Case Digest: Barba vs.

Liceo de Cagayan

G .R. No. 193857 : November 28, 2012

MA. MERCEDES L. BARBA, Petitioner, v. LICEO DE CAGAYAN UNIVERSITY, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Dr. Ma. Mercedes L. Barba (Barba) was the Dean of the College of Physical Therapy of respondent Liceo de
Cagayan University, Inc. (Liceo).
In the school year 2003 to 2004, the College of Physical Therapy suffered a dramatic decline in the number of enrollees
from a total of 1,121 students in the school year 1995 to 1996 to only 29 students in the first semester of school year
2003 to 2004. Due to the low number of enrollees, Liceo decided to freeze the operation of the College of Physical
Therapy indefinitely. Thereafter, the College of Physical Therapy ceased operations and Barba went on leave without
pay starting. Subsequently, Liceo sent Barba a letter dated April 27, 2005 instructing Barba to return to work on and
report to Ma. Chona Palomares, the Acting Dean of the College of Nursing, to receive her teaching load and
assignment as a full-time faculty member in that department. Barba did not report to Palomares and requested for the
processing of her separation benefits in view of the closure of the College of Physical Therapy.
Another letter was sent to Barba but the latter still refused to return to work. Hence, Liceo sent Barba a notice
terminating her services on the ground of abandonment.
Barba filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, payment of separation pay and retirement
benefits againstLiceo. She alleged that her transfer to the College of Nursing as a faculty member is a demotion
amounting to constructive dismissal.
The LA ruled that Barba was not constructively dismissed. The NLRC reversed the LA. Liceo went to the CA and filed
a Supplemental Petition raising for the first time the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
over the case. Liceo claimed that a College Dean is a corporate officer under its by-laws and Barba was a corporate
officer of Liceo since her appointment was approved by the board of directors. Thus, Liceo maintained that the
jurisdiction over the case is with the regular courts and not with the labor tribunals.
In its original Decision, the CA reversed the NLRC resolutions. The CA did not find merit in Liceos assertion in its
Supplemental Petition that the position of Barba as College Dean was a corporate office. The CA further found that no
constructive dismissal occurred nor has Barba abandoned her work.
Unsatisfied, both Barba and Liceo sought reconsideration of the CA decision. Thereafter, the CA reversed its earlier
ruling. Hence,Barba filed the present petition.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the labor tribunals have jurisdiction over Barbas complaint for constructive dismissal?
II. Whether or not Barba was constructively dismissed?
HELD: The petition is granted.

MERCANTILE LAW: corporate officers

FIRST ISSUE: Labor tribunals have jurisdiction over Barbas complaint.
Corporate officers are elected or appointed by the directors or stockholders, and are those who are given that character
either by the Corporation Code or by the corporations by-laws. Section 25 of the Corporation Code enumerates
corporate officers as the president, the secretary, the treasurer and such other officers as may be provided for in the bylaws. In Matling Industrial and Commercial Corporation v. Coros, the phrase "such other officers as may be provided
for in the by-laws" has been clarified, thus: "Conformably with Section 25, a position must be expressly mentioned in
the By-Laws in order to be considered as a corporate office. The rest of the corporate officers could be considered only
as employees of subordinate officials."
However, an assiduous perusal of these documents does not convince us that Barba occupies a corporate office position
in the university. In Liceos by-laws, there are four officers specifically mentioned, namely, a president, a vice president,
a secretary and a treasurer. In addition, it is provided that there shall be other appointive officials, a College Director
and heads of departments whose appointments, compensations, powers and duties shall be determined by the board of
directors. It is worthy to note that a College Dean is not among the corporate officers mentioned in Liceos by-laws.
Barba was not directly elected nor appointed by the board of directors to any corporate office but her appointment was
merely approved by the board together with the other academic deans of respondent university in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in Liceos Administrative Manual. Though the board of directors may create appointive positions
other than the positions of corporate officers, the persons occupying such positions cannot be deemed as corporate
officers as contemplated by Section 25 of the Corporation Code. Thus, petitioner, being an employee of respondent, her
complaint for illegal/constructive dismissal against respondent was properly within the jurisdiction of the LaborArbiter
and the NLRC.
LABOR LAW: constructive dismissal
On the issue of constructive dismissal, we agree with the Labor Arbiter and the appellate courts earlier ruling that
Barba was not constructively dismissed.Barbas letter of appointment specifically appointed her as Dean of the College
of Physical Therapy and Doctor-in-Charge of the Rehabilitation Clinic "for a period of three years effective July 1,
2002 unless sooner revoked for valid cause or causes." Evidently, Barbas appointment as College Dean was for a fixed
term, subject to reappointment and revocation or termination for a valid cause. When Liceo decided to close its College
of Physical Therapy due to drastic decrease in enrollees,Barbas appointment as its College Dean was validly revoked
and her subsequent assignment to teach in the College of Nursing was justified as it is still related to her scholarship
studies in Physical Therapy. Particularly, for a transfer not to be considered a constructive dismissal, the employer must
be able to show that such transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee.
GRANTED.

G.R. No. 171219 Case Digest

G.R. No. 171219, September 3, 2012
Atty. Fe Palmiano-Salvador
vs Constantino angeles, respondents
Ponente: Peralta
Facts:
This is a petition to reversed and set aside the decision of the CA dismissing the petition before them.

Respondent Angeles is one of the registered owners of a parcel of land located in Sampaloc, Manila. This land is
occupied by Galiga from 1979 to 1993 with a lease contract. Salvador alleged that she bought the land from Galiga
who represented the owner.
Angeles then sent a letter to Salvador demanding that Salvador to vacate the property. Angeles then filed a complaint
for ejectment with the MTC of Manila.
MTC rendered its decision in favor of Angeles. Salvador filed an appeal saying that Angeles had not authority at the
time of the filing of the suit. RTC denied the appeal. Petitioner elevated the case to the CA, but CA affirmed the RTC.
Hence, this present petition.
Issue: Diaz's (respondents representative) failure to proof his authority to represent.
Held:
"[i]f a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff [by one] who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not
deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff."
Pursuant to the foregoing rulings, therefore, the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over this case and all proceedings
before it were null and void. The courts could not have delved into the very merits of the case, because legally, there
was no complaint to speak of. The court's jurisdiction cannot be deemed to have been invoked at all.
Petition is granted.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
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Republic v Batingue Development Corporation
Facts:
Respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the RTC an application for original registration of title
over a parcel of land. Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition. Thereafter, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu
proprio the records of the case to the MTC because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than
100,000. The MTC awarded the land to respondent. On appeal, the CA ruled that since the former had actively
participated in the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner
is thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the Republic is estopped from questioning the courts jurisdiction
Held:
The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired through a
waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. Consequently,
questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal