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772
TABLE
Volunteering
Census
Response
Social
Trust
Informal
Socializing
Social capital
0.140**
(0.040)
0.129*
(0.054)
0.136*
(0.066)
0.192
(0.280)
0.018
(0.048)
0.446#
(0.232)
0.279
(1.841)
2.142
(2.107)
3.790*
(1.733)
3.073
(1.904)
2.795
(1.859)
2.631
(1. 720)
0.033
(0.054)
0.085
(0.063)
0.003
(0.066)
0.033
(0.068)
0.040
(0.071)
0.012
(0.079)
0.882**
(0.276)
0.509
(0.319)
0.961**
(0.275)
0.843**
(0.286)
0.822**
(0.289)
0.890*
(0.372)
0.070*
(0.031)
0.073*
(0.029)
0.079*
(0.037)
0.056
(0.033)
0.053
(0.032)
0.066*
(0.031)
0.466**
(0.122)
0.371*
(0.169)
0.540**
(0.147)
0.582**
(0.135)
0.570**
(0.140)
0.536**
(0.145)
Equation
Social capital variable
Club
Good Government
Meetings Group Members
lndependentvariables
.0008
(.0007)
.0006
(.0009)
.0010
(.0009)
15.319
(26.692)
30.242
(31.624)
24.667
(29.081)
35.418
(31.588)
36.522
(31.408)
35.024
(33.481)
0.026
(0.533)
0.053
(0.503)
0.079
(0.552)
0.085
(0.569)
0.103
(0.601)
0.048
(0.620)
14.239
(20.926)
19.297
(24.953)
0.515
0.331
0.364
0.082
0.050
0.312
0.204**
(0.066)
0.234**
(0.078)
0.185
(0.152)
0.677
(0.462)
0.088
(0.068)
1.774*
(0.748)
N
R2
48
50
48
48
48
43
.0006
(.0008)
.44
.41
42.852
(18.679)
.36
45.797
(19.063)
.33
.0009
(.0009)
41.498
(20.064)
.33
.0009
(.0010)
38.616
(18.005)
.39
7.7
7.6
7.7
7.7
7.7
7.8
1.5
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.7
Dependent variable is grade far overall state government performance. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
nificance at .01, .05, and .1 O respectively far twotailed tests.
A**, *,
TABLE
Informal
Soclalizing
Club
Meetings
Good Goverment
Members
0.065
(0.090)
0.043
(0.381)
0.028
(0.052)
0.521
(0.516)
0.039
(0.074)
0.129#
(0.075)
0.060
(0.100)
0.162#
(0.085)
0.521**
(0.199)
0.619#
(0.312)
0.173
(0.395)
0.048
(0.057)
0.031
(0.302)
0.024
(0.079)
0.022
(0.076)
0.014
(0.107)
0.575
(0.443)
0.105
(0.057)
0.591 *
(0.282)
0.195**
(0.055)
0.127
(0.083)
0.263*
(0.104)
0.299
(0.404)
0.046
(0.062)
0.535
(0.375)
Equation
Volunteering
Census
Response
Social
Trust
Financia! management
0.110*
(0.052)
0.114#
(0.060)
Capital management
0.254**
(0.067)
0.172*
(0.077)
Human resources
0.073
(0.055)
Performance dimension
Dependent variables are the grades for respective dimensions of state government performance, shown in rows. Robust standard errors are shown
in parentheses. Results for the social capital variables (listed in columns) only are shown; other independent variables included are the same as those
included in Table 2. A**, *, and # indicate significance at .01, .05, and .10 respectively for twotailed tests.
SOCIAL
CAPITAL AND
STATE
GOVERNMENT
QUALITY
Data Appendix
Variable
Mean
Dependent variables
Overall performance grade, 199899
Financia! management
Capital management
Human resources
Managing far results
lnformation technology
50
50
50
50
50
50
7.6
8.6
8.2
7.6
6.8
6.7
lndependent variables
Volunteering, 1989 (%)
Census response, 1990 (%)
Social trust, 198698 (%)
Informal socializing index, 198698
Attend club meetings, 198698 (%)
Member of good govt. group, 197394 (%)
Lag per capita income, 1996
High school graduates, 1990 (%)
Log population, 1996
African American pop., 1996 (%)
Gini, income inequality, 1989
lnterest groups, 1990
lnterest groups (residual)
Diversity of interest groups, 1990
Diversity of int. groups (residual)
Divided government dummy, 1999
48
50
48
48
48
43
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
23.2
74.2
64.2
47.5
3.8
10.04
76.3
14.99
9.9
39.5
587
o
o
.130
.48
Std. dev.
Minimum
Maximum
1.8
2.0
2.4
1.9
2.3
2.4
3
4
2
1
1
1
11
12
12
11
11
12
6.7
4.7
4.8
0.77
5.0
1.3
0.14
5.61
1.01
9.4
2.2
456
336
.009
.009
.50
13.9
62.0
50.8
1.81
38.2
1.4
9.77
64.3
13.08
0.3
34.4
107
636
.110
.018
38.6
84.1
72.0
2.23
64.6
7.0
10.41
86.6
17.27
35.9
44.6
2969
1933
.151
.021
1