ii

ilil1

]b exJ

To locatc lluropc as a political irnd ecoDormc elrtlly

ne lhe theory, lirncrro and practice of democracy as,,rgrably,

dmrental .ompoDents oI Europcan culture

ll

ftn-

lntroduction to Eaok

a conlext of global

charge,

llese objectives

and the European mture of dre

coursc

arc reflected

in

the

udcj,,nll provcndllce ol d]e re'pective bootil1ilil

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2

The

Eurapzan Democrdtic Cuhure is a FreDch product, though there are Italian

German al)d British, as well as FreDch, confibutors to the book.

Europe o

Hisnr)

oJ tue

ldea of Europe is

Dulch Dmish collaloration.

Aqects of Europeatl Cultual Diversry emanates ftom Germany, though olle

of the authoG is British.

the Wi.Lc," ItTorld colllcs hom the

UK

We bave haDed the ulie of the series as questioD - lylut ir Errope? - yet rte
^
are u der no illusion lhat fiere ls a simple, straigh$orward answer, or even a series of agreed definitioos that sahsfy. Nor are we rnalring $e assumptron that
tiurope is sr-amped with a unique identrty, or that lt has a marufest destiny, or (hat
a slngrl,I meaoi g is revealed iD ill history

folow in lie tootstcps of Hugh Setou Watso , ,'vho tells us that ihc word "Europc" hrs been used and misused, rnterprcted and misinteryreted rn as many different meanings as almost llny word in atry langnage- There have bectr and are many
Europes 'r The question, then, is a provocative device to set you thid(lng, and lo
prornpl hrnher questions lnstead of rDshin8 jnto detuitions we bave approached
ihe toplc from a number of pornts of vjew and liom fte slandpoint of various mEth
odologies, rdising quesdons as we go aboul how 'Europe' has been conceptualized,
orgaruzed, stilctued md utilized, both itr the pa5t and in the present. The conlrlbu
lors to lhrs series do ot bayc any particular ares 1lr grind The essays are oot propaganda pieces for a 'EDropean sprit', cultural uDiry, a single market, political udor,
or any other European projecl- Or the contr ry, lhey are scholarly explorations
designed to eDhance onl Dlderslanding of the many facets of European identity
We

dealwilh various ideas ofEurope in the pasi

ofeverydaylife and associated tensions making 1br

So, the essays covera wlde catrvas Tbey

aM present; wilh

Lffercot aspects

ltrml unifomity or acceduabng cultural difference; with a politrcat culture fou ded
onpublic opimoD,law axd democmcy; and wilh Europe's reladonship \r'rththe U ted
S\ates, Russia rnd the del,elopiDg countrie$ and with its place in the world econo,ny
cu

The series as a whoLe presents Europe as a work in progress rather rban a finished
product, aconstruction yard rather than a nuseum As a project Europe car Deverbe
compleled Itwiitalways need tobre madc, emancipateil from the past, re-invenled

Accordingly, there ls a strong irchDatron !o re exanine the history of Europe and

to sezrch fol a Europeao idea ul hrstory 'Ilte quesl is not ao easy ore Borders
haye flucLDated. institutions have waxed and waned, mtrons ha1,e iomed, disappeared, re lomed There is even a temptation to presot c tlat the purpose of 1nstory has bee'l for Easl d West to corne together ln an Ec-like Greater Europe
wherc self-satisfacoorr, denocracy and progrdss rule, alurough, as )ou will see,
such p.esumphoDs aJe noi espoused by dle autlnrs of Book I

Irvcstigalions into the mearling of Exrope, iDlo Europeau valDes, iDlo European
idenhty jnevitably hale raised - and continue to pose a numbff of con8iciing
questions. Does rhe Europear'prole!t', as represented by the European Llnion,
ultim^tely rest oD a snJicietrcy of shared values, culturc ar lxsiory? Does thrs
conmoDaLily cxplain why we have come so far; is it a precondrtroD tor lhe slabilily of a European conmuFty thrt rt rs rooted in a cullrral untty, ilr a snong
sc$e of Europeao ness ? Or rs the Europear project deslined to corne to gncf on
lhe rocks of lhe nation slales'l Is the rDailspring ol Europeanness (he very diversity of national and regional cullules aDd, if so, is not tbe pursuii of irre Europeao
identrr] p.r rc a chimera? Are shared values mainly ro be found al the level of
plitical pri cilles thc strite rmder lhe mle of lxw, deuocracy, hllmJn ri8h1s
and nol in political nud sociai practices? Does the nakiDg of Europe depend on
hnd g solutions to cer(air) inheriled problems ' lhe problem of nationalism for
cxalnplc? Or ca dre buropean Union, ns the laLesL nanifeslaLion of x Europea
proiecl be drivel by a desjre 10 build a new Errrope, the legi[macy of whtch is
geared ro the fuhrre dnd not to lhe past? SLrch qucstrons polnt 1(J shrply contrastirg no[oDs of what Europe represeDts but, irespecliv o[ the answe.s, they rest o
Lhe r$sumphon ihal the idea of Europe is enbedded ir a nix oI tlrec related con

ftere ;r sometbinC called Europe' (some kio(l oi Europern 'specrficalron )EuroFars frold a perception of themselves as being ELropean (they have
sometl[rg of

' setru warSON, H (1985) 'W)ar is E!ro!e, phere s lurope? fronr n,ysrnt,o
politxtre , Enco!"/e/, luly/August, vol l,X, No 2, p 9

ffi

re-connecting westcm nnd eastcm Europe; and lhc quic:kctrurg oi ilrLegnLrott I)'o
cesseswi6in dre Europeln Cornmunity/Union bas raiscdlhe prospecLs oi ecor)on'rc:'
monetary atrd pohllcal uDion. W}lal kiDd ofljurope ate we btrildins a.d w]lv / llow
does lnis new Durope.elate to th; patterns and eiPenences of l-uroPeal histolv? Are
rhere drstlncti!e tsuropsan value.s? Is thcre a cohereLrt, recogmsable |utoperlr iderlt
ily? What do Europe a d being European meaD? These issucs arc Dor ncw blrt since
they are now being variously addressed by Pollicians, iournaLsts and acadenncs
borh inside aud outsidcEuope - fiey have a shaD coDtemporary relevance

.
.

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Iirropc oflhe 1990s Lrrs becorne ll nlalor licus oi prrbhc {hscorrrsr lhD crrd t)l
the Cold War irnd the collapse of lhe Sovrcr tJDiur htus oPcnD(l uP lhc Pr)ssrl)ilities {)l

'[Lre

r,,

a Eluopean

'self-iderltity )

History raeah schemes lor EuropeaD nDrry (poLitics

'Etuope').

/o/

and

in tlrc nune of

llr

do

d
out
irlea oi Europe within a weller of political, socidl
so doing, mevitably raise qucslons that cross the

'lhe

ot
essays in th$ book rccoglrlze but
positivc asslrmphoDs. Instead tbe aulhors set

'Itof"'"hi,
the
and, in

cullure

aDd pohlics.

In the frrst cssay lrrn tlen Boer arsxes that a drstlnct sef-refleciive idea of a
jls own oniv emerges with the French
Europe wiG a history and me^Di'g of
the t.lm Europe lrad ben utilized as
Revolution
French
Ilefore
lhc
Rerolurior.
a geographical concept and had been assoclated witll iLre concepr of libedv in
$e-;e of the ancient Grecks, with ChtisteDdom in the fifteenth centxry' wrth

sxte
tUrY. Brt these notious
e ts lhaL etrtcl ard then
torical stages Aftd Lhe
er Politics iionl the

ith

ralion statds, regions

i.lentity and

assesses lhe

Ln contemPorary Europe, explores the issne

of Eurcpean

conlempor,rf relevance of the Europear idea'

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as

di

And
lurbulence alld cha ge, it becme nomal to look lnsroricalv at Pheuomena
was
concepts as ltre producls of Ltjstorical development An hisioricai vision
qro and lo
userj both to dcfend lradilional European values and ihe rtdl,/r
F]rlr den Eocr
Etrope in lne
chrnges ln thc
e also indicates
ext ol vanous

t
T

Iliilcr\

aliompt to hijack Europe in tbe name of Fa'scist Germany'

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Essay 1
Europe to 1914:
the making of an idea
Prepared for the Course Team by Pim den Boer
Professor of Cultunt History, LJniversiteit van
Amsterdam

lntroduction
The term 'Europe' has a long history, but rhe idea of Europe is a recent phenomenon. Ir was not until the begiming of the nineleenih cenrury that this idea, as a
result of a new outlook on the narure and origfus of Europe, cane to have clear
oudircs. It is in paflicular the FreDch Revolution that marks the watershed in
thinking about Europe

The name Euope had exisred for dDusands of years and for cennrries rt had been
somthing more thai a neDtsal geogaphrcal expression. Nevefiheless, until the
end of l}te eighteenth century, Europe was a notior covering certain implicit and
explicit assumptions rather than a concept wrth a clea.rly defned meadng.
Search$g for lbe idea of E rope over tle centDries tums the histoian into somethitrg of ar archaeologiqt peeling away the layors of meaning that have accumulated arcund the (Incepr in differcnt historical priods. Lioguistic usages jn
various hislorical contexls suggest a certain Eu(opem self rwareness, that is to
sal, ar a$/areDss of being pan of Burope and of Europe beilg the discrimilating
elemenr, bul the leIm ifseif has covered a variety of meanings, wbich have
changed with the changing hislorical circumsrrncs.

In this essay I have indicated tluee mailr elemenrs in the history of the idea of
Europe: the identiication of Europe wift liberty, with ChrisreDdom and wirh
civilization. Each of these had its own origin disapparog for a consideraue
length of time before r-sDdacing agaiA. The association of Europe wirh political
ftedom was 6rst made in ancient Greere, in the nfth century Bc, r*bile ir was not
until &e fiJteenth century that Europe came to be identified widr Cluistendom.
Then, dudng the EDtightenmnt of Ue eighteenrh ceDrury, Europe was for 0re firsr
time idenb-fied with crvilization. Howevet it was in the ninereenih cenNry that
drcse various identrfrca[ons of Europe were not or y rediscovered, bur also reassessed and given unprecedenlf,d promineoce.

Until that lime

dre history of ihe lilea of Europe shoDld largely be seen as a history

of separate concepts- At the begiffing of lhe niner@nrh century, howeve! after

ibC rcvolutionary changes, drere origiuted the notion of the ,irrrry of European

il

and ron Ilellenes rlike who lived in Asra, buL \,rcre noL groaning under despotisn,
wcrc jrsl as hcllcose ,rs ary oLhcr ncople ll1 the world

Greeks and Persians

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Thc ncDLral, geographlcal expressioD 'Europe' obtained a special coturoiaaon as

rcsuLt of thl. confrontarion berween tbe Grceks and ihe Percians

Greek colonisl-s settled or the wesL coart of Asia Minor, the Ionian coast The
Acgcai Sea had for cerluies been a connecting route which made possible inten_
sivc co rmercial contacl. Colonization incle$ed the awareness of the drfferences
betwen Heuenes ard non Helenes. The lmg age sPoken by the latter souDded
very slrarge lo the Greeks, and to characieriz ihis gibbeish they calted the nonGrcks 'barbdrtuns' pcople wiro could male or y an unlntelligrble 'bar bar'
nolse 'fhe designahon barbari&s' did nol at first have a negative meaning; the
pejorative connotaron developed only later

The exp.rnsion of lhe Persian empire gave rise to thc revolt of the Iooiar cityslates, which soughL lrelp ftom lher Greek homeland Thus begzn $e wars b
lween the Grecks

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aid

the Pelsians.

It is in llis historical context that Crerk authols from the fifth cenrury Bc tEgan to
co nect ihe geographical concepts of EuroPe and Asia not only with d lerences in
language, custonrs atrd characteristics but also with distinct systems of govefl

nent The cny-state of Ahens becane dre symbol of Grek fteedom, whiie Persta
was seen as Lhe immeme ernpire oi an absolule ruler who re+ected neither god
nor law Th opposllion between Greece ard Persia was viewed by the Grceks 3-s
represenriDg thaL be(wee Europe and As;a, and stood for ftedom a1 opposed to

flippocrates a.ound 400 Bc, the well

klown physician of cldssical

antiqDiry,

posited a connectiou betwcen climate and behaviour:

We hrv now djscussed the organic and sfixclural differences betweefl
thc populations of Asia and Europe but we have slill to consider lhe
problem why the Asiatics are of a less warlike ard a more tame
disposition than the Eulopesns- The deficiency of spirit ard courage
observabte in the human inhabitanls of Asia has for irs p ncipaL cause
the low ndrgin of seasonal vaflab rty i $e tempraturc of lhat
coDtircnr, which is npproximaiely stable tuoughout the year. Srch a
ciirDate does not produce those mnt I shocks and violent bodily
dislocations which would natualy rcnder the temperameDt ferocious
aDd introduce a stronger current ot irrationaliry and passion than
would be rhe case under slable conditions lt is invariably chatrges
that sLimulalE lhe human Erind and that prevent iL hom remaitung

(Htppocrates, Infuences oI atnsphere, wotet aMi sitwtion,

165)

To dris cllmaLic cxplaflatioo, Hippocrates went on Lo add a ifther political one.

The ma.ior pan of Asia is subject to a despotlc form of govenmenl, he argued, and
is thereforc not ftea. When the in}labiraols of Asia fight they do so to gloriiy their
nrlc( nther than themselves Thy rhrefore take care not to be consrdered good
soldiers, whicb has a very pacify[tg cffect on their remperament- A good argu
rnent in supporl of his lbeory, Idppocrates clarmed, was dre facl thaL the Hellenes

t6

lLc cornpuison of lhe clnnates ald poljticaL systems oI Europc on 0re one hnnd
and Asu oLl the other, cootinued lo play a rolc ever when dle lxstorcal srluation
charged draiLically in rhe fourth century Rc, after Lbe subjecLion of Greece by
Philip oI MacedoD. Hippocrates' argxmenlation evidently rnllue ced lire lrlr4.r.
Lhc polirical disserLation by the th osopher Arisrollc (181-322 BO, bur it wits
i.ruIfip,l do,l Jdal red to r,'r, .^,'rcn,|^rJtr.iru'ion
According Lo Adstolle, the p.oplcs (r1 Europe, products of a col(l c1inr0te, Nrc
courageo s but noi particularly skilled or wisc Tlns is wly they arc usurlly nrilc
pendent. there is little cobesion betweeD them. and drey rre umblE Lo rulc olhcrs
lnbabilants of Asia, on lhe olher hdnd, have the brains Nnd r-he skills, but lack rhe
coLrrage and sirenglh of wil]. Thr! is why they remain serviLe alld subjccr t,coplcs
Thus far, Anstolle follows Hippocrarcs' trarn of thauSht, but theu colnes aI ilnportail difere ce In Aristotlc's vicw, the Greeks have m j tennediate gographi
cal position between the Europcrns and the Asims That is \,\.hy rhey combine in
themselves dre positive charactenstrcs of rhc pcoples of bolh connnents lhe
Greeks, according lo Ansbtle, are ftee, tbey have the best politjcal nNitutio s
and drey are capable of nrling ,[] ot]er people

the

Greeks bad adnxttedly been oonqxered by thc Macedonids fiom rhe cold
Nonh, but l[ey soon becnne insnlctors of the ]aller in rll intel]eclu,rl mrttcrs.
Aristode hhlseff beane tutor to Alexand% son of Philip of Macedol the
Alexander uho conquered enormous stetchcs of Asia layng them open Lo
Hellenic i]lllueoce ln a way, the Greeks could fccl that by means of Alexander's
coDquesls they were avenging theDselves on PersLa tbr the damage dorre to thenr

jn the pasL
Under these cirrrmstarces a feeh g ol superioriry uncooDecrcd wiih Burcpe may
have developed, srnce it was rhe Greeks who had proved ro be the best 'politic.Ll
dxmals', in an ideal nterrrediate position between dre ferocnus and w"rlike
N{acedoniars (Europeant on one side rnd dre skilled bur servilc Asians ofl thc

The contrast begins to become blurred

llven after rhe death of Alexander lhe Great in 321 !c, when

ILis short live.l enr

pire began to couapse, tlrcre was incre.srng Hellenizarjon rn the Easr, as well ar
influences ftom lhe Eastem cnll res on the West Thc notion tbaL dre various contbents Ere inhabited by teoples of diffcrent characrer loses rLs eriphasis, but lhc
geographical dcnolations do conrinDe to be used 'fhe names of rhe continenrs re
main $e sarne, and find general introducrion rn the sense rhat, as a resulr ol lhe
propagation of Hellenic idcas, rhe creek lames irre generally accepred, as tlrc so
rnany odrcr Crek lems After all, olr intellectual franEwork is one of the most
manifest ir eriixtces o[ ancienL Grcek civilization From lhen on, the geographical
nJnres dc rarely so dosely associaEd wtlh possible differences n renrperiureni

trur

Extension of geographical knowledEe

dre nost indePenrleol

RotrarN. As far as w and peace are concerned, Europe is
cortinenL, Lce ol foreisn rule, savs Slrabo
d all the usefirl metals'
He also mqtloos that Europ yielils the best lruil' as well
stones frorn elsewhere I1 ha\ an abmdance of
*n,r" it ,-po.ts spi"."
cattle, bu1 few

-d

lrecious

I
t

wild animals.
but not very cfltLry AD, Etrrope is
se not a third, but
to rhe knowledge
rng rDurished lhe

made generally lclown by the Romans in the fust

ceriur] Bc

people lhat had conqrered aU others

*tt

t'
d
al
I

"on'

amenL and

of the city
sidered

as

/-x.opPdn (lpansion.

e
did
id

A lu dameDtil disrincbon did however

end o[ d]e third centurY tsc

zenship in some form and those who

a European
qG,i"" rr
"f
^

r.

Euopeans.

"",i*

Ronm citi
lre thcre was
shared bv ali

Europe in biblical commentary

Introduction

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mation is lacking.

The view ol Flavius JosePhus

19
18

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nrry oI rhe Jewish pLolle, usnally rcferred to as Je\|th A tuluities fll.e \:nttct
nrjor work is ao ancmpL to prnve the liq tty and Brcahess of lhe Jcwish people
in a world donrinaled rDilitdrly by the Romans alld mtellectoally by the {ireeks

fallfDlly follows the Biblical araLlve, but by rcferrirtS lo Cre.ck and

Greck writers altcmpts Lo make it plausible alld lo fit it into the
Graeco-Roman view of rhe world atrd of history He describes how Noah's

Joscphur
Don

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progcny spread o'r( to populabe lhe wbole e3nh, ihe interior par6' the coasts Dd
the rlands. Accordirg to Josephus, some people slill bear the name thir forefathers gave tl,em, while olher names have cbanged. IL was ihe Greeks who
brcught about this in nomerclalure. WheD, long afler the
powerful, they also appropriared to themselves the glory
Grk names to lhe various poples. Josephns then give
together wrth what he considers to be the conGmporary GreEk equivtlents'

It is Josephus \tlo was thc first to local[e the way m whish Noah's Fogeny
spread out over 01e world, using the &ek geogrdphical telms. The seven sons of
Japheth sefled in the mountaiDs of Asia Minol and sprcad nonh as far as lh
Rivcr Don They dso settled in Europe, right across as fff as Cidiz Josephirs
points out how dre Greek names with whicb his readers were famill3r have dis
placed rhc Biblrcal ndres. The children and grodchildren of Shem md Ham are
also localired by losephus, Jnd lle also gives their later Grcek names. Africa was
inhabited by the descendants of Ham, and Asia, from rhe Euphrates l,o the lndian
Oce l, by those of Shem

AccordinS to Josephus, therofore, Europe vas populaEd exclusivelv bv the descetrdanis of Japbeth, and Africa exclusively by dlose of Ham. Parts of Asia were
also taken by Japhelh and Ham, but the greaier pan, to de east, fell lo Shem and
his lribe Josephus also, of course, tells the story of the cxrse placed oD Han's
progery as a rcsult oa his ridiculmg his falhr when the lalter had falen asleep
drunk and naked Ho*evet nowhere does Josephus speak more higl y of any one
continent than aoother In fact, he does no more and no less thall combine Jewish
S.ncdl"Brcal hisrory with Greek 6eo$dphy

Europe and the Church Fathers

his exegesN, the most erudite of the Church Falhers, Saint Ierome (348+20),
whose rDlhonty was unquestioned fbr centuries, lales over Josephus' icxl atBosr
lirernlly a d translates it into Latro. Jerome adds that the name Japhe$ signitres

ffi

'er argement' or 'spreading oui' and that rhe text rn Genesis: 9,27 ftat laphedr
'shall dwel in the tents of Shm' conlains the prophecy i]at the Jews, who are
descended from sbe r, will b oLrstd in erudition atrd knowledge of thc Bible by
us Chnstians, the desccndants of Japhefi.

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Alolher extremely influential Church Farier, Sdlnt Augustine (354 430), expalds
yet tunher on the prophetic implicahons of the tralrres of ihe so'ts of NoJr
Augustine was of Berber descent, and was bom in Tagaste, in Numidi4 in $e
Romarued [)art of Africa. He spen( a Iong period h ltaly and lLen became lhe
brshop of Hippo Reglus, an imponart port on the north+ast coast of what is now
2A

Atgeria After the sa.k o{ Romc by the Goihs in 410, x srrerm of refilgees made
lhet way to Africa and there wet many who bLamed Clnistimily lor thc l^ck oi
hghting sprrit shown by the once so powerful Rorlran llmpire Agarnst liris hrckground Augusrine set out to write a lirdication of fte Christixn chrirch an.l L{r dis
prove lhe cJassic:r] (pagtut) world view The work he pro,Jtcetl, in 22 books, we
trto\\ ts De Ci,udte Dei .o ra taldnas or The Ot| oi Gorl iSautst the p.liant
(4r:1 426)

Augnsrlne exarnhes rn detaii (Book XVI: 1 2) the ln(lde siSnificrncc of lhe

biblical story of the soDs of Noah. Noab was gifrcd wiLh prolhccy tutd cursc(l dte
dcscendanri of his son llanl, irhose nam6 mcans hot'and indrcilLes luturc her_
esies 'lhe ntune of Noah's eklest solr. Shem, mellns 'the narred' rnd conl.rins thc
prothecy thar fiorn the descendanb oI Shem, lroln the Jews, Jesus Chisr wilL be
born. In the tents of Sbem, that is, iD thc churcles, tbe peoPles descendrng fiorn
Jrpheth will spread out, and lhe nrme of the youngest son, Japhelh, drus irr(licrres
'enlargement' or'spreadirg otrL'.
Augustine is eDgrossc.d by the allcgoncal interpretatioD of 1ht Brble l'hc drurken'
tess and nakedness of Noah a(e taken to prefigure Lhe suilerings of Christ. Hence
the curse placed on Ham, the r ddle son who takes his placc between the lirst
fnlirs oi the circnmcised lsraehtes (Shem) and lhe tuLi heesr of the uDcrcunlcised Christirtns (Japheth) fhe texL in Genesis about the sons of Noan is lherefbre
hteqrreted and er{tlicaled ar a prophecy. fte Chnslians are seeo as dre progeny of
Japheth, but undeniandably enough, Augusline, wribng on the coast of nonh
Africa under tfueat of atlack by sea from the north, does not see a conneclron be
tween this assumplion and the contncnLs

Ir

a difterent contexl, howevet Augusline does make a passing leference to the

dpanite dlvision of the worLd, staling thar Asia occupies one hau of it, with
-Europ a-' Atilca, dividgl from each otller by our Grcat Sea , m*rng uP llle
olher half
NoL oDly was Ilaly pilaged by lhc GoLhs, but the Iberiu Peoinsula was also
ravaged by barbadan invasDns The sbearn of retuges who fled 10 north Afric^
included a young priest fuom Braga, an extremely irnporisnl bkhopic in the rorth
ol presenr-day Poaugal. by the name of Orosius- AugusdnE mlde a proFound imprcssion on the yolug man, aDd suggesled to him that l1e write an historical surnof Cl[isri r belief aganNt
mary which, ]fte his own work, would defend the
the heathen So successtul was Orosius tLrat lis Hirtoriae adtersu: paganos be
came the indispnsable Chnstiar history of the world, dn essential volulne m the
few Libraries there were at the time

fttl

At the begir)ning of his work, wbich js dcdicaLed to Augustine, Orosi

s sleted thet
his readtrg of rhe clarsical histori.rns had led hirn to the discovery lhaf carlier times
were not only just as djrc as lfs own, but were cver more unJorlunate in that man
var fuflier irom $e comJorts of the Ilxe religion (Hirlonde I, p- 9). He wished to
desrib rhe vicissirudes of the human lace from tbe Creation to the foundation of
Ronlc, hom therc to the rule ofJulius Caesar dnd the bidr of Cbrist, right up to h]s
own Limcs (p r2). So as Lo enable lhe reader to udentand beiter where lhe various

wrJs and disaslers have taken place, Orosius provided rrot

orly

knowlcdge of

llx

ffi
called the

l,lt

scholar

of classtcal antrquily but he was also the

lsiilore

ha-q l)een

aurhor

of the first Chnsiian encvclopedic hardbook, wbich enjoyed lirert

popu

ry

lanty for more tban iive cenlmres

Orosius gives the Meditermnetur, icross

Roomn name of 'mrJe nositum' or 'our
Europe, where he was Fobablv bonl, hc s
that continen!- 'fhis 6erce defender of the
bDt not o{ a r EuoPe
the basis of this explains the names of the peoples
earlier by Josephus.

the PiIars of Hercules (Orosius I.

ision intD RoDran

Prov

p!

13-14)'

is wjs

done iive centuries

form of administsatron in those trllbr enl times

ces

long

tatjons

a d to legendary (non bibhcal) fgllres

Europe, and the sons ot Noa.h, on the map

mat ol thc world is to

The oldesl, aDd bv Iar the flost comllete' nedieval
-br
of
seville from 602 Lo 632
BishoP
lsidorc'
bv
works
of
i;;; i;;;".;pt"
22

Isidorek lexl does not lcad imrnediatcly

1o dre conclusion

Japhelh were assigned olle conijncnl each, but

t
I
I

the

tlat Shetn Ham

atrd

raps addcd to the lext laier do

t
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
t
I
I
I
I

fact iDdlcate sucb a neat di1,isioD 'Ihe onginal' early sevenlh centDry manu/cru\Lriot has trol survi\ed and so we catrnot be enlirely crndrn whel}ler Isjdore
latr
addiuon'
prul'abl)
;
mosl
ll
is
hmsef
world
of
lhe
.iiv'p'ot*.a thr\ map
howwa The map is enttreiv in ,.cordance widr the description provided bv

ir

of the wo(!) 'orie lcd" iD olhcr words

aligned towards the east, where thc sun rises aDd whcre Parrdisc is suPposcd lo

The maps are (jn the most liter^l sense

have ben situated.

an, thaL

bY the

f A:ov
The $,hole worLl is sunounded by lhe Oceao (se Figure 1)

oq

t.

MER.
3EP.

I
I
I

tr*r{filrr

noe

pcft drlunun

oc6'
Saint Gall Motwstic

tqr
Lt

Pe M.drtdi, VollnE Vl

(s

ni....

= ft': thu: did the ton:

Tanai Flw = the Rh)er Don
Nilu: Fluv. = the Ri'et Nile
Meonaes Poludes

I
t

Whal is probably lne oldest survivrng rnaP, tiom the lale sevenrh century, does not
indrcate the Ocean, bur does show an uninhabited parr of the world The exislence
ol antipodes was already drspuled by AugDstine, rs was the spherjcal shape of the
world Gee Figure 2)

oJ

Noah divide the world aller the Flood

the Sea of Azot

Figule 2 The oldest known ap of the trotld Palimpsest ih

Isidar Coder 237, Saint Gall Monastic LibruD, S 'itzetland
(late seventh century). Fron. K Miller, Mappae M]|l],dr
Valume vI (Srfitga , 1898) (Photo: Dnnsh Librdry Boad,
Loftlan )

Mi
19s1,

165)

The idea that each of the sons ol Noall popuLaLcd one oI dre three continents is ri

ts now rePlme

simp

elm ilrdicaring

tiuc

occasions but
nevertheless

m exa$ple of Litetary arhfice-

Hay, 1957: 1968 edn' pp 38 39)

Interrasanotus et res|.rnsio es in
Il prophctic significance were now lo be aftached to lhe Ddnes oI Lhi sons of
Nout' n"a *r. biblicrl texls, tlre founda[on'aould be laid for ;dentitving EuroPc
Cenesim, see

wiLh

Chrrti.Djry Bul that siage was yet to

come

We will renlm to tlle subjecl of nrhps and Europe\ phce

taLions

of the wor

ld.

ir

pictorial represcn

larer sections

The rise of Latin Christendom

Europe and the Middle Ages

at ihe
Ilr oul search for a concept of Europe ir is woin lookine in solne detail

Charlemagne: king and tather of Eurcpe?

In the seventh cenn'ry, the unity of thc MediteraneaD

srea ws

brokcn up The

cen
decisive faclor was the enomrous Arab exlansion which cornmenced in fiat

Crusatles. In order !o tlo

tlis it is tecessary

10

providc some historical b^ckgro nd

Mag
had by no means disappeared
hands o{ the Moors. Not or Y
rei$, but also the islands of M

BvD afier the defcat of ihe

power also extended 10 a considedble pan of sourhem Itatv'

wlterE claim was laid to Venice ard southem ltalv

perhaps noleworthy
describe lbe codition rrny (Fiscirer' 1957, Pp 50 51) It is
but too much
that this collective name was usect rn relation to an exiemat threat'
nol occur
does
expression
thal
tlLe
fac!
of
lhe
in
view
1()
it
attached
be
value carnrot
egain until very mucll laier

world

ill

the

Alri'a
Their

I
I
I
I
I
I
T

I
I
t

26

tssay

ii
lrnrrll}, ol l5 JUly l0')9, Jcrusnlem w s taLen and
'rrxrrlrs
( lrrsr[n
I u((krDs w(!c lirtrdcd or) the |rcnch Inodcl.

i,,s scv{r,
i

,lt
L

ri

tii

ffi

l
I
I
t

')rrll

ll,c,c urc

Do eyc wru,.ss iceouols

of drc l,kral wordnr8 ofUrbd! II's

rnber

of

tutaPe ro 1t14

tne ta

tng at an toea

ol n plecise idenlificltron bclrveen Europe and

ChrisLendol1r
aFPeal,

brt

we ,lo havc ax aeoourL ol it writLcn rn y ycals latcr by dle E ghsh hisrorian

Willu|lr of M,rlnesbury (. l09ti l l4:l) 'Ihjs is rem8rkablc for lhe uay rn which
llre perilous sitxatron of Chnstendom is connecled with the classical biPanite division of thc world. The Pope is said !o have 6rst staled lhat dre 'enemies of God
had taken possession of Syria, Armenia and the whole of Asia Minor. 'They abuse
the Holy Scpulch.e ard mdke our pilgrims pay to enter Jerusalem. That is bad
cnough, but these enemies, furthernorc, have a much gre-ater parr of the world in
tteir possessron. They irhabit the whole of Asia, which our forefathers rightfu v
considered to be hatf the world-' 'lt was in Asia,' the Pope continued, 'rha!
Clfistendom tust blossomed. Ii was i-o Asia, wit]r two exceptions, that eacb of tbe
Apostles met bls deaih The Chrisliais who noll live In Asia live in povertv and
me complled to pay t (es to lhe enemies They long for the freedom wlich they
'Afnca too,' lhe Pope went on, 'ha.s been hld by force of arms by the eDemies for
more than two hun&ed years.' He pointed out thal, in effliq limes, Afrtca had
br ought fonh renowned defendeF of the Christim faith Herc he was undoubtedly
reFering to Saint AugustiDe. Europe remaired to be mentioned.
But even that part of the world blongs in or y a small portion to
Chnstianily, for who would dre3m of caling the barbarians in the nordr
CtuisriarN, who live on distant islads and seek their food io the Arctic
Seas like whales? But even that smali pan of Europe which is ours is
duealencd by the Saracens and T[ks. Tkee hudred years ago, they
cooquered Spain and the Batearic Islards, and drey hope to conquer the
rest of Europe too.
Tlrc Pope then went on to mate a trumbr of encouaging re arkl alx,ut the cowrdice af the enemy wbo, lfte eve.y people hvlng in fie geat heat of the sm,
havc rDore bains than blood: 'Irt those who go therc sst a crcss upon rleir 8ar
tncots s an outward sign of inner faith... They shall recile absolurion for all
rheir crimes' Orhllianr of M-almesbury's Chtunicle of the Kings of Englandl sc:E
(;ilos (cd) (184?), Srubbs (ed.) (1889) and Hay, 1957; 1968 edn)
I)(:rt,irc aLl rlle intemal differences tJerwen the churchcs of tbe Easl and the West,

ChnsLrarity, lhere was no queslior

(lhrlstrns, bearers of the Cross, had some inte(ests in common. Uniry wds oftn
h,r{l ro lind, bui there were nevenheless cornmunal synbols, gestures, spintDal
idcals and earthly morives It is of hterest that the Pope, the leader of Latin
Chnstendom, states that dr geograpbical location for this form of coDrnuDal

rdentity was !o be found in Eurcp, if only in part of it Within Europe, the Dodlem brrbarians were considered as behg excl dd. Ouiside Europe, the Chdstian
Ch rch's loss of Afrrca was regretled, and a call was made for the conquest of lhe
distanl Jcr salem. But a! this stage, despite some association between Euope arrd

ln lhe course oi lhe lwelllh cenl[ry, t]lc tlueat to Llhrislendon tio r rhe North aorl
East bccaoe less A ring ol I-aLin Cbislian princip,lilies .arnc iDro exNLence
Norway, Sweden Nnd Deumark ,n thc Norrh, PDlmd, Bobemir dld tlun8ary io drc
E t The Normans, who nr the ninti fid lenth centones had coDfined tlemselves
to destuctve raids, played n leading role in the eleventlr and F{elfth centrries ir
sEcnglhening d;e position ofLatin Christendon (Southcm, 1953. pP 25 5)

In thc co rse of the tweuth cenhuy, wesrem mllitary sDccesses in fio E st found
expressjon in theological writings and sccular poelry Ollo. Bishop of Freising,
(1113-1158), writes i his {e I Chranicle of the World Lh^I'Jll human wisdonl
and power begins in the East and enG in re Wcsr' (Olto ol Freising, Clronica V
prcL. MGH, Scnpt 20, 213. .f vm Laarhoven, 32) Otto ol Freisilg was well
comcted. His mother was a daughter of the Gennan Emperor and his brother had
married inlo the farnily of the Greek Emperor in Byzantirm- His Cbronicle is
greatly inspired by A$gustine, but itl Augustine\ thinking there is nothing shrlar
lo. OLLo\ idea of the superiodty of tle West Clrdtien de Troyes, Lhe Poet of
counly romance, sang the praises of Paris as successor to Athens and Rome Even
nysric.il writrngs mdicale $e shjft om East 10 West and attempt to explair it allegorcally. If we are to believe Hugh of St Vlctor liom Paris. the bows of Noahh
.{.k faced Erst aod irs stem West, expressing where I'aradise lay al the beginn g
ot tinc, namely in the Basl, and where tbe Day of J\idgment would tate place at
the end of lime, namely in the West (Brincken, 1973, p. 304)
is perhaps going bo far to posit a conneclion blween such tleological speculation and a gowing self-confllence n\ $e Wes|lt is probab]y more jusiinable to
speak of a growing self-awareness Be fiat as il may, these twelllh ceotury ideas
ire stabd ir tems of ar East West dichotoDy reaching far back in history. A conncltion bcnveen the growing sel-i-awareness and the geographical concep! of
Errope is stiil idrequenl; however, there are sraws jn lhe wind-

Tt

The oldest map of Europe

A splendidly illustated autogmph iranuscript ftom the early years of ihe Lwell{)
century includes, on a pa8e of irs own, the oldesl krown separate map of EuropeThe map was probably drawn by Lambert, a canon of Sainr-Omer, aod is to bc
foDnd \n his Liber Flotidrs, a sort of encyclopaedir bringing togethcr all kinds of
bits of i forrnation in an order which is or aLways cLear, and which nray well b
the result of later mergng and solection.
tsurope rs described in lhe text as constitxting a qunrter of thc world. In this con
nection, mention rs made of the fact lhat TheodotDs, in fhe time of lulius Caesat,
statcd thal rt consliTuted a third, bnt tha( the llxo exLent is only a quar!r.
Elscwhere *rere is a splerdid iLhwinfltion showing Augustus widr globe in his

ffi

flm

ilfr

lirhi \i

,.,iei!&.:

,1

Fi8urc

Floridus,

,rber

(ed

p.

t968,

l lsv

Afric' ro
drv,d-o r' rl'e ! LIromJn ndner wi r Asia 'n rle upper hall
ll
Frgule
ru
lefl
ure
hurope
riphr ald or,ow and
'cee

l'tr

I.

,q""-.ai"g

2.provnc
citles,21
wnrers,
30

xr

lhe

seas' 40 islards'

:":3::J::,ili
ns of Noah is not

ahee and Macedonia

(see

Fiilo'c 4)

L\be

), (ihent,

481 ,

Il
lt-

Fol.24

I
I
I
I
t
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

E sty

I{owever irnpcrfcd lhc gcogr pbical knowledge md oano$aPhic skill delnon

sbated by lhis lirs( map of EuroPc, il ls nevcnheless the earlies! iu'rsbaiion
rcflecting the conceplion oi Europe as a sePdrale geographical unit, and ooe wluch
is divided politicalLy.
ap reprcsedti a longtime past listoncal sibration, not the orc actually exist
ing in lhe e"rly twelfth cenorry. Canon I-an1brt makes no connection bef'veD

The

coDsolation
were

ln

facL

Eutope to te t4: Ine naixtg ot an toea

to havellers,

lhere

for a

hard pressed christendom Lhat. according

Ckiitians somewbere far off iD other parls of lhe world In Ihe

re.

e'Irly fourieenth cenlury,

Etliopiu

seamen rn the lrarbour oI Genoa had recounted

how their country was ruled by dre pnest-kilg Presrer Jolm lBrincken, 1965,
p. 29). More than 4 ccnirry laier. Walsperger places lhis Legendary 'olher'
Cbristian kingdom in Asia (se Fig'rre 5).

Enrcpe and Chrisi

then peoples. The
seen as a prioriry.
portant. The Firsl
l,amk's survey

so far: Anno Domhi, 1099, Godeftrdus Dux (Godftev of Boui'lon) cotrquers

Jerusale .. (Liber Floridus, P 42,Fol 2Or).

Europe and Christendom

Christendom and the map ot the world
In dle foDrleenh cI ury rle geograPbical vnitings of Ptolegly' daiing ftom dre

sec

ond centDry AD were rediscovered This led to attempB to reconstucl ih maPs

which had ben lost. One of the res lf,s of rhis war that the extent of Euop on the
map of the world became much srna.ller- MaPs of EuroPe itself were now atso
dmwn according to Ptolelry's indic.atiofls. The ntst of thcse seems to have been
designed in Byzantium as early as the mid-fourtanth century by drc chronicter
Nitephoros Gregoras (v. den Brlncken Archiv 296). It 'ras only in the fifteenth
cenhry that Ptolemy bcame widely known h the West. His influence \'ras also
noticeable in maps which were otherwise slil baied entirely on the tradilional
medieval conceplon of the world.

I
I
t
I

a map of the wotld whrch is traditional ia its basic conception

but which alro uses Rolemy ai a source, is thal pmduced by Ardreas WalsPerger

A line exanple of

1448 (K. Krerschme( Zeitxcbrift Erdkunde 26, 1E9l) Wa.lsprger' a

Dcnedicline mook fiom Salzbug, drew a traditional round map of the world in lhe
illustrating a wide range of legends and my&s It is a
form of a pictorial
^ccount
with little drawings Paradi-s is

i'r
l

ge, beautifr Ly coloured map, illusrated

representcd as a medieval walled cily with many towers, and sibated at the fur_
thermost eastem point of the map The map rs aligDed bwards $e north. EuroPe
has become smaller than the tndlional one quarter of the world. What is particutarly tuteresting is the way in which the distrrbution of Cbristendom is shown
'Ihis is probably the first example of tne carlograPhic localizauon of the small
Ctrristran cornnru ity surrounded by thc unbelieven'rho inhabi! th major part of
the world. Wa-Ispelger colouls the Christian cities red atrd those of th unbelievers
btack. Europe is pe aps no longer as extensive as it used to be, but he is nevertheless able to colour all irs cities rcd, in other words Chdstran. Ou$ide Elrrope,
he llas also indrcated a few legendary places in rcA such as 'Portana or Nvessa'
tbe capital city of the Indians, where Prester John resids'. It must have been somo

I igule

An/lreas Walsperset

Weltkarle (1448) (Photo British LibturJ Bourd, Latulon

,^prd toln nups of this type, which were of

Do practical nse

but lvlich couL.l

be,

sludie{l, a$enilcd and rnarvclled at in moneslic libraries, there wcre of course also
the navigation charls used by mariners- These so called porlaldni record coaslrl
rcutes vith remarkable accuracy and precisjoi. marking tbe Politlcal identily of
Lhe vanous towns and rcgrons widl tittle flags and coats oi anns (HDy, 1951; 1968
edn, p. 93) Such nfomation, which vas oi litera y vilrl impofance to mariners,

in earlier pedods presum^bly l1arl been lassed on bv word of mouth Drawing the
boundaries ofrhe Christian lvorld oD a map rnade it Possible to visualize them and
to express them D concrete form The su iving pdrlold4t de naturaltv not tbe
ones aclually used on board ship, but are parliculartv frne coPies intended to be
consulted back home rn port Thcy are, however, maps drawn for practical and Dot
for ideological pulroses Nevertheless, ihey too are a means oI reinforcing visually the idenlfication of gurope with Christendom-

The identification of Europe with Christendom

It was not only Italians, bnt also nraDy olhcr Ctuistians who considered it scardal
ous ihat the Pope had chosen to reside in Avtgnon rn prefercncc to Romc the
ELemal City, where Peter had been crucfied znd buried. A dispute arose in whjch
tie French defeD(led themselves with grcat ilventiveDess on the basis ol geo
graphical arguments. One
otr the groundr fiat it was
(latholic Chuch. ard thal
tual consolation more easily if he resrded lnerc (Hav, 195?; 1968 edn' P 74) Hc
added rhat Avignon lry closer to tlre scholals of Paris than did Roine Another
Frcnch advocat of Avignon bcgan by stating that Europe, the lrherilance ot
Japhedr, was one of the tlree pafls making W tbe world atrd that Christians cur
relltly lived in Europe, there being virtua y no Cbristian rulers oulside drat continent. If onc calculated the dimensions of the Christian area (excepting Greece)'
to
one lbu3d that Marsetles was the cDtre- The Vicr of Chrisr on Eanh oogbt
rcside at the celtre of the Chrisnan world. ClFis! himseH had lived ard died ai thc
centre of the whole world- Rone had been chosen as the seat of the Papacy bmetu'r
cause at tha! timc i1 was ccntnl Curredly Marseiles was dre centra] poinl
i g that Avi$on was a suitable residence And nr ani case' as the familiar
papa ibi Roma'indicated' Rome was to be found wherever the

"xp**i""'"ti
Popc was (Hay, 195?; 1968

p1rce dunng Lbc preceding centuries was

volts among both peasaDts a d town dwellen; ir some
the poprlation: France and England became enbrciled
the Gerrar Empire vi.tually disintegraled md bectune
the drna for conflich berween numerous P;nceljngsi a d Italv was rnore frag
mented ihar ever In the course of tlLc fourteenth certury, tlre Osma Turkr con
quered not only Asia Minor but also the Balkans Pressure from the Mongols had
caused these nomatls from Turkestal 1o settle in Asia Minor h the ihirteendr century. By about 1400 their empirc suitched from $e Dflnubc to t[ EuPirates The
fali of CoDstant ople seemed imminent, but new lrcursions and Yictones by thc

The urbinizaLion

edn,

ii lor

anorher

lifly

rcrt commofl dcfensive organtzario - On 29 Mav 1453, Cotsianlhople fell to

Mohanned U. krcwn as the Conq eror' This m'rked the definilive eDd of the
llartem

I
I

yeats

Besides the Holy Roman EmpiJe, thc second Ercat rnedicval Power with Lrniversal
The hercsiEs of Wycliflc nr
prctensions, the Papacy,
sbook the Chlrrch to its vcry
Lngland and Jan Fhs

also
among
foundations. Tbe universar c1

I
I
I

$at had been lakjng

revivcd Mongol empire delayed

atlv resLridcd bv the iDcrcas-

g power of separate states, with these resiriclions bcnrg hid down in national
concoraats. Tte $onastic orders, which had been suclr ll signincant uritvirrg
factor ln lhe Lalin Chwcir in previous centuries, came ro be o'8anir'ed on n much
the begirning of the fotrrp of Bordcarrx, trrnsfercd
ession oi Pofcs ol Frenoh
s- onc i ltonrc and ore irr
cirurc l(J ,rrr ur(l fatlY Y(rirrs
later at the Council of Constance (141+13)

j^

P 75)

I
I

sail, however, he died of iUness

ffi

ffi

he who wa-s dre first to use {irc word

^lso
tnhabiranl of ELuopc (.1 Hay, 1957; 1968 edn, pp 86 7)

varous natiordl langtagcs

ttutupeus n(Lic;.Lnq

tilil

lltill

I
I
I

t
I
I
I
ffi

ffi

ffi

It

wns

The inlluence of humanism on the concept of

Europe
Humoism co tibuted in a variery of ways to foming a con@pt of the solidar
iiy of Europe. Like many terms end:ng in ' ism', 'hunnnism' ls of ninoleenthcentury ongin. Previously, 'humanilas' and 'studia humaniBtis' had been used
!o mean an educatronal progamme based on the sludy of the works of'Greek
and Latin aulhors. The aisl of sucb a prcgramme was to educate a ew typ of
individual by study of 'tie classics', sincb lhese works were considered to
rcprsent the highest form of human acbivemen! ftuolanism had a deep a d
lasriry influence on scholarslnp ard education, of the Featest inPortalca in every country in Ewope. Thc predominant role of the classical languagcs in

secondary and higher education was reinforced in numercus counhes by thejr

cornmofl rools in the ctassical tsadition. Children in the different countries read

the same authors in the course of thelr classical education Aloryside

Christidnity, h manism becane one of ahe factors linkhg lhe dliies of the various

countrig A classical education was ava able to

lion of Europe evn lllough this

consLituted

dre wlrole educated popula

a tiny

sectron

oI

Lhe

toLal

population

A feeting of solidarily was created tlvough the fact that scholars and inlelle{(uals dank in knowledge ,t rhe same classical sprhg. Tbe cotrcept of a
'Respublica litterorio' developed, paraUel to tie older ldea of a 'Rerpublnrd
christidna', which continued to exjst and was by no meaJrs always in con
The classical word Europe became more and more usual Petrarch, the ardent
propagandist of mainly Latrn audrors (h panicular his idol Cicro), lrses the term
repeaLerly. Even so, for the very Prince of Hlmrarists, Desiderius Erasmus of
Ronerdan (1466 1536), the term Europe in iiselJ had not yet any particular sig
nrlicturce. Hc usd it as a matter of course arld ften or y infreque ly. For
Brasrnus, rhe Rcspublica Iitrcturia was also a network of humadstic rulers and
schohrs, wluch visits ard conespondence could serve to maintai! The humdisln
oi lr)asmus, however unlike tbat of ltaly, is prirDarily a Christitn Eld not a
Iluropcm phcDolJlenon. As early as in his E .rrr;dion Mititis Ch,istiani (lso4'], a
litLle mamral for dre wador of Christ, in which he attempted lo preseot de art of
prely, he greatiy lamenLed the lutd that kept Chnstrans divided He mentions a
whole series of antitheses, such as Lhose blweD peasanB and buBesses, rich ard
poor, powertul and weak, b t also natioral rivalries Llrc ltalian hatEs the German,
rhe Flerchman the Bnglishnar, and the Eoglisbman the Scot (FesrugrEre, 1971,
p. 178). He scems to lind these clashes deplorable bcause all concemed are
Chrislians. What is clear is that for hlm Europe is lhe Chnstiar continent The
Eathiridion ]F"cam. widely known firough Fanslations of dte original Lalrn rnlo
English, Czech, Gennan, Dutch, SpAnish and French.

36

1517, in the mLdsl ol rumou$ oi wtu, he publLshed an unlressrve lacrtrst ma

t:esl) Quoela pit:is LhE wo.k is ir 'l.arnent oi Pflrce, wbich everywhere h;Ls been
1l lhe irstigalion of tbe govemor rd chanltJerhrrr
bamsLed or dcstroyed ,
"lntten
of Chffles Y aDd dctlicated to the l}sloP of Lturechl, a b.slrrd soLr oi the DLrke ot
Btrrgundy Erasmrs strongly eDlPhxsized LLe eed for Pe^ce bcLween Burgund)

ln

aud

&dce

ag

Lr:

'IhD lcclinSs olharred treLwcer dre

vdio!s

natrons arc ILlentioned once

How vcry rvrong this isi A SeogrrPhical oame oI Iio imporlaDcc (ltvidcs
ttreln... In earLier tiDles the Rline drvr cd lhe Frctrch aDd thc Gernrrtrs
but ri does ol seprnlo one Christjan l,om anorhe. Thc l'vrc eas
seprate Spmtirds and FrenchtneD, bri tl)ey do not uDdo rhe
cornflunxlrtv of Lhe chulch The sea llows belweert the llnglish ind rhc
Frerch but can in no way sllil lhe u t! of tarth

lrrdrl,rrr, rn Gelrts, 1989

116)

For Erasmls, rt is the rnity oI OrdsteDdon wbi.h is Pnnl^tf' rnd rlowhcLc does
lre spe3k

of rhe unity oI EuroPe

It is specillcalty wilhin the conlext of the TDrkrsh threat ir the E st lbat Euope
becornes a syuo yl]r Ior the Cbnstian 11'orld- This is also lrtrc in the works oI
Frasmus Belgrade fell in 1521 aud rD l-522 Rlrodes was conqxered (an event oI

end to
great significance for trade); lhe Tu osh viclory it Mohacs (152(t pul
Hunsarian indepe dence md opened up ihe way to Vicnna, which dre ltrtts besieged tur lhe fi1st tiroe ilr 15?9 A]l these eveots mrde Elasmus and hjs conteru
poranes fear Lhe worst for Aushia, Poland and the neighbouring countries,
pe ups even for kaly In one of his lelters to dn English patror in Septenrber
1529. Erarmus wrote that 'it is fortunate lbat perce ldre treaty of Kameijk] had

been concluded between the most powertul pnnces f.om all of Europe' (Gerlo'
1979, p 359) The home of ClnsLeDdom, as a manet of course. h,rd come to be
Europe.

t\rother matol hunaDsr, Juan l-u,s Vives (1492-1540), drew ,l pttrillel betvDc-r
oftlle lrks and llLe distinction ruade by tlre classical Greeks beiweefl
Europe ud Asi^, long before lhe Christran pe od In his didloguc about the drs
rhe rdvancc

,'

putes m Europe and lhe war agaiDst the Turk. De Europae disstdis et beLLa t
ci.a diLtlogus (1526). he relates how every Asiatic invaslon ofEurope h.rs alwavs
endcd in the complctc defeat of the invadrlg ibrces He $ves as examPles
Miltiades at the Balllc of Marathon. 'l'hellnslocles at ihe Ballle of Salantln, and tht
Ronan consuL Solla who, at Chaeronea ln 86 Dc, defcrted Mi xadatcs, suppos

edly a desccndrnt of the kIjlBS of Pcrsra lrr ali these battles no more thrn a few
thousand Europeans had sDcceeded in defeating Asrahc forccs numbering many
thor$aDds, even huDdreds of thousa'ds (Vrves, Obras Co,npletat Il, Madid 194tj,

pp 56-l)
Mves, of Spnnish Jewislr exLractron w a Chistran believer, brt saw the stmts
gle against the Turks $ lhe context oI Lhe classical distinction between ilurope
and Asi., wlxch naturally had noilinS to do lviLh Chnstendon. A few years
earlier, however, LIl 1522, he had wrltten lo Pofe .A.l.ian Vl about ihe turmo
EuroDe, saying thal'Christ dcmaded of Lrs tlnt this extensive and sono*4ul

lilil

Eurole, inlemiily
body' (ibid., p 18

sririrg\ implies rlr

own wlrich will

it

now

ciLaliorr

oPe

i\

the

ffi

id

Chistendorn

Reformation and Counter-Beformation

For Laiin Christendom, rlflicted lI! it had alreadv been for cerlturies hv schisns
and heresies, the sixteentn century saw the dNappearalce of even tire rllusion of

lhis
gro
look llace
processes I

unity

liBioD-s

'f

oths re

on of EuroPc
lY bc sccr as
ailh

lhe course ol the sixteenth ce rurv, ilTeconcilablc retigious opposrtions were

crcated. Ther wiN division not only betwerDn CaLirolics and PrcLesLants but Par
ticubrly within Protestantis$ ilself, where far-reaclung fragme tadDn came abouL
duc to lJlc secession of a large number of rehgious groupiogs

ln

lraLrl
Furthermore, thcrc were sizable nurorities, for cxa rplc tire Jews and
in
other dLsseoters, but they wcre tolelated onlv to a very limited exlcnl and
Item cohesion of rellgons
or no Peaccful coerislenc
ion, fragmenlation and disuni
ot EurcPe with Cluisterrdonl

European rulers and the balance of

power
Machiavelli
'fhe idea that a dillerent potiticd resime Qplies in Europe irom rhat in Asia' rs
more m
tommlated in mtiqDjty at the timc of the Persian Wars rs ml \ iih once
Renarssarce
lhe
Lhe political tleory of

38

Asian empire is alificxlt to defeat' but

whole. This could be seer in thc case
able in dris way to explain fte fact that
Enpire did or revol! agabst AlexMder's successoIs'

ialls as

rhe Persian

The sitratioD in the Wast is. in conrast' quile diflerent Hcrc

Princc, ChApte(

A)

cation of what Europe means (Chabod, 1963'

32)

chiavelli is

1oo'

I
I
I
I
t
I
I
I
I
t
ffi

i
,]

and l-oretrzo th!: Magnnce.t (1149 92) rs latcr portr.yetl ds kecPruB a

oi scatcs rn balance (Kaebet 1907, P 1l)

hlgc par

1iilt

The balance of power in the sixteenth century

I

I
I
t
I
I
T

t
ffi

The mvasioo of Italy by fo.eisn mies bad disastous results In t500' the King
of Frace occupied Mjlan, and Naples lost iis indePendence, being transferred to
rhe King ot SpaiD This ira.s the stafl of the Spadsh-Habsburg domination of
It y ln 1525, fte Klng of Fmnce was decisircly defeated at Pavia and taken pris
oner, ihus putting an eDd to the geat inflIence of France iD ltaly. In 1527 lhe
Pope was taken pnsoner atrd Rome was PluDdered by the Drerceoary arNes of the
Habsburgs. The etrormous power which the House of Habsburg suoceeded in
achievmg iD Ilaly, ns possessior of the throne of SPain and that of the Gcrman
Empire, and the fact that it also ruled Bulgundy and the Low Countdes, resulted
in lhe other pdnces of Errope, pflmarily the Habsburg's arch nval, the King of
France, srriving towards the crealioo of aliances in order lo counterbalaoce the
power of the HabsburBs
the mid sixteeDth century Veneriatr diplomats also exPlicitly described dre on
going struggle between the Spanish Habsburgs aM Lhe F{ench Valors ir terms of
a balancc which, in Ure interests of peace in EuroPe, had 10 bc kepr itr a state of
equilibrium (Kaeber pp 15ft). Ihe coflcept of the balance of po\aer, which in
the lifteenth cenhrry lrad stil beeD used only lor tbe situation ir Itrly, came to
be apptied in the secoDd half of the sirlecnlh ce tury to the situation in Europe

ln

il

crvrl war and Pbilip strove to crcate a

40

u lversal Culholic enrpirc

Tlus \vas the context ol tul aridnjss di'ccted lo the Kirrg ot ltiurce In
clearly srale
tlre balance

md
world,. Thc

I.'mnce

i'rl

r,ur tt rs.

l564 wlrch
Pcu(ls orr
llxrsc ol'

('hrislitrD
n,

lcmrs ai tbe arbitratDr betweeu sfain,

qrrrh,rr

lrr'rrr

|r

Dcc, .rrtd ltlc

$ri'l(1,

ha!i(

Nctl)c'lrr(ls wllitlt w(rr

ll"l' rrr.'

dllr sl':

rrr

rrr x

IIr

ir

(rr rltr:
wcre dre scdLes in lhe Lralince ol l-uopc and lirglxn(i lllc ntrrNu(
holder of tbe halarce
(Qttot(t ut t:n'ltt lr )t ]otL ))
Lkelihood. thc dosltuctio o{ rltc SPtuush Arnrx(l (1588) w s lhc r':is'r l(n
tbe Queen of Englaod bcrng credrtcd willr thc losiLion ilr ljrrroF which l'orcnzo
lhe Magnificent had Iulfillcd in Lhc nricrocosnr ol ltalv I cenrury errlicr

ltr

r[

The balance of

powu in lhe seventeenth century

'lhe ilcstructior ol the Affudu was a serious lelback lor fie House ol Hatrsburg
to bc
buL at the beginniDg of lhc seventcenLll century iLs uower wrs still considered
Lhe

Queen Mary of Hungary, a sister ot Charles V and govemcss of tbe Low

CouDtries, wrole rn 1553 that she \\,as aware of the extenl 1o wluch the various
states of Ilaly, in parlicDlar Veorce, feared Lhe domnance of one oI ihe two nost
powerli princes ((lharles ViDd Francis I) and that (he Ifdians were concemed to
ens re lLrat a slate of rquilibrium was maintaitred beLwee these two po ers (Kaebcr, p 20) The snccesses of Chsrles V were watched wrih concen It rvds feared
rhat Lhe rcstorarion of a rniversal monarchy would mean the end of the freedom of
rnrny srales Neverlielcss, Charles V deDied that he was aLtempling io est^blish a
uoivcrsrl nroDarchy 'Ihe drivrrg force behind his actions was dynrstic interest, as
was rhe cass with fie other pflIcely houses at lbe lime Associated with ihis mo
trvo was his pa.ssionatc wislr to reslore and sprcad the Catholic faith For Charles,
il llrould be said tha{ the co cept Euope' played hardly any rolc in his thinking
h bis sllxcLioos to hrs $on Fhilip in 1543 and 1548, for example, the word
Eu.ope is not used. there being mention only of ihe Enrpire, the Christian faith
and the dyn ty (Arvarez, l9?5, pp 90 118, 569 92). The hard'pressed Francis I
soughl ailies against tbe HabsbDrgs, looking both to tbe Protestnnt pnnce.s ol
Germany and to the Sr lan ln 1535, France eDtered iDto an alliance wrlh
Suleiman the Magnficent, with whom, after the slege ot Vrenna, an amistice had
just been ag.eed, together with ibe partition of Ilungary Chnslian Europe war
Ilrorc divided ihan ever

After the abdicadon and death of Charles V h 1558, bis brother Ferdlnand bocatrre
CermaD Emperor and lis son Phtllp I received drc Spanisir Throne, togelher with

ffi

do rinrons .rnd lhe NerherlaDds At dre D.ivrl Brtlle ol LeP^nto (15?l)'

'llrkrsh domhdLrotr ot lhc MedncnarPan wxs l)roken Fr'rnoc was wc e(cd by
dre ltrliaD

mah tfueat to Pace iD

ELrroPc

Bohenia, doniraled by Lhc Protestanl

a d Proclaitned lhc Ptotestant Elector Palatine
- tbeir king lD the ensumg war, Bohenria was defeared and bec ne an hercditary
possessiorl of tbe Habsburbs, wlile Davdia assumeil the elector'l fitnctjon of the
Palathate. The intemal balance of power rn the German Enpirc w;ts thus dis
turbe.l Only Prussia ard Srxo y renained as Protcstturt powers offcring a
counterweighf io the Austrjan llabsbu.gs

hr

1619 FerdirflDd TI bectlme liDPeror, buL

Czechs, refusecl to tecogdze hjm

Cardinal Ricbelieu, thc effcctive ruler oI Fialrce, wrs much prcocc Pied wrlh the
Ilugxenor rcbels, but succeeded nevedheless in persuadiog thc Kings oI firsr
Dermrark and rhen SwF.den to intervene wlthn the Gernar Ernpirc against the
Emperor ln 1631, lhe CathoLc French cardural concluded I s bsidv trealy with
rhe grcat Lutlreran Ki g of Sweden, Gustavus Adolpl s, who won victory aller
victory over fie knperial hoops, but was hinlsoll slair) al the siege of Lulzen in
1632. Aher a number of victorie-s in the next few yerJs, EmPeror Fedinand tr wxs
oncc more dll powedD] rnd Ricilieu, in hrs own vieq wds lorced to dcLlarc
open war on the Habsbugs
Pohtical writings of tLre time rcpeatedLy refer to thc rolc of Frarcc rs ubihalor in
the Gcrman question- State interesl clearly prevailed above tlle orutual Lres be
twec rlle Catholic prnrces Il wrs even pointed orrl that it was in thc rnlerests o[
the Pop! hjmself thrt rhere should be a baimce of power in which ProteslanL tels also ibrmed part of the Catholic Habsburgs (Kaebr, p :12)

ililil

in farticr.rlllJ thrt ol RichelieLr, was even justrned bv ,the

Hugucnol rebels. In his poliLrclll wo:;k De I'interest .les Ptin:es et Estats de La
Chfttiente 0638), ane of their lcaders, the Duke ol Rohan. exprcsses the gennl
opinion that France and SP.uD are tle Iwo loles of intcmaiional politics and tllar
lhc b^lancc between these two greal poweis must seiae as tle guidc li e for die
policies of the other slltes-

irre,rch policy, and

the second haLi of (he seventeenth ccrLlury, the intemational Pohtical situalion
wlrs derennined by lhe expa.sionist alms oi I-ouis XIV'nr power of the House
of Ilabsburg becarne nuch lcss domil aDt rnd raduallv France came to bc seen as
the Inost significant thrcai to the balalce of Power ir Durope. Thc firs! pcrson to
Anltrirn sLalesmNn Franz Paul Baro
point the 6nger
166? in French, Ceman and EDglish
Lisola, in a pub
arxt to allv itsell witlt Austi and to
rnd which was
want Protestart rulcrs of rhc F.encLr King's PJsns (Schmidt, 1966, p 173) l'isoLa
adopts in its enrirety the theory of the bdlturcc oI Power as fbmrulatcd d lv veals
bef;re by tle Duke of Rohan, but rtses il against France ln his view' the Kjrg oI
Fraoce wished to estalrlish a uiivers'rl monarchv and had L\ercn)re become a
tlneat to 1|e frccdorn of Europc, lo retigion and to frde LisDla couplcs lhe idca oI
ihe balarce ol power in Europe nor only willt peace but' also wiih frcedon ol rc-

ligior and lhe gowth ot fiade (Schmidt'

L,ouis

17]).

XtV's altack ol1 thc Udted Provi ces (the Drtch ReprLbtic)

1672 rcsultcd

By around 1700, Europe had L'ecome ihe srafldard framework for lolidcal think
ing The theory of rhe balance of power lrad found broad ac@Itance nnd bad be
come closely associated wr& fie ideal of freedom (or frEedoms) for Europe.
'tsurope', wtuch in (he suteenth cer ury had sti[ been a some\lhat unusual slnonym for Chistendom, had by lhe end of the sevenieent\cenl ry come to be the
Feferred telm At least in Anglo-Dutch and Protestanl ctcles.

The balance of power in the eighteenth century

In the

coDrse

the idea

of the eighteeuth century tbe conceptual link belween 'Europe' and

of a balance of power was irrher developcd lt was operrtive at

tbe

ol both political (rought end politrcal praciice- lbe univenities, lor

instance, raught the system of the baLance of power to tbeir students' and leamed
trealises were pubtishcd on the subject. In Ergland, ihe phrase 'Libeny religron
md tade' was associated with the theory Frecdom for a nomter of staLes, each
evrtb eqBal right!, the fre pmctice of the Prolestant religion and the unhndered
development of English lrade were all enconlassed Liv rhe notion of th balauce
!'l pow"r.

level

dre sphere of political practice, the old system in which England's role was to
kep the balarce between the Bourbons and the Habsbu4s was in thc otid
eighlenth cenhrry disturbed by the rapid nse of the power of Prossia and bv thc
growing il luence of R ssla Fede.lck th Grea!'s conquest ol S esia wi-s dle
slart ol a long coDflict wtth Austna ln 1756 the so called 'Diplotna(ic

ln

RelolDtior' took place, with tie arch-enemies Bou$on and Habsburg forning I
coalition againsi kussia which was supported bt EnglaDd The result wAs uitia new and far more complex system, which even nl
coofusirS. wllat
czme into being
teenlh centtry,
Napoleon. The

mrtely

Lhe

time was

ttlt

to be

Russia.

pose of Christcndom'

(Schm t,

l.

174)

(Kurt von Rflumer Ewr|er Friede Friedensrufe und FtiedensPkine seit det
lcflaBsdnc ( eLemal peac: hoPes ard plans for p'eace sirce thc Renaissance')'

ot

l
42

tsuropeaD nntions based orr the fundamenlal principles of intentational law

our own century lhese lltoPian idalisls lnve conre to he seen as Prophesy

ffit

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
t
n
ffi

Lssay t

Essay

Europc lo 1914. Ihe

fitukig

Eutayc tu

af an idea

organrzations sct rlp aller ench

the United Nations
aDd
ot
NarioN
rlle
l-eagDe
Wars,

irg thc rwo grc3l illternrlronal

of

the

WorLd

ilr lanous tunns a cc{tain concelt ol Burope nn image ot E'uroPe deaeloPed

rmltnrl 1500 which was the tcsuir ot the discolerY oi oiher corrlinelts and of rirt
conqrcst o{ arcrs ouls e Eu.oPc
llurope lurncd hom dle l\4edileranean lo Lhc AllunLic, rl leasl lrl the scnsc that its
econornc ccnrre of gravity sh ted irorr lhe coasls ol thefirlnlcr10lhc 0ons ol rlt)
lanel Venice.nd Genoa lost thetr Fe-cmircncc nnd wcrc ovlxrrkcn bv r)rhcr rir
ics, lirsr oI rll Lrbon, lher Sevllle and Antwcrp n(t hrer Anrsterdrlrrr' Ihnrlntrf
and London These wcre folowcd oll a morc resl.ioro(l $crlo bv Nturlcs, l]orrlort r'
Cddiz n.l many others, each \trllr ils own Golden Agc.

wifi distafll {lesthations .' lhe Anericas' Asih, Africa - ptovidcd LrD lrnPuLs!
for dre econony ard wds the cataLyst of r Slobal molretrrv svslem in whiclL b^r1er'
cJsh, and (jn panicular) credi! werc iil,erwovcn wilh one olber As r result concentrations of fiDancial power were crealDd upo whrch Eu(opcJrl tlllers were to r
greaL extent alependent, dnd which detennjned die progrcss ot European cxp r-

Trade

ffi

I
I
I

Europe as rcpresented in modern cartography

We have atrea.ly seen how the redrscovercd work ot Ptolomv rnltueDced Europedn
map-making liom the mid'fourletnth cenhrry

develolnent ol cartogaphy
Ddrjng the course of the lifteenih century the Portuguese were the first to sarl
along the coart of west Alricr and rhe voyagcs oi Colonbus to Amenca (1492),
Vasco da Gami 10 India vir the CaPe ol Good Ilope (1498) d Magcllan' the nrst
to circururavigate Lhe world (1519 2i) &astica y lrlulsfonned geograPbical
knowledge Addjtiorally Lhe inve tion oI Prjnti g increascd the disLribrlion ol
Overseas exploralion gleatly encc'$aged the lLtrther

il

nMps

'l\e Low

Countries grued a PIe enDlrent position ur nlodem canography

Gerdrdus Mercator (1512 94) produced fine giobes Ior Clrarles V who delisbted
in cxamrning them, and in doing so perhaps c nre 10 rcalize dral the sun Dever in
fllcr set on his empjre- Mercatc'r, who broughl out a standard edltrolr of I'lolIlly'

has never cnjoyed

il

also prodrccd the tu31 oroderD ll]ap of Lurope, io fifteen pNrls ard iledicrled t{)
Granvelle, Ge trusred adviser of Charles V and Philip ll (Mdcntor EuroPa (Dris-

inseparably

burs, 1554), Facsim e Lichtdflrk Reichsdruckerej nch dem Onginal

ffi

il
ffi

nonetheless, not primanly religious ln

cenlral TIle balance uri the guaranlee

essence.

The libertres of Europe were

for rhe fteedom of Prhcs 'rnd of

na

Representations of EuroPe
The expansion of EuroPe
PaGllel !o $e forDrafion o{ po]itical concptl, derermmed to a very considerable
exlent by the problems within Europe itself- and which, as we have sn, impled

ffiil

tilm

Stadsbjbliothek

ar Breslat

helausgegeben von der Geselschalt

ftr

in

Bdkunde

der
zn

was in panicnlar Mercalor's world map of 1569, intendcd tor

mariners, whicL became famo s, using as it did his ingenious cylinder Prolcction
The map coniajns ilstoctions ior setting a course aDd reckoning dLstuces The
famous atlas, in book form, appeared in 1595, shonly aJter Mercator's dea r tlis
heirs sold lhe foljo-sized copper plates engraved wilh fhc maps oi Jodocus
IloDdius, and these were rpublishcd eirlrer as they werc or ro revised fornl In the
course of thc sevcnteentlt cenlury, tle Mqcalor IlondLus atlas bame very Popu_
lar alld was republished and iranslated many dmes. Houdius also publbhed
smaller allases uoder tlle name Mercntor, but cont jnjng new maps- Malry others
also lublshed maps and allases Slowly the Lrodem canograpluc image of the
wilrld hecame us|.1, wiLh Europe tr-kirg up only a sm. l pdrl- Il becal e ciear. it is

Berlio (1891))

I!

ffi

ry
lJDe, that EDrope was the smallesl

descnbed

it

no uncertain tems

oI the con[rlents' hul tlte 'rccompanying'texts

as d1e ocJt,

E;!-

*i
:!

$E

S-
edn,

pp

109-10)

dE

symbols (see Figure 6).

way
iJes

o{

A$

and

onlv

Europeao

1957; 1968 cdn, PP 120-21)

uar

1957: 1968 edtl'

p ll0)

ht'tinai o' J'

ti-,'. t' InmHondius A .$ lvlinnrr'Ilcrtlndtinor'k
t"iit,i',a", lio''vno'' Brilii' I it''n Rrn'tt tn'd t

lndtrPts (

4I
46

t
I
t
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
t

Itlll
W

Clearly ihe Europexns are al)le lo ccll llle shois Chnstianity' lrade nnd colodzitrion arc the clernenls io European xp.lrsion which foiDed the basis for unequivo
c l feelngs of slrperiorily

Europe crowned
W

I
t
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
il
H

to xs, depic[ng lhe Roman province ralher than rhe cootinent'

ll,ere was of cource a rich tradilon of Portmvals of the m)'th of the Rape of

Europa, not only in aotiquity but aiso in the Middle Ages: Europa and t'\e BUI- it
rs [aiurally a movrng tale and an inexiauslible molrve for artistic represeDtation'

. bul it is nol the altegorical portrayal of

a continent

We know of no more thar a singte object fiom the whole medieval pedod on

ard
przzling
later periods but this early association of Eruope and war is somewhat
aPpear to dat'e from around 1500
century rhat allegoncal represenwith standdd afiibutes and syma woman
bols becarne popDlar (Knipping, 197a, P- 361). Europ is ponrayed as

allegodcal
but it is oflly in the
tations of coDtinents

The 6rst

48

Figurc 7 The cot tnemoration ia stone oJ the *ars betu,ee the Romans atul the
Parthions in the second centuO AD From Lexrcan lconograplicum MylLrologiae
Classrcae. (Photo: AshmoLean Mueum, orford )

ffi

qednrp d rrown. \he alone ,' .- .-nstreJ. wlrrle Ln. urher coDlmeni! JJE,nor'
By dound l)80 turor'e crcwneo hnJ become a ni'mrJ rnolrl irr PnnLs Gee lul
exmple, Ftsue 9).
Even earliei in 1537, ar extremely ctrious nrap ol !un4e, in dte form of a w(nna4
uas protluced by the Intrsbruck humanist Johanncs Archduke of Aushia' Holy
Roman Emperor, King of HMgary and Bohemia (only copy now in Mlise m

I Twellh centurJ
candelab a Jron Liese
Ttu threc conti ents ale
dcpicted on the foot
(Phota: ZPnt l Institut lat

Fqute

50

Fisure

ci;a

EutuPe noflned

Philips GaUe dJter Marcw Ghaeraerts F'urope

(Photo
1580, RijksPrentenkabinet, Riik:nuscum Az'Jterdam

Rijksn seum Stichnng, Amsteftlan )

f
I
I
I
I
I
I
t
I
I
I
I
I

L.SSay

1 L\rope

@ ts t4: Ute maKtng at An toea

ScrCIofmogropfp.

ilur

t[i

Kif li il"n"W'#'li,'T# ilil,tli:",li,,'.:x#:gr"#u'.t1,1ru,'ff [ i,f ,l]ri'i'

IM

I
I
I
I
I
I

lrerdrrurdcurn irr tLrnstrnrr-k, cJ llagrow (er:].)' 19i0, pp 46-?) This inventivc

in olre oI the later impressions
corrbiortior ol nllip rtnd
work that was popular in
oual
oJ rhe cosrnogLalhy of S

l0) Ii is a portrayal of Europe

scconil haLf of thesix
the
such as b please the Habsbulgs. SPain is the crowned head and Bohemia
other
her
orb
In
as
im
Srcily
holds
ard
she
hcart; ltaly lomrs one oI her ams,
hand she has a scepte which louches Scotland and Dnglald
Lhc

Spain, Vemce and the papacy ofl the coast

Nuremburg is depicted as the heafl of Eurcpe (see Figure l1)'

co[rbined forces

of

Grcece

At the etrd of the sixteenth century Cesue fupa in lis lconologia (lsted Rome,

>a&*Fi
like valour. the book atrd the owl for scholarshiP, the musical inslruments for lhe
liberal arts. The carpenter's square, brushes and chisels indicate lhe excellence of
the Grceks and Romans and other peoples (all European) in parnting' sculplure
and llchitecturc- A later Dutch edition (1644) adds lavigation and priotirrg lo Lhe
series of images associated with Europe (ltipa, Iconolngia, Dulch fianslation,
An$lerdam 1644, pP. 602-{3).

Ripa's influence was considerable but with respect to the portrayal of fte contiIlents, iLl particrlar, ooe fiDds a great deal of varicry - no doubt Lhe aims and anr
bitions oI dre dilferent cornmissioning agents. We have already seen how such
symbolic poftrayals could sefle ihe purposes of Habsburg, imperial, propaganda
(cf. o\ejvrc].v Allt'ibuten, Reallericon zur rleutsclrcn Kunttgeschtchte (RDI) 1961,
pp 116Gi8). A well knowr example is the allegory pailtcd in 1636 by Franz
F|alcken showing rhe abdicatioD of Charles V in 1555, in which the continents arc

t
n

depicted as prying homage to the Emperor (see Figure 13).

tiis 'impedal' iconology, cleical arrd bour'8eois emblems developed

during the seventeenth centtlry. Al1 examplo of the latter is lhe lnonumental frieze
siulpted by Artus Quellinus on the faqade of the Towr H^ll in Amsterdiml
(1656 58), which vas viewed by many il lhe seventeenth ientulf as the eighth
wonder of the world. The lcace tjeaties ending eighty yeers of war in 1648 were
considered to be a victory over the Flabsburys In the synbolic tiieze, Amstcrdam
takes the place of Charles V m, as il were, a comic parody in marble nther than

Aparl from

ffi
phia

ffi

of

brury )

with gilts
of
the
superiority
separately,
llre
depicted
ll)e conthents

whereas lhe other conlinents stalrd or kneel before her, honottring lter

(RDK V, p. 1161) lf
[rrrope is crprcs:eJ by mcrns ol r.unrparison.

This can be seen, for example, in dre splendid neo-classical adaPtation of Rjpa in
the second half of the eighteenth century by the architect George Richardson ln the
infioductiori of his lconology (London, 1779)' fuchardson clearly states that' by
classifying and cottrastilg the altegorical porfiayals, he wishes to 'give to llle ex
planations md priols a more striking opposition and variery'. The fanriliar symbolic
ntrtibot"a o" natumlly illustrated. The charger and weapons stand tbr ondaunted
jnstruments of all sorts for tho liberal
valour, the owl and the book for scholarship,
garments
a-rts (see Figure 15). The Hom of Ptenty inuicates fertiliry' her luxurious
mark her superior riches, and her crown makes her the Queerl of the World
style different f?onl Ripa's bul the tone $ as wcl] Ii'r
Richardson, it is the superiority of Etuope in the arts and sciences which is prjmary'
For leaming and arts, the Eurcpeans have been most reoowned; all dre
scholaslic sciences they havc brought to great pedectlpn and the
invention and improvement of lnany uscful and ingenious arts,
Not o

4
lsdbelta
ussischer

Lep
Riaoy
nuseum, Staatl

cted on
a

Ilaute af

nperor

ly is Richardson's

in 1589 for the intenrled

ewerbemusertm' Berlin (Photo:
n)

continents bing thclr tribDtc rurd merchaldise to thc city of

Amstcrdam, syrnbolized as a wornarl seated on a ship (see Figtre 14)-

on calrvrs. The fo

the cighteenth century one finds the suPeriority of Europc ex

directly When the continenLs ar1r dePicted together' dleir
clearly indicates their subordlnation lo Europe EuroPe is enthroned'

In the course of

Iiressed nrore and more

posr

re

Figure
(

t 644

12
(P

'Europa': Cesare RiPd, Iconologia

: Rliks mus e um-S t ichtinS, Axtst e rdam )

hoto

55

ililil

ru

t
I
I
I
I
I
t
I

anil Asia's enslavement. It is fol this reasotl that ill Asia the exlcrrl ol lrcc{l(nD
(n
never increases, whercas iI Europe, depending olr circumstances, il wllxcs
tho
irl
EuroPL
of
wancs (Livre 17, Ch. 3). The above ideas concem the freedom
context of rnlemational retations. However, he also fomlulates the Pri[ciple of the

l)irrrieLrl^rly orvitsilliLn, alc wholLy owing to the genius alid hrlustry of),
llr(. illllahitanls in this principal pa of the world
(llicharrlson, 1779, pp j0-.31)

Eurolxr row sL^nds next lo an elegant temple rather lhan holding one in her hand.
This, according to the ei8hteenih ccntury exPlication, irldicates not oI y 'the sanc_
tiLy of tireir religior' but also 'the wrsdom aDd ingenuity of the inhabitants and the
excellency of lheir governmeni' (Richardson, p. 31). Ril.r mentions here only thal
Europe was the continent with thc most powerful fotentates, the EmPerol a d the
Pope. The explanatory text of this emblematic book is therefore anended by
Richardson according to the ideas of the Er ightenmenl the imagc of Europc
wearing a crown was polished and lefined inlo an ideal of civilizatbn Tt is to this

ll

potjsm

ftivre I l.

Cb. 6).

So lar, we have been dealing wilh the befinilion

of Furope from

prim:Uily poliri

ffi

loprc thaf we now tum,

The civilization of EuroPe

. The city is built right uP into the air, with llve or six
other, and the strets are full of an enormous busde of
utlerly astonishing
, no. 24). The pace of life alrd work is

Clrislianity conlinued to play a role in the sell imagc of Europeans during lhe
eighteenth cenhry but it was no lofl8er the dominant forcc that it had been in pre
vious centudes. By the end of fhc eighteerltl century Europe and Christendonl
werc no longer sytlonyms. Eur-opean feelings of supedoflty were basetl on a con
glomeration of ideiu proceeding from IIlc E ightenment which, r tutn, came lo
be associated wiih the notlon of civilization. In charting ihe progrcss we rrced to
consicler the ideas of several philosophers and poiitical theorists

ffi

for the odent.lls:

have been here a month and have yet to see anyone walking ' they run
and they msh. The slow wagons of AsiT , tle measured kead of our
camets it would frighten them to death

one of the visitors writes home to Smyma, arld he speaks

in this connection o[ 'Eu

e rop'6erlnes'). Aoolhcr
ork and the Passion to ellde s'eruichir'); one secs
avail et qu'industrie')

ffi

es

Montesquieu
Montcsquieu in 1748 in De I'erpnt l.J lois ('Thc Spiril of I-aws') provitles I
commentary on ihe political signifcallcc of Europe and at lbc siLrne tinlc xlen'lc
and gives greater depth lo it. Mo tcsquieu is very much 1n the finditlon of those
who, fiom Machiavelli onwards, regard Europe as a secular concept unconnccted
lvith the notion of Christendon and who identfy Europe with the idea of freedom-

Lr this book an attempt is made to explain the peculiar llature of Europe, esoing thrs
peciatty by compari(on with Asia.
Montesquieu is following ln lllo footst
years before (see abovc), in deahng w
dilfer from onc another according to the clinrate in which thcy live''

of an
Such remarks have been viewed as conslifirting the first impetus for theodes
ethic, and even capitalisrn of Europe and

alisparate

liry of Asia tChaboLl, pp. 7l-'4 r. Whrr is

of Montesquieu expresses a blief in rhe
rncutalitLes att bDtable to Asials and Europeans

trilil

ffi

ffi

thousard
y Peoples

ffi

aphor-istic manner, Monlesqtieu ded ccs polihcal enslavenrent frofr

climatic condilions Asra is withoul a temperale clrnate: grcat heat and iotense
cold arljorn one anotier, hc says. In Europe, however, the temperale zone is very

In his own

extensiue, even though the clirnates of Spain and Scandirlavia difler greatly
Asia, poweriul nalions in

Tn

ilri

mcdiately adjacent to onc

quer tlre lal1er. In EuroPe,
withrn the $ame temPerate
reason lor the weakless of Asja and the slrength of Europc' of Europe's liccdo]Il
58

t_

flli

Europe^n

nriion ('unc nation dc l'lluroPe')'

lli
tt
m'

Eqsay t

Lssay

Europe Lo lll4: tne filaKlng ot an tdea

Voltaire
'l he clear idea oI commuoal lluropean custoDs and mtuInels is also to Lre lbund lll
the wolks of a far more popular contemporary of Montesquier, ramely Voltaire
ll Lc riicle de Louis XIV (1751), he writes that 'Christian Europe' can be viewed

liliI

Wil

jnto slaves, thal they respect the

European naLions do not tlrm prisoners of war
attempt lo maintain a comthey
sensibly
arnbassadors of hostile ations and that
(ed
p 40)'
1966'
(Voltaire
in
Adarn
power
of
),
munal balance
a section dealng with the arts and sciences a culn[al interpretation of the telm
Euaope cornes to the fore. Voltaiae's thesis is tlrat despite the wa$ Bnd reLi8ious
disco;d which havc afflicted it, Europe has seen the rise of a 'r6publique littdraire'
(Aclam, p. 70; ct Chabod, p 30). The arts and sciences reinforce one arother and

ln

itilil

provide mutual support. The academies in the various siates together fomr
European republic of artists and scholars:

The English, the Germans arrd the French go to Iryden to study The
famous doctor Boerhaave was consulted by both the Pope and the'l"sar

His pupils attracted foreiSne$ who became docioN elsewhere

The true scholars in each discipline have strengthened the ties xniting lh$ great
scientific and artistic cortununity of Europe This' says Voltaire, is a great comfort
rr a world in which ambitio[ and politics cause so much il1.

We have already seen that, alongside ChristeDdom' humanism was one of dre fac
tors uniting the dlites of tlle various countties of Europe- ln dre sixteenth ceDtury,
l'eeling ol conrnunity had grown up between all rhose who enjoyed the same
sort of ct.lssici educaholl. Voltaire's idea-s quile clearly spring from fis human
rsri. u(x)cq)li(n of the R)cspublica litlerdrid, btJl contain a new dlrnension in fhat

rhc nirlural scicrlces aie in his

view so very imPortant

lrivc years ier the Le siicle de lauis XIV, Voltaire published lus much mote exilfl

ii
t1

Spirit of the Nations,1756, ed. Pomeau 1963), 1be first attempt to provid a 8eneral ove.view of lhe whole of human history up to the cenflry of Louis XIY as
seen from lhe perspective of the history of civitzaLron. It is a major attemPi to
write a new sort of world lustory according to the ideals of rhe Enlightenmeut, wiih
the witel drstancing himself from the Bible, which until thm had formed the standard frame of reference- Voltaire rMkes plain that the histories of Egypr and China
iue more anciel]l and important than those Presenled h the Bible. He states ihat
Europe, 'ow Europe', has become incomparably more populous, dcl), aDd civiliTed
since the days of Chiflemagne, even in comparison with dre Roman Empire (Es.rai, R6sun6 811). Europe has become the continent of tlie Enlightenment,
although sone parts are srill shrouded in darkness However, civillzation and thc
development of science and scholarship had originated rn lhe East - Vollaicc cs
pecially admtres China - and in 'otr Europe' are of only rcce]lt ddlc60

Lurope la 1914 tne naKtng ot at) toea

Alnllohy and d.ukness donrinated Errope for celituries, Vollaule rnainlrhs, but at
re elld of the Middle Ages its peoplcs demalrded such I meftsurc of tieedom
^rd
dghts drat cverrtnally the blirb ric syslern based on slavery was olerturned Th'
\\'crc
irlr
their
inhtrbj!3its
gaineLl
then
their fieedoor, alcl froln
tatioDs of Europe
considered to be peoplc rather than slavcs Ncverlheless, Vollaire ls of lhe opilllon
(Lat this was rot yet sulficient to makc lhcm crvllized and colrghtencd (VolLaire iLl
Porrlcau, 196J, pp.11{' 19) That process woukl takc cenluries
Voltaire conside$ the Enropc of his'own lil]rc to be the most civihzed ionlinenl,
but he often uses rb example of no -Euopean cou Lries as a Lneans of exposing
Europeao abnses and evils. FIe assumes that human natu.e is basically dre same ell
over tlre world, and lhat the dillercnces between peoplcs result lron tlte difJedng
extent to wlrich rcason hlrs been 'cultivated'. By nirlure Lhcy arc all equaL; dre difIerences between thenl are the res|lt of thcir level oI cultivation How splendidly
Europe wou)d flourish, were it not for incessaDl unnecessary wars! Anal how
wrdesplead would be the afls and screnccs, were it noL that such a great number (l1'
lrlen end wometr are bried alive as morks and nuns! Thus Vollaire. who calnot
resist comparing the danlage done to liurope by wrlrrc with the nef rious ellects
he altibutes to thc monastic lil-e.
The concept of Europe propagated by VolLaire is an anticlcdcal oDe He sees the
dominant position Europe has flained in thc wo.ld :Ls being based on the develop
rricnt of rhe arts irnd sciences- Indeed, that is ultimately the consolation he offers in
the lace of dispiritjng evenls, includiDg those of his owlr day- 'lhe nations of
Etlrope have always managed to rise frorn the ashes ol various disasters and civil
wars, due to tleir knowledge ol the iuls :rncl scieoces (Porrlcau, Pp. 8t0 12).

Adam Smith
The growjng awiuenegs of r European cjvilizatiol wrs based on a tallglble in
crease il the wealth ol uations, which could ifford to financo costly standing armies a1ld expensive artit]ery The dreorisL nnd propagandist of a new liberal
economic order, m which mateial self-inlerest was coolly &rd sobelly made the
basrc principle of economics, was Adanr Smrth (1723 90).

Lt lis Inquiry into the Nat re antl Cuuses aJ the Wealth of Natiot s (l'l'16),ll\e
Lo consider-flrcarms advanLageous to civlli
zation, since they aro expenslve rd complicated to rrarNfrclxre ard therefolc
sdmulate economic activrty rnore thar thlr bow and arow irnd rhe catapult (Sehgmarxr (ed.), 1947, p. 198). Montesquicu, by confiast, had pointed out the disastrous
economic efJects of maintaining large eunries of rnerceoaries In the sarne line of
thorghi, Voltaire had lamented the growth of standing arlnies, althoogh he added
thc positive note that warfare berween zumies of mercenaries might spare the civjhan populatron to a greater extent. As hc rcmarks lightheartedly il1 the Es.rar,

Glasgow profcsso( evcn goes so far as

The citjzens of besieged citics arc sometines tr nsferred iiom one rulct
to auother wlthout it costing the lite 01'a single one of them. They are
rnercly the wilner's prizc, gaircd hy whoever has the most soldiers,

carulon and money

(Ponrcau, 1963,

812)

stirP by codsidering tbe arms imlustry:;r

nrlirr sr)ilh is llrcrclilc lakirlg a greal

srrnllrlLrslr)lhcc(:(xrollly,irrl(ilhrrsLo'theextcnsionolcivilisation'IIisspellingoF
's') suggcsls that the word is taken from the F-rench
'civilisarirrlr' (wilh
^
For au inslghl into the intellectual clinlate of dre
concept
'('ivilisrtion' is a kcy
ciglrleertb cclrtury wc need fo tease out its rnca illg But lirst of all we need to
hrve a look xt tLle relatcd concePt o[ culture

The concept of culture

'fhe term

'c lture'

has both rndiviclual :rnd

soci' applicatiols 'Ihe

roots of the

particuNor (Lucs M{)nlcsquicll associatc good marlners in Scneral with Europe in

Lu.

Polit, ssc

tially non

i" rcr

Europcau

birth to c
et I'oisivit6 fait nail
Lurn glves

rNl

of intellectual exercise and the development of

only the Greek 'paideia' as a sy[onym, but a]so the
an 'Bitdung'. All of these, however, had always been
until ihe late eiShteelth cenldry that the social dinot
It
is
ro
individuals
related
sense

mension previously descibed as 'civi1it6.' or'politesse' comes to be associated

with'culruie'; in otirer words, it is only lhen lhat the word begiDs to be used to
rcfer to something collective.

The concePt

ol 'civilization'

the
The social dirnension which the concept of culture gained in the course of
the
French
was
andit
Enhghtenrnent
the
product
of
'xord
eiglrteerth cenhrry, is a
';itsalion' which came into being to desqibe it The word was coined i[ the

iclealistic and anti otilitanan.

'culrure de l'esprit' (Ersars, Livre I, Ch- )C{V)' and scveral of his contemporanes
form followmg it'
use the word 'cullure' m the sane sense bul withouL a genitive

It is noticeabte that neitber Montesquieu nor Voltaire

rrse the lroun

'civilisatiott"

English, too, the teml 'culture' is lountl in thc

wliles in his
s"uenti"ttth century philosoPher Thomas Ilobbes (1588 167{l)
and the edrr
culture'
r:alled
is
thc
earth
Lertuthan ll\at 'ttre tilou. bcstowed on
192)
(Lirldsay'
191'1,
thcr
minds'
cuinrrc
ol
P
a
catron oI children
ihere was lllso
for
metaphorical sclrse The

tn

Peason

t6'), .md

wds nlade
licrs- Outw
tural I
iated
ancl

iely

coutliness

s good manners
a social dimen

s' which were

as

lrs such had never

Agcs' lhe ImPerial

l(olnPlar

manners and customs-

of

courtly

popDlar durirtg
is also clearly associated with the belief in progress that became
phascs of
the course of the Enlighterunent. In this way the idea of levels or
one
'civilisation' rapidly became a familiar
Tire new word enlered tbe English lznguage as

'civilization" aldrough sonle

users

il, preferriflg the older folm 'civility' (Frerch 'civilit6') A ihmiliar

of tlk
poi"ug" ftorn Bo"welt'. lif" of Dr Johnson' tbe editor of Lltc Dictionary
English I'anguage, i\tstrates tlf s:

objectcd to

Jffi

t
I
I
I
t
t
I
m

il
ffi

Johnson's opposition was in vain, and 'civitization' became accepted

English language.
narne

of lhc tlre faiG (Esrais' Livre

1, Ch- 30)

Tn

German. the term

'Cultur' (originally written with

a C) became

irlo

lhe

in the course ol
63

62

Lssay t

Ltxope n t9t4: Ine ntaKtng ot Alt

Lssay

to-Da

Voltaire

illil[

rililfl

'Ihe clcar idca of communal Eulopcan cusioms mLl maLrners is also to be ibund Ln
lhe wolts ol a fat more populaa co fempoftry of Montesquieu, namely Vollrire
Lt Le siicle de Louis XN (1151), he urites that 'Christian Europe' can be viewed
a5 a large colmonwealth of different states, some of them monarchies alld others
having a mixed system of govemment, but all of them intercorurected All
European states have the s-ame religious background, despite rhis being divided
into a variety of sects, aod all have the same principles of civil law and politics,
wh;ch are rnrknown elsewhere in the world It is because of these principles that
European natrons do nol tum prisoners of war into slaves, that lhey respect the
alnbassadors of hoslile latioLrs and tbat tiey senslbly attempt to maitrtair a comnunal balalce of power (Voltaire in Adarn (ed.), 1966' p- 40)
Il1 a section dealing with the arts and sciences a cultural ilterpretation of ihe tenn
Europe comes to the fore. Voltaire's thesis is that despite dre wars and reLigious
drscord which have afflicted it, Europe has seen the rise of a 'r6publique litt6raire'
(Adarn, p. ?0; ci Chdbod, p- 30). The arts and sctences reilforce one aaother and

provide mutual support. Tbe academies ilr the variotls sfates togelher fomr

European aepublic of artNts and scholars:

ililil

irilfl

rilil

ril

il

i[ilfr

ll
rl

The English, ihe Germans and the Frcnch go to l-eyden to shrdy. The
faDous doctor Boerhaave was consulted by both the Pope and dre'l\aLr.
His pupils attracted foreigners who became doctors elsewhere
each discipline have strengtheled the lies xDiiing tlis great
scientillc and aflistlc community of Europe This, says Voltaire, is a great comfnrt
ln a world in which ambitiolr and Politics cause so much ill

'lhe true scholars in

We have already seen that, alongside Christendom, humanism was one of the factors u iting the 6lites of the vadous countdes of Euope Itr tJle sixteenth century,
l'(rclilg of conmunity had grown up between all those who enjoyed the same
sorr of classical eclucation. Voltaire's ideas quite clearly spring Aom dris humanislic concoption of thc Rispubfica lilteraria, bnl coDtain a new dime-nsion irr drat
llrc arLrral sciences ate in his vlcw so very mrporlant,

Irivc yerus after the Le siicle tle lauis X1l4 Voltdre published his much rnore extcnsive E'ssai :ur les moeurs et I'asprit des Mlions (Essot on the Custotns dnd
Spirit of the Nations,1756, ed. Pomeau 1963), the first attempt to provide a gen
eral overview of lhe whole of human bistory up lo the cenlury of Louis XIV, as
seen from fhe perspeclive of the hislory of civilization lt is a major attempt to
write a new sort of world tltstory according to the ideals of dre EdrghteDmeDt, with
the writer distancing himself from the Bible, which until then had formed $e standard frame of reference. Voltaire makes plain that the bisto es of Egypt aud China
are more ancient and important th?dr those presented in the Bible. He states ral
Europe, 'our Europe', has become incornparably more populous, rich, and civiliTed
slnce the days of Clrarlenagne, even in compaison with the Roman Empire (Er

8lt).

Europe has become the continent

turaPe Ia 1914: tDe na)<tng at an )oea

Ararchy aDd darkncss doninaled lrLrropc for ccnluries, Voltaire uaintiins, but at
tie eod of tlie N4iddle Agcs its peoplcs deman.led s[ch a measrre ot lieedom arld
dghl-s tllat eventuxlly the brrberic syslem |esed on slavcry was o\rertumed. Thc
nations of Europe garned their ireedom, ;urcl liorn tlen on their inhabiLants were
considerdd b bc pcople rather dlan slaves. Ncve heLess, Voltaire ls oI llle opinion
that ihls was nol yet sufncient to urake 01em ci\.ilized and enLightened (Volkriro irr
Pomcau, 1963, pp. 776-79). That process would lake certudes
Voltajre considcrs the Europe of his'own time to be the most civiLized continent,
but he oftcD uses the example of roll-Europcan countries as a neans of exposlng
European abuses and cvils. He assumes that hurnan nalure is Lrasically dre same al1
over the world, and that Lbe dlffercnces betweeD peoples result ftom the differirg
extent to whlch rcason has been 'cultivated'. By natu(c L\ey are all equal; the dif
ferences between them are the resull of thef Level of cultivation. How splendidt)
Europe would flounsh, were rt not for incessdDl unnecessary w s! And how
wrdespread would be the afls md scicnces, were il not that soch a gleat n[mber of
lrlen and wornen are buried alive as morks and nuns! Thus Voltaire. who c lnot
resist conparing the damage done to ljurope by wufare wilh thc ocianous efl-ects
he attributes to the monlstic life
The conccpt of Europe propagated by Voltaire is an aDticledcal one- Iile sees the
donrinanr posilion Europe has gaine.l in lhe world as being based on the develop
mcnt of lhe irts and sciences. I[deed, tha! is ultimate]y the consolation he ofters r
the lace of dispiriting events, including those oI his own day The nations of
Europe have always rnanaged to rise from the ashes of various disasters and civil
wars, due to their knowled8e of lhe :u1s i ld scierces (Pomeau, pp. 810-12).

Adam Smith
The growing awaEness of a European civilization was based on a tangrble increase in Lhe wealth of nalions, which could atford to finance coslly $tanding armies alld expensive fili]lery- The theorist and frof,igandrst cl1 a new lrberal
e.conomic orcNer, in rvhich maLerial self-inleresl was coolly ?urd soberly Dade the
basic princrple of economics, was Adarn ,Smitb (J723-90).

bt lis Inquiry into 0rc Ndture and Causes of th" Wealth af Ndtions (U76), tbe
Glasgow pmfessor even goes so far as to colsider lireanns advanlageous to crvrli
zation, sinoe they are expensive auld complicafed to nanufrcturc ard therefore
sljmulate econonic acliviLy more thar thc bow and arrow and the catapult (SeLig
marxr (ed ), 1947, p 19E) Montesquicu, by contrast, h^d poiDted out the disastrors
economic el-lecLs of nainfaining large arnues of mercenaries- In the same line of
thought, Voltaire had lamentcd ihe growth of standing armies, although he addcd
the positivc note dut waJfare between :fnries of nercenaries Inight spare lLre civ
iliar population io a grealer extent As hc remarks lightheartedly in the -Etsai,

of the

EnlightenJncnt,
aldrougll some parts are still shrouded in darkness. However, civilization and the
development of science aBd scholarsl p had oiginated in the E^st Voltairc es
pecialty admrres China and in 'our Europe' are of only recellt datc.

sai, R6sum6

The citizens of besieged cities ere sometimes lrarrsfelred liom one mler
to another without it cosiing the li{e of a single one o[ them. They are
rncrely the winner's prize, gaincd hy whoever has thc nlost soldiers,
camon and money
(l'oncau, 196j, p 812)

Elley

Ltnope to te

t4

Lssay

nte II''rk|nq ot 2n toea

the eitlrteenth ccrlury tbe synonynr for 'cililisation'. '[he word therefi)rc came lo
b(] used in G(]rfian to rcfcr ot only to the original concept of the cuhure ol individual persons, synonymous wllb Bildung, but also to refer 1i] thc social concepi'

One liuds a parallel to the French usage 'histoire de civrlisation' in Johann

Clrristoplr Atlelung's Versuch einer Geschichte der Culrur des menschhchen
Geschlachts (1782).'fte ph,rlosopher Herder speaks of Clrlnl as synorymous with
Auflcldrung (enlightetunent) He concludcs ihat dle distinctior between fie two
te.ms is mercly a differeoce in metaphors, one fiom agric lnue and the other ftom
oted in Rauhut, p. 86) However' as
light, but with no
1784, the words ,4ftliirung ' CuLtur,
the philosoplrer M
sfyle of language which was
literary
and BrldrnS were
not comlreheNible to the German Seneral public (quoted in Raubut, p 87) Thc

wo,d Zivilisation was indeed adopted from ihe Frcoch, but was consideled to be a
rather unfortlnate loan word. (See the following essay by Peter Brgge as regards

thc contradistr ction berween Kultur

now wdtlen sPelted with a

li(nlccl boli)re, llrat was lhe kemel

1 LurapeIa trt:t

utc tt)a^tt)9 ul d') tu'

of dlls ureartog lL imPlied lhat widrin {he pro-

of civilization a dLstincfiLrn was made belween vrrious levels or lh ses ll

wa! taken as .I rnatter ol coLllsc ;'r lhis connection lhrl Iilrofc slrorrld lt secrt lts
ad.J.r

ofthe highos! Lcvel olcivilizrtio Aswchrrvt:scen tlrisviLrw i'

by rhe wry Iluropc' lvas (lcpicrc{l allegoritlllv, lirr Lrt
unambiStrolrsly
illusrraled
stance, by the alchllect Georgo Richiu(ison: lllo ltlrirllc {)l lirt('Po woilrlllf ir crolvll
reflecls such an czrL of civilizaLlon.
thc emborlimcnt

In the coufte oI llte rinctccll{h culltlly, iln cnorllxnls cll'illlsloli itl lll{ lrrj( trl
((
nleanlng of tlie Lcrlu clvllizalioo took Irllcc IIlc rrrrtclcclllll is irr(l(1:tl lll(: lllrrry
wltll
IirroDc
civtlizirLion
ol
idenlilicallotl
the
Iotal
of

1789-1848: dif{erent ideas af Europe

and

Zivilisation).

Bevolutionary ideas and reflections on the old

European civilization

Europe

Twenty years separaie the 'spintual' sketcir of the manners and mentalities of nations by the Frcnch philosophe Volt^ie ard the 'materialistic' study of tho wealdr
of nations by the Scottish ecooomist Adam Smith Durng those two decades,
loughly the third quarter of the eighteenlh century, it became usual to associalc
EIrope ard civilization with one another' the expression'La civilisation eu
rop6enne' was first used ilr 1766 (see J Moras Ursprung) n a work on the Frelrch
colonres in North America probabiy witten by lhe Frcnch Physiocrat, dre Abbd
Baudeau He recommends not only converting the American Indians lo
Christianity but also to E ropearl civi]ization m order to make real Frenchmen ol
thcln! (' . convertir ces naturels non seulcment AL la foi chrdtrenn, mais encore i
la civilisation europ6enne, en faire i peu prds de vrais ftangais par adoption...')
(quolo(l ir) Moras, 1930, p. 47). It is notable that for him Europeal civilizaiion and
Cllrrisliitnity are not one a]rd the same thlng. It would seem, howevet drat he, as a

lircnchnrur, considered that crvilizatio! and France were indeed one and the same.
Iirlurce had a univcrsal vocation to fullil, not only to Christianize but also to civilize. In this context, the expression 'Europcan civilzatioo' presupposes a confton_
tarlon with non Europeans afler a procss of colquest ald colonizatron
Christianity can folm part of this, but Euopean civilizatiofi is nevertheless more
than Chistendom alone. 'fhis is a remarkable chanSe, for we have seen how tle
concepts of Europe and Clrristianity were previously more or less associated
Civilization, then a relatively l]ew wo(d, becoms a slnonym for Europe (and for
the Frcnch, thereforc, for France itscll).
should especially be ooted that the concept civilization had a clear and positive
cofflotation, comcidirg with a growing feeling of European superiority However,

It

tl

feeling did not sland in thc way of an increasing interesl iD areas outside Europe

'l'his seening contradiction is made understandable if one realizcs dlat lhc colcept
of crvilizatron should not be conceived ds fixed, but rathel as a process directed
towa:rds an ideal state lt was the growiog popularity of the idea of progress, men-

'l'he Frencli Revolution was a wate$hed il] socjal md political thinkjng and its inrpact was felt all ovcr Eulope Until lhe Rcvolution, lhe Peasants, who continued to
constltute the largest siDgle categoty in the PopuLAtion of Weslerll EuroPe Unlil

to the nineteenlh cenlury, slill Lived 1 thc shadow of feudalism. Their siN
atron w.N not as h^d as thal ol. their lellows in CenlTxl ald l-,2stem EuroPe, but;r
g.6al n'raDy of them continued to scrue anLl work tlle land for feudal ma-ste6 The
seeds of levolutiotl were aLrcady present in mirny oi the countries oi Westcm
Europe In the words ol Tocqueville, in what is slill a furdamental analysis of lhe
Ancien R6gine tuId the Revolutlon, Iiraitce was not the god wlich created lhe
well

seed but ralher tire ray of sutshine which caused il to sproul

L'Ancien Rigine et la Rivolutian (1856, h OC 2 (1952) 3'1).
Peasant revolts were

was

ir

enderNc

(A

de'lbcqueville,

old Litrope lJle great Revolution in France

of a whole series of revolts signallirg the errd

the

a sense the ntosl sLrccessful

of thc Arcien R6gime .uld lrirns{orming the hated tcudill sysle

certain conti rily rcm^ined, however- For cxample, the Revolution meant a
contiouation rrrdrer than a brcak with the traditio al centralized irllemal stflchrre
of the counlry, and the monarchy and Churcb suwrved in a modifred foam.
Ncvertheless, the feuda] legal slruchlre had gone for cver It is Lnre drat, in certar
remotc backwaters, rcmDants oI the fcudal system sldbbornly remained riSht inlo
fhe twentieth century, bllt lltey were feudal ltavisrns, expelience(l al] the rnore bil
terly by the peasanky because of llle lact thai Lhe principles of rhe Revolution
were famiialr lo Lhem .urd were enshrined ro lc8isLation.

'N{cn are bonr free and with equaL flghts, and renain so'. according to the fanlolls
decLuation of 26 August 1789. In the legal sbxclure and fhe rnental atmosPhere of
feudal society, this Dew lreedom crld equality of dll citizens was Don existent (J
Codechot, Le,r (onsitutbns de la [;rance depuis )789 (l'aris, 1979) DlcLdratL(]n

det lroits

dt

I'

homtnt)

'llrt: ticnch dccrlarltiorr of lhe rights oi man (1789) ensluines various

ideas and

tlic American Revolutlon, but llad a Iar

lrhrascs r.vhir:li wcle lirst set down cltliinll
was dluch rnore a document of principle Its inliu
wirlcr r'ange oi lpplication
^n(l
cnoc was also rouch grcaLcr, France being lhe mosl powerful county in F'urope
llrancc was not the Ncw World but an ancient monalchy in which fhe church and
the ristocracy had gained cnomious plivileges rnd riches for lhemselves'
Article 2 of the Declaration statcs that libcrty, property, secunty and rcsista ce to

the
Lhat full sovereign
ority ln the name
tiors' such as 'est

oppressron ilre

ienable rights of
nation alld that t
sovere:igoly,

all

afes

ulh
titunot

with ali thcir pr

Montesquieu's ideas of thc balancc of powers and the laws (m the plural) whi'h
are dominant during the tulrnoil of ihe Revohtion. National sovereignly should
lather lollow the 'volont6 g6n6rale'(gencral will), coined by Rousseau' which

irr
linds its expression in the Law (singula-r) l'hc king's atlen]pt to flee the counhl
(1792) lcd
with
fte
war
and
at
Varennes,
capture
his
in
whiciir
ended
1?91,
'\ustria
to the escalation of the llevolution The lirtherland was in dalger and the king was
the
considered a taitor A tumirlg polr)t came in 1792, whell lhe Prussians and

custonts tuid local establishments. The natioN of Europe have had the
very saote Cllristian religion, agreeing in the fuirdamental Parts, varying^
re ceremonies and ill the subordinate doctines The wholc of
a liitle
the polity and economy of every country in Europe derived.fTon the
aorni .ou.""r. It was drawn from llte old Getmanick or Gothick
custornsry, from the feudal instituticns \thich must be considere-d as an
emanation from that customary; and tire whole iras bcen improved and
digested into system and disciplire by the Roman law From hence
arise the several orders, with ol without a monarch in every European
system of maturels and of
country...
this quarter of the globe; and
education
the colours of the wLolewhich
There was little dillerence in the form of the universities for the
ealucation of their yolrth, \thether \"r'ith regard to faculties to sciences, or

in

From
which
softened,

ffi

to the note liberal and elegant kinds of erudition'

Arrd Burke ends

with the remark

drat:

F om this rcsemblance in the modes of intercource' and in the whole

lorm ancl fashion of life, no citizens of Furope could.be altogether an
exile in alry part of it . Whett a man lravelled or rcsided tbr health,
plcasure, business or necessity

flom his own country, he never t-elt

hrnselI quite abroad.

(B'urke, Three letters on the Proposals ;for peace itilh the ReBK:ide
299)
Directory of France, 1796; in Ro|ers (ed ) 1850.

baplizcd
Revolutio0 is to falsify historyi lhe principle of eclual rtghts for alL was
blue
always
llo
rneans
by
was
thdt
blood
and
victims,
of
the
wrth thc blood
ard
The ideals of tbe F-rencll Rcvolutiqr hdrl a Bleal impacl Lluoughout EuroPe'
rio
in
others
wcre
enthusiasor
wilh
lrrrch
greetcd
al
lirst
places
though In solne
lentli opposed. iiberty, equality lnd lrateruiry werc trtnlpeted evelywhcre The
*noi" i tl" old Europe was shaken, lo lhe hofior of Nany witil established irr

Burke writes about lhis EuroPe in the past tense_ The French Rcvolutiol) has
brokeir with the state based on thc system of'estales', with the Cl[istian chtuch
and with the ancient universities. France is the centre of Jacobinisrn' therc e

I
t
t
m

t
t
ffi

(ed.), p.306).

mixccl with a desire

lbr lhe rcstoration of

the old sLtulltiol1'

Napoleon and the new Euroqe

H

goocl exrunPle

French Retolutio

shorlly alier lnlo

and wi[r Fmncc
as folLows:

At boltolD lrc]igion' laws

sane. The writers on Pub
nations a conlmonwealth.
having the same bilsis oI

uniformity and cohercnce in large Parts of ihe European continent_ Furthermore'

dominarion by Napoleonic alrd French tyranny fomed all excellent breedirtg
ground for nationaList movements
oPponents rcferred to N^poleon as a'Robespierre on holseback'
the
Code Napotiin, rescinded the first attemPts at social legislalion which

Ilis aistocratic

l\s

Hil

ftflt

67
66

ffir

Lssay

Rcvolutiofi had irfroduced and rcPlacc{l lleti) by the ProlccLioll of plivatc Properly; Devertheless, all becarne equal before the lnw and feudalism was abolishcd'
I-ikewise all privileges and corPJ intenniLliaires (intemre.iiary bodjcs or irsti-

lutio[s) were abolishedj

)

ililil

Napoleollic expanston was the result of Frelch national fervour' and zner the initial enihusiastic reception of the liberatiofl al:mies io Belgium, the Netherlands,
Ccrmany ard Italy, it unleashed nationalist movements everywllere At the ptn
nacle of his power, Napoleon announced the Continental System, aimed at lhe
arch-enemy Ergland, which had begun a naval blockade. Russia jomed the sys
tem. Onc could therefore trxly speak of a 'Fofiress Europe' The Austrian
Emperor gave Napoleon his daughter's hand in marriage (1810)' thus uniting the
Corsican l3uonaparte clan wiih tLe imPe.ial Habsburg dynasty'

ffi

ffi

1ffiil

Never beforc had fhere beeo suclt a concenlration of power in Europe- Besides ie
Grand Empire, therc was a cftcle of subservient states ruled by members of
Napoleol's farnily. On tle continent itself, only Sweden' Denmark, Norway'
Austria, Russia and the Ottoman cmpire were not directly wirhin the Napoleonie
sp)rere of influence The Russian carnpaign of 1812 was a tummg Point which led
1(] the collapse of the Grand Empire, but it was only in 1815 that NapoleoD was
linally <lefeated at the Battle of Waierloo- The uniry' under French dominahon'
which he had wished to imPose on EuroPe was rePlaced by the old idea of tlrc

balalce of power (see above).

il1flil

Lr August 1816, when Napoleon had linally beeo defeated ard was an exile on
Saint Helena, he looked back on his life znd refered to himself (nanrrally making
cverything 6ner than it had aclually beeD) as the'mediateur natural entre I'ancien
et le no vel ordre' ('the natural iDtemediary between the old and the new order':
Walter (ed ), 1963, p. 1075). He had wished to bing aboul an 'as
socratrcn europdcnc' which would have brought prosperity arid happness to the
colllrncnl- 'llrcrc would have bcen rhe samc system lhroughout Europe, wiLh tlte
siu)rc pllnc:il)lcs: 'un code europ6en, une cour de cassation europ6eme' redressant
|(nlr l()rs lcs crrc.trs,..- ('one European code, one Europeiu coufl oI appeal
Tlrere would have beeD a single EuroPean currency, a uni
retlressirrg all
"r,ors;;.
linnr systenr of weights and measrues, the same laws Napolol also proposed a
Ijrrropean Academy and European pdzes to slimulate scientilic research. Europe
wlrs to become o e family and one people, and havellers would have found them.lr/ent (see also Mlmorial lJ, p 345,
selves in a cornmoD fatherland wherever they
6 Novemtrer 1816)

ltlimorialI, in
I

il

ilflil

Il,

lhis is a vision of a frrture Europc which is diamelrica-lly opPosed to Burke's view

of the EDropean past For a long trme, foliowing on from Lhe ideas of Burke,
Europe's past would play d more mPortant role than its fotwe.

historical

f ou ndati o n s

Eu ro pe's

ii

The most impoflaot result of the Revolutionary turmoil for fhe concept of Europe
was that il rcceived an hNtorical credence, which had previously been lacking
The Eemendous break with tradition as such was iflcomprehensible. Aftel some
time Lhe turbulent events, the chaotic succession of regirnes werc sccfl as historioal

Ll

LssLly

Lurope lo 1911: lhe tnah )g ol an dea

1 tutape Ia t9t4:

LtE ntat<tttg at dtr rut

necessitics- All thesc uPhealals lvere thc catalysls oI changd ill thc iltellcclua] clinlate, whicLr lnade it norDal lo see a wholc range ol phenoNena as the result ol
lislorical cievclopmeol. ln this post rcvolutiontry peliod quiLe a nunber of no
tions. which had been lltoreticxl and abstract, became Listo cal concepa This
histo.ical way o{ rhiJ djrg enrichcd and deepened the colcePt of EuroPe The terDl
'Itulope' carne to be [sed in a ILlucil more consciotts rnarurer' It l]ad a familiiir rilrg
pollor centu es Lrut now came 1(l be eodoweil wilh bistorical irlterpretaLions

'uld

itical ideas. 'fhe idea of Europe bpcame more signilicant, but there wal no ques
tioll of a ve$ion that commanded gencral agree lenl Various lFoupulgs had their
own idea of what Europe ha{l bcen rnd oughl 10 be.

Europa Christiana
'Es waren schdne gliinzende Zeiten, wo }r-uropa ein christlir:hes Land war' ('they
were splendid times when Europc was a Ctristiitn l-and') is lhe first linc of the
famcrus essay Die C,lristcnlrcil oCer EurcPa wirich Novalis2 wrote ii l?99 (Novalis, in Kluckhotm aDcl Sa]nrrel (eds), 1983, p 501). The work ls a Poetical exhor
tahon lo religious revival iui.l is full of nostalgia Accordng to Novalis, medieval
Europc hdd beeo one large Chrisrian comrnunity with a single splritual leader: the
Pope The Papacy had now been destroyed (Lhe Pope havug being irnprisoned'
irnd dre Papal States lunted jnto a rcpublic in 1?98) The Middlc Ages shorrld
serve as a soLucc of inspirafioo fbr the Pvivat of the CkistiaD lai(h aod the visible
Church. witirout national borders beiDg considercd
hr France too, the country where (he sharPest orilicisn of the church had beelr expressed and where ir Dercjlessly articlericll policy ha(l been pursued, thcre was a
riLdical change in thc value attributed b Cltristendom and lhe Middle,\gcs
Chateauhianclr lrad an enormoLrs effcct with his Gltie du christiLlnis te (1802). in
which he sang thc praises of Lhe influence of Clxislendom on poery, [teralure,
music, ifchifecture. theology aDd fonns of worslup. Chrjstianity hxd a fonnalrve,
salutary effect rn all areas of lit! Conpared lo classical Antiquity, tle Christiiur
Middle Ages had an unnlistakabLe moral suPcrio ty Were not infanticide and div

orce common in,Artiqllity, and was it not the case tLrilt bfole the rise ol
Clristianity rhere had beeo no polrfic.rl cohesicrnl 'l-es soci6l6s llotlarent 6temelie
ment enfe 1'anarchie populaire el le despotisrnc' ('Socielies cont[rually llucluatcd
between popular ararchy.md despolisrn'; Reboul (cd), 1966, p 250)
The reassessment of the Chnslian Middle Ages gave the concept of Europe a his
toical fo[ndahon The idea of Europe was lhus given a clear'ly delined and devel_
oped historical perspective, which had been lackirrg even as late as the eighleenth
century. Thc concepl oI Europeal cultr.rre llas indeed arisen in the eighteenth cen
t[ry, bul lhe hirlory of European cullure as an idea m itself origirated only in rhe
Novaiis was fie pen-name o{ Fncdrich von Hardenberg (1772-1801), a Gclmau
rom nlrc poet who was called the 'Prophet of Romariicisn'

'z

lrangois l{cn6, Vlcomre de alhaleaubnard (1168-18:18), French writer aDd polrticinn

(;i\i. .Iu .histianirn.. a vlrdicarion ol rhe CLrLrrcLr of
c, elovaled hir (o
l)rc enuneuce a ror)g French writers ol lxs dirl

Ilis

lio

clynairic one. This hisloricaL vision of

political, social and religious
cotrtcmporary
witl
Europe w,rs closcly coDnecteal
concept of Europe was therebrilg
The
should
the
futxre
what
of
aIcI
irleas
ideals
fore not only histoicized, but also po[[cized; m orher words, it was seen more
the ftamo
and more rn histoncal terms, with contempolary political debate forming
and
e
supporters
sp
of reference. Roughly
arties therc were
the opponen$ of the ide
Europe'
consiilerable differcnces
njneteenth. The concept

ol Europe became

Europe according to the Holy Alliance

form But there were also clefenders

of Europe were of a mote mun_
and
visions
of the Floly Alliance whose molives
ilane natrie. An example of this attitude towards Europe is to be found in none
other than Mettemich (1??3-1859), the Chancellor of Austria. As he himselt said'

Such ideals could sometimes tak on myslical

Eulope was one single fatherland (Chabod, p. 109). After the Napoleodc period,
he had become more conscious than ever of the mutual interdependence of the
states of Erlrope, In Meltemich, and in othd ProPonents of Realpolitik r tte
Restoration period, otre finds not a romantic--*eligrous e[thusiasm but rather the
ialea of Europe as a cormonwealth of states, which must see to it that a balance of
power is presewed, along the lines that had existed between ihe sixteenth and the
eighteenth ceDtdry. Mettemich. who attempte4 to pu[ t]re strings of the pentarchy"
the five n ing staies Etrglan4 France, Austria, Prussia and Russia, was mocked as
the 'Baron de balance'.
The Restoration thus saw a gigantic alliance to counter dre revolution The oP
ponents of the rcvolution could be motrvate.d by entirely different considerations'
it is therefore possible to hace two completely divergent visions of EDroPe that
of Christian unity among the romantics and that of the balance of power among
the conservative realists

among the defenders

of the Holy Alliance

Europe according to the liberals

Progressive and

of EuroPe Yet
a vision of the
was opposed to

Idealized visions of the rcligio

in the post revolutionary Peri
Europe- The desire for Peace
was irl a sense Projected back
argulnent in contemporary pohlical debate

that of the reactionary romantics lt coresPonded' however, with the latter when
the interpretation oI ihe history of Europe became the topic of a debate in which
historical arguments were Dsed to rcinforce current political ideas and ideals'
authom were already making a distuction between Wesi
anrl East European powers (Gollwitzer, P. 220)- One of them even speaks of a div
ision of Europe into 'ileux z6nes de sociabilit6', a westem one which is Iiberal and
an eastem one which is conservative- The distinction can be seen a,s one between

It is notabte that libeml

constitutional and absolutist forms of government This division of Europe which

exteniled wesh'r'artl beyond the Atlantic to take in the Republic of the United
conStates and eastward to include the empire of the despotic Tsar of Russia, was
siilered a new and fundameotal characterisLic of modem times (Gollwitzer' pp'
222'3). T\e contrast between East and West would continue to be vry poptlar
essay
when circumstances Save occasion for it to be utilized (see, in the following
World
War)
by Peter Bugge, the discussion of the Second
Among fie liberals the aulhor with the grcatest influence on the formation of the
(1'18'7 1814)'
historical foundations of the idea of Europe was Fratrgois Guizot
the
During the pedod of the restoration of ihe Bourbon monarchy, he was one of
at
the
Sorbonne'
History
Modem
leaders of the liberal oPPosition. As Professor of
origin and development of tte system of represen
he
vehemen y rejected by the suPporters of divine
Lati

to be restorcd to its old glorf.

mo

susPension

I
I
t

of dre old order

jnto decay
Clfistian civilization, which in tbe West has fallen

had been lifted by the university

I
I
I
t
I
I
I

71

70

I
I

authorities, Guizoi was able to recommence h$ lecturcs and began an turalysis of

tilc history of Europe ironr the fall of the llonrau lmpire to lhe FrencLr Revolulion
civiLization (whictr he also refers to
the Rornau Empire md the nse of C
pe suPeriol lo alt olhcr ( iv iTalion\
always dominated by a single princl
construction wbjch leads to tymnny, the characteristic featurc of Euopean civilEa

ilil|l

tion is Precisely that

The vrriety of eleme
basis for fhe iieedom
eh Europe, Rosarvallon (ed.), 1985,

ru

ilil

ffi

ilili

iill

iilt

annot

t"Ilir
P 77) With the fall of

the Roman Empue'

and
the establishment of lhe Clristian chNch led to a divorce betweer worldly
be
divorce
This
klown
never
had
civilizations
othcr
which
spiritual authority,
tweeo the world of deeds and the world of thought is, in Guizot's view' the tuntlarnental source of the faeedom of conscience for wluch so many struggles tuid so
oluch suffering had taken place in EuroPe afld which had only been victorious aL a
late stage, often against the wishcs of rhe clergy

Destnte h.is respect for lhe Ctrurch, ihe proteslant Guizot does not idealize the
Micldle Ages. LIe sees re Reformation of the sixtcenth cenlury as the rebellion ot'
thc human spirit against absolute authonty in the spiritMl freld Guizot considers
the Rcfomatron as ut'ilan de liberti' ('otrtb]otrst of liberty'; p 262) aDd as an
ellonnous step forward towards fteedom of thought and tlre emancipalion of llre
human spirit (p. 264)

Guizot also views the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England as an exkemely

positive factor in the development of liberal Europe. William of Orange, lhe leader
of lie protcslant (Dutch) republic, was a chief opponent of the absolute monarchy
ol L,ouis XIY a|d set himself up as the head of a Ewopean leagtie for religious
lrd civrl liecdoln (Rosanvallon, pp.284-5).

r1.n) ., lrrlrl

Alongsidc the libelal vtsjon of the historic l (lcvcloPnrcnt ol IiIo|e, il d()Di)cr rliL
vision of hislory came illlo exislence which, as in lllc caso Lil lhc roilcltolliu ics irrrrl
the liberals, was aLso closcly associatcd wllh cullenl Politic l lll(l soclill iLl(ils irnrl
ideals h 1848 lhe ycar oI revolulion$, vlsi()rrl\'res lurncd ilclivisls

Europe according to the democrats

was rn ihe 1840s that popular culture was recogmzed. Until the lhe v^st lower
layers o{ society had been rcgarded rs barbaric It was ta-lien for Eranted that Lhe
concept of civ ization was to be identified with tlle 6lite. Conxnentatofs' snch as
0re historian Micheleta , not only identilicd thernselves with lic vrctims and the
opfressed but also made the common peoPle the

It

rnary factor in lhe developmenl of civiliTationlargely io the context of lhe natlon. Tbe concept
had been almosl synonymous wrth Europe as a
with natlonal borders lluroPean civillzation wils subdivi.led inLo valious rational
cultures.

The increashrgly louder caLl lor an extension ol the right to vote aDd for socill refonn also had a lal8ely natiollal iiNncwork oI lctiJrence- Mary advocales of
demociacy hoped ior the elevation of the people on I niLdonal sc^le.

During the lirst hall of the nineteenlh century, national Dovernents had a
predomutantly rofilerttic bias WhiLe the rcactiolary rumanlicists glonficd the
Cafholc Mi.ldle Agps and praised dle union of [ilone and altar, the progressive
romanticists lound tlreir hspiratlon in the ideals of Lhc French Revolulion, idets
let loose by the French llevolutior. A good examPle is Giuseppe Mazzru
(1805 72), the chaltrpion of the ILalian ,4rsorg;men ro llis ideai was tllal of an jn
dependent (arti Habsburg), [bel{ (anti clerical) and classless (anti feudal) unitecl
Italy After the failure of the 1830 revolt, he lled to MarseiLles where he fomded
the Yourg Italy lvlovement ln 1834 he started an IntemahoDal of progressivc
oationalists iD Switzerland 'fbis Drovement, whicb took the nar\te younq Europe'
included such Sroups as fornS Gernnny, Yttung Polattd and Youn1 ltdb'. Lrke \e
Jacobins of the French Revol tion, thcy believed in u versal h0nian rights and
the equality and lialemity of aLl peoples ([listoire tle I'Europe, p.325, cJGollwilzer, pp. 304 5)

Power, evlrlr that of democracy, needs to be kcPt

witlrin bounds. F-reedom, which forms the esselce of European civilization, is the
result of its plurifonnity, which mDst be guararteed

l''l

Cirizot's vision of re development of EDrope became the stardard view in liheral

circles, not only in Fraflce but also elsewhere, in particular in England lt was not
olrly a lucid analysis of the blstory of EuroPe, but also one that could be use(l to
rcinforce the politlcal demands of the liberals in the struggle againsl the alliance of

We have already noted (see above) thlt tle national awareness and ideals of cos'
rnopolitanism of the laLe eightec fh cerLu.y revolutionary mentality seemed to
leave hardly any roon1 lbr the idea of Etuope It is rem.rkablc, lherefore. lhat haLI
a cenfury later the concept of liurope has d very prominent Positjon io rhe meli-

lhroDc and altar.

Thc rcvolution of 1830 rn Paris meant the eild of ihe ulira-royalisf regime of lhe
Rorrrhons and established lhe constituiional C)rl6anist monilrchy, in which Guizot
played a key role as chief miflister Events seemed to justify the liberal vrsion of
72

rrr

'fire nrcreasing denuutl lor JcnrocLacy and lor soci'l 'clomrs to hvr)rrr rh': b'{)r'l
Lower classes ol die poP lalior wetc also reurlbrccct l)v ctrlliog oIr Iiist(nv

'l'lrc i(lc^s of lhe Eulighlcnmc t ill lhe eighteenth century are also seen by Gulzot
ls progress, as a stage iD the liberalion of the human spirit. Neveflheless' he also
poirlts ottt lrow, ciuring the French Revolution, the absolute rule of radical ideas.
wiLhout account being late of other rights, made it possible for tyrarury to anse
Qlosanvallon, pp. 300 3).

In lus opinion everl human

ll

ll.c.-lr 4l Iln lrLcr:rl', gr.w uf

to

alion'

fltft

il

the (leleloplrerll ol Europc, bul in tilc late 1340s powerttrl clernocl-alic movements'

I
'

lrles Michelet (1798 1874) at one Iilne collaboratcd tnth Clujzot at ttre Sorbc'rne His
LlLnoire
worts were his monxrten(al llistoire de ltraNe (2,1 vols, 1833 57)
^t\d
tc la Rirolution (1 voLs, 18,17 53)
grcatesr

73

tllily of lhorclolutionarjcsoflS'18'lircliberaliorlofthecitizcflisLotakeP]ace.
withir lbD rri(xr rn(l vast layers of the populatiol are to ta](e part fu the national
c'rltLlle: lhe couotLf should reconcilc the socjal classes with olle anodlel
Srrbscqucnlly, ho\tovcr, lhcsc rcbom natiolls should becDme

parl of the brother

hootl of Europcur ircoPles.

Demofiats therefbre see Europe llot as a baiadcc of powers accordmg to the views
of political realism, but as a lederatior of nations: there wes no piace for haUed
among the irdividral ratioDs, the oliiNate ain bcirg liaterl1ization. Micllclet evcr
went as far as to describe lhlj lelationship beLween liFnce and its major rival,
deux llectrialts, posittre et nigative' ('lwo
sitivc and rlcgatLve'), which sltoulcl not be
was to bc rnade (Michelet' le Peuple; it

Europe in the griq of nationalism

(184F4914)
Barricades
The 18.18 revolution sent a treme doos shockwavc through Europe
calitals'
in
lniiny
simultaneously
werc thrown up aknost

ffi

]Ii.otaz.q 1962, p.224).

Ulliler the inJluence of democratic ideals, an illportant change took Place iD lhe
historical perspechve of the i.l
century, the oriSin of EurcPe w
Fmpire. 'lhe eslablishment oI
considered to nark the starting

enth

wns

only

n
the nileteenth ccntury
The era of romantic idealism was over' The second half of

*^]l
civilization Grote' who had bccn a Member of Parliamenl
of widespreail deflocIatizalion' was the lirst to point out
the politicaL sig ilicance of Athens as lhe cradle of democracy
It is tfle rhat Greok civilLzalion had bcen hailed for |l lon8 time as tlre mothe' olthe cradle of EuroPean
and a fe(ent a(lvocote

movements 2lso
ao.t,inot"a by political realism The national liberalion

ccasell clreaning turd started to adoPl a pragmatic aPProach

ffi
few years.

ffi

civiliza
nish the revolutionary appodl ol the collcelt of lbe history of a !'uropearl
in
Rorne
lhan
tion, with its ealliest roots in Alhens ralher

ffi

indicator'
We have come full circle Eulope iniLrally no more lhan a geographic
after
Centunes
warsthe
Persian
of
co[tert
the
in
lieedom
was lirst idcntified with
ilis identificatio had clisappeaLetl. it was replaced by the identi{ication of Europe
with Cluistendom tul(l strbsequently, in lhe erghtccnth century' with civilizatlon'

ffi

More rhan ever before, Utuo

ihe unification of Italy and
nations wiihin Europe and
which the idea of belongirg
grould.
Greek liberty ihe menorable slatlilrg poinL of luroPe
74

ffi

alism lt was nol only

among the indivi'irral
created a climale in
pushed into the hack

itil

ritfll

t:ssay I

Europc ro tv t4: ne ma4ntg

of rlational lnificrtion extended beyond ltaly aDd Cerrnany;

pcoplc livirg bolh in rural commudties and in cities in old Political lations slr'h
'I hc vrgorous process
as

ltrnce, Ilngland and the Nethcrlands were tumed irlto ationid citizens honl thc
half of 1be nineteenth century onwards. The entire educational system.

si:concl

lrorn prirnary school to rnivcrsiry, was stimulated and influenced by nation

ililr

fl
ffi

l)uilcling. Historical education ptayed arl important role in this process The srudy
of history had expanded enonDously during the nineteenth century atrd was now
being greatly encouraged arld filunced by national govemmelts Historiography
of
ancl ihe teaching of hisrory were given a lational resonance in the countries
Europe, whicb they still retain, Reflecting on the past was inseparable from lhe
perv;ive process of nation-buildilg. Ilistoriography became a kind of national
gerealogy, with cootemporarJ Politics as the starting point and the history of literature and art being viewed thJough the nineteenth century nationallst looking-glass-

l'he penod between 1871 and 1914 was one of amed peace The issue of

Alsacc Lorrame prevented a good rclattonshrp developing between Fmnce and

Germany. At the begiffring of the twenlieth century' we even see dre emelgence of
a trxe clrns race, fuelled by the aggessive loreign policy of the Gennan Empire
I this slrained natio[alistic cllmate, it seerned as if many were consciously airn

ing at a grcat European war.

ffi

ffi

flil

ffin

ffiil

ill

I'olitical tlrought, donrtnated by national self-interest, could be very cymcal about

Europe, This is ilhstlated by Bismarck's statement that to lim' the Chzurcellor of
the newly-established Gelmiin Empire, Euope was merely a geographlcal ex_

pIession And when Bismarck, having explained Prussian plans to r English ^m

bassador, was told that'Europe would Dot allow it" he replied with the question
'Who is Europe?' (Gollwitzer, p. 340). In 1876, Bismarck wrote that he continually
hcard the wor.j Europe being used by pohticians to dmand something from other
(Gollwrueq p 447)
lxrwcrs which thcy were alraid lo ask tbr on their own behalf

'lhis rr^n, who had cnforced Gennan unification,

was not concemed with Europe.

(;ofllriur uDillcatron was-brought about against the wishes of the olher European
'As Europeans we were al
l)r)wers Iror cerllurics, Europe had ignored Germalry.
'but as Germam we
otheIs',
said
Bismarck,
work
for
do
thc
donkey
wnys dlaLlc to
lrrvc llo rlcnlrnr ul pl:ryirrg tJlis role.

There wcrc, of coulse, allemative voices to those proponents of,RedlPolirit Evcn

ill Gcmrdoy, therc were those who remembered what Lnmanuel Ka[i had written
lls early as l?95 in a theoretical lrealise ertitled Zum Ewigen Frieden (Towards
Etemal Pcace). h this trcatise, he stressed thc lleed for the creatioD of a league of
nalions alld sketched a federal Europe (Gollwltzer, p 90, Denis de Rougemont,
L'Europe, inrention culturelle, Histary of Europeon ldeat 1 (1980) 33). Kanl
argued that from the point of view of Reason there was no ottror way to legalize

,l

the rclatronship between states than tlnough the creation of a comrnulily ol

peoples (in tbe same way as indivlduals have to abandoll lotAl frecdorn, which
leads to ?uurchy, and obey certain rules)

1li

'l'he creation of a 'United States of Europe' was propagate(l with cnthusi?rslic l"r
ln I848, but such ideas were votced even m ch later' for exarllP]c whcn lhc I'olislr

il

Fssay

f.ur()Pe to 1911: the n)ahtng at an toea

revoll was crushed by the l{ussiarrs l| 1863 a]1d when the Solbians rose against
'Iurkish domination in 1876 The laller bloody event prompted Mctor Hugo to trrguc once nrorc in l'avour of the nccessity ol creating a Eur-oPcan lederation, 'on
*tri.tr n.....iry all phiLosophers agroe' The acts ol cixelty cor nitte(l in Scrtrir
prove thal Europe needs'Llne nationalit6 europdene, un gollvememelrl unl' trll lrllme se arbiftage frltemal, la a]6nlocratie en paix avec ellg-m6nlc.. ' ( li llnropejln
nationality, onited govemrnenl, grcal frirtemal arbilratlon democmcy llt Pcacc
with ltself') And Victor Hugo woqtd nof have been a true Frclchnral] lf he had
not slrggested Paris as the caP-li\I (Hisloire tle L Durope' Caq)cn{ier dnd Lebrulr
(eds), 1990,

pp

363-64)

'lhcre were other pleas like VicLor lluSo's. but dley had little el'fecL on Eurolean
polltics. I-eading politlcians considered theD unrcalistic iclens lroln fhe past, ong_
inating fro tirir naive jdeaLism ol 1848. Thal lhese idea's of a United States of
Europe, however old-fashiolred, would become very ]elcvant agdn r tlre t\'cnti
eth oentury. alter the horrols o[ two wol]d wara, could noL be lLnlicipated- DururB
the heyday of lralionlr.hs r, lberc lvls rlo r(x)r]] for supranltional organizalidlshis did rlot mean, ol'coursc, that Europee s lircked sell-conndelrce as EuropearsIl is rema-rkablc that in Gerrnimy, France, Iingland, Iraly, and elsewhere, therc ex
iste(l a decp rooted awareness of one's owll Ilation sh4ring a vague but comD)oll
Ijurcpcan destiny. Even tite ruost ardelt nationalistic polemics contained an el
cnlent o[ what one rnight call a 'EuroPean sous-cniendu' (ilnPlicit un.lerstandiLg
about Durolc): the idea that the lllropcal nrtions had in conmor their superionty
over non-E ropean naliorls PIovlcled the irnpetus for thcit rapi(l cxpitnsion olltsrde

"l

rope.

This leads to tho paradoxical conclusion fhat tht] era ol dsiDg Dationalism rs also
thc hrne oI boundless beliel in Eur'opeau sLrPrcililcy aLnd unlirniled Europcan self_
conndence lt was the Fra of ulprccedenled Europcan expansion. Progress calne Lo
be regarded as almost syronymous wjth E roPean civilizatioll lhe rdca was
widely held that the hisLory of tlre world had rcached it-\ highcsl level ol dcvelopnlnt ir1 EuropeDll civillzation- ErlroPeans were to lc^d the way clscwhcre as rhc
worid movecl lowilrds progrcss and crvrlizatiolt.
Europe's self-co {kleocc flourished, however, the secret underflining of
cultural assuledoess had begun Both wlltlin and outsjde EuroPe, new civllizations
were discovered. We have already iroted the emergence of Popular cultLlre in
Europe during the 1840s. Ar the encl of thc nincteendr centllry, non-Ifurope^n
peoples became lhe object ol exterNivc cthnographic studies, wlich accomPaoied
t}Ie colorization process 'l hese peoples also apPeared 1(] Posscss civilizalion m

wlile

some lbrm or other.

At the begiruing oi thc nineleendr cenLrtry it was higitly untlsual lo use the plural
fomr o[ the tenn 'civilizatiorl' Durmg the sccond haif of the nheieeDlLl ceDtrry,
liowcyer, Ihe rllor,rls aid cusfoms o['prinitive' peolles also came to bc worthy of
the name cllt re. Besides Eur-opcan civilizatior, lhere ts a Ptimitive Cultt.[e,
whrch is also the title of Edward B. Nlor's Lamous antJrropological work. II mllst
bc ldrnitted, though, thrt i the EngLand oI 1871 lli! was still regarded as inl u u.sual application

of the word culnrre. Cullural relativism was

abseDt

ilr'lylor's

work an(l he rcmalled faitlful to the idea of progress and EuroPean civilization.
'lb hull and rnost other ethnologists, etluology was a sciencc which sened the la_
horious, but nccessary and steady elevahon oi primitive peoples towards the blessings of European civilization. (E.B Ty1or, Prinitive Culture, Researches into the
derelopment of mythology, phiLosophJ, religion, drt and cuslom,2 vols London
1871) CI J. Leopold, Culturc in comparative and evolutionary perspect^)e: E.B
'Iilor and the makinS of primitive culnzre (Berlin, 1980).

It

was not until the Great War

of

1914, however, that the simple equation of

Europe and .ivilLation ceased lo exrsl as a domrnant idea. The awareness oI crisis
was all-pervasive. even in ihose countries not directly involved in the war. Could
anybody be so insare as to still believe in uninterupted prcgress and the values of
so called civilizaiion after the hell of Verdtn? A sense of doom Prvaded Europe.
Europe was associated with degeneration arld decline. Yel even this feli]rg of de_
spair, that touched so maly, was a form of European self-awareness.

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ffi

ffi

ffinl

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fI

D. Tjeenk

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(cd$

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les

tueurs et l'esprit Lles natioils,

l-

Bildttng',

RAUMER,

r(UR]'voN (1953) Eu'iScr Fr*tle: Friedensrufe un,l Frieden.rp[ine seit

(1953) 'Die Hell'.xnll der \A/or1e und Bcgriffe Kultur, ZviLlsatloll,

e

nndri.s c h' R o m ani J c h e M o ndl.t c hr tft, ytyt

83

-7.

enais sdnc e, F tetburg,MuDcheo.

I w

(ed) (1936) OroslLls: (c417

Eng. traN by Kr[g Alfrcd

llBBoul., P.

(ed

) (1966)

^r,

alhateaubriaod:

Llistotidc

Girtit

LldNersus pdganos,

dt,r

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SANFORD,

EM

Pdgans, yo]i

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The

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) (1966)-

Er.rdi sLr

RAUHLIT,

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BO

) (1962)

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Pans. Gamier

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(ed

llanburg

see KTUCKHOHN,

d.e

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(1906)
des
europdischen Gleichgewichlt in der pub'
Dre [dee
KAIlEllR, E.
tizistische Litemtur vom l6 bd zltr Mitte des l8 Jahrhunrierts, Betltn
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rIoFMEIsrER,

civitatib

tt

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HIPPOCRATFIi see: TOYNBEE, A.

Alexis de Tocqneville: I) Ancien Rlgimc

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an idea,Ednbutgh. Editburgil

JosEPHUs seer THACKERAY, 11. sTJ.

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H. (1951) 'ZL( Wortegeschichte und

L,lchtdruk

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M[.LER,

GOLLWITZER,

taea

Paris, Galhmard

Garnier Flammarion.

ffi

(lsl edn Duisburg, 1554): Facsinile

MliRcAfoR, Eurtpa

MEYER, J. r'. (1952) (ed.)

StePlzen, Lomlon

L!/opc Io 1914: tl)e ft'akng oI an

vol V Shrttga , Mctzler

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sn.r(iMAN, rj. r(.
^.
I-ortdon.
ol rtu Weatrh o/ Natrr,'rrr,
sMrIH. A])AM scc: SELTGMAN, F- r{ A (cd.) (19a7)

souTnElr.\, R. w. (1q53) The Making oI the Mildk: Ages, London, Hutchinson

STUBBS, w. (erl.) (1889) Willelmi MaLmesbiriellsis Manarchi De Gestit llegum
Anglorum Libri Quinque, voJ 11, London.
THACKEITAY, II. sT r. (trans ) (19-10; i973 edn) Josephus: Jewish Annquities Book
l-lV, Cambridge, Mass.A-ondon, The Loeb Clxssical Lrbrary
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IOYNBEE, A- J. (ed., kans ) (1924) llippocrates: 'Influences of allnosPhere, water
Greek historical LhouBht ftram lTomer to the dg,e of
and situation', Chapter 16
Beacon
Presserac
liLts,
Lol.donffarorto,
II

it

TyLoR, E- B (18'71) Pritnittre Culture, Ilere,rrchts into the Development o.f

Mytholoey, Philosophl, Religion, Art dnd Custonl,2 vols, London
VIVES, JOANNIS LIJDI]VICI (1964 edn) r lluntpru tlis.ridiis et bel[o Turcico dilllo
gus fL526l, rD, Operd onni,1, tomus 6 (Valentrae, 1734), pp 452481; also in
Obt a,:t Completds

II (Madrid,

1948)

VOLIAIRE see: POMEAU, R. (ed ). (1963)V0LTAIRE: see ADAIVI A. (ed.) (1966)

w,\rrEll, ci. (ed.) (1963-64) Napoleon. Lc ninotial de Sdinte

Las Cascs, Puis, Gallrrnard

llitine lPdrl l)r

Essay 2
The nation suqreme
The idea of EuroPe
1914-1945

Li

ll

Prepared for the Course Tebm by Peter Bugge

Senior Research Fellow, Slavisk lnstitut, Aarhus
Universitet

ffi

lntroduction
lh
Professor den Boer demonstrated in the first essay how, from the late eiglrtee
a
nowas
de"J
It
of
in
the
shape
emerged
of
Europc
century onwards, a notion

tion that consistcd ol a pturality of conllichng interpretations of Europe,

drawing on a specific set of historical references'

each

'Europe' has proved to be a highly potent' if imprecise, political concept heocc

I
I
t

the ftequent aftempts at definition:

. Who belongs to Europe and who can be excluded?

. Wich values are genuinely (and uniquely) European?
. Is therc a threat towards Europe and where does lhe threat come frorn -

m
fiorn

within or lrom without,

such questiom have immediate political consequences rnd
the inteQretation of the term 'Europe' has ben so disputed
why
to
cxplajn
begir

All rhe answers to

So, one must be
somewhere , fron].
the eye of the be
Gelman or Russi

ffi
ffi

ffi
so are ttref perceptions of Europe itself
have just drawn a ilistinction between
Ettrope ard this will shaPe tbe argumer)t
Lwopel ntean how Europe is scen, how

82

afud

projects fL'r

R'J perceptions

of

and analysed And

Essay

The nation supretne:lhe

ilea ol EL Upc 19l

Essay

1915

silce !!e resldct ourselves to discllssing how llulo|e ns lheolsclvcs have looked at
l]urope, I coukl also say Lhat thc irnagc covers a liuropcalr se]l underslanding, ol

growiig

t-.orlrasl, Praiects for Europe is meant to covel Polilical manifestations of l'eel_

ings of unity and plans for the orgaruzafion of the contioent Of course, no clear_
cut boundaries between the two concepts can be found- Alt projects are nou-rished
by perceptions of Europe and these percePhons again, at least implioitly, contain

suggcstlons

for change.'

ffiil

ffi

ffi

iltr

ilffir

ii
li

luxLuies as oledical care,

loverty ot the proletiuian

ilr

rnasses r-enralned

in-

ma11y

symparhedc illtellecruals could cven see a 'new Proletarjalr Europcan Lype' en]erge
in the discrpliled workel orgalized in the ]Ion-naiiondisl, all-Europea Seconrl

Lllemational.
man lookdcl pla[sib]e: newspapers, tclcBrePhi, trains aDd
tr^vel brought people closer'lo cach othct arrd the worLd almost visibly seemed to
shrink. Stetar Zweig givcs ar excellenl descnption of the infellcctual nlood:

,{ new brotherirood of

as

if

lrinnrphs of our lectutlcs, our science, a Europeen cornmunity spirit, a

European national consciousness wars coming lnlo being. How useless,
we said to ourselves, are fiontiers when any plale cim fly over them
with ease, how provincial and artiiicial ltre custon$ duties, gualds ard
bordcr patrols, how incong ous in the spirit of these tirnes wbich
visibly seeks Lroity and world brotherhood! This soaring o[ our feelings
was no less wondedul than lhat of the planes, and I pity those who
wclc [ot young dudng tlose ll6t yea$ of conlide ce ru Europe.

The nation supreme:

the idea of EuroPe 191/+-1945

(Zwcig, 1943a, pp- 1534)

Lr my searcll for the idea of Europe in ihe three decades ftom the outbreak of one

disastrous European conflict to the eld of anoiher I wilt drvide my argxment in

two: frrst some projects for Europe la\inchetJ berween 1914 and 1945 are discussed to see how people souglrl fo counter the perils of two great wars arrd an
unstable peace. However, without a deeper knowledge ol lhe eta's perceplions of
IiurcPe, i e. rhe way people looked at Ewope, its treDds of development, its state
of hcalth, and lts relations to the sutrounding world, we car only 8et a supetfcial
u (brstirnding of these projccts and their ongitrs and scope This complex a]rd
()llc c(nrlr a(lic{ory pattem of Pelceptions is reated in ihe second half of tlte essay'
Itul, L)clinc this, I wlll briefly present some preconditions of the pre-war era and
grvc a sh(xl srormigy of re historical setting, which shaped the era's nofions of
lirro1rc.

To many post wat observers, the last decades before tie outbreal of war in 1914
looked like a haven of innocence. These years have been described as a golden
era: 'obvionsly tie happiest time in the development of the European society'
(KrejEi, 1931, p 214)- There is dfinitely more than a tinge of rostalgia in such
staternents, bnt the conlrast in atrnospherc before and after the war must have been
huge At thc tum of the century, a feeling of oplimism and firm belief ir progrcss
seems to have prcvailed in most European counries: impresswe technological ancl
scientific advances allowed for a huge overall increase in wealth, which gave lhe

tw
Europahild
approxinately from

'

'Ihe use of the

l)eL.deen

lo eoloy s[ch

In \tenoa we shoutcd wilh joy when 816 ot flew over thc Channei
he had bec| our o\an hero; becausc of our pride jn the successtvc

The end of innocence?

rffi

chiulce

Euope 1911-1945

counties sociat legislation bad been adoPled and ,rs the social
dcrnocratrc pades tume.i 'refomisa and were lolerated in the poliLrcal syslem,

tr
ffi

The nalio] suprettie: tlle iclea at

^
bathrooms. and lelephones The
rnense, Lrut

It\

iddlc classes

'idea of Europe'

inspired bv Heinz G

p
while

(Gollwitzer, 196'1,

lstes

e of Europe"

es

However, tbis was oDly half fie lruth. Thc process oI tapid rndustnalizatron,
whicb revolunonied all aspec$ of liie m thc nineteenlh century, helped both lo
create and to dcstroy a feeliog of 'European ness'. It fostered rf tfuougb soch
things as compulsorJ schooling irnd inrproved communications, which gavc increasilg nurnbers of pl]oplc a rudlmentarJ knowledge oi Europe geography and
politlcs It also helped to undennile it because, as r.vc have seen in Pim den Boer's
essay, lndustnalizatid[ was bouud up with the process of nation building and
this drd Dor lead to European soli(Lrity but t.i a lierce lationalism, replacirLg lhe
castnopalitdnism of elrlier ccnturics.

Politically, these lrends expressed themselves across Europe in a vociferous

nationalislic jingoism al home and a Flthless imperialist racc abroad; the new
Entoperlt internationalism of lhe liLreral intellec$als or socialist workers was in
fact the privilege of a minodty- Politically (.!rd partly also DtellectualLy) thc seose
oI Europe as a unity became eroded. Bismarck precisely described thlr situaLiun
when, in 1876, he dryly rcnrarked'Qui parle Europe e tofi' ('Who talks about
Eurcrpe is wrong'- cluoted fron Barraclough, 1963, p. 33)
Pim den Boer has well descnbed the paradoxical link between dsing Dationalisnl
and unlimited European self-conRdeDce ln spite of the growurg number of warn
mg voices, we may accept thc tlrnn 'innocence' as representrng a situation where
lew people could (oresee the devastaling consequences of the slumbering forces lr
society, once the war came. These colltGdictions arc summed rqr by Henrl Cord
Meyer:

chas of the First World War rvas

h wrs thirt grcat El]roDceo era, so

The age Lhal disappeared into the

golclen linereenlh century

the

irttlll;rli(nllrlrsl irr sIrri1, tlrslrilc {ll(r llt0k of iDtcmilhotlal organizauon In

lhrs hifly Lrlx)ch, irs it llllurLs to rrs irr rchosPecl, thc intellectud'
cultL(al, irnd matcrirll l)rogrcss colnbilled witll an trnosllal diversiled
balance o1'diplornatic s!rcngth _ Lrlitrclcd rnost lne o[ Lbe cenury to the
1irll ethicat ancl practical d^ngcrs to Western Crvilizatio)] of rcliaflce

'l'rue,
upon Lhe cirLt of naked lorce in inlcrnationll relations.
nineteenth cenfury colsti(utionalism and respcct lor thc law appeajed to
contribute aLl elleclivc salegLrard of lntemlL ]ihefiy and secudty Yet, if
tlre inlemaiiotral systetD \{as exposed lo the caprice of fbrcc' intemal
ecoDomic and political secudly was nre!itablY ieoprrdized

(Meyer, 1955, p.336)

'lielly was lhnost uliibntrly fslt as il gteat inj stice in Germrny and its re
visio hecirnle a rnaior polilical obieclive atl tluougtr the inter_war periocl
The rcstoration of Poiand was part of a national reconstruction ol turope'
which took placc in the name of lhe Wilsonia[ principtes of nationa] self
.letemrination- A whole number of small lalion states were creatd on the
ruins of the Tsnrist and the Hapsburg Empircs; but, o[tcn' thefu borders were
ihawn to weaken the losers Gemany, Hungary, tuld Austaia rather than to
satrsfy ethnic cnteria. In faci, the establishment of a smallr Austria was a se
lire violatioD of the principle of nltiodal self-determination since an over
\ahelming part of the cottnlry's population preferred an Anrcihrsr (co rection)

'ri

with Germany.

Europe 1914-'1945: some historv

What started iD I914 as a tradilional Er.riopeau war turncd into long years of iritherto unseer m^ss deslftctjon and depivation. Ii ended in 1918 in revolutionery
upheaval, tullnoil ald chaos, which also ]eft the EuroPctui sel[_consciousness in
the meantime ilie war had becorne a wolld war zmd' ot accide tauy, the
two most spectaculaa leace plans werc launched fuom outside the ttadiiional
Eurcpeau centre: by Lenin's Bolsheviks alld by tlle American president Woodrow

mins.

Il

Wilson (185G.1924).
The intervenLion o[ the USA o the side of fle Allics had a dccisrve iln|act on the
war and demonstraled that the old Duropean era was grlduaLly giving way lo a
new Westem oI Atlantic one- Aiso, Wilson introduced a new elemenl in worlLl
polihcs: politics bascd on mor-al pdnciPlcs, raiher than on lraditional powci To
irini, the goal oI the war w^s rrot so much b deieat Gennany as to iDal the
'lbis was most
world safe lor clemocracy', i c to orelte a new' jusi, workl order'
proloundly exFessed ill Wiison's idealistic 'lourteen poirrts' speech to Congress
ol 8 lonuoty 1918, which demanded the greatest possible autonomy lor tle peoples oI Europe and the ccssion of Gc ran colonies il Aliica IIcc trade and d;c
arnament ancl fiDally tlic creation of ^ I eague ry' Ndlionr to ])lotect the liberly of
all alioDs alrd to secure world pcacc lhough based irl Geneva and heavily domi
at a
Dated by the European powers, the Lel8ue of Natio s represe ted xn attemPt
I
Jrad
The
l'eague
soLution
Etuopean
a
specifically
than
orcler
tather
global peace
iertain modesi success during the lg20s, but as intemdiional confficts got tougher
in the mid-1930s its impotence becarne obvious And lrom the very beginning it
the
w^s a severe blow 10 WilsoD ard the League that the USA refused lo ratify
covenarlt. lnsicad the USA withdrcw into isolalionism for two decades
'l'lro Covenant o[ ihe l,caglre oi Natiolls was Pan oI the Versailles lieaty, bui ur
spite of tLre rbetorjc the Peace featy was wrllten more in t]re tradltronal spirit
nl *inn"rs nnd losels tlnn in the spirit of idealtsm Bntain aDd Fr:artce insisied
ol
oo inposrng veLl harsl conclitions on the beaten encN) wiih the Purpose
re_
tbc
whole
givetl
wirs
Cermany
*"ot"uing C",-ouy :rs rnuctr as Posslblesponsibility for tLle war, and the counlrl had to accept to Pay enonnoLrs relAr
tu th" victorious powers. lirlrthermolc, bits of whaL had lraditioDally beetr
"iiou,
regarded as Gcrman te[itory hacl to be ceded io Po]and and severe restriclioos

*J.e p.'t on the size oi lhe (;erman amly Not sutPrisirgly. the
86

Versailles

'lhe jrnmediate resDli of bo r rhe war alld the following peacc treary was courplete
years fle
chaos in Gcrmany and most of the newly established countries For four
lrench rernained intransrgent io their demands for repararions alfiough it was oll
vious that a Germany ridden by hyperinflation and extreme Political instability
could not possibly pay. ln Jmuary 1923 French lroops cven occupied thc Ruhr
Basin, butlt was an opcrarion from which they reaped nothi-ng positive

Ilut

new factor grldualty dernonstrated' even to traditlonal nationalists, th?lt

Germany couLd rtot forever be feated as an enemy. As the tsolsheviks in Rossir

managed to stabiliT-c their regime (in spite of not achieving world rcvolution) a
elemelt wts brought into the European rcality: instead of war berween the

new

nations, the Bolsheviks called for a class war in every counry, ald so dre rnete
existe ce of tie Soviet state became a direct challenge to liberal denocrats ilnd k'
nationalisls of all kinds.
2
Conmrunism prcsenlcd rtself as a modern phelomenon' an ideology that offercd
prescription for lhe futurc The sarne is txe for Fascism, the most mdical anli
bohhwik movernent bom after fhe war- Fascists in ltaly and elsewhere' aud later
Neiional Socialists in Gelmany, colNidered lhemselves to be the most efficienl

'nd

expression

of

nytllical will oI fie People

ffi

I
t

t
ffi

n
ffi

ilffi

as'The EuroPearr Civil War 1917 1945''

ilil

ruPet'te

w'

ntc 'eaa

'-utaPc

tJt+-tJ+J

A civ;l war with Europear implications (lhough fL,ught rnore io the ramc of ideol
ogics than in the anle of EuroPe) did tzke Place lr Spairl 1936-1939 All lhu
SoYlet Union and Nazi Gemany gave
aclivc supporl to the Republican and !'ascist causes respectively' but the liberal
clemocracres refused to help tlre Republican government in Madnd and, accord
ingly, were accused by pro-Republican activists of indirectly supPorling Franco
maJor E[ropean powers were involved.

fhe

The end result was a complete victory for Franco.

I
flilil

fr
ffi

tffi

Septernber 1939 a new European war broke out when Hiller attacked Polturd
slral:lge rapprochmeta between Gennaiy llnd
^
tlre Soviet Udo , as Molotov and Ribbentrop in August 1939 signcd a treaty of
nofl-aggression, which secret]y divided Poland and the rcst of edst-central Europe
inlo 'spheaes of influence' and paved the way for Hitler's war. In spite of fierce
British resistarce it looked as if Iltler was close 10 complete victory' but his a-s
sault on the Soviet Union in June 1941 proved less successful ihan filst expecled
The Brirish-soviet alliance that ensued was reinforced by the USA a{ter the
Japanesc attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941. Once agarn Europe ha(l1o
rcly on outside forces until American and Soviet soldiN $hook hands in Berlin
(May 1945), thereby signalling the complete defeat of Nazi Germaly and dre enrl
of the Fascist epoch. ranco's rcgimc persisted rn Spain rntll his death io 1975'
but it became incEasinlly obvious ttrat its survival was an anachronism, and thc
same might be sard of Salazalr's Fascist regime in Portugal, w]rlch cmmbled after
his retirement in 1968.)

This move had been preceded by

boca ie Lnmrensely poPtrldr, and a r^cisr in

rerpretatlon of the war as a conllicl beLrveerl primiLivc Slavs and supeior Cer$'dls

'cho s c'f hate atsaust lingla d')

'llic Gcrnla s wcrc llol ltlollc in thcse

was used rll lhe laolaganda againsL Russia.
Iecile alenllnctatiotls ofthe elrellly: the llrllLsli ftrr cxirrnpl: wr:ro cxhorlcd trr liglll
agarnst 'tire IIuns'
'lhc /)'ol'i'r
This led to dle near colhpse ol lwo netwotks ol I'lulopeilrr soli(lilrily
wr ilcrs lrrrrl
ttxr
rlarry
as
all
prolourlllly
shxk$l
was
hoot) of European irtellectlals
(Jr
arhsts tried to exoeecl eaiih ollrcr 1n PitLriotislrl Aplrcals lror lhri l;w lrrrnlortrtcs
Ic rcttivul
pacifists who rernained toyal to the ideals ot 1'
yll o'rly Io
wrlh suspicloo xlrd ilcoNprehensroD. TlLc noti
lhc lircIlch
in
rcu
even
was
widesproad
one's fatherland
writcr Ronrain Rolland (1866-1944) pLrblished his pacifisl articlc,4lr t[es"-ur lt lrt
n?ilde ('above the cotflict') in 1915 he was condemncd as a tuaikt not oI y Lly
of{icial France, but also by oonserva.tive newspapcrs in neulral DenlDark (Boll
Johansen, 1988,

Also .roc,.rlirr

p.

162).

ernaLiar,rtlisnt as explessed

in the

Second

Inlenational quickly

evaporated as the ParliamenLary Social Demouatic parties all voted for wm Sorne
socialists, especrally in the shong Ge[nan and Auskian pafiies, even saw lhe wiu
l$ a short cut lo soclalism since wartime economy would require strong state plan
corld be jusiilied ar
Diog and cootrol And so the war aod a Gema. victory
an histolically progressive and necessary step towards the desired goal' In tlre first
years of the war, socialist opposilion to it was uNignificant.

on and lhe senseless horrcrs of battles such as VerduD piled up,

the lteling becanre widespread that something more than a traditional war between
states was laking place. The Deed for a global irlteryretation grew and, for insrance, ihe question of 8ui1l was rntcnsively discussed on all sides' although few
sdll denied sovereign statcs the riBht fo prolect their iDtercsts by lluhtary neaos
(Nolte, 1991, p. l)41 Tlre ALlies were unifonnly oonvi]rced Lhal Gcrnuny bore re
wholc responsibility for the war; accordmgly they tended to intelPtet the war as
As- tbe war went

lilH

ilffi

iil

Projects for Europe

Wc can now tu lo some of lhe most imPo.talt projects for Europe launched nl
this period. First, I will discuss re scope of two conflicLing plans for Europe proposc.d drring the First Workl War. Then I will consider several proposals, made in
rhe relatively stable ieriod of the mid-1920s aJter the initial post war chaos, for a
united denrocratic Europe. However, Fascism and Naztsm posed a formidable challelge to democratic forces io Europe, so it will also be necessary to discuss
the solutiors to the Ertropan 'menace' offered by these ideologies as well as the
oppositiol and resistance to them, both be{ore and during the Second World Wru.

flffi

The effects of the Great War

il
I

1l

flt

'Ihe First World War sent m lioos of young men to their slaughter; but io ad
dition, on the home fronts, the whole populahons of the walriug counkies were
mobifzed and involved to a degree hithefio ulknown
This had sevcre ideological repercussioDs. The values of nineteendl century liber
isrn were swep! aside ds war hysteria SnPped lhe combatants. Nationalists saw
in lhe war al opportunity to purify the nation and to fnd a new spiritual commun1ly above thc hite and petty conflicts of everyday ]ife. National self worship and
the call for uiity Led to demands for disoipline ald stro[8 men-'Ihe enemy was
srneared in every possible way: in Germaly, a 'Hassgesang gegen England' (i.e.,
BB

conflict belweerr civilized dernocracies and barbalous Prussian militerism Lt

Gemalry the spechxl1l of opinion was wider', rangrrtg from Lruly i Peria]ist calls
for a lotal German vjctory, which would secure lhc country its riShtlul place r tbe
sun, to interpretalio s ol the war as ir deloncc ol (iennal ldcntily lgainst tl]e threat
liom Brilish capitrlisL utilitarianism
debatable wheLher any'lrue'E aoPeanisrn was at alL possilrle u dcl these
cjrcurnstances Jean Bapliste Durosellc simply slates that 'De 1914 n 1918, rl
n'y a plus d'Eruope' ('From 1914 to 1918. there was no Europe'; DLuoselle,
1965, p. 261) and sklps the war years compLeLely. Ilowcver, I will present iwo
programmes lbr a new Europe one lron each side of fie front line wlich,
in spite of thou obvious bias aDd po[ucal utilita-rianism, bofh contain an eicrnent
of idealism that al least pertially karscencls lhe lalTow naLionaL interests of dleir
proponenfs. Bolh foc s p marily on cerfal Europe xnd, in spite of thc politiodl
obsoleteness and oblivion to which Lhey weLe soon cxposed, they have retained
Lhell ideological releviurce: tle two Posillons rcappeared with lrew strenglh
seven decacles later in the Lvely dcbalc of the 1980s on Cenlral Europe (see Ole

It is

Wrvcr 's fbLloving essay).

'Ihe 'war's economic prison' mentioned is the economic blockade upheld by thc

Friedrich Naumann's' Mifteleuropa'

Iiieclrich NaulJrann (i360 .9i9) is the flr'sl autllor Prcserlted in Lhis essey'
we rnlrst put his contributi()n 1r1to pclsPeclivc. To begirl wilh' Nau a was Dot
the flrst Gennar to th rk in 'Mittelcuropean' Lemrs' although hc definitely added
much to the potency a,rd PoPularity of tLle concept (Meyer, 1955, pP l06if) Anil

Since

secondly, Mifteleuropa was just one arnong many Gcmran foreign Dolicy options
md noithe most inlluential- Wrlhelnine policies during the war had other aims'
the rlirect poljtical impacl of Naumano's proposals We will in

whiih modified

fact meet a toetic vision of Euope rathcr lhan a htlL lolidcal Proiect'

/i/rr?nle powe$, and primarily Britain, agaiNt the Central Powe$. lt added economic warfare to thc long list of means ernployed in the conflict and contribuied
severely to the want and starvation;n Germany and Austrra in the later yea$ of
the war. lhe blockade meant an end to Gennany's colonial dreams and demonstratetl how much Gemany and Austria werc dependent on domestic resources'
Naumzmn propounclecl ihat the more or less accidental military union o[ Gennany
end Aust a-Hungary could be tumed into associations of real solidarity leading to
a better po
a political

the fuhue,
economic cooperation. Naumann did not exPect the war to lead to lastir)g peace or

EuroPc, and though he would not exclude a leconciliation wilh

Frrnce in $ome distant futur, France seemed to bc too closely tied to Britain ror
the time being. So he envisaged a post-war Europe with two 'Chinese walls' of
economic and military chaJacter running from north to south tltough the conti
nent. one betwecn Germany and France, the other somewhere between Gennany
and Russia Natmann's main concem was to avoid a ihird wall between Germany
and Aushia Hungary, which would weaken both powers. As for the smaller rra
tions in Europe, Naumann expccted defence needs and economic ccnhalization 10
make it impossible for them to strvive witiout alliances with the great Powers, so

harmony

in

he welcomed thc Balkan States and, perlups later, belligerent Italy ilr

il.ii

ilil

llilil

his

Mitteleuropa.
Naumann was careful not to go inlo conslituilonal niceties and lett quEstions srrch
as nationality problems to the separate states, but ihe Or?/rtdl ('overstate') hc
euvisaged was a somewhat loose coDfederation deaiing first of all with ecoootnic

A Gennan'MilteleuroPa' ot a 'Mitleleuropean'
ilenlions hate nat
antl opponents ol hit
I question

European commol) rnarket and dcttnce

Naumaru a-oticipated that mfitary imPerialisrn (the 'Chinese walls') would learl to
a highly controlled and integraled economy in peace as well as war- Mitteleuropa
was very much the means to justify these economic ends.

matters crdating a huge Central

oJ

(lerman.r,'s role in liuroPe losl .tnJ of its relevdnct

(credil Bil(lar&ir I'reussischer Kultut hesitz' B(tlin)

in the mediacval Holy

In his mind's eye he saw a Central
litics, re-emergiog in a lnodern, liberal

Naunann found historical justilication for his project

lllillt

tl

tiill

supremacy. Goodwill was needed for the

driving
folce of integration and Naumano was
be
the
would
economy
project, but

no doubt that Gemlan efficiency, organizational skills afld work ethics wo ld

set the slandard for the whole rcgion Naurnann admitted that this nrm regine ln
all sphercs oI life would seem to many like an unattr^ctive loss of individual frcc
don anri that it would contibtte to felings of Geflnan unpopularity cornmon in
other counFies. Bul he neve heless considered this t-rend towaftls 'rn
Orlanisdtionsstaal ('organizatioDs state') to be a historical necessily as was th
concentration of htmanity in large competing units undl the ernergence (in some
unspecilied futue) of a 'Uniled States of the Planet" Austria-llungary could lirst
of ali contribute to this economic Gro.t,trdum (a kind of extensive lnardet or arenir)
with rts scme of good laste alld q[aliq' to soften up the harslnlcss oI dte Norlh

ation, as he eagerly favoured a Gennan ovcrseas coloruai expansiotl'

'l_hc last words of Naumann's book
The war lorced him to Look in new dircctions
to hLs visloni
gave
birth
clearly clescribe the experiencc thirt

fruil of war' We have sat togcLher in

ha"" foughl together' we are determincd

Mrcl Ewope lMitteleuropal is thc

irr._

-^i"'."ono.i"
togelhe(!

to live

prisnn,

*.

fiawnttnn, 19)5, l9t6

edn'

2137)

Gemran rationalisrn

9l
90

l,,i

Lssay

lhe ualion

N^uorann preachcd tolcrince towards thc smallcr olltions

tl

Lssay

sulene lhedeaol Lutopc 1ll1'1915

in Mllfeleu'Pd lle

lorurd clemands for a forcecl'Gennanizalion' of these naLions botll

ha[nful and un

iIl Austna Hungarf.

fl

does not
lere we find the manl problem in Naumann's argumelt: Naumalu hirnsell
to
rnake it clear whether ihe confederation envisaged was a goal ir itselt or a mears
granted
fbr
much
so
hegemony
sccrrre German interests. Naumann took German
Europearr peo
llllrt lre was completely unable to
ld not lead to a
ples tlrrrt tbe tbreseen German
s obvious:
tlirect Germal Herlrclaf ('rule'). In
I

ffi

persuad
Vorherrsch
this

destruclion oI tlle olll In',n.irchy But lo tlLe Lepr(scnL'tlvcs ol'

lhe small. nort-privilegetl peoples ol Arrstr ial lurlgrry who der!^nded lutorlomy
or flrll independence {or theil tr.rtiorls, Naumamr's bot'k rvrs n gili ionr lrcrvetr
Thc rDore Ar.rstrlr-l:IunBaty could be frcsoo(e(l as cteroaily 'lcPcrrtlr'nl rrlx)rr
GerTnaDy. the easier rt wo ld l)e lar :fglle lbr rls clismeli bcl nlcnl

ililr

ffi

lu'

tirreatened

fron all sides

(Naumann, 1gr5;

1g16

e.rn, p ttrJ)

lll

book

Natronalisis attacked hrm lbr giving up 'natural' Gemran irnperialisr demands and
lirr weakeniug the Gelman race, whereas the Social Democrats found his project
irrrperia]istic, even though they were generally moderatc in theh condemnatio s'
Ycr otlrers crttLcizerl him ftir stuving so hard for Miileleuropean self-sufficiency
that it woukl leave the rcgion isolated fiorn futemational free Lrade, an argument
Naumann later tried to parry' In spite of such citicism and his own political misfoflulrcs, Naumarn never gave up his vislon. In an article written after the collapse
of Germany alld Austria Hungary he very unsentimenta]ly bade 'auf Wiedersehen'
Lo Mitteleuropa while still believing tbat the lives a.nd economies of Getmans,
Czechs, Hunganans and South Sldvs would continue to be sufficiently inteltwined
to make some kind of supranational coopera(on Decessary (Naumann, 1918, 1964
edn, pp. 976j0.

T. G. MasaryR's 'New

of tlre leading iigurcs irr thrs strLrBgle was llre ( 7.cch

'l

(i

I)hrlosoPlr(:r
Masaryk (1850-1937), wbo lr 1914 had gone roto cxile lo fighl lor ln lrtilcp(rt
dent Czechoslovakia. Masulk Llltcw very woil llllll wiLhotrl 'r (:oltlPlclo tc
organization of east centr al Europe brs drcaln lbr I rn(leperlllcnl alzechoslovirlir
would rernain unreahzed, so hc tried lo prese[l his ob]cctivcs in il broa(ler
European frrmework- Florn February 1916 tbe hiskli:ur R. W Seton Walson irn'l
other Britrsh supporters oI thc sllall Slavic peofles Published' af Masaryk's te
quesl, a joutnal. l-he Nc\r, EuroPe llorvever, Ibr a long tlme it wa's hal(l to sup_
pLet1]ent the entl AusLnan Ptopagumda wrtll !iable altematrves sincc llritam,
France and Russia had co[flictiDg ambilions ill the region. But the collapse of tlx]

'l\arist regi e and Woodrow Wilson's

appezfance on the world slaglr gave

explanatiotr of the war and a Post war
bolh
an
Masaryk an oppofluuty
progrnnrne for Europe, which he did in a book, once agaiu called ?)re Nel'
taror"z, publishcd in 1918
to preseDt

formltion liom merlieval and arthoritfiiao fonns of rule (which lic lerned
'lheocracy') to rnode democracies ln modem demociacy, he said, freedorn

'llre ,Lmbiguily of Nanmann's argunrent was reflccted ro citiques of lus

ilil

natrcrt suPren)e- Ihe rclea af Eutopc 1914 .1945

Masaryk described a Europe in the [udst of a hugc cultural and polilical lrans-

ffi

ffiflr

ltE

filr lhe corlplete

ClDe

ill,l

Euroqe'

NaumaDn's book was aLnost unmediately translated into EnSlish In Bilair rnd
clsewlrcre, Mitleleuropd was prcsented as a piece of exteme Geman irnPerialisln ard a pan-Geman threat io Allied national interests. The main war objective of the Entente powels was to preveut German hegernony in Europe' btt
when il carne Lo Austria_Hungary their inlentions were less cleal The general
lrend was to support any split belwecll lhc lwo Contlal Powers buf not to allow

was expressed both on aD indiriduai level and colleclively, as everJ naLion's

right to sell-deleminatiol. So, for iNtance, lhe Gemrans were lully eDtitled lo
urfte, but io this process the 'Relch' had isolated itself from tlle gcner.rl
Eu-ropean lrend towards defi]ocracy: undemocBlic at home, Pflssiao absolutisnr
rlso fer.r'etlerl the nationd princrples abroad jn a wild imPeriaLlst Drang nnth
Or1,n ( yean ng lor lhc,Easr' ) Next to Germany, Austria had provcd unable
to modernize and graot its peoples t]le nghts liey were entitled to, arrd the
Habsbrug rnonarchy had degenerated into iul 'artincial' and authoritarian regimc,
totally dependerrt upoD Gefinany

In colrtrast, Bntan, France and, not least, Wilson's USA were presented as em_
bodiments of modern democlalic pnnciples at all levels of society So MasaJyk
could iDlerpret the war as nothing less than the logical culmrnation oI llre confllct
betwccn 'theocracy' and democracy So long as l{ussia had a Tsarist regine, hs
Lhcory dld rot fully hold Hence the Russian revolutioo ol March 1917 was highly
we]comed by Masaryk Russia could now be preseDted - with a iot of wishlirl
ilnDking - as belng otr the road (o democracy Also the Bolshevik L,lkeover in
November 1917 was a lurther boost Thlr Bolshev {s initially supPorted dre principle of national self deleminatron, and the revolutionary cbaos rn R ssie made it
acutely necessary for ihe Allies 1(] have reliable fnends belween hoslile Germarly
zrnd red Rrssia
'Drang nach Osten', oflginaly rreanng )ddrnrlrs for thc tsast, has also col11e lo
mcan erpatLtLon, N 'p sh' towards dre East, with the sense of breaking oui of a
restdcted aroa lo a llace where ltrere wrll be n)orc sp^cc furd freedom, at LeL)enstaunl

'?

(hviag space)

of
oI a larger nation livinS, outside thsir compatriots' tedtory, who h the-interosts.
protection
fu1l
that
and
suggested
full nartns would hav; to accept minority status)
of these mirorities' rights would suffice to avoid conflicts

ment,

no clear mandate from Europe it restricted itself to calls for economic cooper
ation as a basic conclition for later fedral measures_ Il soon fell aPa'l when news
about clashes between rival national interes(s in EuroPe reached the delegates'

hacl

Though making plans for Europe' Masaryk put gleat emphasis on America's .politicaliole in the conmon Euro Amencan civilization, and in this resPect his views
ale more 'Westem' than lraditionally 'Erxopean' But like most ofhis contempor
European
aries, his horizon never hanscended cullures based oD Christianity and
trarlitions He condemn ed Turkey aE kultu'fTemd und borbartsch ('alien to culture
aboDt extending the
and barbarian'), and said nothing about the colonial system or
chltures
non-ENopean
to
pnnciple of lational self_determination
and
In both Naumam's and Masaryk's Proglammes the elements of exPediency

I
I
I
t
I
I

I
I
I
I
Post-war plans for European unity (1923-1930)

i!
Preussischer Kulturbesitz Berlin)
94

whole lot of nation

Masaryk got hrs 'new Europe' ol rather one half of it: a
io what looked like the culmination of a Focess which' in the
.tut"" *"ri
"r.ot.a
of nations'
revolulionary year of 1848, had becn coined lhe sprin|time
plurality of
a
of
bloom
the
full
to
lead
should
national freedorn

iuppor"Afy,'ttti

I
I
t
t
I

I
I
I

I
I

Essay

cult[res

a fearure often associated with Europe However,

i[

reality minority

proble$s, murual drstrLrst and Post war economic collapse soon exposed tle difficulty of drawing the line betweon nalional self-realization and nalionalistic expansionism. Little became of disarmament Plaffi and economrc cooperation as the
tholsands of miles of new borders in Europe were soon follified with amries and
customs barriers The ljbral Italian ex prefiuer Francesco Ntti in 1922 lamented
trc thorou|h Balkanization of Europe (Nird, 1922, p- 51) and post war EuroPe
seemed hardly on the verge of becoming a pluralislic and prosPelous community'
Nevefiheless, the Pinciple of democracy wdr streDgihened ir Europe after the
First World War, and optimistic spirits could hope that war and the succeding difRculties had made all Europeans understand t]re ne.ed for cooperation ln the years
of European rccovery after 1923 a number of programmes for a united Europe was
introdu;ed, the most influential being the one sponsored by the founder of the
Pan-European Union, Count fuchard Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894-1972) We will
ftrst of all exarune Coudenhove-Kalergi's ideas and then show how his proposals
were given political welght by the Frerch politician Aristide Briard.

Coudenhove-Kalergi's Paneu roPa

Coudenhove-Kalergi had an impeccable background for working on behalf of
fiamsnational understaDding. His mothd was Japanese and h0s father was an
Austrian diplomat; and he spent his early, pre war years in bilingual Bohemia'
then in cosmopolitatr Vie n. The war aod the collapse of Ausfria that followed
was a shock to say the least but, nonetheless, in 1918 he had high hopes that
Wilson's peace prograrnme and the lrague of Nations would secure a better,

l
t

t
I

tne netton sLprente: ute luea ut -utuPe 13t+tr'

The necessary nroder[rzalion of lhe political systen of Europe would havc lo con-

anarchy, since technical

so-called

lete Even the

e world was about to

be

ers were rePlaced bY fed_

erally organizerl world powers, as could be seen Anlenca (botlr in rhe USA and
h the 'Panamericao' uruon), in rhe new Sovlet Russia and in the Bntish Emplre

ii

Only Eluope \i as la88mg behind. t

Coudeniove-Kalerg! knew the difficultles of definurg EuroPe. Geographical cri
teria seemed immediately inappropnate, since Europe was nlerely thc westem Ptu1
tem border. Fuflhemore, cul
ncal revision tiom the titne of
spread to all continents, which
allowed for several nerr'r' 'global power ields' with rools in dre same culture, hut
in sharp conhast to tl[s apParent cultural success, E]rrope as a political entity did
Ilol exisl. Paneuropa was lhe name grven by Coudenhove-Kalergi to rhis aspirturt
political Europe to distinguish lt ftom gcographical and cDlturat Europe'

B tain and Russia ln Coudenhove-Kalergi's view'

'grown
and become a Polltical conhnent in its own
Europe'
out
of
Bitaln had
ight, too big and powerful to be included in Pane ropa However, rclations between the two were to & based on cooperation and mutual defence guarantees,
4nd both were to sharc 'the European cultural task' - i e. the Europeturization of
This Pareuropa excluded boib

peaceful world. He was, however, soor disaPpointed by both the lag e and the
disruptions in Europe and he became convinced that only a politically united
Europe could overcome the continent's Foubles. A convinced activist,
Coudenhove-Kalergi argued for the creation of a Pan-European Uniot as an international pressure group, in his innrelri'al Paneuropa, fust published in 1923.
Coudcnhouve-Kalergi's approach was essentially Polilicat: although he frequently
used llistorical analogies and argumenfs, he did not use the past itself as a basis for
his ideas. He seemed to take Europe so much for granted that he never had to ask
',) this entity ought to be sfiong. He obsefled that the historical era of European
world supremacy was ovet and tbat tbe supremacy of the white race had beEn
broken. But the decline of Europe boih could and should b halted in order to pre
vent the continent ftom becoming a mere plaltiing of world politics lo an indirect reply to the Gemar philosoPher Oswald Spengler (188G-1936) and his
iryunensely popula.r book Unterlan| dcs Abendlandes (The Decline of the West,
1918), he alluded to the root of the problem as well as the cure:
The cause of Europe's decline is political, not biological Europe is not
dying of old age, but because its inhabitants are killing and destroying
one another wiih the insmrments of modem science. The peoPles of
Euope are not senile it is only thek political sysiem that is senile. As
soon as the latter has been radically changed, the complete recovery of
the ailing Conlinent can and must ensue.
(Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923; 1926 dn, p xii)

Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi in his hefi'tJ in the late 1920s .indefatigable in his agitation for d united Europe (credrt: Sulde tscher Verlag,
!4unich)

orlr.r l)rrls ol llrc worl(1. llrilirin by controllilg the coloDics, rud Paleuropirby
proritlirrg llrc IrLrrnarr rrtw lnrttritl lor lheir dcveloPmerlt. Brilam also was [o scr've
ns a rncrliator bdwcclr I'rrrtnlclicr and Paneurofa, shce all ttnee shar-ed the samc
culturc and thc silmc dcllloclat'rc vflltles And if Bdtain sbouLd somehow lose its
empire, its inclusiod iD I'itncuropa wo ld seelrl natural ld obvious'

Kalcrgi wirs lnuch morc critical towards Russi^ By choosinB the

Bolshevik way Rrrssia lud tumed its back on the dernocratic princiPlcs now pre
domin^nl ilr Eruope, ancl so the bordcrline between lhe newly fotrnded eastem

without national sovereignly

Coualenhove

Itr

lJ.ussia should rDark the easten eid oI PaleuroPa'

Europealr clemocracics
^nd
in
Also, Russia saw itscLf n1ore arld morc as a spccific nrrro.rian entily and as an
thirl
doubl
any
was
l1ol
il1
Courlerlhove-Kalergi
llcld
delendelrl global lower
Russia woulcl sooll recover after ils (levastating civil wfi, and lhat it would pursue
its faditional polilics o{ expaoding to ttre West \Vhether red or while, Russir
ihe
rvouLd always seek hegcmony, turd only tluough mutltal cooperation would

ffi

l,'se IheLr impoiancc.

I
fi

Great

ffi

ffi
chalgeable.

ffi

ffi

bal economy

rm

the lricnds of Italy

s8

iiill,

lill
I

uPtc)tc

Lssay

ota Dca ut LutuPe tr14-tr4J

the naItoD

'uprcn1e:

lne tdea al tDrope

lttl tu4'

viILaE to the honle

'is

ilii

to

philosophy are obvious, but Cotldenlrove-Kalergi makes Europe Dot the nation
the conslitunt socio-cultual enlity and he does allow for historical charlge: irr
1923 he was jn doubt about wheE to place l\rkey, but in his 193'1 book Kemal
Atatitut's new'I'ulkey is bade welcome in pohtical and cultulal Europe!

..s
.9S

.6h
<L

d:

!
E

l
I

I
I
I
t
I

Coudenhove Kalergi exPected PaneurdPa lo be the Pro8ramnle o{ every deoocrat

ff rG

3 St
e i.:
E
EI

.: d2
S": $
qF !:

!sq
.c,

i Fr

*ol. _:
*TU'
t' '-n
G.ri
Y

tss
:!\\

r:e
t !2
];a<
gh;:
i J-n
.9

-d

ffi

YSF
flffi

ffiil

and tllough her

zrll of mankind.

Y:e.
ia\-!1.
l!s;
: s]l

and patriot. For small concessions of sovercignty all countrics woul'l prosfer
economically and obtaln a lasting peace, aDd ther nalional culnues would benclil
fiom the free exchange with all the otier European schools. Conversely, the cnenrics of Paneuropa would be {ound to the exireme left (among the Communists) nnd
to the right (among the miltajists and national chauvinists), but predominantly
among those groups who were economically dependent upon customs borders nnd
cconomic protectionism. Coudcnlrove-Kalergi had great confidence in the soclal
democrats, so l s main appeal in 1923 was lo the denocratic non-socialist pilrtie\
iu Germany and Fmnce to abslain from revanchism or rcvengo A huge coalifion
'' of democrats across all Europeall borders was needed in a common defencc
rgninst deshuctive extrenists.

In sum, Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pineuola was an astonishing mlxhrle of largescale Utopianism, potent polilical analysls and clear-sighted pragmatism: for instarce, he suggested the use of Engiish as a corDnlon second laDgxage in Europe,
since it would be irnpossible to solve the rivabies between the major conlinental
languages and he prodicted that EngLish wolrld become the pre-eminert global
mears of communication an1'way. Idea[stic in his belief in EuroPean brotherhood
and in the possibility of global harmony through some balance of the suPerpower$,
he also unlesitatingly accepted lhe colonial system, perhaps with some underlying
assumpfior that Aftica (blus natlve America rrd Australia) had produced no cul
mre comparable to the four world cullutes that he rccognized: European, Arab,
Indian, and Chinese.

Atistide Briand's proposals for a united Eurcpe

of Coudenhove Kalergi's whole argument was his finn
belief ihat the world coDld be changed through poljtical agitation and action his
remendous voluntarism Thc Pan EtlropeM Union lounded in 1923 soon had
locai branches in all European counties i]md greal efforts were rnade b persuade
politicians ald oprnion-makers lo support thc movenlent.
Perhaps Inost characieristic

The stratcgy of inlLrencilg first of all the political and clrltural 6lites Proved fruitlul, and in France Coudenlove-Kalergi nanagcd to wln fie sympathy ot two lead_
ing politicians, 6douard Hetriol (1872-1957) and Aristide Briand (1862 1932).
the
honorary president
Brrand
1927 er/en accepted thc position
Pan-European Union- And generally, ftom the nid 1920s France pioneered poL{ical effortJ io establish networks of brord, institntiolalized Europeal cooperation.

in

oI

of

The First World War had a profound impact on French lotrons of Europe. For four
ye4Js, French teiriiory had been lhe nain birttlelield alrd le coufltry had suffered

1924 there was a radicai clrange of emphasis as elections brcuglrt a lefl-wing co

alitioll led by 6douard Heriot to power. Ilerriot was an ardent suppo er of the idea of

ln

nfil

ffi

T
T

I
I
I

4t$trJt

BriLt d-

rcn, h

rrd lo flar? Luroptan

in tht Inl?] wol

Prrm?r ard Ih? fu{ t4ding Poliltrnn
on r1x pnltrt ol rfindd trreJtl: RrePr vtollPl

inn

Pari.r).

ition, the chaos in Germany seemed to weaken ii-

'for in Bet lin

i(Joudrd Herriot, Brianl's close allJ, in Iront of the Brandenburger
proqranne
anJ
fot
a symbol of the Franco-German reconcilfuttion so vilal for
European cooperation and stabitity (credit: Roger Viollet, Patis)
103

102

I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I

Lsrdf

rt)c

ttatutt.LrlJtc)tlE

t')-

^'cd

lt

LLtuPc

tit+

tal'|

Europeal cooperation, and in Ja[uary 1925 he made a sPeech i which he formulaled

th notion of a 'United States of Europe' Srowing crut of lhe cooperation fultroduccd
with thc Irague ofNalioos.Ihs speech evoked [o immediaiercsponse, buf the po]l tjcs
oi reconciliation was contmued in 1925 now with Painlev6 as premier iuld Bdand as
foreign ministcr n the Treaty of Incarno, which paved thc way for (iermany's
,dnissron to the l-eague of Nations in 1926 and Suarantecd dre borde$ ii \testem
Europe. The agreement was signed by Fmnce, Belgiun, thly, Gennaly and the fIK
Of course, the French rdpprochement 9,t^simpossible wilhout German benevolence
and abstentlon from 'rcvanchism'. The syrnbol of this reconciliatory approach in
Germany was forergn minister Guslav Stresemann (1878-1929)' wllo for many years
closely cooperated wittr Briand.

iLI

ScnoDs pan-European initiatives had to wait until Aristide Briand took the lead in
the late 1920s In a speech to the Irague of Nations in Geneva on 5 Septernber
1929 hc called for the creation of a sorl of federul link belween the European na
tions. Briand fust of all stressed that the time was ripe for closer economic cooP- '
eration- Four days later, the speech was lbllowed by a dirBct political idtiative as
Briand invited a]l Europea[ forcign [unisters represented in the League of Nation$
to infomral discussions on the subject of Euopear unity Bnald's proposals were
well aeceived in a ooncofirmittal way and he was authoized to prcpare an ofiicial'
memorandum wiLh specilic proposals for thc EuroPean governments to con$ider'

iffi

flfli

ilil

tl

I
I

il

Briand's memorandum was ready by I May 1930 In his prefatory remarks, B tuid
mentlons the danger to stabiliry and security inherent in the present division of
Burope into a Large number of competing small states Awareless of such factors
as commolr racial backgrourd, common civilizatlon and geographical proximity
should point these stales in thc direction of cooperation rather than conlenliorl
Ilowevet despitc hrc high-flown visions, Bnald's specilic proposals werc modesl

Firsl, lhe European govenxnents were to prepare and ratify a treaty, establishirlg
lhc p.mciple of r European 'moral union' and confirming the solidifity of lhe
govemirents to
l)arhrers involved Funller, the reary was to oblige the EuoPean
holcl rcgular rneetlngs. The main organ for this cooperatioD w;ls to be a 'EuroPean
corrlerence'for all participarltJ. Between ifs sessions a smaller, pelmment'Politi
cal corumitlee' with rts own secretariat was to take carc of day to day business.
Finalty, the goals and the motives behind this cooperation were to be formally
confimed. aud Briand listed a whole number of issues ralging from customs ar
rangemenls to hygiene to academic and political exchange programmes, which
co ld be treated iD this Europeao forum. Unlike his Geneva spe,ech, Briand now
gave absolute prcfereuce to political issues, especially peace aod secunry, and dernanded tlre subordination of economic mafters to politics. A potitlcal rapprochemzrl was seen as a precondition for the creaLioD of a Europeall common market

But suryrisingly, Briand hardty gave the proposed European associatiol any
competeDce at all- Ffst of all, Briand rcpeatedly sbessed that by no meaos was
his assocration lo compete with thc Irague of Nations On the contrary, Le deDranded a 'subordination of the European association to the kague of Natiolls',
iurd rnade membership of the League a prerequisirc for participation m the
Union Nor was the European association to take over any responsibilities of the

ils caPacity as mecliator tret\\'ecn conllict[rg o;rliolrs lr'rrtLrenrror e'. he

nntlirLiled thar tire purpose oi the cooperarion \!as to be 'itgrccnrenl' r1(rt trrrily'
thu nll
and called lbr feaslble prouedtlres. llnarll rejecte(l aoy lcslrictlollrj Lllxnt
conditional sovereignty Lrnd lull political indcl)cndeocc (rl Illc Iillrol)cilrl stirl(r''
whrch madc the arriLngernent look Al rnost likc rr lxrsc crrrrltrrlt:r;rlirrn

League

ir

ljr his political desiglrs, Briam! pul !lrcxl cIrrl)h sis (nr I]rilrslr
process

of European coopcralion- Thls

iLii lrl(lcc(l lllLr wh()l(r

irrv{rlv(:rrx rrl rrr lhr

vclllllr(: wirs lrrr

Faorlcll seclrriLy ilrLcrosls lllLi tlK, Irs rr si r;rtory ol tlr'

Locamo agreemeLlt, rvas colnlliLlccl lo sccuring lho sliltlts (ll() rrl wtrtLrrr lirtt"lt
({itrl!
which lradc Ftanr:e most rcltrclant 10 cu1 Iics witlL lho lJK i'r lirv()r'i ol st'rrtr
(;clrrlrrly
lty
Als(r'
wilh
allilrnco
ou
a
lragilc
dePendcrt
laJgely
nental associatioll
proposug a sofi of Etlropean iedcratidr fllia d coukl assrrlc lris uaslcrn litrrlttrrttt
oUiir, nototty Poiaild and Czechoslovakia' tLritl lhu l'riurLx)-( ;cllr tutt trtppnxltt

ttoubtedly rootect

ln

mcll would not take Placc

at

reir crpettse

Briand's memoraldun was passe{] lo the Europcan govcllllnells, who wcrc asketl
to rcspond- Simultaneously, suppolters of the proposal c P^igned wiclely oLr its
bchalf and debale irl the Elr(opean press wir's Lively Bli^nd was hefcd by hts t:olol'
league Eclouard llonlot, who pubLsltcd a lengthy and dctailed sttrcly in suPporl
partthe
of
lhe
suPpofiers
the
very
leasl'
(Eurttpe,
At
1930\'
Bdand's ptoposals
Eulopealr rdea were successflll in maKng all Eutopean govemments glve serious
pere received
consider^tion to the question, alld in thc fbllowing monlhs lepiies
lrorn all thc twenty_six govemrnents who had becn asked
The resDlt was prcsenled by France in a report of 8 September 1930 General1y
speakmg the recepLiorr was poljte, but lar tiom ovcrwhelming. There was a willingness to go on with the talks, b t rl was obvious that the adherenfs of lhe
Leagxe ol NatioDs teft no need to supPort a Po"ential lival. Technically, mosl
governments cniicizeal tlie strborihnation of politios to ecooomics Some de
(Jfhers stessed rhe ju
malded that eco;oDic jssues be accorded a clcar p oriry.
of
slates asked for tlre
number
poLiLtcs
A
and
of
econornics
terdependence
incluiion of Turkey iD the process, while Cermimy .rnd llaly requested the ifclusion of tbe Soviet flruon as well- Most hesitant ir lLer overall approach to
Bnarcl's suggestions were Itely and the lIK. A {ew days latcr in Geneva, Bnand
lried to persuilde the League ol Nalions to cstablish a 'Europcan Council' as a first
slep in the process, bul British resistance allowe.l for no nlore than a 'Study
Comnission for tho European Union' under Lhe auspjces of lhe League and wit)r
Briand as president 'Ihe commission hlld a coLlple of Deetings over tlle next year
before

it wound up its

acr.ivilics-

llcrur 13rugttrarr. Listo ttvc tea.on' wh) rlolhing c:lmc ol lbls p-m Eulopc.ur inilial
ivo (BruBmans, 1965, P1l. 56i'.):
1 The mai advocates of the proposal quickly i-lisappeared from lhe scene:
Stresemann died in 1929, and Bri.rod gradually faded froN the political sce e
belore dying itr 1932.

The project showed a lack of Politlcal courlge and realism by demanding

European union while at the silme tine Promising lo leave nalional sover
eignty untouched.
105

lldtLsLl Li'|Lr. ',i:| rvils tsLrc(irlly hi]l(l io olcfco le'

go on 1!iih I rL'irLojcct ilSlrrrr'rt lhc u'ishes oi lhc l.lK

rlld lcw

wele

villirg

lo

,l 'l'hc ccononrLc *orLLl crisis scl il1 reusi g lrlilss unelnPloyment arxl unrcsl nrr']
lorLlnP !uv.nl'rrenl l' l rA' lrrolP',i"lr; rr'" lrlt \
5 Partly ns a resrtLt of tlris, National Srualism began ro gain gourd in Gennany

ilr
with its virulcnt natiorlllljsrn alrd rcvanchisln- Once the Nazis scized Irower
a
or
a
Briand
ideirs
of
fcderal
tol
lbe
ltdt
uas
uo
roorn
1933,
lherc
January

Couclcnhovc Kalcrgi.

ol
To these file reaso[s we nrusi add a si,rth thc resjslalce of fhe Leaguc
dlal
to
a
btre|ucracy
Nxtions
fotential

Fascism, Nazistn and Eurolle

conneclnay seem larecloxical 10 Lalk abotll'Ror-ope orevcn'EuroPca less'in
ist i d
atioli
slrongly
werc
novcLnents
IJoth
Nazjsm
i;,- ,u;tfl lo".ioo ancl

lt

It coll(l bc clllirlleLl lhore was filore scope lor discussions about [ulopeanism ltl
l\4ussolini's llxly than rn Ijitler's Gernany- Although Mussoiini boasted abort lhc
crcaLion oI a stoLo tohlildria ('totalitaria state'), lhe intensity of totalitarian con
trol llr ltiJy rever got ne2tr lhe level expeienced in GennaDy. But, orl tire other
hand, the w soon dcmonsbated that only the opi iol of Nazi Germany lltrltcled-

Nazi 'Neuropa'
B.rsically, National Smialism was a Prograrnme for Gennany and not for
llurope. Ililler had lwo prirnary goals: ta cleanse the Gennan racc lion't irltcri'rt
elernelts, such as Jews ancl Gypsics (and German life from the irllue'Dce ol
Jevish Folshevrk thi kiDB) and to create t Germat Lebensrttum by cxPT ndirg Lo
thc !ast. This exheme B/rll uwl Boden nationalismus ('blood and soil nalrcoil
ism') coul(l nol toleratc ideas of trans national conrnunities, and 'Paleutopir'
and simitar projecls were coldenmcd by }litler as degeneraie Jewish attenPts lo
subvert thc Gennan people by raciaL mixture
The qncst lot racial purity was so extrcme that Ilitler cbndemned any ilrtegr'ali('rr
even beLwecn'blood relatcd'peoplcs like dre Germalic. He dismissed suggestioos
thili onc oJ the 'racially valuable' EuroPeao great Powers could by force and assLuilation create a Lmited Burope with the argtDent that suclr a ntxtlrrc even il
il only includc(l related taces .. would lead to fhe degeneraiion of ttre rrrling trce
and tlrrs i.leplivc the project oI any possible value (Foerster, 196), yt 24'l)'

Rijksbarol, 1937, P. 64)

fron
E rope,
(ier nran
marked,

w;rs r(:rrl
Itrrd the

lhc

ti(,xs rro

f llrrroPe

into two Living spaces, a pa1r German and a Mediteranean pan-ltaliau, but he care(i
ol
httie about the soullt.'l'ollitler, o ly a Gcrnan dimerlsion mattoled; thc ellorfs

dilferclt
SS idco]ogNts ro lacially deterDine a d assess the quality of lhe
Gerf]anic tril)es in F.uroPe was more lo Himmler's tnste LhaD io thc F'iihrer's

tle

With tiis in
lalcr

1o

nf

d, one may legitimately

a-sk

why wl: shorld bothcr to take N^7i\m

lalnent:

such all organjzalion liad

cr'ist'"tl

1l/n\/,'v /,roJ,

,L/2J
o7

106

tl
I)unn8 the war, lhe concept of Iiuropc ^PPcnrs
rn Geman propa8anda ralr by drc Allics-

tu)

h.tvc bccrr rrsed rnorc ficquently

Lhe Nazi seizure of power in 1933, Gennany l cd tt) Present

itself as the only efficient bulwark against Communism. Versailles had left Europe
weak and all Gemany wanted was to undo the utlustice of l9l9 and see all
Germans united in a cornmon state. A strong Germany would be beneficial for all

Iniiially, lollowing

thal
atrty h:rzy about qosstions concernlng lhe lcvel of Political indePendence
common
to
a
Fferences
coun'Jies
AnLl
Cennan
non
to
llle
be
would
Branted
Europe wer" systenatically omilled froll-i doncstic German lrolaganda'
agam purely in
The atLack on the Sovict Union brought aboul yct anolher cltange,
p
(i955'
259)' that rhe
notes
srumental, ill Nazi Buropean propagalda Kluke

o[ Europe, and iD a 1936 speech Hrtlel even used an expression that, much laler'
ililfr

would become Popular: 'the EuroPean house'

keep the order

a housc

in which Germany was

In many countries, and not least in Britaln, this propaganda was not without

t
ffi

ffi

ffi

tffi

ffi

ffi
lrlllh

rl

lii

il

tr)

suc

cess. ln 1918 19 Bdtain had ben more reluctant than France and lhe USA to en
dorse the splifiurg up of central and eastem Europe, aDd
'New Europe' remailed low. The incalculable consequence
tional self-deteftunation looked ralher less attract(ve than
soml. European great power accord or equilibrium ln 1938 several aftempts were
made to persuade Germany io accept her share of responsibility fbr tbe Europem
order, culminating in the Munich crisis of September 1938, when Germany, Italy,

France, and Britain decided upon the fate of independent Czechoslovakia without
reference to that unfoffunate country. Two commeots illusrate the level of official
British c gagement in Europe at that timel Neville Chamberlarn, talking about
Ci eahoslovaki4 refered to 'a qudrrel ill a far-away country belween people of
whom we know notlung', and his brother Austen Chamberlan, echoing Bismarck,
had earlier spoken complacently of a place 'for which no British GovefiIment ever
will or ever can nsk the bones of a Bdtish grenadter' (he was referrinB to the
Potish corridor in 1925). The deshuclion of democratic Czechoslovakra was not
considcred an issue big enough 1o justify a new war'

(icnnirn occupaLioD of what was left of Bohemia-Moravia in March 1939, the

pirct wjlh Stalln in Au8ust, and the attack on Poland in September demoNtrated
thc lcvcl of siDcerity of previous talk. But the war and the seizure by 1940 of
rnuch of lhe continent only forced the Nazis to adjust thelr Europea[ propagand'
lo lhc ncw nccds of Gennany- In order to mobilize all continental econolrues for
its wrr effort, Gcnnany had to Present a programme for a'new order m Europe'
to those conntdes under German occupation or controi As in the First World
War. rhe reed for a contiuental European corimon market was stressed (although
with muclr more emphasis on ihe necessity of plarming than for instance by
Naumann), and the rntlitary and economic virtues of 'European autarky' were
praised. Propaganda stories descibed the advantages of organizing the 'European
family of nations' in a pohocal and economic union after German pdnciples and
under German supremacy. Against rotten old B tain a young and healthy 'united
front of rhe different peoples of the Continetrt' should anse to secure Europe's

fteedom.
Denrnark

(All tlrese exptessions are taken from a Nazi leaflel' published ill
in 1941.)

Aftcr some uritial success, the ability to mobilize people rn the occupied countries
declined as it bocame evident lhat slogans aboui the comolon Erropcao economy
masked an ever nlore ruLI ess Geman exploilalion- The proPaganda was rornnrk

'Behind the en(m\/ po\rets - lhe Iew German!'s politital and ilitory enemies
trig,ht change, hut Nazi prapaganda nerer forSot the racist care oI its illcology
(r:rciit: Biltlarcluv ['t eussischer Kulturbesilz Berli]1)

rotivc ol 'tlrc slrtiSglc oi dlc pcollcs of Ilulolc agaillsl bolshevism" di(l not +
pcrr in Gcrnra[ propagand^ utrtrl it vas rcpo ed that some rlon colununisl circles
rn the occupicd co ntries wclcomcd the assault Ftorl then on- Hider could he
'markerr.d' as the stardard bcrrer oJ E roPean cultwe and, aftr Staliogmd, as
Europe's delender hon lhe Eastern menaoe. In a speech il Ber)in on 30 January
1942.

Hitier said:

This tin]e it is not a war we arc hghtlng just on behalf of our owo
German people. bxt a struggle lor the whole of Europe and thus for the
whole of civilizcd hurn:urity

(Ili

er. quote.l

in Schlrc, )992)

In tiris way Geman soldiers, and SS volufltee$ (WafTen SS) from olhcr countries,
werc actually seot to dic 'for GerDany and for Europe' a1 Statingrad and in Berlin.
Once again, the Nazi use

of 'EuroPe' had no other Purpose ti^n

10

cus lir liuropo wide, anti-Fascist agitatior' Generally speakiDg' public ilrlerest rn
und support for lede|alist proliramnles for Europe reached an absolule low in the
1930s

Only the rvar led fo a revitalizatior of the plans fot European unity Walter
Lipgeru, in a vely thorough study (Lipgens' 1968)' describes how the voice of
rrnity was echoed in almost all European resistance nrovements and how the demands for a federal European order werc expressed with quite a differcnt accent
from that oI the interwar years They were all primarily motivated by mo'al or
ideologrcal arguments, which shessed ttle need to overcome the narow and de_
structive pover of the nation state and tbe need to secure bumal dghts and indivrdual frcedom against all instif tions. '

iil

justify arl un1L) lotice

limiteil centralist German rule on the contiDeni But we should not fall
how attractive this propaganda was in its various phases.

ffi

Anlisemitism was not confined to Nazism, and cal1s lor dictatorial l^w and order
in the building of a new EuroPe or-in lhe struggle against Bolshevism appealed to
a1l too nratry.

ilosley

lamented the missecl oPPortunities to found a new Europe on

such priociples but his belief in the existence of such opportu ties sewes as

v/ert not pro Fascist couaborators about the viabfity of creating a new Europc
in cooperation with Gennany.
As the colsequcnces of Nazi rule became obvious' the exPerience of the collapse
of the old ortler led to the inevitable conclusion thai national pride and vaniLy

ffi

salutary war:ning.

Opposition and resistance

Soon after Hitler's seizure of power thc Gemran branclt of the Pao-European
was dissolved and its literatuF oudawed. In Coldenhove-Kalergi's words,
the anli-European revolution had conquered Gemrany:
It was from then on that Germtry cut itself off from Europe more and
more decisively: in extemal affairs tluough pan Germai Policies, ill
intemal affairs tl[ough racist policics, morally by depriving people of
theiJ humao rights, lega]ly by rewriting the laws and ecoromically by
notions of self-sufficiencY
(Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1934, p 151)

Ihion

In many clandcstine documents the need was slressed to include the Cetnlirns 'rlrtl
to avoi(l natronalistic revenge 'lJle Manfeslo of lhe E roPean llesisla (c, pnl'
lished in Geneva in July 1944 by members of the Resistanco ftom Ilillc separdlc
couDtrjcs. called for a federal union of the EuroPean Dations; lhe nairr argumenls

(a)
(b)

Coudenhove-Kalergi and other adherents oI a federal Europe had to face lhe fact
thai, as Iong as this regime was in Power h Germany, no such union was Possible
apa frorn under Nazi ruie. The Pan_Europea! Union with its headquarters in
Vicnna concentrated in the following yeal.S upon presewipg Austrian irdependence and establishing regroDal economic cooperalion among the Danube countries backed by lLrly and France In doing so' the movement had to compronrise
with lbrces lar lrom the democratic ideals of dle pro8ranrmes of the 1920s, and a
split occurred betlvecn Coudenllove-Kalergi' who remained fiercely anti-Bolshevik
as $rell as anti_Nazi, and left-wing intellectuals who saw in the Soviet Uniol a fo_

'

ilt Lhe war against

drawn lrorrr olnrr I ounhe\

SDain. halv. Slolakiu, llungary, Rumada and F-inland took pad

Souier r.nion, roecrt'.' !}ilh rel,e(entalive m Llary

which did not fornally conunit thcrxelves

uul'

thE

the necessity to have the Germals participate in European lifc without tlucal
cDing their neighbours;
in
the need to protect national minorities afld avoid the abuse oI minority

ilil
liii

riil

terests; and finally

thc demand for cooperation ln the economic rcconsrmction of the continent

after the war. without which any democratic political order woukl be tluea
tefled (Brugmans, 1965, P 8l).
This 'Reslstance philosophy' rnarufested itsell in almost all dre counLrics urxlt)
rlx)
Germarr occupation or Fascist rule' with oDe exce?tion: in Scarldiiavia'
a
h^d
ltaly
'Atlantic'
order
an
of
Resistalce movemenrs seemed more in favour
a
pllly
carne
to
who
by
many
supported
movement,
fedemlist
particularly strolg
iole in ttaiian poJt-war Politics. perhaps a reaction against the long experience o[
Mussolinr's Fascrsm. Lipgens obsewes Q-ipgens, 1968, p 251) that Resistance
filovernents:in smaller coultries, such as Belgium, were generolly more reluctaflt
to commit themselves to larBe scale post war planning than their colleagucs in

(c)

111

110

lliltl

l|lH

nnl

Lssay

2!

ne nBlton suplt)tlte. ute tuur ut

\vafiime
ision of lhe co tioent into 'spheres of inlluence' rnd - without relliud for
had
t'nion
lhe
Sovict
affcr
visiors the restor^tron oI the rl^tior states I ELiroDe
nnd
cvelrts
thesc
on
inlluence
had
no
Europe
i-n
talel ils share. The Rcslstalce
oilviolls
ne
nlotc
bcc
ALlies
of
the
ihe
lntenlions
N
grew
1944,
frorn
fiustration
irll{r
Outcrics wJre heard protesLirg ageinst the way thc conlinenl was lo hc sPlit
llrd
lovcrrilc
of
hatrccl
cxplosiols
irnded
i
exhaustiorl,
two halves, but lho war
nr()v(!
against the Gcrmans and I growing conlrunist lnllLrcncc irl Iho Rtlsislrtl)co
w;ts
:tt:rrt
chiels
ments Thc rapirlly declining inlluencc of pro li:derll llcsistarrcc
Ih'r rirl)itl
tuated by {rc retum of old politicil lcaders lroul r:xilc or prisorr lllr(l
rlrvisio
politrr:ll
ol
linos
of
traclilional
re-errelgence

having bcclr I)lore objecLs

Prob^bly a result of snrall cou tries
the courttries url
thart suLrjects of hi;tory' The highly lirrrited access to archives i
of the otlprogramrDes
the
to
follow
it
difllcult
der comhunist mle has made
matelirl
and
Czchoslovak
Polish
but
Europe,
Eastem
in
coormunist Resistance
s[uctures as
indicates that tbeir political 6lites were at least as interested in federd

Italy or

Fr rce

lhe Westem Resistarce leaden

lil

lLrr'
Suppoflers ot fomlllized Eurcpciltl coopcIaljon sccnled to llilv{: ll(lvililL:cLl rl{)
ur 1919, bul neveflheless a lesson had bccrr teiuned lhc tltscrcrliling ol
ther- than

|ilil

tbc issuc a high Priority.

the IJSSR was the main obstacle to the realization of any plans for
in
the federalization of Europe. Theorctically the questioD was settled by l-enir
he
which
in
Europe',
of
States
'On
a
United
for
the
slogan
1915 in his article,

'llle attitude of
llilt

oI grander poLitical visions.

Ferceptions af Eu{ooe

iilr

conWe have scen how in lhe nilreteenth cel]tury rival per'ceptions of Europe were
'fLre
con
relercnces
of
hisLoncal
a
set
on
specific
structed, each of them Lllawing
in
rools
hcle
have
presented
themes
Many
Lhensincc
dinuDished
lias
not
tusion

llr
lrll

jfl

rlre ultra nationalist order of thc ioiel_war period wirs nol lorgotlorl iln(l irs
Europe obviously coulcl not jump direclly {rom lhe ho[ors o[ wllr lo a lc(lcral
puaclise the neetl for a tnnctional lpproach fbcusing, llrst of all' on ecollolluc
collaboratioD in thc reconstmcho o[ Europe bcgfu1 lo be slressed at the exPensc

capitalist countries, a srong centralizatiotl of the proletariat would be necessary rn

cormtries' slruggle aganst the forces of capitalism (krun, l9l5' pp'

these

ll9-43)
As SovicL rule beoame a rcalily, suclr thescs proved highly adaptable to thlr foreign

lrevious times, but I will

appropnatc.

Fmt, we will

co rected wi
we silali sec
war.
Then
re

haditionally

Europe rdentiiicd by Pirl tlen Boer as freedonr'

Chnstiality, civilization end dcnocracy) faced the new posGwar Europe, and h
nally we vill tum lo questiotls of European regions and borders

with

Lhe perceptioDs

of

Culture versus civilization

ll

ment desired by France and

.luring the wff: in 1943 Sta
Germ-any to dissuade the

Wcs
rc

Unron not only 'tanted

r-emained unchanged

We have seen, in ltim delr Boet's cssay, how ll1 the ]atc eighteenth cenlury the

separafe peace with

schemes The Soviet

concepts

according

to

thc

fubbentrop Molotov ag(eemeols of August 1939, i

tempts to establish a Danube federation or similar
its neighbours, arld fulthcl-rnole suggested a new di
several small ndependent unils (tipgens' 1968, p. 22)-

- with the USA in the vanguard evennlally yielded to rhese

of the necessity to maintain cooperation widr the Soviets The
USA further hoped io create a global security organization, and in this scheme of
lhingri a united Europe was demed uounlerproductive. The end result was the rliv'

Thc Westem Allies

demancls because

112

of culnue aftl civillzation were neuly

syllonymolls- Ilowever' in

GemMny, the !-rcnch te]Tn 'civrlisation' lvas considered a ralher unfofiunate im

port, anal thougb the nillelee th clJlrlury a co trasl betwcen 'Kllltur' and 'Zivilisa-

tlon' was Eladually irlroduced (Elias, 1939, Cbaple. I tbr lhe

drscussion), which

standar{l

in the First World War was heirvily exploited to explam an'L

justify the wa{ The dis! lcion suwrved thc war and it appe?Lrs discussions of
Europeanness even today - an indicaliotr oi its relevMce in frequcnt altempts To
Llefine the naturc of ELrrope. We eet lhe disthclion in EdgiI Morin's Penser

l'Europa ftom 1987: 'culture', in hit temrinology. means

the

Jcwish-Christian {ireek l-aLin cultural foundahons of Etrrope, whereas 'civilizalioD' covcrs homanisrn, ralionality, science ald lreedont hr dlis se se' civilizxtion
r:orres lllcr- cullute.

J]

i
looks

il

Morin's 1987 pdsPectrve'

ccol1le
cult re

ll;rliorl

'cll 73)
'

o[
Let us have a closer look al the l'altirne use

r'

ffi
geography or mce.

I
t
t

tLrese concepts

Culture, civitization, and the First World War

ffi

ffi

t2'1ffl.

ffi

ffi
Geirnan wartime ProPaganda
ffiil

Max Scheler
During rhe First World
tbe war

w'r'

not as a clash bctw

representecl hY Germanv. rurd

ci,,us,!es
114

and its inhabit:urts-

'tbScheler'this.Iirrglishcapitalistdisease'hadspreaddangerouslyallover

il;;-;;;At

*t

had not been left unaffecled as

tie country's inrpen^list

Rtieres und det

115

had been sad lo sec how most tltropeall

('carricrs o[ cslturc') rcnounced all colrnron iransnrtional rc]igious
jn the war' which tlueiL
This decline hacl rctched its nadir

iro(l llrlLonalisl senlinlents Prove(Li,,ltj,j,llt,

Lssay

Thc tlalion suprene: thc idea ol Euope 1911 1945

Es:)ay 2

rit,,

It

,uri nur,,i ,uiltortty

loDnd it colni"n"a r,,,l".r,ny all transcendenLally anchored viLlucs Rut Scheler
Dletclvnrlstakcnloblnretllcwaritselfforthismisery'Tllenrtlrlessrressol.war
utilitariaoism'
*",
nt"n*, ul dcenl mlli!:{ism' but oI convenient Pe^cetirne
"'.', " IIo room lor whrt was roble in hurnanity'
lefi

'tlE] nalion supretie ilte t'|ce ot tutoPe

1tr4 tt

IcnlilY 'rl'
thrjir slii(j :s iul (il)cri0rll\(lllajru Wiilcrrsicx!1li I l lrirrrs- ll(livl(luill

wh(11 l)losclv(ls il llorlLlrllrr, oatlnl! col)rlllllrl'! rrl 1ht rvlrolr' IcrrIle

II. bclir:vr,rl rll{.se slrlo\ lo br.s;rrrrlrrrrl ir u lirrrlrtrrrr r. r'r''
tl|us a Lrnc
"uitr,c. lra(l lroi srrlrrrrirrr(l lL' rrrv lr( rl\ rrrrlrr)rr:rli rrrr r" ')ll! I l r"'l
')r
.;". rt,"y
rrrtrl

will'),

",,ppu"..fty

of uLrlitarralisru
Scheler

wrrs ol

Nlorrc rn

Irs rcltl'rllritrr r)l III( (;(IIIMIsL

L1r

rrs

lrrLlq

irl I'

'rr'1

which

light the
lbr the war to become a ?unfying flame' in who-se briShl
Iderlistjc Ciermro
again
clear
beconle
would
lope
ll
of
,,".
[or' arrd hope
.,rf,,i"i- *"tfa soon understand the values tley tiskcd thet lives
tire front li'c
of
sidc
other
lhe
ol
sokliers
zuiiv-iL
v idealistic young
"q".
demiDd ful Nll
ajrd
var
r
to
Lhe
led
had
orat
ct.ceii
tbe
t""ligttr"

ScheLer hopcd

.tpi",it"r values

*",1t.1-

cnlbraci g lluropcan brotherhoodor ro its fdll' deFDdlng

I'hc war would lead cither to the rellaissirnce of Europe
(iennany
slill had an anliwon
,".,n *tr.*r"r the Geflnan or the English spirit
cosnropolitanihe
with
combinahor
in
which'
.,loii,rft",, ft*o;. conl trnity spirit
the f^te of all oll
for
of
responsibility
its
sense
spirit,
national
isiu .,1 0re G..rnan

Wilhehrile

stafc

mankiir(l,madeitnalulalforthecountrytoleadthestruggleforthespirifual'alrd
vi ues
uoti,i.tt ut,r,u ol [urope. Suhelcr calls such a brotbe
lonned
Callolic
the
tlat
h.
lropes
7- t,'ri"rrr:^i,^rnu7, ond
In this'
become the cornmon ora
,*nr r"r,iuor will ag^in
-ilspiration
oI
Catholicisnr
torn
rcligior'rs
in tl)e deep, iurer
th" Cltu,.h can iinrl
fclt in Cieflnany.

Agrinst

l 'rghllr^rc vision in vlLich thc world is divided to ftee a

llusslltn em
Jaf,anese ernplrc ruling h dlc East, a culturally unfieative

Mongolian

nletha cal, capitalist America as rhe

i,,t" l-itirrtoi"g to tLe West, and finally a
spfitually
i,.,,, ru'llriL,si ulilil.rnirnis l Scheler p ts his positive vision of tr
stlpremacy:
nilillry
Genniur
llrtcrl c(xrlinclllil linoprj under

ald so on

A Communist interqrctation

Frrrot'e wlrrclr will ' {r'ens

purilaniccl 'iislonrorr ul
I nglistr AIneni.llr .'aprlalisrn and il\
'atvini\lrc
-h-n"d"liry, and at the sarne time a Europe
which rcverses the
lurovcmenl of expansiol ftom l]asi lo West ilrlo West to East
(Scheler, 1915, p 249: sec dlso p- J53l
\.{

lI

rll br

as lragic and-des[xurive
surn, Scheler sees the spread oL capittlist civilizalton

aDd deed'.a Lrue

bttt he
.,r,Drouuity oI lovc. He wants Catholicism to dehvcr the spiritual recovery'
a
giv-esScheler
This
Etllopc
of
defence
upp"^I" tn Genrtuny, not the Churcir, in
at
differently'
or
Britjrin'
capitalist'ds
ls
al
least
Put
nrotrt"nt, ** ,,ot G..,nony
(iennalry save rtself from calitaiism and at the
least as iudustrializc<i? How can
the answer in lhe
sar c tlme cxPloit Lhe v Lues ol teclrnology? Schelcr Ilnds
of the state alivc:
idea
lntirlrity's
krPl
(ierman state liernla,ry (ancl Auslria) lrirvc

io a Europe bascd ()Il culture, i.e a uoitluc nobiliry of thought

don'? IIl I917 he fbun(l the rnswer in Soviet

l{

ssia

flscinaiing interPreliltiul ol the oi$e llr his tullcl 'O1cl anrl New
b0t
CLrlturc'. Capitalism, Luk:ics notcd, was lhe ctllnlilliltion ol clvilizatloo so fal'
'Clullure" wc
al the sarDe tirDc it was ir li)r cc that dcslrovcd all gclnrine cnlntre
should noLicc, is ooL Llsed here'irl tlle (ienran sense; l'ukics defines it as crr:t1_
thi g that is d!:ttheLi&llv antl ulncultv |altxlbk in Pralu( ts Q A ahilitic: lxvontl
theit fun( li.rlal ne.rr.! il) Ther. rvete scveral rcasons lor lhis

Ll 19l9

(a)

he gave

1r

relity

Iea0s

Ll

l lhc ru

e'

theY

ftlher lhan tls cootiollors licollodric growth

irlLrl Lrcconre a

3o^l iu llsell

(b)

abont EuroPe, but ihe sfuclure of the argument demonstrates

is inf-* Inu.tt'Co,rr.rtunirt tldnking, jn spite of its 'anti European' universalisir'
in its
and
era
modem
the
of
;;;;;; i; Ed";' traclitions"both in its diagnosis
as iLrBolshevism
to
describe
made
beer
,"1"i." a it, dilemmas Attempts have
roots ir European
tr"r.ntty Rurrion and therefore non-E[roPeafl, but without firrlr

liitlc

1rioti,..is rrr a ctp(rljsl sLrcrcLy - cven cultuRl

j{
Ill() L:()rxnrric circLrlalion, Lhey bccane conmodities And the ol y v^lue
thcy cnd&l up lllving was thorl comlrlodil] value' thcy lost the cultural auton
oxry Llecessary lbr them tLr lrese e any genune' innel valte'

LLrkiics says

pre-capilalist moclcs ol Produclion o\ilture was of course the privilege and

product;f the ruling classes, but it did have arl inner autonomy as the ruling
*"." still abolc the slsteor of prcductron, not just agents of lt' which
"lur"""
enabled them to appreciatc ge uine lalue uLd allow for its crealion'

;;t od ; ;^,

As

products

rll

were dugged

(c) hr

of Bolshevism to many Elropeiur intellectuals !'/o'ld

agpeat

hardly have been Possible.

Der lJnteryang des Abendlandes

iilil

commeDtato$ seomed

to

agrce

drat

were rnrer
of Europe as a patient lying feverishly on the deathbed
war to the
the
during
Brandes
G"otg
lit"'ory
fro* tt D-irit
"iiti"
1988'
"
(Do11-Joharsen'
"r,,--r*itt
Romains more lhan two decades 'ldter
_tcJ,ir"tiit,?.t[t
of
collapsc
near
thc
about
^f".
intellectuals were iust as convinced
"'t uropearVnur,n
ptogtess
continuuus
its
abolll
been
had
parcrtts
civilir.ation as tllerr

l"Gption"
real ctllture

onebookbecamednilrunecliatesFnbolofallthesesentimcntJ:nrstpublishedin
(lntergang der
,"'rir"a a few years later, oswald SPngler's Dr
iSl Sthe leasi
"";
perhaps
ii.-ai"ra", tin" o"cline if rhe werl) became a bestseller - the moodnotof a whole
to
gave
trame
tft" *p*tly complling title which
t

lessly cri{ica1 th^t its inner harmony liad disappeared'

""^t." "i

fl
ffi

ffi

gnerauon.

q
B
;ith a multiplicity

?ltempt at an
world culturcs

Spengler's book
ophy of historY.

found a 'morphology of world

histo

ffiil

tible cr tures)
according to

fo r sea
;;;; ,"-;;',bt t;-a
even
spensler
analvsis'
this
;;;;,-;, il;r, to life cvcle on the basis of over
next
the
f"-*Lt ^ble ro predict developmeots
lY',*il"lli""*ia.*a
a powerful mythlcrl-rclrglous
C.rfto.", f*" youthful sping, is the time of
a number of phases compared sometimes to ihe

between culture and civilizationi

society wishes to create a socielal ordcr of a killd that

to a li{estvle thal $ns Led onlv bv the rulirg classes
;;u;;ii;;""y;""
wl ch was noL available to any siogle class
bul
J"fr- ."pu"fi.,it,
rlrllng capitalisn.
134)
Conmunist

(t,ukit.t, l9t9,p

(and lhc capitalist lcrverts!?)

Through slatc planning thc Perversions ol capitalisln
of the economy' not vice
contlol
in
and hunanjty reinslatc'l
.ouia i"
"lirrri,1at.a
versa.Tlrrrs'lreedofslperfluouswoFies,Peoplecouldletumtotlreuulyexisten
diErcssiorr' since
of life ani producc culnrre in abundmce This is a

it,

tf..ro."i"g

out an<l tire cultwe transfofms into a civilization

terms 'culture' and 'civilization' ln
So here we meet yet anolher use of the
P of a rulrute its
s.enoler's telminology, civili/ation is
mrior culrrrrr
d"*'t"
.all
il-'"lit."'.-t"uhook rn'l his
his
but his main thenrel
i,t";;;i"t",

tli

tru";;;;.
'

Ior

fr"r*".n-iit" iiofiti""f,

arcc
ch Revol tioo therc brielly exNied a
of
feudal
dcsirxcuon
rd
the
cituens
ol
emanciprtion
i i"oLogical

exa rple, in the years alier the

lre

hnce
zenifh, takes on a fuller and a mole serene aPpe

"t
with I sweetness
the creativity of any cullure is mosl subLime
;";;; ;;"t","hi"h,
the culture's soul dies
e
oI
lhe
f
eod'
the
in
Bnt
;;t;;;;-"0;t $elancholl

barbarians

l[ffi1

rilf,t

ilfli

flffi1

sptng

made br
Empirc)
ding to
'rinete"n

of antiquity.

(lea'L

occidcntal
fransrlron
are called

ilt

lillr
I

ties in Lhe economy

119

118

ii
tilfi

unspilitual, unphilosophlcal, devoid of art, clannish to fie Point of

bruLaliry, aiming relentlessly al tangible successes, lhey stand belween
the Hellenic cullure and notlingness.
(Spenqler,

flil

iltil

iill

itilt

19IE; 1926

edn,

32)

no one could triss tlre point-

At first glancc, Spengler grves the imprcssion of being just another culrural pessimist. His main symbol of civilization was the metropolis, the cosmopolita! centre
of rootless, depersonalized masses. His epoch was charactedzed by a loss of religiousness and sense of purposc. Money ruled supreme, accompanied by Political
cyrricrrn and philosophical scepticismBut civilization was not only the manifestation of decay aid disaster; its end was
also tle birth of something new Spcogler held that civilizalions could maoifest
themselves actively: if'civilizatioo man', as SPenSler called him, could not direcl
lris euergy inwards, an outwards expansion was possible _ its name being imperialism. To Spengler, Cecrl Rhodes was the fust herald of a new age which was to
uiique
cuhninate in the next two centuries. Also, occidental culture had ce
^in
features in being furure oriente.d ?rnd with aspirations towards etemity Its spint
had manifested itself in a technical inveDtivenss, wluch has allorved E[roPean
culture in its civitized phase to spread all over the world. Since the spreading of
civilization was rnevitable, one could just as weil make the most of it, for instance
by engaging in impeflallst cooquest radiq thari succumbing to decadent pseudo
philosophies like pacifism or scepticism Spengler did in facL -find a limeless tnrlh
beyond all morphotogical change, a principle thal offercd a last resort frcm the
decadence of world history. This hxth had a lot in commor with the then fashionable Social I)arwinism (Nolte, 1991, p. 221), dressed up in Nietzsche. In
Spengler's words:

iilt

llvcr ill hrstory it

will{o powcr

is life and life only - race quality, the triumPh of the

nud no! thc vrctory of truthfi, discoveries, or noney that

signilics
(Spen9ler, 1922, 1928 etln,

ilt

Thc coming of Cesarism breaks the dlctature of moDey and its political
weapon democncy. After a long triumph of world ciry economy and its
urterests over political creative force, the political side of life manifests
itsclf after all as the stronger of the two. The sword is victorious over
the money, lhe rnaster-will subdues agail the plullderer-w]ll. If we caU
these money-powers 'Capitalism', dren we may designate as Socialism
the will to call into life a mighty polilico-economic order that

I
I

p.507)

Spcoglcr's book (whose lirst edition was published early in 1918 the frrsl volume only; the second volume was published in 1922 - in expectation of a Geman
victory) czLn therefore also be read as a piece of warlime propaganda Eiving philosopfucal absolution to the Gernan war effort. IIr common with his above merl
troned colleagues, SpeDgler colsidered the co lict to be the inevitable rosult of
the historical lftmsformations of the t[ne, a conflict in which 'Inoney' (lie UK)
was fightiDg against 'blood' (Germa[y). Spengler was not iI doubt aboot the out

i'1

120

ds IL clitss inlcrcsts, u sYsleor ol l(,fry thoughtfulness and

cluty-scrtsc lbirl kccPs the wholo ill lilre con.Iition for thc declsjvc batlle
of iis hrstory,;rnd liris baltlci is dlso lhc bat e ol money and Law
(SpengLer, 1922; 1928 edn, P 505)
transcc

Spcngler's socialisrrr, to be sure, hirs litLle to do wilh Marxtsm and even less witlr
the Utopido socialism ol the nircteenlh century. It found its fuxe expression r the
Prussian Orgnnisatrolsslalrl with ils abi.lify to mobilize ail resources in the imperl
llist shrggle. So, conlrary to traditidlal intcrpretations, Spengler was ro( a pessl
misl Hrs lristoricaL detennioism was nol defeatisrnj be Lad written off one cullulc,
but only i[ the lrope rat a rlirw one vital, dynarnlc, and ruLl]ess in a Nietzscheart
way - could be bom in Westem Europc- Thts is fie cssence of his recomlncn
datlon to yotlng geleratiots lo give up cullure aid philosophy ilr favour of letlr
no)ogy, military fbrce, and tlrc politics of power (Spengler, 1918, p. 57)

Facing post-war Europe

The hoffors of lhe war-, America's intewention in liuropc iuld lhe post war near
collapsc oI lhe lutopean economies convinced lnost observcrs thal Lhe days ol a
self evident European world supremacy wete over. All 'European-ninded' intellectua-ls had to lace this r:elative decline in Europe's global position, and bolh
Catholics and Libcral democlats were coofrorted wilh the growth of poverful lew
rrends in EuropeaD politics, which reiecied most oI ElrloPe's Past: to thc adherents
of Cofixnunism or Fascrsm in ils various natuoni]l ve$ioN, 'lhe old world' was to
Ldlly discredited ard both idcologies ftied io exploit the metaPhors ot' youth a d

vitality to

jncrea-se dreir popularity.

Many young intcllectuals, who had cither wltressed 1he senseless losses at the
front ljne, or the famine, deprivatro[s and corruption at hotrie, felt lhat the liberal
system that had lcd tb this wadare haij lost all credibilily. These feelings arc
strongly cxpressed rn a pocn by Ezra PoLrnC (1835-1972) and in fhe harshness
and uglioess of the inmediate post-war drawings of George Glosz (1893-1959)Conseq[ently, both lDe[ (anLl with them many of thc new, young generation)
looked for radical solutions. I'ound in liascism aod Grosz in Commuusm.

Hugh Selwyn Maaberley

IV

iI

any case,
These louglit
iurd some believing,

lro

domo, in any casc

Some quick to aml,

some for advenfurc,
some ftom fear ot' weakless,
some fTorn feal of celtsure,

.orc Ior lo\c ol:l,lu!'ltc.. n rrnr.i..r'inn

leamiDg latcr ..

somc in

{.ir.

lcarn

n! ln\c nl \,d gh'cr

l)ir(J s,)rr(', t)r0 |llr

The comfoft ol EuroPean culture

itr,

noLl'dlllcc' o['el

{le(]or".

wrlkcd cyc dccp iu irr:ll

bclicvrnt r., o,d rr,cu's lies, i;rcn unl)eiieving
crnlc lloiilc! llortrc Io it iie,
homc io rnlny dccoils,
horne lo oid lies md ncw itllrmy;

somewhil flawed feeLings of superiorily.

usury age-old aud age-lhick

and liars

in public

p'races

as neler beiole. waslage as L]cvcr beiore

Young blood and high ttoo':i,
hir cheeks and fine boLiies:

Darilg

ibfiilrde

as never belorc

frankness as never belirre,

tlisrllusions as oever told ir1 the old days,
hystclias, trench confessroLls,
laoglrter o l of dctd bellies

W
Scheler

in

1915 was sute that

i{

Noli

America should suddenly cease to contrih-

ffi
There diecl a rnYriad,
And of the best, amol1g thcln,
For arl old bitch gore i the teeth,
For a botched civilizalion.
Charm, srnilirg

a1

ltilil

the good mouth,

Quick eycs gone under eafih s lid,

ilil

Ior tru gros. 'l nJ lell lilu('

For r lew thoLrsaltd baltcred books-

(['zro lound, 1920; 1952 edn, pp- 2474)

1tilffi

Liberal pr-ogramrnes tor ll united Elrope such as the ofles of Cou(lenhove-Kalergi

and Briand had rrouble gairrirlg mass alhaction in competitjon wilh nationalistic

iliffi

llril

tilil

European-nirtded

iellecluals:

Mdespread Pessinisrn w:Ls the (L)Inirlant chatactelistic of Europcal

tirought between the two w^rs

lDuroselle, 1965, P 267 )

We

cal

exceltions, bul everywherc we ntcct a feeling ol unccrtainry whicll

the comP]ecenl ol)timisl)1 of the prcviolls cclllury

lirLrl

filr fion

i\

somc 9otslaughleredan'(]alhersSol,'i,'h'Geo3eGroszgraphictilyillu\lro|esl]vhorroro
ulti,n n.[ nn'' r"dit Akad.nie !'t Kiintt"' Bctlinl

' on

"

1?3

122

iti
riri

to thc lield of culture, lhe loss would be i lte in r:ourparison to lhe loss of a
European nation such as France or Italy, at le;Lst so far as qualily was collcemed
(Scheler, 1915, p 287). Fifteen years and a peace settle e t later, Ortega y Gassct
Doted (ibid-, p 20), that the living stardard of the average American nfght be
higher thar jn Europe but, by companson with Europe, the level of thei 'selecl
rninoitics' (i.e their intellectual 6lites) was stlll relatrvely low.
Lrte

liiiliI

Despite this, Eu.opearrs still felt somewhat defensive: the Czech wriler Karel
Capek (189G-1938) in a letter to Lhe New York Times fried, in 1926, to explarn
why he would find it dangeroBs i[ American idea]s were to spread to Europe.
Some aspects of the American way of life particulatly alarmed him. Fist, the
speed and bustle, since for Capek work efficiency was not the be-all and end all in
life, and also because most of what was valuable in Europe was the product of
people who werc not in a hurry:

'l'he dilfercnce bclween cultllre and civilization was very visible in the caso of thc

was a social dnlocral. and socialism

in lhe

bLLsic scnsc

rlrtr wt rrlt IIril

risrrl, wlrrr:h consr ioLrs lY

oi carc lirr

cvclYlrtxlY li) ltirr' llrL

I l lag{nlistic sociill sYr
lisnl rnd prinrrljv.: trlili
tarizrnisnr, princ-Lples alicn
17s).

a d dangcrous I{) hue llllrol)ea

vlrlLrL:s

(Krclii' l9ll'

Europe wasted its time for drousands of years; drat is where its
inexhaustibilrty aod fertilily comes from.
(Copek, J926,

p. 18)

ril
takes a certain laziness to fully appreciate life, 6apek noted, and ir the same lein
he courplained about the American cult of success. Europeans used to have a heroic
tradition, they died for their faith, for love, for truth or for similar irrational tlings.
Il1 its craziness Europe had managed to carc for thousands of other things besides
success, and while these-things remained, the devil took whatever there was oI success in history. Fi ally, Capck found it hard to accept the cult of quantity:

It
rffi

fifi

I
I

flil

iir
1i
i

it

The Creaior of Europ made her small al1d even split her up irto hltlc
parts, so that ow hearts could lind joy not in size but in plurality
(lbid., p. 50 author's translation Jrom Czech)

i-apck was a liberirl democrat, a pragmatist, but dris did not prcclude a touch of
ostalgia and rotlanticism rnmlding in his view of Europe. Once agaio, onc woD.:r|itrlrsrrr wrs not alter rll a Luropeiur ilvention
'lrrs it
lrirciDg the same pfoblems, and explicitly basirg his analysis on the dichoiomy of
cullure and civilization, CaIJck's countrlman, lhe wifer and literary critic F V
Krejdi (1867-l9al), in his book Czechhood and Europednnds (1931), hied to
analyse the essence of Euope.

CivilizatioD, he said, was easily transferable as could tre seen from tle way
Europear civilization in its specific Anglo Saxon version - had conquered all
continents- Culture in contBst was specilic ard histoncal, it was a slr ctrre of aesthetic, ethical and intellectual norns and practices generated over centuries.
According io lkejLi Europe, since antrquity, had proved to possess a speclal abil
ity to open new dimensioni for all huma ty and even now its moral and social
fhinking incamated the conscience of humaniry Always - and lhe exact sciences
had added new dimensions to th1s - Europe had sought to make the ftuits of its
spiri( bl:come a li,ed experience, a daily affirmation of the virtues of
Buropeanness. When successlul in ttis, culture arrd civilization beoame one, as
could be scen in Westeflr Europe aM parts of Central Europe.

Lo avord
emocrats
fadition
lew dec

now the shaken EuoPean ego found comtbrt in thc cosiness

irr

to

of
ld'

of

re Past'

Europe and the Nazi mvths

From an icleologicd standPoint, Fdr;cisrn and Natioml Soci'lism wele, as previously menlioned, ihighly heterogeneous irod cven conftadictory in tircrr ourious
blend of anti modemism with a technocratic modernizing ethos, thei-c search fo(
rooiJ in aDcient myths and hislory and their claims to reprcseflt the youth and tLe
fuhrre, thelr 'anti-capitalist' anti-socialism and so on. Can olre Ieally spe?ll( of reactionery revolutionaries?! If we are to Atlach this ideology to any of Pim derr
Boer's different identifications of EuroPe we must - however paradoxrcal it may
sornd see Nazi self perception in the tradition oI 'Europe as fieedom'.
At least, that is how the Nazi iCeologist Alfred Rosenberg (1893 1946) presented
Nazism ir his 6ook Der Mythus des 20 lahrhurulerts (1930) Rosenberg conjmcs
up a powerful myth of the blood - the blood in which the soul of every race is
cxpressed. ExteNively miring m)'ths and legends with pseudo-science, Rosenberg
attempts lo alemonsfate how thc unallerab]e racial soul aDd the vahes attrib[red
to it have ruled the life and history of the races. In Europe, Rosenberg sees tbrce
principles fiBhtmg a life and dealh struggle: dre authentic Nordic Abendlan l :esling on freedom and ho our strugEles wilh hoih the Calholic church. this child of
decay ard racial chaos in Rome with its tyraltrric dogmas and demands lor slrbDrssion, and the heralds of chiios the Jews and their adherents wilh theu mateti
alisL ildividualisrn,
Jewish money.

Manism, and mock dcrrocracy whicli otly hidcs the rule of

Iu Rosenberg's cyes, fhcsc thrce powcrs were fighting 'um die Seele eines jeAgn
Europaers'('aboul the soul of every single European' Rosenberg, 1930, p. 118),
ard tie war had shown that no coexistence between them wa,s possible.
Everywbere, all forces had to conceDhate on cleausing the lational spi t of ideo
logical dregs ard the national body of racially aliel elements. FGnce, for instaoce,
q,ould have to desist froln racial degeneration before lhe country could rightfully
claim its rahfal position in EDrope. In this racia] and ideologrcal struEgle,
Rosenberg called all 'rcal' Eurcpeans to ams:

l
I
I
t
I
I

to accept a future as an Asiatic pover'

Europe's states were all founded and mainfained by Nordic peoples.

This Nordic man has been in part poisoned and in part exterminated by
alcohol, worid war and Marrism. It is clear that the white race cannot
maintain its position in the world unless it creates order in Europe...If
Ewope is to be preserved, the fust Fiority must be to revive dre Nodic
sources of Europe's power ihese are Gemany and Scaldinavia, with
Fir and aad EDgland.
(Rosenberq, 1930,

640)

l
plutocracy without nadonal identity'

I
I
I
I
t

The revolt of the masses

AIfrcd Rojenber|, Nazi ideolo1ist, trho drew a rac[al

(racist) interpretation of Europe to the extreme
(credt: BiLdarchi, Prewsischer K lturbesnz, Berlin)
127

126

tr t4re

Essay z

tJt4-t14J

had allowed nrany pcople to obt n a staodard of living, wlxch only a few dccadcs
ago would h.rvc bcen lhe cxclusive privilcgc of thc wealthy Iew. Now nothing see
rled to prevent a life of frecdom and luxury

But

if

the masses possesscd modenl teclmiques, ftey still lagged far belund in
Droral upbritrging. They were like spoiled children who considercd the whole complicated material and social orga zation of society, from which they benellted,
natural like fresh atr, instead of realizing that it was the lrail product of a specific

il

civilizafion. Only dle combination of mnetenlh century liberalisn, capitalism,

fri

l'
l!

and experimental science had made the explosive social progress porisible. tsu1
'mdss people' hated the nobility afld generosity of hberaL democracy, since they
had an antipathy to values that were different from their own, to everything that
was unfamllid to them- They rcfused to listen ard leam and favoured lhe lyranny
of mediocrity, devoid of ideas aDd values Politically, they could only express
themselves in 'direct actiol' or violence, si0ce any dialogue would imply sornc
higher 'rules of the game' a principle unacceptable to 'mass-.people'

No wonder, then, that 'nass people' fell athacted to the nililism of Fascism

and

Bolshevrsm, two rnoverlents cynlcally mocking the plinciple of heedoor drat htu1
oradc dcrn possible Bolshevism and Fascism were symptoms of decay; they werc
anachaonistic and offered nothing but a retum to an outlived archaic world, which
had once beelr defeated by liberalism. They were empty, but dangerous sirce the
masses could now usurp the state apparatus lwhich had grown alarmiogly in irnportmce) aod tum it into a perfect apparatus of violence and exploltalion. If ir
happened, it would be the end of historical spontaneily and the death of Eurofe.

But lhe rnasses

a.lone were

nol io blame. Ortega y Gasset was a staunch supporter

ol liberal demooacy, to which hc saw no altemadve. He called it 'the loftiest en

dcavour towards corunon life' md a noble act of self-limitation tuid loleralrcc
(Ortega y Gasset, 1930, p. 58). Liberalism was to him the essence of civilization,
and civilization the negatron of barbarisn. Still, liberaLism had obviously suffcreti

lrorn 'certajD radical yices', since it had brought into beirg such characters ns
'nrass people' who were iD revolt-

Liberalism hacl somehow lost its alertness and forgottetr its nced of a dynamic pro

j:l
I

i
1

granrme; probably

it had been too complacent. It was symptomatic how specializa-

tion had made even scientists 'mass-people', absorbed in their own little worlds
wifhoutknowing the iDner philosophy of the science they cultrvated. The lack of ei
enrentary historical knowledge left pople without 1ilm guide]ines; they had become
roo[ess, aware of their possibi]ities but uncqtain ofhow to use thelll. Petty rationa[,
1sm, which had become so influential after the war, was just o e proof of this.

Ortega y Gassel was convmced that the decline of Europe was essentially a myth
perpetuaied by the Europeans on themselves, and that it only revealed tler own
lack of a prografime. Without the will to progress, all Europeafl values and all tl-s
crealivify would disappear. It would nor have manered so much if only some other
had been ready to take over, but so fat nothing new wds in sight. Europe
^rltho.ity
had
landed ilself ilr a vacuum, but perhnps the present cflsis could lead to a rc,
newal of i1s most valuable priDciples. Europe still trad a missioo to perform; ir
only needed a ew plrilosophy rfid a goal.
128

tttL taLtutt soPtet)tc rtepcdu'LuluP'

'Jti

tJ

ir
Ortega y Gassel suggested a Progrdrltne of l.uge-scale Polirical rclbrn r1mLn8
sleit(l
dre cieation of a 'United StaEs of Europe" Technical developmenls and ihc
ily Browing excharge of ideas had made *re ation slale obsolete. aod sincc a rir
tional community was basically a futue oriented ideological product il ought lo h(r
possible to make EwoPc into a Dalional concePt. This would be lhe only w'ry lo
ievitaLze Europe an.l to present a genuinc, rnomlly suPenor altmiltive to Sovi( l
Comounism,

In sum, althorgh Ortegr y Gasset blaroed modem civilization and the technjcrl
specialization inhcre t in it for the se of the new barbarians the 'mass peoplc'
political level (aicribii8 only a mhor rolo to
tiro rletnmelltal effects of tecbnological development itself) though t]re uniication
of Eorope in a new nation s1ate. 'Mass people' wele mole a sympiom raD ihc
crisis, he said, but he abstained fioln detailed aualysis of the Raws jo
he marnly sought a soluuon on the

of the
rnodem European cllllure lhal wele really to blame

cause

a billjant essay, A.htun|, Europa! (1935), Thomas Mann unmasked the bruraliry an.l the ties on wirich Fascism was built Accepting Ortega y Gasset's mx;n

In

masses, lie directly aftacked the question only hinred

colleaguc
Mann saw tlle roots of the Present miserable state of
at by his Spaoish
Europe in the way in which the bitterly idealislic nineteenth cenhrry seekeN aflel
ruth had tom apat the idealistic philosophy of libcralism Lr a Lragic way, rcason

anaiysis

of the revolt of the

ha.l undennined its own foundations: Marx and Nietzsche were Doble idealists, bllt
they (or rather thcir later interprete$) had lacked a sense of responsibiLiry sirce

they dld Dot see the danger of arlti intellecrual romaDticizing inherent llr their
thinkmg- As thc masses leaned about llle dethroning of spuit and reason, nolhilrg
could prevert them frorD revellDg iD cheap inationalism and intellecnral fTatld To
M.uxr, the cult of the irrahonal oI tle 1920s and 1930s wal utterly Patielic-

'I' (and thus lTom morals

'foday's masses had
lro ambilion but to escape from the
and reaso ) and lale refuge in colleclive ecstasy. Of course theiJ totalitarian masters klew what krnd of ideologies to feed rem with io order to cootrol thenl
(Marx ur his day wanted to cnlighten the rnasses, the Nazis had no such arn
bitions), snce the masses werc sentime tally rom?mtic and took pleasure in a vo
cabulary of blood ald soil in spite of their thoroughly modem trapprngs- The
traditiolal Eurcpean ideas of lruli, freedom ald justice were replaced by 'myths',
i.e. by a deslruction of the borderline between tmth and falsehood Therc was
nothing Christiar in thls rcvolt of the poor in spirit, since all they preached was
the destruction of human ights; nor was there any heroic ethos, since heioism de
lnanded higher moral values dlan lies and murdea
wa$ in no doubt that if lhe rule of the masses and their mastels lasted fo.
:my length of time ir Europe, wai would follow antl bring about the encl of civili
zahon as we knew it. B t what lrightcned hirn most of all was the weakness of the
old, educated world when conionted wilh lhis new ba(barism. FIe saw in all hu_
malisfl an inhcreDt weakness oaused by its owlr good [ature and ca]led tol d

Maflr

]i.e, niLitonL Etrrt4tean httmanitm, ready lo fight resolutely

renaissance of
^
against fanaticism devcnd of sh ne :utl doubt Without this rebjrth, Europe would
be destroyed to the point wberc only rts nirDe was left

As mentioned above, Marn had in 191? been an ardalt defender of culture (authenticity) in its struSSle with civilizatior (Political convenience without deePcr sPiritu
ality). It is therefore tempting to hterpret lhs later defence of civilization as a
'deJection' to the other side, but Mam's later work can be seerr as an attempt al ^
synthesis (I.{olte, 1991, p. 61
Sieg der Denokratie ('The
democracy to the temporary
of Fascism being its 'youth

dignity ('Geheimriswiirde') of humans. And ivithout

fis

spiritual dimension,

mechanical democmcy or 'lhe rule of the people' was not worthy-of its name:
We must defne democmcy as that fonn of govemment and of society
which is inspired above every other viih the feeling and consciousness
of the dignity of man.
(Mann, 1937, P. )21)

l
I
I
I

Democracy in tlus setrse is no less the worldly agent of a transcendental principle

thall the Prussian state-

Catholic dilemmas

with dictato$ who were ProbFascists worked wetl. bul in

t no unholy alliarces with such
could not hope to conhol them (Trevor-Roper'

re possible and that the Church

Woolf, i981, pp' 2L36)

a demoThomas Mann's tioughts indicated tlat there werc intimate ties between
al
cratic hurnanism aware of its transcendental roots and Cbistianity But the
Liance was

intellectuals
Cbristiairity
cles

were

rcverse.6

Mass people in an impoverisheil mass societJ was a harsh realirt after

the First World War. The pictLlre shoi's a crippletl ex senticematt
begging: leIl-han(t side of the tripDtch 'Metropolis' bv the German Otto
(credit: Otto Dix Stift nE' vadltz; Pholo: Galerie der

oi(lEsl-lsdl)
Stuat, StuftRar,
130

Europe

(Golwitzet 1964, p. 15; Schulze, 1990' p

18)
131

I
I
I

Lj-dy i

ti
I

t'tc ttdtutt suyet'tc

tttc tLtea ot EUtuPo ,vt1

tY4c

towr s

tlc

Brirish
ol lhc
a
conrplex
discussion
(1889-1970)
preseated
Catholic Chistopher Dawson
problems of Europe in hts bookThe Judgement of the Nations (1941). In 1945, his
book was lranslated into German ard published in Switzerland. With his thotough
alalysis of the dangers of a secular civilization and rccornmendations tbr Christian
social polihcs, Dawson became an imporlanl representalve of all Abendldn l lrend
in Catholic thought, which became inllintial in Weslem and Southe Europe af-

Defrnitely anh totnlitarian, bDt atso sceptical

trberalism,

Bur

f., $."1.'rr ' ir lrrli "n ir' '\lrulc

i ,1'' I n13l

l,e,,rrse ir
west hrs
lrinciplcs by which rhe

n,..,n..l.rrl',

Dawso

uses fhe concepts

lne virlorv ol suclr J sllrllle'lruclron ol Ihe cplrrnlrl

'rrd

Lived

of'Europe and 'lhe

(Da*stn, l9llt,

4i))

WesL' almosl as synonyms'

hLrl

'westcr'lr crvilizarrort' it
ii'i" tini* (ana m. irs,A.) are clelinitely part of the
lsles
Britistr
the
less obvious il 'EuroPe' also includes

i\

ter 1945 (Nolte, 1991, p. a55).

iilffi

t
ffi

ffi
ffi

ffi

ffi

So fdr. little has been said abouL British views on Europe. Of course, Bntish ill
Lcrcst in questions of Europe and Europeanness was not absent, but all the literature I have consulted suggests that it was geflerally low. Europe was 'somewhere
else', so to speak- Exceptions were rnainly found among Catholics such as Ifilaire
283), as they had obvious re
Bclloc and G. K. Chesterton (Droselte, 1965,
who
had publi$hed his lisloriDawson,
Christopher
ties
ro
the
Contrnent,
litsrous
ca1 stt:lJy The Making of Europe in 1932, was no exception to ihe rule In contrast,

most of their countymen were more co[cemed about the future of the British

Enpire

arrd lhe Commonwealth than about Ewope.

To Dawson, lhe decades after the First World War had seen the total collapse oi
all the optrmistic illusions of nineteenth-centrry liberalism. Westem civilization
aDd through it all of humanity was being exposed lo a destructive totalitifian nihilisnr, which threatened to annihilate it The dreat left no room for
Deutralityi 1irst, the evil came from inside Westem civilization as a result of ils
own dec^y and, secondly, the totalitarian systems had the power to control
rninds as well as bodies, to bninwash people and destroy everything good in
them This danger was more serious for Christiarity than any eallier i[vasioD of
barbarians, since the new evil was dcpersonalized and inspired lrot by the nalve
cruelty of primltrve watiors but by wha! I)awson called 'the perverted scie ce
of a cor-rupt civiLization'- Civil;ation itself had becorne dubious, since ils matcriNl power rurd wcalth was growi g rapidly while simultaneously lts moral
f()undiltions weie eroded. Ihe more the power, the morc complele lhe dest c-

li()n. it scemcd.

-lhe evil flrreatenl g Europe wins essentially of a spiritual kind; and Hitler and
Stalin were its 'creatures, not its creators'. But since 1918, such ev had been hr-

ilffi

ill

ill

stitutionalized in the totalitarian staie, which had corne iflto bing as two reactions
against liberal democracy came togelher- Indivldual liberalism was threatened
liom inside by the mechanization of culture, and extemally it was faced with na_
tiona.I opposrEon in countries without democratic traditiots. To Dawson, the totaLi
tarian idea was distinctively Russian bfore it became German or Italiarr, and he
explains the appeal of Commurrist collectivism by placing it in the context of
Russia's theocratic ideals of Orthodoxy and Tsarism.
Dawson's 'real' Europe was only the pafis with a Roman Catholic past, and evefl
here he makes a distincrion betweerl 'Westem civilization' and what is at tines
called Central, at limes Eastem Eurcpe, evifiln which he includes (iennany.

I)awson was sceptical about th,1s region, which he found cullurally susceptible to
the spint of aulhodtarianism and collectivism:
133

132

lronr rlr( (onlcAl llrirl I)lwso s !ision ol i 'lvestern Eul-opean ledemtidi'

r()l llrclurlo Ilrrtrri , rvhiLlt P()lilicxlly Nlrs to rem:Lin oLltside Europe

does

Europe's regions and borders

l)awson hild littlc to sny irbouL GcrmallY's eastern neighbours, and ill most of the
lLleratue discussed so lar, tho lluropenll Llorizon has been esseltially Westem
Europcau. Ortcga y Casset un{lerstoocl truroPe to be 'primarity and Probtbly tle
trility of France, Engla cl, Ciermany' (1930; 1961 edn, p. 103), anLl east ol
Germany, perhaps only enigm:ltic llussia was noted- We dretefore need a dis
clrssion oI Russia's compLcated alrd anrbiguous relatio[ship to Europe as seen
both wlth RussiaD and Westero eyes. Rut before thal, I will focus on the snaller

Europe seen {rom Czechoslovakia

and
Ilave chosel to liikc a closcr look ar CzechosLovaki4 lo see how inlellect[als
a
becorne
now
they
had
which
politicians
lhe
ir)
just
aDd
exarrplc,
one
politically
ty of views oo Eurole all ol
East

iLr
I-l
Cleltra]

ffi

new vitality and

ffir

huanians,
such sen_
at
times'
Altd
dre
European
the
Poles
the
Russians,
iuld
iims,

(Krol

ir

to a scll-asserlivc

anti-Western natiotalism

Herlerich, 1989, pp 1021fl.

central Europe should

velop a new kind
capitalist mechani

I-IodZa expecled

rt to

de

for
itical expediency,
ing. For instance,
Europe', and rnan

uelrced by short-terrn pol_

pical of most Czech wrilas being p2u1 ol 'EiNtcrn
and energy frorn lhc wcsl

to Cenual Europe.

3
tr
Turanial langLrrgcs

Lhe

frmiLy ol lturguagcs

relrt'tl to lirrkish

v
it

li

yarizatron-

istically

il]t

li

ovak
nshiP'
135

134

ffi

ration. PoliticallY
West and lhe Russiar East.
Hodza's plans

ffi

Hod;a's Central Europe was the land betwecn Russia and Gemrany The East he
ted as a Part oI Wcsleln
gins with Russia, he
The agrarian character of
Europc or perhaps as

(Caiholic)
'Messiah

inter_war period

ry

ffiil

ol

ophre c'

in the

ililfr

unite spiritually and economically (HodZa, 1931' Pp. 384n' Without such cooPcr
ation, all Cenfirl Europear nations would some day be ground bcFveen thc Inillslones 6f Russia and Germany.

'rre'lr

e was the

Ukrai

Foreign ministcr Edvard BeneS (1884-1948) was honorary president of lhe

(-'zechoslovak Pan-European Union, and another toP politician' the Slovak Milan
HodZa (1878 1944) was seriously involved in the 1930s irr Projects lor tur aSraritur
ccononric union ir Ce[bal Europe. To him, rcgional structures such as this worlld

,.1

Pennaneot Pressure trom

i^) ilas been cmc;al ln lhc
n ole hand. the Poles teel

of thcse oountries

tilr1cnts li3d

war Czech patriots hail striven to emancipate the nation lrom its solid embedment
in Gennan culture. In their sometimes exaggeraied search for non-German rnspi
lations, the Czelhs tumed in various directions from Russia to France and, as an
independent national life began to flourish, the Czechs fbund thcmselves in the
so ewhat unenviable position of 'knowing all about Euope and being completely
unknown io het' (XJejii, 1931, P. 208)- As the war changed that, most Czechs rnd
Slovaks s^w the creation of CzeChoslovakia as a cuknination of a progressile
hend in dre European civilizatior they felt pafi od' They alt knew Lltat the survivaL
of their state was dependent on lhe presewation of the post-war inlenrattonal or
der. So, polilically, Czechoslovakia had great interesi in European cooperation and
the counfy played a very lctive rolc in the League of Nations and ln different rcgional orgaluzirtions.

in

hc bulwiuk

thc

By conrparison, the Czechs felt unconditionally (westem) European Beforc the

be the best and only vtable - fourdation for any 'Paneuropa'- Hodza argued lh^t
all Central European nalions shared the same histodcal experierce, in which they
had been more objects than subjects of tleir own history aod, to avoid national
istic confiicts and economic chaos, tie new nations in the region woukl have k)

them probably very muoh delcmined by what we could call folmdlive

the hislory

bctween thc non-Ildoeuropean Hungarian and the Turkish languages - in lact

llulgarian is only related to Finnish and Estonian) and called for a u on ofall "Iuranian peoples' from Mongoha 1o Hungary (Varda, 1989, pp. 158f).

Essdy

tl
I

frilil

fl

tlte rucaot ruroPe t9t4-t945

Krej6i iD his above mentioncd Czechhood und E&topirll,'lerr also Prescnts a

ELrrope of distinctive cultural zones Io th co troveftial issue of Czech Celman
relatlons he accepts what HodZa pelhaps for politjcal reasols denies: Lhe closc
Czecb cultulal affinity to rhe Germans- To Krejdi, the main axis in the long
rnarch of the European spirit shetched fronr Greek antiquiry through renaissancc
Italy to France and England. The European lifestytes unfolding oo drese histori
cal stopping-places were, in their heyday, objects of desire tbr all of cultur2l
Europe With Italy pohtically weak and England half withdrawn from Europe'
Fmrlce for lwo centudcs became the incamation of European sultwal progress
and was errvied irnd ldtated everywhere. B[t France had become decadent,
seduced by its own spleldour and careless about its cuhural heritage ln Krejii's
words, Fralce had become self suflicient and, in so dorng, had forgotten about

l,l

z tietauo,tsugettte

Essay

1t)e ttatutt

Russia, the Soviet aJnion and Europe

Europe.

tlis frst axis, wherc EuIoPe was a hved exPedence, a new Ccntral
European cultural axis passhg fiom Scandinavia tluough Germany to the Austnan
Empre began to make itself felt with Germany in the lead. The region's sincere.
So adloinilg

ffi

ffi
ffi

ffi

introverted arld pefiaps slightly gross spirit gave Europe dre Reformation, for
which the region paid dearly in the Thirty Years'Wdr. As Gennar cultue finally
recovercd a cenhrry and a half later, the lifestyle of the German elites had nolre of

IIfr

lfr.i

ll'
I

lairs

Freuch lldn. No wonder, then, that fhe culhne of the region became speculatrve and romantic- In this axis, Europe was first of all an idea _ a dream and a fir
lure proiect.

Tied to tlrc continent, the Germarrs were fully aware of rlot being alone in
Europe, aDd they soon bccame preoccupied with the pnnctple of nationality.
Knowledge of Europe became a means to Iea]ize the idea of Europe atld, as
Krcjdi put rt aphoristically, the French drought they oere EItrope, whereas the
Gemrans t(ied lo know her Much of the same was hue about lhe Czechs who
corild not escape a close cnltural relationship with thc Cermans. The Czechs

in r diflicult

siluation shce they were dre Slav tribe that had

peletr'ated funhest;nto the West. Though

ffi

Europeal

Lhe

were put

ffi

intewened directly in (Westen)

ftllly

integrafed 1n Western EtrroPe^n

culturc sirce the accepta[ce of Christiadty, the Czechs had been reluctant to
acccpt Westem civitization, as it usually came duough German mediatiotr and
contained a danger of assimilation. Only in recent years had dre Czechs become
sirong enolgh to grve up romaotic Pan Slav nostalgia and vote for a fully
intcgrated Europe.

was accorded a messiauic role as

'savioul' of

EuroPe-

To Krejdi, true Europeanness consisted il accepting a double adherence 10 oDe's

own nation alld 1o a shared Europear culture In 6le romantic tradition, KreJir
believed in the existence of'national souls' and in tribal-linglistic nalional affinities. To hjm, all European nations had to appear on stage before a fully autheDtie
Europeanness could evolve. He rnentioned dre rccent wave of Scandioavian litera
ture as proof of the richness of such a mulli-cultural Europe, and ire found dre
6lites of small natrons more European than those from the great powers, since they
had to be 'transnational' and know foreign languages to eDrich their own cultutes.
Like [)any of his compatriots, Krejii saw no conflict between a culturally heterogeneous Europe and political inlegrahon, and his book ends on a note of suppofl
for Briand's plans fbr a European confederalion.
136

1s7

tvo lx)wcrs woLrl(l (frrcll c:ollft)l thc lile oI their ha11 ol lhe gLobL
( t,schi7$vski.i, 1959, l)p l l, l0N), l)ul rl tlrc turn of tLre century such a notion wes
bcconling i crcasrngly coDrr ul
th(i

The Bolshevik takeovcr seerrled to lnatrie the tlrsk casv ior most European ob
serveN A political and cultural pariah, Russia requitcd iitde elTort to tre cxcludeci
from cuitural Euope proper. Ilardly any of the texts discussed here accept Russia
uoconditiooally as pdrt oi Europe, the gelleral teldency being to see in Russia a
worid of its own. Some took into account socialism's European ongtrs, but dis
missed the Soviet version as prfmtrve and alien ancl tleeply nrarked by the Asiatic
or Orthodox tradilions o[ Russial hislory.
Somcwhat pitradoxically, this repudiafion of Russia took place at a time when thc
challengc of the revolutiotl and the res[lting wavc of Russiao immignxts E:rearly

i[creased Europcar inlerest ilr Russia ilnd colltaci with its culture. Also the ellri
grflnts Lhemselves had iirely views and one grouP, reprcscnted here by the linguist
N. S Trubeckoj (1890 1938), brought the notion of the olhemess of Russia to ils
logical extreme. For thc iiffl time Russians plesellted Russja as being lundamel
taJly outside the European cull ral world. Though poliiically often just as critical
of the Wcst as the Slavophiles, lhe 'Eunsians' used no(lcm scientilic rnethods jll
dreir an^lysis, which gavc dreir work a curious blend ol itlecjhgy and seious aca
demic resenrch- An arca tpproximately coincidirg with thc Soviet tcrritory was
idenlified as il cohcsrve geographlcal unit that neither belonged lo Eulope nor to
Asia and which was temred tll7-d.fid. Furthennorc, hjstodcally, culturaliy and an
tluopologicdlly this Eurasi r melting pot had fomed an indcpendent workl' and
Trubeckoj could quite agree witir the Westemers who found that the war axd the
rcvolution hrd torn the Eu.opeal mask off thc Russian facc. He made a sharp d]slinclion belween tle Russiaus (whom lte callcd 'T|ranian') and the Slavs an(l
placed the border bel',leen thc West and thc Easl beiwce the two (Trubec[oj.
1927, tr TschiZewskii, 1959, p. 523).
But morc mflueDlial

il

Westem intcllectual ciJcles wns a

crilic of Eura-sianism, the

phrLosopher Njkolay Alcksandrovic Berdyaev (1874-1948)- Bom an aristocrat, hc

had flified with MaD(ism in his yotth l)efore tuming to Cldslia ity. In 1922 he

ir Paris, and Lwo yea$ latcr

great
acclaim.
to

settled

hi s

book'I he New NlitLile AgeJ \las publishe'l

as a Russian parallel lo lhe lirle irl Geman ihinking ihal

libeml civilization antl prcached ils cDd. A.ccording to BcrdyaeY,

T[e book carl be seell

ilisLked weste
history, iike nalute, moved rh)'thmically, aod now the world (ie. tile Chnslirn
world he has Do jntcr-est in thc rest) Iaced a dew Middle Ages The war and the
rcvolution i Russie proved thai the nrod.in em wil's sPintually bumt out and thlt
the old liberal principlcs could no longer be rcstored Some good elenenis of the
nlodem ert would live on into the rlexl cpoch, but while humanism had ljberated
man /rdl, somethilr8 - from lhe thcocr'acy ol' the old Middle Ages, for examplc
it had been completely unable to raise man ro x new spiJitu^l awareness- The
whole theory of clemocracy was based on ihe absence oi'a]ly higber truth and hrr
rnanisrn's pricle had bro ght ils downfall, sincc il God dici nol cxisl' neithcr did

was-a logicaLje'l'his was reflected in Berdyaev's views on ideologies Soci'lismol God But
the
denial
and
Marnmon
of
cult
urta both sh:ted tbe
,uiiof
was righi in.Pltttung
and
"npi,"1,..,
vision
a
had
il
dynsmic;
was
,-ft*" i"lti,^ti.., socralism
or
f"aa But its lnessiarism w rs false and allowed the proletariatdes
a^n".
tyranl'
absolutist
"i'"""
a
Inonsbor'rs'
to become

L-ovirg

^U

vanguarcl
,pitituof freedom in rhe name

,^"", n, ,"U ^nn.",eil

lI

of an empty goal

i! was oPe ly Anticlrrist an'l

Still, Cofnmunism had one foot in the oew era since
Fascisrn

of not believing. From this perspeclive,

Ir general' lhe loss of neuraLtv was a soo'l
era.
new
ihe
;i;;;;';;;*g.f
in
siBn. although Conlmunism soughL an
cliil It demonstrated by negatioo th Je
would be Darked by a retun to a transcen
of Ctuist was shdrply oPPosed to Antichris

,rr"r'a"r-"y"Jirr" m"ral illusion

ffi,

ffi

lbrough ascelic Purification a sP

commulitY would be organic and
tnte pdrliaments of corporative guilds
Bcrdyaev believed ihat R
Europe, Russia had neve

r^tionality of bourgeois
Communism had much

are spiritu
histolY' the
D l;o) Apocalvplic as lhev were' rhe Rus\ian'
in chri't or r conuadeship In Anrichrisr' Rerdvac\
unrlersland lheir sirl{
lPnor of lhe Ievollllion lo tnrke lhe Russians
to the wlole
an
example
be
would
tni'
'"n"'"al
'6'iL"ut
if
Cluiste'rlonr
peoPles
"nJ
all
in
waken
to
have
would

dernocracy:
Lr lhe
^nlv
:;:1 ,:::
;:;;;i;";""".","n ,f*

;::';;;;;;.,'
;;;;;-;.;'r;tsalism
was to r umPh And:

universalist of ail the peoples

Thc Russian people is by nan[e the most
very
Frameworl
rhe
ol
is
Pan
oi
$olld unrncxnon iuro
'",r4,''r'.q"uliry
therr cjling ought to bc lo work lbr
rnirit. and
coslnos'
sPrilual
single
i
tire lormation ol
(BerdYaev, 1924; 1933 edn,P 140)

ill

il

theocracY, aod in his

good and evil secms

sm' bY negatlon'
1an

Ea,st',

th

the end of
ald tle conring of a new era (Eastem
Bolshevisrn indirectly Paved the way'

il
t

Berdyaev shared tlus

nationalism or belief

lr
1938),

t
I

'll!:I-lt:^"i"r

the USSR)

I
I

people found

'disappeared'in
the soul of dre

'l

t
ffi

Predictecl

T,T::;
139

138

ffi

tssay 2

Lssay 2

ne nelan suprcme: tne toee ol Lutope 1914-1!145

'Ihe relucLant or even dismisslve attihrde of most Weslent Europeans lownrds

Russia suggests lhat the awarcness of border$ and nolr 'Europeaoness' l]as beel1
a feeLing of European conmuniry Often the perspec
(a
haveller or inhabitant of some Utopia) or real out
fctional
livc of an imagined
sider was needed to make visible a European identity. Max Scheler observed how

vilrl to the consmrction of

tilt

iil

Tbe anh-liberal German stance with its emphasis on culhrre and traditjon almost
'had io' produce theories of European singxlarity, but even in libenl thought we
olten meet notions of a unique - mostly supedor Europeamess rooted in culture
or race. Aristide Briand's memorandum of I May 1930 mentions Euopean 'mcial
afhnities and cornmon ideals of civilizaLio ' (quoted in Coudenhove-Kzrlergi'
1934, p I l5)- In 1953, the first half of tbe same se[tence in a publication from the
Germar Foreign Ofnce has 'technische Zusammengehdrigkeit' ('technical affinitics') (Europa,1953, p. 33).
This piece of reinterPretation (or'censorship') is hardly accidental. To any Post
Auschwitz observer it is striking how fTequently the colcept of race appeared in
pre-war texts. It was in no way taboo, Dor was it reserved to fte NMis Vital to
so[rc and marginal to otherc rt was widely accepted as at ]east one elemelt relevlnt to the understanding of Europeanness. Somelimes the co cept was used at
the level of nations (the German, Russian, Fiench, etc race)' ard some people
spoke of a European (Caucaslal, white, etc.) race as a wlrole Some cxanPles
serve to illuslratc this Ia ge:
'l hc whole of Europe forms one single race, one single blood fratemily'
wl'x I' is 'lrvidcd inlo manY sLains
tr'ctudenhove Karcrgi, l'tJ1. p. 2/Jt
. tlre disuDity and lack of balalce that marks Lhe German national
temperament is rooted in the racial and historical origins of tle Geman
mtioral being.
(Dawson, 1913, P 20)

fl[[

.even
il"l

li
ti

i]I

te

t4- 1e4'

subieclive ta

cial conimunii-v, but vifiullly ridic lcd lliological racisnr:

stricL classificat;on of rllccs thc arnbilion ol :r1l clhllology is
iflrpossible . Race, rn conlrasl to sPeocll, is unsyslclrlirlic Lhrorrgh arrrl
tluough. ln llre last rcsorl every I lividuirl nuu antl cvi:ry irrilrvirlrrrtl

monlent ol hts existence havc lheir owtl face

(Spcngler,

l1)2) lt)2[]

rtbt,l l.tl)

GiNset:

of ilcompatible cultures

ililfi

tutope

Neverthelcss, racill anthropohgy hiicl bocorrrL: bo{h at:irtkxlically il(rirl)l'rl}lc irrrrl

popular in tlle ldte llineleenth ccntury' rllLl tlc\l'ilc il llrrNt rllt'wllr lll 'rrrli I rr l\l
()rlrllil v
iiterafure tr hacl by no mea s ilisrppealcd lll lllc lr('ri(J(l l)clwcrxl {lxr wirrs-

1ilil

ilil[

he nalton suPrcnte the tdea ot

Of coltlse 0lore were also sceP{Ics Spenglcr acccpted lhc idea of

Eurcpe, races, colonies

ffi

iI

the case of Eastem ollhodox Jewry, where the weaknesses

well as the merits of the whole race are rDore intensly manifested

as

(Zwerg, 1943a, p. 20)

In all cases the bearer of the European intellect is seen to be of a

generalively cohcsive mixed race made up principally of Celts, Latins'
Slavs and Teutons, plus a varishing Judeo semitic minority' which,
wheo considered frorll a geographical point of view, can be dil'rded inlo
broad categories of the fair, Nordtc, blond rlce, the Alpine Jace and the

Medite[anean face.
(Schcter, 1915,

293)

lloorished in Toncs ol our pllncl wllclc lhc llol

seilson .J1 inlctlsc cold lrl ths lro|ics IIlc
anirnal-mar degencrates, alrd vicc vcr-s , inlcr ior r|ces lhc l)y!:mies'
lbr example have bccn Pushcd back towards lhe lroPics by raccs born
alter them and sulcrior iII lhc scale of evolution

.- the huran spccies

ha-s

season is compclsatcd

by.

(lt)30; 196l

uJn,

Not least, such theolics of rlcjnl (blological) itnd cultural dilTercnce

77)

between

Europeans aod non_Europeans were very conveluenl in Sranling legitimacy Lo

European colonial adventures. Genc.alLy, colonialsm was found acceptable wherever thc Europeans werc un^ble to see any 'highcr' culture (i e f-vpic' ly a cultue
strong enough to make serious nilitary or cuitlll al resistance to lhe Europeau penetrafioo).- Chrn^ aid .laPan had won a ce ilin respec!, but nobody saw anythijlS
wrong ;I the exploitation of Africa. To later obser-vels the era's uruellected accePt_
ance of colonialisnr gave fhe idea of Europe a traSic ambiguity, as tbe concept i"?
tramaros ofler. meant freedon, human rights, and democracy' b[l ertramuros
dominatrorl, exploilation, :ud subiugahol (Morin, 1987' p. 147; Duroselle' 1965,
p. 318). Only rn the Rbsistinco Programmes do wo lind a denuncialion o['Euro
irrperialisnl' and calls tbr a rcleese ol thc colonies (Lipgens, 1968' p 18)'

It is worth remembering that Europe between the wars was still overwhelnmgly
'wh.ite' and in a 'global' sense etlnicaliy ralher homogeneous (though of coursc
migration took place, and Danes in 1910 felt no less disfarce from the alien Polish
creatures irnPofted to pick sugar beet thin they do to the Turks today) Japanese
tounsts were llot a fiequenl sight, and people from the Europeal colonies had noL
yet begun to move 1n Sreat numbers to the colonial ceDlres. This Perceived hom_
ogeneity may be one reason for the Sreat intercst devoted to the 'Jewish question'
These very vlsible 'intemal fcrreigners' were (lro firattel for how many centlrries
the Jews had been present m a counlry) a pennaDent remuder of Lhe 'othemess' ol:
the world and posed a problem Qf iiterpreladon ln the fust halJ of this cen ry
racial terminology was conunonplace and, as the quoration above by Srefan Zweig
shows (.lre hinrself a Jew), this was once agnin no Nazi nooopoly
Buf for any discussion on the Jews in EuroPe it is helpful to go back to Friedriclr
Nietzsche (1844-1900) Nietzscbe, in his remarkably allti-nationalistic rellections,
illfoduced the concept of the 'good EuroPean' ard lie belicved thal the European
fcoples would fuse into a new supcnor 'Misohrasse' (rnixed race). This process
141

wolrld aLso solvc lllc'lcwish l)robLeln', which he contendcd o y led to collilicts

in lalion slrLcs- ln thc upbrirrgi g o[ tlis ncw ]lurcpean man, Nietzsche found the
Jews as uscful as rny othcr rlalional 'ingredicnt' (Collwitzer, 1951; 1964 edtt'
p 126), and thc lews ltad clen won immortal ment l)y bei g the Best Europeans
in tJrc Dark Ages:
h the darkcsl hours ol lhe Middle Ages, wben ihe bank of Asiatic

conlrast, Ilerdyacv said, Chtistianity could not Preach cxclusivity or hatred

Lowards llle Jcws, sjncc the rcligion was open to anybody willing to convert Bllt
the Jews were rarely wrlling to give up their identity - a problem also faced by thc
adherents of a Herderian vtsion of Europe a-s a sum of lations lt was highly tnconvenielt to have conli[gelts of Jews itr all counhics, when oDly the nation stale
could form the nucleus of an ideal EuroPe. And for those who neither wan@d to

Ily

fca

rt of
hose

Czechoslovak republic was a haven of tolemnce towmds Jews compaJed to most

neiglrbourinB counfiies, was an ardent spPPofler of the Zionist movemcnl

rnirjur

lm

in occiden,ruizing rt rgain
(Quttted Jrom Goll\rit1er, I95l

; 1964 etln pp

Europe's pride, its belief in its own intellectual superionty, ard its conterlpt lt)r
the 'loli'el races' is sumr ed uP in the quotation below from thc

327f1)

oil

Bo
lus
spi
to

the fact thal Luropelill history was takiog a shape very fa,rnilia'

ture oI the Jewrsh narional characlcr (Schubart, 1938'

1(r

the dcepest
were oficn
a

p 24) Jews

rhe

'ie

e_

of
since it alone has defined itself as an 'historical teleology of all unendiflg sedes
Jewry
European
fate
of
us
that
the
also
remind
goals of rea-son'. The quotation car
'inter
this people 'above EurcPe' was tragically mirrored in the fate of otber

nal foreigners', the Gypsies, invisible to most in ther position'bclow Europe'

rl
ffi

I
t
il
ffit

ffi
Lessing'
pp. 31q/fl. ThouSlr repeatedly refclring to tbe Jewish will to be diftcrent
disapPearancc
t]re
ass[nred
p
399),
iike Ni"its.h" and Spclrgler (Spengler' 1918'
the risirlS cosrnopolitan'
(Westem) European Jewry through assirnilation

I said in tle unity of

ir

of

spjitual thno"/trrr",

r,

Ig35;

1g70 edn,

273)

ffil

secular civilizatiort.

Conclusions

ffi

that the two just minor each othcr:

fiffi

cnt
,rLs

most lines of argument

tfrfi

attached the religious illseParably to tire nationaL

l2i, ttuthttr's transldtian Irom Lhe Ddnrsh version)
(Bertlyaer, J935

143
142

llli
tfr]l

Essay

the nalon supreme: the tdea ol Eutope 1914' 1915

Firsl, the politicat life of the period was mled by a disastrously triumphant
nationalism lt accompanted rf not fostered both the wars, and in the il)ter'
wru period it characterized lhe behavrour of most actors on lhe European

il
tililil

ru

Seconrily, even people devoid of nationalistic chauvinism uncolditionally accepted 'the national principle'. Thc Europe of Versailles vas ibulded on it and
was for many protagonists a vital step iI the realization of the ancient EuropeaD
ideas of fieedom and equality. If cultural Europe was primarily comPosed of irs
ational culturcs, therl political Europe ought to be ihe sum of its natiol states We
saw how the main political initiative towards European unity between the wars,
thxt of B.iand, did not even dream of violating the principle of national sovercignry, and the prestiBe of lhe nation in the hierarchy of values is perhaPs best de
.."it",j ty tt i" qnootion from Briand's loyal suppofier, Edouard Herriot:

esuh['hed.

lBriJnd] affirmed the necessity to presewe the sovereiSnty of different

countries destined ro become united in a federation. Occasionally, he

ffi

blamed the fimdamental differences of conception on certain

internationalistr who wished to suppress nations in favou of abstract
notions, w(houi having any point of contact with hislory and life

(Herriot,

ffi
ffi

iilt

Itfi

ffi
tFi
iilll!
I

i:rr

l!!ilr

l;i

lr

1930,

between the peoPles:

...jf I were to try io lbrmulale ll]e intellectual situatioo today' I would

widr tfrin3s
say that the present drive to nile Europe has more to do
tlran il has wirh
348)
(zweig, )91jb'

5A)

pry1"

Thlrdly, those who warned against nation stale Pettiness were also deeply in
fluenced by this Line of thought Coudenhove-Kalergi and Ortega y Gasset - major
advocates of a 'Uniied States of Europe' both considered the nation state as arr
intermealiate step on fhe way to the creation of a common European nation, one 1{)
which all inhabitants werc Lo feel nationallJ nttached, In Italy in 1932' the inllrlen-

of the Nazis
Mos[ plans tor' European Lrniry liom \'au]ntulD lo the propagancla
a world of
lo
adjustment
an
anC
fbr
for economjc cooperalion

sress;

Lhe neecl

tial liberal historian Benedefto Crcce (186G1952) wrote:

. just as, seventy years ago, a Neapolitan of the old kingdom or a
Pie(lmontcsc of the sub-Alpirte kingdom becalDe ltalians, Ilot by delrying

thal which they had been, but by elevating it and incorporating it into
lhxt new existenQe, so will the French, Germans aDd Italians and all the
olhers clevatc themselves to b-come Europeans and their thoughts will
trrm to Europe, and rheir hearts will beat for it, as they had done for
their sntlller fatberlands, which they wilt not have fbrgolten, but love
lhe more.
(Quozd from Rijksbaron, 1987, p. 67)

lnalnr, Nazi NeuroPa).

Modem civilization did not restrict Ltself

Lo

underminllg tlre loundations ot'

na-

Once again people's loyalties were seen lo be arrarged in concenhic circles, and
only atter leaming to behave as Europeaos could tlirere be a stitrt to discussion
about the possibility of a truly 8lobal civilizaiioD stan

Europe was regarded prirnarily as an irlerplay of nations tather than of, say,
groups of consumrs or Producers, regional communities or intelest groups de
voted to spccilic issues, and so on. There were, of cotrlse. attempls to sfess non
or [ans-nalional conmuoities of ilterests (for irstance, the German Social
Democrats had a 'United States of Europe' in theK Party progranme) but, in geoeral, the perspective in sucb claims as the solidarity of workers, Catholics, patiJists, and so on, almost inevitably ended uP being global rather than Enropean

('The Bratest daneier to Europe is tircd ess')' said Ilusserl (1935; 1954 edn' p
i+t), tut tu. cadls for a reb-Lrth of EuroPe through a 'heroism oI reasol' had no
more effect thar Mann's desired new 'rnililant European humanisn"

Finally, rnodcm civiiization rnercilessly rcvealed to Europe thal it was no longer

the uridispr-rted power centre o1'the world Europe was ltow ody ooe of several
145

glohi

for European ulifi but

oltel used in
^rgurnents
Oliel, ile lradidonal feeling of Europear superioriry'

powerfields, a conditioll

rot yet lirlly

\r()IrtUchcnded.
il all its pncic ruuJ artogalico, wns mi\cd wilh arl almost paranoid wish lo Protect a
culture thaL hacl suddcrrty discoYered htimations of its own mortality
een projects and PercePtions ol
concepts. The aim was lo clat
L olvioNSIY lhc two di rensions
has turned out to be reasonably
is perhaps because the political projects

applicable for the period lJeated here, it

l* Eurup" were so stufflingly lar lrom auy practical realization that they coLlld
ctuallY.'EuroPcau
cd enouBll to in"i\t

ng a diagnosis that
1945, dte'doclors'
moved in fi-om abroad.

Reterences
BARr{ACLoUGH,

G (1963) EuroPean Unitf in Tltuught and Actiotl' Oxfold' Basil

Blackwell
constmction
BAssrN, M. (i991) 'Russia between Europe and Asia: the rdeological
(1).
pp
1-17
50
Relieu',
in
Slavic
ol geographical space',
(1990) 'Je Masarykovo pojeti NEmecka jeitd aktudlni" in
BEI-oHRADSKf,
Prague
1,
1990,
Plitomnost
edl) The End of Our Time' London' Sheed and Warl
(1924;1933
N.

ilili

Lowlon' SCM Press

(EdO (1988) Europos opdagelsr

ru

BERTYAEV,

BDRDYAEV,

N (7935\

BOLL JOHANSEN,

Tlre Fate of Man in the Modern World,

and

HARBSMEIER,

historien om sn ide, CoPer$agen

de Bruges'
BRUGMANS, u (1965) L'idie europlenne 19l8-1965. Caliers
m The New YorL
(Ti6t
pubhshed
aApEK, K. (1926; l99l edti Amerikanirnu'r

Tlnes 1926), printed in: Od tlovdka k tloviku 1l', Pragte

Wien-Leipzig'
CoUDENHOYE-KATERGI, R N. (1923; 1926 rev edn) Paneuropa'
fanslated (1926) Pdn Europe, New York, A- A Kropl
couDENHovE KALERGI, R.

(1934) EuroP a crwachtt,

Zii

ch Wien

IriPzig

(E

c. (1943) The Juttgettenl of the Nations' London' Sheed and Ward(1931) A'?erica /lP
DUHAMBL, c (1930) Scines r1e Ia vie furure, Pais; kanslated
DAwsoN.

Menace , Londort,

Allen and Unwil

l.-8. (1965) L'idie d'Europe tlans l'[i'ttoirc, Paris' Denoel

I' Fratrkfurt arn M:rirr'
EUAS, N (1939; lgSO edn\ lJber den ProzelS der Zivtlitation

DURosEl-LE,

Sulukamp.Bo]nn'
EuropLr (.1953) Dokumente zB Frage der europdist:hen Einigung'
Mttnich
FoERSTER, R H. (Ed ) (1963) Die ldee Europa 1300-1946'
GOLLWITZBR, H.

(1951; 1964 edn) Iuropabild

unl

Europagetlanke' Murich

c. (Eds) (1989) Dart'ischen - OxtmitleleuroPAitche

SuhkampMain'
am
Franldud
R?.fexionen,
('Czechoslovakia aod Cenkal
u;DZA, M. (1931) teskoslovensko a stietlni Etropa
IrERTERICH, F. anal SEMLER,

t
I
I
I

l
I

I
Zeit eeschichte, 3, pp. 240J 5
KREJai, F.

'146

(1931) ieJirrvt a evropanstvi Ptague'

I
t
I

l'l

LJ.-d!Lll|c)lalullJuPlellleu]ellled

ilr,li

LENIN,

liiliil

Lssa)/

V l. (1915), 'On dre Slogan 1'or a UDited States of hurope', originaily ur

S.)tsilll Delnakft , No. 44, English edr in Colle.ted Worh, vol. 21, pp- 339 43.
l.BsSINtl, l] (1923) Europa und Asien, Lltntover
t.rtcENs, w. (1968) Eu opa-Fdderationsph e eler Wklerstandsbe\reEun|c
I

illtiI

I
I
I

I
I
t
I

940

I 945 ,

Mnnich

1975 edn) 'Alte Kultur und Neue Kulrur', ir PoLitische

Aufstitze 1, Darrnstadr 1975; origiMlty published (1919) 'R6gi kultura 6s uj kult\ra' , in Inter4ofi6n6le, Budapest, No. 6 1 , pp- 6,12.
MAI'll'], T- (1937) Vom kommenden Sieg der De nkratie ('The Coming \Actory of
Democracy') speech in USA, 1937
MAN'N" T. (1935)

Acrtung, Europa, translated (1942) Europe Beware, in Oder of

essay:s and speeches o.f rwo d.ecades, New Yo*, A A. Knopt'.
MASARYK, T. C (1920) Noyd E|ropa stanorisko sloyanski, Prag)e, The New
Europe: the SIa.,) standpoint.

fte L)s),: polttical

MrlYER, H c. (1955) Mineleuropa

The Hague.

in German Thought anrl Action, 1815 1915,

E, (1987) Penser I'Europe, Paris; tramlated (7991) Concepts of Lurope,

Holmes and Meier.
MORTN,

MosLE\ o. 11968) My Lfe, London, Nelsor

NA[TMANN, F. (1915; 1916 edn) Mitteleuropa, Berhn; rranslated (19)6) Centrol
Europe, LoDdorl, P S. King.
NAIMANN, F (1918; 1964 edn) 'Vorlaunger Abschied' (1918),
974-77, Cologne/Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag

Werts, IV, pp.

NITTI, Il (1922) In decadenya dell'Ewopa, Fircrze; lranslated (1923) The

l)ecadence of Europe, London, T. Fisher Unwin.
Nt,lir L, E. ( l99l ) Geschichtsdenken im 20. Jahrhundert, Berlit], Proplylaer.

oRI[(;i y

GAssut', J. (1930; 196l edn) la Rebeli1n de las Masas:

(1961)'thc Rcyolt of the Md.r.r,r, London.

iriarrt,

EanslaLed

Euntpe arul the World, 1850-'982, London, Allen and

I Jrrwi

|ouND, rj. (1952) C.'llected Sho er Poem,r, London, Faber.

RICHIER, E. (19&3\ Leitbilder des europtiischen Fbderali.rm's, Bonn
RIJKSBARON, A., RooBoL, w. H., and wErsct"As, M. (eds) (1987) Europe From o
Cultural Perspssliys, fhe Hague, Niigh and Vafl Ditnar UruversitaiJ.
A. (1930) Der MJthns des 20 Jahrhunderts, Beit\.
(1934) Blut uni Ehre, Munich.
SCHEBR, M. (1915\ Der Genius des Krieges und der deutsche Krieg, Leipzr9
SCHLIE, U. (1992) 'Nur Fiktion und Rietodk
- Ifiders Vorctellungen von einem
Neuen Europa' , ir Franlcfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, I Febnary 1992.
ROSENBERG,

ffi

ffi

ROSENBERG, A_

scHUBARr, w. (1938) Europa uru1 die Seele des Oslens, Lucetne; translated (1950)
Russia and. Western Man, New York, F Ungar
SCTTLTLZE,

ililil

fr

148

I1. (1990)

\e

uaroD sup)efi)e t tte Dea ot EutoPe )r1+'tra

(1918, 1922; l9l$ edn)

Actu/ttiry;\t,t.

t'ers\

ctiver

publislred irr two volulres

7'r''

Declinc

ol

!h('

\l$|

V)l- l ' Form ottd

Wttrirl-hisro'a, Lorrdon' Allen.rrnd

llntrtgilt..l les

^sD(t
W;tti,t"t";, o9Lg\; ll Wetlltslr,rivlte

Ahendlantles

Perspektitun

lJtvin

,(liirst
(;e.sl.lLl
unl

(1922)' -Munich' C ll

Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlur,S

lrxAcs, c. (1919;

r'{)r{rrir{, rr. (198-\)

sPENcl-r-'lR,

Dtz Wederkehr Europas, Berlilt.

lbxte zum
TsclrlzEwsKtj D and GRoH 0 tF''ls) (t959) Eurolto und RtlJsLund DannsLadt
Jslt'ttver'rld/1dDr'ljes'
tttul
tttssischen
Problcnt des wesrcuropiischct
vAnDY,

s B and VARDY' A H (l9b!)

'fhe Austtn-fl tlSdrian Mind: ftt hamc ond

abroatl, Nett York, Columbtir lJniversity Prcss

im Verlluch' 1922 1962'
WIfPERMANN, N (1983) El[op.irJ.li er F'tsciYttLts
Frzu*fl:rt-am Mtin, Sulukarnl Vcrlag.
New York' Melhuei
wool-F, s. l- (Ed) (1981) Fasiim in Er.uttpe, LotlLlon ard
Cassell'
zwuil, s. (1943a) Thc Wotti al Y?-sterilaJ: an tl tabiogrdPJrl' Londo|'
(First pulrtished in 1943 as Drr lVell \)trlt Gcttertl )
zwElc, s (19431, Zcir r.r,'rl Wiy't, Stockholm'

nrtionalism, ilre fasciraton

of war

canre back, as

il

Probably, one

of the most decisive

atld aestheriz^tion oI poliLics Rrtronalis

were, by dclautt.

gration was the temporary rebuff

ilill

of

for rhe projec{ of tsuopear

oationalisIn.

In

te

dre defcared co ntries

wlut

rl(rtrlsrLrl'r:rerci*: As orrc rccerl commertlL(t has pu

r
I
s
I
,,

ll
ni)tron.rl
trerng rooL
tlrerelorc s

'l tre ncw

ar

cortr

d not stoP
accused o[

n l\c lulue
)r'rudfies
..v,,:,ti"cd

u ry

(u]-r,in, 19.l, t) tj)

B70ff.)

was left behind, even anong nations on dre winning side, was a general

fscling of defeat.

ffi

rr

arxr Aenuine [r,ropci,,,

The collapse of two Dational ideologies that had been bellicose,

aggressive and imperialistic brougbt about arl almost lota] disclediting
of nationalism in every guise. Among the nations of westem Euope
that were on the Allied side, the most rcmarkable diDg was that the
terible years of occupation and resistance hrd nol resulted in a
resurgence of chauvinism.

(Ho[fun, ]966, pp

tr

ol

lt:
condrnons

Gennany aud Italy - nationalism had beeD associatcd \tith the regmres thal had
led dre nations into war, defeat and destruction. I[ the words of Stanley Hoffman:

,]

had vcL) nrrclt Llrc rrr

'Zero Hour'
force

ol
tice and criminaliLy (for exar
/lesenrrJr riuring lhe 1950s, w
s,,ience as ,r v"lricle for social

responsrble brd higLr hopcs

tradition abandoned as legitimizing

Il such problens ils w'[' rnjlts_

artrclcs in dre jotrmal So'iid/
sl helraviourist belicf in soclrL
; rnd in lhe 1960s lhe biih oI

In rhe irnmediate post war years, some Europeans

lHil

fllili

vr'ere strongly hfluencd by a

feelirg fhat somet}tinB special had ben bom h the resjstance to Nazi oppression.
One explssion of it can be found ill E. P Thompson's descriptiol of the mood at
rhat time, reflecting on rhe le$ers written in the last years of the war by his
brother, who died fighthg with Bulgarian partisans. The brother \rrote rn 1943:

IIow wonderfrrl it would be ro call Europ one's fatherlard,

and

thilk of lftakow, Munich, Rome, Arles, Madrid as one's own cities.

I arn not yet educated to a brcader Dationalism, but for a United
Statcs of Europe I could feel a patriorism far transcendjng my love

for lingla.ncl

ilil

'lhis thion

he srw ar 'thc only altcmative 1l) disnsler'- And later

in

the

sirrrc year hc wrole

'I hcrc rs a spiriL abroad
1til

ffi

in Europe which is fincr arld braver than

rLryrhirtg thal tired continDt has known for centunes, and which
cannol be withstood You can, if you like, thi[k of it in tenns of
politics, but lt is brcader and more generous than aoy dogma It is
thc confidenl will of whole peoples, who have known the utmost
humih.rtion and suffering and have triumphed over lt, to build their
own Iives once and for all.
(Quoted in Thonpson, 1982,

I spel)t lime ln ScaLrdi avia bcfbre and

kind of Swedislvscandjnavian model
socieiy - belongjng ncilher to thc East
Such a socrely wor (l ui ze plaruring
'jungle capitatjs ', where aggrcssive
Stdrcs
of
llDiled
irratiorLaliry
Lo avoid the
tlle rrmarkef forcs are allowed lree rclo, ,trd il lvould use lhe nrarkct Lo avoid

Le
du
in
r.

4)

lt

l,
iL

ti

'This aspect of r'esisfatrce looked not towards the history of Europe, but rather ro
the promise of Europe which ight mean the possibihry of freeing oneself hom
lhe old Europe. People were rcady lo learn something rcw; irr certain quarters
therc was a feeling of generdl preparedness fbr redefir)ing basrc allegiances, for
changing course.'nle lirst attempts ro rnstrtuLionalize a llew Europcan nlegralion

Eastern EuroPe in the Soviet griP

1945, decisive power in Europe rcsled ldrgcly wrtlr the tlSA and lhe USSR
Most of what was soo !o be callcd eastem Lurcpe lile'hor Curhr counrries

ln

153

Essay

Essay

Europe since 1945: ctisis lo renewal

Euope since 1945: crisis to rcnewAl

had becn liberrled by the Soviel Rcd Army and this would have a profou effect on the politicai realircs of the regioo- Thc borde.line between ihe USSR aDd
the rest of Europe, which to mmy Euopean observers in the inter-war period
had been the border beiween Europe proPff and some alien world, moved more

than a huoclred miles lo thc wesi The Soviet UnioD kept what it lrad been
granted by the Ribbenhop-Mololov aBreemenls of 1939, and morc. The Baltic
repubLics re rained linnly ill Ore USSR, ard pans of Gemuny (East Prussia),
Poland, Czcchoslovakia atd Romafli,l, too, were anndxed. Poland, by way of
C
coDlpcnsation (probably as a means of weakenflg
d
Poland preoccupied with r possible German 'r
8
mrch former Cierman terntory. Morcover, all the
(except lor the three Ballic republics) were allowed to re-establish their slate
sovereigtrLY

-fhis sovereigtrty soon proved lo hare very narrow lirnits Steadily, regmes totally
loyal to ard dependent on Moscow were rnstalled in all countries liberated by the
Red AJmy (except for Austna) h Czcchoslovakia (the counry with lie skongest
pre-war demoqatio lraditiol ard lhe one that took dle longest to bgcome a 'peo_
ple's demodacy'), some non Communists sought to adjust to tlrc rew realities by
ie-launctring tbe idea of Czechoslovakia as r bridge berween Russil and the west
rDil not just between iheir Two social systems - but it soon became obvious that
lhe Soviet Union had no intenlion of experimcnting with arry such east-cenhal
Europeal 'third way'Politics itr easLcn ELuope were subjccted to m inrlial transfonnaLior according to
the o ld developect ln the Sovict Unior under Sratin. There has been much discussion arnongst hNtoiians of the Cold War on Lhc degree lo which this sJraputg
sremme.l froln aclion or reaction. from a Soviet d.ive for expansion or a westem
plesswe on an essentiatly rlefensive Soviet Union Btt even iJ olte leans towards
ihe latler interpreration as to security/powu Politics (ie the West being the
slronger side), rt is uDdeniable that the uniformization 01 'easlem' Europe was
d.iven also by the iruer logic of'Soviet-lype societies' (Lemailre' 1989)

'fhe re-creatrol of easrcentral Europe in the image of the Soviet Union leflecled
the logic oI Sial$ist ideology HoldlDg a mo[opoly on lruth dedved ftom
Marxis; Iflinisrn. fte Conrormist Party wielded absolute power' Whatever the ef-

fects ol tLre Cold War, the unifomizalion of'eastem europe'was deliberaie and
systematic.'fhe Soviet Union harl. since the 1930s' purged all 'eastem' European
iornmunist Parties: Ior rnstance, most of the Polish Panv leadership was elimi
nated to ensure lhai no indePendent national leadership cotld emerge Moscow

Marshalt pian. loreign Muister JaD Masaryk was imrnediatety surnmoned lo

Moscow and ordered Lo refuse the Amencan offec

all the courties m the Soviet

From 194E the Soviet model was implanted in
sphere of

iafluence

gree

:#f-tr;;

ol unitormilv

ietastating
i"p O.n,"V

results*-t"", *y

regaral

for the

ne

was glven
produclion

in the rclevant countnes.

Soon

ffi^it

both
"- ",

in the eye of the westem

*a'*iiot,n'easem Europe' emerged' . whrch

the Cornmlmist
in
-n'""t.."""t

propaganda and

of construclive work and fraremal co-operation to

J"" . *-. u p*odi""
','r,iro.-,
gr"v and opprcssed wasteland lntegal to Soviet
i"ittt
ol
^
"ti'"'.hegemony in the reBion was rtre princrl.l'
roral
."",.t,
Moscow
on
d"pendenl
direcdy
'.t--rnU*ljlt
rulc whith made all lhe salelliles
,litidi ond
and
lttle trarsnational co-operalion The ' arsa{ founded
-Pact in
were
c
Aid)
Econor
"^J'^fi"*"J-i"t
council for Mutual
i^*t
;;#;"d"

(ontributed lo dlF
.cnlv lo westem cLDlomrlic and economic iniljarivcs and
rexliries
uniJnrmrty
of
blanker
Ihe
,"i,i. .t .r.* intierauon B.rt beneadr
jnrendrd rand claimedr homogeneirv nevcr
rhe
and
;;;:-t;t";;tuli.;d'

Brurd East Gem

building workcB

BerlinWall, Atg
1961 The worke
oJ DM) 28 (Phor
Deutsche

I
t

I
I
I
I

155
154

li
il

wcnl bclow dre level of the power 6lite (Kusy in Hertench and Semle!
1989,

p.

190)

IA lhe econolnic rprere, Comecon ncyer led to a ru inremal 's()cialjst Darkef

The system of baner exchanges could not disguise the sevore disiorriotr of production aDd prices brcughr about by 6e cennal planuing sysrem. This alone made
a severe limitation on travel ln the eastern bloc necessary. Travel was of course
resricted for pottrcal reasons Tbc attempt 10 prevent travel affe.red Soviet cit!
zens mosl ndically - in 1988 less than one per ceDt of the population (soldrers
156

exclude]j) had cver visiled a forcign countuf Bu

as well ile distorled price-systcm, shortages olv
vertiblc currencies made ir necessary to prcve l
sult irom my unrestici.d opening o{ the bordcrs (ibrd p l9L) Evcn mlliLJrv
i most
co operation was resricted to thc rop echclons lhc Soviel booPs installed
of the satelLrLe counFies wcrc keP! sricdy isolarcd lrom thc local Poprlation'

the atlonal
The Limitcd access to Favel w,l one fcaru tbar helPd to Prcserve
peculiarities of ine easrem Europcan states Another was fie f3c! tMt rn dre whole

Th(
Ot:t
Sov

inl

ffi
Essay

Essay

Europe since 1945: ctisis ta rcnewal

Eurcpe since 1945: crisis lo renewal

I
I
I

I
t

Resistance lehters

ring the 1956

Hunlulan

ptising (photoq phs:

grotrPs nr the rcgion

freedom
comse lrom the West) was a stranBe lack of mterest ln the struSgles lbr
be
could
which
a
phenomeron
coontries,
the
ncighbouring
ond indpendetrce in
159
158

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

t:ss,.ty

in 1956, 1968 and once again in t9110 81 irr thc behaviour of Ilrrngary's,
Czechoslovakra's aud Polull's neiShbours (Vajda h ll & S, 1989, p 129).
secr

ll
i

lil

'l hc surface unifor:nily and hornogeueiry of eastem Europe by no means imPlied

Nny scrious attempts to integrate coDnlries at tbe social level. On the confrary, it
rnighl bc argued that national varieties and stereotyPes were presgrved and sometimes even cultivated, while ilr westem Europe, trade, travel alld mass communicalion were spreading a greater unifolmity of everyday habits and lifestyles.

Where does this leave the concept of'Europe' in eastern Eurcpe? Quite smply,
rcpressed As indicated in Essay 2, the attitude to 'Europe' had been different in
each of lhe east central European countries in Lhe mter_war peiod, partly 2ts a
res lt of thei-r rcspoose to the Versailles settlemert- Similar clifferences could be
seen in 1945, but in geneml the prestige of the Soviet Union in lhese counties
was greatly eDhanced and westem Euope was more or less discredited, belng
charactcnzed as decadent and having shown itself to be impolent in the face of
N^zism, a feahrre aptly used by dre Commu ists lo argue for a new (al tlmes
cve.n 'slavic') ea-stern brolherhood. In this kind of argument, 'Europeanness' was
neither used, or needed.

il

ilit

lill

j
I

lr

Thus fhe hadilional problcm of'east-cenlral EuroPe's' sLanrs a,s 'borderland' between the East and West seemed to be decided in favour of an 'eastem' attachment
and ii must be said that, initially, thi$ association receiYed domestic supporl, not
least in intellectual ci-rcles- However, the harsh realities of 'Sovitification' sooD
led to a rc-articulation of the border problem, sillce the new superimposed socio
potiticat sysiem (with its Stalinist terror and brutaliry) became unavoidably ident
ilied with the country ftom which it originated, that is to say ihe Soviet Uuion or,
rather, Russia. Communism became Soviet Communism, and Soviet Comrunism
was interprcted in terms of the Russian tradition of absolutisrn, orthodoxy Geligious and later ideological) and brutality. Any rebellion against this system seerDcLl ((hrc ro the bi-polar logic of dle time) to imply a concession to (westem)
I.iurolrall values. Mihily Vajda accumtely expresses dris feeling when he wtlles
thilt the goal of all the rcbellions h easl-central Europe (i.e. Poland,
Czechoslovakia aria Hungary) is not so rDDch a challenge to thc polilical status
quo in Europe (with Hungary perhaps as an exception), but a means of 'die
F-rmciglichung des Eurcpeeftums' - 'making possible European-ness' (Vajda,
1989,

p. 120).

case of Czecboslovakia, many reform Communists,r prior to the

invasion of 1968, had retumed to the traditional Czech idea of building bridges
betweeo East and V/esL Most notable perhaps was Milan KundeE, who, irr a famous speech at the Fourth Czechoslovak Writers' Congress in 1967, argued tiat

In ihe puticular

the combination of (wesiem) European cultural roots and socialist principles gave
Czochoslovakia excellent prospects of becoming a model for lhe whole world
Kundera was later t() lose both his Party membe$hip and many of his illusiuns
about this kiDd of 'liird way'.

'Reform CommUnism' rcfers to the wrng ir$ide tle Cornmunist Party drat tned lo
carry out denocratic and/or market reforns; most ofterL the refercuce is to the Prague
Splng of 1968, ar it is in dris casc

,il

160

EuluPe 5nn

1 the rcglmes in e^stcru EuroPc, t]]c concePL oi EtLopc rvas oflen met wrlh
susprcron, but allowerl as a troticrl lool lor l()liticitl devcloPrl)enls or, lo fut iI
bllrntly, as a loreign pollcy ilrslrument lor lho Soviet Unl{nl in rcllrtiot] tu wcstern
Europea s l-fller such e strau!-cnr coutti bc clcploye(l xllxlnsl oll)cr lalll(:ls For-irr
slance, Flungary rnd lhe Gl)ll in lhe l9E0s legitirnrzcd a lirlcign policv dcviaLirrg
from thal of the Sovicr Union witl relcre'rce to dre condilio s ol 'sru ll llnd

WiLl

mediurn-sized stales in -Flutope'. Mren Polaud ill thc 1970s Preseotcd Proposals
for nuclear weapon-flee zones ilt cc|tral Europc with r sPecrlic celtral tsulopean
argumentatiou - tlfs was in prhciple x part of the Soviet scheme, bul it w^s cerl^inly done with a vehemence and a lwist which originated in Warsaw, not
Moscow 'l'he exetcrse was paflly rcpeated by BulSture i reliltion to II Balkan nu
olear weapon ftcc zone in tlte 1980s (whetr lhe Bulgiuians cultivated lII .s with
Greece

via the 'poLticrlly conecf p.incjple of arlti-nuclearism)- In

eastern

European societies,'Europe'was mainly a telm and idca employed by dissidents,

signfying western, democratic, hurnanist or olhcr sirnilar odentations-

Western Eurcpe

in

the American sPhere

Ilr the post war siluation, thc Uniled States played a crucidl role in the recovery of
westem Europe Thc llSA noL only helped western EuropcM counfries 10 get o,
their l-eef agarn (wilh tlre Mflrsh.ill Plan and Orgtuuzalion for Eulopean Econonrit:
Co-operation), but it also supportcd thc prinoiple of European union/integration
However, lhere were vanous Arricrican ideas about whal fomls European inte
gration should or should not take, so the role of tlre USA mtst be seen also as a
facidr that set linuts or integiation Wrth hindsight, it is eirsy to see how all major
steps in European jnlegratron have becn dcpcnde[t on Aorcrical initialives or suP
port |tr/allacc, 1990; I(ummel atd Sclxnidt, 1990). The original EC projecl had
strong Arnerical backing and the Limes wTe-n the ptojecl Prospered, until recenlly,
werc always pedods when the Us adninistratrorl was clearly positive towards rn
tegratron,

The curious dialeclrc of Atlanticisl and Europealrist was alPatent in one key fgure, Jeal Monnetz Charles de Gaulle aLld others suspected lhat Lre was only an
Arnerjcan influenced factllitator m Europe and oertairlly he worked to make sue
that European integration took forms compatible wilh Amelican policy. I{owever,
he also worked to inspirc American pohcy. He was, in fact, a key actor in a sfiong
transadantic networ*, iobbying lbr co-operatjve slmchrres witlin which westerl,

Atlantic and Eumpcan instihrtions could evolve in mutually supportive ways.

(crosser, 1978; 1980 edn,

pp

101 6).

the post-war history of westem Europe thcre ha-s been a tension between
Atlartic co operation and specrfic westenl European co-opcratiol, but in the security lield rn particular, tbe Atlantic 0{AIO) lmc has dominated 'lhere have becn
oDl-v rclalively weak moves lowards clear western Eurnpean co-opcration in the

In

Jeful Monnei (1888-1979), Fiench sLatesnan, distiigrdstred econotnist and financr;rl

expen. He was presidenL of the Europcan Coal and Steel High Authonty from 1952 to
1955, a d in 1956 became prcsidenr of thc Acrion Commirlee lor the llnrtcd Suies of
Burop0.

'7

161

security area. fn other ueas te m;urifestation of westem European co operattiLr

has been stongcr. In the econonic field there has been a relatively far reaching
iBtegraLion especially conceotrated on the development of the lluropean

Commu ty.
ccoDomic field, howeler, the reiationship wilh Atlantic/American
stflrctures lemains complex- The ilnnediale successes of wesi European gowih
inteand rcconstruction, as well as the more long_telm evoltrlion of west EuropeaD
gration, happened inside US_sponsored global institutions of i tematioDal finance
ind trad", su.tt as the dollar rcgime:mcl GATT (the General Agreement or TFde

Even

in the

and Tariffs).

bcgan within an Americal-sponsoted

block,S 01 prohibitrons againsl
in eastem E rope, werc inPosed bY the
illdirecl efiecls , n mouJrling .rnd s\aDing

no dtect

the forms of European illegratioD

We have seen hcrw, from the nid-1940s, rhe leading powers

economic pragmatism or a new vision

of Europe?
The EC

lnokiog back ftom a vantage point of rhe 1990s, lt is tempting to see ihe movement towads political and economic integration in post-war Etlrope as a senes of
straighrforward steps, with the occasional sideways move (see Table 1). ln fact,
such a bald catalogue masks some very diflerent visiols of Europe; it skates over
different vie.,vs of European inte8ratiofl and conceals the cut and thrust of
Enropean politics as govemments wrestled with questiols of national self-lnterest
in the context of European economic and political integration
1945 Winston Churcbilt, though lut of oflice, was widely seen as a key figurc
for post-war Ewope and a fedemlist into the bargain. In 1940 he had proposed

In

an Anglo-French Union just before the fall of Fftmce; 'there shall no lorrger tn
two nations, but one Franco Bitish union' (U in, 1991, pp. 9ff, 29 35). During
the war be had argued for a Council of EuroPe. The British Seneral election of

1945, however, brought about lhe rcplacemert

of

Churchill with the arri-

in the affairs of

I
I
I

t
I
I
I
I
I

tholgh sucb progremmes generated coDfrontation rather than co

al., 1987, p.24).
'Lik""i.",
on qu"stions relating to the ftilure destiny of Europe there
np"i^rior,
Unionwas little agreement between the UnLted States and lhe Soviet

pos!war Penod.
a ploject' lhereby
Anolher possibility for ihe fulule was to re-dellne Europe as
turn
now
process
we
overcomiDg the European pasl, it is to li1is

ChurchIll. Roosewlt and Sl\lin al lhe Yalta Conference, February 1945 (photo: IlultonlDt
163

162

rssay

lable I

i
:

ffiil

fl
ffi

ffi

ffi

flil

ffiii

ffi
{l

ii

lLll1l

ili

li

lbwards t-uroPean inlcgrali

1947 plan for European Recovery Programme (M.rshall PLLo)

lq4E siBn'nB of the Brussels Tteaty
establishment of the Organizatiol for European Ecolomic Co operatlol
(OECC)
1949 formation of North Atlantic Trcaty Organizalion (NATO)

formation o[ the Council of EurcPe

1951 establisl]Inent of European Coal and Steel Conunlrnity (ECSC)
t9-52 signirg of European Defence Coomunity Treaty (EDC)
1954 rejection of Europeai Defence Community by Francc
signing of Westem European Umon (WEU)
1955 Messioa Conference on European integrahoD
1957 signing of the Treaty of Rome
1958 commenceme of rie Ewopan Economic Cornmunity (EEC) 'Europe of the Six'
establishment of European Atomic Elergy Cornrnissioo (Euratom)
1960 establisbnElt of European Free Trade Association @FIA)
Organization for European Ecooomic Co-operation (OmC) becomes
Organization for FJonomic Co-opemtiofl ard Developmert (OECI))
1963 signing of the Franco-West Gennan Trcary of FriendshiP
1966 EEC agreement in a Common Agriculh{al Policy (CAP)
1967 formalzation of the European Community (EC) t]rrough a merging of
the institutions of ECSC, Eurotom and the EEC
1973 accessron of United Kingdom, keland and Dnmark to EC
opening of Conference on Securiry and Co-opelation io Europe (CSCE)

lq74 cslrblishment of European Council, consisting of heads of national

govcr rncLrls.of EC membr states
lr.l?5 coDclusion ol Conterence on Security and Co_operation in Europe
(CSCE) and signing of Helsinki Final Act
1979 establishrnent of European Mofletary System (EMS)

l98l

Lssay 3 Lurope stnce te4t: cnsts ro terrewat

culoPe Sntce t 943: crls/s lo renewat

accession

of Grcece to EC

1983 signing of a Solemn Decluation on EuroPean Umon by heads of srate

and govemment
1q84 Euopean Parliamenl approves draft trealy on EuroPean Union
revival of Western European Union fllrE(I) as a Europear defence

forum
1985 European Council adopts llte Single European Act (SEA) agreement
on an intemal single rnartet by the end of 1992
1986 accession of Spain and Portugal to the EC
1989 proposals for ar EC charler of FundamentaL Social Rights
1990 as a res lt of German unification, East Germany eniers the EC
1992 signing of the Treaty of Maasticht - fudier steps towatds econonic
and political uniou

irtegElionist (Lhough not

enLi

European) ClemerL Attlee, wllo Led a Labour

gove|Ixnent.
a major spcoch ro Zulich (whcll hild becrt Lliscussed
with C-'ouder lovc-Kalergr bcforehand) Lhat il w^s nnperalivo Lo r'.slablish a []ritcd
States ot' Europe. Churchjll's argumenl wils, however, nrorc h slmnH slrllclrcnt Ic
garding lhe appropriate policics to bc ibllowcd on thc conlincnl, raLhcr lhrr,r iirr os
pousal of a British Europeal policy rr(lic^lly dilfcreDl lrolr th;rl ol Alllcc's
Churchill |r spite of his'1940 strilgcstion {lid nol no* cortsrtk:r :rrr
Anglo French union LIre core of Europciul ullity Alotl8 wllh Molrllcl, l((nl'illl
ALlenaus and many olhen, he oow bclieved tltal Irt ilttL:o_( ict ttllllt Iotl)lx llrillrr)rr
had to be the starting point, and in thc Zurich speech hc sai(l:

In 1946, Churchrll argued ul

The lirsL slep in the re-creation of the Europcdn tiuDily Illllsl llc il

parfiership between France and Germarty. Iu tltis way only call Iiiulco
recover the moral leadership of Europc- 'fhcrc crlD l* no rcvivlrl ol
Europe without a spiritually grcat Francc iurd a spiritually Srcirt
Germany...Great Britain, the Bntish Commonwcallh ol Nrlrons, rlliShly
America, and I trust Soviet Russia ..must be (hc liientis lnd sPolsors ol'
the new Euope and must champion its righl to livc iL[d shi c.
( inlton Chrrchill, I9:iq)temLcr 1946,7'nith IJ i,!:Isity)
Thus, the widespread hopes that Britail would lcad European unificdlion were to
be thwarted, and the core movcd elscwhcre, while Blitain coDcenhated on security
matters and the partnershrp with the US Thc Britlsh emphasis on i1s 'special rela
tionghip' widr Washington was alanDing to the French, meking the UK a potential
Trojan horse.

wift

the advent of the Cold War and the division of Europe and GermaDy, platrs
for an all-European unilication became uffealistic and hopes {or turification came
to be centred on lsepaJate easlem and westem arrangemenis. On lbe western side,
fto:'., 194'7, ihe US was actively engaged in strengtlening westem Europe. In 1948

Bitain, France, Belgiun, the Netherlands and Luxemboug, in the

so-c^lled

Bru$sels 'Ireaty, canle to s{Jl]le colrlmon agreement

in ihe area of secunty and defencc, but this affingement was quickly overtaker by the formation in 1949 of
NAIO.3
In westeflr Europe a major objecfive for thc adherents of lluropean federaLism was
to conslruct a supra-nalionaL organization out of what l)ecane, in 1949, the
Council of Eurcpe. Opirion was split between federalist plans from France aDd
Belgiuir and more rnhimslist plans, in particular from Britain- 'fhis split parallels
the laler diffcrence betweeD the EEC and tlc l.;uropean ]iee 'Itade Associarion
GFIA) 1l1 lheir attiftrde towards politrcal integration versus frec trade. Beiause of
these differences the Council of Etropc was not shaped its a supra-national body

mJ d,d not bccorrrc a veticle lor inlcfrbri"r.

r Ir t9S4, thc grussets Treaty c[anged inlo Lhc Wesrem Euopean UDion (l aBfI), also
j cluding Wesl Cernrury and ltaly- But this love was only to pave rhe way for fie
rnclusion of West Germa ] in NAI'O Ilre WEU remamed nargrnal until ihe begiming of
Lhe 1980s, when it gai ed inportancc as a possible velucle
European scurity co-operatlon

ol

rhe revrvcd inrerest in

far-reaching, sDPra oational intelFation oPerating ln a federalist lonnat Ths

involvecl selting up a Europeall Parliament and on ihis basis re-cflstinS ihe whole
political orgalizarion ol Europe and lhercby tanscelding t]re PrevarLiflg nation

iltill

il

state mosarc.

wio, 1991, P. 34)

The maiD theme of the late 1940s and early 1950s
,

ir tlic matter of European 'i Britain usually wilh suPPort

The most imporbnt development towmds westem European integration' the process of {omring ihe European Economic Cornmunity' subsequently the EuroPean
Community, got under way in 1951 in Paris, when six countries (France, Belglum,
the Netherlandi, Luxembourg, Italy and West Germany) signed a treaty creating

inter 8olenmental kind oI co

aJed b1 Francc. llalY Belsiunr'

West Gennary) wanted a more
ap?roach towards general European unification, i.e. integration in specific arcas
with the hopc that one issue would pull along the next towards generul integrahon
The major motive was political: to guaGntee a lastlrg peace between Fratrce and

.lean Monnet (1868-1979)

muer (

187

( lnion) and
fotntk:r ttf tlrc CD(l (Christidn .Demo'.roti'
his
reLtrenlctlt
of
rhe
itr
htttl
shot's
lear
lsas to iga:. rhit ptcu'Lre

6-1967 ), Mdyor of

i'tn*ru* t ii

alogtrc,

oring spirit in the

cawe of a'United States of Europe' (photograPh:

Iluropean Communlti)

Charles de GduIIe (1890 1970), P

France as a Breat power and Pres
French Republic 1951fr9 (Photog'
K eJ s to ne IH ultonl D e ut s c h )

: HultonlDeutsch)
167
166

ru

ru

I
I
I
I

Lr-at

LUtoPe

Iy .

stttL

Lu'uP|'

-,tee

rilil

ilt[
lu rlt

I
I
t
t
t
I

Ce(nany. War between the two should be made not only unimagnrable - but also
materially impractical'- The plan also had an econornic dimeosior - alron!:st olhor
things the French stoel industry leeded safe supplies of coal

((jrrrsscr, ,{980). llt

spicuous o1 tllcsc
(:omnrurrity (1.!)(l)

The formal opeoirg shot for the process had been a Press conlbrcrlcc jn 1950 by
the Frenctr Foreign Ministel Robert Schumail. Ilis proposal was lhat coal and
steel resouces in westem Europe should be pooled and co-administered by a
s pra-national authority. This should improve the market by reducing tariffs and
other barriers, and spcincaUy would handle the instability caused by the shoflage
of coal and oversupply of sleel. As a first step towards more Seneral Political integration, a Franco-.GemaJ. rapprochement was seetr as the essentiaLrelqqionship of
tlre union- The plan acfually stated:
The French Govemment proposes that the entire Frelch Cerman coal
and steel production be placed under a joint High Aut]rcrity wiLlfn the
framework of an organization which would also be opelr to the
paJticipation of the other countries of Europe.
(Grosser, 1980, p 119)

ticrrlnr. sincr: tho

The plan was dratted by Jean Momet, who was then head of the FrencL Plaming
Comflission In his conception rle coal and steel union should be only the fust
step towzrrds political lntegation.

The European Coal and Steel Cornmuniry contained various instituhonal inno
vations of lasling importance: a supra-national authority (the High Au lonry) with
considerable powers, dircct ircome for the community in the form of taxation and
thereby less dependence on the member countdes, a Common AssembLy which
was 'thc nrst intemational assembly in Europe with legally guaranteed powers'
(Urwi , 1991, p. 50), and a Co'irt of Justice with the task of ruling on the legality
ol ary lligh Authority action 'by rcotiog the whole ECSC strudure in the last
rcsort ln the rule of law, the drafters of the treaty introduced a concept which was
lo hc of trenendous lmportance for Europeal integratiorl as a whole' (Urwin,

lq9l, p 5l).
'lhe trcrd lowardi economic integration coDtinued. ID 1958 an importiurt step forward was marked with the foamation of ttre EEC and Elrlatom. But those who
.hcw up the Treary of Rome (195?), tbereby paving tlre way lor the EEC, had a
pohtical as weu as am economic agenda. In the words of Waltcr Hallsteh, the fust
president of lhe EEC:
We are not just integrating economies, \te are inie8rating politics- We
are not just sharing our fumiture, we are building a new and bigger
house,

ffi

(Quoted in Urwin, 1991, p. 76)

Political union was now

ffi

seerr as achievable as a consequence

of ecolomic inle-

glatlon.

The process of European integration witnessed numerous selbacks. A typical

source of conihct was French susprciol that the Germans were too dependent oB
{ilil

the United Srates. The majoa transatlantic conroversies were played out with the
US and FIaIIce as the main cornbatants, arrd West Germany as the major variable
168

o
lllxnlc(l iltt(x
l')5(| 54 lhi
l) ()l)l)()srrrll lll
ic(s ovo' co

l\

volr's- ILe Llosl con

il Iirrolxrillr l)clcncc
r|lr rrrrrlrrllttly ttt ltrtt

lr|r'rrttrr"'l ttr

tttt

'u'
plicltiorrs lirr lr'cndr r"ilillry sovr,r,'i11nrv Ir)rrl'rrrl ll'r: pr'"'rr' l"l irr 11)'r\' t'r
Wrsl (iorrIrI'y srgrrirrg tlrr: ll'rrss(:ls Ii(:i'ry rrrrrl lrrrrrrrirrll ir rrrr r l' r t'l N/\l(
'

ALrothcr ol'thesc conllicls w:rs

ovtrr llrc bil l(trrl liirrrtro Wcst

t ir rrrrrrrr l(){r

I lrlv:r't

operation, and the polilical limits to it.

major cause of disagreement in the 1960s between France and West Germany
was over the differenr perceprions o{ the rote of the USA in Europe Though, as
the debates between the Atlanticists and the Gaullists in thc West Germatr
Cluistiatr Demoqat pafly show, diftbrences of opinion could be found within, as

well as berween, the two countdes (cf Nolte, 1974).

arose ovcr Frelch aLtemPts under de Gaulle to prornote
irter govemmenlal co-operaliotr with West Germany, at the exPense of F'F'C
rnechanisms- This was unacceptable to the smaller EEC counfries so loog as
Britain could not operale as a balance against Franco_Gemlar domilation'
Witho0t Britain, the smaLl cou tries of the F,EC wcre very nuch dependent on the
thrust of srpra nationalitY

A further complication

Among the controversies

of

re 1960s should be mentioned French (de Gaulle's)

oppositior to Ildtish membership of Lhe EE(], allegedly because this would be

fanLamou|t to giving the Americans a votc inside tlle coDlnuDrty. (It was seelr as
part of K(j redy's 'grand design' for an Atlantic partnership) This 1963 refusal
ied at first ro a strenglhening of counter intelFation in EFIA The Fiench line crrl
mirated ftom 1965 in clear crisis, with a F-rench walk-out rn 1966 ended by the
so-called 'Luxembourg cornprcrmise', which institutionalized a national right to
veto. Thus, tbe process of integration was stalled even tbough ilr 1967 dre
Ertlopeao Commututy had been formalizeci as a resull of the merglng of the institutions of the EEC, EDralom and lhe Etropean Coal and Steel Cornmu[ity

FIom 1969, Wily Brurdr's social liberal coalition govelnment in West Germa.ry
wa-s less suppoflive of the idea of a supft-nationaL westem EuroPeaD irtegration
tllarl iis predecessors. lnstead, the all-Europeiur onentation (r.e includurg eastem
Europe) and a confederala view on tlie EC Played a comparatively larger rcle in
'West Germar thinking. Bmndl and bis pany 'slressed the role of the ration-slate
for the central Europear peace order' (Ilacke, 1988, p 169) This seemed to bl3
derived from lhe emphasis or Gemar policy atul OsQolilikldilente

a 'Confederal'

a loose league ol stales sucll as ihe CIS, in contrast Io

tighter conslructlon of d new, joint slale, sucb as lhe USA

'federal'

.r

Kissinger's nremoirs, T&eWhite House Years, 1979, pp.405-12) The whole logic
of Brandt's opling towards the East implied that he could no longer just concelrate on integration in the West and hope for this to exercise magletism in the
East; he had to start working for some kind of all European framewotk (Frieden
sorilnung, 'peace order') in which Germany rDight eventually reach unificatiotr'
and in which Lhe improved relaiions tovfids lhe East could be tocated as well

In ttre 1970s, westem Europe

as a whole experienced

Feat difficully over econ-

omjc alevelopment. The economic set-backs at the beginning of the 1970s, which
were ilramatically worseneil in l9?3 by the oil crisis' hit westem Europe very
hard. Econornic problems persisted *lroughout the 1970s' furthered by the seconrl
oil crisis i! 197&-79. Against thil background' tensions developed between the
EC countries and the USA, mainly because of the economic policy of the USA
(leading to their budget dencit) and the fluctuations of the dollar. Ore consequence of this was that West Gemary gave up supporting the dollar and togedrer
with France, at the end of i}le 1970s, initiated lhe EuoPean Monetary System
the
@MS). The rclative economic stagnalion in westem Europe continued into
early 1980s. A major economic lalking Point duriDg this penod was 'Etuosclero_
sis', a condition that resulted in Europe lagging behind in the intemational econ
omy. This, perhaps, was a factor in stimulating EC countries into renewed
aftempts at integration in rhe secolrd half of the 1980s.

tl s time, the EC had expanded its membership

lield of operation. The original six signatories to the
by the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland and

its

By
Willy Brandt (1913 1992), German Chancellor from
1964 to 1974 and winner of the

l97l

Nobel Peace

Prize. This picnre was laken aI the Brttish Laboul

Parry Conference in 1986 (photograph:
HuhonlDe ts.h)

ed

in

1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986 and, in 1990' the former GDR was brought into
the fold tluough uniication with West Gerrnany. The collapse of dictalorships in
southem Elrlope in the 1970s did more than just Promote the cause of the newlyestabtshed democracies jn Spain and Portugal with lhe EuroPean Community lt
meant, as far as westem Europ was concemed, a teturn to a EuroPe that was pol
itically and culhnally accePtable in the wider world wrth the admission ol more
of southem Europe, the EC could claim to include more of ItiJtoricdl Europe than
hitherto. It became entitled to parade as lhe EuroPean Community, when il in
cluded Greece, the cradle of democracy, arid Spain, a major actor in European history and expansion- The image of westem Eurcpe thus became less problematic
and this in tum served to prcmote European identity and strengthen the European
idea-

Integration theory
The process of European integlatiolr managed to give birth to a theory almost a
integration tiory'' It seems appropriate to dwell oD thls'
oisciptine of its o*i

The standard interprelation of integration tleory is to Presen! it in t}le form ol lhree

it could be exPressed as follows:

schools. In a simplined form

shor'rld

il

171

174

I
I
T

I
t
I
I
I
t

l
I

Essay r

EuIUP- -''e

siDcc in rany ways it can be seeu as a ibrmahzed expressiorl of tho aclual as

surnplroDs bchiDd the practrce of lcadxrg politicians aod lugh ranldng civrl scr
vants. Neo functiooaliin (the leading school of iDtegration lieory) stresses the

(tnore orless automatic) self propelling dynamics of integration, so-c;lled 'spill

issue catries with it ntegratioD jn anothcr (funcrional il
legration); iD the cou6e of the integratron process political actors 'letu!l', i.e re
direct their orientation and lheir practice towards (European) political bodies that
become inrportant- Eventually ftey miglrt even switch tieir loya.lties to nelv poliLi
cal sfucturcs ('polilical spill-over'). Fina.lly an agetrcy ir the EC pimarily tlte
Cornrnission is charged with fie task of making integatioD proceed, and rn
negoliations it wil try to handle political conllicts tl[ough 'upgrading rhe com
mon iDterest' instead of always making compromises on the lowest common de

over' Integration on one

1

$
W

ffi

flil

ltill

nomrator (this lhird type is called'cultivated spill-ovet') (Iranholm-Mikkelsen,

199t). 'nle view presented is one of political dlites, of incremental change, of
'lcaflung' ard redefining interests. In contrast to federalist integration plans, there
is tiltle tdlk of mobilizing the peopte, or of demanding things rn the name of 'Europe'; nor is emphasis given to concentaied moments of choice or constilutionmakrng. As with original functionailist lheory, the basic idea is drat by abstaining
frorn the controversial 'high politics' decisiotrs of securify, prestlge and power,
one can gradually cultivate political change from below, from 'low politics'.

Integration: a EuroPean Proiect

To some extent this could be presented as the reality of the 1950s and early 1960s,
since a stable context was created by the supcrpowers, and iDside this it was possible to operale as if security and high politics did not exist. Because the basic con
flict wa-s now bet\reen the USA and l-he USSR and these superpowerc dominated
Europcan) integratio'l theory since it does not stan out &om a fixed regjonal set-np, but
instead firvoLlrs llexibrhty as to scale. The aim is to bandle issues at f]re point wher il rs
Dos( r;rliorLal for them to be addressed and hence the nation-state is not always th most
s|ilnble vehicle Func[onalism har a stro g flavour of technocratic ideology: the main
poull rs lo prevent the hadling of issues from beng contaminated by polirics. In an
nrcre.rsingly iuterdepe ent world rt will be in the interest of everyone to a1low issrcs to
bc orsanized accordins to lheir nature: form should folow fimction

ilffir

0r)

Neo lirnchonalism is much more clearly a theory of regional ntegation (taking the
a,\ the sbnrng point); actually
nei) functionalism is the most important and influeotial theory of regional integration lL
lates from tunclionalism thc rdea of avording too much politicizarion ard tryhg to focus
on concrete co operation, but thrs slrategy is lioted 10 a theory which actually rccogDrzes
political prccesses and especrally focuses on lhe role of 6Li1es ard their capacity for
gradual teardng, i.e. how a process can become self-reinforcirg by chadging the way
aclors deftoe their inierests and interprehrions. Thus, it avoids the idealist assumptior
about altrurs8c actofi, but aJsumes thal the process of integation can carry along lhe
politicd (and other) 6lites in rcdefining their own rational seif interest m ways that
increasiogly make dre supra naLional insLitutions ther referent iNtead of the DatioD.state

ailll of integration in a rcgron hk Europe

{ffi

[i:ii
,:;iii

'I

;l

somc

(i)

of the characteristics of the project for Europeiut iotegralion

The extent of EuroPe

(iii)

Federalism is (in ihis context) less of a reory itnd more of a strltegy Itr conrftsi to
tne 6[te-approach of neo-tunctionalism, it stresses the (occasiornl) mobilizatior of the
masses- Tlle 6lites are wedded to the existirg (i-e. nation state) strucbrres but, since
integration actoally will b in the interesl of all, the people world choose a Eoropean
coDstruceou if they got the chance Therefore, one sbould nol (as the neo-funchonalists
want) avoid politicization, bur nrobilize pDople for ihc decisive move where power an(i
authority can be traDsfened to a new constil'nion, a new supra-natioral rnit

172

il
d
as Jeao Monoel put
themselves, but by

If

pressed oD

this

thai they were not

integrationisls rePlied
g creaied by others or'
t drawn uP by the Six

in them' (cf

Wallace'
173

much in {crms ol the US beinB a negative, extemiLl power but more in the sense
(h^t Eur'opeilrl integration was, at the same lime, a pafl of and a resistance to the
Arnerican order.

i990, p. 111).'fhis is somewhaL rlisi gcrriLi)xi [)cc^usL:, as L]ritain lbund to ils cost
in 1963. a tlistinr:-i,on rrccrls L(J l)c madc bcrwecn those counlries that decli ed
membershlp tutd those lhat were refused membership. Nevertheless it is fair to say
that the posl-war politicians who, within dre linits set by the superpowers, set orrt
to re buiid Europc, were 'iess inclined 10 describe the outer boundaries of their
imagheci Europe than to organizc the counfiies at its corc' (Wallace, 1990, p 20)For Monnet. a pdnciPal ilrchitcct of Europear inlegralion, Europe's corc consisted
ol Fralce, Britaur and CermanY.

(vi)

as Peter Bugge has shown' a useful distinclion

abawn between perceptions of Europe and prdJ?cr-r for EuoPe. This essay is not
burlt arounrl such concepts. The reason for this is in itself arr important point rc

Dudng the inter war period,

This d1d ot mean that vis:ions ()1- a wider Europe werc tolally obscured, but that the
rcality oI the siluation demanded thnt western Europe reorgamze itself in the first
rstance. A way of prising eastem Europc out of thc SovieL gip was to strengthen
integr^iioD, pcace ancl plosperity i[ lbe westelll part of lhe conthent Although the
division betweell eastern and westeflr Eurolc was rcgarded as artificial, lloDe fhe
less the practice of Norkrng within a west luropean frzrle of refeluce for decades
producecl a mcntaL map wherejn 'EuroPe' was olten taken to mea0 either westem
Europe or even thal part of Europc beloDgmg to ihe Europeiur Corrrmu ty

(ii)

Perceptions and Proiects

Content

can be

war
flarding tlrc differcnce betwen ihe intcr war ard post war period' In the inter
years. perception and project often meant a split betwecn rmages of a desperatc
situation and gland designs for their sol tion ln the post war period the frrn
damenral difference is that there actually is a process oI EuroPean integration arld
'project' rlow means taking port in alld mJluencing the process rathcr than issuing
stirring cftlls for radical change- PerceptioN and projects move closer and it nakes
sense to lreat them together Applying this temiDology to the peiod 1950 to 1980
it could be said that the domiDarlt perception of Europe is one of a regional grouP
of peoples leaming from their histodes that they should lollow either a co
operative way (Britain, Scandinavia) or a suPra-Dational way (Contulental, Ewope
of the Six) down a less nationalistic road. This is not the doomed rror driven

As 1() corlent, the EC project has focused otL blead-and FutLer political an(l ecolromrc iss es and the promotion ol Peacc and prospcrity rather than on hiEfsouodjng abshactioll anci g.andiosc historical and culiurrl clairns

(iii)

Merhod
The nreLhod oI ilitegralion has beer a Lnix ol

neo_functioDaLrsrn alrd occasional

federalism. That is to say, technjcal (zurd not overly political) co-opention irl some
fields, leading to fuIlher co_opcration alld inte8lation in others through the gui'l
(neo
ence of detem ed 6lites and in a process fbcused on 6litc politics

functionalism)
asking them t
grand federtrl
fur

c ti

(iv)

oPle'

rn

Economic and political integration would provide peace and Prosperity and may
well lead to a sftonger say in world politics bnt not a unique or dominanl rolcFurthemrore, the project is in itself a process - a course of action wbich llorrlr)les
European jntegration not by high-sounding rhctoic' but by Prirctical, down-lo'
eardr co operalion

i1
hl

liiiil

t
I
I
n

neo-

onalism

ldeological/philosophical basis

Europe as a common destiny?

re course ol the 1980s Europe began to emcrge from dre loDg shadows
from colonialisrn, war
cast by the Second World
s of superpower dorni
and holocaust had largely
t tended to attract crili_
nance it was the USA and

During

cism on the wider Political stage.

was accorded a posifive rather than n
negative cachet (Fifielkraui, 1986; Jahn l al., 1981. p 25) For examplc, ru thc
mid 1980s tbe United Nations Universrty launched a Foject on regional securily
ltith separate progmmmes for Asia, Latin America, Afiica and Ocea[ia; tuld, aflcr
six months of deliberation, EtIIope was included- The US and the USSR were Presumably powerful and secure enough to manage without the attentions of thc IIN
University, but not so Europe. Europe was grouped among the 'you[g' emergcnt
continents but beyond this, wiihin EurcPe itself' a more conlidelt, asseldve mood
Before the bar of world

Europe rather than tle furure for F-uroPc

(v)

rl

Obstacles

Undoubiedly the corltmlrins strcngth ol natlonahsrn - charccterized by iotegralion

in
ists as short-sighted national egolism has bccn a ca[se of shain Additjorla]Iy
so
sfuctlrlal LemN, ihc position of the USA has becn a complicating factor rlo1

opirioL 'Europe'

r
U

il
ffi

ffi

175

1f4

ililill

colrl.l be delected At the level ot culture, ideol-rgy :md identity, Elrrope from thc
nrid 1980s seemed to be regafuing a selsc of dynamism lJurope was once rnore
en]elging as a positive idea, solllethiJlg llrat Europreans should seek to rcalize' Preserve and defend. It was against this backdrop that le process ot ntegratlon wt
thin the European Community gained a new mome tum'

ilrl

ilffi

ililii

nili

By contrast the mood of the late 1970s and early 1980s had been much rnore tentative and uncertain. Pelceptions of the EC were dominated by f-he conhove$ial
Cornmon Agdcultural Policy and concems about the growrng buleauclacy io
Bmssels. The EC could be cornpared with a cyclist- It had to sustain the mornenlum of inteSralion or fall iI this case, not to the Sround but at lcasl to the baselinc of a customs union (Ka$er et al , 1983) In thrs respect we have atready
touched on the debate about'Eurosclerosis', reflectiJrg the fear that Euope wolrld
fall behind in the new technological revolution and lose its Elative Position 1r lhe

world economy. These fears, coupled perhaps with concems arisilg ftom superpower tension, were lo be the mam diving-force behifld an attempt in fte middle
oI thc 1980s to give new impetus to Lhe process of integration The most imporF
aot initiative was ihe series of meetings of the European Cou cil rn 1985 wbich
agreed plals for rJrstitutional reform of the EC and the plan for an intemal smgle
rnzfket by 31 December 1992. In a masteryiece of symbolic politics a oarne and n
ileadline for the re-laurlch of old ideas wa-s created At a sfroke, a political reality 1992 - wa$ conjured up and all acto6 in iniemational as well as domestic polilics
were compelled Lo relate to it. Though it was assumed that the total prograrnme

by 1992 the iflpelus of the projecr hiis had a selfreinforcing effect. lo 1988 {9, the project was expalded further with dre so-called
Delors plan for a rnooetary union GM[D. Thus it was not urtil the end of the
1980s that west European co operatton, lateflt ill the European Monet'rry System
would be inplemented

flli

iii

il'

since the end of the 1970s, was put into practice tioogh it should be said thal il
was only witir some difficulty that agreemeDt was reached on the first phase Early
ru 1990 these plans were suPPlelnented by a Franco-Gemall proposal for a politicul union of the EC Crcat difliculties, es?ecially wift the tIK, were experielced
nr rcgir(l to these irririattves, but at the Maashicllt sullrmit ln December 1991, de
spitc a number of caveats atld rcservations, a corllse was set tbr economic and pol_
iticd union. Silrce then the Danish referendum oI Julre 1992, rejecting lhe
Maastricht Treafy, and lhe moDetiry crisis ir Octobei, which led to Italy and thc
UK leaving the Echange Rate Mechanism, hrve generated some ulcefiainty but
whatever ihc political fall-out arisilg from this, it can be said that, from thc

rnict-1980s, the EC has undertaken siSnificant irew iDitiatives and created bold
prospecli for itself.

Although the 1970s have been characterized as a time when Europe seemed 1{) he
losing some of its dynarnism, there was surPrisingly some success in the forcign
policy field- European Political Co-oPeralion CEPC) had beer se! uP through de
cisiods laken in the early t970s, and enjoyed a clear inler govemneltal statusEPC worked well i[ fie early rounds of the Cooference on Secunty and
Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), known as the Helsinh Process-6

The CSCE hos something of a loog history.It grew out of dre various, mainly Soviel
plans of tle 1950s and 1960s for a European confercnce to sancdry the outcome of the

1'16

177

of a transnational, European civil society, existing as an altemdive to thc estall

lished nalional states, In projecting Eulope as such a single, hansnatlonal' m llifaceted local society the concept acquires an anti-establishment hue. Thus Europe
is lined up in social movements that are against state, Politics ard pottical pa ies

One, two, many 'Europes': the re'emergence

central EuroPe

ol

For much of the post-war period, the politicavsecurity debate ovel Europe was
couchecl in East West temls. From the early 1980s, this situation began to change,
as instanced by Gorbachev's notions of a 'conmon European horne' and the wave
of litenture coming from France about Europe. Europe was frequenoy on the ton
gue of Russian, French and Gennan commentaiors and with different voices singd ask ourselves: did this represent a
ing in the n
The answer is no lf we scratch thc
sudden alral
were not all refeming to thc sanre
surface we
oundanes from the West as well as the
l1u
dilfelent 'European' values (J0]n et al ,
Ea
me, EuroPe stretched from ihe Atlantic
19
to rhe Urals, i e. a coclevord for excluding the Amedcans, while otheIs hypoiheians were excluded To some'
of a shong centre (Brussels),
its very lack of a centle.

The tendency to see security and politics as questrons of Earope becarne much
more obvious after the conclusion of the INF treaty ia 1987 (dismantling thc highly

il

I
t
I
I
I
T

Europe's true natule

poirrts
These iLiscourses necessadly moved away from previously held reference
'naiural"
pattenr
as
a
new
as
legitimate,
a
new
order
install
Since the poht was to
The
there wa.s a tendency towards 'deeper' rcferences, a search for ne't principles
the
on
fields
of
security
resLrlt in ttre 1980s has been a much closer link between the
have
The
arguoents
other'
on
the
geography
and
one hand and culture, history

(to ge-

alrnost
's essav

179
178

I
I
t
I
t
t

I
I

'European values' as the continuation of war by

difterent means
Centrel Europeals did not monopolize tfu debate
powerlul voices parrrcularly French, German arrd Ru
Lhemc . This sectiort will locus on ll ese .rrrPPllrS
these different 'Europes' is a privileged way of gainiDg access to the political

and alocumentation of the diffe@nt Europes, see Wnver 1989, 1990 and Wever et

al., forthcoming.)

For the sake of argumenl, tbis Presentalion is made as if one cor'tId talk of ltd
French or the Russl^n way of thinking about |urope. Thj.s is obviously not $e

I
I

case; a more comprehensive study would show how each sational discourse is, in
reality, a layered structure, where d(fferent groups disagree lwildly oll certain is
sucs, but may then shife a more basic code and set of concefm. Thls in nrm might
be contested by some margirul groups; and with lhese th? majorily would then
share a yet more absfact, more basic concePtion of stale, Iladon and Europe (for
methodology, see WiEver et al., forthcoming, Chapter 1) Thbsc Europes do not rc

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Mihail

Gorbacher (1931 )General Secretary of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1985 199);
President of the USSR 1988-1991. The authot of
glasnosL ( openness ) and percsfoik^ ( restruc turing)
(pholograph: HultonlDeutsch: Richard Mow).

politwl

ftottrer had been wrongly placed between wesiem Europe and centml
Iiurope, which territory came to be seen as'eastem Europe'. The solution, of
course, would be to redress this mistake, and move the political botder to its correcl location, between Russia and Europe
Furlhermore, the original central Europe discourse had a peculiarly indeterminale
nature. Central Eurcpe is neitber geography, Iror history, neither a place, nor a progranme but 'a way of thinking' (Milosz); 'a cultumlly connected area' (leszek
Kotakowski); 'a culture idea - or fate' (Kundera); it 'only exists as a state of
mind' (Stefan KaszyrNki). In a fleld where no political action seemed realistic, and
no altemative was allowed, intellectual and cultural exchange was drc or y means
of opening ?olitical space. (Later, when 'ordinary' politics had re-emerged rn lhese
countries, tbis specific mixture of culture, history and geography with all ils am
bivalences was no longer seen to be a prcrequisite for articulating a voice in tlie
region ) More important then was the notion of a 'rclum to Europe' taking cerlral Europe to Europe, or even fo the West an idea fhat had been mpliclt ill the
ceotal Europc d$course all along-

180

fer to-public opinion nor to the average citizen, but to Pollfical discourse,lo lhe
logic of political argumentatron which is shared among opponents in the settng of
a national, political cultue.
That lhere 4re such national differences as lo what is generally emphasized in a
cultwe, ald thereby what is meant by Burope, can be seen ftom the sel of four
books comprismg Lhis course Who is writiog what?'l'he French wite abodt ilrsti
tutions,lhe Germans about grass roots and society, Lhe Bdtish about rclations with
the outside wo d. and L\e critrcal task of deconsrirlcting the concept
given to tlre small nations, the Dutch and the Danes!

of EuroPe

is

German 'Eurcpe'
Germary, Lhe cenhal Europe debate was transtbmed into a debate about
Mitteleuropa One rcason for this is that Cermans tend, quite natnratly, to speak in
German. The change of word was, howevet, more than a matter of lranslalion
Whereas for Milan Kundera 'cenlral Europe' was the afta be )een Germany ald
Russia aD area etemally weak and shaped by resisLance to its powerful neiEhbolf]s lbe Mitteleurcpa dlsct$sed in Germany was one that (surPdse, surprise!)
contained Germany. -flte Mitteleuropa concepl thus refered to a real area with a
decisive political weight, rather than being a question of Purety cultural idenr.ity.
lllevitably, Mitteleurapd has connolatiorls of 'Getmany alld its suroundings', ihe
Geman area. (On the difference betweel cenhal Europe and Mitteleuropa, see
Waver, 1980, pp. 49 51; Ganon Ash, 1990; Rupnick, 1990. The social demo-

In

181

crrlrr.iourral l.tiI'

ttttt

N.rrurrann's bool. M

iLl c I

(;,1ialln-tltitft

u[al(r)

in

1986 cven rcp ntcd a selection Iidqr

anolhci (ierlllrn 'inLernnl prcssurc' Led to attemPts to move bolders. ln the

Europe o[ the ]990s, this $ no longer a viable option irnd' to some extent'
simllar pressures (a Geman state smaller than the German nation' and an
economy able to expand its geographical covemge) arc given a different ou1let. For German natioral policies (in relation to minorities; Polartd) and irr
econor c pollcies (Czechoslovakia, Baltic republics, I{ungary) it makes seisc
to underplay the significance of bordersCDU circles this logic has sudaced as a means of resolving the problem ol the
GermarFPolish border (the Oder-Neisse line). There are sevcral statemeirts by
CDU spokesmen n the Bundestag (for instance Jdy 1989, November 1989,
March 1990) conceming the Oder-Neisie border, where it is argued that thc prob'
lem can oaly be solved by arriving ar a Europe wherc borders h:rve lost ll''i'
meaniig. Thus, the argnment ruN, Gelmany would grow togethel across the borl
cr. The CDU argument on Silesia takes exacdy the same fonn as the SPI)
pre-1989 arglment on German-German relations Jan Kroll, spokesnran lor ihe
Silesians, the main German minoity in Polald, ha-s as his motto: 'l want to live in
'I'tlen his German communities
a Europe withoul borders'. That is ulrde$tarldabte
can grow together (with the resl of'Germany'), without having to question the

h
tures that these borde$ contailr.

border

cleaiy on the Geman agenda And so is a slre gth

Liinder (the German siates. si\teen since ur;fi
ening of regionalization, ol
cation) acting across the borde$, building networks and avoiding actiofl by
Support for

rnirority rights

rs

il

lill
iiiil

n
T
T

the

Empire').

'Germany'. Federal Germany remarlrs passive arld a Getmur Mittele&roPd is construc{ed by irms, tjrder and individuals lnking up in a tight pattcnr of ilrterac]tion.

Alter Ger4an utuficatio , it is said, some people in the llclghbolrrill[l c(rtrlri''\

hstened for the sound of marching boots. 'lhey would hale beell better adviscrl l()
listen for the sou[d of tiptoeing. They should be grateful, loo As there i\ ir

I
n

German alliaDces in EuIoPe.

t
1986)

too strong nor too weak. Poiilicat thinking has remained linked to the conccpt oI
the state - fiot to lhe idea of the state as the embodiment of power and will but to
the notion of thc state and power as a practical rssue that requircs handling or Inay
even lle secn as a potential throat to be crlnailed (Weever cI r''l ' forthcorning)

ffi

ffi

183

182

ililfi

-ssay a

tl
it

it
ffi

I
t
t
ilt
ffi

Lulope 5rL

Thus, nalurilly, the concept of LwoP has been relalcd to Processcs wherc fbmitl
'lhe less the natid)_
statc st ctr]rc; anal state action begin to losc Lheil lnPortarlce
(cf
Stiioner 1990) ln
slates signjfy rn a fulure Lurope, thc better lor Gemany
where pol
thus
be
fullilled
can
Europe
and
G".m- thinti,tg, Projecls for nation
absent
weak
or
are
itical sbxctures
ing constituled afld actiog in a way that is Frcoch'

French'Europe'
For the French, this kind
cal thinking has to be ab
will. In most variants of

ca

clear bordcrs znd endowed wiih a certain mission

cat reality, it will have to take on these qualiiies

lf

lot be For them, Politiabout coherence and about

cenralized, demarcated by
Europe is to become a polili

ln the lune of cie Gaulle, the slogan (dlough not actually his expression) was
('slale
L'Europe des pdrri?i, respectmg the full sovereignty of tE etut nation
the
state
nation
of
th
to
lhe
pedigree
nation'). This seemed logrcal in relation
ln
built
could
be
EuroPe
the
lrew
whicb
on
the
only
foundatlol
was
state-nation
ro
1983-4 there came a drarnatic shift in French European policy Francc started
areas
as
many
in
role
exercise a state-like
prcss for th
actor with a defence identity and a culhrt'rl
as possible
experienced a volte-face On the corltrary,mission. It
fhe political thinking was the same just one level up Now Europe had lo hc
whai France had always wanted to be France had bccome too small' and ils 'nis
sron must be liiken over by 'EuroPe' (Schubert 1988) Thus dre French conccllt
of lhe state is lepeated at the level of Europe, and the apparent lum-round ol
1983 -4 in reality is bascd on continuity at the level of political druking' Enrope
musl now be what France should have been and could somehort remain ll musl
includc a politjcal and defence identity, its owll values and rccognition hy exleral aclors.
'l his sccrns rncornprehcnsible to the Danes and probably to the British, who thillk

ffi

Drorc iD zero s{rm terms: what

ffi

ffi

ill

regaincd through the constitution of

Europe

tlul is

able lo acl and eam respect

iiom others.

l,o clo

words, a \ry un stalelikc Europc' utlable !o act in uorty )

is given lo Bmssels is lost to Copenhagen or

what ts won back to the nahon is taken away ftom a federalizing

Europe Not in France, where 6 Mitterand can say: 'The more Europe ihere wili
be- the more Fmnce'. the explanation lies in Frenclr thinking about the nidon,
which implies that the nauon has a mission atrd that it has to act and be recoglrizerl by others, fust on the EuroPean and then on the intemational scene This is
not to suggest that lhe French regard themselves as a chosen people wirh a rnis
sion. The French idea of France is not that the French people are s[perior in prirres: hu$an dghts, political
ciple; but the values France
seclion on the eighteenth
of
the
and
the
rdea
rights,

'lhis is illustlatcd by means oI Figt

fuse nelworks, France's is (a child'
roundhg world -:urd one is well
becaose, untll the esPousal of fedel
dly ilt ltre hcarl oF Europe wa-\ sorDewhat uncleal

on, a pdticularly intrmate

cenrury). The French have,
relarionship with tlese values lt is this logic tlat made lt possible for de GauLIe to
state in his New Yeal's speech 1967:

Our action is directed toward goals which are connected alrd which,
because they are French, rellect the desire of all men.
(Grosser, 1978;

tili

Grman

l98A edn, p 184)

FigtLre

Three LuroPes
185

ffi

184

Russian'Europe'
llrc ltrrssian rll!sbatiol rs ll box Lct me explaill. Lr the Soviet
lrlurot,e

logic'
Mosco
violory

The 'box
discoursc

oLr

of thc 1980s, tire slogan wrs aiorbachev's 'conlrnon European house'

(or

'horne') The Soviet Union had latrched many poslwar European pro1ects but the
Wcst had alwlys been suspicious of the line lhat wc EuroPans should stand
together in peace, but we are being thwafied by the int sive presence of lhe
Americans in Europe So when Gotbachev staned singing tlle praises of a 'com
mor Er.rropean ho se', fhc West inttially heard the sanre old song. However' lwo
novel features soon emerged- Irirsl, in Gorbachev's version, the emphasis rvzr-s
much mme clearly placed on culnual and histoncal algumenls. We Europea s, it
is argDed, belong together because of a sharcd culftre and history This is a way ol'
estab[shing a tundamental basis for a specillc loLitica] arranggment, bul il also

cerltrc o[

cisivc

the
de-

of

Europeanizahon
,iiilil

iiiill

culs the othcr way so as to establish ccrtain values and traditions as bindrg on the
Soviet Union. The will to takc this on boerd relales io thc use of the 'European
home' argurnent ilr SovietA{ussian Politics (probably no less llnpo ani dran its cx
in the
temal use). It wlls a slogan of the FuroPeirn lirLc or the Westenlisers

is to
tion to dEvelopments in Gemany in the autumn aJld winter of 1989 90 an(l it
we
now
lum.
aspecl
lhat
this

Soviet Uniou.

Europeanizations

froing, lhe standard lersion of the 'cornmon house'

becamc one where the United SLalcs' right io particlprtion wa! acklowledged (and
the CSCE was preserted as the illslitution:rl lrarncwork lor the consrucdoll of lhc
Secondly, al-ter some

toilg

a somewhat static mirBllel

oltaPse of the Berlin Wall
L,el's bcgin wrlh TilrnLc

and

house).

If it (ihe box) is nol to keeF the Amenca|s otrt, what then is

oI course, to kcep the Russians inl With thc general decline

the pLrposc'/ lt i\,

(and eventual dis-

confuse(l
Frenclr reachon to events in Germany in 1989-90 has been somewhat

appearance) of a Soviet power and posiliotl, Soviet/Russian Europc lr1l.s

siiihercd in reccnt ]eais lrom bcing offensivc to deiensive The original vedion
coulai be charactcdzed as oifensive irL tiral it w.ls aimed at wirning ihe he'llrts
o1 wesl Europeans, and thc Wesl Gcnlans in Paniculilr (Malcoln 19894 and
lg89b). But wilh thc events of 198q it bccame clear lllat lhe Soviet/Itussian

t
I
T

sfuggle was not intelded to increase influence in westem EuroPc, but t']
ndnimize the /oss of influence in eastem as well as westem EuroPe As one
Sovielologisl has put it:

wril in any case be some sort of Europctui Home, ard a horne in

which the European parl Df tilc USSR wi[i have a place is the only
altenrative to one Irom which it is shut out
(Shenlietd, 1989, PP 7lf

'I'bere

workable French PolicY line

)

European Flouse' liradunlly bccame Pir( of a policy whose rnain

aim was to prevent the 'soviet Uniori - and later Rnssia from being excluded

lhe 'corlmon

fiom EuropeMoscow userl to have a solid prcseice

thr, a presence has to be crealed in

Europcan stitrtions ancl, fust and

aLl the drAmatic ciranges of 1991

Ijnioo

fo
-

- it is likely that this logic will

h Europe wiib

tanks and troops WiGout

ffi

icipatuo" in

ss (Despite
the Sorier
ire orte of thc fuw consta ts

ir

lhe torei8n

policy of Moscow.)
1A7
186

Esray r

ll

l:ssay

LuroPe strrce ts4c: crtsts rc renewal

Lurope stnce

1!4r crts6 Io renewar

ffil

ru

I
I
n
ffi

ul tlu,

WdU

irg on 'Projcct Europe' the EC wa-s the end as well as the means. Now that the
airn is widened 10 iuqlude all of Europe in a conJedemtion, lhere is an increased
ncc(l lix an liC capable of bringing this aboDt- In order to be a forse in wider
Firrolle, thc L,C must exercise greater political clout only thJough political mcans
ibelf. This
is Mrlterand's grand dessin.

can the EC creale a Europe larger than

a

political

project

the strengthenirg of ihe EC

es

Tlre French stress or the Comrnunity's Ostpolitik is very logical, because this is
the only way to counterbalamce German economic dominance in eastern Europe
German lirms act without a covering policy - fieir economic calculdtions lead

them to make specific investrnenls. German economic expansion therefore grows

frcm laistez-foire, i.e. non-state prccesses. Frelch companies, on the other hand,
have neither the srength nor the motive for comparable investment- Thus, drc less
political 'help' is extended to eastem Europe, the more Gemrim economic dolni
nance wilt take hold. The place for France to be, threfore, is at lhe head of the
EC's policy towards the Easl- Eastern Europe should not be Left to chance (for
chance, read Germany), but helped/rDanaged/conholled by joitl political actiuD.
Eastem Ewope becomes poliricized and multilaieralizcd ProPosals for big EC

ffi

ioint projects for

188

eastern

Europe

such as the Bank

of Reconstntction and

from the John F. Kennedy School in Berlin carry off souvenirs tl",at had
'falletl off' the WaIL Notember 1989 (photo: Deutsche Press'Agentur)

Studenls

Development emalate liom Paris (while Gennany is doins a lot mor bilaterally
eastenr European countdes that were prein assisting fomrer Soviel republics
^nd
viously conirolled by the Soviet Union). For an understanding of the French position, it is importmt to nolice the way in which easLem-Europe is now beiog
rncluded iD the EurcPc projeot. Eastem Europe is percerved not as a part of
Europe in action, but as the missiotl, the r.l.t]i for westem EuroPe.
Germany the imtitrl fedeml Sovemn]el]t response lo the breachhg of dre wall
was glidcd by fear ol provoking rcaclions from the lorr A]lied Powers, Britain,

ln

Essay r

Lurope stn(E te45: cflsts to fenewal

I
I

oo 'Project Europe' the EC war the end as well as the means- Now that the
aim is widened to inalude all of Europe in a conJederation, there is an increased
Decd lbr ai EC capable of bringing ftis about. In ordel to be a force in wider
Europe, thc EC musi xercise greater political clout only tkough Political means
can rle EC create a Europe larger lhan itself. This - the strengthening of the EC as
a political project is Mitterand's grand dessiniDg

I
T

t
T

Tlre French srress on the Community's Ostpolitik ts very logical, because this is
the only way to counterbalance German economic dorninance iD eastem Euope.
German 6rms act without a covering policy their economic calculations lead
them to make specific iovestrnents. Gennan economic expansion iherefore grows
ftom laissez-faire, i.e- non state processes. French companies, on the other hand,
have neilher the srengdr lror the motive for comparable investmetrt. Thus, [re less
potirical'help' is extended to eastem Ewope, the more German economic dominance will take hold. The place for France to be, threforc, is at the head of the
EC's policy towards the East. Eastem Europe should not be left to chance (for
chance, read Gemany), ttut helped/qranaged/controlled by io.nl political acliou.
Eastem Europe becomes politicized and multilateralized. Proposals for big EC
joint prcjects for eastem Europe - such as the Bank of Reconstnction and

188

i,,l

Eastem Europe is perceived rot as y'

Europe rn aclon, bul as fle mi.tjioa. Lhe task lor westem Europe.

jncluded

in the Europe project.

ln Cermany dle irurrirl redcral gover'lnent response to Lhe brerchirg of Ir"

was guided by feu o1'provoking reactions from lhe four Alhed po\,r'ert'

L]
I

ffi[

tilr

il

I
I
I
il

tsrilish reticerrce over Europe has meant that she is flot part of ihat Saurc OnLy
when one talks of defence and secudty in nattow terru does llrilain cntcr Lhe
$tage, sinoe she claims a mediatng role between the USA and Europe.
The UnitEd States, wrth more justrce, could be iflcluded. US policy lras playcd an
active and constructive role rn the German-EDropean uniication process (the US
belflg the most pro-uoilicatioo of the four'), aDd has fi.lrthefmore succeeded in
securing iD the new Europe a surprisingly strong position for NATO, and ao acceptable shape for the CSCE as a fall-back option, should NAIO later be Inarginalized. NAIO and the CSCE in some ways are movrng in parallel as truly
inter-govemmental, all European, consensus-based 'safety nets' with a specnl rolc
ior the 'quasr European' Russians and Americans- Thus, paradoxictrlly, the USA
carr be included iu tLre aralysis by replacing references on the previous pages lo
'Russia' with'Russia and to some extent the US' and'the CSCE' with 'NA|O
and the CSCE'.

t
ffi

NAIO (USSR/Russrr

and

tlSA);

sub state and non-sLate politics (around GemuDy)'

in Europe
We are nol so much witrressiag a concenlration of Power

gf"

U-a*tL-tion'

ver]sus nadonal

"""ralld audrority aoross va ous,levels'

powet

iliversity

nor a strug

but rather a disPersal of

A neo-medieve! F-uroPe?

146)

ln Europe, tlrerelbie, we see the following patlem emerging: a parallel strengthen

ing of Lhe EC and the CSCE, and the grolvth of infomral Gemr2ur lretworks r
Mtteleuropa. The EC and the CSCE are not tied together in any un1fied, European
conslnrctioo. They each work on their own wavelength- They are driven by a common dynamic by being interlinked as a mdLter o[ Realpolilit - but they are not
p.rrb of a single machine. They are perceived in differenr ways by different powers, b t the political logic of the sihration makes them mrtually dependent. Thc
EC and CSCE stand as different European projects and, in a lurbulent peiod, bave
scrved to promote the complex process of European[ation.

for the idea of Europe in tbe

of potitics, secwty issues

ll

classical slale-to sra@ relatiols in CSCE and

No powcr will submit to a settlement, however well balalced zurd

lrowever 'sccure', wbich seems totally to deny its vision of itself

Searching
ffir

.
.
.

Tlre logrc of this is capture.d when we rccognize that we are Dow actuaLly mikirts
somedrilg akin to a peace settlemenl Its stability depends on not Putting the
Loser in loo degraded a position. At th$ point, more than fbrty five years irfter
the war, the losers of the war, Gennany and Japan, have wol the peace The
prublem for lhe peace seltlement will b whetber rt rs acceptable to the losers of
the post-war pcacc, France and Russia, who will see a reladvely high and privi
leged position decrease unless they can find new channels for what they deenl
[realingful to their rlation, state, politics and secuity. As HeIuy Kissingcr
pointed out, in his 1954 disscrtation on Europe after the Napoleonic wam, a state
may not be treated only lTom the outside a-s a factor in the birlance - an arrangement rs only stable if all major powers can perceive the Dew order as cornpatible
wllh ils own vrsion:

(Kissinger, 1957,

These clynamics move at Lhrce ri:fterent levcLs:

EC (France);
super st^te crcatiolr

1980s has inevitably forced us into a'rvorld

ancl power-manoeuvring. Europe is a far less logical

construction than any junior security expefi or political scientist co ld draw ul. A
ncatcr Europeao archrtechrre is easy io imagi e. But politics is different A Donstellation of interacting projects, each containing their 'Europe' is actnally the il
logrcii ELrupe rn whi.h we aJe living.

Some are undcrgoing Brussellization an'l some are moving down

of the rcgions networks, local authontics, business aod other
a
Europe
towards
iniliatives emerging across state borders-

NAlo mitiative

'Ihcre are dilferent ways o{ looking at presetlt day trelrds in Europe ls the EC the
real sovereign slate while lhe merlbcr sta(es e actually becoming iicreasingly
'1S3

tlr

have the member states still retained iheir

sovereignty, i[ which case the EC is just an Btemational organization? Or is tiis
simply a false dichotomy in that nofle of them is sovereign? If it is a false dichotomy (and I am inclined to thbtri Lhis is the case) it must be because chaoge is hap
pening at the level of sovereignty, of the te[itoria] state- It is important to get tbis
clear because stght conceptual inaccuracy can lead us asfiay The focus shotld be
ot the end of the territorial state (and thereby the oeo-medieval theme, since the

ljkc counly (regioral) authonhes?

territorial state has de-fined tbe modem epoch in conftast to tle medieval), but
most debate phrases possible change in tefins of the likely end of lhe ution-state,
which is a diffeEnt debate. The natiotral idea arrived on the scene in the lateeighteerth century and was fused with Lhe already existing principle of the territoriat state (which had so far been based not on [ationa] but dynastic legrtimacy)
For the last two hundred years or so thc teritonal statc has thercfore been combined with the national idea (making up the oalion-stat), but if we focus on the
nalion-state we end up in a iliscussion of nationalism, and dre natiooal idea persists. However, change ir tating place, but al an even deeper level: that is to say at
the level of sovereignty and fte territorial state. Thus nations continue but the
states that they relate to aje oot what tbey used to be, since the tlale is chaoging,
with authority being dispersed across several levels in our 'new middle ages'
Hence present west-Europeatr developments entail deciCive changes betweel the
unit of identification (rle nation) and the unit of political organization/authority
(the state - and incrcasingly the EC)

hatl no fixed idea of intemalional relations' or 'foreign policy', as an activity limiled Lo a specrlic kiod of urft (state) and ooly to be coDducted among these and on
between emperors,
thc basis of equality. Of couse, to the
d hights might rcpopes, kings, archbishops, barons,

semble

ca
cities,
intemational Elations. All, fot

atrd signed forllal

agreements, sent diplomatic missions, settled their disPutes by arbihation and war
and regulateil at teast part of their behaviour in accordance with cornmonly ac
cepted laws and cusioms. However, ii would be vrong to suppose that these re

intematio[al, in the modem sense of the telm, for they occured rol
individuals and '
between sovereign t
temational' and
corpomte grouPs- A
in medieval Europe'
'domestic' relalions
(Htizgrefe, 1989, pp llf.)

In the literanue and

that nations are simply seeking to move from multi-nation-state orgarization io
nation-state poLitical stl1lctules.

of

reglonaliation and a 'EurcPe of Regions', 'region'

is used at various levels:

(i)

In rhis Europe, societal security wiil be high on the agenda Because of the chang_

ing relationship between stale and society thcre will be more and more security
pr-oblems, demanding securitl policies of a new kind What can a nation/society
io when it feels tlreatened as a nation/society aad vhen it is less able to use lhe
insfuments of the state to cootain people' ideas and technological developments
that are felt to be undenniDing the sense of national cohesion? It will be com_

alebate on

Orc can talk of a 'region' as the unit smaller than the existitlg state (as for
instance in the Swedish sense of 'rcsionalpolitik' - potitics dealing with the
regions; especially the weaker ones).

(ii)

One can talk of 'regions' in

ile form of

state-to state co-olrerallon, such as'

for instance, arrangements rvithin the 'pentagonal', Dow 'hexagonal' (Austfla'

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, Yugoslavia as long as it existed' and Poland
since 1991) ot cenhal European co operative struchrel involving Poland,

(iiD

Hungary and Czechoslovakia

*..,i'ii"",lit3fr,
al and economic

A cultuml coffriunity, it is assumed, will rJI mosl cases first of

activating and inteNifying its forms of cultural expression
by
itself
all defend

will

need culrure.

potcldally move away ftom each ottrer and societies become seclfirly dctors in thei'- own right. Tbis is where the parallel to the Middle Ages
one
comes in. In the medieval system in conirasl to the modem state system -

State and society

net-

works.

it

of this section' partly because is a truly new

phenomenon, and partly because it is this kind of region which is lkely to take on
a specific role in the emerging division of labour between Europe, nation and region.
Th latter is the main focus

195
194

Comparisons between our times and the Middle Ages arc of course problematic'
since there are numerous differences. but the various pajallels are first of a'l manifestations of a common difference from the modedl state system. The purpose of
using the medieval metaphor is primarily to fiee our minds ftom the confines of
the mod"- state system. Our concepts and thinking about politics are so deeply
prcjudiced by concepts from the modem system of states, territodality and soverlJvith the present-day fluidity,
eignty, that new developments are almost invisible.
questions.
we need to treat these concePts again as

Beyond the nation, beyond the state: concepts

a Europe of regions

I
I
I
I
I

t
I
I
I
I
I

British rcticence over Europe has meant that she is not parl of that ganre OnLy
whetr one lalks of defence and secudty in narow terms does Britain cntcr Lhc
stage, since she clairns a mediating role between the USA and Europe

I,
i'l

nilffi

fl
ffi

ffi

rffi

The United State$, with more justice, could be included. US policy lras playcd an
activc and constructive role in the Germal Europeao uni-hcation process (the US
being the most pro-unification of ttre four), and has furthermore succeeded in
securing ill the uew Eu(ope a surpnsingly strong positron for NATO, and ao acceptable shape for the CSCE as a fall-back option, should NAIO later be rnarginalized NAIO and the CSCE ur some ways are moving in palallel as huly
inter-govemmental, all-European, coosersus-based 'safery nels' with a special rolc
for the 'quasi-European' Russians and Americans. Thus, paradoxic.rlly, the USA
can be included rn the analysis by replacing references on the Prevlous pages lo
'Russia' with 'Russir - and to some extent the US' and 'the CSCE' wilh 'NAIO
and rhe GSCE'-

Tlrese dynarnics movc'di. three dltlelcnt levels:

super-statc crealion h IIC (F-rMcc);

.
.
.

classical starc to-srdte relarions

CSCII ancl NNIO (USSR/Russia aod USA);

srlb state and non-stale politics (around Gemany)'

of powcr in Europe nor a sirug

of
veisos naliontll dilcrsity bur rather a dispersal

'We are not so nluch witnessin8 a concenlralion

gi" ou--

g-tr"llt

"ion'
power and aulhorily across various.levels

A neo-medieval F-uroPe?

1he logic of this is captured wben wc recognize that we are now actually rnailirts
something akin to a peace settlement. Its stability depends on not prlftllrg the
loser in too degraded a posrtion. At this poifi, more than forty five years after
the war, the losers of the war, Germany and Japan, have won the peace. The
problem for the peace settlement will be whether it is acceptable to the losers of
lhe post-war peace, France and Russia, who wrll see a relatively high ard privi
Leged position decreaie unless they can lind new chalnels for what fhey deem
meaniogful to therr nation, statc, politrcs and security. ls Heruy Kissinger
pointed out, rn his 1954 disserlation on Europe after the Napoleonic wars, a stale
may not be treated only f.om the outside a,s a faclor iD the balance - an afiangemenl is only stable i{ all nrajor powers can perceive the new order as compatible
with its owr vision:
No power will submit to a settlement, however well balanced and
however'sccure', which seems totally lo deny its vision of itself
(Kissinger, 1957,

ffi

ffi
1[f

fil[

iil

146)

ln Europe, therefoie, we see the fbliowing paltem emergilg: a parallel strengdren

urg ot thc EC zurd dre CSCE, alrd thc grow r of infomral Germ,ur networks iD
Mittete rcpd. Tl\c EC and the CSCE are not tied together ln a]ry uufied, Euopean
conslruclion- 'Ihey each work on dleir own wavelenglh- They are driveu by a cornmon dynamic by being interlinked as a maner of]Redlpoliril - but they are not
parts of a smgle machme They are perceived in differetrt ways by different powers, but the political logic of the siluation makes them mutually dependeut. Thc
EC and CSCE stand as differelt European projects afld, in a rurbulent period, have
served to promote the complex process of Europearization.
Searching for the idea of Europe in the 1980s has inevitably forced us into a worLd
of polit:ics, securily issues afld powea maroeuwing Europe is a far less logical
corstruction th:m any juo.ior security expert or political scientist colld dmw
A
Dealer European archilecture is easy lo imagine. But poliiics is differenl- A constellation of intenchng projccts, each containing their 'Europc' is actually the il

ul

logical Europc ilr which \ye arc living

NAIO hitiative. Some lre undergoing Brxssellization and some are movilg down
other
lowards a Europe of the regrons - networks, local authorjlies, business aid
rnitiatives emerging across state borders
the
There are differcnt ways of Looking at Prcsent-day trerds ln EuroPe Is the llc
rncreasilgly
becoming
aclually
are
states
real sovereign sl^te 1vhile the melxbe!
193

sovereignly,

is haP-

had no fixed idea of intematioml relatiom' or 'foreign policy', as an activity limited lo a speci{ic kind of unit (state) and oDly to be cotrducled among these and on
between emperors,
the basis of
d loights might repopes, kings,

8el lhis
ould be

and signed formal

arbit'ation aDd wat

have the member states sti1l rerained ltheir

just
an intemational organization? Or is this
case
the
EC
is
which

like counly (regiooal) authoitics'/

0[

dchot-

end of the territorial stdte (and thereby the neo-medieval iheme, since tbe
territorial state ha.s de'flned the modem epoch in contrast to the medieval), but
most debate phrases possible change il term s of Irc ltkely end of the nation-stale '
which is a different debate The national idea arrived on the scene in the lateeighteenth cefltury and was fused with the already existing principle of the terri
to;ial state (which had so far teen based not on Dational but dynastic legitimacy)'
For the last t1xo hnndred yeafi or so the teritorial state has thereforc been combined with the national idea (making uP the Dalion state), but if we focus on the
nation-state we end up ]n a discussioD of nationalism, and dre national idea per

or f\e

([he state

and increasingly the EC)

equality.
archbis
semble intetnational
aSrcements, sent
and regulated at
cepted laws and

with corDmonly acPpose thai these re-

lalions wete

)
Comparisons between our times arrd the Middle Ages are of course Foblenatic'
since there are numerous differences, but the various parallels are 6rst of all manifestations of a colnfiron differeDce from the moderiT state system The purpose of
using the medieval metaphor is primarily to fiee our minds ftom the confines of
the modern state system, Our corcepis and thLking abqut politics are so deeply
prejudiced by concepts from the modem system of states, territoriality- a d,soverttt", tt"* alevelopmeBts arc alrnost invisible. With the present-day fluidity'

"ignty,

we need to heat these concePts again as questions'

Beyond the nation, beyond the state: concepts ot

a Europe of regions
that nations are simply seeking lo move from mulli-oation-state organization to
nation-state political stuclures.

In rhe literature and debate on regionalization and a 'EuroPe of Regions', 'region'

is used al vadous levels:

(i)

ing relationship between state and society there will be morc and morc secuity
pr-oblems, demanding sec ritJ Policies of a new kind What can a natiory'sociery

io when it feels tkeatened as a nation/society and when it is less able to use the
instnrments of the state to contain people' ideas and technological develolments
comthat are felt to be undemining the sense of national cohesion? It will be

Hungary ald Czechoslovakia'

towns, s;a[

states, thereby

fomdng

tcqions'
reglons'
net-

tnic

works.

become seState and society potentrally move a'tay from each other and societies
Ages
the
Middle
to
the
parallel
where
is
rigd
This
own
their
curity acrors in
one
st'ate system
modem
to
the
conrast
in
system
the
medieval
In
in.
comes
194

Politics dealing with the

(iD

(iij) One can combine lhe nvo, arriving a

consisting of regions it the first sens

all defend ii,seu by activaring :md intensifying its foms of cultrual expression'

Orc cafl ta]k of a 'region' as the uoit smaller than the existing state (as for
instance in the Swedish setse of'regionalpolili't'
regionsi especially the weaker ones).

In this Europe, societal secuity will be 1 8h on the agenda Because of the chang-

I
I
I
I
I
I

The latter is the main iocus of this section, partly because it is a truly new
phenomenon, and partly because it is this kind of region which is likely to take on
division of labour between Europe' tration and re
a specific role in tlre
gion.

"^"tgittg

I
I
I

There has been in recent yedrs an increasirg awareness of new pattems of cooperatlon such as the areas along the Danube; the constellation of Calalonia,
southem France and northem Italy; the eastem Alps (Alpe Adrialrc); the westem
Alps (Arge Atp) and ths Baltic Sea Region. Io some places we see old pattems
beirg rcactivated as co-opetation amo!.E countrizs - for instance the 'hex-

agonal'/'pentagonal' co-opetation between the old countries

of tbe

Bulgari'dns or the southem border of the

'norlhern

tloni, U..ia". ihe proble$ of borders we havc the

t.".^ti" p-oo. of who should be seen as belo

the nAlevels;
Ernest

GelLner has vfi.itten:

Habsburg

Eorpire- Such a co-operation is 'regiooal' in the seDse that it is part-Euope and it

does Dot follow extemal definitions of ecotromic groupings or Power-blocs but
reactivates a pattem 'ftom below'. But it has nothing to do with regions i'l the
states. In other places we see partJ d/ r/dte.r ccoPerating with other part-states
(for instance Germal. LiinderJ across flatiotral boundaries. 'Alpe Adriatic' in the
eastem A]ps consists of Friaul, Trentino-Southem :Iyrol, Venezia, CroaliaSlovenia, K?imten, Upper Austda and Steiemart, with Bavaria and Salzburg as
observers. Here we are talking about regionalization in the dual setrse as (i) a 'region in Eurcpe', and (ii) as independent politics by the regions in their rcspective
couDfle$.

In the case of Baltic co-opratiofl (on which we will conctrfiafe al dre end of this
seclion) there has been talk of 'a ne,,v Haqsa' (referring to a network of ftading
towns in northem Ewope in the fourteenth and f,fteeEth centuries)- The 'Hansa'
metaphor denotes a co-opemtive arraDgement betwen towns, Poits, cosmunilies
not states. Although we might be wihessing a growing co-operation among
,rrales around the Baltic, Baltic co-operation is likely to be expressed, primarily, by

I
I
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I
I
I
I

ating EuroPean iotegration.

of norl-staie actors such as bu$iness 6Ims, theatre groups and municipal

authorities, i.e. in rc hterplay of regionalization in the states.

a number

In regionalist circles there is a teDdeflcy to present the rcgions as more 'tlue' than
other communilies. This kind of regionalism often looks like 'romantic nation
alism' one level down. The rcgionali$ts love to point out tbat the nation-slates arc
artificial constructs wbere identity and cultute ilere conitructed as Part of a political prcject. It is, however, exacdy ihe same with the regions: they are not given by
nature, just lying there waiting b be discovered. Thete ate no 'nahtral' legiotrs.
We have similarities and commonalities along various dimensions in a complex,
criss-crossilrg network. This does not make the project of a region less valuable or
real. After all, the nations have proved to be emphaticaly real.
Recognizing this political character of regionalization makes con-flict-management
easier, in the sense that one is morc likely to see contrasting views as legitimate.
There is no rcason why the relatiotrship among the emerging regions shor-tld be
harmonious. J. G. Herder and the other early thinkers on nationalism believed that
nationalism was peace-making, because if all people were allowed nalional self
detmination and limited themselves to thet owrl land, ftere would be harmony
As we hrow, it was slightly more complicated than thatl Fi$t, there were prob
lems of &awing dre co[ect bordrs between one land alld another- Secondly, there
were problems of finding out who should be seen as having a legitimate dght io
cotrstitute themselves as a state:'Basques','Catalans',' Corsicans', and'Bretons'
- or 'Spaniards' and 'French'? Bxactly the same problems will emerge if tlle grjp
of the nation-state is loosened and we allow the 'nahrral' regions to unfold. wlrere
is the eastem border of Transylvarnia, the border betwen Macedonians and
196

Russia.

ent ch'dnge of interstate borders'.

con
The end of the East-West coniict and the deepening of ihe west Eu'opean
jn
ident
of
multiplication
general
more
the
are
elements
struction of a Community
ities that has takcn place in Europe in the lg80s Political/social identities are seen
197

of being reduccd to a single dirnension, or one sot oi

loyalty relafionships. Thus, the creatjon of a 'Ba]tic' (as well as a 'European')
iclentity should be understood in its jnt icate relaiionship to processes of identityformation (and ldentity differentiation) on various levels. Several tarrs , sub .!Ild
as lcss fixcd, less capable

Thcre is no single EC lanpage, al]d no atlempt to create a unified education^l

Giandomenico Majone puis it,

proc
produces
identiflcation

economic atrd political integration

the same
ciassicat rrack of buildiog Lrp overly shong national ldentities' which would rnake
1t difficult for eastem Europe to maximize the beneht from the changes in westem
Europe. A possible altemative could be a strengthening of multiPle identities, lo
cal, regional aod national. This would make it easier lor eastem Europe to link 0p
to EC developments, arld \aould give eastem Europe a chaoce to escape ihe Peren-

nial dilemmas of oational conflict-s and insecurities withfu and betweefl states'
Traos-regionalism might play a decisive rcle in this respect Bemard von Plate
spells orrt in detai the role such regions miSht play ill rclation to the recognitron
oi new slates, arld therefore could have played in the case, for exarnple, of the rec

respective counfries.

Regioualisrn also makes it possible lbr ethnic ninonlies to have more intense con
tacl with their lellows ilr neighbouring countries without raising the issue of
border revisions. Although the secrity factor has been decisive as an openjng
be
move, as a chzmge which makes regionaLizltion p,Jsib/? - tle ddving lorces
to
processes
relating
those
in
hrnd rcgionalization are, paradoxically, to bc lound
European iltegration

and a growing desire for

a communrty mole distinct and
_
culturally homogeneous than natignal society. This process is
peculiario Europe, but it may lind here its most advanced exPression'
atso

not

(Majone, 1990, P. 68)

by tlis kind of process a'e the mjni

smaller communities within states (but seldom asoss borders)'
The mechanism is one of incrcaseal functional differentiation according to scale'
leading to large scale administration of complex econbmic and technological systems, ind moie localized anchorage of culture and community Only as a derived
lion rn the sense of 'transeffect can this '
the regions (in the microborder-regions'
they display a tendency to
sense) become
search for foreign relations, and shengthen their om position by relating to other

In tlle fust

mstance, the rcgions produced

o[es: regions

a-s

regions Linkitrg up aqoss bor

pear to be the lessot dedvd

wortld ap
alional re

iations, especially ihe

1990).

example

Under this heading, it should be noted that tbe relationship betweer 'regions' itr
tte mi('o or linder sense and the Ewopean Community is now becoming more
complex and conftove$:ial- In ihe 1970s there was a tendency to move away {rom
the ;adon-state towalds a simultaneous streDgthening of sub- and suPra-national
or global processes. At that time, however' the movements below the level of existig stut"t '"vere all more or less etbnic projects aimed at sfiengthening smaller
nadJrs such as Scotland, Wales, Brittaly, Corsica, the Basque country and the
Lapp people. These were classical movemenis of secession, ihough sornetimes
to the level of claims for incrcased autooomy for a specific people'

t"ali""A

number of sub-regional communities in Europe-

that
Land, or a paflly autonomous region' Thus ihe arguments of the 1980s
nation
betwee
the
gap
hence
EC
and
to
the
soverei8nty
losing
nation-stafe; \lerc
1S9

198

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
t
I
I
I
I

to bc made' but
old East West border' Not becxuse tllere l(e many tugible galns
it
is now inlercst
c
thcrefor
,r""^"." ,Ut co-oPeratiolr use,t to ire impossiblc and

li

r I'i

]u,

ffi

t
fi
ffi

rllg.

the Corffnunity as'member states" whercas Catalans and Corsicans' Scots and
Lombards will fbrever remain bound to 'regrons'?

EC integration' is not as compelling as it

Thus
might
"uont
has been found.

sue

is real and not to be cast aside as i[el-

' integration of the nation-states No Panacea

Even trans-border-rcgionalization, like Baltic Sea co operation'
wrll be stimulated by ongoing EC integration, although the relatiooshif will bc
complex and perhaps conflictua.l.

slate co-operatlon.

The lesson seems to be that a 'Europe of Regions' when il rneans a Europe built
of hundreds of small communitles ('the Swilzerificalion of EuIoPe')' is probably
rrot as realistic or as workable as its advocates Portray Funhermore, democracy'
citizenship alrd other imPortant gains of modem society have been cultivated in
the nation-state frarnework and this inheritance should not be dismissed too casilyIn the evert, lhe regions are perhaps not as viable a proposition as the trans
regrons.

The Baltic Sea Begion

m

ffi

ffi

ffi

frlfl

illil

II

fi{rher the togic ald dynamics of the neP re8ionalization by try

in), somewhat prcvocatively, to develop the following llLesis Northern Europe
*ill Tn l i, plor" in a 'Europe of the Regions' , but the re1i')n vtill be the Battit:

We can illustmte

this-'Baltic'project wjLl devclop into a 'blne banara"

Sea Region

Why Baltic? Is lhis region more

conira.ry, Swetles ald Lirhuanian

eJ

)? No, on the
But existence of

intellecruals, his_
identirics is Dot statii- Nations
torians and politicians - they did not have a priol existence; but after the projects
of natroD-buildrng had taken their course, they became very real indeed The
Baltic Sea region could take on such a rca-lity There are three roasons why the
Baltic prqect has an impetus at present Gor further elaboration, see Wever

conferences, scientific joumals and think tank reports have beguo

lJnatse
vehicl
es the

1991.)

'llhe lirst reasol is that it is ze]t. The Nordic (Scandinavia) belongs to the ol(t
Europe, the Baltic to the new Or, to put it differently, after 1989 we are suppos
caty living in a 'new Europ', but what in practrce does it mealr to you and me?
We lreed a concrete, local 'new Europe' in which to pariicipate and lhat is why
most of tbe new tegions in Europe have come into existence alollS and acioss The

-.Voftjen is Scandinaviar

teminology for 'scatrdinavia' specificaly, it nleans the

memben of the Nordic Coucil: Icel.trd, Norway, Sweden' Finland and Denmark' plus
the semi-urilependen! areas Greenland, Faroe Islands turd Aaland lslands (In
Scandinavian_- and geological - tems, Scandinavia nonnally excludes Frnland, lceland
and somctimes

to g|e the

1ro

the
tiotr of a 'Baltic Region' some legitfnacy- This has created tlle context for
The
oPeratioD
co
lbr
Detwork
'rider discussion of a Baltrc tegion as a flon-state
regloF is

Political
Paltne$'
so it begins to take on the reality ol a nelwork. The two areas in wtuch the Baltic
region lias begun to makc an rmpact dre cultuic and inflasfucturc' Cullure because

of the relalion to identity-formation. and ir{TasLructure because this is seen as an

ecolonic pre-condrhoo for development
lendencles 'anrl luture projeclions poiDts to the viabrlity
the Baltic Sea region as a traDs border regiDn in the emerging Europe lt you

A combination of presellt
of

thint ihis is silDply irdulging

poscd rationale

il

an imaginative exercise, then beware! The suP

ir pesteln llurole is the declining tbrtunes of

lor regionalization

Deffnfik.)

201

200

iffi

Lhe nalion stale As the pull of sovcreigtty weali.ens, regionalization acquires morc
scope. Ilistory and cultural geogaphy are being revised to take accouflt of tl]e
dual proccsses oI Eurcpeanization altd regio alization, which are altedng the gencral skucturc of E-lllopean political space, As part of this process there is sornetimes a tendency to present lhe regions as 'natriral'. Tdts applies to some extent to
tr.uN-border regions, but much rDore to sub national units such as the Germarl
Ltitaler.'f)hey ar-e prcsented as oftenng slrong local identifications for their populations. Of coulsc, this is a nristake Not every Bavarian knows all others, nor flre
they identical. All political commuiilies of dus size are imagined like the nations, and Europcl

graphical situatiotr but as a dcscnPtion of thc political and ecoDomic rci i(itrs ln
post Cold War llurope.

Detinitions of EuroPe
widr Euope very much in the ascendant it is timely to reflect on what Europe means - does it stand for sometiing, does it exe-mPlify cefiain ponciples or values'
does it have a panicular identity?

ili

Europe considercd negatively

il

In ar arlicle on national identiry agd the idea of

The idea of Europe

Limits to Europe
In currc t debate on Europe there is no clear sense of the geograplucal boundaries
of Europe. This does not indicate a l.rck of concepluirl clsrily; rathcr, it rnifors the
acfual political form thflt Europe is trking. It is logical in reiation to the political
forces and developrne ts at the end of the 1980s and the befiming oI tle 1990s fhe rcvolutiols in easten Europe, thc break np of the Sovicl Union, the ending of
the Cold War and the strergihening of the proccss of mtegElion in fte EC. Europe
is a magnetic lield Russia is not extemal, North Afiica is llot extem, - they arc
just outer peipheries.

oI the Coid War, ca bc prcscntcd in tlre folm of

'concentric circles' The image oI'ooncenfic circles' desctibes a widening sphcre
of influence: the EC, EFIA, eastem Europe, Russia. This diflercDliation makes 1l
possrble lbr Eulope (cle faclo natcdalized lx lhe EC) to d.t and most oI the im_
pulses fbr .r1l of Europe elm^n^le from Brussels, allhough only a part of EuroPe
belongs lo the EC. Even if all the European states sat around onc (CSCF,) lable
they coulcl not rcach the sarne amotnl of'agreemcnt' as js now produced by lhe
slightly unbalarced proccdure of'concenlric circies'. The capacity for actiorl by
the EC resLrhs in a h-Lcrarchio Eorope.'l1te asymmchrcal relationship includes
EC-EFIA relations. hr lhe words of lfeleD Wallacc and Wolfgang Wessols, 'mosl
of the pressurc has corne from thc EFTA side; most of thc tems have been sct by
the EC, its agerda and workrng nethods' (Wallacc arld Wessels 1990). Whether it
js industrial s1aldards, irade po]icy or scc[rity nlost decisions tlavel frolll West
to East. The llC makes decisions that only bmd lls membed but thc EFIA coulr
hies have no rcal altemative but io adapt. When they have made the necessary ad
jushlents lhe lormcl eastem bloc countrics will also have to follow slit if drey
w^nt to stay Ln the game: a d then lhe ex Soviet rcpublics will have to deal wirh
this rcaliry.

EuroPean

unity' Anthony

T)

Smith arBued thatl

Identities are forged out of shared exPeriences' memories and mytbs' in

relation to those of other collective identities. They are in fact often
forged through opposition to the identities of siSnifcant others' as thc
hisiory of paired conflict so often demonsftates Who or what' then, are
Europe',s signilicant others?
6mth, 1gg2, p 75;footnote odded)

In a sense this Posits a

nt

lalion to opposites- So,

others? The rcalities

ste

se

I
I

European poLitics, atler the enci

:lhe eastem border is thercfore not a liDe (Ukainc in, Russia out; or Moldavla in.
Ukainc out; or the lJalts in, ard so on) it is more Lke an impuisc ihatjust 'runs
out' somewhere on the eastem llains. Thcre is no eastem border just a gradu^l
thinning out This statemont is not rneant as a timeless interpretation of the geo

aradoxically the mair challenge to Erlope - ihe

the EC programme of 1992 was designed to cort
Japan and not
, co capitalist states of tlle USA and
the so caued 'alien' Middle East.

key issues of the 1990s.

two
This rhen is the main 'struggle' in which Europe is engaged Euope ha's
com
oI
this
kind
and
lields
ar
technological
economic
'enemies' but only in the
are
petrtion is not very serviceable in generating identity The USA and JapaD

I
I

l
l
ffi

ffi

ffi

n Europe According ti"T:::-"::T:T":.i:tJ

r, ,p".it. '-"r "l t:"*':*.I:'nlY
ll:i;il.'
[?]l"tlfl
" reflectio'
n md self refleclion (Moril 198?) The
consinn!
wbictr lrirs generatetl
.-, --^-,^--.
ot"*i"P
tocluolosicar
an(r
1,p|rorclr.irs

barrlly appropriate counter imagcs for Europe nor is the Third World A disi"
tegrarjng'fhird World miSbt become an objec! for Europeai polilics bttl is
scarcely suiiable for idenriry fbmatiol - a Prcspect rendered evell more unlikely
by the existence of ex-colonial ties.

fltffi

fl

";;;:"J
;iilJ il;"il;';; ii"'""""""",'sell-reflcctiolr on fiIe
rcllectlon
i,

The atteinpt to define Eorope in lelms of iLs opPosites IlaS oot Produced any clearcut solutioDs. Perhaps the currenl absence of a signif,cant exlemal tlreat to Europe
has softened the force of this kind of identity consmrction. It fierefore seems ap
propriate to adopt a more positive approach, looking at Europe Pel re and con_
sidering whether it can be denned by virtue oI intemal characleislics and inhelent
principles.

ilil

rtil

ffi
rliillll

ilIlil

During rhe 1980s and the early 1990s, Europe's political stock has risen consirler
abty. 1'he dual movemeni-\ of EC integmtion on the otre hand and Lhe collapse rrl'
the Soviet Empire on the other are widely seen as a kind of victory for the idea of
Elrlope. The states in the westem part apPear to be willing to hand over sover
eignly to a supranatlonal poliiical construction and the states in the eastem part ale
'ret rBing to Europe' now that Sovrel conrol has been lifted ln this context arBu
ments that use 'Europe' as a baseline have a certain political force and encoluage
speculation about the meaning of Europe, the question of European identily arld

'fhe contemporary quest for ihe meaning of Europe and aul understaading of the
Europan idea need to be set into an histoflcal contexl. We have seen in Pim ilD
Boer's essay how nolions of what constituted Eulope chalged according to his-

iLod

-10-^::1
been aPProccss) lave.

rs
but Svcrker S'jrLin reminds us thdl there

js
fle Wesl'
Bul xgain, sjDce Europe bejng equatcd with
cannot be

dislinct EuroPean cachet

stictly rPplied'

lfweresorttohisLoricalandctrlluralexPlcnJtlonsofEurop,:mrdentitythennot
io btrt ''ve ,rlso
to coltend with the drvergencres already referred

*" i."""
""tyi"
seetheresidualslreltglsofthelrd/ejofEuropentd.lotEuropeperse'Thispoint
D Smith:
has been elegirntly been madc by Anthony

rorical circumstances and how. afLer the Frencb Revolution, they became lflked to
a self{onscious historical perspeclive. Petcr Bugge showed how ln an age of
nationnlism, the idea of Europe was expressed in visionary projecls. And cNtirlts
our nli[ds back to 1945, we have seen in ihis essay how dre process of integratlon
was regardcd as a means of avoiding dre disastea of further European cilil war So
wc rrccd to be awari that the Europeatr idea is not a fixed entiry and that it caD ell
conpass sonre wide variations - both democmcy and Fascism have flourished on
European soil- At a time wben Europe is being praised for its pluraliry and its culturi dlversity, it should be remembered thai Euope has oflen served the interest
of particular states, peNons or groups and at times it has beetr suppresslve of dif
ferences and vaaiatioDs.

In attempting to define Europe from a positive standpoint it could be claimed

that Europern identify is characterized by certain political principles - democ
rdcy, fieedom of opinion, constitutionalism. It is lruc that such Pdnciplgs can
b found operating i-o colltempotaty EuroP but they can also be fould in the
USA, Ausfalia, Japan and elsewherc and cannot be said fo defrne Europe

1[

"-,* "_""*,*t
ni.o',"lrt",. i"*rofrnenls.

Il

Eu r o pe cons i dered Pos itivelv

the existence of distrnctive European values ald principles

ffiil

rs bcios roote.l

lr

any exclusive sense.

Similarly even more abskact notions such as self criticism, doubt aud scepti
cism are advanced as being distilctlvely or lypically European (see the reierences to Modn, Enzensberger and Kundela in the section entitled'One, two,
many Europes' above). There is some basis for pornting to tlesc philosophicdl
204

A EuroPean natian-state?

cetrlury
back

The nineteenth
communiry datring

on stmilar Projection.t
Hirbemrr' and oLltc'.

etemal

"rLT:
u ."u_

iI irnempts are madc to canl lorwerll l}le

in the form of the nineteenth cellury nation-state lheir thesd are

defealing cnlerprise Trkng lhis lrl]e,

European projecl

bound to laill

.our lask is less to rcassure ourselvcs of our cornrlron origils iu tbe

Eulopeaur Middl Ages thar lo dcvelop a new political self conlidence
corrmensurate with the role of Europe in the world of the twenty first
century.
(flabermas, l99l )
-Ls

I'low, then, the E0ropean project Io be advanced'1 Habemas'suggeslion is to {o

cus on a'European constilutiolal patdotism'. Natlonal identity in contempoEry
'post nation?Ll' Europe is fonned by allegiance to the folitical principies of democracy and the coNtillltional stale, which has, howevet to be reflected throLlgh the
prism of dre specihc natiolral cultud and listorical memory. This is the folm rdtional identtty can/should take, it wlls argued by Habermas and with him malry
centrelelt Germans rn dre 1980s. And acttally it is also thc way lo be EuroPean
Loday, he now says, because these princjfics are 10 a lrlrge exLe t sharcd by all tie
member countnes of dre EC.
Therefore, jt is doDgerotls and self-deibat g to ttrur,k of a ljnk bclwcert European
history alrcl culturc on thc one hancl and European politils on the odler h tcnns of
the former necessitatinE! the latter Euopean intcgration is not coming forth be_
cause it is 'natural' and'necessary', nol becausc we'are'European and thcrefore
'have to' crcate a political cxpression for this our true identiry, buL hcc^usc it is a
project io which sufncrent polilical energy is invested (cf Wjrd, 1992). Tltere
n1ay well be good reasons 1br lrtegration but these are differcnt lrom lhe imagc of
recessity being oeated by the appeal to history. This was thc way nation-b ilding
succeeded alrd one might dreretolc legiliNalely ask, is it not necessary ln thc
Eurcpean case too'/ The lluropean idca rright not be 'true', bu1 to ruuration of tl)c
past is 'trllc' without any slecific pcrspective, alld perhaps pohhcs has always lrl

volved an ability lo rcrnembcr sclcctively G\ielzsche, 1888); or

iI

ect. It is tli-lllcull to tcll ver) Ier"lc stories about 'Europe' as a subject' as a

soul warilering tluough history Slill dificutl - or inhercntly impossible? Yet to
come. or olrt of reach?

tity is more in tune wirh

It is possible

in a matrix of 'multiPle

modem
idertities', w

post

baker' railway enthusiast, mothcr, conservative, from Hamburg, etc Of course, People alwa)s were
many fhngs, bu
Probably always
tional identily w
Iere t identities.
identities - among these the national and the European (Knudsen, 1989; Buzal cl
al , 1990, pp. 56tr.)

relate to natioDal ialentities? Wi[ the EC then have a EuroPean identity taking ihe
fbfm of the nation'state - a national, EuroPem ideltity - and thercby crush lhe
old, national identities? Or is it not a question of identity at all?
The dilemma of Europe and nalion can be seen as being generated mosl fuorle

thc words of

a Europe

filil

I
I
t

tlut

Yct, the essence ol a naLion is that all iodividuals halc many lhings ilr
coilnnon, ard also thal thcJ have forgoLten many things
(ltenatt, 1882)

I
I

Probably, some eiernent oI this rewnting oI history is involved in aly urajur

po[tical project. ajn ihe other hand, ir is very Likely that fie Eurolean project

246

ii

T
e

is big enough
and luve
community
be
a
to
enough
and
small
economy
for
basis
to be fte
cultural identity;

(a) Go for a comprornise at an in between level, i

Emesl Renan:

is different from the nineleenih century oation-building proJect, jn that rt is rror

about constructing the same kind o[ exclusivity lrl spite of lhe various meanings nnd focuses of the conccpt of llalion - liom Frcnclr civic to German eth
nrc it is hard to disflgrce wilh Antboiry D Smilh (1991), who states that the
concept and politics of the nation have worked according to both scts of conno
latiorN, and lhcreby also nlevrtabiy llith thc lint to the edmic, ronantic, 'GerrD'.n' conceptjon of a peoPle cxisting rrl ilse]f as a pre political reaLty: a rcality
which is given.m ultinlaLe value is not only above the individual bui in the last
instance is the sowcc ol idenlity arrd rneaning lor the indivicl,ual (Berliu. 1978;
1982 ed ). This logic is to a vcry linited extent at play in the European pr'1-

plicdtior).

ffi
tte te

emetgence

Tlis

argunent

of neo Nazis iII Germany' the country where peoPle have most
o$'e to Pierre Ha-ssmer

ffi

:,

it
i

Essay

Eurcpe sitce 1945 cttsis to kxxrwrl

consistently been asked to avoid ccn{ralized identity and latioua]ly delcgtte

the appropriate place, be it 'the West', the ldnd or thc EC'/

lt

to

Possibly a more reahstic approach thafi the i-nlinite multrplicatlon of identides can
be outlinei in ihe followilg way (although the stability of even this can be questioDed):

ffi

l
I
t

as long as the shell is bard.

The national level (together with, in some places' the regional one) remains
the focus for cultural identity, for community The 'Gennan' tlTre nalion re
marns a! tbc national level but in its orlSinal Herdedan fonn, where lhe na_
tion is so impo ant that expression in a state becomes umecessarl 0 irver e/

tual po[ticdl lroblcNs ant] conccnrs

dl , tbfihcoming).

This pattem can be discelned in rccent hcnds and

it

has dre advantage of not

clcmanding from people numercus political identities, but tno clearly defioerl posilio s, each attaining a considerable weiSht,in the area where it countl'

loyrlly
frLbhc could plc(lgc lhcit

il
tioDs, calling them, for instance, cilric state notron CFrance) and organic peop[e'
ll.rtion (Germany). Th.en our future could possibly consist of a dualism, w;lfi
Europc as the civic state-nation and our old nation-states as orgimic people
ations Idendty and politics are delioked and refocused. lf fhis process is rcally
under way, rt means lhat orre malot idea of Eutope tn the 1990s will ellrbrace
Europe as a non ethnic, non_organic, Polltical, civic 'natlon' or 'republic''

fr

il

'

The contemporary relevance of 'the European

idea'
ffi

ffil

ilil1

ol EuropEan 'idcniity', and of ifirages of a common past? Are

they poLitically siSnificatt, and of what do they actually consist? Is it a feeling of
beirg one? Or ofjust ot being total straogers? Or is this not the questlon at all? Ts
the decisive dynarnic ihe one whereby 'Europe' is constituted (defrned) io con[ast
to someihing non European? Or, rather, is the constnrction of EuroPe geared lo a
set of hherent values and principles? Where does ilis finally leave us as lo 'pcr
ceptions' and 'projects' of Europe? What are the evolvrng ideirs of Europe - and
whar happens to the idea of a 'EffoPean idca', and to lhe idea of a 'history of the
Luropeirn idctt'?
So, what is the role

parlly on differenl wavelenglhs-

too clevor and enliBhtened for any of this argumentalion, will try to keeP their
thinking free of such Euro-metaphysics as displayed in this book of essays, while
half-consciously going along with the trotion of a geneml strengthening of the
European seJf-image and the self-evidence of there being a 'Europe', a 'Eulopean
idea' and a 'history of the European idea'.

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Acknowledgements

ll

Ezrr Pound, 'Hugh Selwyn Mauberley' (Section IV' Pari I) ftorn Colletted Shorter
PoenJ, repriuteal by permissioo of Faber & Faber and New Directions Publishing
Corp Inc.
'lhe work of the Htunaruties Programme Cornmiftee of the EADTU has been
carried out with the support of the Commission of the European Community
within the frameworks of the ERASMUS Programme and the Jean Monnet

ru

Prcject

Nofes on contributors
Pim den Boer
Pim deD Boer (b. 1950) stuclied history rn I-eiden and Paris He obtarned lfs doctorate in 1987 in Leiden with a thesls entitled History ds a Profession: lhe pnfes
sianalization of hrstorian.t in France I88A-1940 @nglish translation forthcorning:
the
Princetol Udversity Press). From 1978 to 1988 he was a lechler in history at
ol'
Professor
appointed
he
was
lnstitute of History, Universily of Utrecht ln 1988
of
Amsterdamat
the
Uliversity
the History of Ewopear Culftrre

Peter Bugge
Senior
Universiry. He graduated in 1989
Czechoslovak studies. lle has pu
Peter Bugge (b. 1960) is a

Slavisk L)stitut at Aarhus

I and political science antl
acadenuc and olher lour-

crtlnals oo Czechoslovak Politics and history, and on Czech and central European
Danishinto
essays
ture. He has hanslated most of Vaclav I{avel's

Jan van der Dussen

Jan var der Dussen (b. 1940)
Leiden and York University
Universities Foundatioq for In

at the Umversity of

rI Tbe

Netherlands

from 1973 to

1988

Idea of Ll\tory (Oxford, 1993)

215
214

I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
t
I

I
I
I
I

i
I

OIe Waver
Ole Wever (b. 1960) is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Peace and
Conflict Research, Copenhagen. He has taught intematiotral relatioN at Aarhus

Index to Book

1
Rntair 191-2
culture ald civilization in I I
and the First world Wa{ 88-

&

Adelung, Johann Cbnstoph

Ademuer, Korrad 155, 166, 169

Adrcn VI, PoPe 37

Glorious Revolutiotr (1688)

Afuca 20,28, 30,

Rosenberg on 126. 12?

a-nd PanewoPa

141

48
Alexander the Great 17' 18 2?' 39,46'
America see United Stales

Kontraster ('A1l EuroPe

Studiet af International

antiquity, md the idea ofEuope L4-19

Relatiors' ; Copenhagen,
Recast: scen^tros for the

Aristotle

Pinter, 1990) and ldeniry, Milation and the New Securit! Agenda in Europe
(with Barry Buzan ef 41 , London, Pinter, 1993)

Broch,Ilermam

127

Brussets TreatY (1948) 164, 16

Bulgaria 161
Burke, Edmu d 66-7

antr-semilism 142-3
1?

Byzan[ne E$Pte 2?
Caesar, Julius 2l 29

Asia 20, 21, 30

Christians in 28, 33

'

comPared with EuoPe

Atatiirk, Kemal

9?-8

1G17,58

Camden,

Wiliam

41

Caneti, Elias 127

101

Kevin Wilson

Athedan deBocracy 74

caonib Ism 62

Kevin Wilson studied history at the Udvelsiry of Liverpool (PhD 1965) and edn
cation at the Univenity of Nottingham (MEd 1977) He has worked for lhe Open
the organisation of tulorial
Umve$ity sitrce
fo coulses otr British and
services
support
TU Humamties hograrnme
European history
Open Univqsity l44dl i r
Cornmittee from

Attlee, Clemen! 165

Augustine, Sarnt20 1,23, 24' 25'28'29
August$, Caesn 29-30
Axstria, and tbc HolY Alliance 70-1

Capek, Knrel 124

crpitalism, culorre and civihza

Elrrope? course tearn.

Austrra Hungary, and

N ?Iom?tr\n' s

balance_o{_Power Polilics
and. the concePt of Europe
and EurcPean rulers

Carolingran EmPue 2G7,

cadography

MitteletioPu

9L

'

92-3

l0

38-{4

Chamberlain, Neville 108

Charlemagre, EmPeror 2G7,
Charles [, King 42

barbaria.os 17

ltil,

Catholc chuch I16' 131-3

central EruoPe 135, 1?8-80'
ChambrlaiD, Austen 108

Baltic Sea region 196, 199,200-2

barbarism

3l

see maPs

129

Charles V, EmPeror 37,40,4i

Chateaubnand, Rangois Re#

Baudeau, Abb6 64
Belloc, Hilare 1 32

cheste(on, G K. 132

Benes, Edvard 135

I42-3
Berdyaev, Nikolay Aleksandrovic 138 9'
Bergsor, I{eDri 114
Berlin Crisis (1961) 157

China 141
Christendom, identi-fr catron ol
27

4,32-8,6944

biblical comnentary, Europe iD 19-26

Bis@arck, Prince Olto von ?5' 76, 85' 10R

ChnstianitY
Calholic cburch 116, 131-:
EuroPe in biblictl coruner
and Juda6m 143
and liberalism 131-4
PaPal authority and the Cr'

Black Sea 18,22

chrchill, ftniton

Bolshevism 119. 128, 139

Cicero 62

Berlin, Isaiatr

151

BerlmWali 155, 156, 187' 188, 189

Boswell, James 63
boundarios of E[rope

civ ilization
15 , 91

'

131

, I7

'

?42

Brandes, Georg 119

Brandt,

WilY 169 71'

Bdand, Anshde 96,

145

112, 163-

182

i0l-2,

104-5, I22, 136' 140' 144'

capitalism and cultue 117

concept of 63-4
and cultre 10' 11, 113 21

ofEuroPe 58 65
identification of Europe

ir 9

ll

"e

l-. reir

rl

r.r" Sir.

l/'

re 34

and cenfal Europe 180

ald Gemany 170, 188 9
and Panewola 99

141

Soviet domination of 153

istopher 45

ncil for Muhral Economic Aid) 155 6

Irst

ulhual Pohcy (CAP) 1?6

EC

ofnaiions, Europe

Gelmany
concept of Europe 181 4, 18
culture aDd civitization m 63
and the Czechs 136
East Wesl Germarl reunr-f ica

Europem Parliament

6l

Ciermany see fldl Germary

se

ECSC (European Coal and Steel CoDrmunity) 164, 167-.8'

169

Lncrl

of (141+18) 34

tem

68

202

,pe 163, 165

ution

Elys6e Treary (1961) 169

Enzensb,erger. Hans Ma znns,

3 8

A.h Europa l'18 201

EPC @uropean Poli tical Co operation)

144

Erasmus

32
nce on Securiry and Co oPeratiotr io
16 7, 186,192, 193
over 1?2

l7G7

u\d Mitteleuropt

36-7,4l

llratostbencs

ERM (Exclrarge Rate lvleclunism) 176

ethflc homogenizalion, jn eastern EuroPe

Code Napa/'on

rd crvilization

ll,

117-l8

Euratorll168,
Europa 15,4il

113-21

14,123
idenhty 194

from 134' 5
:'s 'New EDroPe' 93-4

Urion

154, 160

Persia 15,48

aph.t,The
he flglrts

dgeinent

aJ the

Nations

ofman (1789) 66

Corl

and Sleel Conxnunitv (ECSC) 164, 167-8,

164, 169

17I

176

EFTA 202

59,63
125

165, 168 9

l2l.

123

Grote, George 74
Grotius, Ilugo 44
Guizot, FranEois

7l

3,74

Gustavus Adolphus, Kiug ofSv

gypsies 107. 143

41 2

Eancis I, King ofFrance 40

Haberm^s, ltirscn 205-6

Frarco, Gereml ftarcisco 88

Frederick tr, King of Prussia (the C'reat) 43

Habsburg Empire 40, 41,43,

identification of Europe \lith 13, 14 74

a[dNazr self Perception 125 7
Frcud, sigmund 127

75

HaLlsteID, Walter 168

Heidesgn. Martin 115

Helsinh kocess see CSCE
Herder, J G- 64,95, 115, 196
Herodotus 14-15

Helfioi, Edouard 101, 103 4, lr

Gama, Vitsco da 45

Hippocrates 16-17, 19, 58

Gardels, Nathan 207

GATT (General Agreemeni

169

169

futtre

Grosz, Georse

193

aDd France 184, 187-8

Europear, Econorruc Commmity (EEC) 164' 167-8, 168'

'olDtion 43

Gregoras, Nftephoros 32

-3

funcLional iniegration 172

luropear Clormcil 164. 1?6

European Defence Co lmittec @DC)

179, 180,

First World War

and European identitY 201

and neo medielal EuroPe 193-5

and regioN in Effope 198-200

identity 206

Mikha

sse

Greks, allcienl
and cultDr 62
and ihe idea ofEurope 10, I

Rosenberg on 127
in the sevenieenth cetrhrry

t69
lLDd

pa 99

Ees, Scines de la Dic

EuropeN.n

E ropean Community (EC) 9, 162

) 3l

r on

48 58

Wesl Germr

Greece, and the European CoID

,65 ,13, 184,204

ofnatioos 11
considered negativelY 203-4
considered positively 175-6, 204-5
delL ng boundaries of 15,9'7 .131 ' 119 ' 202
atld its othe$ 1i
ongiLts as namc ol a continerrt l4-15
rnily in diversily l1

6reat War

pan-European hitiatives bY 101-6

znd Lhe reudficatron of Germany 18? 9. 19i
revolution of 1830 72

as a conmoDwcallh

I1

Gorbachev,

',l

aLlegodcal illuslratiotrs of

Rosenberg on 126, 127

Scheler on tlte German state
Social Democralic PanY (SF
social democrats 153

se? 4lso Prussia:

9|r.l

169

Europe

67

Giucciardini, Francesco 39

,nd Cluistendom 69
civic state-nation 208

158

90 2, 95.

urification of75, 76
atrd the Ve$ailles Treaty 86

France

Eurasia 118
ion 10.

41

Fracketr, Franz 53

18

and regronalizalion in Euro!

Firsr World
culture and civiltzation 114-21
and Cze.hoslovakia 135
effecis of 88-9
and tlle masses 130

72

-58, 63,

r ap

natioml socialis (nazism)

W l0, 14.7i, l5l )

EMS (Europern Monebry System) 164, 171, 176

Enlightenment, Ge 13,

a\d Mittele

Federal Republic of Germany see West Germany

Fedinand II, EmFeror

feudalism 65,68

fl

19?

and European identity 207-l

and European integration 16
a d the Filst World War 8G

and Masaryk's 'New EuroP

fedelalism 172, 174

EF'TA (Erropean Frce Trade Associalion) 164. 165, 169,

ffiil

GDR (Grman Democratic I

Gernd-Polbh border (Ode,

Eichanse Rate Mechanisn @RM) 1?6

fascism 87, 106-7, 125, 139
atrd the Catholic church 131 3
Mann on 129-31
and the masses 128

EDC (Europedn DefeDce Commiltee) 169

EE(l sce Euopean Economic Communily

rlergi, Count tuchard 96 101, 106, 110,

t45,165
dlhrral task'97-8

67

Eurosclerosis I71, 176

39
ru1ture and civilization 117 19
)Pes 181 7

I76

European Union 9. 16.1

tsuropem Community

ecolomic cooperahon il45

as 11. 7L

9? 8, 179

European Political Co-operation @PC) 176 ?

rope 160

et

European irtgration 163 75

European Monetary System (EMS) 164, 171,

ecoooLnic pe.fomrance, iD Europe 171, 203

lo

Germans, in e:$tem Etrope 158

'Europeadzatron ofBurope'

of9
i,

European identrty see identity. European

Europcin Frce Trade Associalion (EFTA) 164. 165' 202

on

Trrde and Tariffs) 162

cauue, Charles de 161, 167, 169, 184,

Gelher. Emest 197
Genscher, Haff Dietrich 190,

185

Hitler,

Ador

10, 108, 110, 112,

Hobbes, Thomas, Leoiatl,an 62

Hodza, Milan 135, 136

Hoffmal, Stmley 152

191

21s

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l-cJr.roLo, LjiLltlc

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l,ukrics, Cynrgy I L?

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13

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l4l

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socrrlrsrtr (rrazr!!r) S?, l(Xr'

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and lhe idea oI EuroPe

neo medievi[ EuioPe

l7

fl
lill lll, 1l: /

l')tl

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Ilurotrcln o (r)tt stllc 2{)5 ll

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Orosius

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rtrce, LuropeantLcss rooted

,rt l]r{' M rssrs

2l,

124'

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in l4{l

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Reagan,Ihn.rlLl

177

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Otto, DisLro! ofFLclsirg 19

221

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80

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IIL, liDPc,o.75

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lUo;si, l)oinmLqre lr) I

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119

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79

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Url,an tr, PoPe

and the Euopesn Commudty

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,39

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wa.lsperger, Andreas 32-3

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symbol

o{moder

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14 l'7.1234, l4o

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trans-border regions 195

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138

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0,

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Var 10, 108 10, 151-2
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143

Zweig, Stefan 85, 141, 145

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139,142

28

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l-2

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88

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Souet Union 138-9

collapse of 9
culture and civilizahon 125
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and the Second World War 109-10
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and Gem]an-EDropean
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3

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848)'14,15 , 95

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sociaiism 120 1, 125, l19

socialist internationaLism 89

830) 72

tJnitcd Stnle{

social democracy 153

1i3,

hul.rl KirrtlIrrrr /r'? llr rlrrIr

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Socinl balwirisrn I20

asainst nazi Germlrny 111-12,

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