fees and
disbursements" 40due him. It is still subject to the tempering hand of this Court.
The Court notes a hidden agenda in the petitioner's haste to execute the compromise agreement
and subsequently, to force the transfer of the properties to himself. As we have observed, in spite of
the issuance of the writ of execution, it does not appear that the petitioner took pains to implement it.
We find this perplexing given his passionate and persistent pleas that he was entitled to the
proceeds. There can indeed be no plausible explanation other than to enable him to keep an "ace"
against the private respondent that led finally, to the conveyance of the properties in his favor. To be
sure, he would have us beheve that by redeeming the same from the mortgagee and by in fact
parting with his own money he had actually done the private respondent a favor, but this is to
assume that he did not get anything out of the transaction. Indeed, he himself admits that "[t]itles to
the properties have been issued to the new owners long before the filing of private respondents [sic]
petition for annulment." 41 To say that he did not profit therefrom is to take either this Court or the
petitioner for naive, a proposition this Court is not prepared to accept under the circumstances.
We are likewise convinced that it was the petitioner who succeeded in having the private respondent
sign the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a preprepared document apparently, that allowed him (the petitioner) to exercise the right of redemption
over the properties and to all intents and purposes, acquire ownership thereof. As we have earlier
averred, the private respondent, by reason of bankruptcy, had become an easy quarry to his
counsel's moral influence and ascendancy. We are hard put to believe that it was the private
respondent who "earnestly implored" 42 him to undertake the redemption amid the former's obstinate
attempts to keep his lands that have indeed led to the multiple suits the petitioner now complains of, apart
from the fact that the latter himself had something to gain from the transaction, as alluded to above. We
are of the opinion that in ceding his right of redemption, the private respondent had intended merely to
forestall the total loss of the parcels to the mortgagee upon the understanding that his counsel shall
acquire the same and keep them therefore within reach, subject to redemption by his client under easier
terms and conditions. Surely, the petitioner himself would maintain that he agreed to make the
redemption"in order that [he] may already be paid the P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded him in the
Compromise Agreement," 43 and if his sole concern was his fees, there was no point in keeping the
properties in their entirety.

The Court simply cannot fag for the petitioner's pretensions that he acquired the properties as a
gesture of magnanimity and altruism He denies, of course, having made money from it, but what he
cannot dispute is the fact that he did resell the properties. 44
But if he did not entertain intents of making any profit, why was it necessary to reword the
conveyance document executed by the private respondent? It shall be recalled that the deed, as
originally drafted, provided for conveyance of the private respondent's "rights of equity of redemption
and/or redeem" 45 the properties in his favor, whereas the instrument registered with the Register of
Deeds purported to transfer "any and all my rights of the real properties and/or to redeem," 46 in his favor.
He admits having entered the intercalations in question but argues that he did so "to facilitate the
registration of the questioned deed with the Register of Deeds" 47 and that it did not change the meaning
of the paper, for which Judge Santiago acquitted him of any falsification charges. 48 To start with, the Court
is at a loss how such an alteration could "facilitate" registration. Moreover, if it did not change the tenor of
the deed, why was it necessary then? And why did he not inform his client? At any rate, the agreement is
clearly a contract of adhesion. Its provisions should be read against the party who prepared it.
But while we cannot hold the petitioner liable for falsification this is not the proper occasion for it
we condemn him nonetheless for infidelity to his oath "to do no falsehood" 49
This brings us to the final question: Whether or not the conveyance in favor of the petitioner is
subject to the ban on acquisition by attorneys of things in litigation. The pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code state as follows:
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his
guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to
them, unless the consent of the principal have been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration;
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision
thereof, or of any government owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the
administration of which has been instrusted to them; this provision shall apply to
judges and government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the
sale;
(5) Justice judges prosecuting attorneys clerks of superior and inferior courts, and
other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the
property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within
whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition
includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect
to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may
take part by virtue of their profession.

(6) Any others specially disqualified by law.**

In Rubias v. Batiller, 50 we declared such contracts to be void by force of Article 1409, paragraph (7), of
the Civil Code, defining inexistent contracts. In Director of Lands v. Ababa 51 however, we said that the
prohibition does not apply to contingent contracts, in which the conveyance takes place after judgment, so
that the property can no longer be said to be "subject of litigation."
In the instant case, the Court observes that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of
Redemption and/or to Redeem" was executed following the finality of the decision approving the
compromise agreement. It is actually a new contract not one in pursuance of what had been
agreed upon on compromise in which, as we said, the petitioner purportedly assumed redemption
rights over the disputed properties (but in reality, acquired absolute ownership thereof). By virtue of
such a subsequent agreement, the lands had ceased to be properties which are "the object of any
litigation." Parenthetically, the Court states that a writ of possession is improper to eject another from
possession unless sought in connection with: (1) a land registration proceeding; (2) an extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of property provided that the
mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened; and (4) in execution sales. 52 It is
noteworthy that in this case, the petitioner moved for the issuance of the writ pursuant to the deed of sale
between him and the private respondent and not the judgment on compromise. (He was, as we said,
issued a writ of execution on the compromise agreement but as we likewise observed, he did not have
the same enforced. The sale agreement between the parties, it should be noted, superseded the
compromise.) The writ does not lie in such a case. His remedy is specific performance.
At any rate, the transfer, so we hold, is not subject to the injunction of Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
But like all voidable contracts, it is open to annulment on the ground of mistake, fraud, or undue
influence, 53 which is in turn subject to the right of innocent purchasers for value. 54
For this reason, we invalidate the transfer in question specifically for undue influence as earlier
detailed. While the respondent Herrera has not specifically prayed for invalidation, this is the clear
tenor of his petition for annulment in the Appellate Court. It appearing, however, that the properties
have been conveyed to third persons whom we presume to be innocent purchasers for value, the
petitioner, Atty. Paterno Canlas, must be held liable, by way of actual damages, for such a loss of
properties.
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning Atty.
Canlas monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his
hability for payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said
respondent at the expense of his lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations against the
other. To obviate debate as the actual amounts owing by one to the other, we hold Francisco
Herrera, the private respondent, liable to Atty. Paterno Canlas, the petitioner, in the sum of
P654,000.00 representing the redemption price of the properties, 55 in addition to the sum of P20,000.
00 as and for attomey's fees. We order Atty. Canlas, in turn, to pay the respondent Herrera the amount of
P1,000,000.00, the sum he earned from the resale thereof, 56 such that he shall, after proper adjustments,
be indebted to his client in the sum of P326,000.00 as and for damages.
Needless to say, we sustain the action of the respondent Court of Appeals in taking cognizance of
the petition below. But as we have stated, we are compelled, as the final arbiter of justiciable cases

and in the highest interests ofjustice, to write finis to the controversy that has taxed considerably the
dockets of the inferior courts.
Let the Court further say that while its business is to settle actual controversies and as a matter of
general policy, to leave alone moot ones, its mission is, first and foremost, to dispense justice. At the
outset, we have made clear that from a technical vantage point, certiorari, arguably lies, but as we
have likewise stated, the resolution of the case rests not only on the mandate of technical rules, but
if the decision is to have any real meaning, on the merits too. This is not the first time we would have
done so; in many cases we have eschewed the rigidity of the Rules of Court if it would establish a
barrier upon the administration ofjustice. It is especially so in the case at bar, in which no end to suit
and counter-suit appears imminent and for which it is high time that we have the final say. We
likewise cannot, as the overseer of good conduct in both the bench and the bar, let go unpunished
what convinces us as serious indiscretions on the part of a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered.
1. ORDERING the petitioner, Atty. Patemo Canlas, to pay to the private respondent, Francisco
Herrera, the sum of P326,000.00, as and for damages;
2. ORDERING the petitioner to SHOW CAUSE why no disciplinary action may be imposed on him
for violation of his oath, as a lawyer, within ten (10) days from notice, after which the same will be
consolidated with AC No. 2625;
3. DISMISSING this petition and REMANDING the case to the respondent Court of Appeals for
execution; and
4. ORDERING the petitioner to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson) and Medialdea, ** JJ., concur.
Paras and Padilla, JJ., took no part.

DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant,

MAGULTA, respondent.

vs. ATTY.

ALBERTO

C.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and
client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a
business; it is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration.

The Case
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action
against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint is
accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the following:
xxxxxxxxx

That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta,

sometime in September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law
Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who agreed to legally
represent me in a money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for
breach of contract;
That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the
demand letter and some other legal papers, for which services I have accordingly paid;
inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta
suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which he subsequently drafted, copy of
which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the amount of
Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);
That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4,
1999, deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the
Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that I needed the case filed
immediately;
That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had
already been filed in court, and that I should receive notice of its progress;
That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty.
Magulta but there seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I frequented his
office to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to wait;
That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every time]
I asked; and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court
personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for my satisfaction, he even brought me
to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he

left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building and told
to wait while he personally follows up the processes with the Clerk of Court;
whereupon, within the hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of Court was
absent on that day;
That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the
Office of the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magultas complaint to personally
verify the progress of my case, and there told that there was no record at all of a case
filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the Certification dated May
27, 1999, attached as Annex C;
That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto
C. Magulta at his office the following day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to
with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when
shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because
he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease my
feelings, he offered to reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and
June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of
which are attached as Annexes D and E;
That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to
complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive
conduct;
x x x x x x x x x.[1]

On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline,[2] respondent filed his Answer[3] vehemently denying the allegations of complainant for
being totally outrageous and baseless. The latter had allegedly been introduced as a kumpadre of
one of the formers law partners. After their meeting, complainant requested him to draft a
demand letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former never paid. After
Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the latter
requested that another demand letter -- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted by
respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer, complainant asked
the process server of the formers law office to deliver the letter to the addressee.
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting,
respondent drafted a complaint (which was only for the purpose of compelling the owner to

settle the case) and prepared a compromise agreement. He was also requested by complainant to
do the following:
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainants wife

All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all
the files pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the latter
instructed him to draft a complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose services had never
been paid by complainant until this time, told the latter about his acceptance and legal fees.
When told that these fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost P4
million, complainant promised to pay on installment basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondents secretary and
told her that it was for the filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the
lawyer immediately called the attention of complainant, informing the latter of the need to pay
the acceptance and filing fees before the complaint could be filed. Complainant was told that the
amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee
later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the
filing of the complaint because the former might be paid by another company, the First Oriental
Property Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill Industries.
The negotiations went on for two months, but the parties never arrived at any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the
complaint. Respondent reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response, complainant
proposed that the complaint be filed first before payment of respondents acceptance and legal
fees. When respondent refused, complainant demanded the return of the P25,000. The lawyer
returned the amount using his own personal checks because their law office was undergoing
extensive renovation at the time, and their office personnel were not reporting regularly.
Respondents checks were accepted and encashed by complainant.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and
if anyone had been shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he.

The IBPs Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:

x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law
Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainants deposit of
the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of
respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time
frame contemplated by his client, the complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill
this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his
attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused complainant
additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part,
unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the
respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not
exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress upon
the respondent the gravity of his offense, it is recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.[4]
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the Commissions recommendation.
Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Clients Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of
the Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for
the filing fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill
complaint; hence, the formers failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that
the amount delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was for attorneys fees and
not for the filing fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or
the defense of the clients cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only
protect the interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and
help maintain the respect of the community for the legal profession.[5] Members of the bar must

do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, the
honesty, and integrity of the profession.[6]
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between
him and complainant, because the latter never paid him for services rendered. The former adds
that he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his
partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the formers business. To constitute
professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally
on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged;
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his
service had been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a
view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or
acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is established.[7]
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship
between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the formers fees. [8] Hence, despite
the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent
dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was dutybound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest
possible time, in order to protect the clients interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a
client, they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in them.[9] They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and the defense of the clients rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and
abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law
legally applied.[10]
Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his office
to complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was
quite incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client to issue a
receipt erroneously indicating payment for something else. Moreover, upon discovering the
mistake -- if indeed it was one -- respondent should have immediately taken steps to correct the
error. He should have lost no time in calling complainants attention to the matter and should
have issued another receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.

The Practice of Law -- a

Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession
and not a business.[11] Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.[12] The gaining of a livelihood is not a
professional but a secondary consideration.[13] Duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal
interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which
emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much
money.[14]
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the
receipt issued by the law office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must
be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional capacity.
[15]
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all
moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional
ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. [16] It may be true that
they have a lien upon the clients funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully come into
their possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been
paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements.
However, these considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the
moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. [17] In any event,
they must still exert all effort to protect their clients interest within the bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public.[18] Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing
fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the
former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.
On the other hand, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the
practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar will disbarment be
imposed as a penalty.[19]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice

of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be
furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a
copy in respondents file.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., (Chairman), abroad, on official leave.

DANDY V. QUIJANO, Complainant,

vs.
GEOBEL A. BARTOLABAC (Labor Arbiter, NLRC-NCR South), and ALBERTO R. QUIMPO
(Commissioner, NLRC-First Division), Respondents.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
On 19 March 2002, complainant Dandy Quijano filed before this Court a verified complaint 1 written in
Pilipino against herein respondents Atty. Geobel A. Bartolabac (Bartolabac), Labor Arbiter of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo (Quimpo) of
the same Commission for violating Canon 12 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
According to complainant, respondents violated his constitutional right to due process in failing to
execute the final and executory judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 126561 entitled Quijano v.
Mercury Drug Corporation.4
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Complainant was dismissed from service by the Mercury Drug Corporation (corporation). He filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Eventually, the case was elevated to this Court. On
8 July 1998, the Court promulgated its Decision in favor of herein complainant ordering, among
others, his reinstatement.5 The corporations motion for reconsideration was denied by this Court in
its Resolution dated 5 July 1999.
Complainant relates that he filed with respondent Labor Arbiter Bartolabac a motion for execution on
9 December 1998 but despite the final resolution of his case, Bartolabac issued an order that in
effect changed the tenor of the final judgment.6 While the decision of this Court had mandated
complainants reinstatement, Bartolabac instead awarded backwages and separation pay.

The Court, upon learning this, issued a Resolution7 on 17 November 1999 directing Bartolabac to
fully comply with its Decision dated 8 July 1998 and Resolution dated 5 July 1999 within a nonextendible period of five (5) days from receipt thereof and to explain in writing why he should not be
punished for indirect contempt for his actuations in handling the case and defiance of the Courts
directives.
Pursuant to the Resolution of this Court, Bartolabac issued an alias writ of execution on 18 February
2000. However, respondent Bartolabac allegedly again unilaterally issued another order dated 5
April 2000, amending his previous order and assigning the complainant to the position of self-service
attendant of the corporation instead of his original position of warehouseman. Subsequently,
respondent Commissioner Quimpo overturned the above order of Bartolabac and directed the
payment of separation pay rather than reinstatement to a substantially similar position as ordered by
this Court.
Complainant adds that he had filed a motion to cite counsel for respondent corporation in
contempt8 and an answer to the order dated 5 April 2000, but these were disregarded by Bartolabac
on the ground that an appeal was already underway at the NLRC by the corporation.
Further, he states that he was not given a copy of the appeal memorandum filed by the corporation
with the NLRC; yet, the NLRC First Division headed by Quimpo disposed of the same. He also
alleges that the corporation did not post a cash bond for the appeal nor did they give him a
temporary reinstatement or payroll reinstatement, which according to complainant, is mandatory.
Despite this, and without giving complainant any opportunity to comment on the appeal
memorandum, Quimpo nonetheless issued a resolution dated 26 September 2000 which ordered
the corporation to pay complainant separation pay plus backwages. Complainant asserts that
Quimpo should have inhibited himself from deciding the case as he, or the NLRC First Division, was
the public respondent in the Supreme Court case.
Complainant admits having received the monetary award in the amount of P449,062.98 from the
corporation in satisfaction of this Courts ruling in G.R. No. 126561 but contends that the award
cannot be considered a cash bond for the appeal memorandum before the NLRC as the same was
computed until 24 November 1999 only and he has a right to the award because his case had long
become final and executory.
Thus, complainant asserts that his constitutional right to due process has been seriously violated by
Bartolabac and Quimpo.
On 22 April 2002, this Court issued a Resolution9 requiring respondents to file their respective
comments on the complaint within ten (10) days from notice.
In his comment10 filed on 4 July 2002, Bartolabac states that the present complaint is a rehash of
several complaints against him which complainant filed before different fora, including this Court and
the Office of the Ombudsman.
As to the issue of monetary award and reinstatement due the complainant, Bartolabac argues that
the records of G.R. No. 126561 reveal that the corporation had already released to complainant the

sum of P297,930.75 as cash bond deposit. The amount of P449,062.98 had been deposited to the
cashier of the NLRC. Out of the said remaining amount, Bartolabac directed the release
of P250,660.62 to complainant. The remaining balance ofP198,402.36 was to answer for
complainants MEDICARE and SSS contributions, withholding tax, loans, etc., which had yet to be
determined at that time. Bartolabac gave both parties the opportunity to dispute or defend their
respective claims but complainant failed to cooperate either by not attending the scheduled hearing
called for that purpose on 27 March 2000, or by failing to file controverting evidence to dispute the
claimed deductions by the corporation.11
Before Bartolabac could adjudicate the proper monetary award for complainant, the latter filed a
complaint against him before the Office of the Ombudsman for oppression and grave misconduct.
Due to this supervening event, Bartolabacs sense of propriety compelled him to inhibit himself from
further participating in the adjudication of the remaining balance of P198,402.36. But most
importantly, he adds, the case was re-raffled to Labor Arbiter Gaudencio P. Demaisip, Jr. who
awarded the whole amount of P449,062.36 which complainant has already received.
Offering another perspective of the case at bar, Bartolabac avers that after the Supreme Court had
rendered its decision in G.R. No. 126561 on 8 July 1998, the case was re-raffled to Labor Arbiter
Renell Joseph R. Dela Cruz for the satisfaction of judgment. At that point, the exact monetary award
and reinstatement aspects were raised. Both parties submitted conflicting computations on the
monetary award. The corporation also asserted that they had abolished the position of
warehouseman and there was no substantially equivalent vacant position. Labor Arbiter Dela Cruz
then ordered the parties to submit their respective position papers but eleven (11) days thereafter,
said labor arbiter issued an order inhibiting himself from handling the case as he allegedly could not
bear with complainant dictating the rules of the proceedings.12
The labor case was re-raffled to Bartolabac on 20 April 1999. Unaware of the pending motion for
reconsideration of the corporation in G.R. No. 126561 where the feasibility of reinstatement was at
issue, he issued an order on 24 June 1999 ruling out complainants reinstatement, awarding
separation pay instead and the amount ofP573,228.00 (less necessary deductions) as backwages.
As a consequence, this Court on 17 November 1999 reproached Bartolabac for completely
disregarding the corporations motion for reconsideration with this Court, directing him to order
complainants reinstatement and payment of backwages, moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorneys fees, and requiring him to explain in writing why he should not be punished for indirect
contempt for his handling of the case and defiance of the Courts directives. Bartolabac complied by
filing his manifestation stating that his office was not furnished with a copy of the motion for
reconsideration. His act of adjudicating the issue of reinstatement was impelled by the sense of
urgency on the matter since he received a letter signed by complainant and a Memo from the NLRC
Chairman referring the complainants letter to him for appropriate action. 13 Both letters sought the
immediate disposition of his labor case.14
Based on the foregoing, Bartolabac maintains that complainant engaged in forum-shopping for while
complainant knew of the existence of the corporations motion for reconsideration with this Court, he
remained insistent that Bartolabac resolve the reinstatement issue.15

He also stresses that he did not incur delay in the disposition of the labor case. After he received the
17 November 1999 Resolution of this Court on 22 November 1999, he issued an alias writ of
execution on 24 November 1999 directing the sheriff to garnish the amount of P449,062.98 and to
cause the reinstatement of complainant to a substantially equivalent position. When the sheriff
returned the writ unsatisfied for failure of the corporation to comply with the reinstatement aspect as
the open positions were only for pharmacist, pharmacy assistant, cashier and self-service attendant,
he lost no time in resolving that, while the first three positions need college graduates, the selfservice attendant position may be sufficiently performed by complainant even though he is not a
college graduate.16
Lastly, Bartolabac declares that with the filing of the appeal from the order of reinstatement with the
NLRC, he lost jurisdiction over the issue.
For his part, Quimpo alleges that his inclusion in the present administrative case was due to his
participation in disposing of the corporations appeal on the issue of complainants reinstatement as
self-service attendant. He asserts that by law, the Commission has exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
hear and decide all decisions, awards or orders rendered by the labor arbiter.17 He adds that said
authority was even tacitly recognized by the Court in its Resolution dated 7 June 2000 in relation to
G.R. No. 126561. The pertinent portions of the resolution read:
"On the issue of reinstatement, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order on April 5, 2000, directing the
private respondent to reinstate petitioner to the position of self-service attendant. The reinstatement
order was impugned by the private respondent as the petitioner was allegedly not qualified for the
position and there was already strained relations between the parties. The reinstatement order is
now pending appeal before the NLRC.
As the NLRC has acquired jurisdiction over the issue of petitioners reinstatement and the amount of
deduction on petitioners monetary award is subject to proof and/or dispute by the respective parties
before the Labor Arbiter, the letter-complaints of the petitioner are thus hereby NOTED.
IN VIEW THEREOF, Labor Arbiter Geobel A. Bartolabac is hereby directed to determine with
dispatch the amount still owning the petitioner, if any, and to see to it that no further delay would
hamper the proceedings before him. Public respondent NLRC, on the other hand, is requested to
expedite the proceedings before it on the issue of petitioners reinstatement. 18
Hence, Quimpo adds, the NLRC did not abuse its discretion when it assumed jurisdiction over the
corporations appeal.
Quimpo likewise explains that in resolving the appeal, he took judicial notice of the various
resolutions issued by this Court and with utmost good faith and fidelity tried to implement the
directive to reinstate the complainant to his former position or to a substantially equivalent position.
However, due to certain supervening events that transpired after the resolution of the labor case and
up to the time of execution, reinstatement had become improbable and so it was the ruling of the
Commission that separation pay instead of reinstatement would be the most logical, sensible and
practical solution.19

As to complainants claim that he was not furnished a copy of the corporations appeal
memorandum, records show that a copy of the appeal memorandum was furnished his counsel and
in any event, complainant admitted his knowledge of the existing appeal when he filed a Reiteration
of Motion to Release Monetary Award dated 20 June 2000, arguing that his monetary award should
be released to him since only the issue of reinstatement is being appealed to the Commission. 20
Furthermore, Quimpo states that complainant filed a similar complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman for neglect of duty but the same was dismissed. Complainants motion for
reconsideration was denied with finality on 21 February 2002. Complainants act of re-filing another
administrative complaint is designed primarily to harass and intimidate him. 21
He also notes that complainant already received the full satisfaction of his monetary award which
only shows that the Commission has complied in good faith with the directive to execute the
judgment award in favor of complainant.22
Without waiting for this Courts action, complainant filed his Reply to Both Respondent[s]
Comments23 on 23 July 2002. He substantially reiterates the arguments he made in his complaint.
On 19 August 2002, this Court resolved, among others, to refer this case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On 6 May 2003, the IBP submitted
its resolution adopting and approving the report and recommendation of Investigating Commissioner
Lydia A. Navarro dismissing the complaint against respondents.24
Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration with the IBP but it was subsequently denied since the
matter had already been endorsed to this Court and the IBP no longer had jurisdiction over the
case.25
We nonetheless resolve to treat the motion for reconsideration as a petition for review on certiorari of
the IBP resolution.26
We now go to the main issue at bar, i.e., whether or not respondents are liable for their acts in
deviating from the final and executory judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 126561.
The Court is unyielding in its adjudication that complainant must be reinstated to his former position
as warehouseman or to a substantially equivalent position. This was stated in its Decision dated 8
July 1998, reiterated in the Resolution dated 5 July 1999, and again stressed in the Resolution dated
17 November 1999. In the latter resolution, it was particularly expressed that:
Indeed, private respondents [Mercury Drug Corporation] contention, as erroneously upheld by the
labor arbiter, that there is no substantially equivalent position for petitioners reinstatement has been
categorically discounted by this Court. We took judicial notice of the fact that private respondent
Mercury Drug Corporation operates nationwide and has numerous branches all over the Philippines.
Petitioner, as warehouseman, occupied a clerical/rank and file position in said company and we find
it highly inconceivable that no other substantially equivalent position exists to effect his
reinstatement.27

Clearly, the Court is unwilling to accept the corporation and respondent labor arbiters reason that
reinstatement is no longer feasible because the position of warehouseman had already been
abolished and there is no substantially equivalent position in the corporation.
Both respondents labor arbiter and commissioner do not have any latitude to depart from the Courts
ruling. The Decision in G.R. No. 126561 is final and executory and may no longer be amended. It is
incumbent upon respondents to order the execution of the judgment and implement the same to the
letter. Respondents have no discretion on this matter, much less any authority to change the order of
the Court. The acts of respondent cannot be regarded as acceptable discretionary performance of
their functions as labor arbiter and commissioner of the NLRC, respectively, for they do not have any
discretion in executing a final decision. The implementation of the final and executory decision is
mandatory.
As held in Siy v. National Labor Relations Commission and Embang:28
Once the case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. The
prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his victory while the other party is obliged to respect
the courts verdict and to comply with it. We reiterate our pronouncement in Salicdan v. Court of
Appeals:29
well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by
the highest court of the land.
The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is
essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become
final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must guard against any
scheme calculated to bring about that result and must frown upon any attempt to prolong the
controversies.
The Court recognizes Bartolabacs efforts to adjudicate and advance the cause of complainant,
albeit erroneously. In his desire to settle the issue of reinstatement, he determined that complainant,
a high school graduate, be appointed to the position of self-service attendant which requires the
appointee to hold a college degree, since the corporation "failed to rationalize the need for a college
graduate for the position of self-service attendantandcomplainant has exhibited before [the
NLRC] that he has a reasonable degree of comprehension to understand and perform the functions
of a self-service attendant."30 Complainant had pointed out several job openings31 in the corporation
to which he would be qualified, but respondent made no effort to verify it. Instead, he took at face
value the corporations representation that there were limited vacancies. It is inconceivable that a
company as large as the corporation, operating nationwide, could not accommodate complainant
and appoint him to one of its numerous rank and file positions.
Again, we are unceasing in emphasizing that the decision in the labor case has become final and
executory since 1999. There can be no justification for the overturning of the Courts reinstatement

order by the NLRC First Division and full satisfaction of the monetary award of only three (3) years
after the finality of the judgment.
lawphil.net

The Court is not wont to compel the corporation to instantly restore the position of warehouseman if
it has been already abolished. Indeed, the Court granted that complainant could be reinstated to a
substantially equivalent or similar position as a viable alternative for the corporation to carry out.
lavvphil.net

Our Constitution mandates that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property without due
process of law.32 It should be borne in mind that employment is considered a property right and
cannot be taken away from the employee without going through legal proceedings. In the instant
case, respondents wittingly or unwittingly dispossessed complainant of his source of living by not
implementing his reinstatement. In the process, respondents also run afoul of the public policy
enshrined in the Constitution ensuring the protection of the rights of workers and the promotion of
their welfare.33
As a final word, we note that the IBPs report and recommendation falls far short of the Courts
expectations. After a lengthy account of the allegations of the parties, the investigating commissioner
concluded its report with a two-paragraph uncommendably bare exoneration, thus:
A detailed examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the parties showed that
respondents Labor Arbiter Geobel A. Bartolabac and Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo only
performed the duties required of them under the Rules and Procedure of Law particularly that
pertaining to the NLRC Rules and Procedures and the Labor Code; as Labor Arbiter and
Commissioner.
In fact, complainants complaints against them before the Ombudsman relative to the same case
were dismissed with finality which office has jurisdiction over respondents relative to the
performance of their duties as Labor Arbiter and Commissioner and not on a lawyer-client
relationship nor on the practice of the professions as lawyer or members of the Bar.34
How the IBP investigating commissioner arrived at that supposition or in what manner were the acts
of herein respondents regularly done cannot be extracted from its scanty determination.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds respondents liable for violating Canon 1 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondents Labor Arbiter Geobel A.
Bartolabac and Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo are hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of THREE (3) months.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation on the
records of the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent.
RESOLUTION

BIDIN, J.:
In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine National Bank charged
respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset Management Group of
complainant bank with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
thus:
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.
by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant bank in which
respondent during his employment with aforesaid bank, had intervened.
Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in arranging the
sale of steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for
P200,000. He even "noted" the gate passes issued by his subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in
favor of Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division
Compound. When a civil action arose out of this transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant
bank before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had since left the
employ of complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.
Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case filed by
complainant bank against his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave misconduct and
dishonesty, respondent appeared as counsel for Elefan only to be later disqualified by the Civil
Service Commission.
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainants Asset Management
Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of the spouses Ponciano and Eufemia
Almeda with complainant bank by writing demand letters to the couple. When a civil action ensued
between complainant bank and the Almeda spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter were
represented by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is one of the
Senior Partners.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as counsel for Mrs. Ong
Siy but only with respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC decision. He alleged that he

did not participate in the litigation of the case before the trial court. With respect to the case of the
Almeda spouses, respondent alleged that he never appeared as counsel for them. He contended
that while the law firm "Cedo Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" is designated as counsel of record, the
case is actually handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred that he did not enter into a
general partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers named therein. They are only
using the aforesaid name to designate a law firm maintained by lawyers, who although not partners,
maintain one office as well as one clerical and supporting staff. Each one of them handles their own
cases independently and individually receives the revenues therefrom which are not shared among
them.
In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that respondent was previously
fined by this Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No. 94456 entitled "Milagros
Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et al." for forum shopping, where respondent appeared as
counsel for petitioner Milagros Ong Siy "through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and
Associates."
The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully substantiated.
Respondent's averment that the law firm handling the case of the Almeda spouses is not a
partnership deserves scant consideration in the light of the attestation of complainant's counsel, Atty.
Pedro Singson, that in one of the hearings of the Almeda spouses' case, respondent attended the
same with his partner Atty. Ferrer, and although he did not enter his appearance, he was practically
dictating to Atty. Ferrer what to say and argue before the court. Furthermore, during the hearing of
the application for a writ of injunction in the same case, respondent impliedly admitted being the
partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of record that respondent was working in the same office
as Atty. Ferrer.
Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm is true, it is in itself a violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the clients secrets and confidential
records and information are exposed to the other lawyers and staff members at all times.
From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to devise ways and
means to attract as clients former borrowers of complainant bank since he was in the best position to
see the legal weaknesses of his former employer, a convincing factor for the said clients to seek his
professional service. In sum, the IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in
consideration of the money he expected to earn.
The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for 3 years.
The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on October 4, 1994, submitted to
this Court its Report and recommendation in this case, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated October 25, 1994 of the recommendation contained in the said Report with the IBP Board of
Governors. On December 12, 1994, respondent also filed another "Motion to Set Hearing" before

this Court, the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration. In resolving this case, the Court took into
consideration the aforesaid pleadings.
In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion appropriate to emphasize the
paramount importance of avoiding the representation of conflicting interests. In the similar case
of Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95 SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former Legal
Officer and Legal Prosecutor of PARGO who participated in the investigation of the Anti-Graft case
against Mayor Pablo Cuneta later on acted as counsel for the said Mayor in the same anti-graft
case, this Court, citing Nombrado vs. Hernandez (26 SCRA 13 119681) ruled:
The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to disagree with him,
that even if respondent did not use against his client any information or evidence
acquired by him as counsel it cannot be denied that he did become privy to
information regarding the ownership of the parcel of land which was later litigated in
the forcible entry case, for it was the dispute over the land that triggered the mauling
incident which gave rise to the criminal action for physical injuries. This Court's
remarks in Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos:
"Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a
complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and wellknown facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an
attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in
advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainant's cause."
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former
client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their
previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the
other side in the forcible entry case. In the case ofHilado vs. David, supra, this
Tribunal further said:
Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and
client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but
as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice. . . . It is founded on principles of public policy, of good taste. As has been
said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties,
but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With
these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorney, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double dealing. Only thus can litigants. be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to respondent in
the case at bar. Having been an executive of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as
counsel for the opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction which he

formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting interests, to wit:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express conflicting
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning
of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interest when, in behalf on one client, it
is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO from
the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in Metro
Manila.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

MANUEL N. CAMACHO, complainant, vs. ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C.

PANGULAYAN, REGINA D. BALMORES, CATHERINE V. LAUREL and
HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES LAW
OFFICES, respondents.
D E C I S IO N
VITUG, J.: JVITUG
Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional
Ethics, specifically Canon 9 thereof, viz:
"A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of
controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less
should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with
him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon
the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to
mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not
undertake to advise him as to law." barth
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the
Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C.

Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores, Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P.

Bustos. Complainant, the hired counsel of some expelled students from the
AMA Computer College ("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case No.
Q-97-30549 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged
that respondents, then counsel for the defendants, procured and effected on
separate occasions, without his knowledge, compromise agreements ("ReAdmission Agreements") with four of his clients in the aforementioned civil
case which, in effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims they might
have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all civil,
criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred
that such an act of respondents was unbecoming of any member of the legal
profession warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law.
In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his corespondents had taken part in the negotiation, discussion, formulation, or
execution of the various Re-Admission Agreements complained of and were,
in fact, no longer connected at the time with the Pangulayan and Associates
Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, he claimed, had nothing to do
with the dismissal of Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were executed for the sole
purpose of effecting the settlement of an administrative case involving nine
students of AMACC who were expelled therefrom upon the recommendation
of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal. The students, namely, Ian Dexter
Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F. Domondon,
Melyda B. De Leon, Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito,
and Cleo B. Villareiz,, were all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE,
who apparently had caused to be published some objectionable features or
articles in the paper. The 3-member Student Disciplinary Tribunal was
immediately convened, and after a series of hearings, it found the students
guilty of the use of indecent language and unauthorized use of the student
publication funds. The body recommended the penalty of expulsion against
the erring students. Jksm
The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V,
AMACC President, gave rise to the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-97-

30549 on 14th March 1997 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of
Quezon City. While the civil case was still pending, letters of apology and ReAdmission Agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf of some
of the expelled students, to wit: Letter of Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of Neil
Jason Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22
June 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 31 March 1997,
of Mrs. Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter Melyda B. De Leon and ReAdmission Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of
apology, dated 22 May 1997, of Leila Joven, assisted by her mother, and ReAdmission Agreement of 22 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of
apology, dated 22 September 1997, of Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission
Agreement of 10 October 1997 with the AMACC President; and letter of
apology, dated 20 January 1997, of Michael Ejercito, assisted by his parents,
and Re-Admission Agreement of 23 January 1997 with the AMACC President.
Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission
Agreements, a Manifestation, dated 06 June 1997, was filed with the trial
court where the civil case was pending by Attorney Regina D. Balmores of the
Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices for defendant AMACC. A copy of the
manifestation was furnished complainant. In his Resolution, dated 14 June
1997, Judge Lopez of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court thereupon
dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.
On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines ("IBP") passed Resolution No. XIII-99-163, thus:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex 'A,' and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment Atty.
Meinrado Pangulayan is suspended from the practice of law for
SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his duty and DISMISSAL of
the case against the other Respondents for they did not take part
in the negotiation of the case." Chief

It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-Admission
Agreements were formalized, complainant was by then already the retained
counsel for plaintiff students in the civil case. Respondent Pangulayan had full
knowledge of this fact. Although aware that the students were represented by
counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them
and their parents without at the very least communicating the matter to their
lawyer, herein complainant, who was counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q97-30549. This failure of respondent, whether by design or because of
oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and
in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Respondent fell short of the
demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers only
on the administrative aspect of the controversy is belied by the
Manifestation which, among other things, explicitly contained the following
stipulation; viz:
[1]

"1.......Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4) of

whom assisted by their parents/guardian already executed a ReAdmission Agreement with AMACC President, AMABLE R.
AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for violating the AMA
COMPUTER COLLEGE MANUAL FOR DISCIPLINARY
ACTIONS and agreed among others to terminate all civil, criminal
and administrative proceedings which they may have against the
AMACC arising from their previous dismissal. Esm
"x x x......x x x......x x x
"3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to
Withdraw from Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 will by filed them."
The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and
the IBP Board of Governors in their findings; nevertheless, the recommended
six-month suspension would appear to be somewhat too harsh a penalty
given the circumstances and the explanation of respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS
effective immediately upon his receipt of this decision. The case against the
other respondents is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as
an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO
A.
ALCANTARA, complainant, vs. ATTY.
PEFIANCO, respondent.

MARIANO

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint against Atty. Mariano Pefianco for conduct unbecoming

a member of the bar for using improper and offensive language and
threatening and attempting to assault complainant.
The complainant, Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, is the incumbent District
Public Attorney of the Public Attorneys Office in San Jose, Antique. He alleged
that on May 18, 2000, while Atty. Ramon Salvani III was conferring with a
client in the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) at the Hall of Justice in San Jose,
Antique, a woman approached them. Complainant saw the woman in tears,
whereupon he went to the group and suggested that Atty. Salvani talk with her
amicably as a hearing was taking place in another room. At this point,
respondent Atty. Mariano Pefianco, who was sitting nearby, stood up and
shouted at Atty. Salvani and his client, saying, Nga-a gina-areglo mo ina,
ipapreso ang imo nga kliyente para mahibal-an na anang sala. (Why do you
settle that case? Have your client imprisoned so that he will realize his
mistake.)
Complainant said he was surprised at respondent Pefiancos outburst and
asked him to cool off, but respondent continued to fulminate at Atty.

Salvani. Atty. Salvani tried to explain to respondent that it was the woman who
was asking if the civil aspect of the criminal case could be settled because
she was no longer interested in prosecuting the same. Respondent refused to
listen and instead continued to scold Atty. Salvani and the latters client.
As head of the Office, complainant approached respondent and asked him
to take it easy and leave Atty. Salvani to settle the matter. Respondent at first
listened, but shortly after he again started shouting at and scolding Atty.
Salvani. To avoid any scene with respondent, complainant went inside his
office. He asked his clerk to put a notice outside prohibiting anyone from
interfering with any activity in the Public Attorneys Office.
Complainant said that he then went out to attend a hearing, but when he
came back he heard respondent Pefianco saying: Nagsiling si Atty. Alcantara
nga pagwa-on na kuno ako dya sa PAO, buyon nga klase ka tawo. (Atty.
Alcantara said that he would send me out of the PAO, what an idiot.) Then,
upon seeing complainant, respondent pointed his finger at him and repeated
his statement for the other people in the office to hear. At this point, according
to complainant, he confronted respondent Pefianco and told him to observe
civility or else to leave the office if he had no business there. Complainant said
respondent resented this and started hurling invectives at him. According to
complainant, respondent even took a menacing stance towards him.
This caused a commotion in the office. Atty. Pepin Marfil and Mr. Robert
Minguez, the Chief of the Probation Office, tried to pacify respondent
Pefianco. Two guards of the Hall of Justice came to take respondent out of the
office, but before they could do so, respondent tried to attack complainant and
even shouted at him, Gago ka! (Youre stupid!) Fortunately, the guards were
able to fend off respondents blow and complainant was not harmed.
Complainant also submitted the affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III,
Felizardo Del Rosario, Atty. Pepin Joey Marfil, Robert Minguez, Herbert Ysulat
and Ramon Quintayo to corroborate his allegations.
In his Comment and Counter-Complaint, respondent Pefianco said that
the sight of the crying woman, whose husband had been murdered, moved
him and prompted him to take up her defense. He said that he resented the

fact that complainant had ordered an employee, Napoleon Labonete, to put a

sign outside prohibiting standbys from hanging round in the Public Attorneys
Office.
Respondent claimed that while talking with Atty. Salvani concerning the
womans case, complainant, with his bodyguard, arrived and shouted at him to
get out of the Public Attorneys Office. He claimed that two security guards also
came, and complainant ordered them to take respondent out of the
office. Contrary to complainants claims, however, respondent said that it was
complainant who moved to punch him and shout at him, Gago ka! (Youre
stupid!)
Prior to the filing of the present complaint, respondent Pefianco had filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative and criminal complaint
against complainant. However, the complaint was dismissed by the said
office.
The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
found that respondent committed the acts alleged in the complaint and that he
violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Committee
noted that respondent failed not only to deny the accusations against him but
also to give any explanation for his actions. For this reason, it recommended
that respondent be reprimanded and warned that repetition of the same act
will be dealt with more severely in the future.
We find the recommendation of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline to be
well taken.
The evidence on record indeed shows that it was respondent Pefianco
who provoked the incident in question. The affidavits of several disinterested
persons confirm complainants allegation that respondent Pefianco shouted
and hurled invectives at him and Atty. Salvani and even attempted to lay
hands on him (complainant).
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility admonishes lawyers
to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow
lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal
[1]

profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other
and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times.
[2]

In this case, respondents meddling in a matter in which he had no right to

do so caused the untoward incident. He had no right to demand an
explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman had not or could not
be settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the matter to
respondent, but the latter insisted on his view about the case.
Respondent said he was moved by the plight of the woman whose
husband had been murdered as she was pleading for the settlement of her
case because she needed the money. Be that as it may, respondent should
realize that what he thought was righteous did not give him the right to
demand that Atty. Salvani and his client, apparently the accused in the
criminal case, settle the case with the widow. Even when he was being
pacified, respondent did not relent. Instead he insulted and berated those who
tried to calm him down. Two of the witnesses, Atty. Pepin Marfil and Robert
Minguez, who went to the Public Attorneys Office because they heard the
commotion, and two guards at the Hall of Justice, who had been summoned,
failed to stop respondent from his verbal rampage. Respondent ought to have
realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal
profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. Whatever
moral righteousness respondent had was negated by the way he chose to
express his indignation. An injustice cannot be righted by another injustice.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Mariano Pefianco is found GUILTY of violation of
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, considering this to be
his first offense, is hereby FINED in the amount of P1,000.00 and
REPRIMANDED with a warning that similar action in the future will be
sanctioned more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo,
(Chairman),
Sr., JJ., concur.

Quisumbing,

Austria-Martinez, and Callejo,

JOSE M. CASTILLO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SABINO PADILLA, JR., Respondent.

Jose M. Castillo for complainant.
Anselmo M. Carlos for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTIES. Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of
the cause with which he is charged. The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all
personalities between counsel.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE UNCALLED FOR IN THE CASE AT BAR; PENALTY.
Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay,
que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such
cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only
to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure
up to the norm of conduct required of a member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves
reproach because this is not the first time that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of
judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities
and warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. Respondent is hereby reprimanded
for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of
the offense will be dealt with more severely.

RESOLUTION

PLANA, J.:

Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for the use
of insulting language in the course of judicial proceedings.
chanroble s.com : virtual law library

As the material facts are not in dispute, we have deemed the case submitted for resolution on the basis of
the pleadings of the parties.
Complainant was the counsel for the defendants (and at the same time, one of the defendants) in Criminal
Case No. 13331 for forcible entry before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan. Respondent was counsel
for the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case on November 19, 1981, while complainant was formally offering
his evidence, he heard respondent say "bobo." When complainant turned toward respondent, he saw the
latter looking at him (complainant) menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the presence of many
people, complainant was unable to proceed with his offer of evidence. The court proceedings had to be
suspended.
While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the same at the complainant, claiming
that what he said was "Ay, que bobo", referring to "the manner complainant was trying to inject wholly
irrelevant and highly offensive matters into the record" while in the process of making an offer of evidence.
The statement of Atty. Castillo referred to by respondent was:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph

". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was included in the present complaint for ejectment was
because defendant Erlinda Castillo wife of this representation called up this representation at his house and
crying over the phone, claiming that Atty. Sabino Padilla was harassing her and immediately, this
representation like any good husband would do in the defense of his wife immediately went to the school
and confronted Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. with a talk and asked for a yes or no answer if he harassed the wife
of this representation and if yes, right then and there l would sock his face."
cralaw virtua1aw library

Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice;
and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation
of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. (Rules of Court,
Rule 138, Sec. 20 (b) and (f). The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all
personalities between counsel. (Canon 17.)
Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay,
que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such
cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only
to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure
up to the norm of conduct required of a member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves
reproach because this is not the first time that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of
judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities
and warned to be more circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings. (CA-G.R. No. 09753-SP, Court of
Appeals; Civil Case No. C-7790 CFI of Caloocan.)
The Court, however, notes that in the case at bar, respondents actuation was triggered by complainants
own manifest hostility and provocative remarks. Complainant is therefore not entirely free from blame when
respondent unleashed his irritation through the use of improper words.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe proper
decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt with more severely.

chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanroble s.com :chanrobles.com .ph

SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

CASIANO U. LAPUT, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F. REMOTIGUE and ATTY. FORTUNATO P. PATALINGHUG, respondents.

LABRADOR, J.:
This is an original complaint filed with this Court charging respondents with unprofessional and
unethical conduct in soliciting cases and intriguing against a brother lawyer, and praying that
respondents be dealt with accordingly.
The facts which led to the filing of this complaint are as follow: In May, 1952, petitioner was retained
by Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera to handle her case (Sp. Proc. No. 2-J) in the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, entitled "Testate Estate of Macario Barrera". By January, 1955, petitioner had contemplated
the closing of the said administration proceedings and prepared two pleadings: one, to close the
proceedings and declare Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera as universal heir and order the delivery to
her of the residue of the estate and, second, a notice for the rendition of final accounting and
partition of estate. At this point, however, the administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera refused to
countersign these two pleadings and instead advised petitioner not to file them. Some weeks later,
petitioner found in the records of said proceedings that respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug had
filed on January 11, 1955 a written appearance as the new counsel for Nieves Rillas Vda. de
Barrera. On February 5, 1955 petitioner voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as counsel for Mrs.
Barrera. On February 7, 1955, the other respondent, Atty. Francisco E. F. Remotigue, entered his
appearance, dated February 5, 1955.

Complainant here alleges that the appearances of respondents were unethical and improper for the
reason that they had nursed the desire to replace the petitioner as attorney for the estate and the
administratrix and, taking advantage of her goodwill, intrigued against the preparation of the final
inventory and accounting and prodded Mrs. Barrera not to consent to petitioner's decision to close
the administration proceedings; that before their appearance, they brought petitioner's client to their
law office and there made her sign four documents captioned "Revocation of Power of Attorney" and
sent the same by mail to several corporations and establishments where the Estate of Macario
Barrera is owner of certificates of stocks and which documents purported to disauthorize the
petitioner from further collecting and receiving the dividends of the estate from said corporations,
when in fact and in truth the respondents fully knew that no power of attorney or authority was given
to the petitioner by his client, the respondents motive being to embarrass petitioner to the officials,
lawyers and employees of said corporations, picturing him as a dishonest lawyer and no longer
trusted by his client all with the purpose of straining the relationship of the petitioner and his client,
Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera; and that Atty. Patalinghug entered his appearance without notice to
petitioner.
In answer, respondent Atty. Patalinghug stated that when he entered his appearance on January 11,
1955 the administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera had already lost confidence in her lawyer, the
herein petitioner, and had in fact already with her a pleading dated January 11, 1955, entitled
"Discharge of Counsel for the Administration and Motion to Cite Atty. Casiano Laput", which she
herself had filed with the court.
1awphl.nt

In answer, respondent Atty. Remotigue stated that when he filed his appearance on February 7,
1955, the petitioner has already withdrawn as counsel.
After separate answers were filed by the respondents, the Supreme Court referred the case to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. The Solicitor General recommended
the complete exoneration of respondents.
It appears and it was found by the Solicitor General that before respondent Atty. Fortunato
Patalinghug entered his appearance, the widow administratrix had already filed with the court a
pleading discharging the petitioner Atty. Casiano Laput. If she did not furnish Atty. Laput with a copy
of the said pleading, it was not the fault of Atty. Patalinghug but that of the said widow. It appears
that the reason why Mrs. Barrera dismissed petitioner as her lawyer was that she did not trust him
any longer, for one time she found out that some dividend checks which should have been sent to
her were sent instead to petitioner, making her feel that she was being cheated by petitioner.
Moreover, she found that withdrawals from the Philippine National Bank and Bank of the Philippine
Islands have been made by petitioner without her prior authority.
We see no irregularity in the appearance of respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug as counsel for
the widow; much less can we consider it as an actual grabbing of a case from petitioner. The
evidence as found by the Solicitor General shows that Atty. Patalinghug's professional services were
contracted by the widow, a written contract having been made as to the amount to be given him for
his professional services.
Petitioner's voluntary withdrawal on February 5, 1955, as counsel for Mrs. Barrera after Atty.
Patalinghug had entered his appearance, and his (petitioner's) filing almost simultaneously of a
motion for the payment of his attorney's fees, amounted to an acquiescence to the appearance of
respondent Atty. Patalinghug as counsel for the widow. This should estop petitioner from now
complaining that the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug was unprofessional.

Much less could we hold respondent Atty. Remotigue guilty of unprofessional conduct inasmuch as
he entered his appearance, dated February 5, 1955, only on February 7, same year, after Mrs.
Barrera had dispensed with petitioner's professional services on January 11, 1955, and after
petitioner had voluntarily withdrawn his appearance on February 5, 1955.
With respect to the preparation by Atty. Patalinghug of the revocations of power of attorney as
complained of by petitioner, the Solicitor General found that the same does not appear to be
prompted by malice or intended to hurt petitioner's feelings, but purely to safeguard the interest of
the administratrix. Evidently, petitioner's pride was hurt by the issuance of these documents, and felt
that he had been pictured as a dishonest lawyer; for he filed a case before the City Fiscal of Cebu
against Atty. Patalinghug and the widow for libel and falsification. It was shown, however, that the
case was dismissed.
No sufficient evidence having been submitted to sustain the charges, these are hereby dismissed
and the case closed.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
FLORA NARIDO, complainant,
vs.
ATTORNEY JAIME S. LINSANGAN, respondent.
RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:p
The spectacle presented by two members of the bar engaged in bickering and recrimination is far
from edifying, although it is understandable, if not justifiable, that at times zeal in the defense of
one's client may be carried to the point of undue skepticism and doubt as to the motives of opposing
counsel. Some such reflection is induced by these two administrative cases wherein respondents
Jaime S. Linsangan and Rufino B. Risma, who represented adverse parties in a workmen's
compensation case, did mutually hurl accusation at each other. The charge against respondent
Linsangan filed by a certain Flora Narido is that he violated the attorney's oath by submitting a
perjured statement. When required to answer, not only did he deny the complaint but he would also
hold respondent Risma accountable for having instigated his client, the complainant, Flora Narido, to
file a false and malicious complaint resulting in what respondent Linsangan called "embarrassment,
humiliation and defamation" of a brother in a profession.
On September 9, 1971, this Court referred the above administrative cases to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation. Such report and recommendation was submitted on
May 31 of this year.
1. Insofar as the first case against respondent Jaime S. Linsangan is concerned, the report contains
the following: "In support of her complaint filed with this Honorable Court, complainant Narido heavily
relies on the refusal of respondent Linsangan to withdraw despite warning the affidavit of

Milagros M. Vergel de Dios ..., which affidavit Narido claims to be perjured. ... Mrs. Narido and Atty.
Risma threatened Atty. Linsangan with disbarment should he insist in offering the affidavit of Mrs.
Vergel de Dios." 1 Nonetheless, such affidavit was filed. It was found as a fact that there was nothing
improper in presenting such affidavit, its alleged falsity not being proven. Even if it were otherwise, still
there was no showing of respondent having violated his attorney's oath for submitting a perjured affidavit.
Thus the report continues: "With respect to the other allegations in the affidavit, suffice it to say that there
is no evidence showing Atty. Linsangan's awareness of the falsity thereof, assuming arguendo that they
are indeed false. As testified by Atty. Linsangan he has no intention whatsoever of misleading any court or
judicial body, or of violating his attorney's oath." 2
2. As for the charge against Attorney Risma, the report stated the following: "This administrative
complaint stemmed from the belief of Atty. Linsangan that Atty. Risma 'by virtue of his financial
interest in the Award,' instigated the filing of Administrative Case No. 944 'in order to accomplish a
short cut in winning a case even by intimidation or unfounded threats, by depriving a party of due
process and at the expense, embarrassment, humiliation, and defamation of his undersigned
brother-respondent.' ... It seems unkind to allude evil motive to Atty. Risma. It is perhaps more apt to
state that Atty. Risma's missionary zeal to fight for the rights of his clients triggered him into filing
Administrative Case No. 944. We should admire Atty. Risma's dedication in championing the cause
of the poor. Mrs. Narido, his client, is a destitute woman. She needed every centavo of the award. To
her, any delay in the payment thereof meant grave injustice; it meant deprivation and starvation.
Faced with the dilemma of his client, Atty. Risma had to rise to the challenge. In view of this, it is
more in keeping with Christian precepts to say that it must have been the plight of Mrs. Narido
rather than his alleged financial interest that Compelled Atty. Risma to advise his client to file the
case against Atty. Linsangan. ... There being no direct evidence to show the alleged bad faith of Atty.
Risma in advising his client to file Administrative Case No. 944 against Atty. Linsangan, the benefit of
the doubt should be resolved in favor of Atty. Risma. Consequently, the charge of instigating the filing
of 'disbarment proceedings against a brother attorney with improper motives and without just ground'
necessarily fails." 3
3. From the above, it was the recommendation that on such charges, both respondents should be
exculpated. It being shown in the investigation, however, although it was not one of the charges in
the counter-complaint filed against him that respondent Risma would seek to collect fifteen per cent
of the recovery obtained by his client, contrary to the explicit provision in the Workmen's
Compensation Act allowing only a maximum of ten per cent and that only where the case is
appealed, there was likewise a recommendation for admonition or reprimand. The aptness of such a
penalty was predicated on the fact that respondent Risma had not received a single centavo from
the client. Moreover, it was clear such contract for attorney's fees would not be enforced. In the
meanwhile, he had been serving his poverty-stricken client faithfully and well, even advancing some
of the necessary expenses. What was recommended commends itself for acceptance.
4. This further observation is not amiss. The two respondents would be well-advised to heed these
words from Justice Laurel, announced in Javier v. Cornejo: 4 "It should be observed, in this connection,
that mutual bickering and unjustifiable recriminations, between brother attorneys detract from the dignity
of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this court." 5
5. One last word. The report submitted by the Solicitor General is characterized by thoroughness
and diligence, but its quality would have been improved had there been on the part of the Solicitor

concerned a more adequate grasp of notable opinions of this Court on legal ethics from Justice
Malcolm on, thus obviating the need for reliance on secondary authorities, both Philippine and
American.
WHEREFORE, the complaint in Administrative Case No. 944 against respondent Jaime S.
Linsangan is dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent Rufino B. Risma in Administrative Case No.
1025 is exculpated from the charge of having instigated the filing of an unfounded suit. He is,
however, admonished to exercise greater care in ascertaining how much under our law he could
recover by way of attorney's fees. The contract entered into between him and his client as to his
being entitled to fifteen per cent of the award granted her in a workmen's compensation suit is
declared to be of no force and effect, the penalty imposed being that of admonition merely only
because he had made no effort to collect on the same and had even advanced expenses for a poor
client. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the records of both respondents.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez,
Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.