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June 22,1903
^^y\n
,f.
Kohler Collection
K^
iJ^\%^OG -1^^^
IN THEIR CONNEXION
BY
IN TWO VOLUMES.
VOL.
II.
^'onbou:
MACMILLAN AND
CO.
1869.
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tif
Tnnis/nliiiii ninl
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reserved.]
LOHDtIN
R.
CliAV, SOSS,
AND TAYLOR,
BREAD STREET
HILL.
PRINTERS,
CONTENTS OF VOL.
II.
CHAPTER XXVII.
INTELLIGENCE.
Purpose in
the formation
and action of the iris Gradation from unconscious to conscious and rational
motor actions in the eye, and in the digestive orgtins Actions determined by
sensation All motor actions are intelligent, whether conscious or not Intelligence, unconscious and conscious, formative and mental, is fundamentally
the same This view includes instinct We cannot point out the beginning of
sensation, or of consciousness
Most thought, perhaps all, is partly unconscious
Identity of formative, instinctive, and mental intelligence A special act of
creation is not necessary for every new adaptation Moral difliculties lessened
by this view Parasitic worms Unnatural or immoral instincts All matter
is endowed with forces, and vitalized matter is endowed with intelligence
Disease
is
no exception
is
Vital actions
minister not
Development of unconscious
Love of
life.
Note
Instinct
Instincts
some
Darwin's ex Instincts of
to Intelligence
Pp.
fishes
CHAPTER
11
XXVIII.
MIND.
Mind
Consciousness
Definition impossible
plicable
is
is
of
Acquired
Sleep
taste
sensation
it
CONTENTS OF VOL.
VI
II.
Pp. 12
man
a dread of
17
CHAPTER XXIX.
THE PHY.SIOLOGY OF MIND.
Differentiation into organs of vegetative
Its
and of animal
Nervous
life
Contractility
the
first
It
possible exceptions
is
life
Its
its
facts
is
of consciousness
cereljrum
thought
Is
Consciousness of thought
is
distinct
cause
from thought
Nerves
Unconscious
The sen-
of thought
produced
Scat
of
consciousness
Its
is
Thought
acts
musician
This
may become
consensual
Position
Instance of
of
"Will
is
itself
CONTENTS OP VOL.
of will
Ideo-mutor
and voluntary
action.s
Vll
II.
how
distinguished
The
theory
incomplete.
Note
Nervous Currents
telegraph currents
Consciousness
is
Compared to
Nerve-fibres are more than merely conductors. Pp. 18 41
is
electric
first
CHAPTER XXX.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THOUGHT.
Physiology
useless as a guide in
is
Feelings of
consciousness
Proofs of
Gradations of
explicable
relation of sensations to each otherAttention to
Emotions Feeling
is
inexplicable
Thought
It
is
conscious
when
of relations
ceases
to
be
Thought
explained
thus
thought
"What
only, to the exclusion of the feelings between which the relations are
it is
is
is
4247
Pp.
CHAPTER XXXI.
MENTAL
HABIT.
All actions tend to become habitual Motor habits Voluntary actions becoming
habitual and consensual Mental habit, or association of ideas Impressions on
Law of association
stated
Instance
Memory Acquisition
mental facts referable to the law of mental habit alone ? Parallel question in
biology I believe in intelligence, in addition to the laws of Kabit The question stated
Is intelligence
tion so brieflv
an ultimate
fact
?Why
*8-5^
CONTENTS OF VOL.
Viii
CHAPTER
THE
GROtrxp.S OF
Definition
is
XXXII.
Moral
Sentient organisms
Keason
it
may
and pain
how they
he possible to teU
organisms to do what
all
The
Pleasure and
is
II.
their welfare
is for
by sensation Exceptions
Desire and fear Love of
Great
in the organic
their
for
life
life
i-oots
gi'eat
life
have their seat in the nerves of consciousness Germ of the moral nature in
of unselsensation Prudence
Unselfishness Holiness Origin of jjrudence
fishness
is
5664
Pp.
CHAPTER
XXXIII.
MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.
Is sensation
mental
The question
is
only verbal
their
Reverie Recollection,
memory with
little
or
developed
jSIora]
nature
whence
also
its
is
for
CONTENTS OF
the
future
Emotions
VOL.
IX
II.
statement.
Note
There
and thought
believe there
unconscious feeling
Pp.
is
no
6582
CHAPTER XXXIV.
MENTAL GROWTH.
Analogy between the organism and the mind in development by differentiation
Organic and mental integration Analogy of organic and mental growth The
organism is constructed out of the food by the organic intelligence so mind
^Assimiis constructed out of impressions of sense by the mental intelligence
forgetting
Parallel
in
receiving
and
in
youth
most
rapid
lation and waste both
mental impressions Organic and mental growth both consist in excess of what
Waste is a condition of organic life so is foris received over what is lost
getting of mental life If we remembered everything, we could not think
Coalescence of residua by forgetting What constitutes familiarity Words
must not only suggest their meaning they must suggest nothing else The
Summary
first of these is secured by remembering, the second by forgetting
Formation of habits of action by the same law Moral benefit of forgetting
Forgetting
is a
Pp. 83
91
CHAPTEE XXXV.
THE SENSES.
External senses
That of heat
their constituents
bine, but
may
so of
to touch
smells,
distinct
is
The skin-nerves
taste
and these
Orange White Sounds do not so com Reason of this in the constitution of the nerves
mixed colours
be discriminated
without
nerve
and hearing Reproduction in memory of
touch,
Intellectual senses
impressions of sight and hearing Pleasure due to this Its moral importanceCause of this in hereditary habit Senses of touch and heat These sensations
resistance Muscular sense Taste
do not combine What touch cognises
of hearing
sight,
sight,
is
Smell
its
sations of colour
light,
Characters
of sight
Of
sounds Hearing
CONTENTS OF VOL.
II
taste,
for
for
The
practice overtones
intellectual,
may
be distinguished
re-
With
senses
sesthetic
ear
loses
no
time in combining
impressions.
Note
colours
Reasons
against this
No
Opinion
The
kind of sensation depends not on the nerves, nor on the ganglia, but on the
organ of sense Sensations of light due to pressure, and to an electric current.
Note B Colours and the Laws of their Combination
Difference between sensations of sight and of the other senses
Meaning of ligJit and of radiance
Heating and chemical effects of radiance Eadiance consists of undulations
Rays of different wave-lengths are mixed together in the sunbeam Their sepaby the prism The places of brightest light, of greatest heating power,
and of greatest chemical power, do not coincide Different rays have different
colours
Succession of colours Difference of colour is a physiological fact, and
analogous not to tone but to pitch in sound The octave in sound and in colour
The series of colours in the spectrum is circular, and the opposite colours are
complementaries How to combine colours Whites produced by the comliina-
ration
All colours
Black Grey BroAvn Result of combining
and secondaries
in
but there
We might expect
distinction of primaries
may be in a physiological sense Further matheconsiderations Wave frequency A colour and its octave are 360"
any physical
matical
is to
No
How accounted
for
All
Dis-
CHAPTER XXXVL
PERCEPTION.
Perception
is
more than
it is
The same act may be the one or the other, according to circumstances The subject has been complicated by extraneous questions Perception
and the cognition of space are
but have been confounded We cognise
inference
distinct,
space before
we perceive
objects in
it
CONTENTS OF VOL.
iu space
Cognition of space by
tlie
XI
II.
motion of a sensation
superficial extension
Explanation
not a simple
tions
Perception
and sight^What
of objects in space
Combination of impressions of touch
is " the external world " external to ?
It may be extra-
Note
act,
itself.
when produced
Pp.117 132
CHAPTEK XXXVII.
THE RELATION OF THE MIND TO SPACE AND TIME.
Our knowledge of time
that space
necessary
number
is
I believe
is
Is
is
we
cognised in a parallel
expressed in time
separate origin
way Opinion
Similarity of space and time Both are
space
Magnitude
is
a primary cognition
is
sensations as successive
Conclusion
for
it is
human mind
is
from
for
is
believe this
Our
is
not essential to
all
mind, but
sight,
because
we think
iu
Hearing
is
well as
first
two
words Sensations
acci-
sensations
time
though
of different senses
it
may
of sjiace
give cognition
Case of a
mind
CONTENTS OF VOL.
Xll
develoijed out of
tlie
its
Illustration What
Possibility of a consciousness
II.
independent of time
Instance
believed in
of this being
133142
Pp.
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
TIME,
I
SPACE,
AXD CAUSATION.
hold the experience theory of our knowledge of space and time in preference to
that of forms of thought
is
inherited
of the experience of the race become fonns of thought for the individual
forms of thought
adjnitted
Is
by Kant
The
experience theoiy
is
There
is
eternal future.
Note: The
Philosophy of Kant:
The
that of
liis
"Practical Reason"
is
is faith.
Pp. 14.3151
CHAPTER XXXIX.
MENTAL
IN T E
1. 1
GENC
E.
argue
it
of
Thought
which
is
mental Difficulty
of the latter
not a
all
for
Belief
is
? Some
is
say by habit
only I think
this is
no explanation-
subject to the laws of habit, but habit cannot produce belief Phy-
analogy
is
CONTENTS OF VOL.
only principles which enter into
known by
all
xiii
II.
They are
These are
The
involved in perception
Beliefs
blance of
my
its
diflerence
it
self
for this.
is
CHAPTER
Pp. 152
168
XL.
The
and mind has been fully systematized, as have also been logic,
but the sciences of the results of man's
mental activity have not yet been systematized, including those of language,
art, and society
The laws of these subjects depend on the laws of mind, but
science of
life
the converse
is
not trae
Comparative gi-ammar
syntax
is
hoped
to be
is
for
a habitual element
only comparative etymology, but comparative
Language is an organism As life constructs the
as yet
without meaning
tive sciences,
is
yet
Morphology and the science of language are both comparaand sciences of progressive change The embryology of language
unknown
Historical
ciples as organic
changes
English
Love of novelty
is
Morphology of
art
same prin-
Its progressive
is
Continuity of history
and gradnaluess of
political
Politics
CONTENTS OF VOL.
XIV
of the law of habit
and history
II.
Analogy of
jiolitical
later developed,
CHAPTER
IN HISTORY.
by climate
selection
This process
world
flicts
effect of
jourely physical
is
History
Direct
183
XLI.
NATURAL SELECTION
Conser-
Pp. 169
Natvu'al
Average
difference of
new circumstances
and having a
selection
is
Natural
distinct character
moral
determined by man's mental nature Victory in human condepends on moral causes^It does not depend chiefly on courage Supeis
Pp.
184191
CHAPTER XLI I.
INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL OllGANIZATION.
Division of labour in the organism and in society
development,
material
Groimd of the
Industrial
Society
and
is
an organism
political organization
is
resemblance
Life
is
in both a
mode
of activity
Intelligence Three differences between individual and social organizathe whole exists
tion Social organization does not depend on structure In
Habit
it
Argument
Note
It
ject to
H. Spencer
My
Pp. 192
197
XLIII.
The present subject naturally comes at the end of the work Any such classification must be imperfect Subjects belonging to more than one science
Spectrum analysis polarizing crj'stals electro-chemistry One science giving
:
CONTENTS OF VOL.
suggestions to
aiiotliev,
The
matics with dynamics The
ments
to another
telesco])e
Such
is
First
other sciences,
reasoning
is
Logic
Mathematics
Connexion
and
its
The
of mathe-
of mathematics
tliose
XV
II.
which
order
is
is
to he a
from the
Summary No single
Logic, unlike
series
applications
the
not an organon
is
the initial
is
comes
before
life
first
life
tion of astronomy,
Parallelism
cosmic sciences
of
ground
series
nary case of a being coming near the universe the order in which he would
Chain of laws, each link presupposing that which comes
see its phenomena
Parallel to this in the arrangement of things
before it
Living beings are
:
Matter
is
The
The only
widest laws are the simplest, and act through the longest time
certainly unalterable truths are those of logic Time
matter
is
the latest
last
force
Artistic rule of
Not
chapter believe in
nature
highest beauty in least quantity, and, in poetry and music, at the end
all
tion of
dynamics
obligations to
of
astronomy
Science of language
My
198 220
omitted by Comte
Humboldt
Pp.
CHAPTER XIAY.
REM.\nK.S ON
Agreement of the
historical
THE HISTORY OF
SCIENt'E.
logical order
is
is
CONTENTS OF VOL.
XVI
Mathematics
both The
is
II.
is
may
originate independently,
ments of space.
Note: Measurement of linear spaces:
.sistauce
of velocity:
Pp.
of energy
221227
CHAPTER XLV.
EEMARKS ON THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES.
and complex is the subject of a science, the less is mathematics
In connexion with this, the facts of life are in some degi-ee
not imply any uncertainty The same is true of morals
This
does
indefinite
Certainty without precision Four fallacies and their origin that logic is an
organon of discovery that mathematics is the type of science that clearness
The more
special
applicable to
it
and
that precision
is
its
is
jihysical
verification
Conclusion
Pp. 228
2-34
APPENDIX.
Three questions
Is life
in the affii-mative
an ultimate
fact
Are
answer
Moral sense Intelligence Life Quotation from Huxley
Is
an ultimate fact
My reply to it
Pp.
ERRATUM.
p. 50, note, Sot Leilie renrf Liebe.
all
235240
WE
have seen in a previous chapter that vital functions Formaare to be classed as formative, motor, and sensory,
^^^l'^^
Sensory functions develop into mental ones; and for the and mental
^""^
purpose of the present chapter I shall speak of functions "^'^
and mental.
as formative, motor,
In the
last
two chapters
an
into
hexagonal
cells,
we cannot
Instinctive
it cannot be
think that they have
the bee,
,
,
,
1
actions of the bee is exactly the same m kind with the with
B
VOL. II.
2
formative
gence!'
[chap.
wonSl
than
]but
intSL^^
there
Instinctis
S'"^''-
is
number
of animal species
while
These instincts of bees and wasps are the most remarkable and the most extreme case of motor actions directed
by a definite, intelligent purpose, which purpose is yet
totally unconscious.
distinctly exceptional
between the
the ins.
iris,
enabling
it
to
order to
involuntarily and
The formation
retina against too much light.
the
protect
^^ ^^^ ^.^ ^^ ^ ^^gg ^^ unconscious formative intelligence,
and its action in closing against the light is a case of
spontaneously,
Contract,
in
it
From
'
INTELLIGENCE.
XXVII.]
p.
r.
The motion
of the eyeballs
And, to
between the
voluntary.
J
is
''
>
Gradation
conToious
to conscious and
rational
!^oi"
.
actions, lu
tlie eye,
voluntary ones,
is
asserted that in
it is
We
will.^
iris
find
swallowing
and iu the
!!,lf^^!r''
though accompanied by
sensation.
The action of the mouth in chewing and swallowing is mostly performed in obedience to sensation,
with little direction from the conscious will, though it is
in
is
involuntary,
mouth
is
altogether
voluntary.
own
separate
motor
actions.
But
have
of obstructions
and
and voluntary
ii.
p. 222.
He
ones."
men have
moment.
b2
At one end
i.
p. 163.
'^^}^'^'
sensation.
[chap.
at the other is
4
of
tlie
perfect consciousness.
The muscular
same organizing
its special work
fits
by the
the
iris is
throughout.
All motor
that
iutelS^enT ligencc
whether
'
or"not!"^^
is
but
the
are directed
con-
is
intelligence
by an
it is
by
intel-
only in the
is
due
is
as
truly intelligent
as either.
Intelli-
^"^nscious"
and con-
foiToative
^"'^
is
believed to be fundamentally
mind. The two are generally
,
t-.tt
t
conscious mental mtelugence is believed to be
mental, is
distmct
fundamentally
j^^-m^^^n,'
the same.
This view
includes
-tt
is believed to be Divine.
and formative intelligence
fundamentally the
same, it wiU. appear natural, and what might be expected,
that there should be such a gradation as we actually
manifested in the organic creation
find
telligence
the intermediate
is
region
being
occupied
by
INTELLIGENCE.
XXVII.]
intelligent
by
in a word,
instinct.
vital actions,
each action to
its
and
that
but
it
becomes conscious
is to say,
only in thought
it
thought.
berate
end
specific
deli-
all
the Most
tlie
pg{Jfpf'
all. is
conscious."
gence
is
If these views
which
is
and
if
fundamentally identical
with the
mental
man;
intelligence of
identity of
[i^g7'
tive,
and
out the bones and the wing-feathers of the bird in order to nVence!'
combine lightness with strength, and places the feathery
fringes
is
[cHAP.
which, in the mind of the engineer, has devised the construction of iron pillars hollowed out like those bones and
feathers
its
that
also
is
hexagon.
This view of the essential identity of orgaiuc intelligence
was inevitable
and
that
all
it
now
that arguments,
which
special
creation
is
notneces-
I believe to
be conclusive, have
form
but in virtue of a
tion
and
all
motor
instincts,
and
finally
organic forma-
becomes conscious
man.
This view, as I have already remarked, has the great
life,
it
was under
by
this
^*^'
.
worms.
have stated has also the advantage of rej^Qying certain very serious difficulties connected with the
Divine Purpose of Creation. I refer especially to the existence of such animals as parasitic worms, which are as
The view
Moral
mode
of
life,
but have
pain, disease,
INTELLIGENCE.
XXVII.]
On
Creative Wisdom.
from species
self-adapted to
new
applies
to
why
all.
called Unnatural
is fertilized ;i
them
when
in the
pupa
state,
its
eggs in the
It is surely
and
abnormal results of
This word
istic.
is
vital intelligence,
indefinitely,
but
we have begun to
"
know even
as
we
are known."
On this
be
sufficient
to
show that
my
position
p. 427.
is
quite
instinctT.''
We
All matter
with*^"^^*^
know
endowed with
and chemical, which
We
forces,
[chap.
by the action
know
forces
forces
that matter,
of these forces, is
the motion
of
neither
is
from without
brought
created at
Energy or force
created.
is
the
only becomes
it
moment nor
from
actual
but there
is
an
effect of
Divine power
So with intelligence.
All intelligence is a result of Divine wisdom, but there
is not a fresh determination of Divine thought needed
ever a stone
every
for
falls or
new
fire
burns.
adaptation in
structure, or
organic
for
Every Theist
further,
and
vital-
irelidowed
with In-
creation for a
^^^^
^^
endowed
igouce.
species.
separately
believe
organized
vitalized
gyj^g^jj^jg
is
new
Qf
fall
We
have next
intelligence acts.
to consider the
common
Intelli-
to formative, motor,
Tlie only
actions in
law which
is
alike is
them in
the life and
P'PllCG
tends to
guide all
vital
whatever direction
is
any exception
to
most favourable to
I do not think that even disease
this
law.
Many
diseases,
as for
INTELLIGENCE.
XXVII.]
instance probably all eruptive ones, are due to the un- the
-g^^pg^
orcfanism.
and lead a
life,
and ministering
rest,
life
own
to their
^^^^
general
direc-
life,
on
disease is
no excep-
though to
Vital
minister
tage
.,
Here
of the race.
"^
is
the ^^*
**^
*^
race.
Where
agreeable,
sensation
is
and what
developed,
is
what
destructive
healthful
is
is felt
tive
functions.
Social
^ff<=*i"-
is felt
as painful
as
and
where conscious intelligence is developed, pleasure is consciously sought and pain is consciously avoided as such
and for their own sakes. But the instinctive unconscious tendency to seek what is needful for life and to avoid what is
injurious
is
down
l*evelop-
unconaction into
conscious,
See Carpenter's
that cancer
is
is
Human
He
Physiology, p. 371.
is
an
cured by extirpation.
See also
when not
vol.
i.
p.
167, note.
and
^natemal
it
may be
10
[chap.
instinct.
NOTE.
INSTINCT.
Darwin endeavours
Instincts
of social
insects
of
cannot be
difficulty,
inherited.
Darwin's
life,
of social insects
selection.
bees, wasps,
and ants
explanation by
natural
selection.
budding
culty,
there
is
this peculiar
and rephes
to
it
He
may be
this
dififi-
applied to
been perfected by
think
them due
to Intelligence.
all,
is
explanation;
is
really a case
conscious.
The
many
most wonderful in
how
11
INSTINCT.
XXVII.]
are
we
an instinct as
the male of which
mouth ? ^ Questions of this sort, howmore nor less difficult to answer than questions
some
fishes
a case which
Darwin mentions
Instincts
o'
some
nsnes.
CHAPTER
XXVIIT.
MIND.
life,
sible.''"
^^^^
by a
mind
-^^
definition of mind.
^^^ possible.
as conscious life
It
;
would be an obvious
this, it
So far as I
would be plausible
but, as
we
mind
however,
to
define
see,
It
as intelligence
would be
but, if the
The want
of
life alone,
any exact
but to
definition,
all life
what-
embarrass us much.^
Mind
is
^^*^
ourof
sensation.
Conscious- is consciousness.
Jiess
What, then,
is
consciousness
cable.
explained
all
that
we can do
is
H. Spencer
is
arise.
life
distinct
doubly inaccurate.
It
action.
MIND.
CHAP. xxviii.J
13
is
All consciousness
species.
of feeling.
It
is
all
Consciousness, then,
Sensation
sation.
is
is
is
con-
but
it,
To use
it
is
not possible to
feeling to be conscious of
it is
comes
before
consciousness
it
is
Conscioussensation
it
'"'ittiout
a truth within every one's experience,
though
^
o consciousnot a very familiar truth, because the absence of ness.
This
it.
is
is
'
*'
must often,
however, have occurred to every one suddenly to become
conscious of a sight that had been before his eyes, or of a
sound that had been in his ears for some time and to
remark, "I saw (or heard) this, but was not conscious of it."
But, what is still more conclusive than this, it is impossible to doubt that in sound sleep there is no consciousness
of sensation; and yet when any one has become accustomed
to sleep in a loud monotonous noise, as for instance that
of a mill, it is well known that a sudden cessation of the
noise will put an end to sleep, just as its sudden commencement would do. This proves that the sound must
have reached the sleeper's sensorium, or in other words
must have been heard, though his consciousness was, in
the most literal sense of the word, asleep to it. This is a
consciousness
is
It
sleep.
the consciousness of
We
it.
sciousness
sensation.
may
is first
awakened by
sensation,
and
if it
merely sentient
life,
is
life is
j^J^^.*^^"
14
I shall
of the insentient.
more
are some more remarks
have to go into
Conscioustiifct
this subject in
but before I do
so,
there
from ^^^^
sensation,
to
[chap.
*^ sensation
'^^
though
one,
it
The truth
may
fact,
my
in
is
which
is felt
as disagreeable at
become
Hence
it
first,
repeated often
is
common
Acquired
enough
taste,
to
familiar.
is
the very
am
now speaking
not
by music,
by
or
poetry,
mean
which
which a liking
for
and
by
visual beauty
more complex
is
taste.
is
We
know
disagreeable at
that
first,
by
repetition
taste
due to a
it
in other words,
think
much more
it
it
is
no explanation
be acquired, I admit
it
make
the fact
advance
it
what
or,
only
as being
So
of fact.
it
among
what
is
Had
this distinction
monstrous absurdity
See vol.
i,
p. 188.
(as I
MIND.
15
Analogous
XXVIII.]
gi^ng'^from
different
S6I1S6S
Softness
is
they are
analogy
by every
felt
one, yet
felt to
is felt
sensations.
senses
different
is
objects of touch
soft
are
and
soft colour,
totally unlike in so
merely impressions of sense, yet the impressions they produce on the consciousness are in some
far as they are
degree similar.
Another
is,
itself,
it
and
j?? }f-}^'
divisible.
recognises
itself as
Biological
mental or
ground of
and
mind,
which in
that nervous
is
^^'
all classes
to a
the unity of
itself to
be,
its
action
is
and
really
is,
mind
feels
H^^-^]
16
tions,
This
[cHAP.
primarily a metaphysical
is
and
live,
Some
may be
sentient,
of the
we
but
Sensation
siUe^"
P^^"^^
nervous centre)
but
it is
by the mind
is
of
human
before
it
is
it felt
contains a sensory
consciousness affirms
its
impossible, because
it
I do not think
man.
What
own
I say
is,
that
and
indivisibility,
is
whatever.
Conscious- of is this,
h^^^dir-
^^^^ consciousness
is
is
never inherited.
not transmissible,
may
This
fact,
perhaps stand
on in the
Mental
last paragraph, that consciousness is not divisible.
transmissible,
and
often
characters, like bodily ones, are
become hereditary, but the transmission is never accompanied with consciousness. Habits which have been formed
by the conscious acts of the parents may be inherited by the
offspring but the habit is inherited without any consciousThe offspring have no consciousness,
ness of its origin.
thing, no memory, of the conscious
the
same
or, what is
Hereacts by which the habit was formed in the parent.
ditary habit is so much more conspicuous among animals
some
in
my
meaning,
it is
"We cannot say that such animals have any true individuality.
See
than in man,
Note
to Chapter
XVI.
MIND.
XXVTIT.]
17
for
the
frightened
or, it
by man.
consciousness of
They
cause.
its
by the
is
Selection will,
less
VOL.
II.
dread of
^'^'
CHAPTEE XXIX.
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF MIND.
IN
^-
--
organs of
vegetative
Development
animal
life.
what
It is necessary for
me
animal
life
essentially
consist of
Contrac-
mental
of
the**^'
latter.
has
^^^^'
tihty, tlie
it
contractility
that
is
The
life
is
power of
muscular tissue to contract under the influence of a stimulus, and in contracting to transform energy from the vital
jnto the motor form ^ in other words, to do work by contracting. In those simple animals which have muscles but
no nerves, as especially the Hydrozoa, the stimulus under
:
tissue, will
slowly propagate
itself; so that, if
one tentacle
But in
those more highly organized animals which have a complex nervous system, the stimulus rmder which the muscles
contract usually consists in a flow of nervous energy.
The
is iiTitated, the other tentacles will also contract.
between the action of muscles that usually conunder a stimulus applied to themselves, and muscles
difference
tract
Life.
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF
CH. XXIX.]
19
MIJSTD.
the nerves,
originates in the
affects the
of a
muscles in
muscle that contracts from the stimulus of a foreign body coming into
contact with the muscle itself, and one that contracts
from the stimulus which the nerves transmit to it when
be decomposed.
pi-imaiy
to'traus'^
it
^^
ISTervous tissue,
on
is practi- ^}^
more
'j'^^'^^'^^'"-
rapid,
to the
^^^''^'*"
It
is,
C 2
simple,
20
[chap.
for the
Ganglia.
the
conducts
stimulus
outer extremity
The other
ganglion.
fibre
action.
action
;"
it
This
is
it
its
of the fibres
situated, to its
is
One
it.
terminates,
what
is
and causes
called "reflex
ganglion.
As
is
a develop-
ment and outgrowth of muscular structure, being developed by differentiation from it. This is observed, both in
watching the successive stages of the development of the
highest animals, and in comparing the various members of
the animal kingdom, from the simplest to the most complex
Nervous
function
differenti-
ated from
muscular
function.
except
nervous system
stimuli
Sensation
does not
exist at
first.
is
muscles
the
is
themselves.
But when a
scale, sensation
appears
the nerve-fibres on
the action of
some
not of
all
We
cannot
tell
21
XXIX.J
and
whatever of
itself,
Sensation
presence or absence.
its
It is utterly
possible that
we can
ever
know how
or
why
it is
in
is
im-
that the
We thus
or fundamental
been added to
lopment.
endowment
its
gentimt
nerves
histologically alike.
[.
Sentient
Parallel
The history
functions.
life, is
developed
it.
Besides the
among them
a pair of
is
which (notwithstanding
optici,
fibres,
and the
off
Corpora
^^^^^^
'
22
motion
their relation to the
sensory
ganglia.
and
is
will.
[chap.
The
of sense is as follows
An impression
and ganglia
of sense
is
trans-
is
corpora
striata,
necessary in order to
Consensual
action
sensation.
retina,
make
!For instance
is
a flash of light
falls
on the
it
on the corpora
striata,
and
This
its simi-
larity to
merely
reflex
action.
is
is
sentient,
to
the
impression.
Sensation
at
first is
only the
guide to
is
by
action.
sions received
those impressions.
Sensation existing by
itself,
and not
life,
XXIX.]
into
23
;
these pass,
consensual action
by
so
scale, sensation
appears not to exist alone, but solely as the guide to muscular action.
possess.
organs consist
of
insects
^ ^
thil*'
the
are, consist
by uncon-
functions, than
man.
Especially
is
for their
to the
wasp
it
is
man.
life.
Besides,
the sensory
mean
function,
is
unconscious of
of the con-
we now go on
to
the
with some
excep^^^^-
24
The
spinal cord
sentient
Sensory
ganglia
developed
out of
spinal
cord,
life
it is
is
the
[chap.
life,
corpora
striata,
and
cerebrum
out of
sensory
grade
than
these.
ganglia.
This
is
is
organ, though in
man and
it
is
it
a double
We
have every
The
is
cerebrum
from unconscious
tbe
organ of
consciousis
ness.
Largest in
the highest
animals.
instinct.
In
classes, it is
ganglia, but
fishes,
of the vertebrate
man and
the rest of
all
is
many
together.
The
unlike
either the
spinal cord or
Cerebrum
nerve-fibres
not in
but,
direct
connexion
with the
oi'gans of
external
life
The
with
the
either
cerebral hemi-
life.
Its
structure.
is
XXIX.]
hemispliere,
masses of
connected with
are
each
25
by other
other
fibres.
no
We
evidence whatever.
direct
With
analogy.
tiscGr-
called phrenologists
by
analogy.
is
facts.^
mental function
is
localized
comparison, imaginaWere
&c.
Phreno-
^^^y
disproved
according to
when
case
all,
when
same
when
affect the
mind
in
known.
result.
We have
seen that
it is
if
is
motor impulse
is
it
this.
It is
of nervous
ganglion
Now,
1
if
think there
is verj'
is
a feeling, which
it
much
certainly is
truth in phreno-
26
[chap.
it,
it is
is
also
make
due to a
thus produced.
fibre
Nerves
conclusion,
and
if so, all
that
the
the evidence
we have
nerve-currents
leads
to the
are
of consciousness
n^
Z.^
-C
j.1
t-
A sensation
is
by the
first,
nerves.
ends
Is con-
^^*di^"eT
in the
^In^aiil
The nerves
of sensation
have
with the
Is
the con-
cerebral nerve-fibres
or is
it
due
or the
cerebrum? '^
,
l n
k
An
answer to this question
fibres, receiving the current ?
.
XXIX.]
27
and
consciousness of sensation
is,
itself,
thought
it,
so the consciousness of
^i^oi
^t
jg
distinct
there
is
may
evidence, and
it
is
now
by those who
generally admitted
tbousht
thought, or suggestion,
we can
may
go on in unconsciousness, that
often have
anything whatever to suggest them, either in external circumstances, or in the thoughts that were consciously
night,
am
my mind
Sometimes when
sciously occupied
myself very
sometimes soon
is
my
of incidents,
consciousness.
of
wakening in the
perfectly awake but not
lines
after
I find recollections
recalled
are
often
my
conscious
memory
for years.
for
any
by wdiich to account
them, and made myself certain that there was none.
But there is no effect witliout a cause, and if these
must be a function
of
vital function,
its
own
'^^J^X
to this, apparent
liable
Eeoollec-
peculiar
^^"'*^"
28
nerves
and
[cHAP.
Nerves of
thoug it.
The
and I think we
may
consequently
sensory
ganglia are
conscious-
^'^^^'
motion by
currents, set in
these,
Owing
have
nerve-currents
to the remarkable
of setting
power that
but this is
and thought are, I believe, in their own nature unconscious
^^^ t^6 nerve -currents of sensation and thought give rise
to consciousness, not always, and not directly, but only by
scious
Conscious-
thought,
how
pro-
currents
to
flow
along the
nerves of consciousness.
My
to the question I
answer
sequently this
is
is
con-
due
to
consciousness
to the
fibres
or,
is
due
mutual action of the sensory ganglia and the nervewhich connect them with the ganglionic substance
of the cerebrum.
itself, it
If
is
it
is
not the
will necessarily
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF
XXIX.]
memory
of a sensation is a continuation or
memory
itself,
it.
when
is
little
This
has disappeared.
show
29
MITn^D.
how
necessary
have to
some of the most elementary and important mental
it
is
^^^^^
itself conscious-
is
in a future chapter,
its rudi-
to
sensation
outlasting
the sensation.
whatever in understanding
There
itself.
it
is
no
difficulty
to take the
bright light
This
is
when
Sensations,
as a fact.
that flows along the optic nerve, and produces the sensation of light in the optic ganglia, continuing to fl.ow after
its
may
when
elastic bodies,
It is to
not currents of
currents.
as,
manner.
or,
The
when we
for instance,
is
recall
^^^^'
be explained in a parallel
to
in a word, recollection
what we
is
due
of sensation
tlie
sensation was
or
recollection,
as
But
due.
tion of a
current of
conscious^gg_*
there
reproduced
of sensation.
so
[chap.
currents
by
those of repro-
law of mental
habit, or, as
it is
according to the
which
of
act
I shall
have to speak
in a future chapter.
Consensual action
produced
bered"cou-"
sciousness.
j^ many
cases, remembered consciousness acts on the
^
motor nerves, and on the whole organism, exactly as the
>
oi"igiii^l
The
it,
would
do.
produces nausea.
sea-sickness
Such
due, however,
to reproduced
of sensation.
motor actions
going, not
by
indicating
by
a sensation, but
this
are set
or idea, of a sensation.
In
mind which
am
here attempting,
it
my
belief
on the
As
by a nerve-current of thought.
Thus,
when
remember
speech I heard yesterday, the revived consciousness of the sounds is just like the original consciousness I had of them when I heard them, only fainter;
to-day the
XXIX.]
currents
now they
sensation, while
of
31
are
by
excited
currents of thought.
nerves
^^"sual
which they
direct
sensual action
just the
is
it
is
same in voluntary
at another
as in con- voluntary,
according
* !:^^
in consensual action
nature
is
excited to act
in voluntary action
it
is
motor current which will cause the eyelids to close, without the action of will, or even the production of consciousThis
ness.
is
consensual action
may
also
believe the
nerves of thought, in
producing voluntary
inotor
ganglia
the nerves
^ ^^^'
As
identified.^
already stated,
it is
now
may
also
be
is
just as the fibres that connect the sensory ganglia with the
The whole
action
is
of consciousness
Position of
^^ "7^*^^
of will.
32
[chap.
consciousness.
is
is
this
when
action
current in the
and
on the motor
this acts
Voluntary
actions
may
voluntary at
become
consensual.
Instance
of a
musician.
is
may
hereditary
in animals,
as in birds,
of this
is
afforded
especially music.
by the
act of learning
In learning to play
of walking
become
may become
actions,
This
first
is
Even the
many
act
Among
first
have
by
One
instance of this
and in
apply to
all consensual
actions.
dogs.
natural.
This explanation
will not
Were we
to study
man
is
only,
we
the case
XXIX.]
33
any of
its
ancestors
will, either in
I believe
it
to
be due to
action.!
It is
^^''*
the bee
*^^
makes
i,een^de
^^
l"ped out
sensual
"its ^^'^
SGllStl3.l
is
developed out of
all,
life,
which, in animals
action.
The
life,
though
its
sensation.
VOL.
II.
out of in^^^^i^nt.
34
Summary.
life
Enumera-
[chap.
and
may be enumerated
as
Sensation,
tion of
mental
Motor
actions.
action,
Will, and
Thought.
Each
of these has
its
own
and
nerve-fibres,
special
is
or,
in other words,
by
the converse.
according to
definite laws.
Mutual
relation
of the
The
may
and
nerve-fibres of
mind
nervous
organs of
mind.
Nerves of thought.
^
Motor
Sensory ganglia.
ganglia, or
corpora striata.
'S'
Organs of
Sensation.
Voluntary muscles.
sense.
in currents flowing
the
first fact
of
mind
XXIX.]
35
Sensation sometimes determines the flow of a downward Consencurrent from the motor ganglia along their nerves to the ^^^^'^^^^'^
muscles, causing muscular motions.
This
is
what
is
called
consensual action.
Conscioussensation.
connect them with the ganglionic substance of the cerebrum, producing consciousness. This is original consciousness, or consciousness of sensation.
producing thought.
Thought
not
itself
of consciousness.
it
Conscious-
jucecrb
thought.
Even
of mental interactions
various kinds
is
incomplete.
It
we
have
to
The phenomena of
sleep,
D 2
mental
life,
and on the
36
by
tbeir nerve-fibres.
[cHAP.
may need
Independ-
explanation.
which sleep
in
consists,
the
fibres
that
connect them
or to keep
up the communication.
Thus, in the
and thought
may
memory, reasoning, or
invention while the sensory and motor nerves, with their
ganglia, may be engaged with some consensual action, such
but
as the practice of some easy mechanical occupation
the mind may have no consciousness of what the eye is
seeing, or what the hand is doing
in physiological lanbe
intently
occupied with
In sound
sleep,
the whole
activity of the
cerebrum
appears to be suspended, including the nerves of consciousness and will, as well as those of thought.
activity of the sensory
round during
still
is
very
possible,
The
much
such
sleep.
^'
while
all
suspended,
work as in
somnambulists show that
mind
is
are at
The actions of
must be awake, and capable of guiding consensual action. Thought and wiU are also active, and yet
Somnambulism appears to be
there is no consciousness.
the only mental state in which determinations of the will
the waking
state.
their senses
made
are
unconsciously.
XXIX.]
As
iii
tliis
37
is
gtated"'^^
avowedly propounded as only a hypothesis, I shall conclude by stating, more distinctly than I have yet done,
the evidence on which
it rests.
we had no
analogy would make it
Even
if
direct
nerve and
But we have
function.
own
its
direct evidence
separate
anatomy, and
Functions
fail
is
and
are
known.
perfectly well
of
gg^g^jj^j^j
nerves
i^fJn-ed
by
analogy,
method
It
is,
however,
all
analogy
may
other
;
and
certainty as to
distinct sets of
These are
to Cerebral
be thus enumerated
1. The fibres connecting the sensory ganglia with the
:
The
fibres
connecting
the
different
parts
of
The
fibres
the
I
And
of thought,
Will.
As
a parallel to
psychological (or
these
what
is
anatomical
facts,
the purely
of
38
Mind
Three
primary
*^^
[chap.
that
to say
is
Consciousness, or Feeling
functions,
Thought
and
Will.
It is at least a probable hypothesis, that the three sets
probably
spondino-
thereto.
functions.
j^ggg^
Now,
liow are
we
will.
thought
and
facts greatly
conscioustiuct from
These
will,
Nerves of
conscious-
'
of reasoning applies to
what
I believe to
Thought
unco^uscious,
is
though
it is
That
is to
say,
it is in itself
is
not
uncon-
XXIX.J
Being
itself
unconscious,
of consciousness
seat cannot
its
and I think
39
be in the nerves
analogy
all
is
in favour of
is
tlie
of
ougit.
or,
mutual action of
and
'due to the
cerebral hemispheres,
man and
;
and
that the
rest,
it is
my
reasoning
little difiiculty in
is
assented to thus
there can be
far,
by
"What
is
the
Sup-
on deliberation, to draw
back from a position of danger, and do so this is voluntary
pose, for instance, that I decide,
action.
deliberate,
differs
my
it
better
judgment
this
The stimulus
to ideo-motor
originally
of thought.
*
Cai'penter's
Human
to voluntary action
Pliysiology, p. 577.
comes
Ideo^i^,[{^ar
actions
tiu^Iuished.
40
[CHAP.
directly,
medium
of
reason to
The theory
plet^'
outline, is
filled up.
but an
which
outline,
Among
other
no account of one of the most remarkable and yet common of mental facts, namely the act of
which may be defined as the direction of conattention
In any but the most
sciousness by a voluntary act.
deficiencies, it gives
of little
is
or no use as a guide.
NOTE.
NERVOUS CURRENTS,
Conscious- If
T^^
^s
secondary
^^'
my
theory of consciousness
^ secondary
is correct,
consciousness
The consciousness
phenomenon.
is
always
of a sensation
is
is
One
current of
It is to
order to illustrate
first,
my
but
meaning,
may make
is
not a mere
is
it
will
In
electric telegraph.
Compared London
to d6ctric
continuation of the
Telegraphic instru-
from
teleffi-aph
currents,
But
The
NEEVOUS CURRENTS.
XXIX.]
41
say, a battery
battery.
Just
so,
may
is
other.
not a continua-
is
is
is
The ^^gL
necessary to the
two substances
voltaic current.
is
CHAPTEE XXX.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THOUGHT.
an analysis of
and
analysis illustrates,
is
anatomy and
That anatomy and
are, I believe,
tifying the
Physio-
though
all
depemis on
nervous
will,
we have no means
af iden-
particular mental
^* elementary
parts,
usflessas
a guide in science,
elementary psychology,
and of
without
howevex,
is
must be studied
further
as a
its
distinct
This,
we
''
But though it is impossible to trace the deon nervous action in particular cases,
that dependence is proved as a general truth by all analogy,
and by much direct evidence such as the fact that great
mental power is never found without a well-developed
connexion.
P^iidence of mental
Proofs of
this.
cerebrum
true)
met with
But there
is
is
sometimes
certainly
no
malformed
one.
CH. XXX.]
nervous energy,
wliicli requires to
43
be renewed in sleep
composition of the
phosphorus, which
We
is
separating
and
we have seen that these correspond with the three primary
mental functions of Feeling, Thought, and Will.
In speaking of the results of psychological analysis, I
say feeling, thought, and will, rather than consciousness,
thought, and will.
Feeling includes consciousness, but it
cerebral nerves for consciousness, thought,
will
produces feeling
and
Feeling
is
^'
^"
'^^
consciousness.
pressions coming
of sense, or from Feelings of
from the external organs
o
sensation
the external termination of any of the nerves of the body, and feel'
*-
belong to sensation
the brain
belong to consciousness.
itself
ness of a sensation
...
while
it
is
present
is
;
sensation which
is
is
memory,
no longer
The
simplest,
cousc*iousness.
.of
out of
or the consciousness of a
present.
Beyond
this
are
generated indepen-
organs
of
We
feelings.
sensation
and
consciousness,
which
and
feelings of
and
desire
and
memory
out
44
[chap.
Feeling
is
cable^^"
feeling
is.
when
and
made
to understand
knowledge, so
this is real
far as it
but no possible explanation could make him underTo use a mathestand what the sensation of green is.
goes
matical
mode
of speech, sensation
But with
Thought is
explicable,
thought
^mconscious thought
may
elements, and
It
ness.
is,
Thought
otherwise.
is
it
even
is
admitted, that
universally
believe,
sensation
all
The
first
the
is
conscious-
^J^L*^/
S61IS6
01
the rela-
to
sensations
to each
other.
each other
the
consciousness,
for
Qf
their
co-existence
once, the
more than
or
more
separation in space.
or
more
sensations,
time,
or
of
Now, when
consciousness
to the rest
instance, of the
succession in
co-existence or
their
or
or,
in
is
generally
common
directed to one
language, the
mind
For instance,
Attention
particular
sensation,
music and talk are both going on at once, the attention will
probably be directed either to the music or to the talk, but
not to both.
*'''
^.
?j,
relation
if
rest.
ness
is also
than
to the other.
in geo-
study!^
set of relations
between sensations.
of
XXX.]
45
by the use of a
The
lines
of
the
diagram
may be either
geometrical diagram.
drawn in white chalk on a black board, or in black ink on
white paper; but it makes no difference whatever to the
this that I can think of, is that afforded
nor would
it
make any
if
It is
make an impression on
his sight
were there no
differ-
the lines.
is
them considered
as a relation
between
colours,
but with a
particular kind
truth.
geometrical
of the
of
tru.ths
geometry in themselves, or in relation to all possible intelligence, it is an unquestionable fact that we begin our knowledge of geometry, and indeed of everything, by cognition
of sensations and of the relations between sensations.
thought
the
first
that
it is
relation
be admitted by
But
all.
am
the con-
is
This, I be-
inclined to think
though
it
is
accurate not to be
sufficiently
we
when we
am
that
is
say that
'
sensations
which
are related.
much
The
relations of
geometry
we
^^ij ^^
related
things.
ness of
't'pJftfl.fi'i'iQ
'
to
mere
see red
46
Here
related to
green,
am
but I
[chap.
are the
two
each other as
am
not,
am
but I
But we
knowledge
knowledge
of rela
am
or metaphysically as
tions.
that
we
relations
There
we may.
nothing
is
new
my readers
thought
thus explained.
in all this.
logically
between them.
one half of
scious
it
it
is
it
is
a mere truism,
scious thought.
Thought has
to
ness
that
sensations on
based.
(I
to say, of remoteness
is
which
do not
ceases to
arises.)
scious
clusicm'of
feel-
the
relations.
are.
And
this,
believe, is
the
may
be said in reply to
ill2fS
between
which the
nevertheless ultinaately
tions,
of^rda^*^^
tions only, subjects
the
it
is
Thought
Now,
thought
offer this as a
objects of thought,
be con-
all
mathematical and
all
this, that, if it
were
true,
performed unconsciously.
XXX.]
47
tmconsciously
unsought, they
know
not
how
that
is to say,
as the result
CHAPTEE XXXI.
MENTAL
All actions
tend to
become
habitual.
IN
HABIT.
Law
habits,
and
to
tifically
When
Motor
habits.
becoming
the formation of
Voluntary habit
habitual
and consensuaL
at once scien-
is
it is
of
actions
than
mechanical
habit
the power of
arts,
that
not
individual,
human
beings
which
actions
at
so
first
hereditary
to
learn
were per-
may
be so trained
unconsciously,
by
ideas.
purpose
much
and to good
more thoroughly exBut the isolated manner in
studied,
till
MENTAL
CHAP. XXXI.]
The law
as if
it
HABIT.
is
49
generally mentioned
Now,
no doubt an
is
it
is
concerned.
is
not resolvable
is
it
It
Ideas
may
my
it
is
a perfectly
wherever
it
will
meaning.
be defined as
all
which
sequently,
by common
is
usage, but
it
is
intelligible
This use of
is
sanctioned
and, I
^^"^ P'^
consciousness are
sensory or
^'^^'^l-
think,
ness
or,
memory
Law
in
of as""^
stated
feel-
the conscious-
and less
have been experienced
Let us call two sensa-
in fewer words
A and B
groups of sensations,
succession
of a man's instance
statement the sight
instead of an algebraic
<J
o
face and the sound of his voice may become so associated '^^^^ ^^^
:
J?
VOL. IL
voice.
50
the two
may
[cHAP.
other, so that the sight of the face will recall the voice into
a single sensation
sense of sight
is
of sensations has
a group of sensations
become
familiar, it is capable of
becoming
by contiguity
time
ciation
con iui
rience
by
^^^^
Association
contiguity.
y,
^yiiici^^
though
this
is
way
is
called asso-
produced in another
il
fl
reTl
fP
'
mind the
face
when
it
mean
association
the sight of a
resembles.
by resemblance
Association by resemblance
both cases
of ^^^^
.
same prm
law of
In order
habit.
by
as
to
be indistinguishable
Explana-
as,
for
instance,
two
book
at a
If I see a
friend's house,
tion of as-
by resem- are two distinct incidents, partly alike and partly unlike^
blance:
^-^.^^ -^ ^^^^^ y^^ ^^^ copies of the book were exactly
similar, unlike in that the places
MENTAL HABIT.
XXXI.]
61
But when
the second impression on my consciousness is made by
seeing the book for the second time, the idea of the book
is
the
idea
of the
This
is
incidents
make on
When
its
may
always be resolved
the other,
one thing, or
similar parts of
A X and A
T.
In
A X
by
is
contiguity.
is
a case
tk,nT^^'
contiguity.
In order to prevent
my
X-
my
E 2
HABIT
52
by resemblance,
AND
INTELLIGENCE.
[cHAP.
what
elaborately explained
itself
may
when
formally stated,
is
self-evident
is it
it is
are formed
by
by resemblance is
by contiguity. But I beKeve
that association
tion
all
simple associations
so
generally admitted
include
all
to a possible objection to
my mode
of
It
is
as
we
it
may
mental law.
I believe, however, that this difference, important as it is, may be shown to be merely one
of degree.
The law of habit is, that actions tend to repeat
different
All assode^*euds
on
habit,
themselves.
tition
but
no less truly
became habitual after countless
repetitions.
If, indeed, we knew the meaning of any
words without having learned them, this would no doubt
be a case of association wliich could not be traced to habit.
But it is safe to assert that no case of the kind exists.
In the chapter on the Laws of Habit,^ we have seen that
a case of habit than
if it
Chapter XV.
is
MENTAL HABIT.
XXXI.]
and
it
is
by
disuse.
This
is
universally
"53
Memory,
as
we have
sists
in the liability of
seen,
and con-
Forget^
]^'gg
habits
^f^
by
language,
it is
But we have
forgotten.
its
^^^^
promi-
supposed
* ^^ ^*'
memories of childhood.
r
As
is
a law of all
life,
so the
law of Associa-
The
acquisition of knowledge
the learnincf of a
Accuisi^'
tion of
ledgl'
are wanted.
Error.
Kcverie.
effort of will.
Imagination, or invention, consists in the
formation within the mind of ideal associations, which the
inventor may afterwards construct as actual combinations
Invention,
54
as
when
poem
[chap
or a piece of music
is constructed, after
being
is
first
as,
for instance,
when
Sir E. Murchison,
from
may
my
appear to some of
I reply,
must be the
and
all
mental combina-
mind
can only
com me.
j^ ^^^ present
is
originality
in
its
is
mode
But
it
impossible.
of
the
by experience,
unquestionable.
thiak this
truly origiaal
Are all
mental
-able to the
*^^
-inTntal
hahit
Parallel
Origin of species.
whether
question
^-^q facts of
in biology.
adaptation
can be due to the actions,
Organic
^
\^liev0
mtelligence, in
I
forces, acting
MENTAL HABIT.
XXXI.]
which
is
an ultimate
science of mind.
a principle of organ-
is
addition to
j^abit^^^
telligent forces, or
elements, but
is
55
the
Ju.st so in
fact of nature.
an ultimate, primary
or whether
is
incapable of being
fact,
it
an ultimate
it is
keep
I shall
something
is
But
ultimate
^^.ct
I believe
fact.
Is intelli-
as
for
it
to speak of habit
and
It will
who
is
in
any degree
of ideas
very slightly.
our ideas
of external
things
to
as
which
class
belong
distinguished from
And
have
dis-
My
is.
Why
^^^J^^^a
association
treatise
on biology
and
and
applications,
would be
The
on
this or
any other
subject,
is
to
"'^
^"
CHAPTER XXXII.
THE GROUNDS OF THE MORAL NATURE.
Definition.
Moral
mind
restricted
and wrong. I intend to speak of the moral nature as coextensive, and indeed identical, with the emotional nature.
Moral
is
contrasted
j/o?-aZ
is
is
ledual.
sense of
pleasure
and
in the
If^the*
moral
?nthe^^^
pain,
Pleasure
and pain
are luexjilicable in
serfs'
may
or,
and
ni-
but
it
jj^^y
law
p
that it directs all the actions, whether
intelligence,
o
organisms
whatever
to do what formative, motor, or mental, of an orgamsm,
the
health
of
organism.^
life
and
the
is best for
welfL-l!^^^'^ direction
it
guides all
'^'-
'
m
_
See
p. 8.
am
57
CH. xxxil.]
lutely unerring,
it
it
is
in itself abso-
the
fall
But
this, as
it is
is
developed, Sentient
when organisms
at least as
committed
j,ble
in taste
indications
right,
and
as to
if
what
this
is
be entirely
for
the^iaw^
perish.
The sense
and pain
the root
is
so that,
Desire and
5S
organisms
once
acquire
and
desires
[cHAP,
fears,
the law
of
life"^
or sensation,
with
all
down
is
life.
we have
in
common
which prompts
their
all
universal
among
organisms, sentient
We
and
insentient,
by that
intelligence to
perform not only such actions as are salutary for the individual, but also such as are needed for the perpetuation
of the
race.''-
is
When
sentient "and
organisms
become
which minister
as those which minister
actions
to the
life
of
conscious,
the
and
social
affections :
of desire.
Thus the
instinct of a
she pro-
and,
if
she
all,
gives rise
and any interference with its performance gives rise to a sense of pain.
The affection
of a bird or other animal for her young has thus
to a sense of pleasure,
See
p. 9.
XXXII.]
its
instinctive
which
intelligence
59
sensation, in the
or
prompts
organisms,
all
life
own; and
the same
We
life.
Great
are 'in-^
...
'
'
and
this is affirmed
by
all
We
we weary
of
monotony and
The
full
form,
is
we know
we
like
what
is
like novelty.
its
it
is
true.
paradoxical
but we like
familiar,
and familiar
that
it
to
flieht,
Die Bhime
verbllilit,
Vol.
i,
p. 188.
Schiller.
ones
60
and
[chap.
same
Many
it.
and
whom
music", to
commence a
I should
were to endeavour
if
novelty
the
whole
of
subject
is
that
law
human
human
the
all
novelty
for
trace
to
slight
disagreeable
applications
pleasing,
but great
connected with
is
character,
and
all
the
character in history, in
The sense
of
beauty
a very complex
is
fact,
and
tion of
ciple to
eauty.
which
eluding
that
by
in-
and excluding
all
it is
that
meant
it
is
meant
to include,
to exclude.
analysis.
any
beauty
is
complex
But
law already
is
changes
are
painful.
XXXII.]
61
eye.
who
those
Slight changes
either alone.
form,
may be
order
due to variety
is
among
beauty of colour
is
foliage
that which
is
all
The soundness
An
artistic
fail
are based
on our
natiiral
and
feelings
and
I believe I have
have their roots in the deepest
;
life.
thetic
and
social feelings,
and
so
much
of the sense of
which we have in
living beings, whether sentient or insen-
common
tient.
with
all
is
in
any way
though
much
Roots of
?ti^3
organic
^^^*
62
that
my
is
in
may now be
[chap.
to
But there
Emotions
and
doubt generated by
by^associa-
tion-
Associa-
law of what be called the association of feelings, as distinguished from and parallel to the association of ideas, is
feeUngs
this,
that whatever
all
becomes the
Thus the sight
itself
The
of
Money
is
money.
desirable
it is
by
fedTng^
of
its
means.
money can be
in
any
The love
life.
desirable things
formed,
it is
men spend
may have
others,
by
which
able to purchase.
it is
own
a secondary
up
it
as if
But once it
and many
it were de;
else.
It
among the
civilized races of
men
one
Emotions
is
is
hereditarv
real
of kindred,
any
life,
emotion, produced
is
a primary feeling.
it is
practically a primary
The
is,
se^aTin the
nerves of
ness.
ciation,
This
is
true alike
be primary,
assoor,
in
XXXII.]
63
The sense
sure and the
of pleasure
or prudence.
1.
2.
own
Prudence.
the
3.
stance,
preferring
Uuselfish'^*'^^-
is
I cannot think of
in the
pleasure,
to provide for
care
or
and the
Origin of
P^i^deuce
readi-
or
sense of one's
own
Out
of the
And
and
pain.
and
fears, of
love
and love of
arise of
virtue.
no room
cussion
it
necessarily arises
will
have
The
much
debated.
is
a subject which
have stated
my
reasons
which prompt
all
of the race.
mere sensation,
of unsel"s'^'^''^
l^oli'^ess.
64
[CH. XXXII.
for instance, is
the pleasures of
The
sense
a case^^^
of intelligence.
is
And how
than
all
the rest
life,
or sensation,
at this
most important
subject.
It
the philosophical school which he so ably represents, that the moral sense
is
what
feeling,
ought to
say,
He
means
that besides
and lower
little
of
whence
it is
derived,
it is
underived.
CHAPTEE
XXXIII.
MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.
T)EFOPiE
mind.
ciples of
Mind
It is
is
development.
itself
belong to mind
as
one which
my
my
is
may
and
I state this
I reply to
it,
of fact,
Consciousness belongs to
that
have stated
my Jjfh"^
by the
heart,
mental
either
by bodily
or
feelings.
VOL. IL
seusation.
action Feelings
i^s^onlv'^
is
But, as a matter
Is sensa-
by
tion and
of consoioiisiiGss '
66
I
or bodily
fe'din^sf ^
have just
mental
common
usecl the
feelings," to signify
feelings of sensation
common
expression
understand what
it
and
what
The
feelings of consciousness.
perfectly accurate,
is
[chap.
really means,
we
if
and do not
accurately
let ourselves
anatomical
grounds
their
which
jjjo.g
mental
itself.^
due
to the action
-^i
j^t
mental
feelings, or feelings of
consciousness,
no fundat^ction'^^^
those of consciousness.
Sensation.
Besides sensation,
heads
Conscious'^^^^^
1.
aU
are
tions
to
we have
be classed under
Consciousness
to
feelings of con-
Consciousness has
2.
Thought.
Thought
its
root in sensation.
its
root in the
living
And
which has
3.
Will
It
may be
its
all
is
myseK, by
vol.
ii.
MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.
XXXIII.]
which
all
mind
sciousness has
is
its
developed
67
Had
each other.
We may
germ
of sensation,
but thought and will send down each its own root into the
insentient life thought into unconscious vital intelligence,
will into the motor function.
Relation
iji^^if^^
to the
jj^^P^'^ti'''^*
I have a few
more remarks
to
make
before going on to
by which mind
difl&cult, if
which
to
subject,
oiit.
which
it
is differentia-
differentiation, it is
imply that
Especially
is this
differentiation signifies
true
when
form
deve-
will appear to
hranching
is
the successive
In the tabular
summary
of this
tree,
development
Analogy of
^^'^^^^} *"
organic
and most completely in the develophighest. The differentiated organs and tissues of organisms ^^^^^'
do not branch out and separate on the contrary, the more
complete is their differentiation, the more complete also is
intertheir integration
that is to say, the more unlike they ^^tion of
become, the more perfectly their functions are combined, m?nT
of all organisms,
r 2
68
[CHAF.
development
but
it
make any
now proceed
to state in
some
detail
how
I conceive the
by development the
We
thought and
feeling,
have their
Develop-
is
ment
germ in sensation determining consciousness. The voluntary powers, on the contrary, have their germ in sensation
of
thought,
feeling,
and
\vill.
Or we may
tradictory metaphor,
is
to say, in consensual
and
stating
its
and
will, or
motor functions.
Consensual and
the volun-
Chapter XII.
I shall
MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.
XXXIII.]
69
mentally voluntary
^ ^^^"
do or not to
do.
mean
to.
'
inter-
^J^diate
class.
sense voluntary.
The development of merely consensual or sense-determined nervous action into will is, perhaps, the greatest of
the mysteries in the whole of the mysterious realm of life.
I am unable to throw any further light upon it and as the
'
fall
within the
As
Sensation
g^iousTess
^'o.th i'lex-
^^
of the
I shall
speak
nature.
This
is
See
p. 29,
Develop-
omory,
f'o'n con-
outlasting
sensation.
70
memory is
[chap.
number
of impressions
successively received
Necessity
thought
Hearing
words
it is
and
sentences,
sively,
The
power
is
thinking
sensation
effect of this
economize time in
the consciousness of a
itself
would be impossible
it
to
practically
is
to
cognise
thought,
I say,
would
be,
impossible.
Memory
is
of
memory another
first
when
is
which have
memory by
mind
itself.
association
is
it
In other
equally true
By
the esta-
becomes possible
for
one
MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.
XXXlli.]
71
itself,
up the remembrance
of another, but that remembrance may call up another
remembrance and this may go on for a great number
one impression on consciousness
call
of times.
in
the
Reverie
may
of
succession
Reverie,
calling
number
manner can
we account for the strange way in which absent and longThis
forgotten things will often come back to memory.
unaccompanied by consciousness
unconscious suggestion
is
of unconscious thinking.
in no other
But
to the
memory
The next
is
suggestion, but
by a voluntary
re- EecoUec-
memory.
we
It is
order to recall
needed, in
Recollection
is
what we wish
recollect.
This
to every one
remember.
Children often
to
it
later
is
is
acquired.
they can
well
known
Children
7.
Somethmg
it.
of the
t'o"-
Attention
is
a voluntary act
voluntary direction
of
it
may
consciousness.
may
verify,
is,
think,
^.^ttg,jj^>^i
to
can be
72
[chap.
recol-
lected.
attended to
may
be recognised
when they
We have
now
memory, from
impressions on the consciousness, up
what
is
A higher
stage of
new
formation of
tion, or the
1.
it
Memory.
2.
Memory by
Eecollec-
3.
4.
tion.
Imagina-
pressions
tion.
association.
by the action
ment
of
reasoning
out of cognition of
relations.
memory and
reasoning power.
As
the
germ
of
memory
is
the power of
has vanished
so the
germ
of
There
are,
The
believe, three,
as
when two
brevity, let
2.
The
For
If
MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.
xxxiil.]
73
two sensations
it,
If I
For brevity,
co-existent in time.
let
us
call
Succes-
sion.
3.
The
If I feel
two
objects,
hand on a
slab of marble,
and
find
For brevity,
let
it
is
a case of
If I press one
two sensations in
space.
Space-
sensation
of
impression of sensation
may
cause an emotion, as
mind
For brevity,
of another.
But
let
it
an
when
may
be the cause
causation.
Causatiou.
mind
simple
the
space-relation
and causation
are,
according
cession.
my
only to state
are,
and
of the
to
my
belief as to
relations
relations.
74
As
[chap.
has ceased
is
the germ
of
It is
be
to
pre-
is
Asso-
EelatioDS
presup-
posed in
that the
association.
true,
mind
whether
by
ciation
the
cognises
am
This
likeness.
is
equally
likeness
resolvable
is
by
association
into
contiguity.
The
first
cognition of relations
Perception.
things.
I think that
the second
is
the perception
of
tlie
data being
hemispheres
unconscious,
the sensory
Perception
may
have
its
seat in
sensory
ganglia.
is
it
conscious
has had
ganglia are
thought,
its
or,
if
it
has become
But
origin in consciousness.
perhaps the
seat,
power of cognising
not only of
likeness,
suc-
and
and possibly even in the Vertebrata, they
In a future chapter I
are the seat of perception also.
shall have to treat the subject of perception with greater
in
insects,
fulness.
MENTiVL DEVELOPMENT.
xxxrii.]
simple inference
it
consists in the
is
on
its
man must
75
power of making
siicli
peg.
of the
the distinctively
able to see
it is
But
the animals
is
man
intellectual, I
it
On
at will.
and with
is
?*
'*^i'^-
*^^'
thouo-ht
m Abstrac-
of
Language.
i^S-
VP^hately's
I'angua^e.
"
And
believe he maintained
ments of thought
is
at
the distinctively
is
human
power, and
lower animals.
possible to
make such an
is correct as to
the facts.
inference as that a
man
hat
is
we
think in words
and that
if
we were
process of thought
believe the
think
I
I
it
is
the result of
should think
so,
even
if
of
though"
76
[chap.
due to the
power of
directing
thought
at will
associations.
is
new
at first
whence
also the
power of
abstraction.
Instance
in aritli-
metic.
table
that
is
say,
is to
truths,
In saying that
instance, we have
sixty-four,
for
number
houses,
of sixty-four
it
matters not
they
may
may
count up to the
be books, or
we only make an
cattle, or
assertion con-
is
mind can do
is
always
it.
Voluntary
action
of the
mind
is
Voluntary recollection
its
higher than
later deve-
spontaneous action.
loped than
involun-
tary.
is
is
The same
is
also true
MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.
xxxiii.l
of motor action
77
is
a later and
may
cUstuictively
Simple
^^if^renoe
abstract
'"^^^s-
development
we have
The germ
Out
is Moral
of
and
felt,
JJ^ture
developed
fear
and out of the desire and fear of present things, !,i!f!!,l
such as desire for food or fear of a wild beast, arise care and pain,
for the unseen and distant future
and hence the virtue care for
:
(for it is
At
a virtue) of prudence.
new ^^^
future,
objects
by the
association in the
money can
it
associa-
mind
of
money with
the desirable
money
is
it
things that
will obtain.
mark and
obtain for
its
owner
attribute of a
because
for
is,
it
is
the
tion.-
it
is
only
or
chiefly
for
the
may
Sympathy.
78
the fear of
the fear of
man
it
[cHAP.
same
but
to the pleasures
Love of
rkMwledge,
ana of
holiness,
of
<?
those
its
am cominced of
The main divisions
but I
plan.
are
part.
differ in
they
same
division
are, at least in
may
of which, indeed,
be regarded as a continuation
two tables
Vol.
i.
p. 163.
it
The arrangements
MENTAL DEVELOPMENT,
XXXIII.J
but this
have endeavoured
its
own
As the
to
79
is
make each
point of view.
communicate information
to give a concluding
Sensation
summary
of them,
it
may
be well
may produce no
effect
it
beyond
may
itself,
produce
or
it
The
may
Con-
action.
is
first
an ordinary paragi'aph.
produce consciousness, or
sciousness
not to
is
intel-
memory by
The germ
nation.
power
is
and imagi-
the cognition
and the
space-relation
ciation,
emotions
action,
action
tion
of
thought.
it
the sympathetic
this
in
its
simplest
and the
"When sensation proform
is
consensual
muscular
action,
Summarj'.
80
Tabular
1.
By
[chap.
Sensation.
itself.
statement.
^
a.
Continuance of
consciousness
1.
Mnemonic.
)3.
when
sensa-
tion
past.
is
Memory
by
suggestion.
7. Voluntary
re-
collection.
,
5.
Imagination.
a.
of
Cognition
simple rela-
l.Tntellectual.
tions.
2.
2.
(8.
Perception of
7.
Simple
things.
Rational.
Deter-
mining
Sensation.
infer-
ence.
S.
conscious-
Abstract
rea-
soning.
ness.
a.
Sense of pleasure
and pain.
Emotions of association.
Emotional.
Sympathy.
. Love of beauty
and of
f Knowledge.
^7). Moral sense.
S.
a.
Consensual action.
3.
mining
action.
7.
Deter-
Voluntary
rection
di-
of
thought.
The foregoing
all
now
state
them
separately,
and
classified
of view of development.
1
Chapter XV.
Mind:
MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.
XXXIII.]
"3
O
-^
CO
7i
bo
or
tissu
C>
no
motic
orga
notion
tn
4-5
'S
^ M
otion.
n.
c^_, c*_i
o
a 3 a a
.2
"o "s
l>,
0)
fl
to
m
rmatio
rmatio
rmatio
ontane
nsensu
c?
P,
pj
taoo
j3
CO
81
P4
tab <o
s
s O
CS
9
CD tw i)
54-1
O)
^H
7^
-t-
>->
ctf
c:
C0.2 S
^
-M
S
-r-*
luntar
p ft
!-(
-*-
ft_2
ca
o o
compo
flex
o o
f^
|i(fe
o,
!D
::;
go
O O
xPi8>
5
s
CO W
B 01 ^<o
05.
S.::^
0^
03.
O 3 o
K- HH
t^o
o
B
a
t^
(P
^^
cB
-^ '^ 'S
'S
's!
cS O P
O
O ft. a
S ph a
S
a
CB
?S
OJJ CD
cD.ii
:;<
'-3
c^
-2
A
pH tZ2 -q CO
01
i>ra
8'
Oi c^5
a
c3
C3
_o
o
a
Second
tabular
statement.
60
.g
a en
o S
cS
>-,
CO
a a
u n
OS
cm'
CQ
>'.
C3
fl^
r/l
C/J
O)
bc
't>,
f>;=l
rn
'5
i!
Sh
*+->
=2
CD
>
rr" -3
^
fc.
cH bOfl
O)
d)
,13
-M c^
t
a
a
3 g, o
< o
C3
I^H
rH
VOL.
II.
82
[CII.
XXXIII.
NOTE.
is to say, feelings
which
expression, feelings
sciousness, as
where
and
itself
and
are one
sciousness of a sensation
itself,
I refer to this, as
itself.
it
thought.
may probably be
though
inadvertence.
I beUeve, however,
I believe
there is no subject to reconsideration,
that I
unconscious
feeling.
and
am
right
I believe that
it.
It
may be urged
that,
as unconscious sensations
common remark to
we did not know the
Avas gone.
strength of our
own
It is a
lost,
that
what we were
we had at
circumstances
and though
become
actual.
is
I believe
we cannot be
unconscious
CHAPTEK XXXIV.
MENTAL GKOWTH.
TISr the last chapter, I have given an account in outline, Analogy
-- of the process by which the mind, like an oroanism, ]>.^^^'^^^^
and
ism and
in d^eloij-
"i^"* ''^
tiatiou^'
developed out of the germ of sensation. The resemblance is one of analogy, according to the received
is
definition of
analogy,
namely resemblance of
relations.
the relation to
of the
or
bodily tissues
and
organs.
And
the
is
this
analogy,
functions
of
They
twofold.
not only agree in the vast complexity of both being developed by differentiation out of a simple germ
they
;
more complete is the differentiation, or mutual separaand nnlikeness, between the various organs, the more
tion
complete also
and dependence
complete
mutual co-operation
in mental development
the more
their integration, or
is
;
so
As an
is
of mental functions,
may
g2
?^^^g"^*^^
tionr
S-i
perfectly
tliouglit,
scientific
^oT^k
[chap.
from
differentiated
make
it
feeling,
work.
closeness.
well-known
It is a
The
organism
and
is
built
perfectly
is
is
equally certain of
is less visible,
consisting chiefly
structed
organism
This
organic inigence
^f
^j-^g
^^^
.^
^^^^
nutrition.
Tliere
the principle of
I have
so
mind
is
con-
out of
ini-
reasons
though unconscious.^
The growth of mind
come
to
and
something
this
life,
my
stated
materials
air.
is
for
believing,
analogous with
is
intelligent,
As
this.
to the
mind from
so
all
the
without,
genceV
vious to sensatiou
we have
but what
it
evidently not
growth.
But
this is
of
mental
As
Leibnitz expressed
it,
iMENTAL GROWTH.
XXXIV.]
"
There
is
85
this
it
vital intelligence
is
and there
it
ligence,
organizing intelligence of the vital organism, and the intelligence of the mind, are one and the same principle,
though acting unconsciously in the organism and consciously in the mind and further, that this intelligence,
:
manifestations,
its
is
an ultimate
fact,
itself.
have not
yet,
The
and
new
assimilating
material, is as constantly parting with AssimilaThese two processes respectively consti- ^g J^*^
tute nutrition and waste and the excess of nutrition over
old material.
'
Waste
is
more rapid
in early youth.
parallel to this.
The mind
is
sions
still,
is
memory
is
away and
fade
them
are lost,
Parallel in
^''^'^emng
^/essionT"
their place
what
youth.^'^
new
'^r^^^+h"*^^^
lost.
As
organic growth
growth consists
impressions than
This,
is
it
in
the
organism
-^
the
stronger
closer
distinctly stated, is
still.
excess of
'*^'^*^t
i'"*,
received
over what
^ ^**-
it loses.
when once
the parallel
consists
con-
Waste, no
self-evident
less
but
than nutrition,
86
Waste
of
a is
is
otSc
life
life
[chap.
The
and growth.
organism is not like a crystal, which simply acquires substance, and, when it has done growing, remains in a state
Both during growth and after
of molecular immobility.
that waste
is
life
weakness of mind, as
machinery.
so is for*^
am
liability
*o *^^^ l^f^
life.
less
every-
could not
think.
is
This
may
is
is
life
of
am
necessary
so forgetting,
necessary to the
is
no
and growth
bered"
to
than remembering,
lose
an imperfection and a
is
of the mind.
we
liability to
g'^^^Y^^
If
the
it
will
become
evident.
we had
^'^'^^ received since the beginning of our mental life, we
should be distracted by their multitude, we should be
If
we remembered
all
we
if all details,
forget.
MENTAL GROWTH.
xxxiv.]
Further
87
memory develops
power of
recollection,
and
it
is
The most
all.
which
growth of young
An
many impressions.
_''
impression leaves
when
it
is
its
residuum
in the
memory
and
^^^9^: ^,
residua by
forgettiug.
pressions
is
familiar
anything until
witnessed
we have
The
it.
we
indeed,
are
forgotten
earliest,
it is
part of
tlie
how
often
we have
^.*^''"*5^
arity.
of this
is,
been
left at
each time
we have heard
it.
Familiarity with
and
familiarity with
its
meaning.
The sound
sound
word is
but the know-
should rightly
it is
it
its
of a
have
fulfil its
88
tbeir
is
needed
they^must ^^ery
suggest
The
memory
of
else.
first
.secured
by the not
power of
by negative,
The
else.
it
though purely
less necessary,
forgetting.
requisite that
is
gjgg jg secured
is
it
[chap.
The sound
of a
word may
the second
getting.
before
beriuo'"
it
it,
and
other
all
the circumstance of
its
meaning.
impressions on the
its
Of
all
as it has
is
its
that
are
meaning
The word
would indeed remain in the memory, but not as a single
coalesced residuum it would not be separate and detached
from irrelevant objects it would no doubt suggest its
meaning, but it would suggest so much else that it would
not serve the purpose which language is meant to ser\^e.^
distinguishable, and could not coalesce into one.
'
It
may
be objected to
this, that, in
its
meaning
after
meeting with
it
we
only
89
MENTAL GKOWTH.
XXXIV.]
nuw
Slim
life.
into knowledge,
constantly acquiring
new
mental
life
and growth
So
be con-
necessary to
is
it
to
material.
it is
of forgetting,
of
mental phenomena.
doing
this
it."
The process
with conscious
for- Forma-
first
;
set
by which
do a thing by
the process
We learn
to
attention
"
acquiring
mean
is
is
law of
But
forming the association between a word and its meaning with peculiar
I think that children begin to acquire this power while they are
facility.
But it is not likely that a trace of it exists at the time
learning to speak.
when language
knowledge
is
il^[^ of
action
by
tllG SclTTlB
law.
90
[chap.
habit, the oftener they are repeated the easier they become,
until at last, in
many
cases,
They
but when set
it,
work
cians
become able
workman.
to perform in this
Some musi-
by the sound
of the successive
before, but
this
it
lost,
power.
The
Moral
fo^rgetting.
^^^'
^^
another way.
and
we
are of forgetting
oui-
is
good
would be bad
present,
it
is
when no
nobler cause
1
is
at work.^
And
SIattiiew Arnold.
91
MENTAL GROWTH.
XXXIV.]
to
is
law.
which
,,.
It
is
all
vital
case
of that
tendencies,
gradually disappear
1J.-
law
whether organic or
of habit
when nothing
in
occurs to
Laws
^j^g j,^^g
virtue ofofliabit.
mental,
call
into exercise.^
1
Forgetting
a case of
is
them
CHAPTEE XXXV.
THE SENSES.
it
the consciousness of
them
space,
it
which they
For the analysis of the more
it
ways
in
is
we must
also take
make any
we
that
we have
to
is
by means of which
sentient organism.
The
External
senses.
heat
is
distinct.
The
muscular
sense
of
its
by many
as a distinct sense
muscular
for regarding
it
action, is classed
belongs to
touch.
as five
namely, touch,
That of
external
my
reasons
THE SENSES.
CHAP. XXXV.]
touch.
93
is little else
than a merely
verbal question.
now proceed
differences I shall
The nerves
1.
mouth
and of
heat,
^'^j.^gg
of
.^^.^
taste.
to enumerate.
These
the nerves
we
by the consciousness
of taste
as distinct
sensations.
if
taste
smell,
or
rately.
resultant
it,
sensation
and
it
In some
resultant
those
of
cases, of
colour
its
is
constituents
is
one, the
but when
all
the
prismatic
94
White.
Sounds do
not so
combine,
but may
be discriminated.
[chap.
which is
totally unlike any of them, and could not possibly have
been predicted from them.^
The sense of hearing is the
only one among the senses which has any power of cognising, as distinct, sensations of the same order which come
mixed together. We have a power of distinguishing simultaneous sounds, and even of directing the consciousness, by
a voluntary act of attention, to one sound among many
thus, any one can, by a little effort of attention, hear
what a particular person is saying amidst a buzz of conversation and some persons acquire the power of listening
to a single instrument in a whole orchestra.
This is no
doubt an acquired power that is to say, it is not likely
that infants are born with it but it is a power which is
not the less characteristic of the sense of hearing no
amount of practice would give to the eye the slightest
vestige of any power analogous to this
no practice could
confer the power of seeing any of the separate prismatic
colours in white light.
There is reason, however, to
believe that the sense of hearing is no exception to the
law that sensations of the same sense, when transmitted by
the same nerve, combine into a single sensation.
There is
colours
are
is
white,
Reason of
this in the
constitu-
tion of the to
by the same
nerves of
hearing.
nerve.
I shall
hj the same
The
nerves of
smell,
sight,
of smell, of sight,
hearing
transmit
no other
sensation.
to transmit
to
no
them.
On
tlie
I think
we may with
THE SENSES.
XXXV.]
'9,5
for this
We
law.
surable velocity
along a wire.
much
less
what
Probable
sensations
of differeut
being
*'"?'?\^",
thus flows along
the nerve, as well as what flows along
* the mitted by
electric wire, is not a fluid, or matter in any form, but the same
'
^"it^o^t
if
the same
distinct.
Thus,
thrown into water at a little distance from each other, the waves raised by the two
will, where they meet, be seen to coalesce together, though
they afterwards separate but if the waves from a stone
are met by the waves proceeding from heavy drops of
rain, the two sets of waves, being of different orders of
magnitude, will remain visibly distinct, though intersecting
are
size
each other.
If
transmission of
ganglia,
it
it
is
vibrations
is
due to the
that our
first
cognition of space
is
due
to touch, including
sight.
96
Intellec-
tual senses;
touch,
sight,
There are only three of the senses which can be regarded as in any way intellectual senses I mean, as
3.
hearing.
[chap.
By hearing we
men, and by sight we
touch.
knowledge of external
we make
the intellect,
part
greater
obtain the
our
things.
by means of
progress in knowledge
of
most impornext
show
tant of all;
chapter,
for,
to
it is
acquire our
have
as I shall
in the
first
cognition of
and hearing
is
tion in
sions of
sight and
hearing.
Pleasure
due to
this.
-Its
moral
import-
a conversation or a poem.
This power
is
often a source of
what
is
These
this fact.
is
" i^leasures
of
were
possible
senses in the
tion
if it
to
recall
pleasures
were
memory"
for the
of
to enjoy
are perfectly
mind.
the
them
But
if it
unintellectual
in the recollec-
same kind
the meat we
memory
of
have eaten and the wine we have drunk that we can feel
in the memory of the music we have heard and the
pictures we have seen, it needs no proof how bad this
would be
for
human
character.
And
further
many
of the
would embitter
life if
memory
all
but,
other
THE SENSES.
XXXV.]
Till',
sound
of recalling
facility
1J7
is
works with the materials of sense, works exclusively with those of sight and sound, and produces the
results which we enjoy in music, in painting, and in the
far as
it
tions
memory
it
stops here
senses, the
development of
And
this, again,
At the
risk of
some
repetition, I shall
now enumerate
of
each.
1.
and one
of
]^"j_
my
hand on a
slab of These
sp]i
marble and
feel it
The sense
VOL.
ir.
and
sfi i"i
Oil ^
jo not
combine.
98
resistance
"What
l^l^X..
;.
resistance,
all
[chap.
we
by
cognise
and resistance it
appears uncertain whether there woidd be any sense of
muscular motion whatever that is to say, it is uncertain
whether muscular action would give rise to sensation if it
cognises
Muscular
sense.
it
is
Our
and
first
due
is
to the sense of
an intellectual sense
of the intellect
developed state
cognitions of space,
we
though in a
obtain information
is
being reproduced in
2.
Taste.
The nerves of
way
vivicbiess.
and of
heat,
between
its
constituents.
intellectual one
it
memory.
"
of taste
The sense
at all
is
;
not an
and
its
originally nothing.
"We do not perceive the motion of our muscles by their own sensations,
but attain a kuowledge of them only when perceived by another sense.
The muscles most under our control are those of the eye and the voice,
which perform motions microscopically small yet we have no conscious:
We
move
yet with as
It
THE SENSES.
XXXV.]
which
09
mouth.
3.
any other
sense. Smell.
resemDlance to
}\^
this
is,
which
In other respects,
nostrils.
intellectual sense
it
also,
memory.
4. The nerves of
all
is
white
for
not an
is
its
black
of their pro-
in
conditions
tasto.
no doubt, a consequence of
duction
any other
sense. Sight, or
orr"
only a
is
particular
theory
ethereal
The undulations
medium.
we
but, so far as
an
the
unilula-
sensation of light
by
those rays
appear to
and,
what
is
are acted on
^^p^j!g*^)!'
I'g^t,
differ
but in kind
when they
which
The subject
it
to
its
differ
reason
of colours
See Note
consequently
and
Note
at the
end of
is
at
my
com-
further
this chapter.
of space,
end of chapter.
h2
their
though I
various
sensations
^^"^""'-
100
demonstrable that
Sight gives
think
of^pac'r
o'btained, not
Characters
of sight,
it is
Sight
is
by
sight,
tlie first
[chap.
cognition of space
is
but by touch.
and in connexion
memory,
5.
hearing.
any other
is
sense.
and
Semicircular
canals give
a sense
S ^^f.
direction
of sounds,
all
great
\T.vidness.
tion
memory with
it
'
'
-,
power of judging
in precision
very deficient
of other senses
it
This
insufficient to
give rise to
Heiiringis
^^^
nt'ii''^
R"iises, in
ofdiscri-
minating
SllllUl-
Ta
neons
soiinrs.
There
separately.
is
to
this
.,
Distnbutijii
of the
The nerves
Carjientei's
Human
Physiology,
j).
669.
XXXV.]
101
SEKSES.
Tilt:
nerves of
'
^^J^^^
organ derives
its
name from
is
to be formed.
aud
purpose of sensitive
'^^'''^'Ces.
No
smelJ,
Distribu]/erves of^*^
^f?^""g
are
it is itself
strung.
So
each
its
own
impression on the
make
when heard at
nerves, and make
sounds,
tliat different
consciousness
when mixed,
unlike
are felt
by
consciousness.
we must
its
own
Laws
of
suikmous
acoustic vibrations.
number
of vibrations
vibration
constant
s;e
^^t'l'ig-
ear, excite
by
its
l'"<;r
or sound-A^'ave.
Soiuid, in
lliB
Ediiiliurgh
Ueview of January
lSfi8v
The
TyndaUV
^
lav/s
teetures
of
oji
^otu con""**"''
^f
string.
102
same in
bodies whatever
all
[chaf.
but vibrat-
it
Olio string
another
vibrating,
best, in treating of
of strings only.
If
two
elementary
strings
for
which reason
acoustics,
to speak
bridge,
we have
^^'^ ^^^^'^
Every sound
strung to
is
own
its
pitch,
and
its
vibrations
of analogical probability.
in
Tone of
'^"""'^
how
produced,
-^^^ygg^
qj,
overtones,
fundamental.
When
the fundamental
is
not accompanied
Consequently, neaii}^
complex sound.
many
is
what
fundamental
The over-
fundamental.
may be accompanied by
overtones.
Tlie
is
due
the fundamental.
arises.
How
Tj'udall's Lectures
is
ou Sound.
sible as
103
THE SENSES.
XXXV.]
a complex sound
Why
a complex
of hearing
Why
do
do
se)iKlarv
vibrations,
its
own
nerve-fibre separately
'"^^f^^l?
sciousness?
when heard
All sounds,
into
am
this
is
J!"*^
,.
sultant
and other
and
mental and
most
bodies,
as the funda-
overtones are habitually heard together, the The comear in most persons never acquires the habit or the power ^I'^^tiou
its
-^
-"^
-^
them
while
or distinc-
it
"^
guished.
The senses
of sight and
sight and
^^^'^""g
Avhich minister to the intellect in any
high
'
state of intel- are the
lectual development
and, no doubt for this reason, they most intel;
through which
unusual to
music, but
we
that
derive any
mind
senses.
exactly as visual
more
to visual beauty.
The reason
tense
in-
104
fecliiig
than
visual
beauty,
because
the ear
loses 110
time in
conibiiiii
impressions.
of this pi'obal)ly
is,
au expression which
what
is
called
by
is
and colour
[chap.
of form
is
sound
this occupies some little
i.s
due to the combination of distinct impressions on the
sense of hearino- which combine in the consciousness of
;
is lost
lost.
To
of
this
fact,
in combining simultaneous
little
time
lost in
is
XOTE
A.
The
distinct
nerves for
distinct
colours.
ojjiniou
was
first
On
subject
to see
it is difficidt
conclusive evidence
for,
how
lately
this
and
exist,
are
to
what appear
to
me
The hypothesis in question rests on the belief that each sensory nerve must transmit a single kind of sensation, and cannot
any
other.
Now
be contrary to
Reasons
trausniit
aj^ciiust
this.
No
special
nerves of
taste.
gustative impressions
(to
upon the
front of
t)ie
while those
common
1
1"5
XXXV.]
which
rise to pain,
is
nut the
case with either the olfactory, the optic, or the auditory nerves.
made upon
impressions are
essentially the
jMoreover,
if
is
would appear
it
is
must
and a
The
we have
hearing, as
from
sense
of the
case
is
of
different
these.
Each
sound
distinct
is
which would be
Eut, as a result of
which
are received
this, it
different
nerve-fibres,
we should be
colours in a
compound
colour
we
were true that any one nerve- fibre can transmit sensations
it
it
must be
distinct
is
no evidence whatever
sensa- nor of
this conclusion.^
which any
nor on that of
its
ganglion (for
all ner\-es
and
all ganglia,
alike),
nei've
itself,
Thekiud
so lar "f
seiisa-
but
Thus a nerve which terminates in the outhegaueve transmits the sensation of light,
and a nerve which termi- S^^\ ^^^'^^
external termination.
its
'
The
doubt
left
plicable
the
tastes
sensation,
is
and of
salt,
difierence
between
equally inexplicable.
The conclusion
'
.,
lluiuaii riiysinldgy,
]i.
(il7.
"
Ibid.
may appear
|i.
tjlT).
on the
difier- organ of
are no sense.
106
to
[chap.
when
But
the retina and the optic nerve have been habitually trans-
due to
pressure,
I think
disease,
It is stated, that
and to an
electiic
current.
an
light.
electric
if in
This
blue.^
is
primary colours
for it is
set
which produces
direction,
set
NOTE
B.
There
between
taste,
are a great
many
distinct
to be
sensations
true of the sensations of colour; but such is not the fact j all
of sight
and of the the sensations of colour
which are possible, at least to the human
other
primary elements.
In what
Meaning
of light
and of
radiance.
of a sensation.
radiance.
Heating
and
chemical
and
little
forms of energy,
all
:
tliis
fall.
understood chemical
radiance.
graphy
1
is
I
It has
effects
effects of
it is
capable
when sunbeams
also many peculiar
takes place
my
XXXV.]
There
is
what I regard
107
medium. The radiance of the siin, and of all other sources tions.
with which we are famdiar, consists of a variety of rays, which, ^.^^^ ^
difterent
SO far as we know, differ from each other in no physical character wavelengths
of the undulations of which they are composed,
except the length
^
'
"'
are
The velocity of all the rays is the same, and consequently the
number of undulations, or waves, to the second in any ray is
mixed
together
"^
^}'"^
sunbeam,
that ray.
so that rays
is
the
the least
constitute a sunbeam,
prism
the
The unequally
tions.
refracted rays,
when
direc- prism.
received on a screen,
As
radiance
is
a form of energy,
and
it
due
to
it.
When we
is
apply this
test,
we
energy which
it
contains
if at all visible.
or,
greatest
This, of course,
in other words,
is
What
is
is
The
it places of
that
jjogt of
gi'eatest
almost
The
rays.^
coincide
the eye.
least
the succession
is as
follows
by
Theory
raj-s
have
cUfferent
108
KeJ,
Succession
ot colours.
greatest cbeniical
of different wave-lengths,
is
logical
'
sound.
physiological
It
possible.
which
tone
its
of colour,
colour of light
its
i^itch
for,
a purely
is
In the manner of
lengths,
altogether a quantitative
is
is,
undulation, and
The
fact,
light is not in
The
impossible.
is
^vodLXX.ceqiialitative differences
difterence,
and those of
the purple.
"^"^j^^"-
green,
red,
Difference
green, bluish
orange,
[cHAP.
its
production,
is
and have, so
as
far
There
is
corresponds to the
markable way.
faculty, for
pitch of sound
law of sound
It is a
it is
re-
is
in
it
saj^,
numerous
TliB
octave in
in colour
manner recognised
^^^ other.
colours.
There
as the
is
same
What makes
is
the
is
fact,
true of
which
is
It
is,
I tlunk, to
The word
is
shown iu the
text, the
analogy
it exjiresses
German and
suggests
it
is
in English
and moreover,
untrue.
^ According to M. Dcspretz, " the number of vibrations required to produce an api)reciable musical sound, in persons endowed with an acute
sense of hearing, may vary from 16 [in a second] for the lowest, to 73,000
(Carpenter's
Human
Physiology, p. 660.)
This
is
Uuit
is lo
2i
say, 16 x
+ " =5,536.
note
:
XXXV.]
109
is
about one-half.
difficult,
Satisfactory observations on
from violet
to red
even to
difficult
through purple
and
see,
more
still
If there
is
this theory of
still
be in the
but also from the visible fact that violet and purple are intermediate colours of tint between blue and red, just as orange
is
visibly intermediate
all.
recurrent,
it
is
using only another word for the same fact to say that
it
colours
is ?f
circular.
circidar
is
The
series
number 399,401,000,000,000
to
so that
observer's eyes.
~
For the
fact
already leferred
to.
of this veeurrencp,
see
Professor
Gras.smann's paper
110
is
[CHAF.
and
tlie
oiiposite
colours are
compleTiientaries.
pair of colours in
^ circular order, that every opposite
i x
'
^y^gQ combined.
Grassmann,
is
This order,
is
to
say,
it
in
shall
according to
shall
make
i
Professor
PUEPLB.
GREEN,
little
doubt
XXXV.]
pairs of
Ill
colours,
when
Eed and
bluish green.
violet.
what
p 1,
combine
fall
colours.
Mixture of
same in appearance
as that
other pair,
it
"'
'
iust as the
''
com-
mon
is
pounded
of yellow
chromatically alike.
The white
light of
day
of course
is
all
the pairs of
is
to say,
com-
is
tints,
among which by
If
we mix two
mixture
rials
or
due to those rays which are not absorbed by any of the matethat the more ingi'edients we put into our mixture the more rays
is
so
are absorbed,
which
is
contrary
F'oj;l^^ced
blackness.
the two methods of mixing will not give the same results.
^}?^
pairs of
comple-
mentanes
are
^I'^^'^^^'y
dineveiit.
112
Except white,
All colours
Black
in the
or lowered white.^
is
all
e.xeept
[chap.
Brown
and grey
Light,
which
tints,
only a subdued
is
Black"'
^^y ^
Grey.
Brown.
*'^
more
or less diluted
with white."
j^^
mentary,
be similar
necessarily
in
appearance
to
either
constituent.
i.9
like simple
j^g
jjj^Q
constituents
by
The compound
the prism.
colours,
o])tical]y
however, though of the same tint with the simple ones, are in
different,
many
No
dis-
from
It follows
tinction of j^^^j
this,
that there
is
no distinction of primary
may be
either primary
'
primary, because
and
or secondary
secondaries in
secondary, because
/'
other colours.
any
.sical
pliy-
sense,
it
may
''
it is
and
j^ ^Iso follows
so taken
the circle of prismatic colours, that the centre of the circle falls
within the triangle whereof they are at the angles, either white
Most of
wlwt are
callcil
grey tints,
however,
probably contain
bine.
2
Sir
he proved that there are but three primary colours, namely red, yellow,
Helmholtz however has, 1 think, shown satisfactorily that
aiid blue.
Brewster's results were due to an imperfect method of observing, and that
no ray of
tlie
spectrum
coloured medium.
ened, but
it
preserves
is
uuchauged.
may
be
gi-eatly
weak-
XXXV.]
or any
other colour
suitable
proportions. ^
We
may
equally primary.
113
fact,
rays of
all
colours are
has found
Ijut
^7
^ T'hysiological
sense.
all
compounded
there
^'^'"
I shall conclude this note with some remarks on the mathe- Further
theory of chromatic octaves and complementaries. ^a*"^-
matical
it
better considera-
unen-
*'^"
is
due,
we
find the
its
which
to
either a
wave- frequency of
its
by the same.
and on
by an
have
tlie
arc of 360.
laid
Now,
them down,
are
separated,
ment
each colour
from
it
might conse-
any
of
colour,
we should be
tary
ratios
red, yellow,
blue or
violet.
But there
is
to the difference
another less
common kind
and bine.
VOL.
II.
114
We might
separated
expect
J ^Q 2^ the wave-frequencies of
mentaries
to be 180
by an
[cHAP.
It might, I say,
soTjare root of 2.
fessor
pairs of
them
of that opposite to
Eed
it
; ^
36-40
Bluish green
Orange,
39'80
Blue
41-40
Indigo.
column were
of the
to those of their
tion and
theory.
numbers
Yellow.
Diserepancy of
ratios of the
1,
54-70
colours
51-80
4765
in
the
right-hand
they would be
Bluish green
51-47
Blue
56-28
Indigo
58-54
colours are
i]xTee
by the hypothesis from the wave-frequencies of their compleand the differences, besides being all on the same
side, are too great to be accounted for by any accident or error.
Thus in such a circle as I have imagined (in which equal dismentaries
How
anomalous, but
acconntecl
ij^ite
is
it is
easily explained
it is
for,
produced by sunshine.
sunbeam
is
the
name we
We
give
means
same
to.
of an interference-spectrum, obtained
colour.
XXXV.]
brightness
purple.
its
much
that
its
But
of vision which
is
so constituted as to be
is
more
115
it is
eyes,
tlie
circle
we have
circle, as
pairs of
complementary colours
Eed and
bluish green
Were
White.
=:
"White.
White.
White.
White.
it is
=
=
=
leaving any
But
circle are
much
(or,
in other words,
so that
of equal
quantities) of the two would not produce pure white, but would
have a residual green tinge. The neutralization, or conversion
into white, of all the colours, without residual tinge from any
of them,
is
attained
by the
brighter on the green side of the circle than on the purple side,
this involves as a geometrical consequence that the colours
little
As
to find separated
by the green
tints,
by an
which
It has
been suggested that cats and owls, and other animals which see
may have eyes unusnally sensitive to the very refrangible
well in twilight,
rays,
the
which
violet
are relatively
ones,
I
^'"'^
'^'''S"t
to
116
those of
tlie
[cii.
XXXV.
degi'ee of saturation
There are three, and only three, ways in which any two
These are
of colour can possibly differ from each other.
tints
1.
or,
all
Professor Clark
of giviug a
-J.
for
any
*^*"
jg
The
tint.
any possible
may
and of
taking as unity for each colour the brightest tint that can be
be stated in degrees of
am
principles
of harino-
^j.g
nious
in this note.
colouring,
^q
Ijq
thing, but if he
is
it
to
right that
it
for
-r~,
If
is
we have no
rules of
any value
We
know what
and
be unable
colouring.
it
is
to
to discover valid
me
CHAPTER XXXVI.
PERCEPTION.
IT
all,
no dispute, The
It is also agreed by
that mind begins with sensation.
^Jj^
that sensation is inexplicable.
But the most debated sensations
is
question of psychology
is,
how
is
sensations give
rise
to to^pe"cep-
perceptions.
^^^^-
Perception
^j^^n eoo--
'"tion
it.
That which we
or weary.
ill,
perceive, according to
is
what
itseK,
vigorous
And
mind
I must, however, in
some
that
perception
space
we
thus,
if
is
to say,
may
be remote in
from a star on my
Thus,
perceive that
my
its
if I
source
is
throat
the
^^ gg^g^?
tions to
it is
is
dry,
and may
may
118
my
caused by
having eateu
[chap.
meat an hour
salt
time,
sources present
sensations to
accurate
it
This
it
mind
refers
the most
is
not perfectly
is
really inferences.
from
but
accurate
ivJiich the
in time.
We
ago.
of perception
definition
and
disease,
Thus, I
I
yet the
per-
aecurate
defiuitiou
exclude
sible.
reason of
this,
inference
is
as,
my
in
an inference
of inference.
'
it
is
opinion,
ceptiou
when we
inference,
regard
simple
to
the
and
Perception indeed
first
refer light to
as
that perception
refer a sensation
is
only the
When we
instance,
for
And
all
and
its
source
star,
and
inexplicable
act
of the
mind
bethc^oue
or the
taneously,
cording to
circum-
thought.
The same
stances.
as
it
or
by the
of
effort
dog will
smell a dead animal and perceive at once where it is
Thus, uogs perccive
wlien a
man may
sidering
for
some
ascertain
little
its
smell.
source of the
may remain
in
is
It
may be
said that
is
This
conscious oue.
just supposed
is
119
PERCEPTION.
XXXVI.]
is
true
a result of
its
We
can
him graduates from hesitating inference to unhesiand when it has become perception,
tating perception
it is accompanied by no more conscious thought than the
And when inspontaneous perceptions of an animal.
tifying
ferences
that
what
is,
are
effort, we
them as perceptions. David perceived
was dead, when he saw the servants whisper.
no
difficulties.
the question
is
which
generally surrounded do not arise from
believe
the
difficulties
with
any metaphysical perplexity in the nature of the subject itself, but from its being complicated with other
questions which come before us in connexion with it.
These questions concern the relation of the mind to space,
to
ment
got mixed up together, concerning the nature of that act
by which the mind refers sensations to their sources, the
nature and origin of the cognition of space, and the mode
in which the sensations of sight and touch are combined
in the perception of bodies. To these three distinct
inquiries some writers add a fourth, namely, the nature
of the idea of material substances as distinguished from
their properties.
It is
no wonder
up
together,
if
when they
to
mixed
be manageable enough
are all
I have stated
my
is
to be defined
^ggi^f^^t"
plicated
by
questions.
120
Perception,
aud
the cognition of
space, are
distinct,
but have
been confounded.
[CHAF-
may
"VVe
Such a
to say,
is
might
On
itself
infer
the existence
and of
it is
relations in
an external world
as
but I believe we
We
in space
cognise
space
before we
perceive
objects
in it.
before
we
sations
before
so,
existing
necessarily
in
space,
it
we can
more
I go
on
to state
believe,
we
cognise space.
way
fully the
When
must be understood
in which, as I
meaning sensations of
the same sense. Let us imagine what may take place
when consciousness is being first awakened by sensation.
sensations, I
A ray
as
this is cognised as
now
Cognition
of two
sensations
as separated in
space.
fall
on a
sensation
first
first,
it
all
in space.
let
this will
be
respects similar to
This, I believe, is
my
But
is
It
is,
in
any
if
some distance
warm spot is moved
from the
first,
let
121
PERCEPTION.
XXXVI.J
this will
its locality
and
two dimensions
I believe
first
But
rudimentary
j^^ ^-^^^^
ways, only
extension
can be
cognised.
Coguitiou
cognition 01 space.
I do not suppose that the cognition of space could be Cognitions
^
"[j^^^^gf
time
of a sensitive surface.
By
these
cognition
we acquire the
between our own sensations
of
space-relation
only
cular sense
" is
space^external, that
to the body.
is,
Our perceptions
Pereepo\"(.g
of e.xtemal to
is^acqnired
'
1..
resistance to motion.
who
and
power in order
on the senses
may produce
a cognition of space
and
122
[cHAP.
Sight, like
miSiiill
cognises
superficial
'^^
3.
sensation changing
its place.
are
cognizant
originally
What we
we
-what
Percep-
sensations
bihtl^ an
acquh-ed
power.
that
superficial
of
Originally see is
extension only,
and
of in seeing is
only
sav,
to
is
1
objects
by
the
1-1
by touch,
a
of inferring
sight, as
jt ig
is,
of external
existence
is
these
views.
time.
2.
extension,
Facts con-
same
at
is
of
first
But
him
easier to think
of extension as
as linear or as solid.
we imagine
we
If
namely, that
it
is
than either
superficial
Such a
little
fact as this
difi&culty,
may be com-
its
adult,
development.
It
may
be said that on
my
Answer
to
o yec on.
is
no reason
why
our
we become cognizant
by the co-existence of two separated sensations, but by the co-existence of an indefinite number
of sensations, some of them similar and some unlike,
spread over the surface of the body and thus our first
than Knear.
^^ extension, not
sensation.
that
123
PEECEPTION.
XXXVI.]
is to say,
in those of sight
-,
-I
u_T
to^both"*^
touch and
sight.
g^g^jg^i
connexion
^^q
seij^jjey_
to
sight,
whether
dimensions
dimension.
no way of cognising a
power of
power
is later
made
acquired,
and
is far inferior
but this
in accuracy, as
It has
been
they
circle or a square,
Cognition
latter)
M 'Cosh's
2 See Dr.
Berkeley said that a
'Cosh's chapter, already referred to.
person born blind, and acquiring sight suddenly, would not know a circle
from a square. In his time, no observations on the subject had been
made. It has been subsequently stated, that his purely theoretical views
have been confirmed by observations on persons cured of congenital
cataract but a very carefully observed case reported by Dr. Franz of Leipzig
(quoted by Dr. M'Cosh from the Philosophical Transactions of 1841) appears
;
With
respect to
the inability of the eye to perceive the distance of objects from itself,
until it has learned to do so by practice, Mr. Abbot, in his work " Sight
and Touch," argues that no observation of the kind is in the least degree
conclusive because in all such cases as yet recorded there has been but
one eye, so that the patient has been without those means of perceiving
and in that
distance which arc given by the simultaneous use of two eyes
;
124
Additional
j)roof of
[chap.
we have our
first
cognition of
The magnitudes
which the hand cognises and measures are linear magthe magnitudes which the eye cognises and
nitudes
space from touch rather than from sight.
this.
Touch
cognises
linear
magni-
sight
cognises
space
is
we ought
to think of linear
angular
ones and contrary,
we think
more
If our conception of
tudes ;
is
If,
on the
we
easHy of
linear ones.
the former
than of the with us ; we
latter.
much
easier to
measure
common
words
denoting
the latter
are technical.
and
such words as
inch, belong to
altitude, azimuth,
To speak
neous thoughts of space, whether
to scientific language.
common
language;
A being
with sight
only
would
cognise
only
angular
magni-
Were
tude.
ojitical
so
that,
of
learned.
This
is
cognition of space
My
know,
is original.
125
PERCEPTION.
XXXVI.]
would be its own eye but it would be totally unconscious of any distance between its eye and the objects.
Not, however, that they would seem close to its eye the
question whether they were near or far would for it have
no meaning.^ If in the course of its development it were
to acquire a hand or a tentacle, by means of the motions
of that organ it would acquire the sense of distance, and
then its knowledge of the properties of space would be as
complete as ours but, as its ideas of angular magnitude
centre
the former
and
it
In
all
Now
in terms of recti-
know
Thus,
if I
perceive
impres-
^he'two
of
'
126
and
soiinclp.
is
That
is
to say, if I raise
is
my
as a
that,
is
[chap.
is
know
my
my
hand
that on
meet
with a corresponding sensation of
I
touch or if I stretch forth my hand and feel it, I know
that on raising my eyes I am certain to meet with a corresponding sensation of sight. The two sensations are met
paper-cutter, I
am
stretching forth
certain to
with together
and
the same
but quite
sufficient,
object.^
B erkeley.
Berkeley, and
He
of vision.
is
deduced
it
celebrated theory
liis
data,
and
on
it
It is
cataract.
stances have to
walk
found that persons under such circumlearn to see, just as children have to learn
Quotation
to
from
M'Cosh.
or,
they had got from touch, with that which they are now
receiving from sight; just as persons who have learned
them
A very remarkable
hare
by the
that
is
to
2
what may be
to say, persons
who
first,
(Carpenter's
Human
Physiology,
when
familiarity with
two languages
exists already
a matter of course,
is true.
is
not
but
it
PERCEPTION.
XXXVI.]
127
mean
that con-
Young
swim
them able
we
see
to perform, without
Difficulty
i'^'^^?*
lllStlllC-
tive
^'*
aTuck'
it
water which
for
sees is water in
perception which,
is
man
correct,
It is
but
if
man
is
that there
is
We
rational.
and reason or, since the words instinct and reason have
acquired misleading associations, I will say rather between
;
mind and
the lower
human
ones.
Mill, in a review
an unsolved
When my
difficulty in
the
way
first
of Berkeley's theory.
attention
was
me
not a merely residual difficulty, like those planetary perturbations which the theory of gravitation failed to account
for in
Newton's time
it
128
shown
of H. Spencer, have
[cHAP.
is
The question
apparent.
how
is,
only
is
and
really
is
swim ? And
swim with-
to
the answ^er
is,
that these
tlie^e are
cases of
habit,
result of experience
man
only that in
duck
it is
the experience
it is
As
neither
is
The
inference.
Presump-
fact that
we
by
'
^^^^^
^^^'
tamty,
loss
And what
tion.
IS
r.
whether we ought
o/the"
organic system.
many
to refer the
it
cases
we
are at a
sensation to anything
by the disordered
The multiplicity
a cer-
of the senses
state of the
is,
however,
subject,
multipli-
city,
and
binatioii.
It is
PERCEPTION.
XXXVI.]
129
mental
natiu-e as highly
tliis, a
developed as ours might he evolved
were sight
and
that sense
if
enumerated
we
The
means
as
true
in other words,
sensation
or,
of his voice.
we know
2.
of space-relations
hearing,
and
The cognition
of a third
dimension
Cognition
of space-
mi
3.
^'^^"
It
it is
The cognition
:
to its
tio" enumerated.
when Assign-
iu^perce^j-
place, but
act,
1.
call Elements
m space by means
relations.
Having learned
to refer a sensation to
a source, and
we become
in external
space
that
is
to
say,
to
perceive
Percepobjects in
space.
objects
impres-
ideas that
we have
of external objects.
sions of
g,^^j^^.
perception into
What
is this
mind, or only
"
understood to be external to
to the
body ?
it
is
the body
may
appear to
In other words,
This question
to the ^'^lat
Is
is
" the
external
"'
to dispose of it
"^^^''^"^
to
130
It
may
be
extra-
mental, or
only extraorganic.
which
includes the body, and of the extra-organic world, which
But I think the question redoes not include the body.^
If I am right
presents a real though a soluble difficulty.
in agreeing with those who think that perception is an
by speaking,
inference,
of
instead,
aU that
external
In so
inference therefrom.
far as the
an object of perception,
No
organ
of sense
can
perceive
itself.
[chap.
It is here to
it is
itself,
is
the seat of
in so far as
it is
be observed, that
when one
by
body
world
of our organs of
it is
perceived, not
they are the only organs of sense that give any idea of
space.
see
hand can
itself,
finger,
cannot
feel itself,
feel it
but the
perception at
feel
all, it
it,
to us to regard
it
as a
"
difficulties
distinctions
2.
note.)
I
Ferrier.
perception.
xxxvlJ
131
NOTE.
As
And
further
as
it
for, as
knowfecl"e
^ P^^
sio-ht only.
Case"of a
j^emg
all
cognise
things, "ly
that
%--
of lines and to
only
it
n^ly
.
.
There
is
nothing hypothetical in
matical truth.
all this
it is
'
'^^^
^'
^J^
CtlUllOt SG6
all
see^i
see7i
as portions
on the
is
is
tive
knows
K 2
"'"
line,
straight
and every one who has studied the theory of perspecthat it is true of what we see on the earth.
When
we 2^<'rceive plane surfaces and straight lines by sight, we do not
see them ; we infer them from what we see.
Perception is only
heavens
'*"i"'^'^.''
^,.^!! ^^
great
''"
'^^'
132
The
a rapid inference.
lines, or rather
through
sight,
must
when ^T)ro-
^^I'i'^i^^ lines
cluced.
Reid's
o/v'isibles
meet
but
parallel great
great circles
on a globe intersect
two
Any two
sjahere.
at the
two
by
straight
which
and
xxxvi.
[ch.
Now,
poles).
arcs of great
as
circles,
which
Now, the
making
this statement
tions except
is,
that if
accurate
way
of
all,
sight,
we
but of great
circles instead.
Bar-
nsters
"
for
space.
no better
really
" Essays
by
a Bar-
denly
to
from
"
It
-yvhich
is
it
placed
ujDon a
straight line to
an
medium
He
would see the rails, which would be the first straight lines he
had ever seen, apparently meeting, or at least tending to meet,
at each horizon ; and he would thus infer, in the absence of all
other experience, that they actually did enclose a space
produced
far
enough."
The answer
two
to this
straight lines,
being nearly,
when
if
is,
that
what he would
else.
circles,
see
would not be
CHAPTER XXXVII.
THE RELATION OF THE MIXD TO SPACE AND TIME.
TN
--
first
in space.
It
rise to a
rudimentary cognition
And
besides, as I
have
become cognizant
the
act
that
One
is
of time
to say,
of cognising
is
we
great
diversity
school,
'
as
we cognise
so we origi-
we'cocm^se
of time
Our kuowl?'^o*^.of
our primary
But concern-
is
in
our sens^tions as
successive.
i believe
^P^^*: '^
cognised
in a
"^^^^
134
[chap.
to
In the
last chapter I
must be
aucUime
i^
many important
anything
else.
infinitely extended,
tude
is
and unlike
and both
Magni-
infinitely divisible.
Both
are
is
to
''
necessary.
say,
,t
conceive them as
we cannot
not
tut
We
bemg.
can
voluntarily form
existing things,
we can
remain.
We
effort of
the miiid,
of a limit to either
any direction to
or an end to time.^
IS more
i
i
p
i
naturally
as in space, we habitually think of magnitude rather as
1 Mr.
ill says it is credible to him that there may be a limit to si^ce
(though of course he admits that it is inconceivable), and I suppose he
would say the same of time. I do not agi-ee with him but I mention
;
to be
confounded
who
is so free
on the contrary,
from
it.
do not think
could
name any
XXXVII.]
On
we speak of a expresseJ
we never speak of
^^
Thus,
a time of space.
135
[j^ia^u
we speak
numbers
of
time
tlwugh
number
is
expressed
"^ ^""'
It
may
be said that
all
this is irrelevant.
It
may
be
the eye.
This
is
If
it
find
our cognition of
if
and
we should
surely
development
as this of its
but
and
space were developed by means of
is linear,
so is
motion
;^
It
may
rotatory motion
may
is
arcniment
relevant?
"
nintiiius.
Hut
fo
!{^"J^1"
Larval an
f(Jpn]^s^of
these
cognitions.
136
than of a surface
as
but,
we have
[chap.
is
the case.
Eeasou
adviiDCoil
for think-
ing that
the cognition of
space
is
from
motion.
of the theory
is
thinking of space
from what
is different
it
would be
my
But in
mode
of
if it
opinion the
somehow
is
less of a
may
is
to space,
Time
more
is
in-
separable
from our
and we cannot
in
other words,
mind.
first
These
that space
facts
mind
must be formed
at least,
and
is
convinced me,
am
or,
way
inclined to
really determine
later
in a fundamentally different
it
may
l^y
in the
means
of motion.
way
have just
consciousness to space
is
It is
unquestionably true
unlike
our
But
can be shown to
its relation to
time.
XXXVII.]
human
it
137
were acci-
consciousness, as a consequence of
which the human consciousness is developed out of its original germ of sensation. I believe j hcn^yg
I think it can be shown how the tliis is not
this can be shown.
6SSGHtitll
human mind has been developed under circumstances to all
which have caused its relations to space to be unlike its "?*^}' ^\
aceidental
relations to time and it can be further shown with great to the
probability, how a mind might be developed, qu.ite consis- nihili.^
tently with what we know of the laws of mental development, imder circumstances which should cause its relations
to space to be the same as its relations to time; or, in
other words, how a mind might be developed which
the
manner
in
'-
is
ence.
by every
one.
That
is
to say, if the
sensation, it
sciousness
is
As
sciousness
much
a matter of
T
developed
T
implied in
is
this.
i_i
that
is to
the
first
is
it
how
this way.
In order
say, it
should
loped in time.
o^ir
sensation itseK.^
memory
necessary to the
consciousness
But
of the two
outlast the
first
is
sensation
Consequently, a rudimentary
time
con^^lousness
fact,' I think it is
begins
one, that our con- with the
succession
-Dili.
Bnt let us see 1
^f gensa-
all
is
it
is
is
unquestionably deve-
think
of certainty
Possibility
sciousness
heing degpae
)Y^^
y<,"'
^^
138
The
fact that
ness,
we do
so,
I thiuk, not
is,
though
is
a fact of couscious-
fact,
it
an ultimate
In order
[chap.
account for
to
it
consciousness
fact that
we
is
siglit,
hearing
minister
tu mind.
Of
tliese,
only the
first
two
give cognition of
space.
The sensory
Qjjiy
'
faculties
which we have
j.|jg
that
'
examiue are
to
to say, touch,
is
and hearing
man at least, have any appreciable effect in producing
mental development.^ Now, it needs no proof that it is
only touch atad sight which give rise to any cognition
of space (including the mnscular sense as belonging to
Hearing alone could not give it. But, in comtouch).
sight,
hearing has
from
all
it
differs
same
that
is
tions of the
time or in space
distinct,
sense,
Time
is
cognised by
all
This fact
sight.
relation.
touch and
mutual
but space
that
is
time
cognised by
is,
all
I think,
enough
-j
connected
sensations
cognised only by
is
closely
all
thought,
because we
with thought.
words.
lopment of thought.
j.i
q thinking in words,
which
is
It is also to
successive.
we
If,
for instance,
we
see a flash
and hear a
what
XXXVII.]
appears
to
sensibly
moment,
later
senses
of the
same
sense,
witli
flash,
tlie
sensations
that
so
139
or
at
a cognition
of different
"mJ'on'l'
tliose of
sense^can
of
S^^'^ '*
man
of
we
human
the
inseparable from
of as something external to
There
it.
is
enough, I say,
the
in
is
ception of time
But
by means
though
these,
facts
we may
consciousness
if
were developed, as
lofty as ours
it
We
must
had no visceral
had any, that they
so that either it
all,
or,
if it
is
said
looked
is
at.
It
may
having position
must of necessity
The consequence of
paper on which
sensations.
its
This
am
is
writing,
true
and cognise
its
and
feel the
by means of both
chapter, we have every
position
we
felt, and had never felt anything that we had seen, the idea of identifying the objects of sight and of touch would not occur to us as a possible
or conceivable idea.
Case of a
^JioTied
out of the
g,viit
only:
140
consciousness
its
this
would
[chap.
would be developed
would be
in both space
developed
in both
time and
space.
would be a simpler
fact
we have
its
because,
be developed in
the
difference
Illustra-
or the
ness,
tion.
called
space-relation.
of time
^
;
are supposing
inseparably as
feelings
If
1
as
series of
it is
is
space.
series
we
is
as'
which
is
aware of
if
itself as
the
is
how
is
a series of feelings, it is a
a series.
exhaustive one.
mind
I agree
it
141
XXXVII.]
conceivably possible to do so
I reply, that
we think
in What
is
of a subject which,
This, of coiirse,
by the terms
is
not a
I only offer
as a suggestion or indication.
It
may
be
at the most,
answer
said, in
would complete
my
argument
may
it
but
that, if I
as to the difference
it
account
full
human
between
conscious-
in order
Possibility
"'
consciousness beinsf
and not in time, sciousiiess
developed in space
^
as a parallel and an oj)posite to the development of the indepen.
human
however,
is
This, time."
with.
I say,
being in this
way developed
in space
appears to me,
is
it
whether
142
[cii.
XXXVJI.
in time,
or
consciousness which
is
But
not de-
is
it is
lieved.
It has
consciousness of time.
is to
now
in.
has proved
itself before
now
to be believable.
CHAPTER XXXV
IT.
AND CAUSATION.
TIME, SPACE,
IT
will be perceived
lias
followed
my
reasonino's
the relation of the
thus far, that, as regards
mind
and time,
iioki
the
f,^P''iience
theory of
which is our kuowassociated with the name of Locke, namely, that our knowgp Jg and
ledge of them is derived from experience, in preference to ti^, in
the theory which is associated with the name of Kant, of to that of
their being d priori forms of thought existing in the mind fo'"s of
thought.
,
previously to experience, though it is only by means of
experience that the mind becomes conscious of them.
I
see no reason whatever for thinking that the conceptions
of space and time exist in the mind in any form at all,
to space
In
is
what pro-
in opposition to Kant,
who main-
foraof
t'lo"^'''*
for tliG
and includes
it.
is
The
reconciliation
individual.
144
mental habit,
is due to Herbert Spencer, in whose work on Psychology
I believe that his doctrine
tlie subject is wrought out.
will, in another generation or two, be universally accepted, and that the age-long controversy on this subject
^I^^'T!
[cuap.
of hereditary
will cease.
The
thought?
ultimat^*
inexplicable
or a result it
is
it
as ultimate
and
result of experience
of
encer"
The
experience
The
ideal
theory.
known
talism
them
The
ideal
cousilteuT
with the
logy of"
Kaut's
if I
understand
reality,
of the
and in deriving
mind
all
itself
Kant's ideal doctrine, that space and time are not only
inexplicable
facts of
by experience, or accounted
this doctrine, I say, was quite consistent with
at all,
psychology of Kant's time, which regarded mind as
it
was a
And
it
was a
and perhaps
TIME, SPACE,
XXXVIII.J
AND CAUSATION.
145
think
objects in space
namely, those of
life
it is
an
throry'ir"
consistent
'
is
to
which
is
think
!^1,.,
is
and perhaps has no existence. Kant did not draw this Kant was
kept from
T- n
^
conclusion his faith kept him from it but his philosophy scepticism
us,
was
on the contrary,
it
ad-
VOL.
11.
foith'^in
spite of
sophy.'"'
146
But
[chap.
if it is true, as I believe,
The
experience f^cts of
raakel our
knowledge
thongh
Sfa
external nature
we know
belief"
is
cognised
HOW come
I believe that
within the
sphere of consciousness.
^^^-
is
b'^^connntr
conscTous-
our
possible
Causation,
like space
direct cognition
by
my
their
belief that
we
acquire our
mind
comes within the sphere of consciousin the act whereby it cognises the succession of
ness
sensations in time, time comes within the sphere of con-
sciousness.
I believe that
we
way
to these
namely, by
is
it is
matter
But there is this peculiarity about the cognition of causaThe other three simple relations which I have
tion.
enumerated obtain between sensations and in cognising
But with
them the mind may be perfectly passive.
;
is different.
One
:
sensation cannot be
when we
are cognizant
AND CAUSATION.
TIME, SPACE,
XXXVIII.]
witbm
is
]47
in the
mind must be
in
some
degree active.
tion in
instance,
for
of a
Abyssinian war.
of joy at
feeling
I
the result
of the
to
Causation
'^
'jog'^ised
in be-
coming
of mentTi
^<^^^o^-
the
reasoning by which, as stated above, H. Spencer has explained the origin of our conceptions of space and time as
And
since the
commencement
to write
We
Thus,
when
that
is
I determine to
am
am
so, I
to say, I
am
my
of the motion of
my fingers, because
he
It
is
thoughts.
my wiU
directly
directlj^
my
will is
But when
I There
as the cause
is
the
is
such a theory,
it
to consciousness.
So far as I can perceive, our
though quite sufficient, reason for believing that our
muscular actions, such as the motions of the fingers in
lie
only,
l2
cocnit'"^*
i^f tiie
will
cause of
of Leibnitz, muscular
will
and, absurd as
is
14S
that
we always
[chap.
is
this
it,
would contradict a
much
cognition, just as
as
if
my
is
fact of direct
he were to
assvxre
me
that
We
How we
identify
physical
and mental
cansation
as cases of
the same
law.
^jqjj
fire
joj-
but
say that
and
Qf causc
is
a fact of matter
effect is
r>
is,
-i
as I believe, inferred
jjg^g causing
J
& Jiov
is
and
this rela-
a fact
-iptacts.
/>
by us Irom the
and
of mind
;
'
/-it
Grood
this relation
of cause and
I
effect is witliin
self-evidently
think,
no mere
inference,
is,
but a fact
cognition.
of direct
many
here, as in so
is
But how do we
right.
it,
as
consists in the
fact that
of
Thus,
matter.
desired
tlesired
if
I will to think,
my
is,
thoughts act as
if I
pointed out,
will to write,
is
one case and not in the other, yet the effect follows the
cause in both cases with equal certainty, and we learn to
identify the nature of the causal action in the
In a word,
we
identify the
two
facts of
two
cases.
mental causation
as
when
is
the determination of
my
TIMK, SPACE,
xxxviii.]
AND CAUSATION.
If a being
were to
exist,
141
w^th
thought
ijeing
motor
po^^^i-s.
appears to me,
force, as it
is
of causation.
It W'ill
those
who
it
to experience
we
it
I agree with
it
" fire is
in where
them
to experience
which we observe I
which
;
When we
we
say,
for instance,
state a fact
when we say
that "
fire is
which we
But Mr.
the cause of
than
this.
think
we apply
the
analogy of our
own
fire
analogy
men
is
It
may
be said this
fancies of their
own
minds.
I think,
which
by the
system of psychology in which mind and matter were regarded as distinct and totally unlike substances.
Tlie
progress of science has gradually brought us back to the
man
is
" u-iii^f[i^j^jj"^
that
it
ascribe
effect, I
150
midst of which
it
is
placed, hut
is
[cHAr.
life,
makes
highly probable,
it
Smiiinary.
if
is
But though
true so far as
Belief in
finit\"of
spacG anil
Any
tion.
if
it
matter to be
account of
ovu-
it
why we
We
I cannot, however,
is
alike
Now
belief.
tliis.
It
an end, by the
Difference
ourTe'uef
of an
past,
of
fact that
and
future.
is
without
experience of
^^
without a beginning
one's consciousness
a-n
moment
so that, for
to,
me
there
is
I think
in conversation
by
my
TLME, SPACE,
xxxviii.]
AND CAUSATION.
we
knowledge of time by
and
direct cognition,'
151
obtain our
it
first
has become
is
is
not a result of
habit.
it is
no
is
to
next chapter.
NOTE.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT.
I
who
write
But I
believe I
am right. The
first hand.
system unfolded in his " Critique The
it
with pure
really
mind.
But I beHeve I am
in no way a basis for
sible.
is
budding
itself
up in
was pos-
^^
i^g^ii's'^
identical
scepticism-
Pi-actieal
"
Eeason
;" that,
philosophical language,
faith
of ''lia^t's
" Pure
is
it
on the
speaks in a
pure
CHAPTER XXXIX.
MENTAL INTELLIOENCE.
The most
important
question of
biology
is
whether
intelli-
gence is a
primary
fact.
IN
my
discussion
think I
may add
now under
is
this
Is
intelligence
an ultimate primary fact, witliout physical cause, and without any cause except Creative Power or only a resultant,
;
have
argiied the
alfinnative
of organizing intelligence,
and have
now
not to be accounted
as those
for,
it,
is
an ultimate
to
self-adaptation
argue it
of mental.
have given my reasons for believing that organizing intelligence and mental intelligence are only different maniI
me in
with me
Possibly, not
many
of
my
most probable
that all who think
as to the primary and independent nature of intelligence in either of these two cases
will agree with
me
this
but
it is
It
is,
however,
intelligence,
grounds.
Difficulty
of the
but this
1
is
Chapter XXVII.
it less
MENTAL INTELLIGENCE.
CH. XXXIX.]
certain
is
it
.153
latter
^^^^ '""
in the eyes
There are
j^eas.
else
mind
imagine.
possesses no
really creative
and recombine.
And,
as I
perience.
Thus, for
experience.
the whole
instance,
its
mere
lie
beyond
perience.
of
science
facts, consists in
it
many
of
man
lived
Now, what
makes these
is
inferences
Is
it
or are
its
am
of Coleridge's opinion.
an element of
ligence is needed,
in
intel- Element of
;
association.
The laws
In
thought
which is
the "* f^ .
^^^^^J'
in all
result of
experi^^^^'
own
the laws
Associa-
*gp^,j\''
our
or another language
and
I believe that
fail
to account
for con-
154
ceptions,
our
for
merely as thoughts
of things.
The
laws of association
corresponds to an external
Belief in
the constancy of
the order
will
beliefs.
In other words
heliefs.
[CHAF.
One
of the
reality.-^
most important of
all
our beliefs
the belief
is
or, as it
is
We
always
cold,
we
or, to
use general
same or
same properties,
and the same or similar causes will continue to have the
same effects.
All reasoning from known things to unknown is based on this expectation not only reasoning
from the past to the future, but all reasoning from known
things to unknown, whether the imknown things are
future, as when we endeavour to foresee the weather
presimilar tilings will continue to ha\'e the
sent, as
when we
axiom implied in
all
acquired
Some say
by habit
only.
think
is
no
explanation.
is,
is
this
this
is
that the
is,
How
The
it
is
in
it.^
true
the question
is,
how we
acquire
our belief
what comes
1
to the
See Note
at the
See Note
at the
same
me no
thing, it is
explanation at
all
or,
an explanation which
The expressions
or,
as I prefer to call
it,
are practically
MENTAL INTELLIGENCE.
xxxix.]
The
known
to
from
the
question is, how are we able to reason
the unknown ?
why we believe, and truly believe, that it
takes for granted that
wliicli
be explained.
to
is
is
we
And
the answer
is,
that
among
with
the things
among
it
we do
we
are familiar
we do know.
Surely this
same thing
habit, is the
as to say that
it is
is
due to
due to associa-
Now, how
itself,
pro-
No
doubt
appears to do
it
so,
but
this, I think,
of things is habitually
what
is
chapter,
is
it
merely this
As
if
For
stated in a former
any two
things, such as
thoughts, so that
thunder, and
if
if
we
we
them
will
see lightning
hear thunder
we
we
shall think of
separable
it
may
be,
There
is
may
be said in reply to
many
this, that, as
a matter of
fact,
by habit,
and by no other cause whatever. Most men have beliefs,
especially on religious and political subjects, which have
belief is in
haljit,
originating usually in
156
Belief is
subject to
the laws
of habit,
but habit
cannot
produce
[cHAr.
but
belief,
This
education.
true
is
it
mental function,
is
of habit,
determined by habit
habitual
may
This distinction
are
association
belief.
Physical
analogy.
mind
is
it is
capable of
The
action of
governed
all forces is
all
not follow
association
tliat
will
is
of
itself able
to
it
does
produce
belief.
It
in
may
be asked whether
we should have
To
this
this confidence
if
the order of
if it
a mathematical absurdity.
to
grounds of
But,
is
it
tliis
shall
have
of
involved
show the
may be
not perfect
said, the
is
it
constancy of
tlie
order of things
Objection
from the
inconstancy
of the
weather
answered.
This
is
true
relevant to reply,
of
which
speak
of
celestial
much an instance of it as
From the fact that the changes
irregular, we have learned to expect
constancy of
the order
It
may
stancy
of
be said that
my
MENTAL INTELLIGENCE.
xxxrx.]
sun
will
probable.
It
to-morrow
rise
m acting
it
is
157
not certain, but
is
we
so probable that
it is
are
of thin f^s
certain
^^"t
only
t>ut
it is
as if it
go on
that
for a
true
all this is
nevertheless,
it
is
I reply,
as certain as the
on until
The law
tron.
of
i-i
same antecedents
consequents
it
but
finite,
Our knowledge
be cut
is
infinite
of things
and we must
consequently regard
liable to
by the same
is
but
^o be
interrupted
it is
all
all
as being
being predicted,^
contrary,
is
it
is
on the
I believe
hilitj'
'
At the
best, it is
is
all
amusements.
DO possible data.
of "
The Logic
all.
any
'
really
iMusatioii.
^" '^^^^
sense tlio
law of
158
causation
is self-
evident.
[chap.
being implied
foimcl
From
all this I
but
an ultimate
is
If this is so,
action,
and iu
desire
and
fear.
fact,
action there
This confidence is
presupposed La
it
is
is
The
desire of a
wiU continue
to
burn
to satisfy hunger,
and such
belief, as I
The
how-
our thoughts
it
principles
whicli
enter into
all reasoning are
those of
loi^ic.
soning.
The only
are
those of logic
an inference.
In
all
on that
it
there
is
been acquired
how has
truth; but
it
have argued that mental habit or experience cannot alone and of itself produce belief in the
?
my
reasoning
is
vaKd
it is
natiu-e, or
any belief
at all
and
constancy of
MENTAL INTELLIGENCE.
XXXIX.]
159
universal
than
it,
merely that
is
^^'
it
is
and
will be
it
but
This
true.
Further
belief, I think,
to intelligence.
ternal to ourselves is
is
obvious that,
been suggested to
us,
the belief in
may
involved in perception
^
^
*'
have
-^
.
source within
me
its
existence receives
its
its
it
This
must
there-
would be a contradiction
once within and without.
source were at
But
do
we
at all
for it
or,
This
what
substance?
why do we
in other words,
their objects
is
for,
of identity,
the
why
is
only a particular
refer sensations to
way
of asking the
possibility of sensation
"
which
is
;
"permanent
^
just as
it
would be an
ings.^
if
question,
call it
tion.
is
cannot be true
are
iii^olved
lu percep-
self,
to
feelings,
we
it
definition of
^'^^^"^
substance.
160
[cHAP.
become conscious of a
self
Axioms
physics'
4.
is
an
there
effect
must be a
cause.
my belief that
is
not resolvable
of \hoht
but
ini-
thmight
and tte
belief in
them
is
implied in
all
thought and
all
it
on the contrary,
and without
experience,
would be
possible.^
Belief
memory
of
mind
but
>
to call
it
is
it is
but to
state
conscious of our
2
an impression
It is
own
own
existence,
existence.
these truths
MENTAL INTELLIGENCE.
xxxix.]
161
memory
an ultimate
is
fact,
is
an
any other, or in any way explained. Its root and origin is fac^**'
no doubt in the cognition of feelings as they follow each
other in the mind but this is no more an explanation of
the fact, than it would be an explanation of the life of a
plant to trace it back to its seed.
Now, a belief which,
;
fact of
to
memory,
be accounted
for
mental
an ultimate aud
is
by the laws
of f^tell?
gence.
intelligence.
logic,
and the
results of experience,
memory,
all
are not
thought,
knowledge
in
thought that I
am
it
may be
blance of
Idealism
my
I do not
it
Kant
is
only apparent.
maintains
Resem^f^J^y
that theory ta
'
and not
to the miad,
I believe,
on and
and causation
laws of
logic,
are laws
of
its
^rence.
thought.
VOL.
II.
162
same explanation
will
[chap.
sible formation of
There
To repeat the
no contradiction.
ever,
memory
howwhich
is,
distinction
But in
mind
is
from
follows
It
this,
question whether
that the
we
nature
constant
oui'
it
if
minds, being
totally
it WCl'6
not
so, is
irrational.
Intelli-
gence
with
and another
from
set of intuitions,
my
To
is
co-extensive
Ufe,
different development,
fact,
is
an ultimate
all, it is
in some degree;
for, as
of the bee
not
always
anil
conscious.
Intelligence
scious,
it is
is
are all
about
Summary.
U thought,
To sum up the
is
formally logical.
remarks
I believe
MENTAL INTELLIGENCE.
XXXIX.]
163
ideas,
and
Belief
"elfigence
memory.
is
I con-
memory, or expectation, an
intelligence
is
is
is
implied which
a necessary condition
work, which
is
as nutri-
at ^^^ ^?
chemical imply
is
properties of the food that supplies the materials for build- po^eiT^"^
ing up the organism, but which is a necessary condition of
all
But
it
admits of
all
on the contrary,
perfect consciousness.
highest
stronger, for
eye," than in
is
any part
of a tree or of a zoophyte.
fact
in psychology
No
inteiH-
loinfnates
most in
^fe ^Sth
proof organic
the
fact, mental.
its
domination.
In conclusion, I have
peculiarities of the
minds
mind
to
of
any
Peculiari-
the
So far as I
single principle to
am
^f
able to man.
which the
and of
due to a peculiar
spiritual intelligence in man, distinct in kind from any
principle of organic or animal intelligence, and having no
holiness
its
opposite, sin,
is
Sense of
^ '"^ss.,
164
But the
root therein.^
[chap.
intellectual superiority of
Power
of
thou^hT
at will
power
power
is
namely, the
on which depends the
man
ahstractions,
mind
of
Conscious- 1
^
^^^
mean
The higher
is
The symbol of
selves so
first
other words in this, that the child applies all other words
to the
others
same objects
;
but
namely,
it
itself
by
others
of
/ and me
which
to which
so that
in the same
to
it
to
it
it
/ and me
to
an object
way
of other words
is
learned.
instance,
is
them
associated with
by
imitation; but
how
its
It learns
does
1
See
it
p.
64.
own
self;
always with
to use them,
know what
no doubt,
to
imitate?
MENTAL INTELLIGENCE.
XXXIX.]
165
subsequent development of
that
leads to the
it
consciousness
of
IntelH-
needed for
this,
self
now completed
laws of
treats of the
]\Iy
and
show the primary and
and
to
work which
and mind.
life
treatise,
but only to
latter.
NOTE
A.
On
"
is
to be assigned to the
state
o/Qnotation
go on as
arrested only
by some
failure or contradiction."
The
italics are
Professor Bain's.
This
is
is
an ultimate
that belief
is
Now,
His theory of
I think
its
it is true,
different
however,
and
is
not to be
and forcilily stated, though from a point of view somefrom mine, in Professor Terrier's Introduction to the
Philosophy of Consciousness.
2
belief,
and an important
active powers,
Tills is clearly
what
of an active element.
fact,
edit. p. 537.
166
Bat
feelings.
this is not
[chap.
its
Stripped
IS
no es-
plauation.
and
no explanation
this is
at
all.
first
rudimentary formation of
Belief in
belief, or
substance.
is
of
no
Mill on
Bain.
difficulty of
all
that
is
to say,
He
does
but
its
I think,
refutation.
as
or, to
use what
perhaps more
is
account for the power of conceiving, but not for the power of
believing.
Bain on
the belief
in the
veracity of
memory.
memory
memory
germ, readiness
in
is,
its
that
it is
is
to
belief is produced
to act
I think this
on
is
and
I think
vol.
iii.
memory
mind.
167
XXXIX.]
is
the perception of
succession of feelings in
tlie
tlie
of their succession.
evidently idtimate."
be ultimate as well
WiUiam
Hamilton's
why may
so,
memory
Mill on
is the
same,
NOTE
B.
in his "
System of Logic, Eatioci native and Inductive," accepts the usual doctrine, that there are two kinds of
reasoning the one, inductive or analytic, ascending from parti-
Mb. Mill,
:
Inductive
particulars to particulars
the
fire
as
it
^"
when
once
may be
expected to burn
it particulars,
again.
that
It is true
to another,
by induction,
number
by deduction.
Mill
!Mr.
is
But
this is not a
work was thought of, that all reasoning concerning things involves the axiom that the course of
out long before the present
nature
is
uniform
scientific language,
or, as
that
what
it
in less
own words
" If Quotation
its
major premiss
'
168
[CH.
XXXIX.
universal major
What
Whence came
is
hut
the
governed
of the
origin of
or' syllogistic
the belief
in the
constancy
of nature.
due to
habit.
it is
association, or
thinking that
it is
an ultimate
1
Logic, vol.
reasoning.
my
fact of intelligence.
i.
p. 373, note.
Mr.
mental
reasons for
CHAPTER
XL.
and mind,
i^^fg^'and"
though
science,
is
at present in a state of
systematized
fully
a vast
That
number
of
its
systema^^'^'^'^'
problems
remain
to
or in astronomy.
and physical
that there
The same
sciences.
is
is
hope
true of
to
all
the mathematical
as
have
''*'
of the
sciences
themselves and
their
relation
to
each
^^"-^
.
chemistry
up.
But there
is
No
systematization, but the time for doing this work is, but the
The sciences I speak of are those the "esuits
perhaps, not yet come.
of man's
systema-
activity
have not
170
tized,
including
those of
language,
art,
[chap.
and
and
to
say,
arts, or sesthetics
society.
The
language,
art,
sciences
are
that
all
is
products of the
The laws
of these
subjects
depend on do not in
the laws
of mind,
but the
converse
not true.
In language are
an intelligent
and an
habitual
element.
is
an habitual principle
and by habit alone.
we
But
it
is
also
by
habit,
obvious that
all
language, at least
ligence,
and not
to habit.
distinct
powers
me
as to the absolute
171
XL.]
intelligence
and
that habit and
language
as
memory
is
a case of habit,
follows
it
science of comparative
The
will be at some future time.
grammar has not as yet got beyond
comparative etymology
it is
not so evident as
it
Conipa-
come
into
perhaps,
of logic as to
am
not able to
to
and
in
language.
Organization
is
life,
but
life
is
the
Language
^^f;," :,,
organism.
172
As
life
theM-tJanism, so
cause
High organization
organization.
of
^ highly
Jvist so,
[cHAP.
its
language
development of thought
life
constructs
is
developed language
life
however,
is,
thought
has
constructed the
the action of
life
is
in building
an oroanism
both in
of words
aud their
be
its
each forms
instrument.
Variability
gua^r
to
is
to
say, the
Y)?^Tt of this
meanings, ^
t
p
i
no umit as to amount oi change,
allowed and that all organisms
if
is
If this is true,
any
difference
comparf'l^ ^?
in the
oro-ans''
variation
is
the same
fo^"
is
when
word which
German word
hcide
is
fundamentally
ISTo
one doubts,
heath are forms of the same word, and that the similarity
is
We
usually speak of
but
it
is
Words
also
XL.]
limits of the
173
their forms
remain
their
little
much
is
to find
carried
much
We
it.
in
functions
fi'om
This
further than
we
all naturalists
admit, they
Further, there
is
mark
its
true affinities.^
Implicit
mean
to
is
:
will mention
and means imand obedience have come
can think
tlitit I
properly opposed to
The history
of, I
explicit,
is this,
stupid to
tion,
was
to be believed.
know what
Thus, a
not
^
err.
XX. ).
descent.
oJ-^anT'^
compargijeut"
letters.
174
may, by a very
Morphological
correla-
tions
independent of
function,
sliglat
[chap.
We
have seen that there are some morphowhich are due to laws of
correlation merely, and appear to have nothing to do with
Such are the
the adaptation of structure to function.
of language.
same deeply
the leaves and in the
cloven or branched
structure in
formation
comparable to
inflections
without
meaning.
in
language
corresponds
to
the
adaptive
principle
in
175
XL.]
comparative grammar are understood, the more fundamental resemblances do their students discover xinder the
embryology, because
development or of
I do not say of
we know nothing
its
am
yet, as far as I
embryonic
state
sive
'^
^^^^'
its of lan-
ofS'^'^S^^
life
and
differences
French.
wliich
is
the'e^e"
arts,
Historical
much
is
yet
but
come a subject
of science,
we
namely,
-I-,
involving
tne same
principles
176
as organic
inorplio-
logy and
language.
Morphology of
art.
is
possible
[CHAF.
and
it is
found
same
morphology and in the science of language. In art, we
have to do with comparative morphology, and with deIt is no
velopment and progressive gradual change.
metaphor to speak of morphology in art; the word is
to involve the
best
architecture,
In
instance.
or
changes.
English
architecture.
avoid the use of language which sounds as if it were borrowed from organic morphology. Thus, in describing the
progressive changes of the architecture of England,
bold,
descent
Roman,
ture.
with
modification
Or in tracing the
the word descent is
elaborate.
(and in
Gothic,aud i^ufg
architec
we
was modified
on the one
we
side,
and
find that
is
is.
admitted.
XL.l
consciousness
little
Ml
made with
is
not fundamental,
is true,
as I
ligence
and mental
The love
artist.
:I77
if it
intel-
unintelligent principle,
is
own
its
t]e\?ro-^
S'ess of
bility of habit.is
On
art,
without
which,
all,
this
It
able.
is
may be
than
have stated
it
to be.
Habit
is
reason
01f conof tinuity in
do
"''^
of lit''
not deny that the history of art presents some very re-
Some
I shall
new
style.
Others
materials or of
new
kind further on. But the total change in Suli.stituEnglish architecture from the roiind-arched Norman of w?"/"
Glastonburv to the Early Pointed of Salisbury is not to be of Early
thus accounted for. It appears to be a case of almost total Nonnan.
instance of this
But
2
3
of the
Laws
on
the
XXVIL).
Norman kingdom
VOL.
II.
of
178
This is
probably
paralleled
in the de-
velopinent
of species.
contrary,
it
completes
the
[chap.
between
parallel
tlie
history of
intelligent, or logical,
principle in
beyond doubt an
is
gence in
art modifying the
in the
morphology of
art,
as well as in
materials
intelligence works
given to it
by unin- hereditary habit, so
telligent
habit,
without
violating
the consistency of
style.
ruped.2
where the
Instance
in the
modifica-
artist's
its
purpose, which
is
know
is
of,
the
way
in
its
style
distinctive
tion of
of architecture
Gothic
architecture for
the display
of stained
glass.
Politics,
glass
architects.^
human
It
of life
politics,
or the science of
society.
is
true of language, of
still
ii.
art,
XL.]
179
and of every product of human activity continued through successive generations though it is not
of society,
worker or thinker. This truth is a result of the fundamental truth, that habit is variable, but only gradually so.
All the historical researches of the last half-century tend
to
^^'
is and"''
be gradual-
history,
not
all Continuity
changes, no
Destructive
gradual.
may
sudden, and so
death
may
doubt,
life,
'
changes of habit.
in,
political
g^^'tli'
are conse-
It quences of
much
"*
Ijab/t^^^
exaggeration, that
"
form a
state,
sudden
when they
and appear
])'!|['|['*'^
political history.
fangufge,
now
go
-1
Byron.
^"^
fl"*'
history.
180
[chap.
to
cSS
mental
education.
of
acquisition
^^^^
as
the
of
result
own
or
and their meanings coining to suggest each other without any effort of
thought, so that the reasoning process which is needed in
order to understand or to form a sentence is in a great
any other language consists
in the words
a sentence, or practising an
art,
or
done-whether forming
whatever it may be is
done much more rapidly, wliile the attention is set free for
Learning an art, or a language, occupies
other purposes.
the whole attentionthat is to say, according to what I
think
is
it
absorbs the whole consciousness in so far as the consciousness is under the control of the will; but when the art
if
it
may
be practised while
tent artisan
it
is
in
it
difficult.
And
for the
it is,
to
a language with
to read,
at
Thus, a compe-
same reason
persons
is
is left
without
effort
sufficiently familiar
enough of
it
much
of the book.
Both confornlatinn
of habits,
Necessity
of per-
manence
in habits,
It is a parallel truth
and
political
pTog^ess
on.
It
is,
ior instance,
XL.]
liameutary constitutiou,
181
biit it is
would be impossible
Other
for the
itself,
just
as tlie
had
if
its
to
In a word, as education
of our sentences.
is
possible oidy
by actions becoming habitual, so political progress is possible only on condition of institutions becoming in some
degi'ee permanent.
They are the greatest of political hores
any
on the merits of
institution
Political
^'^^^-
whatever,
it is
political
unconsciously before
Society acts
T
and
it
,,,.,.
at nrst springs
^
Government
scarcely a meta-
development
Consciou.s
a kT"!-^
develoiied
up spontaneously
^'^^^
'^"'^
in society.
intelligible,
custom
that
is
older
than lajislation
laws
originate unconsciously in
sciously modified
impossible
if it
See Maine
oil
Ancient Law,
clia])ter v.
182
least is
supposed to have,
older than
any
its
origin in
[chap.
immemorial custom,
statute.^
and
habit,
Habit
ought to
be controlled
They
politicians
Habit
are right.
to
by gence
and
will
is
intelli-
nothing
intelli-
gence.
else
it is
But
politics.
munity
habitual forces
is
this,
were
it
command
This
of intelligence.
Politicians
it
is
and
to
be so
known
is felt
to us as those of
by
all
that these
names
indicate an important
it is felt
by
all
who
It
and
are anything
and
permanence of habit
possibility
of
The
evil.
:
is
in the
habit
intelligence.
The dominance
is
among
nations
it is
well
if it exists at all.
Entire races,
The relation of written to un\yritten law api)ears to have been somewhat different in the ancient republics from what it is in England. The
Twelve Tables of early Rome, and other ancient codes, according to Mr.
Maine (Ancient Law, chap, i.), were not ac?(^i<o?is to the customary laws
Their usefulness
of the legal traditions, and abused the power due to that function.
XL.]
183
vatism
is
due the
fact,
which
is
To
have a tendency
of this
is
to outlive institu-
probably the
l-ve^their
usefulness.
CHAPTER
XLI.
NATUKAL SELECTION
HISTORY.
!>[
1
preceding chapter I have spoken of the applicaIN tion of
the laws of habit and vaiiation to the facts of
tlie
history.
new
I shall first
new
tion, in producing
t)'pes
of character in
colonization.
colonizing
new
countries.
mean
colonization as
is
effected now,
Average
(litference
of emi-
and
grants
friini the
parent
stock.
much
kinsmen which
Direct
elfect of
now
it
cir-
cumstances.
is
to
first,
is
restlessness.
and
thus,
those of
wUl
also tend to
be inherited.
Lastly,
Natural
selection
by
clin ''^''*^
of a r.ice
suited
thereto,
there will be
emigrating population to
country
is
whom
tively unhealthy
families
whom
it is
the
new
compara-
among
whQe
the latter
NATUKAL SELECTION
CHAP. XLi.j
no children
IN HISTOKY.
185
any
the action of natural selection will, in the course of generations, cause the
who
of persons
physical constitution.
that with
Noav,
it is
ch^i!["ter
And
thus will a
new
is
It is
or
for its
own
nature.
"
God
fulfils
This
P'f'^s* i^
physical,
Natural
?'^l'*ction
IS
also
true of the
world
human
History
is
history
is
ii
p.
other animals,
166), acclimatization is
tion
two
causes.
common with
effected partly
partly
by the
it
mental
nature.
186
[chap.
bodily ones.
it
is
is
on the course
of history
physical science
make
history a
The law
every species
is
and
Vii;tory in
liiitnan
stitutes
CO iflicts
lU^pends
among
on
moml
the
of
peculiarity
human
man
is
this,
that
causes.
of
history
Among
offspring,
depend on such
at the highest,
The same
may have been true of man in his earliest prehistoric condition, when as yet he was but little removed above the
But in any state of man which history
higher animals.
records,
and doubtless
the
dawn
of
What
article, entitled
Rccicir of
December 1867.
rlfgi-ee
suj,'geteil
by a most able
British
NATURAL SELECTION
XLI.]
187
IN HISTORY.
uot
by physical but by
moral superiority.
This will probably be assented to as self-evident
never-
many
Asiatic tribes
yet,
Mahomedan
till
The causes
way
before Europeans.
We know
civH society.
of victory
that primitive
tribes tend to
break up into fragments, as in the case of the separation of
the families of
We
Esau.i
Abraham and
have
not,
nature
we may
so far as I
;
will be greater
among a people
temper, while
those
in
of selfish
whom
I believe
historical
the
Book
of Genesis, from
ut whether
it is
up
and contentious
oritrof
powei- in a
staV^ue
\ ^^^^,.
coming
virtues.
Abraham
forwards, to be mainly
domestic-
188
[cHAP.
into
existence,
to live
life,
and
tribes consolidate
The
vTitueT^
with
this,
the
This
subject
is
ness of disposition
It
virtues.
may
of taming a race of
men
is
the difficulty
their character
This,
But
uutameableness is simply the character of the savage, and
freedom and the love of freedom are of no moral worth
whatever unless they are based on loyalty and the capacity
Fidelity, loyalty, and the capacity for
for obedience.
I
say,
It
military
and
military power.
NATURAL SELECTION
XLI.]
189
IN HISTORY.
them the civic virtues. It is not very easy to define in The civic
what civic virtue consists, bnt it is happily so well known ^'"*"*^^'
among us
meaning
':hat
no definition
is
may
Tt
intelligible.
shown in
It is
all
history
how
The
in the physical
on, of
world
a process of natural
is
selection goes
In the
were
present day, where the inferior races are unaljle to adopt the
ways
of civilized
It is going
and the comparatively benevolent disposition which civimen have now acquired appears unable to arrest it.
lized
This
is
exactly the
way
in
which natural
selection acts as
race
being destroyed, a
there
men
is
as
nothing at
among
is
new
all
which
Among
is
when
'
i3ut
edition).
I.
chapter
iii.
afterwards
g^J^^^^l^^'^
gated.
190
[chap.
jugated,
what
This
is
is
importance.
of
the
The answer to
it
is,
on the whole
dominant, whether
T think,
Political
satisfactory.
progress
due to conquest.
of
to
Western Europe.
But when nations,
the
Eoman
conquest
as distinguished
Ulti-
are consolidated,
mately,
war
ceases
an
agency of
to be
progress.
it
and
to ideas.
In the peaceful
strife of
our modern
Peaceful
progress
due to
tutions
competi-
principle to
tion and
natural
selection.
Justifica-
tion of
freedom.
which progress
is
due
is
still
the same
justified.
its
unavoidable concomitant of
Where
NATURAL SELECTION
XLI.]
191
IX HISTORY.
to find
that
may
successfully transacted.
is
to
say,
and
free
and
is
fair discussion is
in the world of
dom
human
In a word,
it
is
by which
necessary that
may
select
and preserve
In
have treated
CHAPTER
XLTI.
have shown how the prinof habit, variation, and natural selection apply
the last
IN ciples
two chapters
and mind.
Division of to
organization
Society
IS
an
orffanism.
definition
is
the same
The
between
where labour is
divided or, to speak more accurately, a society where
employments are distributed is not metaphorically but
literally an organism. The expression, " physiological division of labour," has been borrowed by biology from political
parts
science, to signify
guage, the
what
is called,
But
to
speak of
The more
is
also their
tlie
greater
is
the differentiaThis,
which
is
CH. XLII.]
true of organic
life, is
193
It is too
life.
members among
who
is
divided
and
it
is
an organism
namely on the
distri-
actions of
those parts.
The
Nutritive
1.1
is
comparable to the
of the animal.
nervo-muscular organization
&
There
is also this
Industrial
political
organization.
^^^.^
is organic de-
human
1.1
of
to the complex.^
society there
is
-iiii-Pf.
>
same
in remarkable
and man.
It is the
and last for but a few generations unlike the kingdoms and republics of civilized men. I further believe
small,
VOL. XL
organized
are the
th?longest
li^'^^.
194
that
tlie
[chap.
civilized
societies
out
of
Further
of the organism
the material
Constant
matefial!
matter
is
cast off
by
is
constantly
excretion, while
new
is
same matter.
Just
members
so,
of the
community,
periods,
successive
at
community are
so that the same
of
consists
different
individuals.
The
of
blancr*^"^'
which
of the individual
life
Ground
parallel
to be accidental
it
is
^*^ ^
1. Life,
ia
r
activity,
Habit.
lutelli-
gence.
is
mode
common
This
ground, as I think,
of activity.
life
would be a
contradiction.
and
2.
The laws
3.
controlled
by
intelligence
to
due
mental intelligence in
which
social, is
social organization
and
The mental
intelligence to
process which
rp,
differences
individual
and
social
tion.
Social
till does
not depend
ture.
it
effects
no consciousness whatever.
I have to remark, in conclusion, that there are three
differences between individual and social organization,
-^hich ought to be clearly stated.
In the individual organism, organization depends on
in other words, the relation of parts with
structure
respect to function depends on their relations of position
and form. In societies this is not the case,
;
life is
concentrated
195
XLU.]
in the
brain
zation
of
life,
In
whole.
and from
follows
it
societies,
the parts
that
exist
for
the
exists for
it
the
exists for
tlie parts.
the parts.
ductive function.
social
and
it
is
'
must be subject
individuals,
if
analogy
death
is
to
good
for anything,
1ms no
ductive
function,
^^^.
^.
societies
I think necessarily
it tells
a law of individual
is
It
life,
the Ar<nimeut
so is
for the
and births, in a normal state of things, compensate, and more than compensate, for deaths.
But if
death is a law of social life, there is no law of birth to
birth
compensate.
KOTE.
HERBERT SPENCER ON THE SOCIAL ORGANISM.
It will be perceived that the ideas of the foregoing chapter are
on the same
subject.^
is
true
and most My
objec-
but, not satisfied with pointing out the general resem- tv^^.^u
blance between the principles of organization in the individual ject to H.
valuable
and the
social organisms,
parallel
way which
which he
discovers, in a double
tabular form.
The
The
Commodities.
Blood.
in the two, in a
nutritive system.
circulating system.
O 2
^pencer-
196
[chap.
Money. ^
Eed
Blood-vessels.
Double
lines of rail.
blood-corpuscles.
(arteries
spinal
cord.
ments.
Telegraph wires.
The cerebral
Nerve fibres.
Nerve
Parliament.
ing railway
ganglia.
fibres
controlling
the
arteries.
traffic.
the foregoing
not,
'^
'
wealth
" as
an
artificial
as giving life
to
the
whole
body.
The
magistrates
officers
of
and
judicature
other
and
execution
Artificml joints.
" Silver and gold have to perform, in the organization of the state,
the same function as the blood-corpuscles in the human organization.
As these round discs, without themselves taking an immediate share in
1
the nutritive process, are the medium, the essential condition of the
change of matter, of the production of the heat and of the force by wliich
the temperature of the body is kept up and the motions of the blood and
all the juices are determined, so has gold become the medium of all activity
in the
The
life
quoted by Spencer.)
oxygen
to the tissues,
is,
from them; so that they are used in the process of nutrition without
Carpenter, however (Human Physiology, p. 198), refers
being consumed.
XLII.J
and member
Joint
to perform
The
ivealth
liis
and
particular
is
The
every
sovereignty,
the
of
are
The
by whom
needful for
it
suggested unto
Eqxiity
and laws
Concord
Sedition
Civil
The
war
to
it,
all
Its business.
things
know
are
strength.
do the same in
moved
duty, are
members
nerves, that
The memory.
are
J
An
artificial
reason and
Health.
Sickness.
Death.
^vill.
197
CHAPTER
XLIII.
rpHE
])reseut
J-
naturally
comes at
the eiid ot
the work,
^[qj^
programme
of
work
to
in otlier words,
it
is
impossible to
It
would
To understand history
attainments of man's
In this chapter
it
man
intellect,
is
one of
biit it
does
to utter prophecy.
me
to avoid
must
be imper-
Any such
rlassifica-
tion
^'^
'
'
The divisions in both are in a great degree arbiand the tabular form does not represent the real
I think, however,
order of things with perfect accuracy.
that a much more complete and regular classification of
the sciences is practicable than we could have expected.
correct.
trary,
Chapter XIII.
CH.XLIII.]
When we
199
on
we come
do not mean
^^ niore"^
tl\an ouo
Spectrum
Whether do
^"%.i.^
crystals
crystallography
Whether do the
facts of electro-chemical
'^
cheniis'try.
The only
possible answer
is
science of
human
kind of connexion
when one
is
A third
to
mistry a variety of
new
substances,
or furnishrifis^to'*^"
another,
chemistry.
fourth
way
is
when one
science becomes, in
or sujiply-
mean, when
2i|it"\^'
one
science
it
enabling
Thus,
another.
it microscope.
It
Connexion
^^'
^a.cs
^^itli
..
200
HABIT
AJS'D
INTELLIGENCE.
[chap-
is
only,
it were, accidental
that is to say, it does not depend
on the nature of the sciences themselves. If this is not
quite evident, it will become so on reflecting that it is
conceivably quite possible, though unlikely, for a man to
as
But
nomy
is
impossible
for it
would be
a contradiction
to
The connexion of
micsinjply
those of
mathematics.
mics.
It
is
would be impossible
so
much
to state the
as
tion,
which
is
to be a
series.
Such a
series is
only
approxi-
is
not in any
is
first
knowNow,
mately
possible.
it
in
some
on
201
XLIII.]
The value
possible.
by
The order
it
places the
simplest
It is
substances are vitalized, or capable of vitalization.
simplicity
of
the
speaking
necessary to observe that, in
speak of the
its
pro-
matics
is
perfectly simple
varied
that no
complete enumeration
is
yet possible of
What
202
[chap.
man
will
an arrangement
question that,
No
single
series in
nature.
if
is
fit
into
is
it
practicable, such
sciences
come
and each member
before the
subjects
go before
after
First
division,
into logic
and
its
but
is
it.
first
logic
on the
other.
unlike
the other
sciences,
is not an
organou.
applications.
it,
of
In another way
some
particular
make
whereby
we come to know what we did not know before. But
logic is not an organon of discovery. It has no discoveries
"When we master the science of logic, we do
to make.
not learn anything that we were ignorant of before; we
only become conscious of knowing what we previously
knew unconsciously. The axioms that a contradiction
cannot be true, that what is true of every one of a class
is true of each one of the class, and that things which
of discovery
that
is
to say, they
discoveries
XLiii.]
same thing
203
logicians
have not taught lis these truths, but have only made us
aware that we know them, and have always known them.
Logic is exclusively occupied with determining the foundations of knowledge,
the superstructure
or, to
works backward
to build
to the fiindamental
and
principles
as-
namely, because
not an
that no o notation can be
organon
of knowledge
logic is
looical
for the
of logic itself.
The notations
of
of arithmetic
and algebra
Boole's
though
may
it
laws of reasoning.*
Logic
is,
mean the
I do not
the sciences.
axioms
is
first
that which
is called,
the dictum de
is
have to
No
do,
of
in the language
is
et nulla,
first
omni
is
all
the second
based
the third
sciences, which,
by Euclid in stating the postulates and axioms as he has done and yet
this work did not extend our knowledge
but it is always desirable, not
;
not only
to infer as
much as
much as
number of primary
Laws of Thought.
smallest possible
^
See Boole's
possible,
but to
from the
principles.
universe.
Consequently,
who would
class
logic as a
thought, as to
of thought.
call logic
2iot
an
111-
reasoning
Logical
'^^'^*''^" '^
jug'^'^^"'^'
204
[chap.
ject
sciences
We
depend on those of
now
logic.
to
sciences
Matliematical
aud
physical
sciences.
Mathematics
comes
before
physii/s.
existing things
of the properties of
may
be called the
sciences
though
it
for
is
not simple in
its properties,
universal in
occupied by matter.
its
all
nor
And,
aud
geometry.
Logic
is the
initial
science.
number
sciences
;
are
algebra,
or the
and geometry,
go on to
physical sciences,
and form.
We now
the
or
those
205
XLiii.J
distinction is Sciences of
speak
or, to
of
lifg.
It is
life.
come
of life are
The
matter.
in our Those
less general
life
life
of
^^g'^gj-gt
than those of
presuppose those of
dynamics
being
At the head
gj^gmigj^i
sciences.
of
which
and energy in so
and after this
cases whatever
gecondaiy
dynamical
mag-
The dynamical
chemical.
Energy
This
sciences
is
come
is
simpler. conie'^
and gaseous
but consists of
and moreover
many
it
one
is
aware who
not
distinct elements,
is
before the
is at all
And
of the
conversant
sciences
may
be enumerated as
Molecular
The
chJmistW
names
of the
two
latter
206
Molecular
defined!
aggregation
includes
it
[chap.
or
Crystallo-
and
distinct
it
so peculiar that
as a separate science.
It
it
is
is
much
better to treat
series,
because the simplest facts of chemistry would be unintelligible without some knowledge of molecular physics
enough, at
least, to
understand what
having
own
its
chemistry
"
;
meant by
solution
and
a distinct substance
is
equally characteristic
elements
is
or evaporation.
of
with
it
this, of course,
while
it
is
is
" crystallographic
its
We
Two
frthe^
sciences
YiYst^'
those'of
now come
to the sciences of
merely as such
^^"
fall into
logy,
which science
pertieTof
organisms, logy,
physio-
These
Morpho-
life.
is
a part
lography
is
a morphological science,
and
its
relation to
may
in
fact comparative
morphology,
is
which
is
who
cultivate
207
XLIII.]
physiology.
vital
convenient, and
is
former apart
or,
a distinct science.
'
man
mind of Second
art,
group
not yet
order,
is
now
It
208
[chap.
.,-1
y;
Si
sis
8
s
5r>
r^
'e
-^
-w
L>^ "^i
.>
1^5;
t.
a,
P
O
ft
3 o
ft
o
.3
o
C3
6C
Idhular
statement
en
s
o
-g
CO
ft
ft
ft
<D
0)
^
H
EH
'
i
o
.<u
'^
to
_a
>
*'"'
>
-M
^
^
_g
>"
sp
OJ
-M bD
<D
-^
g
-4-
+-
ft
ft
o
Mao
i-
S C
XLIII.]
209
On
It has
This
no place
true
is
is
some
for it omits
of the
for
most
astronomy.
needs to be supple-
it
Position of
'^^*'""
meteoro-
sciences.
classification
which
detail,
though
it
I think,
is,
But such a
principle.
Now,
is
it
phenomena
found in nature.
as actually
matter
is
series.
it
some
1
It
are optical.
may
And
the facts
to astronomy,
VOL.
II.
and
of geology do not depend
electrical
j^
210
on any one
vital
for
set
cation of tlieni
[chap.
dynamical,
we know
products.
I
propose
to call
them the
cosmic
sciences.
now under
consideration
enumerated
The subject-matter of an
above, which are abstract ones.
abstract science is a particular group of laws, under whatthe cosmic sciences, in opposition
to those
may
the motions of a
star,
act
thus
includes alike
opinion at
best
least,
and
and
heat,
I believe I
am
thus geology
which
(in
my
entirely to be referred to
authorities) is
of force
of volcanoes,
the
laws
by physical
ParaUelism of the
abstract
and the
agencies.
series
of
cosmic
sciences.
and
is
We
The
series
of the
Its ground.
Gradation
of pheno-
mena from
the vastest
to the
smallest.
dynamical laws.
211
XLIII.]
to
is
confined to a few-
about as
many
of depth below.
the distribution of
life,
And
phenomena
the
nificant size in
of
life
The laws
nents.
on the
The
may be
may be
called
called
geological biology
science
laws which
the
have seen
"VVe
that, in the
among
treat of
phenomena
treat of
W'hich
First,
'
tical
distribution,
its
first
which
as to
Astro^^^y-
and
its
fluctuations
'
this
is
not iden-
is
is
science
this
chiefly
an application of the
consists
of
applications
^'
;
the
laws of heat and electricity to a great variety of circumstances, though it has a branch which stands in the same
relation
optical
to
the
laws of
phenomena
ism.
an appli-
Terrestrial
^^S*^*^*"
radiance,
as rainbows
p2
and
and
halos.
treats
of
of
such
Third, oceano-
212
Oceanography.
[chap.
rents,
Mineralogy-
it is,
Palaeontology,
and the
its
distribution of
species.
is
tribution of living
species
have shown in the chapter on Distribution,^ this dependence is much less rigid than might have been expected.
There is thus a kind of rough approximate parallelism
and the
Of course there is no cosmic science in any
cosmic.
CorreBut astrosijondences Way Corresponding to logic and mathematics.
between
nomy pretty accurately corresponds to dynamics terrestrial magnetism corresponds with perfect accuracy to the
series.
between the two
Or what Maury
calls the
by
translating
it
into
may
it
The
be best shown
The general theory of the tides belongs to astronomy, but those more
phenomena which cannot be deduced from the general theory,
but must be ascertained by observation, cannot be called astronomical.
-
special tidal
Chapter XVIll.
XLIII.]
magnetism
abstract theory of
213
graphy nearly correspond to the sciences of heat, electhough the tides, which belong to
tricity, and light
oceanography, are purely dynamic phenomena. Geology
We may
now enumerate
Tabular
enumera-
Astronomy.
.
Terrestriai magnetism.
tion of the
cosmic
sciences.
Oceanography.
Geography,
Geology.
of the distribution of
living species.
As
sciences, this
enumeration also
may
probably admit of
n
Ti
powers of perception like our own, it it were to come universe
,
J.
At
of infinite space.
towards our world from the regions
t^" order
in which
he would
^^-^^^^^_
214
all
[chap.
the planets.
JSText
in the
it
ject-matter of geology.
And
last of all,
supposing this
would
Chain of
each
;
supposing
it.
Parallel to
the
this
laws of
life
^"^^'
it
and heat
and
the laws of general dynamics presuppose those of mathematics, which are based on the properties of space and
In the actual distribution of things, which contime.
g^j^^-.^j-gg
^j^g
ditiou of
is
''
of
step
arrange-
ment
At every
life.
would
laws
of palaeontology,
life,
that
It is a necessary con-
be surrounded
The
and
air.
are
air,
of meteorology
their
and
small
proportion unorganized matter that surround them.
Those masses
ma
ei.
^^ matter
on the surface
of
the
XUII.]
215
proportion
these are cases of the general law, that the simplest pro-
to space,
inert,
Matter
is
^'^^^^ "?
simpler than
properties
its
and
The same
time as in space.
are the
most uniform
*|jg''^^''
and the most general in their action, not only in space but longest
^'
also in time.
The only truths,. in any science, which we
are safe in pronouncing to be absolutely unchangeable by The only
any agency whatever, are the simplest and most funda- ^j^gUg"!-^
mental of all truths, namely, those of logic. It is not able truths
possible even to Omnipotence to make a contradiction of^iog^^''
The properties of space and time, on the contrary,
true.
may be capable of change by the Divine will I do not
;
assert
that
they are so
mathematics
and
may
if it
only say
is
so,
we cannot
assert
Space and
Omnipotence could not make two right lines enclose an area that
make two right lines as we understand right lines,
enclose an area as we understand an area ; for this would be to make
either a right line or an area, or both, be what they are, and yet different
which would be a contradiction. But it is to me credible that Omnipotence might, without any contradiction being involved, have made the
properties of space and time different from what they are.
And I see no
true.
is
but
infinite
number
of dimensions in space
may
be not
is cajiable
Perception (Chap.
XXXVI.).
216
Time and
space were
before
matter.
Gravitatiou is tlie
onl}- constantly
acting
force.
and
force
came
by us
into existence
[chap.
and
tliis is
actually true,
if
and it
nebula.^
primeval
work
in
the
was
Finally, the most complex and special of all modes of
and
activity, namely life, was of later origin than matter
origin
than
functions,
mind
was
of
later
vital
the
amons
circumstances, but gravitation never ceases to act
Life
and
mind
are
the latest
products.
unconscious
life.
perties
The
constantly in action.
highest
products
are the
results of the
least in
quantity,
and the
least
forces, it follows
life
product
still.
constantly branching
plicity, complexity,
and
variety.
Evermore
And,
and the
last in
time.
as in the
come at
them, and are
See the chapter on the Motive Powers of the Universe (Chap. VI.).
See Chapter VI.
XLIII.]
It is
the
many remarkable
man and the nniverse
one of the
mind
217
which
the l^j^f of
noblest product, that this distribution of the products of man with
of
and
of
in time, is that
which appears
maxim
It is a
is
it
in art that
perhaps
is
.'
.
rule of
i^efnty in
least
In
all art
In
good.
rises
is
not
all art
it
is
properly placed
level,
it
wliile if
to the eye,
ear.
But in the latter that is
and music, in which the parts of a com-
maxim
is
this
and, in
further mugjif
at"
If
it is
capable of being
the two tabular
positive science
all
all
known
that
no such notion.
far as possible to
is to
say, science
what
having
is
its
called
data in
^
^f**^*^
chapter.
218
[chap.
Even
mind.
keep clear of
physics
possible,
and
metaphysical methods.
to
tlie
But
this is not
theology.
On
firmly as I believe
in positive
science
it
is
science.^
Opposition of
There
is
literature
and
history to
science.
scientific.
human knowledge
Common
sense
is
It is true
at least I believe
Nature of
historical
science.
it
so
that
such a thing
pos-
is
is
between
human
nature.
distant
dependent, but
It is
it is
true as
not
tlie less
in-
desirable to understand
life of Washington.
It is true that
nations tend to become politically consolidated, but it is
not the less desirable to understand the character and the
life
of Cavour.
See Preface.
COIITE
XLIII.]
219
SCIENCES.
NOTE.
COMTE AND HUMBOLDT ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.
It will be perceived
tliat
following
My
obliga^'" ^
His
Astronomy.
of the
-r,,
series
sciences.
Physics.
Chemistry.
Biology.
Sociology, or Historical
My
series is the
points of detail.
and
same
The
are as follow
and
Political Science.
as this in principle,
differences
may be
hut
diifers in
some
"Where
from
my
^'?'*
his.
group of sciences.
at
I do not place astronomy iu the series of the abstract sciences of astroall, but in the parallel series of the cosmic sciences
because "y;
with a special
set of laws,
force of gravitation,
terrestrial
The
motions as well as in
celestial ones
the law of the
motion of a cannon-ball, or of a stone thrown from the hand,
for instance, is of the same kind with the law of a planet's
motion.
partly according to
according
to
its
locality,
physics
as
in
and
chemistry,
and partly
terrestrial physics.
With
and biology,
my
ar-
by which barbarous
compound Comte means the science of history and politics,
occupies the place in his series which I have assigned to a group
of sciences not yet systematized.
Sociology,
220
g
this group,
and
tlie
[ch. XLIII.
It is a great
language
fault in Comte's series of the sciences, though only a fault of
omitted by
^^^g^^i ^jjj j^q^ pf principle, that he has left no possible place
for the science of language.
My
obli^ations to
"
^J ^^^^
the
first
The
series
so far as I
am
by
CHAPTER XLIV.
KEMAEKS ON THE HISTOEY OF
ACCOEDINGr
SCIENCE,
down
is
in
an arrangement
series,
whereof the
those
beginning with
.
subject-matter
is
^j^e his-
toncal
order of
the evolu^
and going on to
*|,ig^gg*
with their
plex and special.
This, which is the logical order, is also in a great degree o|gr^
Those sciences whereof the subjectthe historical order.
matter is simple and general have for the most part come
into existence as sciences earlier than those whereof the
subject-matter is more complex and special. This is what
we might have expected, and for two reasons. In the first
general,
As
first
to be discovered.
first
mean painting a
been laid down first and progress consists in the discovery of a constantly increasing number of more special
;
truths,
general
Ilhistra-
pictm-e.
222
[chap.
single step
the time
of
in the pro-
Newton
consists in
the discovery of the laws of heat, and their establishment as a particular case of the more general theory of
force.
But, like
scientific
mere
all
illustrations,
comparison
this
of
completion
is
and
it
is
not
above is
only ai>
'
complex.
The
and
and
and
valuable light
is
It is true that
The
progress
seience is
twofold,
...
'
^^"^
^^'^'^
and^
^0 ^*^^^ cases
known
and upward,
or inductive, consisting in
new laws by
a process of generalizing
inductive,
the discovery of
Mathe-
from facts.^ These two processes of discovery, the deducIn mathetive and the inductive, sometimes go on apart.
^^^tics, all is
deductive
chemistry
inductive
deduction
and
heat.
But
ment
both.
and deduction
co-
the
heat i5
now has
Essays.
i.
XLiv.]
applied by
223
SCIENCE.
deductive
reasoning
to
is,
special ones.
must be under-
first
place,
g^
before
it
in the series, yet this is not always, nor generally, are not
when
is first obvious
and on which
step
of
without
the
dynamics
aid
of
is
especially
is
on
the series,
in
This
is
not the
mathematics.
chemistry
did not
the
it
logically based.
is
it
next before
^^ ^'^*-
But
it
experiment.
is
true
Thus,
prevent
of electricity
chemistry from
and being in a tolerably forward state, before electrochemistry and thermo-chemistry were thought of. In
the same way, biology is based on chemistry for such
science
"^.^uate
indepen-
and of respiration
224
orifiiiial
condition of
its
[chap.
commencement, but a
late result
of its progress.
an approximation to the
truth to say that the early development of a science
depends on the simplicity and generality of its subjectWhatthe matter. AVhat really causes a science to be developed
^^I'ly i^ partly the accessibility of the facts which constiorf In of
a science
tute its data, and partly the obviousness of its fundamental
In the second
conceptions.
on!"^^
place, it is only
This, I think,
is
It is very interesting to
Mathematics.
Geometry
alsebra.
This
especially true
The data of
but
its
is
it
was
developed.
later in being
of chemistry,
on
whatever
but
its
than experiment.
This
is
make
equal, a
science
of
obser-
than one of
not so much because experiment is
earlier progress
experi-
ment.
It
to devise,
it
it is a mere searching in the
would have needed more than human ingenuity
d priori and all at once, a set of experiments to
;
easy to
XLIV.]
225
==
o the point
would be at some point nearer to human life and duty
most
that it would have begun at biology, or psychology, or
f^^^''
politics, and not at mathematics, which of all possible l^uman
'-
is
it as
and
"
Galileo's contemporaries
Why
stars,
know
of man, and
we
shall probably
was too
remote from human life to be obviously useful, and would
never have made any progress whatever if it had waited
to justify its existence by its usefulness
its first progress and still
was due to its own intrinsic intellectual interest. ^ And ^*^ moving
power IS
.-.
.11
,1
,1
the same is stiil practically true, although the usefulness not useMScience, at its origin,
Chemistry
is
a partial exception
making gold appears to have done something for its progress. But the
effect of this was probably very slight
and the gi'eat discoveries of
Lavoisier and his contemporaries, which really founded the science of
chemistry, were made without any such stimulus.
;
VOL.
II.
226
ness,
but
iutellec-
of science
is
now no
[chap.
tiial
as at the
interest.
first,
not
its
usefulness but
its
is
still,
intellectual interest.
utilities
would
in all probability
be missed.
" So 'twere to
Sliovild
was not
hook
in seeking for
certain
means of
The
It
telegraph.
were discovered.
was at the
remotest point from human life, is true also in a somewhat
different sense from that which has been insisted on above.
All science all inorganic science, at least depends on
science
All
inorganic
SC1GI1C6
science
depends on
Sentsrf
space.
was the
earliest
of the sciences.
NOTE.
Jleasurement of
spaces
Equal
which
are capable
The
and
all
Tennyson's Day-dream.
See the Chapter on the Relation of the Miud to Space and Time
(Chap.
3
XXXVII.).
This remark
is
made in-H.
XLiv.J
227
when moving
in the
line or
of velocity:
on
parallel lines.
Equal times
are those in
which equal
spaces.
Equal
times.
which,
Or (what is
when acting
in
opposite
directions,
neutralize
of force
each
other.
forces.
Q 2
of resist^?*^
CHAPTEE XLV.
REMARKS ON THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES.
chapter, different
to different sciences;
Indeed
life.
it
may
be stated
The more as a general truth, that the more special and complex
special and
are the facts which constitute the subject-matter of a
complex
is the
science, the less susceptible is it of mathematical treatsubject of
a science,
the less
is
mathematics
applicable
to it.
ment.
tical science;
is
altogether a
mathema-
(sound,
mathematical.
In connexion
with this,
the facts
of life are
in some
degree indefinite.
life
is
connected
the
truth that
their
facts,
known with
this
is
diflicult
perfect numerical
it
quantitative relations
is
are
too
229
CH. XLV.]
within moderate limits no doubt, but without any ascerThus, in that branch of biology which is
tainable law.
it
impossible to
is
same
does
^
inferior in precision to those of the inorganic sciences, are any"min no sense, and in no degree, inferior to them in certainty, certainty.
The same
true,
is
make
repeated in order to
long
by
it
it
habitual,
disuse.
or,
again, for
how
It
precision.
happiness
is,
tendency of falsehood
but
it is
Certainty
human
precision,
injurious to
is
never possible to
anything can
tell
how much
is
The
it
injury
ethical
does not
We may
enumerate four
relation of mathematics
They
all,
fallacies
and of
I believe, have
earliest sciences
that
in the
origin
230
[chap.
that logic
1.
is
not to extend
its
foundations,
that
The
2.
of SCIGIICC
that
is
'
'
that
fallacy
Mathematics
science.
matictis
the type
to Say,
"
sequently
it
it is
mathematics
is
is
the type of
all
and con-
observation like
aud
The
3.
intel-
hgibleness
are tests of
truth:
Descartes,
who
down
laid
intelligibleness are
must be
and
of truth.
tests
is
true
and whatever
conceived as soon as
is
true
it is
must necessarily be
fully understood.
it
is
clearly
In physical
mere truth of
for,
and
error consequently involves no logical absurdity
and a
conception may be clear and yet not true.
But though it
fact,
;
is
is
knowledge.
caution
ledge
Yet even
is
it is
true
a proof of imperfect
test
I do not
mean merely
mystery
life,
mutual relation of
and of all the facts
XLIIL).
231
XLV.]
of unconscious
intelligence.
contradiction
a proof of error
caution in
is
application
its
It
for
but
it is
also
is
tliis
test also
needs
is
real
or only verbal.
4.
certainty.
at
is^i^e
criterion of
This notion
it
in the
attainable
is
would refute
itself if it
were
for
were
it
indeed,
true that no
it
is
is to
would be impossible to
a conclusion which it
But
the notion of some necessary connexion beaccept.
tween certainty and precision is, I think, implied in such
expressions as " mathematical certainty " and " mathematical precision;" and in the belief, which is often
die at all
and
man
that
however, though
is,
it
allies itself
is
still
in a very
immature
Vol.
I.
p. 6.
state.
pre-
But, as I
232
Extension is
of the
word
*^f
[cHAP.
or, if it
SC16I1C6
habit of thought.
We
an extinct
word
a notion
science
is
still
a somewhat
word but I
;
come
to be used with
sur-
wiE
It is
scientific
science.
Induction
methods
of
^^^^
tion must
co-operate, results
and deductive
and perfect
two methods
coinciding.
of induction
scientific
method
to say of
is
None
theoretical
by the
by induction from observation and experiment while at the same time, by the converse process, the
results obtained by induction from observation and experiment are checked and verified by the calculated results
of theoretical deduction.^
In language which is at once
fS'^iliai' ^^^ accurate, this is called tlie coincidence of
results obtained
;
Theory
vatioli'^'''^'
As was
retical one.
are verified
results
(the theoretical data in this case consist, of course, in the general laws of
human nature).
This
it is
is,
to be verified
by the
other.
XLV.]
233
SCIENCES.
is
we have
in
knowing how
on them,
The
shown by the
utter
is
best
human
human
nature.
become
mathematical in form
can ever
nevertheless I think
we
are
^'^^*^"
'IS
safe in asserting
" that the relation of theory to observation
is
Historical
}ts
niethod
tiie
same
as that of
science!
mean mere
when
theoretically
dencies of
other.
now
all
unprejudiced
first
is
familiarly called
may
free Free
trade.
human
men
state
which
it.
is
an exception
to In what
the law of the necessity for verifying the results of the one ^atheit may be thought that the matics
method by those of the other
;
verification.
It is
fication.
234
tion,
we
[ch. xlv.
and do not
But I think,
need to test it by counting or measuring.
though I do not wish to speak dogmatically on a question
which rather belongs to metaphysics than to logic, that the
reason
why we
of mathematical reasoning
is
is
But
to
put a case
quite conceivable
if
the
it
reasonable
makes
is
powers.
alike
it
it
it
is
all
the sciences
human powers
that
duction by observation.
We
much more
powerful,
throughout nature
and
is to
work
But
it is
Life,
Intelligence are
it
is
obvious
a single law.
and gravitation
it is
It
APPENDIX.
APPENDIX.
As
is
its
principal purpose
to state
of Intelligence
that intelligence
is
work
far as this
is
a controversial one at
all, its
purpose
In
so
is
to
it
of Three
^^'^'^
or
is Is life
origin ^^^^^
an
^
power 1
Are the organizing power which builds up the wondrous Are organstructures of the body, and the intelligence of the mind, mere Jf^^^ ^T
results of habit, variation, and natural selection ? or are they intelliboth due to a principle of intelligence which is not capable of ^^ateVcts^?
directly in creative
2.
altogether peculiar,
thing else
In
this
that
is
to say, of
mental habit
or is
it
I have answered
lower than
With
^^ ^
ultimate
work
I have expressed my
moral sense are each incapable of being resolved into anything
way
Is the
answer
^fg^^^-^^
tive.
itself.
it
is
my Moral
it
contains an element
which
238
life
and
work
sensation.^
and of
full discus-
its results,
would be
gence,
With
respect to organizing
and mental
intelligence
work
intelli-
consist of
an
attempt to prove that they are not capable of being resolved into
any unintelligent
my
Life.
agencies.
It
would be needless
to recapitulate
my
matter can be
vitalized,
and living
sort,
On
In a question of this
to permit
Huxley's high
my
reasoning
against his.
some
mixed
Z^\
"
When
of
them
in a certain propor-
tion,
and an
pear,
electric
spark
is
the passive and active powers of the water and those of the
rise to
it.
At
32
Fahr. and far below that temperature, oxygen and hydrogen are
elastic
imitations of
Nevertheless,
force.
the most
we
call
and we do not
hesitate to believe
Yo\.
I.
p. 89.
239
APPENDIX.
'
'
amongst the
crystal or
trary,
we
live in the
of molecular physics
On
the con-
as clearly
water as
the hoar-frost.
leaflets of
we
of the matter of
is
no
parts
its
Is the case in
put together.
life
sort of parity
but
does
operandi of an
electric
What
'
This reasoning, on a
first
is
produced by leaving
out
the
and convincing
that
its
apparent
of
difficulties
the
question.
The analogy
ment.
of a watch really
we
It is true that
manner
in
which
"
and
it
matter,
wliicli
is
is
really a
chiefly
wide divergence
for the
formed of combinations
of
reply
'*
240
is
protoplasm
" in vitalizing
The only
altogether unsound.
effect
of heat
is
is
when
the subeffect
vitalized
is
when
by the
affinities
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HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY,
Mr. Crabb RobinsotCs Diary
&-
TRAVELS.
19
whom Mr.
&=c. &'c.
astical,
Sta'e'l,
Lafayette, Coleridge,
Lamb, Milman,
Rogers (James E. Thorold). HISTORICAL GLEANINGS A Series of Sketches. Montague, Walpole, Adam Smith,
:
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Cobbett.
J.
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is to
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set 0/
lectures.
HISTORICAL GLEANINGS.
J.
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E. T.
Rogers.
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Series of Slvetches.
Crown
8vo.
By Rev.
ds.
papers on
Smith, M. A.
"
work which
neglect.'"
History of England.
New and
By Goldwin
Cheaper Edition,
^s.
Saturday Review.
Demy
8vo.
Second Edition.
B 2
\2.s.
GENERAL CATALOGUE.
20
6.
Legislation of 1861 ;
8.
States.
Tacitus.
THE
By A.
English.
With
Map and
HISTORY OF TACITUS,
J.
Notes.
Svo.
J.
translated
into
Brodribe, M.A.
lOs. 6d.
and faithful
translation.
"
J.
and Notes.
The
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readers
With Maps
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The
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this
2s.
translato7-s
scholars
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fcap. Svo.
Brodribb, M.A.
J.
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it is
treatises
chronological
summary.
all,
and
the classical
student.''''
Taylor (Rev.
Isaac).
WORDS
and PLACES
or
By
\2.s.
"
the Rev.
Isaac Taylor.
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Svo.
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Saturday
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HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY,
TRAVELS.
21
D. D.
Archbishop of Dublin.
whom
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Trench (Mrs.
of the late
unfamiliar."
is
Fcap. 8vo
R.).
Dublin
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sidered.
New
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Historically,
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THE
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Strategically,
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Capt.
Asiatic Politics
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and anecdotes
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RICHARD TRENCH.
Mrs.
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Chenevix Trench,
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Author's
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origin,
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l7t this
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[continuea)
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NONCON-
FORMIST.
REV.
GEORGE WAGNER,
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late
ha^'e rarely
met with.'"
LITERARY
Churchman.
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HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY,
&-
TRAVEIS.
23
Ward
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OF SCOTLAND.
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Wilson
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ESSAYS IN CRITICISM. New Edition,
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:
fouhert
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and the
Bible
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Contents
"Uncommon
Churchman.
Poems for
lyrical
Italy
8vo.
cloth
pcwer and
MON
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4j. 6d.
POEMS OF
ENGLISH.
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RURAL LIFE
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" Full of life and genius." COVRT CIRCULAR.
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and
information
S-
BELLES LETTRES.
rj
France in poetical
literattire.
In one moderately
very
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sized
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of
to
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Athen^^UM.
to the
Notes of
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Library, Cambridge.
University
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Perseus.
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Cura A.
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AtheN/EUM.
TENNYSONIAN^,
HOR.E
J.).
Tennysono Latine redditas.
(A.
With
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reprinted
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oj expressiott are
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Church
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G.
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"
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vative
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England, in
sometime Fellow
With a Memoir by F. T. Palgrave.
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mind of cultivated,
this
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Eraser's
poems of
A}-thtir
Hugh
Magazine.
Translated by
5j-.
may
be
summed up
in one
word
Literality.
line for
To follow Dante sentence for
has been my strenuous endeavour. "
wordfor word neither more nor
Author's Preface.
.
sentence,
line,
less
De
Vere.
THE
INFANT BRIDAL,
By
SPECTATOR.
POETRY
Doyle
(Sir F. H.).
BELLES LETTRES.
&^
Works by
Sir
29
7^-.
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LE MORTE
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30
GENERAL CATALOGUE.
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For English
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GUESSES AT TRUTH.
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*
Guesses at Truth.
literature
which
is
and
the
'
Briiyere agreed
to utter
'
Hamerton.
a painter's camp.
Hamerton.
Book
This
is
I.
Second Edition,
In England;
the story
the
and
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of an
Book
II.
Artist''s
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'
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of La
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"
It
It
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ness,
8vo.
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Edition.
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John Herschel,
is
admirable,
the
Void
By OuTis.
The main
8vo.
object
iSj-.
question of Homeric
is fully
HIATUS
8vo.
The
translation
we should think
Hexameters.
"It
Cheap
bs.
says:
this
Review
31
SATURDAY Review.
REALMAH.
Crown
Of
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vivacity
Celtic
Legend^
Spectator.
GENERAL CATALOGUE.
32
Kingsley (Canon).
THE
See also
Hungary.
the Rev. F. D.
Maurice.
Third Edition.
Elizabeth of
a Preface by
Fcap. 8vo.
Third Edition.
55.
Fcap.
5j.
PHAETHON
or,
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Loose Thoughts
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Loose Thinkers.
for
is.
"Works of
(Professor). AMONG MY
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Lowell
See
Fiction."
BOOKS.
Two
England
Witchcraft;
Centuries
Third
ago;
Six Essays.
of Belles Lettres
Shakespeare
Lessing
mentalists.
" Under
short as it
ration^''
the Willows
is
Saturday
Review.
(Professor).
CRITICAL.
ESSAYS,
Chiefly on
LL.D., Professor of Rhetoric
8vo.
By James
ds.
or perhaps because
is,
Masson
Fcap. 8vo.
I2J-.
BIOGRAPHICAL AND
By David Masson,
University of Edinburgh.
i)d.
analysis,
a clear statement
Athen^um.
POETRY
Masson
belles LETTRES.
Sh-
(Professor)
{continued)
BRITISH NOVELISTS
33
Being a Critical
Crown
8vo.
its
Is.
6d.
breadth
y.
6d.
Poem
of a newly-married lady.
" One
tion,
the
is
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manner of its
Mistral
lated
" This
terms
to
sweetness
Myers
conception
(F.).
MIRELLE:
is
is
in
word
Trans-
6j-.
(Ernest).
" //
itself to
o_f
indeed,
and execution."
by H. Crichton.
is
epic poet/i
original,
tmique
not too
and showing
expression."
much
THE
cloth,
zs.
to call it
this
charming
puritans.
epic."
AtheNjEUM.
By Ernest Myers.
6d.
stately
and dignified,
not only a high poetic mind, but also gi'eat power over poetic
Literary
Churchman.
W.
Myers
Nettleship.
POETRY.
essays
By John
on
ROBERT
T. Nettleship.
BROWNING'S
ks. 6d.
GENERAL CATALOGUE.
34
Beatrice
is
OTHER POEMS.
By
the
Hon.
ds.
poem;
it
displays a splendour
of landscape painting, a strong definite precision of liigltlv-coloured description, which has not often been surpassed.''''
Pall Mall Gazette.
Norton.
THE
LADY OF LA GARAYE.
Norton.
P'cap. Svo.
4^. 6d.
" The)-e
much
is
and may
THE
Orwell
TIMES.
the
Hon. Mrs.
Edition.
Si.xth
bright description,
expressed,
By
Frontispiece.
be classed
among her
best
BISHOP'S ^VALK
Poems on
Times.
AND THE
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tlie
By Orwell.
Scottish Covenant.
works."
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5^.
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insight into
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T.).
ESSAYS ON ART.
DyceHolman
Mulready
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Art
late
Fellow of
By Francis
Exeter
College,
6^-.
HerbertPoetry, Prose,
Hunt
and
Sen-
Cross, &^c.
Gem
Edition.
Edited by F. T.
With Vignette Title by Jeens. y. 6d.
possibly
excel
the
'
Gem
POETRY
Patmore.
&^
WELLES LETTRES.
Works by Coventry
THE ANGEL
IN
Patmore
35
THE HOUSE.
Book
I.
BOOK
vols.
III.
Tcap.
I2S.
Zvo.
2J. 6(/.
Fcap. Svo.
45-.
6</.
literature.
of domestic
life.''''
SATURDAY
Review.
Rossetti.
Second
little i7iarziel
Edition.
Fcap. Svo.
5J-.
it
Spectator.
THE
PRINCE'S PROGRESS,
Fcap. Svo.
With
ds.
it forgets
that anybody
is
listening." Satvrtiay
Review.
GENERAL CATALOGUE.
36
(W.
Rossetti
FINE ART,
Crown
M.).
chiefly
8vo.
dante's hell,
^-^-.f
"Dante."
By William M. Rossetti.
Contemporary.
\os. 6d.
Eraser,
lications.
Roby.
By Mary K. Roby.
Fcap. 8vo.
5j-.
Kilmahoe
is
a Highland Pastoral,
Smith.
'with
warm
5^-.
soft air
remarkable gra^e
of
andpic-
Fcap. 8vo.
redolent of the
other Poems.
Fcap. 8vo.
zs. 6d.
5^.
S^.
sweetness,
and
Smith.
POEMS.
Fcap.
8vo. 5j.
" Wealthv
which
is
and grace ;
6^-.
LIFE.
Athen^UM.
By
the Rev.
Walter
C.
Smith, M.A.
37
" These are among the nveetest sacred poems tve have read for a hm^
With no profuse imagery, expressing a range of feeling and
expression by no means uncommon, they are true and eleinted, and their
timt.
pathos
is
Nonconformist.
cliffe.
" The
8vo.
Trench.
Works
Dublin.
ot
\os. 6d.
POEMS.
ELEGIAC POEMS.
Fcap. 8vo.
Third Edition.
Fcap. 8vo.
They coiuhiue
With an Essay on
his
"js.
6d.
2s. bd.
of the
Fcap. Svo.
4^. dd.
Dublin.
This volume
it is
is
called
there
of
5^. dd.
that
Selected and
is
nothing in
this
it to
prez'ent
the household.
Speci-
tnens of all classes of poetry are given, including selections from living
The Editor has aimed to produce a book '^ which the emigrant,
authors.
fitiding
room for
in his trunk,
shelves
and
little
this
might
and
that on some
narrow
be one."
Mall Gazette.
GENERAL CATALOGUE.
38
Trench (Archbishop)
{continued)
Chiefly Lyrical.
Fcap. 8vo.
is.
" The aim of the present volume is to offer to members of our English
Church a collection of the best sacred Latin poetry, such as they shall be
able entirely and heartily to accept andapproiie a collection, that is, in which
and
Turner.
SONNETS.
Turner.
8vo.
By
Dedicated to his
the
is i7iconsistent
Preface.
Rev.
brotlier,
Charles
Tennyson
Fcap.
4J. 6d.
to
Mr. Tennyson by
his brother,
and
have,
SMALL TABLEAUX.
Fcap. 8vo.
d^.
U.
" These brief poems have not only a pecidiar kind of interest for the
student of English poetry, but are intrinsically delightful, and will reward
a careful a7id frequent perusal. Full of naivete, piety, love, and knviuledge
of natural
objects,
and
and
generally a simple
subject by
these sonnets
ROSCOE.
Svo.
AND POEMS.
By Mrs. Henry
gs.
The
life
compared to
''It
is
her.
taste,
with quick
and
and
intelligent
chd)-m 0/ style."
sympathy,
Pall
Mall
Gazette.
Webster.
DRAMATIC STUDIES.
"A
5^.
''^
Nonconformist.
" Closeness
MEDEA OF
EURIPIDES.
3^.
Literally translated
3^. dd.
literary skill."
Athen^UM.
6a'.
WOMAN
SOLD,
us that she
is
is
Review.
It
so often
Cxovra. Svo.
"Js.
6d.
obsemations
the life; that she can observe with subtlety, arid render her
venture
and
conceptions,
complex
impersonate
can
that
she
;
delicacy
with
into
Guardian.
GENERAL CATALOGUE.
40
AA/^ebster
{continued)
PORTRAITS.
Fcap. 8vo.
(yd.
3^-.
JVeister's 'Dramatic Studies'' and 'Translation of Promehave luon for her an honourable place among our female poets.
She writes with ranarkable vigour and dramatic realization, and bids fair
to be the most stucessful claijnant of Mrs. Browning's mantle."
British
'\AIrs.
thetis
'
Quarterly Review.
Woolner.
my BEAUTIFUL LADY.
" It
is
By Thomas Woolner.
Third Edition.
clearly the
product of no
idle
ing
Fcap.
Sj.
to utter
great thoughts,
poetic genius.
No man
and a
can read
and
inward yearn-
this
and fnish of the workmanship, so to speak, as well as by the chasand iinpreteiuiing loftiness of thought which pervades the whole''
Globe.
fitness
tened
gilt.
POETS.
Frontispiece.
i8mo.
is.
Extra
GLOBE EDITIONS.
Under
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issuing
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title
GLOBE EDITIONS,
carefully edited,
secure
whom
constitute
and
English
at a small cost.
indisputable
The
enough
guarantee
as
plied
The
and
the
elucidating
been sup-
series
Literature
is
reach of
all.
Shakespeare.
SHAKESPEARE.
Wright.
"A
to
to
been taken
historical, literary,
Authors,
The names of
an
clearly
of Standard
Series
W.
Edited by
Ninety-first Thousand.
plays, poems,
and
sonnets
are
.Shakespeare books."
Athen^.UM.
the busy
the best
man, above
of
yet the
all
all existing
GENERAL CATALOGUE.
42
Bart.
" // is
The
3^-.
New
6a'.
Caxton,
Edition of
Modern Use.
revised for
Edward Strachey,
Edition.
Scott. THE
SCOTT.
POETICAL
With
Globe Svo.
New
Mall Gazette.
WORKS OF
Biographical
3J. (>d.
Pall
SIR
WALTER
T.
Palgrave.
by F.
Essay,
Edition.
Spectator.
Burns.
Globe Svo.
3J-.
bd.
New
Edition.
" Admirable in
all respects."
By Defoe.
editions,
is
Globe Svo.
a book
to
is
likewise
and genial
an
have and
to keep.
and
and binding. A
Rlr. Henry Kijigsley,
is
is
6d.
3J-.
It
well-written
biographical introduction, by
by
Cambridge.
of Trinity College,
Morning
Star.
Professor
GoldsmitK s
traits
^^
and
life,
liliscellaneoiis
newspaper writes:
Globe 8vo.
iMasson.
Works
'acOTSTAAti
the facts of
and minute a
so careful
as
to be
biography."
Pope.
Edited, with
8vo.
Professor
Ward.
Globe
6</.
3J-.
is
is
rich in interest."
The
notes are
many, and
ATHENAEUM.
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the COMPLETE WORKS OF
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Christie.
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" Messrs. Macmillan have, in
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Nothing can
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to
selected poetry,
be callea
and
classical.
and
arranged,
with
Notes,
by
Francis
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" This
delightful
little
many of the best original lyrical pi-eces and songs in our language, grouped
with care and skill, so as to illustrate each other like the pictures in a
well-arranged gallery.'"
QUARTERLY Review.
" //
POETS.
Coventry Patmore.
includes specimens
to
Morning
awaken
Post.
its
GOLDEN TREASURY
THE BOOK OF
PRAISE.
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45
Enlarged Rdition.
give place
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SATURDAY
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full of the
Spectator.
William Allingham.
form
physical splendoicr
Selected and
his
Sayings.
Selected
Mark Lemon.
and arranged by
to justify
best jest
Review.
BACON'S ESSAYS
With
" The
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edition
EVIL.
By W. Aldis Wright, M.A.
scholarship of
"
Spectator.
possess."
we
GENERAL CATALOGUE.
46
THE
PILGRIM'S PROGRESS
come.
"yi
from
this
World
to that
which
is
to
By John Bunyan^
bemififul
and scholarly
reprint."
Spectator.
well-selected
of
By
Spectator.
Times and
all
all
Countries.
The Heir
of
Redclyffe."
"... Totheyoicng, for ivhoin
collection
hook of reference,
away a weary
time."
it is
especially intended, as a
We
half-hour.
Athen^um.
to their elders,
to take iip
have seen no
when
their wish
is to luhile
irettier gift-book
for a long
Smith.
Memoir,
Two
Notes,
and
Glossary,
by
beautiful edition of
W. Clark, M.A,,
many
book-buyers."
"A
dainty
Edited from
Fellow of Trinity
Examiner.
Burns
will be a prize to
Edited, with
Alexander
Vols.
vet out."
most interesting
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J. LI.
and cheap
little
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EXAMINER.
with
GOLDEN TREASURY
THE SONG BOOK,
SERIES.
47
Musicians.
'^
choice collection
diffuse,
LA LYRE FRANCAISE.
for
A perfect gem
The
of a book.
was written."
With
"An
anew by
best
Harrow
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School.
By an Old Boy.
and most
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the Author of
"The Heir
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Vignette.
admirable edition
Review.
in
ILLUSTRATED
A BOOK OF WORTHIES.
written
trust,
we
and
to
an admirable
scries:'
WESTMINSTER
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LONDON
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