[G.R. No. 108926. July 12, 1996.

]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF DEMOCRITO O.
PLAZA, Respondents.
Solicitor General for Petitioner.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Facts:
- Petition to review and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati confirming respondent Democrito O. Plazas title over Rel. Plan 1059, which is the relocation
plan of Psu-97886.
- Subject property situated at Liwanag, Las Pias, was first owned by Santos de la Cruz, successively bought or
acquired by Pedro Cristobal, Regino Gervacio, Diego Calugdan and Gil Alhambra. After Gil Alhambra died, his
heirs extrajudicially partitioned the subject property and declared it in their names under Tax Declaration. On 5
July 1966, they executed a "Deed of Sale With Mortgage" to respondent. Upon receipt of the full payment, they
executed a "Release of Mortgage". After the sale, respondent took possession of the subject property and paid
the taxes due. He appointed Mauricio Plaza and Jesus Magcanlas as the administrator and caretaker thereof,
respectively.
- On 14 November 1986, respondent filed a petition, for the registration and confirmation of his title over the
subject property alleging that he is the owner, possessor since 1945
- Republic, contended, that: respondent and his predecessors-in-interest have not been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land, tax declarations and tax payments do not
constitute sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land and the subject property pertains to the
public domain.
- Heirs of Santos de la Cruz argue that: (1) their predecessor-in-interest, Santos de la Cruz, is the primitive owner
of the subject lot; and, (2) he, his heirs, and upon their tolerance, some other persons have been in open,
peaceful, notorious and continuous possession of the land in question since time immemorial until the present.
- Kadakilaan Estate contends that: (1) They have the torrens title of the subject property; and, (2) petitionerappellee or his predecessors-in-interest have not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
- the Heirs of Hermogenes Rodriguez alleged, that they have title under Royal Decree No. 01-4, Protocol No. 1891;
Decree No. 659, approved Plan of the Bureau of Lands No. 12298
- On 3 January 1991 Proclamation No. 679 was issued by the President withdrawing the subject property from sale
or settlement and reserve (the same) for slum improvement
Issue: W/N there ownership is acquired by prescription
- Petitioner argues that the burden rests on the applicant to show by convincing evidence that he has a registrable
title over the property sought to be titled, which the latter failed to do. Mere tax declarations and the actual
fencing of the property was done only starting 1998 were not sufficient evidence.
- Realty tax payment receipts show that petitioner-appellee has been very religious in paying, indicative of his
honest belief that he is the owner of the subject property. Petitioner-appellee has proved that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
property in the concept of owner for a period of 30 years since 12 June 1945 and earlier. By operation of law, the
property in question has become private property.
- Respondent had introduced some improvements on the subject property from the time he purchased it.
- Tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they
are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property, manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to
the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.
- Petitioners witnesses Elascio Domitita, Manuel Dolom, Bernadette Aguinaldo and Virginia Franco. As properly by
the public respondent, alleged possession is that it was only with the tolerance of rightful owners of the property
- Petitioner also alleges that the land in question had been withdrawn from the alienable portion of the public
domain pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 679. The proclamation did not prohibit the registration of title.
Registration does not vest title. It is merely evidence of such title. The Torrens system was not established as a
means for the acquisition of title to private land, as it merely confirms, but does not confer ownership.
- In LOI No. 686 paragraph 3, it is mandated that the NHA, upon request of the local government, expropriate or
otherwise acquire land for the SIR program.
- Affirmed
G.R. No. L-38510. March 25, 1975.]
SPOUSES DOLORES MEDINA and MOISES BERNAL, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE NELLY L. ROMERO
VALDELLON OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MALOLOS, BULACAN, SPOUSES CIPRIANO
VILLANUEVA and RUFINA PANGANIBAN, respondents.
ESGUERRA, J p:
Facts:
- Petition to review order of CFI, which dismissed Civil Case in which petitioner alleges that plaintiffs (petitioners in
this case) are the owners of a parcel of land in, Bulacan, purchased sometime in April 1967 from Margarita
Punzalan, Rosal Punzalan, Quaquin Gaddi and Paulina Gaddi;
- Defendants, family friends of the plaintiffs, were allowed to remain in the premises and to construct their
residential house, subject to the condition that defendants will return upon demand";
- Petitioner file motion to amend and respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and an opposition to the
motion to amend and admit the amended complaint

- CFI dismissed the complaint on the ground of "there being another case pending (where petitioners as oppositors
are seeking the exclusion of their land from that of private respondents' claim of title over a bigger tract of land)
between the same parties over the same property,

Issue: W/N the pendency of a land registration case will bar the institution of an action for the recovery of
possession;
The nature of the action embodied in the complaint is one for recovery of possession but not for unlawful detainer
contemplated in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
Defendants withheld possession from the plaintiffs since 1969 or more than the one year period
CFI acting as a land registration court has a limited and special jurisdiction confined to the determination of the
legality and propriety of the issue of title over the land subject matter of registration, and it has no power to
entertain issues of rightful possession and claim for damages emanating from ownership.
Mere plea of title or ownership over the disputed land by the defendant cannot be used as a sound legal basis for
dismissing an action for recovery of possession because an action for recovery of possession can be maintained
even against the very owner of the property.
An action for recovery of possession is totally distinct and different from an action for recovery of title or
ownership. A judgment rendered in a case of recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of
possession and not that of ownership.
Petition granted.
G.R. No. L-44339. December 2, 1987.]
CRISANTA F. SENO, CAROLA SENO SANTOS, MANUEL SENO, JR., DIANA SENO CONDER, EMILY SENO
and WALTER SENO, plaintiffs, vs. MARCOS MANGUBAT and Spouses FRANCISCO LUZAME and VERGITA
PEAFLOR, ANDRES EVANGELISTA and BIENVENIDO MANGUBAT, defendants.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J p:

Facts:
- Appeal from the order of the CFI dismissing the action for reformation of instrument executed in favor of
defendant Marcos Mangubat and annulment of subsequent sale made to defendant spouses Francisco Luzame
and Vergita Peaflor of a parcel of land Paraaque,
- Plaintiff Crisanta Seno mortgaged subject land to defendant Marcos Mangubat for 15,000 loan payable every
month and that as long as the interest is being paid, the mortgage over the property will not be foreclosed; Deed
of Absolute Sale over the subject property for a consideration of P5,000.00 was however executed in favor of
defendant Marcos Mangubat and certain Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat
- Mangubat was able to obtain a title in his name and the other alleged vendees. In 1963, when plaintiff Crisanta F.
Seno failed to pay the monthly interest of 2%, she was sued for ejectment by defendant Marcos Mangubat
alleging nonpayment of rentals; Seno learned that defendant Marcos Mangubat sold the subject property in favor
of spouses Francisco Luzame and Vergita Peaflor for the sum of P10,000.00 Defendant spouses Luzame filed an
ejectment case against plaintiff Crisanta Seno for alleged non-payment of rentals.
- The court a quo dismissed the case against all the defendants holding that the court is no longer in a position to
grant plaintiffs' demands, principally the reformation of subject Deed of Absolute Sale. The motion for
reconsideration was denied
First Issue: whether or not defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat are indispensable parties.
- Plaintiffs contend that said defendants being mere dummies of defendant Marcos Mangubat and therefore not real
parties in interest,
- Necessary parties - must be joined, under Section 8, in order to adjudicate the whole controversy and avoid
multiplicity of suits. But whose interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made in their absence
without affecting them
- Indispensable parties - Under Section 7, are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final decree
would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence.
- Defendant Marcos Mangubat became the absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of the sale. However,
being parties to the instrument sought to be reformed, their presence is necessary in order to settle all the
possible issues of the controversy. Defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat not being
indispensable parties but only proper parties, their joinder as parties defendants was correctly ordered being in
accordance with Sec. 8 of Rule 3.
Second Issue: whether the action against them has prescribed in view of Art. 1144, Civil Code,
- The prescriptive period for written contract and for reformation is ten years as provided in Article 1144 as
recognized in Article 1365
- Plaintiffs argue that prescriptive period must not be counted from the date of execution of the deed of sale on July
17, 1961 to filing of the Amended Complaint on December 29, 1971 but from filing of the original complaint on
August 29, 1969.
- Defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat were only impleaded in the amended complaint of
December 29, 1971 or ten (10) years, five (5) months and twelve (12) days from July 17, 1961 the date of
execution of the subject Deed of Absolute Sale
- A motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription will be given due course only if the complaint shows upon its
face that the action has already prescribed. The action against said defendants has prescribed.
- Plaintiffs contended that assuming the action against defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat
had already prescribed, this defense was personal to them
- Court held that defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat are not indispensable but proper
parties, Pillado cannot therefore, be applied to the case at bar since in Pillado, the parties discharged were
indispensable
- Dismissal of the case against defendants Andres and Bienvenido the court a quo had lost jurisdiction over them.
We have already pointed out that the joinder of proper parties is necessary in order to determine all the possible

issues of the controversy; but if for some reason or another it is not possible to join them, the court may proceed
without them, without prejudice to their rights.
Plaintiffs are barred by laches to bring suit against them.
Laches is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.
From deed of sale on July 17, 1961 to the time of the filing of the present complaint on August 29, 1969 or a
period of 8 years, plaintiffs never took any step to enforce their rights
Defendant Marcos Mangubat filed an ejectment suit against plaintiff but latter failed to appear
Purchaser in good faith, it is enough that he examines the latest certificate of title which in this case is that issued
in the name of the immediate transferor. The purchaser is not bound by the original certificate of title but only
by the certificate of title of the person from whom he has purchased the property.
Person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the TCT and to dispense with the need of
inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry.
Where innocent third persons relying on the correctness of the certificate of title issued, acquire rights over the
property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate.
Decision affirmed.
G.R. No. 3013. January 24, 1908.]
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC CHURCH, ET AL., plaintiffs, vs. CERTAIN MUNICIPALITIES IN THE
PROVINCE OF ILOCOS SUR, ET AL., defendants
DECISION
WILLARD, J p:

- Action dismissed and decreed that all of the property described in the complaint be eliminated.
- Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover the building "a convent." It is proved had been used as a municipal building.
Three churches have been built upon the lot originally dedicated to that purpose, the last one having been
constructed about two years ago.
- Plaintiffs are entitled to the possession of the lot.
- However, the present building was constructed by persons without evidence of ownership. They simply took
possession when its former possessors were compelled to abandon it by reason of war. They can not be
considered as possessors in good faith. Hence, they are not entitled to the structure erected upon the land not
their own.
[G.R. No. 77744. March 6, 1992.]
TEODORA CLAVERIAS, petitioner, vs. ADORACION QUINGCO, ERNESTO TONGSON and THE HONORABLE
COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
Facts:
- Petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals decision affirming the RTC dismissing the complaint.
- An action instituted by petitioner against private respondents for annulment of title and reconveyance with
damages of lot in Negros. It is alleged therein that Lot was originally decreed and registered in the names of
petitioner Teodora Claverias and her brother Federico. Federico died leaving Sinforosa as his only heir. OCT was
lost during the last world war.
- After the war, private respondent Adoracion Quingco, had the OCT reconstructed under Claverias and her
deceased brother, but through fraud, Quingco had the said title cancelled and obtained a new certificate in her
name, as she executed a fictitious and simulated deed of sale
- Through force and intimidation, Tongson succeeded in evicting petitioner. In 1968, petitioner learned of these
fraudulent transactions.
- Private respondents alleged, that the lot was twice sold to their predecessors-in-interest by Sinforosa. In the
settlement of the estate of Eustaquio Quingco, the lot was adjudicated to respondent Adoracion Quingco who
later sold it to respondent Tongson;
- As early as 1922 and 1930, Sinforosa Flores and the plaintiff, Teodora Claverias, disposes (sic) of whatever
interests or rights they may have had on Lot, absolutely and forever, unto the predecessors-in-interest of the
defendants. Retired Judge Vidal Vallejera, testified as to the genuineness and due execution of the document of
sale
- The ownership of Adoracion Quingco and her predecessors-in-interest dates back to the year 1922 when the
plaintiff and her mother sold and conveyed Lot 737 in favor of Venancia Alarcon (Exhibit "17"), which
conveyance was confirmed on June 19, 1930, (Exhibit "18"). From that point in time until 1958, plaintiff Teodora
Claverias exerted no efforts to seek for (sic) the annulment of several documents included in the proceedings
(Spec. Proc. No. 4797). It was only month (sic) later on, April 26, 1959, when the plaintiff made attempt (sic) to
assail the validity of the transactions had between the predecessors-in-interest of the defendants and the
defendants themselves, and the plaintiff and her mother. These are transactions that transpired several decades
ago, giving birth to several documents considered as ancient, stamped with a 'tag' of trustworthiness. Cdpr
So that, even if it is assumed arguendum (sic), that indeed, fraud attended the consummation of these
transactions involving Lot 373, the attempt by the plaintiff in this instant case to nullify these transactions can no
longer proper (sic). Because upon the facts proven, it is not difficult for this Court to conclude that the plaintiff's
cause of action, assuming that she ever had one, had prescribed at the time she filed a suit on (sic) April 29,
1959, (Case No. 5295, CFI-Negros Occidental). And better still, the case under consideration because of laches,
the plaintiff may not now be allowed to assail the validity of the transactions affecting Lot 737, much less the
validity of the judicial proceedings in Spec. Proc. No. 4797, entitled 'Testate Estate of Eustaquio Quingco' which

resulted in the adjudication of the property in question to the defendant, Adoracion Quingco. (Godinez vs. Pelaez,
L-18491, February 27, 1971).
Moreover, it has been also noted that on March 3, 1958, defendant Adoracion Quingco, for and in consideration of
the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00), sold and conveyed Lot 737 by way of an absolute deed of sale to her
co-defendant Ernesto Tongson. As a result of the deed of sale, TCT No. T-23353 was issued by the Register of
Deeds of Negros Occidental in the name of Ernesto Tongson (Exhibit "3", also Exhibit "C"), thereby cancelling TCT
No.
T-23275 in the name of co-defendant Adoracion Quingco. (Exhibits "2" and
"2-A").
As matters stand now, Ernesto Tongson is the absolute owner of Lot 737. Except for a series of real estate
mortgages executed by Ernesto Tongson in favor of the Philippine National Bank, no other valid lien or
encumbrances exists (sic) at the back of his title.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Having been obtained by way of a deed of absolute sale Lot 737 from Adoracion Quingco whose title was
absolutely free from any flaw or defect, Ernesto Tongson, being a buyer of said Lot 737 for value and in good faith
and without prior notice of any right whatsoever than what the defendant, Adoracion Quingco, had over Lot 737,
deserves the full protection of the law. (Godinez vs. Pelaez, L-18491, February 27, 1971). Said defendant then
acquired title to Lot 737 as an innocent purchaser for value as early as 1958 and such being the situation, the
rights and interests of defendant Ernesto Tongson over the lot in question must be set at rest since reconveyance
as desired by the plaintiff can no longer prosper in this case, the land having passed on to an innocent purchaser
for value. (Lazia vs. Donting, L-55911-R, February 25, 1977)." 5(5)
In her appeal from this adverse judgment to the respondent Court of Appeals, docketed as A.C.-G.R. CV No.
05100, petitioner, in her Brief, assigned the following errors:
"1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LOT NO. 737 OF HIMAMAYLAN CADASTRE SUBJECT MATTER OF
THIS CASE WAS PURCHASED BY THE GRANDPARENTS OF THE APPELLEES SPOUSES EUSTAQUIO QUINGCO AND
VENANCIA ALARCON FROM THE APPELLANTS (sic) SAID FINDING OF THE COURT NOT
SUPPORTED WITH EVIDENCE (sic) THEREFORE CONTRARY TO LAW;
2.
THE LOWER COURT ALSO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SINCE LOT NO. 737 WAS INCLUDED IN THE TESTAMENT
OF THE LATE EUSTAQUIO QUINGCO, FATHER OF THE APPELLEE ADORACION QUINGCO, WHICH WAS PROBATED BY
THE PROBATE COURT AND THE (sic) PROPERTY ADJUDICATED TO ADORACION QUINGCO AS HER SHARE A (sic)
PROOF THAT THE PROPERTY BELONG (sic) TO THE ESTATE OF EUSTAQUIO QUINGCO SUCH (sic) FINDING OF THE
COURT ALSO CONTRARY TO LAW;
3.
THE
LOWER
COURT ALSO ERRED IN
HOLDING
THAT
APPELLEE ERNESTO TONGSON A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION, BE (sic) PROTECTED BY
LAW SAID (sic) FINDING OF THE COURT ALSO CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED (sic) THEREFORE
CONTRARY TO LAW;
4.
THE LOWER COURT ALSO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANTS' CAUSE OF ACTION (sic) TO ANNUL
THE TITLE OF APPELLEE, ERNESTO TONGSON, AND TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY BARRED BY
PRESCRIPTION OR LACHES SAID FINDING OF THE COURT ALSO (sic) CONTRARY TO LAW.
In its decision of 22 July 1986, the respondent Court sustained the trial court and affirmed its decision. It held:
"We agree, Against the notarized documents of absolute sale, Exhibits "17" and "18", evidencing Teodora
Claverias' absolute alienation of Lot 737, her mere denials to the contrary are completely unavailing. The rule is
settled.
'A notarial document, guaranteed by public attestation in accordance with the law, must be sustained in full force
and effect so long as he who impugns it shall not have presented strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its
falsity or nullity on account of some flaw or defect provided by law.' (Robinson vs. Villafuerte, 18 Phil. 171).
And to further accentuate the bankruptcy of the plaintiff's position, the defendants-appellees even presented the
notary public who notarized one of the deeds of sale to testify to its validity.
'The testimony of a notary public, who is at the same time a lawyer, must be given more credence to (sic) the
testimony of a party denying a contract acknowledged before the same notary public.' (Cabahug vs. Cinco, CAG.R. No. 6042, February 3, 1941).
Even granting for the sake of argument the veracity of Teodora Claverias' claim of fraud that she never
executed those deeds of sale and her mother merely entrusted the lot to Venancia Alarcon Quingco in 1922
then, still, her claim should be barred on the ground of prescription. Whether express or implied, this alleged trust
was openly repudiated in 1937 when Lot 737 was included as part of the late Eustaquio Quingco's estate in Sec.
Proc. No. 4797, wherein the probate court duly approved the project of partition adjudicating to appellee
Adoracion Quingco the ownership of this lot.
The record further discloses this action of the probate court was not the only judicial rebuff suffered by the
appellants in relation to the land subject of herein case. Sometime in 1958, defendant-appellee Ernesto Tongson
instituted an ejectment case against Teodora Claverias and her husband (Civil Case 268) before the Municipal
Court of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental. The court found for the plaintiff and ordered Teodora Claverias ejected
from the land. On appeal to the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, her appeal therein was
dismissed on September 12, 1967 'for lack of interest and for failure of the appellants to appear.'
Again, in her first attempt to annul the defendants-appellee's title (filed on April 29, 1959), the case was
dismissed by the lower court for repeated failure of Teodora Claverias and her husband to appear and prosecute
the action.
The repeated wavering of the herein appellants in those previous cases to prosecute their claim of ownership
raises serious doubts in Our minds as to the merits of their claim, else why the marked reluctance to press
matters to a conclusion until (sic) now? Be that as it may, considering the legal documents of transfer and
ownership possession by the appellees over the land in dispute, the challenged (sic) posed by the appellants must
necessarily be rejected for lack of merit." 6(6)
The motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision having been denied for lack of merit in the 17 February
1987 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, 7(7) petitioner took this present recourse, submitting the following
assignment of errors:
"I

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHS. "17" AND "18" AS EVIDENCE FOR THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
DESPITE OBJECTION INTERPOSED BY THE PETITIONERS IN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE RULE OF LAW;
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED BY NOT FINDING THAT EXHS. "17" AND "18" BEING MERELY TRUE COPIES OF THE
ALLEGED ORIGINAL UNDER THE LAW THE DOCUMENTS ARE NOT
ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE;
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED BY
NOT FINDING
THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS (sic) GUILTY OF MISREPRESENTATION BY PRESENTING AND OFFERING AS EVIDENCE IN
COURT EXHS. "17" AND "18" AND MADE IT (sic) OF RECORD TO BE A CERTIFIED COPIES (sic) WHEN IN TRUTH AND
IN FACT THE DOCUMENTS ARE MERELY
TRUE COPIES;
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ALSO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACTION FILED BY THE PETITIONERS TO RECOVER THE
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY BARRED (sic) BY PRESCRIPTION." 8(8)
We required the respondents to comment on the petition. 9(9) After private respondents separately filed their
Comments and the petitioner submitted a Reply, an Amended Reply and a Supplemental Reply, this Court gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Briefs within thirty (30) days from
notice. 10(10)
A careful scrutiny of the pleadings reveals that contrary to private respondents' bold assertions that the issues in
this case are factual and hence the findings of fact of the respondent Court are conclusive, legal issues of
transcendental importance are also involved. Additionally, the findings upon which some issues are founded are
not in fact supported by the evidence, are based on a misapprehension of facts, or the inferences made therefrom
are manifestly mistaken. Accordingly, this case falls within some of the exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of
findings of fact of the respondent Court. 11(11)
The basic issues raised in this case involve:
(a)
the correctness of the admission of Exhibits "17" and "18";
(b)
granting that Exhibit "17" and "18" were properly admitted, the validity of the alleged sales of the property
by Sinforosa Flores in 1922 (Exh. "17") and 1930 (Exh. "18");
(c)
the effect of the "conforme" of petitioner to the deed of sale, marked as Exhibit "17"; and
(d)
the correctness of the conclusion of the trial court that: (1) private respondent Tongson is a buyer in good
faith and (2) petitioner is barred by prescription and laches.
I
1.
Exhibit "17" is a copy of a deed of sale executed on 25 January 1922 by
Sinforosa Flores and containing petitioner's conformity thereto, 12(12) while Exhibit
"18" is a certification issued by Antonio Yacapin, Director of the Bureau of Records and Archives, Manila, dated 24
October 1958, and attesting to the correctness of an entry appearing on the notarial register of notary public Vidal
P. Vallejera which makes reference to a deed of purchase and sale of Lot No. 737 of the Himamaylan Cadastre
executed by Sinforosa Flores and Teodora Claverias in favor of Sixto Vallejera 13(13) for and in consideration of
P200.00. cdphil
While petitioner insists that Exhibit "17" is merely a true copy, private respondents claim that it is a certified true
copy. Both the trial and respondent courts, however, did not specifically rule on the objection. They admitted and
treated it as if it was the original document.
Both courts committed a serious error in this respect. Exhibit "17" is not the best evidence and should have been
rejected because the grounds for non-production of the original deed of sale under Section 3, in relation to Section
5, Rule 130 14(14) of the Rules of Court, were not duly established. Said sections provide:
"SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a)
When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part
of the offeror;
(b)
When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c)
When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
and
(d)
When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
xxx
xxx
xxx
SEC 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
Private respondents failed to present the original deed of sale and do not claim that they did. No justification has
been adduced to show why they could not produce the original or the duplicate originals thereof. Indeed, serious
doubt surrounds the existence of said deed of sale. Moreover, there is no showing that the same had been
registered. The reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-7111 (17502) 15(15) does not carry any entry
regarding the said sale.
On the other hand, Exhibit "18" is not a deed of sale. It is but a certification of an entry in the notarial register of
notary public Vallejera. The certification states that "no copy of the above-mentioned document has been
received by this office for file." It was, therefore, erroneous for both the trial and the respondent appellate courts
to declare that it is a deed of sale. While the certification may be taken as evidence that sometime in the past the
notary public did make that entry in his notarial book, the entry is neither a substitute for the document, nor the
best evidence thereof. In this regard, private respondents again failed to show why they could not produce the
best evidence. The testimony of the notary public that the document was acknowledged before him was
insufficient to prove the contents thereof. We also note that aside from the fact that this so-called sale was not
registered, no entry relating thereto appears in the reconstituted Original Certificate of Title.

This error of the trial court was compounded by its sweeping pronouncement that the deeds of sale of 25 January
1992 and 19 June 1930 are "ancient documents" and "appear as the best memorial of the transactions affecting
Lot 737," and so therefore, ". . . [t]he Court is bereft of any justifiable or cogent reason to disturb its conclusion
that in truth, the plaintiff disposed of her rights and interest over Lot 737 several decades ago as proved by valid
and authentic documents of transfer."
Considering the failure of private respondents to produce the original of the alleged deeds of sale, this Court
cannot accept the said pronouncement. An ancient document, under the Rules on Evidence, refers to a private
document which is more than thirty (30) years old, produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if
genuine, and is unblemished by alterations or circumstances of suspicion. 16(16) In the instant case, private
respondents themselves never introduced and effered in evidence Exhibits "17" and "18" as private documents.
On the contrary, they insisted that the same are public documents. Besides, even if they could be considered
private documents, private respondents still failed to prove the two (2) essential requisites before an ancient
document may be admitted without proof of its execution or authenticity, to wit: (a) it is produced from a custody
in which it would naturally be found if genuine and (b) it is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of
suspicion. Both requisites presuppose the production of the original document, something which private
respondents failed to do. cdphil
2. Even granting for the sake of argument that Exhibit "17" was correctly admitted and truly reflects what it
purports to show, the "sale" evidenced therein by Sinforosa Flores of Lot No. 737 is null and void.
Lot No. 737 originally belonged to Sinforosa's husband, Cornelio Claverias, who died intestate. Cornelio's two (2)
children, petitioner herein and Federico, inherited the property pursuant to Articles 930 and 932 of the Civil Code
of Spain, the governing law at that time, subject, however, to Sinforosa's right of usufruct over one-third (1/3) of
the property pursuant to Articles 834 and 835 of the same Code. These articles provide:
"ARTICLE 930. Succession pertains, in the first place, to the descending direct line.
xxx
xxx
xxx
ARTICLE 932. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the
inheritance in equal shares.
xxx
xxx
xxx
ARTICLE 834. A widower or widow who, on the death of his or her spouse, is not divorced, or should be so by the
fault of the deceased, shall be entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to
each of the legitimate children or descendants who have not received any betterment.
If only one legitimate child or descendant survives, the widower or widow shall have the usufruct of the third
available for betterment, such child or descendant to have the naked ownership until, on the death of the
surviving spouse, the whole title is merged in him.
xxx
xxx
xxx
ARTICLE 835. The hereditary portion allotted in usufruct to the widowed spouse must be taken from the third of
the estate available for the betterment of the children."17(17)
Specifically, this usufructuary right covered one-sixth (1/6) of the one-half
(1/2) share of petitioner and one-sixth (1/6) of the other half pertaining to Federico.
Conformably with these provisions, the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 17502, reconstituted as OCT No. RO7111 (17502), was issued on 10 July 1923 in the name of "TEODORA CLAVERIAS and FEDERICO CLAVERIAS", and
made subject to the liens therein stated, the second of which reads:
". . . (b) that the land above-described is subject to the usufructuary right of Sinforosa Flores during her natural
life." 18(18)
Sinforosa Flores could not have, therefore, sold or encumbered the lot. She could have disposed of or encumbered
only her usufructuary right thereon. However, when Federico Claverias, a co-owner of the property, together with
the petitioner, died without any issue, Sinforosa inherited his one-half (1/2) share of the lot pursuant to articles
935 and 936 of the Civil Code of Spain, which read:
"ARTICLE 935. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall inherit from
him, to the exclusion of collaterals.
ARTICLE 936. The father and mother, if living, shall inherit share and share alike.
Should one only of them survive, he or she shall succeed to the entire estate of the child." 19(19)
In addition to her ownership of one-half (1/2) of the property, Sinforosa retained her usufructuary right over onesixth (1/6) of the portion pertaining to herein petitioner.
There is no competent evidence as to the date of death of Federico. It can, however, be safely presumed that he
died after the issuance of OCT No. 17502 on 10 July 1923 because his name is still mentioned therein as a coowner.
Consequently, if indeed a deed of sale (Exh "17") was in fact executed on 25 January 1922, Sinforosa could sell
only her usufructuary right over one-third (1/3) of the entire lot. The sale was null and void in respect to the lot
because she was not its owner. Assuming for the sake of argument that another deed of sale was executed on 19
June 1930, as indicated by Exhibit "18", Sinforosa could have only validly sold the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No.
737 which she inherited from Federico and her usufructuary right over one-sixth (1/6) of the share of petitioner,
but not the latter's share. Nevertheless, if indeed Sinforosa signed the deed of sale dated 19 June 1930, this Court
would find it difficult to accept any explanation as to why the consideration indicated therein for the entire lot was
merely P200.00 when Sinforosa's usufructuary right was sold eight (8) years earlier (Exh. "17") for P300.00. It
cannot be said that this P200.00 was merely an additional sum because the vendee in the second sale is Sixto
Vallejera and not Venancia Alarcon, the vendee in the first sale. There is absolutely no competent evidence to
prove that, as again erroneously ruled by the trial court, Sixto purchased the property for Venancia's or her
husband's estate.
3. No further ratiocination is needed to show the grave error committed by both the trial court and the respondent
Court when they concluded that petitioner herein also sold her rights over the lot in the deed of sale of 25 January
1922, or that it is the "first" deed of sale she executed. Exhibit "17" itself, the very document relied upon by said
courts, does not show that petitioner is one of the vendors. It is only Sinforosa Flores who is shown to be the
vendor. Thus, it states:

"Yo, Sinforosa Flores, viuda, mayor de edad y vecina del Municipio de Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, L.F., hago
constar que, en consideracion a la cantidad de TRES CIENTOS PESOS, moneda filipina, que he recibido antes de
ahora a mi entera satisfaccion de la Sra. Venancia Alarcon de Quingco, . . .
VENDO, CEDO Y TRANSPASO EN PERPETUA ENAJENACION, . . ."
20(20)
The petitioner's participation appears to be limited to the mere affixing of her signature below the word
CONFORMES. This "conforme" could mean nothing more than her conformity to the sale of the usufructuary rights
of Sinforosa. It cannot be legally construed as petitioner's sale of her rights in the lot, or of her conformity to the
sale thereof by Sinforosa for the latter is not its owner; the conforme did not operate to vest on Sinforosa
ownership over the lot since it can by no means be considered a mode of acquiring ownership.
II
Contrary to the findings of the courts below, private respondent Tongson is not a buyer in good faith. He bought
the property on 3 March 1958. Good faith and the exercise of due diligence required him to demand from the
vendor the production of the certificate of title. The vendor was then in possession of the owner's duplicate copy
of OCT No. 17502 since it was not yet reconstituted. The reconstituted title was issued only on 4 March
1958.21(21) Hence, at the time Tongson allegedly purchased the property, he knew, or ought to have known, that
his vendor was not the registered owner of the property.
Furthermore, the entries in the reconstituted Original Certificate of Title (Exh
"A") also show that it was only on 31 March 1958 that it was cancelled upon the order of the court and a new one,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-23275, was issued in the name of private respondent Adoracion Quingco.
The foregoing notwithstanding, laches had definitely foreclosed the petitioner's right to recover the property. In
this regard, We are in full agreement with the trial court.
Although petitioner was the owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 737, she never possessed the same. She attempted
to enter into possession of a portion thereof in 1958, but was rebuffed by an action for ejectment filed by privaterespondent Tongson, who won said case. She lost in her appeal filed thereafter, during the pendency of the same,
a writ of execution was issued against her in 1964.
Petitioner, by her own inaction or through her own fault, likewise lost in her bid in 1959 to secure the annulment
of the titles issued in the names of private respondents Quingco and Tongson. The case she filed for that purpose
was dismissed on 29 October 1959. Thus, even if Tongson may not be considered a purchaser in good faith, the
adverse possession of his predecessor-in-interest from 1922 to 1958, totalling 36 years, benefited him for
purposes of applying the principle of laches. Added to this is petitioner's failure to take any further action to
recover the property from the dismissal of the annulment case in 1959 until 23 October 1972, when she filed the
original complaint in Civil Case No. 615. Verily, she had slept too long.
Prescription does not operate against her as she is the registered co-owner of Lot No. 737. Per Section 46 of the
Land Registration Act, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. Laches does. In Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, 22(22) this Court ruled that
possession for 37 years by a defendant and inaction and neglect by the owner of a registered land calls for the
application of the equitable defense of laches.
All the elements of laches, which this Court prescribed in Go Chi Gun, et al.
vs. Co Cho, et al. 23(23) and reiterated in the Mejia case and in Miguel vs. Catalino, 24(24) to wit:
"1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which
complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(2)
delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the
defendant's conduct and having been afforded
an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3)
lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on
which he based his suit; and
(4)
injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the quit is not
held to be barred.
are present in this case.
In Heirs of Batiog Lacamen vs. Heirs of Laruan, 25(25) this Court defines laches and distinguishes it from
prescription, thus:
"'Laches' has been defined as 'such neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time
and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity.' It is a delay in
the assertion of a right 'which works disadvantage to another' because of the 'inequity founded on some change
in the condition or relations of the property or parties.' It is based on public policy which, for the peace of society,
ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a valid claim. It is different from and
applies independently of prescription. While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is concerned
with the effect of delay. Prescription is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is
principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some
change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not.
Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on a fixed time, laches is not."
(footnotes are omitted)
However, both the trial court and the respondent Court correctly applied prescription insofar as petitioner's claim
of implied trust is concerned. It is now settled that an action based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes
in ten (10) years, 26(26) reckoned from the date of the repudiation of the trust. 27(27)
While We commiserate with the petitioner and are moved by her plea, We must, nevertheless, remain faithful to
Our pronouncement in Miguel vs. Catalino:
". . . Courts can not look, with favor at parties who, by their silence, delay and inaction, knowingly induce another
to spend time, effort and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes and making improvements thereon for 30
long years, only to spring from ambush and claim title when the possessor's efforts and the rise of land values
offer an opportunity to make easy profit at his expense."
Vigilantibus, non domientibus, jura subveniunt. Laws must come to the assistance of the vigilant, not of the
sleepy.

WHEREFORE, due to the equitable principle of laches, the affirmance by the respondent Court in its decision of 22
July 1986 in A.C.-G.R. CV No. 05100 of the decision of the trial court Civil Case No. 615 is hereby SUSTAINED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 71283. November 12, 1987.]
MIGUEL ESCRITOR, JR., ANGEL ESCRITOR, RAMON ESCRITOR,
JUANA ESCRITOR, CONCORDIA ESCRITOR, IRENE ESCRITOR, MATILDE ESCRITOR, MERCEDES ESCRITOR, HEIRS OF
LUIS ESCRITOR, represented by RUPERTO ESCRITOR, HEIRS OF PEDO ESCRITOR, represented by SUSANA
VILLAMENA, LINA ESCRITOR,
WENDELINA ESCRITOR, ALFREDO ESCRITOR, SUSANA ESCRITOR and CARMEN ESCRITOR, petitioners, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SIMEON ACUNA, respondents
GANCAYCO, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in
AC-G.R. No. CV-01264-R entitled "Simeon Acuna vs. Miguel Escritor, Jr., et al," a case which originated from the
Court of First Instance of Quezon.
The record of the case discloses the following facts:
Lot No. 2749, located at Atimonan, Quezon, was the subject of cadastral proceedings in the Court of First Instance
of Quezon, Gumaca Branch. Miguel Escritor, as claimant, filed an answer thereto declaring his ownership over the
lot alleging that he acquired it by inheritance from his deceased father. 1(1) As required, a notice of hearing was
duly published, after which an order of general default was entered. 2(2) The lot having become uncontested, only
Miguel Escritor appeared in order to adduce his evidence of ownership.
On May 15, 1958, the Court rendered a decision in the abovementioned case, Cadastral Case No. 72, adjudicating
the lot with its improvements in favor of claimant
Escritor and confirming his title thereto. 3(3) Immediately thereafter, Escritor took possession of the property. On
July 15, 1958, the Court, in an Order, directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the
corresponding decree of registration in favor of Escritor, the decision in Cadastral Case No. 72 having become
final. 4(4)
On August 2, 1958, Simeon S. Acuna, the herein respondent, filed a petition for review of the above-mentioned
decision contending that it was obtained by claimant Escritor through fraud and misrepresentation. 5(5) The
petition was granted on July 18, 1960 and a new hearing was set for September 13, 1960. 6(6) While the
proceedings were going on, claimant Escritor died. His heirs, the petitioners in this case, took possession of the
property. LexLib
On February 16, 1971 or thirteen years after the disputed decision was rendered, the Court adjudicated Lot No.
2749 in favor of respondent Acuna, ordering petitioners to vacate the land. 7(7) A writ of possession was later
issued and petitioners voluntarily gave up their possession. 8(8)
More than four years later, or on October 13, 1975, respondent Acuna filed with the same Court in Civil Case No.
1138-G, a complaint for recovery of damages against petitioners for the fruits of Lot No. 2749 which was allegedly
possessed by the latter unlawfully for thirteen years. According to respondent Acuna, the registration of the said
lot was effectuated by the deceased claimant Escritor through fraud, malice, and misrepresentation. The lower
court, however, rendered a decision dismissing Acua's complaint for damages, finding that though petitioners
enjoyed the fruits of the property, they were in good faith, possessing under a just title, and the cause of action, if
there was any, has already prescribed. 9(9)
On Appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the judgment of the lower court was reversed in a decision
promulgated on October 31, 1984, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and set
aside and another one entered herein, ordering the defendants-appellees jointly and severally (a) to pay the
plaintiff-appellant the sum of P10,725.00 representing the value of the fruits appellees received for the 13 years
they have been in unlawful possession of the land subject-matter; (b) to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of
P3,000.00 for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and (c) to pay the costs." Hence this petition.
The main issue that has to be resolved in this case is whether or not petitioners should be held liable for
damages.
Contrary to the finding of the trial court, the Intermediate Appellate Court made the pronouncement that
petitioners were possessors in bad faith from 1958 up to 1971 and should be held accountable for damages. This
conclusion was based on the statement of the cadastral court in its August 21, 1971 decision, readjudicating Lot
No. 2749 to respondent Simeon Acuna, that "Miguel Escritor forcibly took possession of the land in May, 1958, and
benefited from the coconut trees thereon." 10(10) The Intermediate Appellate Court observed that on the basis of
the unimpeached conclusion of the cadastral court, it must be that the petitioners have wrongfully entered
possession of the land. 11(11) The Intermediate Appellate Court further explains that as such possessors in bad
faith, petitioners must reimburse respondent Acuna for the fruits of the land they had received during their
possession. 12(12)
We cannot affirm the position of the Intermediate Appellate Court. It should be remembered that in the first
decision of the cadastral court dated May 15, 1958, Lot No. 2749 was adjudicated in favor of claimant Escritor,
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. In this decision, the said court found to its satisfaction that claimant Escritor
acquired the land by inheritance from his father who in turn acquired it by purchase, and that his open, public,
continuous, adverse, exclusive and notorious possession dated back to the Filipino-Spanish Revolution. 13(13) It
must also be recalled that in its Order for the issuance of decrees dated July 15, 1958, the same Court declared
that the above-mentioned decision had become final. Significantly, nowhere during the entire cadastral
proceeding did anything come up to suggest that the land belonged to any person other than Escritor.
On the basis of the aforementioned favorable judgment which was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction,
Escritor honestly believed that he is the legal owner of the land. With this well-grounded belief of ownership, he
continued in his possession of Lot No. 2749. This cannot be categorized as possession in bad faith. prcd
As defined in the law, a possessor in bad faith is one in possession of property knowing that his title thereto is
defective. 14(14) Here, there is no showing that Escritor knew of any flaw in his title.
Nor was it proved that petitioners were aware that the title of their predecessor had any defect.

Nevertheless, assuming that claimant Escritor was a possessor in bad faith, this should not prejudice his
successors-in-interest, petitioners herein, as the rule is that only personal knowledge of the flaw in one's title or
mode of acquisition can make him a possessor in bad faith, for bad faith is not transmissible from one person to
another, not even to an heir. 15(15) As Article 534 of the Civil Code explicitly provides, "one who succeeds by
hereditary title shall not suffer the consequences of the wrongful possession of the decedent, if it is not shown
that he was aware of the flaws affecting it; . . ." The reason for this article is that bad faith is personal and
intransmissible. Its effects must, therefore, be suffered only by the person who acted in bad faith; his heir should
not be saddled with such consequences. 16(16)
Under Article 527 of the Civil Code, good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the
part of a possessor rests the burden of proof. If no evidence is presented proving bad faith, like in this case, the
presumption of good faith remains.
Respondent Acuna, on the other hand, bases his complaint for damages on the alleged fraud on the part of the
petitioners' predecessor in having the land registered under his (the predecessor's) name. A review of the record,
however, does not indicate the existence of any such fraud. It was not proven in the cadastral court nor was it
shown in the trial court.
Lot No. 2749 was not awarded to Escritor on the basis of his machinations. What is clear is that in the hearing of
January 22, 1958, the Court permitted Escritor to adduce his evidence of ownership without opposing evidence as
the lot had become uncontested. 17(17) Respondent Acuna himself failed to appear in this hearing because of a
misunderstanding with a lawyer. 18(18) There is no finding that such failure to appear was caused by petitioners
in this case. On the contrary, all the requirements of publication were followed. Notice of hearing was duly
published. Clearly then, the allegation of fraud is without basis. Cdpr
Respondent having failed to prove fraud and bad faith on the part of petitioners, We sustain the trial court's
finding that petitioners were possessors in good faith and should, therefore, not be held liable for damages.
With the above pronouncement, the issue of prescription of cause of action which was also presented need not be
passed upon.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
another decision is rendered dismissing the complaint. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 76216. September 14, 1989.]
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ORLANDO GERNALE,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 76217. September 14, 1989.]
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA,
respondents
FERNAN, C.J p:
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the
owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 square
meters and covered by TCT No. 50023 of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued on September 11,
1980 which canceled TCT No. 56762/ T-560. The land was originally registered on August 5, 1948 in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted by the President of the
Philippines on July 27, 1948, under Act No. 141.
On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German
Management Services to develop their property covered by TCT No. 50023 into a residential subdivision.
Consequently, petitioner on February 9, 1983 obtained Development Permit No. 00424 from the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part of the property was occupied by
private respondents and twenty other persons, petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the
latter refused. Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property which included
the portions occupied and cultivated by private respondents. prcd
Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal and members of
the Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association; that they have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some twelve
to fifteen years prior to the promulgation of P. D. No. 27; that during the first week of August 1983, petitioner,
under a permit from the Office of the Provincial Governor of Rizal, was allowed to improve the Barangay Road at
Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal at its expense, subject to the condition that it shall secure the needed
right of way from the owners of the lot to be affected; that on August 15, 1983 and thereafter, petitioner deprived
private respondents of their property without due process of law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying the
barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn, fruit bearing trees and
other crops of private respondents by means of force, violence and intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and (3)
trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject private respondents from their respective
farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028. 1(1)
On January 7, 1985, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents' complaint for forcible entry. 2(2) On
appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch LXXI sustained the dismissal by the Municipal Trial Court.
3(3)
Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1986, said court gave
due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court.
4(4)
The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession of the property at the time they
were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry
regardless of the legality or illegality of possession. 5(5) Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same was denied
by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated September 26, 1986. 6(6)
Hence, this recourse.
The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due process to petitioner when it reversed the
decision of the court a quo without giving petitioner the opportunity to file its answer and whether or not private
respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner. 7(7)

We affirm. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for due process to exist. The
comment filed by petitioner on February 26, 1986 has sufficiently addressed the issues presented in the petition
for review filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals. Having heard both parties, the Appellate
Court need not await or require any other additional pleading. Moreover, the fact that petitioner was heard by the
Court of Appeals on its motion for reconsideration negates any violation of due process.
Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the subject property,
private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because
ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an
estate. Title is not involved. 8(8)
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private respondents were
already in possession thereof. There is no evidence that the spouses Jose were ever in possession of the subject
property. On the contrary, private respondents' peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that they even
planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of destroying their crops.
Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such
evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must
be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. 9(9) Thus, a party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the
property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. 10(10)
Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized petitioner's drastic action of
bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self-help enunciated in
Article 429 of the New Civil Code. 11(11) Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only
be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When
possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is
clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, "(I)n no case may possession be acquired through force or
intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to
deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse
to deliver the thing."
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24,
1986 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 9989. March 13, 1918.]
EDUARDO CUAYCONG, ET AL., plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAMONA BENEDICTO, ET AL., defendants-appellants
FISHER, J p:
The issues in this case relate to the right of plaintiff to make use of two roads existing on the Hacienda Torena, a
tract of land in the municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental, the property of the defendants, Blasa Benedicto
and Ramona Benedicto. One of these roads is referred to in the proceedings as the Nanca-Victorias road and the
other as the Dacuman-Toreno road. The court of First Instance held that those of the plaintiffs who claimed to be
entitled to make use of the Dacuman-Toreno road had failed to establish the asserted right, and dismissed the
action as to them. From this decision they appealed to this court but, their brief not having been filed within the
time prescribed by the rules, their appeal was dismissed, on motion of defendants, by resolution dated February
14, 1916. Consequently, the issues presented on this appeal are limited to those which relate to the rights of the
parties with respect to the Nanca-Victorias road, and the determination of the correctness of the decision of the
court concerning that part of the controversy submitted to its decision.
The allegations in the complaint with respect to the Nanca-Victorias road are that the appellees, Eduardo
Cuaycong, Lino Cuaycong, and Eulalio Dolor, are the owners of a group of hacienda situated between the
southern boundary of the Hacienda Toreno and the barrio of Nanca, of the municipality of Saravia, and that the
appellees Silverio Ginoo, Gervasio Ascalon, and Juan Ledesma, are the lessees of part of said hacienda; that for
more than twenty years the appellees and their predecessors in interest have made use of the Nanca-Victorias
road, which crosses the Hacienda Toreno, openly, publicly, and continuously, with the knowledge of the owners of
the said hacienda, for the purpose of conveying the products of their hacienda to the town of Victorias and to the
landing place there situated, and for the purpose of transporting supplies from those points to their haciendas,
making use of the said road by means of carts, carabaos, and other usual means of transportation; that there is
no outlet to a public road from the hacienda occupied by these plaintiffs, the only road and way by which the
products of the plaintiffs' property can be taken to the town of Victorias and to the landing place there being
across the Hacienda Toreno by the road marked on the plan attached to the complaint; that on the fifteenth day of
November, 1912, the defendants closed the road in question at the point at which it crosses the Hacienda Toreno,
and refused to permit plaintiffs to continue using it; that plaintiffs were about to commence to grind their crop of
sugar cane, and that, if prevented from transporting their sugar across the Hacienda Toreno to their point of
embarcation, would suffer damages difficult to estimate. Upon these averments of fact plaintiffs prayed for a
judgment that they are entitled to use the road in question as they have been using in the past, and that a
perpetual injunction be issued against plaintiffs restraining them from impeding such use. Upon the filing of the
complaint, plaintiffs moved the court to issue a preliminary injunction restraining defendants from interfering with
the use of the road during the pendency of the suit, which motion was granted by the court.
Defendants in their answer put in issue all the special averments of the complaint, as above set forth, and by way
of counterclaim and special defense, averred that the road crossing the Hacienda Toreno, over which plaintiffs
claim the right of passage, is the private property of defendants; and, further, that they have not refused plaintiffs
permission to pass over this road but have required them to pay toll for the privilege of doing so. Defendants also
claimed damages for the use of the road by plaintiffs during the pendency of the suit, alleging that the
preliminary injunction had been improvidently issued upon false statements contained in the verified complaint
filed by plaintiffs.

The case was tried in July, 1913. The court on December 8, 1913, rendered judgment, dismissing the complaint
with respect to the plaintiffs Felix Suarez, Probo Jereza, Enrique Azcona, and Melecio Pido, these being the
plaintiffs who claimed the right to use the Dacuman-Toreno road. With respect to the Nanca-Victorias road, the
court held that it was a public highway over which the public had acquired a right of use of immemorial
prescription, and ordered the issuance of a perpetual injunction against plaintiffs, restraining them from
interfering in any manner with the use of the said road.
The
conclusion
of
the
court with respect
to
the
facts affecting
the
NancaVictorias road are as follows:
"Turning to a consideration of the evidence relative to the Nanca-Victorias road we find incontestable proof that it
has been in existence for at least forty years. That the hacenderos located in the southwestern section of Victorias
and the public generally passed over it freely and that it was used for all purposes of transportation of farm
produce, animals, etc. and by pedestrians as well as carromatas and other conveyances without break or
interruption until two or three years ago when the defendants announced that the road was private and that those
who wished to pass over it with sugar carts would be obliged to pay as toll of ten centavos-all-other vehicles, it
appears, were permitted to pass free of charge. This arrangement seems to have existed during the years of 1911
and 1912 and part of 1913, the money being collected apparently from some hacenderos and not from others.
There is some reason to believe from the evidence presented by defendants themselves that the practice of
making these payments to hacienda 'Toreno' originated in an attempt to raise a fund for the repair of the road.
There is no evidence that any other hacenderos between Nanca and Victorias or any other person made any
attempt to close the road or to collect toll. On the contrary the road appears to have been repaired by the
hacenderos when it needed repairing and everyone used it on equal terms until the defendants in 1910 or 1911
interposed the objection that the road in dispute was private. This we think is a fair deduction from the evidence
and although it is asserted that toll was collected at an earlier date by the late Leon Montinola, brother of the
defendant Ruperto Montinola, there is no tangible evidence that this was so and all the circumstances are strongly
indicative of the fact that toll has been paid only during the years of 1911, 1912, and part of 1913."
The request presented by the assignment of error are in effect:
(a)
Is the Nanca-Victorias road at the point at which it traverses the Hacienda Toreno a public highway or not?
(b)
If it be held that the road in question is not a public highway, have plaintiff proven their acquisition of an
easement of way over the Hacienda Toreno at the point traversed by the road in question?
The trial judge, in holding that the road in question is public, bases his conclusion upon the fact, which he deems
to have been proven, that the road has been in existence "from time immemorial," and had been "continuously
used as a public road . . . and open to public as such for thirty or forty years . . . until . . . the defendants
undertook to claim it as private and to collect toll for the passage of carts." (Bill of Exceptions, p. 56.) There is no
doubt that for he past thirty or forty years a road has existed between the former site of the town of Victorias and
the barrio of Nanca, of the municipality of Saravia, and that road crosses defendants' hacienda. It is also true that
during this period the plaintiffs and their predecessors in the ownership of the hacienda now held by them have
made use of this road for the purpose of going and coming from their haciendas to the town of Victorias; but the
question is whether this use was limited to the plaintiffs, and their tenants and employees, or whether it was, as
held by the lower court, a use enjoyed by the public in general. Plaintiffs produced only two witnesses, Segundo
de Leon (stet. notes, pp. 21-22) and Eduardo Cuaycong, (stet. notes, pp. 27-33) to testify as regards the use of the
Nanca-Victorias road. Several other witnesses testified on behalf of plaintiffs, but their testimony relates to the
Dacuman-Toreno road, which is not involved in this appeal. We have carefully read the testimony of the witnesses
Leon and Cuaycong, given upon their direct and cross examination, but we have been unable to find that either of
them has testified that the road in question was ever used by the public in general. These witnesses testified with
regard to the use of the road by the present and former owners and occupants of the estates of Bacayan,
Esperanza, Alacaigan, Pusot, and Dolores for the transportation of the products of these estates to the town of
Victorias, and of supplies and agricultural implements from Victorias to the haciendas, but neither of them
testified expressly that any other use had been made of said road. Nevertheless, it may be reasonably inferred
from the testimony of these witnesses that all persons having occasion to travel between Victorias and the
haciendas of Bacayan, Esperanza, Alacaigan, Pusot, and Dolores, whether or not they were owners, tenants, or
employees of said estates, made use of the road now in dispute, crossing the Hacienda Toreno, and to this limited
extent it may be said that the public made use of the road, but there is nothing in the evidence to indicate that
the so-called public use extended beyond this.
Apart from the fact that there is no direct evidence to support the finding of the court concerning the general
public use of the road in dispute, the record contains data strongly tending to show that when the complaint was
filed plaintiffs did content that the road was a public highway, but merely contended that they had acquired by
prescription an easement of way across the Hacienda Toreno. For example, the action is entitled an "action
concerning a right of way." (Bill of Exceptions, pp. 64 and 65.) It is not averred in the complaint averred in the
complaint that the road in question was used by the public. On the contrary, it is averred that it was used by the
plaintiffs and their predecessors. The averment in paragraph 8 of the complaint that the plaintiff have no other
"outlet to a public road" than that which they have been accustomed to use by going to the town of Victorias also
shows that when they commenced this action they had in mind the provisions of articles 564, et seq. of the Civil
Code, which relate to the method of establishing the compulsory easement of way. The owners of an existing
easement, as well as those whose properties are adjacent with a public road, have no occasion to invoke these
provisions of the Code, which relate to the creation of new rights, and not the enforcement of rights already in
existence.
It is true that in the opening statement made to the court, counsel for plaintiffs, who was not the same attorney
by whom the complaint was signed, stated that plaintiffs contend that the road in question is public, but as no
evidence was introduced tending to establish this contention concerning the Nanca-Victorias road, counsel for
defendants had no occasion to object upon the ground that such testimony was not relevant to the averments of
the complaint. No evidence was taken to indicate that at any time since the road in question has been in
existence any part of the expense of its upkeep has been defrayed by the general government, the province, or
the municipality. The trial judge said upon this subject:
"It is also true whatever repairs were made on the road were made irregularly. The municipality of Victorias had no
funds to devote to the construction and repair of road, and the upkeep of the road depending entirely therefore on

the initiative of the persons who used it, was attended to only at such times as repairs were absolutely
necessary." (Bill of Exceptions, p. 49.)
The court also held that appears from the government grant issued in 1885 to the original owner of the hacienda
adjacent to the Hacienda Toreno on its western boundary, that the Nanca-Victorias road at that time separated
that estate from the Jalbuena Hacienda, and that these facts constitute "circumstantial evidence that the
document to which the court refers, and we agree that the road in question existed in 1885; but we do not believe
that the document in question proves that the said road was a public highway.
Another circumstance established by the evidence, and which is of some importance in the determination of this
issue, is that although the defendants closed the Nanca-Victorias road in the month of February, 1911, and since
that time have collected toll from persons passing over it with carts loaded with sugar, including those belonging
to several of the plaintiffs, nothing was done by them to prevent the continuation of this commenced. It is natural
to assume that if plaintiffs and considered that the road in question was public, they would have protested
immediately against the action of the defendants, and would have either commenced a civil action, as they
subsequently did, or would have brought about a prosecution under section 16 of Act No. 1511.
Upon the evidence taken and admission contained in the pleadings and those made during the course of the trial
we consider that the following findings are warranted:
1.
The town of Victorias has always been the shipping point of the products of the Hacienda Toreno, and of
the haciendas of appellees, as we place from which supplies were brought to those properties.
2.
For thirty or forty years before the commencement of the suit a wagon road, herein called the NancaVictorias road, has been in existence, connecting the haciendas of appellees with the town of Victorias, and this
road traverses the property of defendants. Since the removal of the town of Victorias to a new site the NancaVictorias road has been used by appellees in travelling between their properties and the provincial road which
crosses the Hacienda Toreno from east to west.
3.
No public funds have at any time been expanded on the construction or upkeep of the Nanca-Victorias
road, but from time to time work has been done on it by the laborers employed by the present and former owners
of the Hacienda Toreno and the haciendas owned by the appellees and their predecessors in title.
4.
The Nanca-Victorias wagon road, including that part of it which crosses the Hacienda Toreno, has for thirtyfive or forty years been used by the appellees and their predecessors in title for the transportation, by the usual
means, of the products of their estates to their shipping points in or near the town of Victorias, and the
transportation to their estates of all supplies required by them, and has been used by all persons having occasion
to travel to and from all or any of the estates now owned by the appellees.
5.
The use of the Nanca-Victorias road in the manner and by the persons above mentioned was permitted
without objection by the owners of the Hacienda Toreno until the year 1911, when they closed it, and began
charging a toll of 5 centavos for each cart which passed over the road, including carts belonging to the appellants,
until restrained from continuing to do so by the preliminary injunction granted in this case.
6.
The Nanca-Victorias road constitutes the only outlet from the estates of appellants to the nearest public
road which is the provincial road which crosses the Hacienda Toreno from east to west.
Upon these facts the questions of law to be decided are:
(a)
Is the Nanca-Victorias road a public highway?
(b)
If the Nanca-Victorias road, or that part of it which crosses the Hacienda Toreno, is not a public highway, is
it subject to a private easement of way in favor of the appellees?
The defendants are the owners of the Hacienda Toreno under a Torrens title issued in accordance with the Land
Registration Act, conferring to them its absolute ownership, subject only to the limitations of paragraph four of
section 39 of said Act. It is admitted that there is no annotation on the certificate of title regarding the road here
in question, either as a "public road" or a a "private way established by law" and, therefore, the questions
presented by this appeal are to be determined precisely as they would be had the Hacienda Toreno not been
brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act. The plaintiffs being the owners of the property in
question, the presumption of law is that it is free from any lien or encumbrance whatever, and the burden
therefore rests upon plaintiffs to establish the contrary. As this court said in the case of Fabie vs. Lichauco and the
children of Francisco L. Roxas (11 Phil. Rep., 14):
"It is a settled doctrine of law that a property is assumed to be free from all encumbrance unless the contrary is
proved."
There is admittedly no evidence to show that the land occupied by the road here in question was at any time
conveyed to the general government or any of its political subdivisions by the presents or any of the former
owners of the Hacienda Toreno. There is no evidence, even remotely, tending to show that the road existed prior
to the time when the property now known as the Hacienda Toreno passed from the State into private ownership.
The record fails to disclose any evidence whatever tending to show that the Government has at any time asserted
any right or title in or to the land occupied by the road, or that it has incurred any expense whatever in its upkeep
or construction. The Civil Code defines as public roads those which are constructed by the State (art. 339), and a
provincial and town roads those " the expense of which is borne by such towns or provinces." (Civil Code, art.
344.) While it is not contended that this definition is exclusive, it does show that during the Spanish regime, under
normal conditions, roads which were public were maintained at the public expense, and that the fact that at no
time was any expense incurred by the Government with respect to the road here in question tends strongly to
support the contention of the defendants that it is private way.
During the Spanish regime the law required each able bodied citizen not within one of the exempted classes to
work a certain number of days in each year, his labor to be devoted to "services of general utility" to the
municipality of his residence. (Royal Decree of July 11, 1883, Art. 5.) Under this Decree and the Regulations for its
enforcement (Berriz, vol. 11, 258) the greater part of the work on the public roads of the Islands was
accomplished. Had the road here in question been a public way, it is reasonable to assume that the polistas of the
town of Victorias would have been employed in maintaining it. It is most significant that no mention is made in the
testimony of the plaintiffs' witnesses of any work of this character having been done on the road at any time,
particularly in view of the fact that their attention was drawn to this point. (Stet. notes, pp. 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, and
14.)
The evidence shows that the repairs were made by the owners of the estates benefited by the road, and by their
laborers, as a purely voluntary act for their own convenience and interest. There being no evidence of a direct

grant to the government of the land occupied by the road in question or that any Government funds or labor were
expended upon it, the question presents itself whether the use to which the road has been put was such as to
justify the conclusion of the lower court that it has become public property. There being no evidence that the
original use of the road by plaintiffs' predecessors was based upon any express grant of the fee to the road or of
an easement of way, or that it began under the assertion of a right on their part, the presumption must be that
the origin of the use was the mere tolerance or license of the owners of the estates affected.
This being so, has that merely permissive use been converted into a title vested in the public at large, or in the
plaintiffs by reason of their ownership of the land beneficially affected by the use?
Had it been shown that the road had been maintained at the public expense, with the acquiescence of the owners
of the estates crossed by it, this would indicate such adverse possession by the government as in course of time
would ripen into title or warrant the presumption of a grant or of a dedication. But in this case there is no such
evidence, and the claims of plaintiffs, whether regarded as members of the public asserting a right to use the
road as such, or as persons claiming a private easement of way over the land of another must be regarded as
resting upon the mere fact of user.
If the owner of a tract of land, to accommodate his neighbors or the public in general, permits them to across his
property, it is reasonable to suppose that it is not his intention, in so doing, to divest himself of the ownership of
the land so used, or to establish an easement upon it, and that the persons to whom such permission, tacit or
express, is granted, do not regard their privilege of use as being based upon anything more than the mere
tolerance of the owner. Clearly, such permissive use is in its
inception based upon an essentially revocable license. If the use continues for a long period of time, no change
being made in the relations of the parties by any express or implied agreement, does the owner of the property
affected lose his right of revocation? Or, putting the same question in another form, does the mere permissive use
ripen into title by prescription?
It is a fundamental principle of the law in this jurisdiction concerning the possession of real property that such
possession is not affected by acts of a possessory character which are "merely tolerated" by the possessor, or
which are due to his license (Civil Code, arts. 444 and 1942). This principle is applicable not only with respect to
the prescription of the dominium as a whole, but, to the prescription of right in rem. In the case of Cortes vs.
Palanca Yu-Tibo (2 Phil. Rep., 24, 38), the Court said:
"The provision of article 1942 of the Civil Code to the effect that acts which are merely tolerated produce no effect
with respect to possession is applicable as much to the prescription of real rights as to the prescription of the fee,
it being a glaring and self-evident error to affirm the contrary, as does the appellant in his motion papers.
Possession is the fundamental basis of the prescription. Without it no kind of prescription is possible, not even the
extraordinary. Consequently, if acts of mere tolerance produce no effect respect to possession, at that article
provides, in conformity with article 444 of the same Code, it is evident that they can produce no effect with
respect to prescription, whether the prescriptive acquisition be of a fee or of real rights, for the same reason holds
in one and the other case; that is, that there has been no true possession in the legal sense of the word." (See
also Ayala de Roxas vs. Maglonso, 8 Phil. Rep., 745; Municipality of Caceres vs. Director of Lands and Roman
Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 24 Phil. Rep., 485.)
Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under
claim of title (en concepto de dueo), to use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of
possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en concepto de
dueo, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start the running of the period of
prescription.
A similar question was presented in the case of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Roxas (22 Phil. Rep.,
450), in which case it appeared that Roxas, the owner of the Hacienda de San Pedro Macati, claimed a right of
way across the property of the church to Calle Tejeron, a public street of the town of San Pedro Macati. The proof
showed that the road in question had been used by the tenants of the Hacienda de San Pedro Macati for the
passage of carts in coming and leaving the hacienda "from time immemorial," and further that the road had been
used for time out of mind, not only by the tenants of the hacienda but by many other people in going and coming
from a church half-way between the boundary line of the hacienda and Calle Tejeron. The court held that the facts
did not give rise to a perspective right of easement in favor of the owner of the hacienda, upon the ground that
such use "is to be regarded as permissive and under an implied license, and not adverse. Such a use is not
inconsistent with the only use which the proprietor thought fit to make of the land, and until the appellee thinks
proper to enclose it, such use is not adverse and will not preclude it from enclosing the land when other views of
its interest render it proper to do so. And though an adjacent proprietor may make such use of the open land more
frequently than another, yet the same rule will apply unless there be some decisive act indicating a separate and
exclusive use under a claim of right. A different doctrine would have a tendency to destroy all neighborhood
accommodations in the way of travel; for if it were once understood that a man, by allowing his neighbor to pass
through his farm without objection over the pass-away which he used himself, would thereby, after the lapse of
time, confer a right on such neighbor to require the pass-way to be kept open for his benefit and enjoyment, a
prohibition against all such travel would immediately ensue."
The decisions of the supreme court of Louisiana, a State whose jurisdiction is based, as is our own, upon the
Roman Law, and whose Civil Code is taken, as is our own, very largely from the Code of Napoleon, are particularly
persuasive in matters of this character. In the case of Torres vs. Fargoust (37 La. Ann., 497), cited by appellants in
their brief, in which the issues were very similar to those of the present case, the court held that
"The mere fact that for thirty or forty years the public was permitted to pass over this ground would not of itself
constitute the place a locus publicus . . . dedication must be shown by evidence so conclusive as to exclude all
idea of private ownership; . . . such dedication can not be inferred from mere user alone; . . . no one is presumed
to give away his property. The burden is on him who avers a divestiture of ownership to prove it clearly.'
We are, therefore, of the opinion, and so hold, that upon the facts established by the evidence it does not appear
that the road in question is a public road or way. We are also of the opinion that plaintiff have failed to show that
they have acquired by prescription a private right of passage over the lands of defendants. The supreme court of
Spain has decided that under the law in force before the enactment of decided that under the law in force before
the enactment of the Civil Code, the easement of way was discontinuous, and that while such an easement might
be acquired by prescription, it must be used in good faith, in the belief of the existence of the right, and such user

must have been continuous from time immemorial. (Judgment of December 15, 1882.) In the appealed decision
the court below says that the plaintiff and their predecessors made use of the road in question "from time
immemorial," but there is no evidence whatever in the record to support this finding, although it is true that the
evidence shows the existence of the road and its use by the plaintiffs and their predecessors for thirty-five or forty
years. Speaking of the evidence required under the present Code of Civil Procedure to show immemorial use of an
easement, this court said in the case of Ayala de Roxas vs. Case (8 Phil. Rep., 197, 198):
"The third Partida in title 31, law 15 . . . says that discontinuous servitudes . . . must be proved by usage or a term
so long that men can not remember its commencement. . . . In many judgments the supreme court of Spain has
refused to accept proof of any definite number of years as a satisfaction of this requirement of the law . . . We are
of the opinion that in order to establish a right of prescription [title of prescription based upon use from time
immemorial] something more is required than the memory of living witnesses. Whether this something should be
the declaration of persons long dead, repeated by those who testify, as exacted by the Spanish law, or should be
the common reputation of ownership recognized by the Code of Procedure, it is unnecessary for us to decide. On
either theory the appellant has filed in this proof . . . "
The same thing may be said in this case. Witnesses has testified that they have known the road for a certain
period of years, beginning at a time prior to the enactment of the Civil Code, but no evidence has been made to
prove immemorial use by either of the means of proof mentioned in this decision cited, nor is immemorial user
averred in the complaint as the basis of the right. It is evident, therefore, that no vested right by user from
immemorial had been acquired by plaintiffs at the time the Civil Code took effect. Under that Code (art. 539) no
discontinuous easement could be acquired by prescription in any event. Assuming, without deciding, that this rule
has been changed by the provisions of the present Code of Civil Procedure relating to prescription, and that since
its enactment discontinuous easement may be acquired by prescription, it is clear that this would not avail
plaintiffs. The Code of Civil Procedure went into effect on October 1, 1901. The term of prescription for the
acquisition of rights in real estate is fixed by the Code (sec. 41) at ten years. The evidence shows that in February,
1911, before the expiration of the term of ten years since the time the Code of Civil Procedure took effect, the
defendants interrupted the use of the road by plaintiffs by constructing and maintaining a toll gate on it and
collecting toll from persons making use of it with carts and continued preliminary injunction by the trial court in
December, 1912. Our conclusion is, therefore, that plaintiffs have not acquired by prescription a right to an
easement of way over the defendants' property; that their use of the Nanca-Victorias road across the Hacienda
Toreno was due merely to the tacit license and tolerance of the defendants and their predecessors in title; that the
license was essentially revocable; and that, therefore, the defendants were within their rights when they closed
the road in 1911.
While in the allegation from plaintiffs' complaint it might be inferred that it was their purpose to seek to impose
upon defendants the easement to which arts. 564 et seq. of the Civil Code relate, that purpose was evidently
abandoned, and the case was tried upon a wholly different theory. Proof was offered to show that the right of
passage across defendants' land is necessary to enable plaintiffs to get their products to market, but there was no
offer on their part to pay defendants the indemnity required by section 564.
For the reasons stated the judgment of the court below is reversed, the injunction issued against defendants is
dissolved, and the action is dismissed. No costs will be allowed on this appeal. So ordered
G.R. No. 112519. November 14, 1996.]
CATHOLIC BISHOP OF BALANGA, represented by CRISPULO TORRICO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and AMANDO DE LEON, respondents
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J p:
It is the cardinal principle in Land Registration that a torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible. Considering
that private respondent in this case, by himself and through his predecessor-in-interest, had been in
uninterrupted, open and adverse possession of a portion of the land covered by said title for 49 years, by virtue of
a duly accepted donation, although unregistered, will private respondent, under this circumstance, prevail over
the titled owner?
Thus, we have before us this petition for review of a decision 1(1) of the Court of Appeals 2(2) reversing the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) 3(3) which rendered judgment 4(4) in favor of petitioner and ordered private respondent
to vacate the subject property and surrender possession thereof to petitioner and to pay rent from the finality of
the RTC judgment until the said property is actually vacated.
We quote, as the herein parties have done so in their pleadings, the following narration of facts rendered by the
respondent appellate court:
"The parties do not dispute that the Roman Catholic Archbishop [sic] of Manila was the owner of a parcel of land
(Lot No. 1272, Balanga Cadastre) situated in the Barrio of Puerto Rivas, Municipality of Balanga, Bataan, having an
area of 3,368 sq. m. more or less covered by OCT No. 14379 of the Registry of Deeds for the province of Bataan.
With respect to its rights over its properties in Bataan (inclusive of Lot No. 1272), the said church was succeeded
by the Roman Catholic Bishop of San Fernando, Pampanga which was, likewise, succeeded by . . . Catholic Bishop
of Balanga registered as a corporation on 15 December 1975.
Prior thereto, or on 23 August 1936, by virtue of the authority given him by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila to donate a portion of Lot No. 1272, the then parish priest and administrator of all the properties of the
said church in the Municipality of Balanga, Bataan, Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili, executed an Escritura De Donacion
donating an area of 12.40 meters by 21.40 meters or 265.36 sq. m (the subject property) of Lot No. 1272 to Ana
de los Reyes and her heirs, as a reward for her long and satisfactory service to the church Her acceptance of the
donation, as well as her possession of the subject property, is indicated in the deed of donation, which deed, for
unknown reasons, was refused registration by the Register of Deed Six (6) years later, or in 1939, Ana de los
Reyes died without issue.
Nevertheless, before her death, she had given the subject property to her
nephew who had been living with her, the herein defendant-appellant [private respondent]. The latter
immediately took possession of the property in the concept of owner, built his house thereon and, through the
years, declared the land for taxation purposes as well as paid the taxes due thereon.

His possession of the subject property was never disturbed by anybody until plaintiff-appellee [petitioner] filed the
instant complaint against him on 5 November 1985, or more than 49 years after the deed of donation was
executed, alleging, among others, that: (1) during the Japanese occupation of the country, dependant-appellant
[private respondent], without the knowledge and prior consent of the plaintiff-appellee [petitioner], and its
predecessors-in-interest, entered and occupied the subject property, and (2) despite requests by plaintiff-appellee
[petitioner], defendant-appellant [private respondent] refused to vacate the property in question. In support of the
above contention, Crispulo Torrico, the sole witness and authorized representative of plaintiff-appellee [petitioner]
testified, among others, that: the subject property is situated at the corner of Lot No. 1272, and defendantappellant [private respondent] has, on the strength of the deed of donation, publicly claimed ownership and
occupied the same as early as before the 2nd World War and has built his store thereon.
As his defense, defendant-appellant [private respondent] maintains that by virtue of the deed of donation of 23
August 1936 executed in favor of his predecessor-in-interest, he is the lawful owner of the subject property and
the complaint states no cause of action as it was filed only to harass him.
xxx
xxx
xxx
On 27 and 30 October 1986, 10 months after he filed his answer on 10 December 1985 and almost 3 months after
plaintiff-appellee [petitioner] rested its case . . . defendant-appellant [private respondent] filed his motions [sic] to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that . . . the instant action is barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffappellee [petitioner] filed on 3 November 1986 its opposition to the motion alleging that the defense of
prescription was not raised in a timely filed motion to dismiss, and as an affirmative defense in the answer. . .
On 13 November 1989 the lower court rendered the judgment . . . It opined that, since: (1) defendant-appellant
[private respondent] failed to present the necessary power of attorney executed by the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila giving Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili the authority to execute the deed of donation; (2) the first 2
paragraphs of the Excritura de Donacion indicates that the parish priest . . . was only the administrator of all,
hence, had no authority to dispose in whatever manner any of the properties of the Roman Catholic Church of
Balanga, Bataan; (3) the parish priest was not a corporation sole and registered owner of Lot No. 1272; and, (4) he
did not, in his own behalf or that of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, secure any prior leave of court to
donate a portion of Lot No. 1272 in consonance with Sec. 159 of the old Corporation Code . . . Rev. Fr. Mariano
Sarili was not authorized to, and could not validly, donate the subject lot. Thus, the deed of donation he executed
is unenforceable under Art. 1403 of the New Civil Code and defendant-appellant [private respondent], as well as
his predecessor-in-interest, never acquired ownership of the subject property. " 5(5)
The court a quo having rendered judgment against private respondent, the latter lost no time in bringing the case
to the respondent Court of Appeals for review
"In his appeal, defendant-appellant [private respondent] contend[ed] that the lower court erred in not ruling on
the issue of prescription which he raised in his amended answer and motion to dismiss. The thrust of his
argument [was] that, since the instant case [was] basically and fundamentally a suit for the recovery of
possession of a real property and the complaint was filed . . . more than 49 years after the deed of donation was
executed . . . the instant action should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription . . . " 6(6)
Respondent court is in agreement with private respondent's insistence that the defense of prescription is not
deemed waived when prescription is apparent from the allegations in the complaint, citing this court's ruling in
the cases of Gicano vs.
Gegato, 7(7) Garcia vs. Mathis, 8(8) and PNB vs. Pacific Commission House. 9(9) But respondent court also stated
that private respondent could not have acquired ownership over the subject property through acquisitive
prescription because the same having been duly registered under the Torrens system, title thereto was
indefeasible.
Nonetheless, respondent Court of Appeals ultimately ruled that under the doctrine of laches, the consequence of
petitioner's inaction for 49 years since the execution of the deed of donation, despite its apparently undeniable
knowledge of private respondent's adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the subject property in the
concept of an owner from 1936 to the institution of the recovery suit in 1985, is that it has lost its rights to the
subject property and can no longer recover the same due to its own inexcusable negligence and grave lack of
vigilance in protecting its rights over a tremendously long period of time. In the words of the respondent court:
". . . He [private respondent] and his predecessor-in-interest have been in adverse, peaceful and continuous
possession of the subject property in the concept of owners since the execution of the deed of donation on 23
August 1936 and were never ousted therefrom by plaintiff-appellee's [petitioner's] predecessors-in-interest. It was
not until almost 5 decades later or on 5 November 1985 that plaintiff-appellee [petitioner] instituted the instant
action. The inaction for almost half a century now bars plaintiff-appellee [petitioner] from recovering the land in
question on the equitable principles of laches, which is defined as 'such neglect or omission to assert a right taken
in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party as will
operate as a bar in equity.' Registered lands may not be acquired by prescription but the same can be lost or
acquired by Laches. [citing Lola vs. CA, 145 SCRA 439] Plaintiff-appellee [petitioner] has lost, while defendantappellant [private respondent] has acquired, the subject property by laches. " 10(10)
Now aggrieved by the aforecited decision of the respondent Court of Appeals, petitioner comes before us mainly
claiming that it was contrary to the law and settled jurisprudence for the respondent court to have applied the
doctrine of laches in the instant case and to have considered a mere administrator as authorized to donate one of
the properties under administration.
Petitioner's asseverations are devoid of merit.
First, petitioner postulates that the respondent Court of Appeals should not have, in the first place, applied the
doctrine of laches in the instant controversy because private respondent did not assign the same as an error on
appeal.
True, the appealing party is legally required to indicate in his brief an assignment of errors, 11(11) and only those
assigned shall be considered by the appellate court in deciding the case. 12(12) However, equally settled in
jurisprudence is the exception to this general rule.
". . . Roscoe Pound states that 'according to Ulpian in Justinian's Digest, appeals are necessary to correct the
unfairness or unskillfulness of whose who judge." Pound comments that 'the purpose of review is prevention quite
as much as correction of mistakes. The possibility of review by another tribunal, especially a bench of judges . . .
is an important check upon tribunals of first instance. It is a preventive of unfairness. It is also a stimulus to care
and thoroughness as not to make mistakes. " Pound adds that 'review involves matters of concern both to the

parties to the case and to the public . . . . It is of public concern that full justice be done to [e]very one. " This
judicial injunction would best be fulfilled and the interest of full justice would best be served if it should be
maintained that . . . appeal brings before the reviewing court the totality of the controversy resolved in the
questioned judgment and order apart from the fact that such full-scale review by appeal is expressly granted as a
matter of right and therefore of due process by the Rules of Court. " 13(13)
Guided by the foregoing precepts, we have ruled in a number of cases that the appellate court is accorded a
broad discretionary power to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned.
14(14) It is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal.
15(15) Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals may consider grounds other than those touched upon in the decision of
the trial court and uphold the same on the basis of such other grounds, 16(16) the Court of Appeals may, with no
less authority, reverse the decision of the trial court on the basis of grounds other than those raised as errors on
appeal. We have applied this rule, as a matter of exception, in the following instances:
(1)
Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the
subject matter; 17(17)
(2)
Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of
law; 18(18)
(3)
Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just
decision and complete resolution of the case 19(19) or to serve the interest of justice 20(20) or to avoid
dispensing piecemeal justice; 21(21)
(4)
Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record
having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;
22(22)
(5)
Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an
error assigned; 23(23) and
(6)
Matters
not
assigned
as
errors on
appeal but
upon which the
determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent. 24(24)
The instant controversy falls squarely under the exception to the general rule that only assigned errors may be
passed upon by the appellate court. A just, fair and complete resolution of the present case necessitates the
consideration and the application of the doctrine of laches which is not the same as but is undoubtedly closely
related to, the issue of prescription which was properly raised by private respondent before the respondent Court
of Appeals.
Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or
declined to assert it. 25(25) It has also been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right taken in
conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate
as a bar in equity.
26(26)
The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping
upon one's right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable
situation. 27(27) As an equitable defense, laches does not concern itself with the character of the defendant's
title, but only with whether or not by reason of the plaintiff's long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should be
barred from asserting this claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust to the
defendant. 28(28)
"The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace
of society, the discouragement of stale claims and . . . is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of
permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. " 29(29)
The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will be denied to a litigant whose claim or demand
has become "stale", or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable length of time, or who has not been vigilant or
who has slept on his rights either by negligence, folly or inattention. 30(30) In other words, public policy requires,
for the peace of society, the discouragement of claims grown stale for non-assertion; thus laches is an
impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right which has become, under the circumstances, inequitable or
unfair to permit. 31(31)
The following are the essential elements of laches:
(1)
Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he
claims, giving rise to the situation complained of;
(2)
Delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he has
an opportunity to sue;
(3)
Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on
which he bases his suit; and
(4)
Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant. 32(32)
Under the present circumstances, all of the aforegoing elements are attendant in this case.
On or some time before August 23, 1936, Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili, the parish priest and administrator of the church
property in the Municipality of Balanga, Bataan, executed a deed of donation over a 265-square meter church lot
in favor of Ana de los Reyes and her heirs in recognition of her long and satisfactory service to the church of
Balanga, Bataan. For some reason or another, the said deed was refused registration by the Register of Deeds.
However, she accepted the donation, indicated such acceptance in the said deed, occupied the donated property,
and exercised acts of ownership thereupon.
In 1945, the donee, Ana de los Reyes, died without issue. She had, however, given the subject property to her
nephew who is the private respondent in the instant case. Upon acceptance of the gift, private respondent
immediately took possession of the subject property in the concept of owner, built his house thereon, and
thenceforth paid land taxes therefor after declaring the subject property for that purpose.
The act of petitioner-defendant that culminated in the filing of the present action is thus clearly his occupation
since 1945 of the subject property in the concept of owner in continuation of the occupation of the same nature

regarding the same property by the donee Ana de los Reyes starting in 1936. Undoubtedly, the first element of
laches exists.
The second element also exists in this case. The second element is three-tiered: (a) knowledge of defendant's
action; (b) opportunity to sue defendant after obtaining such knowledge; and (c) delay in the filing of such suit.
Petitioner, in his complaint filed in the trial court, alleged that without its consent, private respondent entered and
occupied the subject property during the Second World War. By its own admission, therefore, petitioner was
clearly aware of private respondent's possession of the subject property in the concept of owner. Petitioner did not
also rebut the testimony of its own authorized representative and sole witness, one Crispulo Torrico, that the
subject property was so proximately located to the rest of petitioner's church property as to foreclose assertion of
ignorance of private respondent's possession of the subject property, on the part of petitioner.
From that time during the Second World War to 1985 when petitioner actually commenced suit against private
respondent, there was doubtlessly all the opportunity to file the appropriate action to have the donation of the
subject property to Ana de los Reyes and her heirs, declared null and void and to demand reconveyance of said
property from its present occupants.
Notwithstanding such opportunity available to petitioner, however, forty (40) years had to first pass by for
petitioner to finally institute the appropriate court proceedings. As such, the second element of knowledge,
opportunity to file suit, and delay in filing such suit, is undoubtedly present in the instant controversy.
The third element of laches is likewise present. There is nothing on the record that impresses us as clear evidence
of at least an inkling on the part of private respondent as to petitioner's serious intention to revoke the donated
property. There was neither a demand letter nor positive testimony of any person who actually informed private
respondent of petitioner's intentions. In other words, private respondent manifestly had every reason to believe
that, with the passing of almost half a century since his predecessor-in-interest accepted the donated property
and without unambiguous intimation of petitioner's non-recognition of such donation, he was secure in his
possession of the subject property in the concept of owner.
In the light of all the above, it goes without saying that private respondent will suffer irreparable injury under the
most unfair circumstances, were we to disregard petitioner's inaction for more than forty (40) years in asserting
its rights.
In applying the doctrine of laches, we had ruled that where a party allows the following number of years to lapse
from the emergence of his cause of action, before instituting court action to enforce his claim, such action would
be barred by the equitable defense of laches: 36 years; 33(33) 12 years; 34(34) 50 years; 35(35) 34 years; 36(36)
37 years; 37(37) 32 years; 38(38) 20 years; 39(39) 47 years; 40(40) 11 years; 41(41) 25 years; 42(42) 40 years;
43(43) 19 years; 44(44) 27 years; 45(45) 7 years; 46(46) 44 years; 47(47) 4 years 48(48) and 67 years 49(49) .
In this case, petitioner filed its complaint in court only after forty nine (49) years had lapsed since the donation in
its behalf of the subject property to private respondent's predecessor-in-interest. There is nary an explanation for
the long delay in the filing by petitioner of the complaint in the case at bench, and that inaction for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time constitutes laches. As such, petitioner cannot claim nullity of the
donation as an excuse to avoid the consequences of its own unjustified inaction and as a basis for the assertion of
a right on which they had slept for so long. 50(50) Courts cannot look with favor at parties who, by their silence,
delay
and inaction, knowingly induce another to spend time, effort, and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes
and making improvements thereon for an unreasonable period only to spring an ambush and claim title which the
possessor's efforts and the rise of land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at their own expense.
51(51) Considerable delay in asserting one's right before a court of justice is strongly persuasive of the lack of
merit of his claim, since it is human nature for a person to enforce his right when same is threatened or invaded;
thus, it can also be said that petitioner is estopped by laches from questioning private respondent's ownership of
the subject property. 52(52) At any rate, petitioner's right to recover the possession of the subject property from
private respondent has, by the latter's long period of possession and by petitioner's inaction and neglect, been
converted into a stale demand. Such passivity in the face of what might have given rise to an action in court is
visited with the loss of such right, and ignorance resulting from inexcusable negligence does not suffice to explain
such failure to file seasonably the necessary suit. 53(53)
Finally, we agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that, while petitioner is admittedly still the registered
owner of the donated property, and jurisprudence is settled as to the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of a
Torrens Title, there is equally an abundance of cases in the annals of our jurisprudence where we categorically
ruled that a registered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason
of laches. 54(54)
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 66555. March 7, 1996.]
SPOUSES LEONCIO MEJARES and EPIFANIA LARUMBE, petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN Y. REYES, in his official capacity as
Presiding Judge, RTC-Cebu, Branch XIV, and MANUEL ADARNA, respondents
PANGANIBAN, J p:
May a person who was initially allowed to build his house on a piece of agricultural land not belonging to him be
held criminally liable for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law (P.D. 772) for refusing to vacate said property despite
the landowner's subsequent demand for him to leave as the latter needed the land himself? This is the main issue
resolved in this Petition for certiorari to set aside a judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, Branch XIV, in Criminal Case No. CU-4971 dated December 10, 1982.
The case was transferred by the Second Division to the Third Division on October 23, 1995. After due consultation
and deliberation on the Petition, Comment by the Solicitor General, Memoranda of the petitioners, the Solicitor
General and the private respondents, and other submissions by the parties, the Court assigned the writing of this
Decision to the undersigned ponente.
The Facts

On April 21, 1978, respondent Manuel Adarna purchased Cadastral Lot No. 7-B, located at Tulay, Minglanilla, Cebu,
from Vidal Zafra, who in turn had acquired it from Escolastico Canizares. The latter and his wife acquired the lot in
1956 through sale application duly approved by the Bureau of Lands for residential and agricultural purposes.
But even before respondent Adarna became owner of the property in April, 1978, petitioners had already been
occupying a portion thereof, upon which they had built their house, by tolerance of the previous owner. Although
respondent Adarna had served notice on petitioners to move out, upon their plea, he allowed them to continue
staying on the property without payment of rental provided they will vacate the same and remove their house
therefrom when the time comes that he (respondent Adarna) will need the land. 1(1)
In May, 1979, respondent Adarna notified petitioners that he needed the lot. Since petitioners refused to vacate,
respondent Adarna brought a criminal complaint for squatting against the petitioners.
On September 28, 1979, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu 2(2) filed an Information charging petitioners with
violating Presidential Decree No. 772, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law, as follows: 3(3)
"That within the period prior to and after April 21, 1978, the above named accused did, them (sic), and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in occupying or possessing for residential and other purposes a portion
of a parcel of land covered by Certificate of Title No. 7-B situated in Barangay Tulay, Municipality of Minglanilla,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, owned by Manuel Adarna and
Esperanza Adlawan of Tulay, Minglanilla, Cebu, by taking advantage of the tolerance of the latter and against the
will of the complainant (sic).
"In violation of Presidential Decree No. 772." (Emphasis supplied)
After the prosecution had rested its case on August 13, 1980, 4(4) the case was set for hearing on September 12,
1980 for the defense to present its evidence. On said date, upon motion of the defense, the hearing was
postponed to October 30 and 31, 1980. But on October 29, petitioners thru counsel filed a motion for
postponement, which motion was objected to by the prosecution. The trial court sustained the prosecution's
contention and considered the defendants as having waived their rights to present evidence, and thus the case
was deemed submitted for decision.
On
December
10,
1982, without
any evidence having been presented
by
petitioners, respondent Judge rendered judgment convicting them, as follows: 5(5)
"WHEREFORE, the accused are sentenced to pay a fine of P1,000.00 and the costs, with subsidiary imprisonment
(sic) in case of insolvency, and to remove their house from the land of Manuel S. Adarna, located at Tulay, Bo.
Tungkop, Minglanilla, Cebu."
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge for lack of merit, in these words: 6(6)
"The ruling of the Supreme Court in People vs. Hon Vicente B. Echavez (sic), L-47757-61, January 28, 1980, is
inapplicable to the instant case. In the Echavez (sic) case, it has been shown that the land involved is a pasture
land, while in this case, there is evidence to show that the land is residential, certainly not a pasture land.
Besides, the defense concedes that the land involved in this case is a residential land titled in the name of Manuel
Adarna issued in his name (sic) which sprang from a sales application presented way back in the year 1956
situated in Minglanilla, Cebu, a thickly populated municipality near Cebu City. Minglanilla, for all intents and
purposes, is within the urban area of Metro-Cebu."
On February 14, 1984, petitioners filed the instant Petition assailing the aforementioned Decision and Order of
respondent Judge allegedly for being contrary to law and jurisprudence and for having been rendered with grave
abuse of discretion, in excess of or without jurisdiction. 7(7)
In his Comment and Memorandum, the Solicitor General joined petitioner's prayer for the granting of the Petition.
On March 14, 1984, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from removing the
petitioners house from the land in question. 8(8)
The Issues
Before this Court, petitioners cited the following errors allegedly committed by the court a quo: 9(9)
"1. Accused did not wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in occupying or possessing for residential
purposes a portion of complainant's land by taking advantage of the tolerance of the latter and against his will,
within the period prior to and after April 21, 1978;
"2. As enunciated in 'People vs. Echavez (sic), L-47757-61, January 28, 1980', P.D. 772 does not apply to pasture
lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more
particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals."
Before we resolve the substantial issues, we noted that in his Memorandum, private respondent Adarna assailed
petitioner's choice of remedy, alleging that certiorari cannot substitute for lost appeal, and contending further
that, assuming that the remedy of a special civil action for certiorari be the proper remedy, still, the instant
petition was not filed within a reasonable period. 10(10) The said Decision dated March 2, 1983 was promulgated,
according to private respondent, on March 2, 1983, while this Petition was filed only on February 14, 1984.
In fine, the issues are: (1) whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this petition under Rule 65; (2) whether
petitioners dispossessed respondent Adarna of the lot "against his will"; and (3) whether the use as residence of
an agricultural property, located in a rural not urban community may be considered a violation of the AntiSquatting Law (P.D. 772).
The First Issue: Jurisdiction
On the question of whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition, we rule in the affirmative,
and treat this case as falling within the exception to the general rule governing petitions for certiorari. In Luna vs.
Court of Appeals, 11(11) this Court held:
". . . Technicalities should be disregarded if only to render to the respective parties that which is their due. Thus,
although We have said that certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lapsed appeal, We have, time and again,
likewise held that where a rigid application of that rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the
rule may be relaxed. Hence, considering the broader and primordial interests of justice, particularly when there is
grave abuse of discretion, thus impelling occasional departure from the general rule that the extraordinary writ of
certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal, respondent appellate court may legally entertain the special civil
action for certiorari."
In the instant case, certiorari is the only remedy available. Otherwise, a wrongful conviction of an innocent man
and woman would be tolerated by a literal adherence to procedural niceties.
The Second Issue: Dispossession

To resolve the second issue, it is necessary to consider carefully the purposes and specific provisions of P.D. 772:
"WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2,
1972, directing the Secretaries of National Defense, Public Works and Communications, Social Welfare and the
Director of Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation
Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City and District Engineers, 'to remove all illegal constructions
including buildings on and along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without
permits on public and private property,' squatting is still a major problem in urban communities all over the
country:
WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully
occupying public and private lands belong to the affluent class;
WHEREFORE, there is a need to further intensify the government's
drive against this illegal and nefarious practice;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order;
SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or
tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for
residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to
one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of solvency.
If the offender is a corporation or association the maximum penalty of five years and the fine of five thousand
pesos shall be imposed upon the president, director, manager or managing partners thereof.
SECTION 2.
This
decree shall take effect immediately."
(Emphasis supplied)
The information alleges that petitioners succeeded "in occupying or possessing for residential and other purposes
a portion of a parcel of land . . . by taking advantage of the tolerance of . . . and against the will of" respondent
Adarna. The offense covered by Section 1 of the above-quoted decree embraces three (3) elements, namely: (a)
accused is not the owner of the land in question, (b) accused succeeded in occupying or possessing the said
property through force, intimidation, or threat or by taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the owner;
and (c) such occupation of the property is without the consent or against the will of the owner. 12(12) It goes
without saying that all the elements or requisites of the offense charged must be established or proven beyond
reasonable doubt. We find that the second and third elements or requisites of the offense are not present in the
instant case.
In his complaint-affidavit, 13(13) respondent Adarna admitted that he had given his express consent to petitioners
to stay on the premises free of rent, in these words:
"That I consented to the request of Leoncio Mijares (sic) and thus allowed them to stay in the premises, without
any rental at all and that they should immediately remove the house from such lot the very moment that I give
them notice to do so;"
Having thus consented to petitioners' possession and occupancy of the property, respondent Adarna may not
validly claim that he had lost such possession to petitioners against his will. And the fact that he had asked them
to vacate does not render their occupancy as one made "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking
advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner." Respondent Adarna cannot claim that petitioners had
taken advantage of his tolerance when they first moved into the premises since the lot then belonged to his
predecessors-in-interest.
The Third Issue: Applicability to Rural Land
With respect to the third issue, we recall our ruling in a previous case that P.D. 772 applies only to squatting in
urban communities. In People vs. Echaves, 14(14) this Court held:
"We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its
preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal
constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squatting complained of involves pasture
lands in rural areas." (Emphasis supplied)
In Bernardo vs. People, 15(15) this Court reiterated its ruling in Echaves. Recently, however, said doctrine was
expressly reversed by the Court in Jumawan, et al., vs. Eviota, et al., 16(16) as follows:
". . . That it is the purpose for which the land is intended and not the place where it is located that is material is
clear from the text of the statute . . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
Thus a piece of land may be found in a barangay. So long as it is for residential, commercial, or any other purpose,
it comes within the purview of the Decree, and any person, who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat or
taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, occupies or takes possession of such property
against the will of the latter is guilty of squatting.
It is true that in People v. Echaves it was stated that the Decree was intended to apply to squatting in "urban
communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals." The
statement, however, is only a dictum, because the lands in that case were pasture lands. As this Court noted,
squatting on public agricultural lands is punishable under another statute, Republic Act No. 947." (emphasis ours)
Be that as it may, the petitioners should still be acquitted even if the agricultural land they were occupying under
Jumawan, comes within the purview of the Anti-Squatting Law. This is because, as previously discussed, the
prosecution had failed to show that the occupancy was obtained "through force, intimidation, or threat or by
taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the owner" or was "without the consent or against the will of the
owner."
Finally, it should be emphasized that by this Decision, this Court is not ruling on the legality of the possession and
use of the premises by petitioners. It is merely ruling on the propriety and legality of petitioners' conviction by the
respondent Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. This judgment of conviction in Criminal Case No. CU-4971 is hereby SET
ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 4701. September 22, 1908.]

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC CHURCH, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ISABEL FAMILIAR, ET AL., defendantsappellees
TRACEY, J p:
Since times beyond the memory of the oldest witnesses there stood upon the land in dispute in Uacas, Cavite
Viejo, a Roman Catholic chapel, in use for religious purposes until September, 1905, when it was destroyed by a
typhoon. Thereafter the defendants, who owned the adjoining land, took possession of it and continued to hold it
as a part of their own property. In May, 1906, the plaintiff brought this action in the Court of First Instance to
recover possession of it, and the defendants claim that the land on which the chapel stood originally belonged to
their ancestor and that the ownership of it by him and by them was admitted by the regular annual payment to
them by an hermano mayor of the sum of 50 centavos, and on this ground the Court of First Instance of Cavite
awarded them judgment. It is clear that this defense can not prevail for several reasons: First, there is nothing to
connect this plaintiff with the alleged annual payment. There is not a word to prove a cofradia, and its existence
can not be inferred from the simple existence of an hermano mayor. (The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church vs.
Santos, 7 Phil. Rep., 66.) The payment of this sum of of centavos, while sustained by declarations of two former
hermanos mayores, is disputed by many witnesses in a position to know about it, and its insignificance is hardly
consistent with an annual rental. Second, the defense necessarily assumes as its basis the existence of the
relation of landlord and tenant between the defendant and the plaintiff or its representatives. of such a relation
existed, it could not be terminated arbitrarily by the act of the defendants; the tenant had the same right to retain
possession of the property after the destruction of the chapel as before that event, until the lease had been put
an end to by regular process of law. A landlord may not summarily enter and dispossess his tenant even for
nonpayment of rent; and until the lease is legally terminated the tenant has the right to possession and may
recover it from the landlord. (Cioco vs. Muro, 9 Phil. Rep., 100; Bago vs. Garcia, 5 Phil. Rep., 524; Bishop of Cebu
vs. Mangaron, 6 Phil. Rep., 286.) There is nothing conflicting with this doctrine in the case of Evangelista vs. Ver (8
Phil. Rep., 653). There the plaintiff was defeated because in the opinion of the majority of the court he failed to
establish the fact of anterior possession, the proofs in their opinion showing such a relation of the two parties to
each other and to their common superior, the owner, as to preclude the possibility of an exclusive possession in
either, the defendant indeed never having given up the occupancy of the property, but the plaintiff having in fact
and by necessary construction of his acts abandoned it. Nor was it clear that the plaintiff, on his own showing, had
been deprived of possession by "force, intimidation, strategy, or stealth" (5 Phil. Rep., 74), or by violation of a
suitable contract, so as to bring his action within the scope of section 80, nor that it had been so treated by the
court below. (Bosco vs. Rebueno, 6 Off. Gaz., 1463. 1(1) ) The principle of the decisions on that section is not
affected by that case.
The action appears to be well laid under the statute. It is only when brought for the possession of land detained
by force, or by one of the other means specified in section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure that it must be
commenced within the year in a court of the justice of the peace, otherwise it may be begun in a Court of First
Instance. (Ledesma vs. Marcos, 9 Phil. Rep., 618; Alonso vs. Municipality of Placer, 5 Phil. Rep., 71.)
This is a possessory action only and on the proofs the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the property. The
judgment of the Court of First Instance in favor of the defendants is reversed, without costs. So ordered
G.R. No. 34004. September 12, 1931.]
APOLONIA CALMA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. EULALIO CALMA, defendant-appellant
ROMUALDEZ, J p:
Under three causes of action the plaintiffs pray that the defendant be ordered to liquidate the yearly crops of the
plantation described in paragraph II of the complaint, from the year 1903, delivering to the plaintiffs their share,
or its value; that said property be divided equally into two parts and the half which, in justice and equity, belongs
to the plaintiffs be adjudicated to them; that the defendant be compelled to restore to the plaintiffs the property
described in paragraph VIII of the complaint, or its value, which is P56.300, and to pay them P66,000 damages,
and the costs.
After entering a general and specific denial of the complaint, the defendant set up a number of special defenses
and a counterclaim, praying that he be absolved from the complaint and the plaintiffs be sentenced to pay him
P13,660.40 on several counterclaims, besides the costs.
After hearing the evidence, the Court of First Instance of Tarlac found that both the complaint and the
counterclaim had prescribed, and dismissed both, without pronouncement of costs.
Both parties appealed from that decision, the plaintiffs, assigning the following errors:
"1. In finding that the plaintiffs' cause of action petitioning for the liquidation of the rents or profits from lot No.
283, cadastral survey of Gerona, Tarlac, has prescribed.
"2. In not holding that the plaintiffs, as undivided co-owners of one-half of said lot are entitled to one-half of the
annual income of 450 cavanes, i.e., 225 cavanes of palay a year, or their cash value, according to the current
prices during the period from 1903 to 1927;
"3. In not finding that the total value of the one-half belonging to the plaintiffs of said rental is P17,554; and
"4. In dismissing the plaintiff' action and in not sentencing the defendant to pay said plaintiffs the aforesaid sum
of P17,554, with legal interest from the date of the complaint, and the costs of the trial."
The defendant, in turn, assigned the following errors to the court below, to wit:
"1. The court a quo erred in applying the statute of limitations to the counterclaims of the appellant.
"2. The court a quo erred in refusing to order. Facundo Salazar, official stenographer thereof, to transcribe his
notes on the testimony of Ernesto Quirino."
The question raised by the plaintiffs on appeal is summed up in their first cause of action, with reference to the
crops grown on lot No. 283 from the year 1903, contending that the statute of limitations invoked by the
defendant in his amended answer is not in point because the latter has been in possession only as a joint owner,
and because even if he were in possession as the exclusive owner, the running of the prescriptive period was
interrupted by the decision of the competent court in 1927 declaring that the defendant was only a coowner, and
not the sole owner of the lot in question.

The record shows that the defendant was in possession of all the land from 1903 until 1927 not as a mere
administrator, as the complaint alleges, nor even as a mere coowner, but as the sole and absolute owner, in good
faith, and adversely to the plaintiffs. He is therefore protected by subsection 3 of section 43 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The interruption of his possession in 1927 did not deprive him of the right which, as a possessor in
good faith, he had to take for himself the products of the land up to that year, according to article 451 of the Civil
Code.
The plaintiffs' appeal, then, is not well taken.
As to that for the defendant, similarly confined to items (a). (f) and (h) of his counterclaim, with reference to
certain sums alleged to have been disbursed by the defendant for the benefit of Gabino Calma, the predecessor in
interest of the plaintiffs, for P3,995 paid to creditors, P500 paid to attorney Pedro Liongson, and for P750 or P500
paid to Paulo Macasaquit, which comprise the one-half which the plaintiff's predecessor had to pay; it is
contended that the trial court should not have applied the statute of limitations in favor of the plaintiffs, inasmuch
as they had not set it up as a defense. We have indeed failed to find among the plaintiffs' pleadings any allegation
of prescription against the defendant's counterclaim. The statute of limitations must be pleaded in the answer and
cannot he set up by a demurrer or proved under a general denial. (Domingo vs. Osario, 7 Phil., 405; Pelaez vs.
Abreu, 26 Phil., 415; Karagdag vs. Barado, 33 Phil., 529.) The plaintiffs should have replied to the counterclaim if
they had desired to set up such an affirmative defense as the statute of limitations, because silence meant only
that they generally denied the allegations of the defendant's answer. (Sec. 104, Code of Civil Procedure; Herranz
& Garcia vs. Barbudo, 12 Phil., 5; Yu Chin Piao vs. Lim Tuaco, 33 Phil., 92).
It happens, however, that the plaintiffs are not under obligation to pay the debts of their late father, such as items
(a), (f), and (h) of the counterclaim. It does not appear that they personally bound themselves to pay them, and
the mere fact that they are the deceased's heirs does not make them answerable for such credits against their
predecessor in interest, inasmuch as article 1003 of the Civil Code is no longer in force, having been abrogated by
certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Pavia vs. De la Rosa, 8 Phil., 70).
With respect to the transcript of attorney Quirino's testimony, which is dealt with in the second assignment of
error in the defendant's brief, it is of no importance, for whether or not this claim of the defendant's is proved, the
plaintiffs are not responsible therefor, as we have just stated.
Finding no error in the dispositive part of the judgment appealed from, it is hereby affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs in this instance. So ordered
G.R. No. 12457, Aquino v. Tanedo, 39 Phil. 517
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
January 22, 1919
G.R. No. 12457
SERVILLANO AQUINO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EMETERIO TAEDO, defendant-appellant.
Zoilo J. Hilario for appellant.
Benigno S. Aquino for appellee.
AVANCEA, J.:
The plaintiff demands from the defendant payment of the sum of P10,000, together with legal interest thereon
from the date of the filing of the complaint. The defendant, in a counterclaim, demands from the plaintiff payment
of the sum of P6,791.75 and legal interest thereon from March 28, 1914.
On May 5, 1913, the plaintiff purchased from the defendant several parcels of land for the price of P45,000
(Exhibit X). In the contract the defendant acknowledged receipt of the sum of P10,000, as a part of this price, the
contracting parties stipulating that the rest should be paid as follows: P7,000 in September of the same year,
P10,000 in May, 1914, and P18,000 in 1915. By virtue of this contract the plaintiff took possession of the lands
purchased. On March 28, 1914, the plaintiff and the defendant, by virtue of another contract (Exhibit Z), agreed to
consider the previous contract as rescinded and of no value. As a result of this second agreement, the plaintiff
returned to the defendant the lands together with all the documents pertaining thereto. The defendant, on his
part, instead of returning the price received by him, subscribed in favor of the plaintiff another document (Exhibit
A) in which the acknowledges that he owes the plaintiff the sum of P12,000, of which P2,000, the amount of the
interest on P10,000 for one year, was to be paid on or before the 31st of May of the following year, 1915, and, as
to the remaining P10,000, it was agreed that the date of their payment would be fixed upon payment of the
P2,000.
On May 28, 1915, the defendant paid the plaintiff the P2,000 in accordance with the contract, Exhibit A. Upon this
payment being made no time was fixed for the payment of the other P10,000.
Subsequently, the plaintiff filed against the defendant an action in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac (Civil Case
No. 792), wherein he demanded of the defendant the payment of the P10,000. Before this case was decide, the
plaintiff and the defendant stipulated that, in the event that the court should find that the defendant's obligation
was not due, they should move the court merely to fix the period in which this sum should be paid, with the
understanding that, if it be not paid within the period fixed by the court, the plaintiff might bring an action against
the defendant for its collection, without prejudice to the defenses which the defendant might set up. It appears
that this agreement was taken into account by the court, for the recover shows that on September 13,1915, it

rendered judgment in that case merely fixing a period of three months, counting from October 1, 1915, for the
payment of this sum of P10,000 by the defendant.
There is no dispute over the fact that the defendant owes the plaintiff the P10,000 claimed by the latter. The
question raised by this appeal is one that relates to the defendant's counterclaim. The sum demanded in this
counterclaim is the value of the product of the lands, collected by the plaintiff during the time he was in
possession of them. by virtue of the contract Exhibit X, specifically, from May 5, 1913, until the plaintiff returned
the lands to the defendant, on March 28, 1914.
The plaintiff contends that the judgment rendered by the Court in Civil Case No. 792 had resolved all the issues
then in controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, and among them that of the counterclaim which is
now presented in the instant case. We believe, however, that this contention is unfounded. The judgment
rendered by the court in that Civil Cae, No. 792, undoubtedly was rendered in consideration of the agreement
between the plaintiff and the defendant to move the court merely to fix the period within which the defendant
should be obliged to pay to the plaintiff the P10,000, without prejudice to the defenses the defendant might set
up with respect to this obligation. Withal, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff should be absolved from this
counterclaim, for the very reason that we shall presently set forth.
The question is this: the plaintiff, on account of having purchased the lands form the defendant on May 15, 1913,
according to Exhibit X, took possession of the same and collected their product. On March 28, 1914, the plaintiff
and the defendant dissolved that contract of sale and, as a result thereof, the plaintiff returned the lands to the
defendant, and the defendant in turn, bound himself to return to the plaintiff the part of the price that the latter
had paid. Is the plaintiff obliged to return to the defendant the products to the lands that the plaintiff collected
during his possession?
The defendant invokes article 1295 of the Civil code, which prescribes that the rescission obliges the return of the
things which were the objects of the contract, with their fruits and the price with interest. He maintains that
pursuant to this provision, the plaintiff is obliged to return the fruits collected by him. But the rescission
mentioned in the contract Exhibit Z is not the rescission referred to in this article 1295. Although the plaintiff and
the defendant employed the word rescind, it has not, in the contract executed by them, either the scope or the
meaning of the words rescission to which article 1295 refers and which takes place only in the cases mentioned in
the preceding articles, 1291 and 1292. rescission, in the light of these provisions, is a belief which the law grants,
on the premise that the contract is valid, for the protection of one of the contracting parties and third persons
from all injury and damage the contract may cause, or to protect some incompatible and preferent right created
by the contract. Article 1295 refers to contract that are rescindible in accordance with law in the cases expressly
fixed thereby, but it does not refer to contracts that are rescinded by mutual consent and for the mutual
convenience of the contracting parties. The rescission in question was not originated by any of the causes
specified in articles 1291 and 1292 nor is it any relief for the purposes sought by these articles. It is simply
another contract for the dissolution of a previous one, and its effects, in relation to the contract so dissolved,
should be determined by the agreement made by the parties, or by application of the other legal provisions to
which we shall refer later on, but not by article 1295, which is not applicable.
The defendant alleges that, upon the execution of the contract of rescission, Exhibit Z, the plaintiff verbally
agreed to return the fruits collect by him. The plaintiff denies this absolutely. As the contract of rescission was
drawn up in writing, it must be presumed that the document wherein this contract appears contains all the
agreements stipulated by the parties. Although the defendant was permitted to introduce oral evidence to
establish that, besides what is set forth in the written contract, the plaintiff also agreed verbally, to return the
fruits collected, the plaintiff, on his part, presented other evidence in rebuttal. Examining the evidence adduced
by both parties on this point, we can say that there is no preponderance in favor of the proof presented by the
defendant. In such conditions, the presumption that the written contract contains all the agreements should
prevail and, consequently, the defendant's contention that such a verbal agreement made by the plaintiff existed
should be rejected.
The defendant argues that , as he bound himself to pay, and in fact did pay, interest on the P10,000 which he
received from the plaintiff as [a part of] the price of the land, it should be understood that the plaintiff,
reciprocally, also bound himself to return, on his part, the fruits which he collected from these lands. This
argument would be valid if the interest paid by the defendant has been paid for the time preceding the rescission,
that is, from May 5, 1913, when the contract of purchase and sale was executed, until March 28, 1914, when it
was rescinded. The record shows, however, that this interest was paid for the time subsequent to the rescission. It
will be recalled that the defendant received from the plaintiff P10,000 as a part of the price of the lands; that, on
rescinding the sale in March, 1914, the plaintiff returned the lands; and that the defendant, on his part, instead of
returning the part of the price, P10,000, received by him, executed in favor of the plaintiff the Exhibit A, binding
himself to pay the sum of P12,000, with interest, one year afterwards, that is, on May 31, 1915. Both parties agree
that P2,000 of these P12,000 is the interest on the P10,000 for one year, at the rate of 20 per cent per annum.
According to that, after the defendant had been in receipt of the P10,000 for two years, he bound himself to pay
interest only for one year. This necessarily supposes that this sum did not earn interested for the other year. If it is
admitted that this interest pertains to the first year previous to the rescission, then it had accrued and was due
when this contract of rescission was executed; however, it was not deemed to be due on that date, inasmuch as
the defendant did not bind himself to pay it until after the second year. Furthermore, if it is considered that this
interest corresponds to the first year prior to the rescission, the year in which no interest was due would be the
following year. Thus the result would be that, while the plaintiff returned the lands, the defendant did not return
the price, and if he did not even bind himself to pay interest on this unreturned price, the transaction would lack
the same reciprocity which the defendant invokes to sustain the contrary. We accept the conclusion that the
interest which the defendant bound himself to pay, and in fact did pay, to the plaintiff, was for the time
subsequent to the rescission. Consequently the defendant did not bind himself to pay, nor did he pay, interest on
the P10,000 for the time prior to the rescission. Applying, by inversion, the defendant's argument, we believe that

we ought to conclude that the plaintiff could not have bound himself to return to the defendant the fruits of the
land that the plaintiff collected during his possession, inasmuch as the defendant did not pay, nor bind himself to
pay, interest during the same time for the part of the price which he received.
But the plaintiff held the lands by reason of his having purchased them from the defendant. On this account, his
possession, until the contract of purchase and sale was dissolved and the lands were returned by him, was in
good faith. As such possessor in good, faith, the fruits collected by him become his own (art. 451, Civil Code) and
he is not obliged to return them to the defendant. In the absence of any covenant, this provisions should be
applied to the instant case.
Aside from the foregoing considerations, equity also lies on the plaintiff's side, because, as the record shows, for
the improvement of the land and in order to produce the fruits which he collected, he incurred expenses in an
amount such that the products collected by him may, reasonably, be considered equivalent to the interest for
tone year on the P10,000 which he had paid to the defendant.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered