CANON 1

A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990

ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant,
vs.ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.
RESOLUTION

Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of
Deeds of Iligan City;
5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified
documents purporting to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land
Development Agreement dated August 30, 1971" and submitting the same
document to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in connection with the
complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant designated as
I.S. No. 7512936;
6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his
client;

PER CURIAM:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon
A. Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of
lawyer's oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent
filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order
complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a
resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted respondent's motion and required
complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, complainant submitted
an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the
following acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro
Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to
as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent
fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation.
2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143, wherein
Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said case being
terminated, acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q15490;
3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, which
properties are the subject of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-15143, while
the case was still pending;
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract
with him on August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential
subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT
No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as
attorney's fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said
property was already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the

7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basis

before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City;
8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office
by making false assertion of facts in his pleadings;
9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not intentionally
tell a he, he does not tell the truth either."
Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on
November 18, 1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply
to respondent's answer on December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent
filed a rejoinder.
In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation
conducted by the Solicitor General, complainant presented himself as a witness and
submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP", while respondent appeared both as witness and
counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to "11". The parties were required to submit their
respective memoranda.
On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him,
claiming that the long delay in the resolution of the complaint against him constitutes
a violation of his constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases.
Upon order of the Court, the Solicitor General filed a comment to the motion to
dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining that the delay in the investigation of the case
was due to the numerous requests for postponement of scheduled hearings filed by
both parties and the motions for extension of time to file their respective memoranda."
[Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent filed a reply to
the Solicitor General's comment on October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated January

16, 1989 the Court required the Solicitor General to submit his report and
recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice.
On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation
that Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General
found that respondent committed the following acts of misconduct:
a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients
during the pendency of the case where the properties were
involved;
b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of
their land development agreement had already been sold at a
public auction prior to the execution of said agreement; and
c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a
document where two signatories who had not signed the original (or
even the xerox copy) were made to appear as having fixed their
signatures [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General,
pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].
Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of
the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit more
evidence before the IBP. Finally, on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a
supplemental motion to refer this case to the IBP, containing additional arguments to
bolster his contentions in his previous pleadings.
I.
Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is
respondent's contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General was limited to the determination of whether or not there is sufficient ground to
proceed with the case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an
administrative complaint against him. Respondent claims that the case should be
referred to the IBP since Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that:
This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the
present Rule 139 entitled DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF
ATTORNEYS. All cases pending investigation by the Office of the
Solicitor General shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and disposition as
provided in this Rule except those cases where the investigation
has been substantially completed.

The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to

respondent's claim, reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not
mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707;
Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to
the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised
Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court
may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring
cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court
or judge of a lower court. In such a case, the report and recommendation of the
investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. The Court shall
base its final action on the case on the report and recommendation submitted by the
investigating official and the evidence presented by the parties during the
investigation.
Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the
effectivity of Rule 139-B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of
the Solicitor General had been substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B
provides that only pending cases, the investigation of which has not been
substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor General, shall be transferred to
the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General was terminated even
before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his motion to
dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986,
the date when respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1;
Record, p. 353].
Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor
General already made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To
refer the case to the IBP, as prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in
duplication of the proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General but also to further
delay in the disposition of the present case which has lasted for more than thirteen
(13) years.
Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant
the referral of the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by
the Solicitor General respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence,
his failure to adduce additional evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore
no denial of procedural due process. The record shows that respondent appeared as
witness for himself and presented no less than eleven (11) documents to support his
contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the complainant who appeared as
a witness against him.
II.

The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent
committed the acts of misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista.
After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of
the Solicitor General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct
which warrant the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power.
The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights"
which was signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to
respondent one-half (1/2) of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm., and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907
sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal services to the latter. At the time the
document was executed, respondent knew that the abovementioned properties were
the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said
case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the
document transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to himself, respondent
violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client's property or
interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession
[Article 1491, New Civil Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of
his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and
constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v.
Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)].
However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics,
which states that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter
of the litigation which he is conducting," does not appear anymore in the new Code of
Professional Responsibility. He therefore concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer
of property in litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, such purchase is no
longer a ground for disciplinary action under the new Code of Professional
Responsibility.
This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a
lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal process" (Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of
the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein." And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. All of
these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The
transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act
which the Court will not countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having violated
Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be held accountable both to his client and to society.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil
Code are prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their
existing trust relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by
purchase the property and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with
such property and rights, as well as with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the
new Code of Professional Responsibility has failed to emphasize the nature and
consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Hence,
notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new Code,
the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art.
1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the
purchase by a lawyer of his client's property in litigation constitutes a breach of
professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought against him.
Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really
implemented, because the land development agreement on which the transfer
depended was later rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer of
Rights that the assignment of the properties of the Fortunados to respondent was
subject to the implementation of the land development agreement. The last paragraph
of the Transfer of Rights provides that:
... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A.
GONZALES, Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise
Hill, New Manila, Quezon City, rendered to our entire satisfaction, we hereby,
by these presents, do transfer and convey to the said ATTY. RAMON A.
GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights
and interests in the abovedescribed property, together with all the
improvements found therein [Annex D of the Complaint, Record, p. 28;
Emphasis supplied].
It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to
respondent to be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the
land development agreement was implemented.
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to
complainant, at the time the land development agreement was entered into, that the
land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had already been sold at a public auction. The land
development agreement was executed on August 31, 1977 while the public auction
was held on June 30, 1971.
Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his
appearance for the complainant in an anti-graft case filed by the latter against a

certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon the request of complainant and was understood to
be only provisional. Respondent claims that since complainant was not his client, he
had no duty to warn complainant of the fact that the land involved in their land
development agreement had been sold at a public auction. Moreover, the sale was
duly annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves as
constructive notice to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part.
The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale
was annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed
to inform the complainant of the sale of the land to Samauna during the negotiations
for the land development agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to live up to the
rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty
and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client
of respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an
important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was
a party to the land development agreement, respondent should have warned the
complainant of the sale of the land at a public auction so that the latter could make a
proper assessment of the viability of the project they were jointly undertaking. This
Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and fairness even in his private
dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against him [Custodio
v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].
Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents
purporting to be true copies of an addendum to the land development agreement.
Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the
document filed by respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the
signatories to the addendum to the land development agreement namely, Ramon A.
Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L.
Bautistawere made to appear as having signed the original document on December
9, 1972, as indicated by the letters (SGD.) before each of their names. However, it
was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant who signed the original and
duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado and Nestor
Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith and Nestor
Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) after respondent wrote them on May
24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xerox copyattached to the letter and to send it
back to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327329]. Moreover, respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had
merely agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed, the alleged true copy of
the addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's Supplemental Motion to Refer this
Case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when respondent
submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of
his Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly
misled the Court into believing that the original addendum was signed by Edith

Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his
solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A
lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact
or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of
Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety
was committed by respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract with the
Fortunados [Report and Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court, however,
finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados, which provides
in part that:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided,
you [respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit,
including court fees.
[Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p. 4].
is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a
lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation.
[See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in
good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to
reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however,
does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him.
An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to
enforce the client's rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324
(1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case,
the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of
some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures
Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts violates the
fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must
incur administrative sanctions.
The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting
as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel
for the Fortunados against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143.
The Court, after considering the record, agrees with the Solicitor General's findings on
the matter. The evidence presented by respondent shows that his acceptance of Civil
Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge and consent of the Fortunados. The
affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they gave
their consent when respondent accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of
Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the recognized exceptions to
the rule against representation of conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly
consent to the dual representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon

6, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional

Responsibility].

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before
the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose
of harassing him.
The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this case,
Civil Case No. Q-18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City, while the complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were
already dismissed by the City Fiscal for insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest,
respectively [Report and Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The
Solicitor General found no basis for holding that the complaints for libel and perjury
were used by respondent to harass complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-18060,
considering that it was still pending resolution, the Solicitor General made no finding
on complainants claim that it was a mere ploy by respondent to harass him. The
determination of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-18060 was left to the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was pending resolution.
The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly
holds that there is no basis for holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing the
aforementioned cases was to harass complainant.
Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since
the above discussion on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining
grounds.
The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent
violated the law and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal
profession. Sworn to assist in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of
law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of the
Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638,
647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering the nature of the
offenses committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of the case,
respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months.WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed
serious misconduct, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for
SIX (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this
Resolution be circulated to all courts of the country for their information and guidance, and
spread in the personal record of Atty. Gonzales.SO ORDERED.

[A. C. No. 5305. March 17, 2003] MARCIANO P. BRION, JR., petitioner, vs.
FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., respondent.

In this petition for disbarment, complainant Marciano Brion, Jr., charges the
respondent, Atty. Francisco Brillantes, Jr., of having willfully violated a lawful order of
this Court in A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza v. Judge Francisco
F. Brillantes, Jr.[1] The decretal portion of our resolution in Atienza reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave
and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch,
instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Respondents dismissal in the aforesaid case was ordered after he was found
guilty of Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety during his incumbency as
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Petitioner now avers that respondent violated our decree of perpetual
disqualification imposed upon him from assuming any post in government service,
including any posts in government-owned and controlled corporations, when he
accepted a legal consultancy post at the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA),
from 1998 to 2000. Said consultancy included an appointment by LWUA as
6th member of the Board of Directors of the Urdaneta (Pangasinan) Water
District. Upon expiration of the legal consultancy agreement, this was subsequently
renewed as a Special Consultancy Agreement.
Petitioner contends that while both consultancy agreements contained a proviso
to the effect that nothing therein should be construed as establishing an employeremployee relationship between LWUA and respondent, the inclusion of this proviso
was only a ploy to circumvent our order barring respondent from appointment to a
government agency. Petitioner points out in reality, respondent enjoys the same rights
and privileges as a regular employee, to wit:[3]
1. Issuance of LWUA properties such as a cellular phone with accessories, as
evidenced by the covering Property Issue Slips with respondent signing as
Accountable Employee;[4]
2. Official travel to various places in the country as shown by Reports of
Authorized Travel kept by LWUAs General Services Division[5]and Report of Travel
accomplished by respondent himself;[6]

3. Designation as supervising officer over other LWUA employees as brought to

light by written instructions personally signed by respondent;[7]

merely borrowed it from one Solomon Badoy, a former LWUA Board of Trustees
Member.

4. Attendance in water district conventions and meetings held in various

provinces;[8]

In our Resolution of February 19, 2001, we referred this case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline found that respondent willfully violated a lawful order of
this Court and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for one (1) year and fined ten thousand (P10,000) pesos.

5. Membership in several sensitive LWUA committees such as

the Prequalification, Bids, and Awards Committee (PBAC), Build-Operate-Transfer
(BOT) Committee, among others, with receipt of corresponding honoraria as borne
out by various Disbursement Vouchers;[9]
6. Sitting at meetings of the LWUA Board of Trustees as evidenced by the
minutes of such meetings;[10] and
7. Receipt of Productivity Incentive Bonus in 1999.
Petitioner submits that all of the foregoing constitute deceitful conduct, gross
misconduct, and willful disobedience to a decree of this Court, and show that
respondent is unfit to be a member of the Bar.
In his comment,[11] respondent admits the existence of the Legal Consultancy
Contract as well as the Special Consultancy Contract.However, he raises the
affirmative defense that under Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum
Circular No. 27, Series of 1993, services rendered pursuant to a consultancy contract
shall not be considered government services, and therefore, are not covered by Civil
Service Law, rules and regulations.
Further, says respondent, according to the same Memorandum Circular issued
by the Commission, consultancy contracts do not have to be submitted to the
Commission for approval. With respect to his designation as the 6th Member of the
Board of Directors of the Urdaneta Water District, respondent reasons out that the
same is not a reappointment, which is prohibited by our ruling in Atienza, as said
designation is not an organic appointment to a LWUA plantilla position. Hence,
according to respondent, the CSC need not pass approval upon his temporary
designation.
Respondent also argues that all the members of the Urdaneta Water District
Board, especially the 6th Member, who comes from the LWUA, assumed such
functions merely by virtue of a designation and only in addition to their regular
duties. In any event, says respondent, his designation as 6 th Member was revoked in
April 2000 and the Special Consultancy Contract was pre-terminated on April 30,
2000. It has never been renewed since then. With respect to his use of LWUA
properties, respondent admits receiving the cellular phone unit but insists that he

There is no question that the LWUA is a government-owned and controlled

corporation, created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 198. [12] As such, our ruling in
the Atienza case, A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, which categorically prohibits respondents
appointment to any position in any government-owned and controlled corporation,
clearly encompasses and extends to LWUA positions.
In the instant case the respondent does not deny the petitioners allegations.
Instead, he offers the existence of Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1993
(MC No. 27, s. 1993) to exculpate himself from the charge against him. However, it
does not escape our attention that the very Memorandum Circular that respondent
cites before this Court provides that the duties enumerated in the consultancy
contract are mainly advisory in nature.[14]
[13]

Without belaboring the definition of advisory,[15] it appears obvious to us that the

tasks and duties that respondent performed pursuant to the consultancy contract
cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be deemed merely advisory in nature.
An adviser does not exercise supervisory powers over LWUA employees nor
does he issue written instructions to them. An adviser is not entitled to a seat in such
vital LWUA committees like PBAC and the BOT Committee. Also, respondents
continuous receipt of honoraria for sitting as a member of certain LWUA Committees,
particularly the BOT Committee, belies his claim that he is a mere consultant for the
LWUA. The evidence on record clearly shows that the LWUA Office Order
implementing National Compensation Circular No. 75-95 [16]refers to payments of
honoraria to officials/employees in consideration of services rendered.
Most telling, in our view, is respondents acceptance of his 1998 Productivity
Incentive Bonus (PIB). The Board of Trustees Resolution No. 26, Series of 1999, of
the LWUA,[17] which governed the release of the PIB, limited the entitlement to said
bonus only to officials and employees (permanent, temporary, casual, or contractual)
of LWUA.
In sum, we find that for all intents and purposes, respondent performed duties
and functions of a non-advisory nature, which pertain to a contractual employee of
LWUA. As stated by petitioner in his reply,[18] there is a difference between

a consultant hired on a contractual basis (which is governed by CSC M.C. No. 27, s.
1993) and a contractual employee (whose appointment is governed, among others,
by the CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointment and other Personnel Actions). By
performing duties and functions, which clearly pertain to a contractual employee,
albeit in the guise of an advisor or consultant, respondent has transgressed both
letter and spirit of this Courts decree in Atienza.
The lawyers primary duty as enunciated in the Attorneys Oath is to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal
processes.[19] That duty in its irreducible minimum entails obedience to the legal
orders of the courts. Respondents disobedience to this Courts order prohibiting his
reappointment to any branch, instrumentality, or agency of government, including
government owned and controlled corporations, cannot be camouflaged by a legal
consultancy or a special consultancy contract. By performing duties and functions of a
contractual employee of LWUA, by way of a consultancy, and receiving compensation
and perquisites as such, he displayed acts of open defiance of the Courts
authority, and a deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer of the court. It is also
destructive of the harmonious relations that should prevail between Bench and Bar, a
harmony necessary for the proper administration of justice. Such defiance not only
erodes respect for the Court but also corrodes public confidence in the rule of law.
What aggravates respondents offense is the fact that respondent is no ordinary
lawyer. Having served in the judiciary for eight (8) years, he is very well aware of the
standards of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. His propensity to
try to get away with an indiscretion becomes apparent and inexcusable when he
entered into a legal consultancy contract with the LWUA. Perhaps realizing its own
mistake, LWUA terminated said contract with respondent, but then proceeded to give
him a special consultancy. This travesty could not be long hidden from public
awareness, hence the instant complaint for disbarment filed by petitioner. Given the
factual circumstances found by Commission on Bar Discipline, we have no hesitance
in accepting the recommendation of the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, that respondent be fined and suspended from the practice of law. The
Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 1.01, provides that a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For violating the Code as
well as transgressing his oath as an officer of the court, his suspension for one (1)
year and a fine of ten thousand (P10,000) pesos are in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco Brillantes, Jr., is found liable for
having willfully violated a lawful order of this Court in our decision of March
29, 1995 rendered in A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza vs. Judge
Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr.He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year and ordered to pay a FINE of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar conduct shall be dealt with
more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Bar Confidant and the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of respondent
as well as circulated to all courts in the Philippines. This decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981
MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant,
vs.SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the disbarment
of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of
grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her.
Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child,
Michael Dino Maniwang.
Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at Cebu City.
Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine
while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos College. They became
sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in
January, 1971, Segundino stopped visiting her.
Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month. They
renewed their relationship. After they had dinner one night in March, 1971 and finding
themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding house since the other
boarders had gone on vacation, they had sexual congress. When Segundino asked
Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with
him, she jokingly said that she was in love with another man and that she had a child
with still another man. Segundino remarked that even if that be the case, he did not
mind because he loved her very much.
Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his
acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married.
In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued
his law studies in Davao City. .Magdalena remained in Cebu. He sent to her letters
and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z).
When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she and
Segundino went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's parents that
they were married although they were not really so. Segundino convinced

Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had passed the
bar examinations. He secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a
marriage license.
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love
and concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time and again
that he would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. He was not present
when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu
Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the baptism of his child.
Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April 25, 1975.
Several days after his oath-taking, which Magdalena also attended, he stopped
corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there was something amiss, Magdalena
went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her lover. Segundino told her that they could
not get married for lack of money. She went back to Ivisan.
In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who
was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him there only to be told that their
marriage could not take place because he had married Erlinda Ang on November 25,
1975. She was broken-hearted when she returned to Davao.
Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she
had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. She reported the assault to the
commander of the Padada police station and secured medical treatment in a hospital
(Exh. I and J).
Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is the
father of the child Michael. He also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry
Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of Magdalena's shady past.
She had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and had already an
illegitimate child before Michael was born.
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion,
respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his promise of
marriage do not warrant his disbarment.
An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He is
required to produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character
and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court.
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued
possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the

legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to
have good moral character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity
in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is
"grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which
render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that
what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the
immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became
pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six
children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified
(In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons
of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior
or deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous. It is in connection
with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of immorality usually
arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the
benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct," will depend
on the surrounding circumstances.
This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still prevailed,
observed that "the legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh and the ease with which
a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and morality is not well cultivated, falls into
temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself
attracted. An occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying "A fair booty
makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt a saint" has become general."
(People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535).
Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following
cases:
(1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Virginia
C. Almirez, under promise of marriage, which he refused to fulfill, although they had
already a marriage license and despite the birth of a child in consequence of their

sexual intercourse; he married another woman and during Virginia's pregnancy,

Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried to
convince her to have an abortion to which she did not agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez,
Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See Sarmiento vs.
Cui, 100 Phil. 1102).

The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This case is
similar to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer Eugenio
V. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H. Soberano before his admission
to the bar in 1954. They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in
1950 and 1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels.

(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were
married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila, and, after such fake
marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs. Agustin,
106 Phil. 256).

On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing and vulgar
nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm conviction that, because
of the close intimacy between the complainant and the respondent, she felt no
restraint whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity.

(3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with
another women who had borne him a child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to
disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage, see Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil.
313).

According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of her long
intimacy with the respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint for disbarment against
Villanueva.

(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by living
on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal
necessities, while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl
as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing
to demand money from the complainant, and trying to sponge on her and persuade
her to resume their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy are
indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123
Phil. 450).
(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to lawyer
Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by him to have sexual congress with him inside a
hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual intercourse because, anyway,
they were going to get married. She used to give Puno money upon his request. After
she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her.
(Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative Case No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439).
(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that he was
single and making a promise of marriage, succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina and his own son
Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till the end of my years in
this world. I will bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony." "Through thick
and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will always be
the first, middle and the last in my life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586).
(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations for fifteen
years with Briccia Angeles, a married woman separated from her husband, seduced
her eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and begot a child. (Royong vs.
Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so
corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See Montana vs. Ruado,
Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382; Reyes vs. Wong,
Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114
Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative Case No. 997, September 10, 1979,93
SCRA 91).
Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the complaint for
disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6116

August 1, 2012

ENGR.
GILBERT
TUMBOKON, Complainant,
PEFIANCO, Respondent.

vs.ATTY.

MARIANO

R.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant
Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon against respondent Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco for grave
dishonesty, gross misconduct constituting deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
In his Complaint,1 complainant narrated that respondent undertook to give him 20%
commission, later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter would receive in
representing Spouses Amable and Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in

an action for partition of the estate of the late Benjamin Yap (Civil Case No. 4986
before the Regional Trial Court of Aklan). Their agreement was reflected in a
letter2 dated August 11, 1995. However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed
commission notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting to 17% of the total
estate or about P 40 million. Instead, he was informed through a letter 3 dated July 16,
1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same after respondent had agreed to reduce
his attorney's fees from 25% to 17%. He then demanded the payment of his
commission4 which respondent ignored.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral
standards required of his profession for having abandoned his legal wife, Milagros
Hilado, with whom he has two children, and cohabited with Mae FlorGalido, with
whom he has four children. He also accused respondent of engaging in moneylending
business5 without
the
required
authorization
from
the
BangkoSentralngPilipinas.
In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25%
contingent fee basis, and advanced all the expenses. He disputed the August 11,
1995 letter for being a forgery and claimed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay
complainant's commission which he clarified in his July 16, 1997 letter. He, thus,
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the corresponding sanction against
complainant's counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a baseless complaint.6
In the Resolution7 dated February 16, 2004, the Court resolved to refer this
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation 8dated October 10,
2008, the Investigating IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be
suspended for one (1) year from the active practice of law, for violation of the
Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). The IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the same in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-4539 dated August
28, 2010. Respondent moved for reconsideration10 which was denied in Resolution
No. XIX-2011-141 dated October 28, 2011.
After due consideration, We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board
of Governors.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who
show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the
profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of
legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their
four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code. 11 Lawyers may, thus,

be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their
professional or in their private capacity.
In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the execution of
the August 11, 1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have
undertaken the payment of complainant's commission but passing on the
responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02, 12 Canon 9 of
the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do
not obtain in the case at bar.
Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal
family to cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four children notwithstanding
that his moral character as well as his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of
Attorneys has been assailed. The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of
fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as
it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. 13Consequently, We find no
reason to disturb the IBP's finding that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath14 and
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
"unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have been
sufficiently established.1wphi1 A "business" requires some form of investment and a
sufficient number of customers to whom its output can be sold at profit on a
consistent basis.15 The lending of money to a single person without showing that such
service is made available to other persons on a consistent basis cannot be construed
asindicia that respondent is engaged in the business of lending.
Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, We
are minded that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution and only
in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of the bar,16 or the misconduct
borders on the criminal, or committed under scandalous circumstance, 17 which do not
obtain here. Considering the circumstances of the case, We deem it appropriate that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year as
recommended.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of
violation of the Lawyers Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the same Code andSUSPENDED from the
active practice of law ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a

member of the Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989

SALVACION
DELIZO
vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.

future will be dealt with more severely, and ordering him to support his legitimate
family as a responsible parent should.
CORDOVA, complainant,

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr. Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee, complainant Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty.
Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
The letter-complaint was forwarded by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline ("Commission"), for investigation, report
and recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to submit a
verified complaint within ten (10) days from notice. Complainant complied and
submitted to the Commission on 27 September 1988 a revised and verified version of
her long and detailed complaint against her husband charging him with immorality
and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was declared in
default for failure to file an answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from
notice. The same Order required complainant to submit before the Commission her
evidence ex parte, on 16 December 1988. Upon the telegraphic request of
complainant for the resetting of the 16 December 1988 hearing, the Commission
scheduled another hearing on 25 January 1989. The hearing scheduled for 25
January 1989 was rescheduled two (2) more times-first, for 25 February 1989 and
second, for 10 and 11 April 1989. The hearings never took place as complainant
failed to appear. Respondent Cordova never moved to set aside the order of default,
even though notices of the hearings scheduled were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the Commission
that she and her husband had already "reconciled". In an order dated 17 April 1989,
the Commission required the parties (respondent and complainant) to appear before
it for confirmation and explanation of the telegraphic message and required them to
file a formal motion to dismiss the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice.
Neither party responded and nothing was heard from either party since then.
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the Commission,
the IBP Board of Governors submitted to this Court its report reprimanding
respondent for his acts, admonishing him that any further acts of immorality in the

The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as follows:

Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this
marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the couple lived somewhere in Quirino
Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to
Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was
herself married and left her own husband and children to stay with respondent.
Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and
wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife, and Fely
Holgado using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado
funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while at
the same time failing to support his legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent
reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from Fely Holgado and
brought his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent would, however,
frequently come home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect
the support of his legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant found, upon
returning from a trip to Manila necessitated by hospitalization of her daughter Loraine,
that respondent Cordova was no longer living with her (complainant's) children in their
conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, one Luisita
Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter Melanie along with him.
Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the complinant, compelling
complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter byhabeas corpus. The
Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their children.
Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to live with Luisita
Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give support to his legitimate
family.
Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from complainant,
stating that complainant and respondent had been reconciled with each other.
After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. We
also agree that the most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent,
assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and
immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely
reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An
applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he is
possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and

dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that
requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good
standing.
In Mortel v. Aspiras, 1 this Court, following the rule in the United States, held that "the
continued possession ... of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the
rightful continuance in the practice of the law ... and its loss requires suspension or
disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment.
" 2 It is important to note that the lack of moral character that we here refer to as
essential is not limited to good moral character relating to the discharge of the duties
and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects the
fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the
generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which
makes "a mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage." 3 In Mortel, the
respondent being already married, wooed and won the heart of a single, 21-year old
teacher who subsequently cohabited with him and bore him a son. Because
respondent's conduct in Mortel was particularly morally repulsive, involving the
marrying of his mistress to his own son and thereafter cohabiting with the wife of his
own son after the marriage he had himself arranged, respondent was disbarred.
In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a member of
the bar by reason of his immoral conduct and accordingly disbarred. He was found to
have engaged in sexual relations with the complainant who consequently bore him a
son; and to have maintained for a number of years an adulterous relationship with
another woman.
In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an
adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the general
public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which he, rubbing salt
on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period of "reform" respondent
took up again with another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing along
his young daughter to live with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the
fundamental institution of marriage and its elementary obligations before his own
daughter and the community at large.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law
indefinitely and until farther orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his
suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission
and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate
family and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento,

EN BANC
RE: SC DECISION DATED A.C. No. 7940
MAY 20, 2008 IN G.R. NO. 161455
UNDER RULE 139-B OF THE
RULES OF COURT, Present:
ATTY. RODOLFO D. PACTOLIN,
Respondent. Promulgated:
April 24, 2012
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

This case resolves the question of whether or not the conviction of a lawyer
for a crime involving moral turpitude constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment
from the practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
The Facts and the Case
In

May

1996,

Elmer

Abastillas,

the

playing

coach

of

the Ozamis City volleyball team, wrote Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes ofOzamis City,
requesting financial assistance for his team. Mayor Fuentes approved the request
and sent Abastillas letter to the City Treasurer for processing. Mayor Fuentes also
designated Mario R. Ferraren, a city council member, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of
the city while Mayor Fuentes was away. Abastillas eventually got the P10,000.00
assistance for his volleyball team.
Meanwhile,

respondent

lawyer,

Atty.

Rodolfo

D.

Pactolin,

then

a Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of Misamis Occidental, got a photocopy of

Abastillas letter and, using it, filed on June 24, 1996 a complaint with the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao against Ferraren for alleged illegal disbursement
of P10,000.00 in public funds. Atty. Pactolin attached to the complaint a copy of what
he claimed was a falsified letter of Abastillas, which showed that it was Ferraren, not
Mayor Fuentes, who approved the disbursement.

Aggrieved, Ferraren filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 25665 a

[1]

spurious. Given the clear absence of a satisfactory explanation regarding his

complaint against Atty. Pactolin for falsification of public document. On November

possession and use of the falsified Abastillas letter, this Court held that the

12, 2003 the Sandiganbayan found Atty. Pactolin guilty of falsification under Article

Sandiganbayan did not err in concluding that it was Atty. Pactolin who falsified the

172 and sentenced him to the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 2 years and 4

letter. This Court relied on the settled rule that in the absence of satisfactory

months of prision correccional as minimum to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days

explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the

of prision correccional as

forger and therefore guilty of falsification.[6]

maximum,

to

suffer

all

the

accessory

penalties

of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment

in case of insolvency.

This Courts decision in said falsification case had long become final and
executory. In In Re: Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,[7]the Court held that in disbarment

Atty. Pactolin appealed to this Court but on May 20, 2008 it affirmed his
conviction.[2] Since the Court treated the matter as an administrative complaint against

cases, it is no longer called upon to review the judgment of conviction which has
become final.The review of the conviction no longer rests upon this Court.

him as well under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, it referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate action.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed
or suspended on the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross

Because complainant Ferraren neither appeared nor submitted any pleading

misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving

during the administrative proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,

moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful

on October 9, 2010 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XIX-2010-632,

order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party

adopting

to a case without authority so to do.

and

approving

the

Investigating

Commissioners

Report

and

Recommendation that the case against Atty. Pactolin be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.

This Court has ruled that the crime of falsification of public document is
contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude.
[8]

The Issue Presented

Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty,

modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the

The only issue presented in this case is whether or not Atty. Pactolin should
be disbarred after conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification.

private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.[9]

The Courts Ruling

Having said that, what penalty should be imposed then on Atty. Pactolin?
In his pleadings before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Pactolin
reiterated the defenses he raised before the Sandiganbayan and this Court in the

As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution. Being

falsification case. He claims that the Court glossed over the facts, that its decision

the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most

and referral to the IBP was factually infirmed [3] and contained factual exaggerations

imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral

[4]

and patently erroneous observation, and was too adventurous.

[5]

character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. [10] Yet this
Court has also consistently pronounced that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for

To recapitulate, this Court upheld the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the
copy of Abastillas letter which Atty. Pactolin attached to his complaint was

conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.[11]

Here, Atty. Pactolins disbarment is warranted. The Sandiganbayan has

confirmed that although his culpability for falsification has been indubitably

a further attempt to get the case before the United States Supreme Court was
unsuccessful. On February 9, 1921, a pardon was issued by the Governor-General of
the following tenor:

established, he has not yet served his sentence. His conduct only exacerbates his
offense and shows that he falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
vanguard of the legal profession.

[12]

This Court once again reminds all lawyers that they, of all classes and
professions, are most sacredly bound to uphold the law. [13] The privilege to practice
law is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically
and, equally important, morally. As such, lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[14]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin is hereby DISBARRED and his
name REMOVED from the Rolls of Attorney.Let a copy of this decision be attached to
his personal records and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of
thePhilippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
April 7, 1922
In Re MARCELINO LONTOK
Ramon
Diokno
Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government.

for

respondent.

MALCOLM, J.:
The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the removal of Marcelino Lontok
from his office of lawyer in the Philippine Islands, because of having been convicted
of the crime of bigamy. The respondent lawyer, in answer, prays that the charges be
dismissed, and bases his plea principally on a pardon issued to him by former
Governor-General Harrison.
Marcelino Lontok was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Zambales of the
crime of bigamy. This judgement was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court, while

By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Philippine Organic Act on

August 29, 1916, the sentence in the case of Marcelino Lontok convicted by
the Court of First Instance of Zambales of bigamy and sentenced on
February 27, 1918, to imprisonment for eight years, to suffer the accessory
penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of the proceedings, which
sentence was, on September 8, 1919, confirmed by the Supreme Court is
hereby remitted, on condition that he shall not again be guilty of any
misconduct.
The particular provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, upon which the AttorneyGeneral relies in asking for the disbarment of Attorney Lontok, provides that a
member of the bar may be removed or suspended form his office of lawyer by the
Supreme Court "by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude."
(Sec. 21) That conviction of the crime of bigamy involves moral turpitude, within the
meaning of the law, cannot be doubted. The debatable question relates to the effect
of the pardon by the Governor-General. On the one hand, it is contended by the
Government that while the pardon removes the legal infamy of the crime, it cannot
wash out the moral stain; on the other hand, it is contended by the respondent that
the pardon reaches the offense for which he was convicted and blots it out so that he
may not be looked upon as guilty of it.
The cases are not altogether clear as to just what effect a pardon has on the right of a
court of disbar an attorney for conviction of a felony. On close examination, however,
it will be found that the apparent conflict in the decisions is more apparent than real,
and arises from differences in the nature of the charges on which the proceedings to
disbar are based. Where preceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls are
founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a
felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the
conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the
pardon has been granted. (In re Emmons [1915], 29 Cal. App., 121; Scott vs. State
[1894], 6 Tex. Civ. App., 343). But where proceedings to disbar an attorney are
founded on the professional misconduct involved in a transaction which has
culminated in a conviction of felony, it has been held that while the effect of the
pardon is to relieve him of the penal consequences of his act, it does not operate as a
bar to the disbarment proceedings, inasmuch as the criminal acts may nevertheless
constitute proof that the attorney does not possess a good moral character and is not
a fit or proper person to retain his license to practice law. (People vs. Burton [1907],
39 Colo., 164; People vs. George [1900],186 Ill., 122; Nelson vs. Com. [1908],128
Ky., 779; Case of In re [1881],86 N.Y., 563.)

The celebrated case of Ex parte Garland [1866], 4 Wall., 380, is directly in point. The
petitioner in this case applied for a license to practice law in the United States courts,
without first taking an oath to the effect that he had never voluntarily given aid to any
government hostile to the United States, as required by statute. The petitioner, it
seems, had been a member of the Conferate Congress, during the secession of the
South, but had been pardons by the President of the United States. It was held, buy a
divided court, that to exclude the petitioner from the practice of law for the offense
named would be to enforce a punishment for the offense, notwithstanding the pardon
which the court had no right to do; and the opinion of the court, in part, said:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the
guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment
and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender
is an innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon
conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the
penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him,
as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
There is only this limitation to its operation; it does not restore offices
forfeited, or property or interest vested in others in consequence of the
conviction and judgement.
Although much which is contained in the opinion of the four dissenting justices, in the
Garland case, appeals powerfully to the minds of the court, we feel ourselves under
obligation to follow the rule laid down by the majority decision of the higher court. We
do this with the more grace when we recall that according to the article 130 of the
Penal Code, one of the different ways by which criminal liability is extinguished is by
pardon. We must also remember that the motion for disbarment is based solely on
the judgement of conviction for a crime of which the respondent has been pardoned,
We must also remember that the motion for disbarment is based solely on the
judgment of conviction for crime of which the respondent has been pardoned, and
that the language of the pardon is not such as to amount to a conditional pardon
similar in nature to a parole. It may be mentioned however, in this connection, that if
Marcelino Lontok should again be guilty of any misconduct, the condition of his
pardon would be violated, and he would then become subject to disbarment.
It results, therefore, that the petition of the Attorney-General cannot be granted, and
that the proceedings must be dismissed. Costs shall be taxed as provided by section
24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. So ordered.
A.M. No. L-363

July 31, 1962

IN RE: DISBARMENT
GUTIERREZ, respondent.

PROCEEDINGS

Victoriano
A.
Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.

Savellano

AGAINST

ATTY.

for

DIOSDADO

Q.

complaint.

MAKALINTAL, J.:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it
on October 5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of
Oriental Mindoro he was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former
municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to
the penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of conviction was
affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was changed
to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted
a conditional pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of
the prison term was remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the
penal laws of the Philippines."
On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder
case, filed a verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed
from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his
answer in due time, admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding pardon in
defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in the case of In re Lontok, 43
Phil. 293.
Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime
insolving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral
turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or
good morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment statutes, it
means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted
rule of right and duty between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84
P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279. pp. 428-429.
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to
respondent places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited.
Reliance is placed by him squarely on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was
convicted of bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a
subsequent viction, this Court decided in his favor and held: "When proceedings to
strike an attorney's name from the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for
disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is

a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been
granted."

of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude
involved is such as to justify his being purged from the profession.

It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it
the Court proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok
was absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in the
citations to support it, namely. In Re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6
Tex. Civ. App. 343; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs. State the
court said:

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain
rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the
bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require
satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither
dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to
them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107
U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men
in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to
ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets
a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body
politic.

We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the record of

the felony conviction could no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding
provided for in article 226. The record, when offered in evidence, was met
with an unconditional pardon, and could not, therefore, properly be said to
afford "proof of a conviction of any felony." Having been thus cancelled, all
its force as a felony conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of this
would not be a pardon, according to the judicial construction which that act
of executive grace was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v.
U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases there cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191.
And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok
case is as follows:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the
guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment
and blots out the existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender
is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It granted before
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon
conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the
penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights it makes him,
as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely
remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike
that in Ex parte Garland, which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offense by him
committed in connection with rebellion (civil war) against government of the United
States."
The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here.
Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder
without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was qualified by
treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage
of his official position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the
crime for which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered
disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of lawyers.
Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ.,
concur.
A.M. No. 439 September 30, 1982
IN RE: QUINCIANO D. VAILOCES

ESCOLIN, J.:
This is a petition filed by Quinciano D. Vailoces for readmission to the practice of law
and the inclusion of his name in the roll of attorneys.
The records disclose that the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental in a decision
promulgated on September 30, 1955 found petitioner guilty of falsification of public
document, penalized under Article 117 of the Revised Penal Code, and imposed on
him an indeterminate sentence ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the
accessory penalties to the law, plus fine and costs. In its decision the court found that
petitioner, as a member of the bar and in his capacity as a notary public,
aknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be the last will and testament
of one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. Presented for probate before the Court of First

Instance of Negros Oriental, the genuineness of the document was impugned by the
forced heirs of the alleged testatrix, and the court, finding that the document was a
forgery, denied probate to the will.

When asked to comment, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through its then
president, Atty. Marcelo D. Fernan, favorably indorsed petitioner's request for
reinstatement.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict of conviction; and upon finality
thereof, petitioner commenced service of the sentence.

On February 13, 1978, Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, complainant in the original

disbarment proceedings, filed an opposition to the petitions for reinstatement; and this
was followed by a telegram of Nicanor Vailoces, barangay captain of Domolog,
Bindoy, Negros, Oriental, addressed to his Excellency, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, and referred to this Court, opposing petitioner's readmission to the bar "on
grounds of his non-reformation, immoral conduct and pretensions of being a licensed
lawyer."

Thereafter, Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, complainant in the criminal case, instituted

before this Court disbarment proceedings against petitioner. The same culminated in
his disbarment on April 12, 1961. 1
On December 27, 1967, the President of the Philippines granted petitioner "absolute
and unconditional pardon" and restored him "to full civil and political rights. 2
Since August 23, 1968, petitioner had repeatedly sought readmission to the practice
of law, the first of which was denied by this Court in a minute resolution dated August
30, 1968.
On February 27, 1970, petitioner reiterated his plea, but consideration thereof was
deferred "until after the integration of the bar has been effected." 3
On December 12, 1977, he filed another petition, attaching thereto copies, among
others, of the following documents, to wit: the resolution of the Negros Oriental Bar
Association signed by 78 members thereof, indorsing his plea for reinstatement 4 ; the
certificate of the mayor of the municipality of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, where
petitioner has been residing, to the effect that the latter "is a person of exemplary
moral character, a peace-loving and law-abiding citizen 5 a certification of Governor
William B. Villegas of Negros Oriental, attesting to the fact that since the grant of
absolute pardon to petitioner, "he has comported himself as a morally straight and
respectable citizen and that he has been active and has cooperated in civic and
social undertakings, sincere and honest in his desire to lead a decent and dignified
life" 6 ; the certification of Dean Eduardo G. Flores of the College of Law, Siliman
University, vouching to petitioner's "honest, upright and moral life ... and because of
his conduct he has earned the sympathy of the people of the community and
regained the confidence of the people and of his other associates: 7 the statement of
Atty. Alexander G. Amor, former president of the Negros Oriental Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, certifying "that Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces ... is a
person of good moral character, whose integrity is beyond question" 8 ; and the
clearance certificates issued by Judge Romeo R. Solis of the City Court of
Dumaguete, Provincial Fiscal Andrew S. Namukatkat of Negros Oriental, and City
Fiscal Pablo E. Cabahug of Dumaguete City, to the effect that petitioner "is a person
of good moral character" and that since his release from the national penitentiary he
"has never been accused or convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude." 9

Anent these oppositions, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through Atty. Fernan,
made the following observations:
By resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 24, 1978, the
following matters have been referred to the Integrated Bar for
comment:
(1) The opposition of complainant Ledesma de
Jesus-Paras to respondent's petition and
supplementary petition for reinstatement in the
roll of attorneys; and
(2) The telegram dated February 16, 1978 of
Nicanor Vailoces, Barangay Captain of Domolog,
Bindoy, Negros Oriental, addressed to his
Excellency Ferdinand E. Marcos, requesting the
Office of the President to oppose the petition of
Quinciano Vailoces for reinstatement in the Roll
of Attorneys on grounds stated therein.
It may be recalled that on January 17, 1978, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar transmitted to the Honorable
Supreme Court for its favorable consideration the above stated
petition for reinstatement.
Subsequent to its being served with a copy of the resolution of the
Supreme Court, the Integrated Bar received a petition dated
February 14, 1978 signed by 'the people of the Municipality of
Bindoy, Province of Negros Oriental' vehemently opposing the
reinstatement of Mr. Vailoces in the Roll of Attorneys. On October 5,
1978 the President of the Integrated Bar wrote to Mr. Vailoces

asking him to comment on the above mentioned petitions and

telegram.

person in the place of Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces could properly

defend himself against such charges.

This Office is now in receipt of Mr. Vailoces' comment dated

November 3, 1978, which is being forwarded herewith to the
Honorable Supreme Court together with other pertinent papers.

Thus, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines reaffirmed its indorsement of petitioner's
"reinstatement in the rolls of attorneys."

It is believed that Mr. Vailoces' comment is a satisfactory answer to

the adverse allegations and charges which have been referred to
him. The charges of immorality (publicly maintaining a querida) and
gambling are general statements devoid of particular allegations of
fact and may well be disregarded. Then, too, the Municipal Mayor
of Bindoy, Negros Oriental - namely, Mr. Jesus A. Mana-ay - who
tops the list of persons who have signed the February 14, 1978
petition vehemently opposing the reinstatement of Mr. Vailoces,
appears to be the very same official who on October 25, 1977
issued a Certification to the effect that Mr. Vailoces 'is personally
known to me as a person of exemplary character, a peace loving
and law abiding citizen' and that 'he is cooperative in all our civic
and social activities and that he is one of our respectable citizens in
our community.' That this official should now sign a petition
containing statements exactly opposite in thrust and tenor is very
intriguing, to say the least, and it is not altogether difficult to believe
Mr. Vailoces' imputations of politics in the conduct of Mayor Manaay.
As for the opposition of Mrs. Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, the alleged
absence of remorse on the part of Mr. Vailoces, and his alleged
belligerence and display of open defiance and hostility, etc. are
matters so subjective in character that her general allegations and
charges in this regard cannot be properly considered. It is
significant that Mr. Vailoces in his comment states: "If she is indeed
that much desperately so in need of cash assistance, considering
really that she is an old woman being recently widowed the second
time, for her satisfaction and as a gesture of goodwill, I am willing to
assist her but only with a modest amount because I am only a small
farmer with still three college students to support."
Regarding the telegram dated February 16, 1978 of one Nicanor
Vailoces stating as grounds for denial of Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces'
petition for reinstatement the alleged 'grounds of non-reformation,
immoral conduct and pretensions of being a licensed lawyer by
soliciting cases,' there is such a lack of specificity and particularity
in such statement of grounds that one is at a loss as to how a

This Court likewise referred the oppositions interposed by Mrs. Ledesma de JesusParas and Nicanor Vailoces to the Solicitor General for investigation and
recommendation; and on August 4, 1982, the latter, after conducting an investigation,
submitted his report, recommending that "Quinciano D. Vailoces be reinstated in the
roll of attorneys upon taking his oath anew of the corresponding oath of office."
The Court sustains the conclusion of the Solicitor General that petitioner has
sufficiently proven himself fit to be readmitted to the practice of law. True it is that the
plenary pardon extended to him by the President does not of itself warrant his
reinstatement.
Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to
reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon
following his conviction, and the requirements of reinstatement had
been held to be the same as for original admission to the bar,
except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in
an original evidence [7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client, Sept. 41, p. 815]
The decisive question on an application for reinstatement is
whether applicant is 'of good moral character' in the sense in which
that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and
proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an
attorney ... [7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client, Sept. 41, p. 816].
Petitioner's conduct after disbarment can stand searching scrutiny. He has regained
the respect and confidence of his fellow attorneys as well as of the citizens of his
community. The favorable indorsements of both the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and its Negros Oriental Chapter, the testimonials expressed in his behalf by the
provincial governor of Negros Oriental as well as the municipal and barrio officials of
Bindoy, Negros Oriental, his active participation in civic and social undertakings in the
community attest to his moral reform and rehabilitation and justify his reinstatement.
Petitioner, now 69 years of age, has reached the twilight of his life. He has been
barred from the practice of his profession for a period of 21 years. Adequate
punishment has been exacted.
Chastened by his painful and humiliating experience, he further "pledges with all his
honor ... that if reinstated in the roll of attorneys he will surely and consistently
conduct himself honestly, uprightly and worthily." Indeed, there is reasonable

expectation that he will endeavor to lead an irreproachable life and maintain steadfast
fidelity to the lawyer's oath.

was received by Ester Calis, wife of the respondent for which a receipt was
issued.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Quinciano D. Vailoces is hereby ordered reinstated in the

roll of attorneys.

From the period of January 1993 to May 1994 complainant had several
conferences with the respondent regarding the processing of her travel
documents. To facilitate the processing, respondent demanded an additional
amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) and prevailed upon
complainant to resign from her job as stenographer with the Commission on
Human Rights.
On June 20, 1994, to expedite the processing of her travel documents
complainant issued Planters Development Bank Check No. 12026524 in the
amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) in favor of Atty. D. Calis
who issued a receipt. After receipt of said amount, respondent furnished the
complainant copies of Supplemental to U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa Application
(Of. 156) and a list of questions which would be asked during interviews.

A.C. No. 5118 September 9, 1999

(A.C. CBD No. 97-485)
MARILOU
vs.
ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS, respondent.

SEBASTIAN, complainant,

PER CURIAM:
For unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct as well as violation of his oath
as lawyer, respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis faces disbarment.
The facts of this administrative case, as found by the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), 1 in its Report, are as follows:
Complainant (Marilou Sebastian) alleged that sometime in November, 1992,
she was referred to the respondent who promised to process all necessary
documents required for complainant's trip to the USA for a fee of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).
On December 1, 1992 the complainant made a partial payment of the
required fee in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), which

When complainant inquired about her passport, Atty. Calis informed the
former that she will be assuming the name Lizette P. Ferrer married to
Roberto Ferrer, employed as sales manager of Matiao Marketing, Inc. The
complainant was furnished documents to support her assumed
identity.1wphi1.nt
Realizing that she will be travelling with spurious documents, the
complainant demanded the return of her money, however she was assured
by respondent that there was nothing to worry about for he has been
engaged in the business for quite sometime; with the promise that her
money will be refunded if something goes wrong.
Weeks before her departure respondent demanded for the payment of the
required fee which was paid by complainant, but the corresponding receipt
was not given to her.
When complainant demanded for her passport, respondent assured the
complainant that it will be given to her on her departure which was
scheduled on September 6, 1994. On said date complainant was given her
passport and visa issued in the name of Lizette P. Ferrer. Complainant left
together with Jennyfer Belo and a certain Maribel who were also recruits of
the respondent.
Upon arrival at the Singapore International Airport, complainant together with
Jennyfer Belo and Maribel were apprehended by the Singapore Airport
Officials for carrying spurious travel documents; Complainant contacted the
respondent through overseas telephone call and informed him of by her

predicament. From September 6 to 9, 1994, complainant was detained at

Changi Prisons in Singapore.
On September 9, 1994 the complainant was deported back to the
Philippines and respondent fetched her from the airport and brought her to
his residence at 872-A Tres Marias Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Respondent
took complainant's passport with a promise that he will secure new travel
documents for complainant. Since complainant opted not to pursue with her
travel, she demanded for the return of her money in the amount of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).
On June 4, 1996, June 18 and July 5, 1996 respondent made partial refunds
of P15,000.00; P6,000.00; and P5,000.00.
On December 19, 1996 the complainant through counsel, sent a demand
letter to respondent for the refund of a remaining balance of One Hundred
Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00) which was ignored by the
respondent.
Sometime in March 1997 the complainant went to see the respondent,
however his wife informed her that the respondent was in Cebu attending to
business matters.
In May 1997 the complainant again tried to see the respondent however she
found out that the respondent had transferred to an unknown residence
apparently with intentions to evade responsibility.
Attached to the complaint are the photocopies of receipts for the amount
paid by complainant, applications for U.S.A. Visa, questions and answers
asked during interviews; receipts acknowledging partial refunds of fees paid
by the complainant together with demand letter for the remaining balance of
One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00); which was received
by the respondent. 2
Despite several notices sent to the respondent requiring an answer to or comment on
the complaint, there was no response. Respondent likewise failed to attend the
scheduled hearings of the case. No appearance whatsoever was made by the
respondent. 3 As a result of the inexplicable failure, if not obdurate refusal of the
respondent to comply with the orders of the Commission, the investigation against
him proceeded ex parte.
On September 24, 1998, the Commission on Bar Discipline issued its Report on the
case, finding that:

It appears that the services of the respondent was engaged for the purpose of
securing a visa for a U.S.A. travel of complainant. There was no mention of job
placement or employment abroad, hence it is not correct to say that the
respondent engaged in illegal recruitment.
The alleged proposal of the respondent to secure the U.S.A. visa for the
complainant under an assumed name was accepted by the complainant which
negates deceit on the part of the respondent. Noted likewise is the partial
refunds made by the respondent of the fees paid by the complainant. However,
the transfer of residence without a forwarding address indicates his attempt to
escape responsibility.
In the light of the foregoing, we find that the respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct for violating Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS
be SUSPENDED as a member of the bar until he fully refunds the fees paid to
him by complainant and comply with the order of the Commission on Bar
Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 6, of the Rules of Court. 4
Pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this administrative case
was elevated to the IBP Board of Governors for review. The Board in a
Resolution 5 dated December 4, 1998 resolved to adopt and approve with
amendment the recommendation of the Commission. The Resolution of the Board
states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment that Respondent
Atty. Dorotheo Calis be DISBARRED for having been found guilty
of Gross Misconduct for engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
We are now called upon to evaluate, for final action, the IBP recommendation
contained in its Resolution dated December 4, 1998, with its supporting report.
After examination and careful consideration of the records in this case, we find the
Resolution passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP in order. We agree with the
finding of the Commission that the charge of illegal recruitment was not established

because complainant failed to substantiate her allegation on the matter. In fact she
did not mention any particular job or employment promised to her by the respondent.
The only service of the respondent mentioned by the complainant was that of
securing a visa for the United States.
We likewise concur with the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution, that herein
respondent is guilty of gross misconduct by engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct contrary to Canon I, Rule 101 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondent deceived the complainant by assuring her that he could
give her visa and travel documents; that despite spurious documents nothing
untoward would happen; that he guarantees her arrival in the USA and even
promised to refund her the fees and expenses already paid, in case something went
wrong. All for material gain.
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable.
They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer's
relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith,
fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer's oath. The lawyer's oath is not
mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep
inviolable. 6 The nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a
person of good moral character. 7 This requisite is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.8 We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct
of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in
serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law. 9
It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly jeopardized the life and liberty of
complainant when he made her travel with spurious documents. How often have
victims of unscrupulous travel agents and illegal recruiters been imprisoned in foreign
lands because they were provided fake travel documents? Respondent totally
disregarded the personal safety of the complainant when he sent her abroad on false
assurances. Not only are respondent's acts illegal, they are also detestable from the
moral point of view. His utter lack of moral qualms and scruples is a real threat to the
Bar and the administration of justice.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege. 10 We must stress that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only
during good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained
and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard. 11

Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to comply with the
orders of the IBP and his total disregard of the summons issued by the IBP are
contemptuous acts reflective of unprofessional conduct. Thus, we find no hesitation in
removing respondent Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for his unethical,
unscrupulous and unconscionable conduct toward complainant.
Lastly, the grant in favor of the complainant for the recovery of the P114,000.00 she
paid the respondent is in order. 12 Respondent not only unjustifiably refused to return
the complainant's money upon demand, but he stubbornly persisted in holding on to
it, unmindful of the hardship and humiliation suffered by the complainant.
WHEREFORE, respondent Dorotheo Calis is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
FURNISHED to the IBP and the Bar Confidant to be spread on the personal records
of respondent. Respondent is likewise ordered to pay to the complainant immediately
the amount of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand (P114,000.00) Pesos representing
the amount he collected from her.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7350

February 18, 2013

PATROCINIO
V.
vs.
ATTY. ROSELLER A. VIRAY, Respondent.

AGBULOS, Complainant,

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The case stemmed from a Complaint1 filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) by complainant Mrs. Patrocinio V. Agbulos against respondent Atty. Roseller A.
Viray of Asingan, Pangasinan, for allegedly notarizing a document denominated as
Affidavit of Non-Tenancy2 in violation of the Notarial Law. The said affidavit was
supposedly executed by complainant, but the latter denies said execution and claims
that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) she allegedly presented
are not hers. She further claims that the CTC belongs to a certain Christian
Anton. 3 Complainant added that she did not personally appear before respondent for
the notarization of the document. She, likewise, states that respondent's client,
Rolando Dollente (Dollente), benefited from the said falsified affidavit as it contributed
to the illegal transfer of a property registered in her name to that of Dollente.4

In his Comment,5 respondent admitted having prepared and notarized the document
in question at the request of his client Dollente, who assured him that it was
personally signed by complainant and that the CTC appearing therein is owned by
her.6 He, thus, claims good faith in notarizing the subject document.

month, Atty. Roseller A. Viray is hereby SUSPENDED as Notary Public for six (6)
months. (Emphasis in the original)

In a Resolution7 dated April 16, 2007, the OBC referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision.

Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice emphasizes the
necessity of the affiants personal appearance before the notary public:14

After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their respective
Position Papers.8Complainant insists that she was deprived of her property because
of the illegal notarization of the subject document.9 Respondent, on the other hand,
admits having notarized the document in question and asks for apology and
forgiveness from complainant as a result of his indiscretion.10
In his report, Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa (Commissioner Funa) reported that
respondent indeed notarized the subject document in the absence of the alleged
affiant having been brought only to respondent by Dollente. It turned out later that the
document was falsified and the CTC belonged to another person and not to
complainant. He further observed that respondent did not attempt to refute the
accusation against him; rather, he even apologized for the complained
act.11 Commissioner Funa, thus, recommended that respondent be found guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, and that he be meted the penalty of six (6) months suspension as a lawyer
and six (6) months suspension as a Notary Public.12
On April 15, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-166
which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, Atty. Roseller A. Viray is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) month.13
Respondent moved for the reconsideration of the above decision, but the same was
denied. The above resolution was further modified in Resolution No. XX-2012-117,
dated March 10, 2012, to read as follows:
RESOLVED to DENY Respondents Motion for Reconsideration, and unanimously
MODIFY as it is hereby MODIFIED Resolution No. XVIII- 2008-166 dated April 15,
2008, in addition to Respondents SUSPENSION from the practice of law for one (1)

The findings of the IBP are well taken.

xxxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as
signatory to the instrument or document
(1) is not in the notarys presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules.
Moreover, Section 12,15 Rule II, of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice defines the
"competent evidence of identity" referred to above.
In this case, respondent admits that not only did he prepare and notarize the subject
affidavit but he likewise notarized the same without the affiants personal appearance.
He explained that he did so merely upon the assurance of his client Dollente that the
document was executed by complainant. In notarizing the document, respondent
contented himself with the presentation of a CTC despite the Rules clear requirement
of presentation of competent evidence of identity such as an identification card with
photograph and signature. With this indiscretion, respondent failed to ascertain the
genuineness of the affiants signature which turned out to be a forgery. In failing to
observe the requirements of the Rules, even the CTC presented, purportedly owned
by complainant, turned out to belong to somebody else.
To be sure, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who
signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.16 Without
the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, the
notary public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the partys free act or
deed.17
As aptly observed by the Court in Dela Cruz-Sillano v. Pangan:18

The Court is aware of the practice of not a few lawyers commissioned as notary
public to authenticate documents without requiring the physical presence of affiants.
However, the adverse consequences of this practice far outweigh whatever
convenience is afforded to the absent affiants. Doing away with the essential
requirement of physical presence of the affiant does not take into account the
likelihood that the documents may be spurious or that the affiants may not be who
they purport to be. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons
who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The
purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of
the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the
partys free act and deed.19
The Court has repeatedly emphasized in a number of cases20 the important role a
notary public performs, to wit:
x x x [N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but one invested with
substantive public interest. The notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. A notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care
the basic requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the publics
confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.21
Respondents failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage
to those directly affected by the notarized document but also in undermining the
integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. 22 He should,
thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a
lawyer.23 The responsibility to faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity of the
oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is more pronounced when the notary public is a
lawyer because of his solemn oath under the Code of Professional Responsibility to
obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.24 Lawyers
commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of
their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest.251wphi1
As to the proper penalty, the Court finds the need to increase that recommended by
the IBP which is one month suspension as a lawyer and six months suspension as
notary public, considering that respondent himself prepared the document, and he
performed the notarial act without the personal appearance of the affiant and without
identifying her with competent evidence of her identity. With his indiscretion, he
allowed the use of a CTC by someone who did not own it. Worse, he allowed himself
to be an instrument of fraud. Based on existing jurisprudence, when a lawyer
commissioned as a notary public fails to discharge his duties as such, he is meted the

penalties of revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being

commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years, and suspension from the
practice of law for one year.26
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Roseller A. Viray GUILTY of breach
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1)
year; REVOKES his incumbent commission, if any; and PROHIBITS him from being
commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately. He
is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.
Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the IBP and
the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision and be it entered into
respondent's personal record.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6107

January 31, 2005

BEL-AIR
TRANSIT
SERVICE
CORPORATION
CAR), Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ESTEBAN Y. MENDOZA, Respondent.

(DOLLAR

RENT-A-

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
In a verified Complaint1 dated June 11, 2003, Bel-Air Transit Service Corporation
(Dollar Rent-A-Car) charged Atty. Esteban Y. Mendoza with grossly immoral and
unethical conduct, praying for his disbarment and that his name be stricken-off from
the Roll of Attorneys.
The complainant narrated that, on September 19, 2001, the respondent rented a car
from it, a Toyota Camry with Plate No. WMK 232, for the amount of P5,549.00. Under
the terms of the Rental Agreement No. 97206, 2 which the respondent personally
signed, the latter was to be fetched at his residence at No. 483 Northwestern Street,
East Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. The respondent rented another Toyota Camry
from the complainant on September 28, 2001, this time with Plate No. WRT 557, and
was, likewise, fetched at his residence in accordance with the Rental Agreement No.
97420.3 This second contract was also personally signed by the respondent. The
statements of account4 were, thereafter, sent to the respondent at his office and

business address at Martinez & Mendoza Law Office, Cityland Show Tower,
Mandaluyong City. Despite repeated demands for payment, the respondent refused
to pay his account, which constrained the complainant to send a formal and final
demand for payment through counsel.5 This formal demand was, likewise, ignored by
the respondent, further compelling the complainant to resort to filing a complaint 6 for
recovery of money on March 12, 2003 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 65, docketed as Civil Case No. 81392.

cognizant that [they] should conduct [themselves] properly so as not to do

injustice to anyone, including the complainant.
14.1. Respondent almost met an accident because the complainant provided
him with drivers that did not have enough rest and sleep before they drove
for him. It is the respondent who is the aggrieved party here and not the
complainant. Thus, it is very unfortunate that it is the respondent who is
slapped with a disbarment case. M&M did not even file a complaint with the
Department of Trade and Industry for violation of the Consumers Act of the
Philippines because it wanted to resolve its complaint amicably.

According to the complainant, the respondents refusal to pay for the complainants
car rental services constitutes deceit and grossly immoral and unethical conduct,
which violates the Canons of Professional Ethics and Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code on Human Relations. The complainant further alleged that this is a
sufficient ground for the respondents disbarment, considering that the respondent
even ignored the complainants repeated demands for payment.7
In his Comment, the respondent denied the allegations against him. He averred that it
was the law firm of Martinez & Mendoza which engaged the services of the
complainant, and that all the trips undertaken were for an out-of-town engagement in
Lucena City. To support his claim, the respondent incorporated a letter 8 addressed to
the Chief Operations Manager of the complainant requesting for the latters
services.1a\^/phi1.net
The respondent alleged that the driver assigned to him by the complainant during the
trip from Lucena City on September 19, 2001 did not exercise extraordinary diligence.
He averred that they almost figured in an accident, and when he inquired as to why
the said driver was not cautious with his driving, the latter replied that he had just
been on another out-of-town trip driving for another client and only had three hours of
sleep the night before. The respondent decided not to report the incident to the
complainant, thinking that it was going to be the first and last incident. However,
during the trip of September 28, 2001, the respondent again almost figured in an
accident, prompting the respondent to contact the complainant to complain as to why
the latter was providing drivers to their law firm who had not had enough sleep. No
one from the complainants staff could provide him with a decent answer,
merely "Pasensiya na." The respondent then demanded a meeting with the
complainants president in order to resolve the matter, but despite repeated requests,
the latter refused to meet with him. The respondent further averred, thus:
14. It is not only inaccurate but also unfair for the complainant to baselessly
accuse the respondent or M&M of refusing to pay their claims. As shown
above, M&M immediately paid all of complainants billings for August 2001. It
was only the billings for September 2001 that remained unpaid because
M&M and respondent first wanted to meet with the President of the
complainant to resolve their complaint. M&M and respondent do not have a
history of not honoring their obligations. As officers of the court, it is

14.2 Respondent respectfully manifests that, only to buy peace, the

questioned billings of the complainant which [were] made the subject of a
complaint they filed against him had already been fully satisfied.
A copy of Official Receipt No. 52095 dated 4 September 2003 in the name of
"Martinez & Mendoza Law Office" is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof
as Annex "H."9
The respondent concluded that the complainant did not have a cause of action for
disbarment against him, as he was merely exercising his right to contest its
questionable billings.
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation and was assigned to IBP Commissioner Caesar R.
Dulay. During the hearing of March 1, 2004, the counsel for the complainant
manifested that although the respondent had already paid his account, such payment
was made only after the court had already decided the case against the respondent
and after the filing of a motion for execution, 10 which the respondent admitted. Thus,
the parties agreed during the hearing that as far as the monetary obligation was
concerned, the said judgment had already been satisfied by the respondent. The
parties were then required to file their respective position papers, which were
basically reiterations of their previous allegations.
In his Report and Recommendation dated April 19, 2004, Commissioner Dulay made
the following findings:
Respondent offers two reasons for non-payment: First, that the obligation was
incurred not by him but by his law office Martinez & Mendoza. Second, that the
respondent almost met an accident on the two occasions he used the services of the
complainant and therefore "he should not be penalized for exercising its right to
contest complainants questionable billings."
...

As to the first reason, we reiterate that as decided by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
respondent was liable for the obligation to the complainant. Indeed, respondent
cannot avoid the obligation and pass it on to his law firm and just make a complete
denial considering that he is a name partner in the firm and law partnership of
Martinez and Mendoza. The Metropolitan Trial Court, therefore, ruled that respondent
was, nevertheless, liable for the obligation of his law partnership. Independent of the
said decision, we find that the documents attached as Annexes "A" and "B" to the
complaint appear to have been signed by the respondent and even assuming that it
was the law firm that was liable, there is nothing on record to show that the law firm
questioned the billings of the complainant or that the respondent referred the same to
the law firm for proper disposition.
As to the second reason, respondent admits that there was no written demand made
for the complainant to account and answer for the "near accidents" alleged by
respondent, which "near accidents" as we understand are his reasons for not
immediately paying. We find the absence of a written demand from the respondent
quite odd especially in the case of a lawyer who is seeking to exercise his "right to
contest complainants questionable billings" or otherwise hold complainant
accountable for the said "near accidents." It would perhaps be understandable if the
omission was made by a layman; but for a lawyer not to put his demand in writing, it
would be uncharacteristic to say the least. Neither was a demand made by the law
firm of Martinez and Mendoza as a basis for non-payment. We are, therefore, inclined
to look at this reason, (near accident) as a mere afterthought and would not justify
respondent in not paying for two (2) years what appears to be a clear and simple
obligation to complainant. As pointed out by complainant, it was only after a writ of
execution was issued when payment was made.
The reason offered by respondent for not paying complainant particularly the alleged
"near accident" is, therefore, not justifiable. The said reason appears to us trite and
contrived. Lack of funds to pay an obligation may perhaps be a good reason but to
use as a reason the said "near accident" on the bare assertion of respondent alone
and not supported by any corroborating evidence may not be readily acceptable. We
are, on the other hand, also not convinced that respondent was deceitful or grossly
negligent by his actions. There is no evidence to show that respondent was acting
with deceit in not paying for the obligation incurred. However, we find respondent
lacking in probity and forthrightness in dealing with the complaint and quite simply
negligent in the handling of this particular obligation to complainant. Taken in the light
of the circumstances presented, we believe respondent should be admonished and
warned to avoid such similar conduct in the future.

It was, thus, recommended that the respondent be admonished and advised to be

more forthright in the handling of his monetary obligations in the future. On July 30,
2004, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline then issued Resolution No. XVI-2004378, adopting and approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
considering that there was no evidence to show that the respondent had acted with
deceit in not paying for the questioned obligation.1awphi1.nt
It is settled that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court.11 A lawyer must, at all times, uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession.l^vvphi1.net Indeed, a lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To
this end, a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which
might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the
fidelity, honesty and integrity in the legal profession.12 Thus, lawyers must promptly
pay their financial obligations.13Their conduct must always reflect the values and
norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.14
In this case, the respondent refused to pay for the services of the complainant,
constraining the latter to file charges in order to collect what was due to it under the
contracts, in which the respondent himself was the signatory. Moreover, as pointed
out by IBP Commissioner Dulay, the respondents claim that he almost twice figured
in accidents due to the negligent drivers employed by the complainant and that he
intended to question the companys billings (which he also posited was a valid excuse
for non-payment), appears to have been concocted as a mere afterthought.
Verily, the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and
should be admonished for his actuations.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Esteban Y. Mendoza is hereby ADMONISHED to be
more circumspect in his financial obligations and his dealings with the public. He
is STERNLY WARNED that similar conduct in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be included in the respondents files which are with the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and circularized to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 1203

May 15, 1903

In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from the practice of

law.
PER CURIAM:
Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause in the Court of First
Instance, in the city of Manila, on the 5th day of February, 1903, why he should not be
suspended as a member of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:

unprofessional and hence to be condemned, are not criminal in their nature, we are of
opinion that the ends of justice will be served by the suspension of said Howard D.
Terrell from the practice of law in the Philippine Islands for the term of one year from
the 7th day of February, 1903.
It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be suspended from the practice
of law for a term of one year from February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.
A.C. No. 6057

First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after
he had been notified that the said organization was made for the purpose of evading
the law then in force in said city; and,

June 27, 2006

PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,

vs.ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.

Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the time of and
after its organization, which organization was known to him to be created for the
purpose of evading the law.
The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W. A. Kincaid, made
answer to these charges, denying the same, and filed affidavits in answer thereto.
After reading testimony given by said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United
States vs. H. D. Terrell,1 wherein he was charged with estafa, and after reading the
said affidavits in his behalf, and hearing his counsel, the court below found, and
decided as a fact, that the charges aforesaid made against Howard D. Terrell were
true, and thereupon made an order suspending him from his office as a lawyer in the
Philippine Islands, and directed the clerk of the court to transmit to this court a
certified copy of the order of suspension, as well as a full statement of the facts upon
which the same was based.
We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the conclusion that they
were such as to justify the court below in arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge
and acts of the accused in connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas
Artes" Club were of such a nature and character as to warrant his suspension from
practice.
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of
violating or evading the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of
an attorney, an officer of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in
his office, and for which he may be removed or suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 21.) The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be
dishonest, or the conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment.
In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of the United
States, vs. Terrell was acquitted on the charge of estafa, and has not, therefore, been
convicted of crime, and as the acts with which he is charged in this proceeding, while

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco
("respondent") for serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1,1 Rules
1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he
filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document 4 against
Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the
notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for
perjury5 against complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and
notarized by me under the following circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property
located at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao,
Quezon City.

B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier a U.S. citizen and thereby

disqualified to own real property in his name agreed that the property
be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several
documents that would guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner
of the property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY
AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stiers free and undisturbed use of the
property for his residence and business operations. The OCCUPANCY
AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr.
Donton.6
Complainant averred that respondents act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement,
despite knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real
property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of
the Code. Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do
something in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the
disbarment case against him upon the instigation of complainants counsel, Atty.
Bonifacio A. Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to act as complainants witness
in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he
"prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness
and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San
Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found
respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San
Juan recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for two years
and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted, with modification, the Report and recommended respondents suspension
from the practice of law for six months.

On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as
provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP.
Respondent stated that he was already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005
after the termination of his pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his
only means of support for his family and his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration
because the IBP had no more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been
referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve
defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey. 9 A lawyer who assists a
client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act
which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified
from owning real property.11Yet, in his motion for reconsideration, 12 respondent
admitted that he caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier.
Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and
transferred the title in complainants name. But respondent provided "some
safeguards" by preparing several documents, 13including the Occupancy Agreement,
that would guarantee Stiers recognition as the actual owner of the property despite
its transfer in complainants name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in
circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands 14 by
preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the
Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law
against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to
achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which
he may be suspended.15
In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice
of law for three years for preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit
concubinage. In In re: Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from
the practice of law for one year for preparing a contract which declared the spouses
to be single again after nine years of separation and allowed them to contract
separately subsequent marriages.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation

of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law
for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994

JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,
vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU
CITY, and JON DE YSASI,respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case,
notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would
indeed have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent
had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and
with the grace of reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead for judicial
intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with
distaste, the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same
reasoned detachment accorded any judicial proceeding before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein
private respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as
sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager
of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on
a fixed salary, with other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone,
gasoline, medical and dental expenses.

As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities
and operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding,
fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to
the hacienda and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private
respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the
house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his
wife and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized
on two separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he
underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer.
During his recuperation which lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr.
Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter,
for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his
medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in
April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary.
Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden
withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor
and legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however,
were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC,
for brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984,
docketed therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of
full back wages, thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees.
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the
NLRC, 1 holding that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his
employment was for a valid cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner
the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination
of employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as required by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. 2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of
the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto. 3
His motion for reconsideration 4 of said decision having been denied for lack of
merit, 5 petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1)
whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled
to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits;
and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages

and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these issues will
necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private respondent, such
as the exact date when petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator, the
character of the pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from private respondent,
that is, whether the same are in the nature of salaries or pensions, and whether or not
there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a
modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and
conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84, 6 for which
reason the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. In
compliance with the Court's resolution of November 16, 1992, 7 NLRC filed its
comment on February 12, 1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the
findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter. 8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter
is worth noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact
that because of the special relationship of the parties and the
nature of the action involved, this case could very well go down (in)
the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. For
this case is an action filed by an only son, his father's namesake,
the only child and therefore the only heir against his own father. 9
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations
were noted that may justify why this labor case deserves special
considerations. First, most of the complaints that petitioner and
private respondent had with each other, were personal matters
affecting father and son relationship. And secondly, if any of the
complaints pertain to their work, they allow their personal
relationship to come in the way. 10
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want
of just cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. He
also charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of
the executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings
thereof.
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of
his functions as farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground
to terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is

wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and
the NLRC as only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court.
Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent faults
herein petitioner for failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of
stenographic notes, erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be
Section
16[c]
and
[d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of
page references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that
technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling, and that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively
ascertain the facts in each case shall be availed of, without regard to technicalities of
law or procedure in the interest of due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be
rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who
conducted the hearing. The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge
who penned the decision does not impair the validity of the judgment, 11 provided that
he draws up his decision and resolution with due care and makes certain that they
truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the facts
of and evidence submitted in the case. 12
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T.
Octavio, who conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11,
1985, and was later transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who
eventually decided the case, presents no procedural infirmity, especially considering
that there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of a public officer's
functions, 13 which petitioner has not successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the
application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due
process, ever mindful of the long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must
be interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge
private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his
arguments. The strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural
niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no
worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and
after due process. 14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which
an
employer
may
validly
terminate
an
employment,
to
wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual

neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of
the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d)
commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer
or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e)
other causes analogous to the foregoing.

During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in

Bacolod City upon the instruction(s) of private respondent to
recuperate thereat and to handle only administrative matters of the
hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is not really obliged
to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao.

The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation
of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for
the purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a
written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least
one (1) month before the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the
corresponding separation pay rates provided by law.15 Suffering from a disease by
reason whereof the continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is
prejudicial to his and his co-employee's health, is also a ground for termination of his
services provided he receives the prescribed separation pay. 16 On the other hand, it
is well-settled that abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes the employer
to effect the former's dismissal from employment. 17

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent
gravely erred in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that
petitioner abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from such
employment.
For
want
of
substantial
bases,
in
fact
or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to
the factual findings of an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent
NLRC, 18 as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by
law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 19
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve
acceptance:
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from
October 1982 to December 1982, cannot be construed as
abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse.
Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal
around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr.
Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn,
Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by
medical bills sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan,
January 22, 1987 at 49-50).

After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special

circumstances involved and basic human experience, petitioner's
illness and strained family relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II
may be considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi
III's absence from work during the period of October 1982 to
December 1982. In any event, such absence does not warrant
outright dismissal without notice and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an
employee are as follows:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without
valid or justifiable reason; and (2) clear intention
to sever the employer-employee tie (Samson
Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and Social
Legislation, 1989 edition, p. 133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute
abandonment. In Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA
328), the Court rules that for abandonment to arise, there must be a
concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt act from
which it may be inferred that the employee has no more interest to
work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative,
Inc. v. NLRC(184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to constitute a valid
cause for termination of employment, there must be a deliberate,
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. . .
Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt
acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does
not want to work anymore.
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no
abandonment. First, petitioner's absence and his decision to leave
his residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his illness
and strained family relations. Second he has some medical

certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able to work,

petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent of
his intention to assume again his employment. Last, but not the
least, he at once instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when he
realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that
petitioner had no intention to abandon his employment. 20
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's
confinement in the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical
treatment. Neither can it be denied that private respondent was well aware of
petitioner's state of health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the medical
and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to
work again. The disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so
serious as to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation
is beside the point. The fact remains that on account of said illnesses, the details of
which were amply substantiated by the attending physician, 21 and as the records are
bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner, there was justifiable
cause for petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and
unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to
constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination of employment. 22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably
may be classified as a managerial employee 23 to whom the law grants an amount of
discretion in the discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated that "I
assigned myself where I want to go," 24 he was simply being candid about what he
could do within the sphere of his authority. His duties as farm administrator did not
strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all times, or
to be subjected to specific control from his employer in every aspect of his work. What
is essential only is that he runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and,
while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this regard he
proved to be quite successful, as there was at least a showing of increased
production during the time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years
1983 to 1984, this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating
from illness and on account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm
operations were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision and control exercisable
by private respondent as employer was necessarily limited. It goes without saying that
the control contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm
administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm
administrator, petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was no
explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin

with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that any
transfer of residence would justify the termination of his employment. That petitioner
changed his residence should not be taken against him, as this is undeniably among
his basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence per se be a valid ground to
terminate an employer-employee relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his
son's intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept
petitioner on the payroll, reported him as an employee of thehacienda for social
security purposes, and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions
therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983 when he
became convinced that petitioner would no longer return to work that he considered
the latter to have abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer listed him as an
employee. According to private respondent, whatever amount of money was given to
petitioner
from
that
time
until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles
from a father to a son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were
made therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely stopped
giving said pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard petitioner
had been saying about sending him to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral
deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado los
(p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of
petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations of sinister motives
on the part of petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon
accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes the novel position that the
agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the administration of the farm
legally converts the initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation. 25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew
about petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The
assertion regarding abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his
continued performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from
May to the last quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant
and legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued
since April, 1984, and his indication of having recovered and his willingness and
capability to resume his work at the farm as expressed in a letter dated September
14, 1984. 26 With these, petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the monthly
pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as salary, pension or allowance, with or
without deductions, as he was entitled thereto in view of his continued service as farm
administrator. 27

To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may
justly be made there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to
report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention
to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more
determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find
dismally wanting in this case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's
plans of returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982,
prolonged though it may have been, was not without valid causes of which private
respondent had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that
petitioner was no longer returning to work, private respondent neither explains nor
substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as
even after January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced"
that petitioner would no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform
services directly required by his position as farm administrator. These are duly and
correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm
machinery/equipment from G.A. Machineries, Inc., 28 claiming and paying for
additional farm equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to
Bacolod through Zip Forwarders, 29 getting the payment of the additional cash
advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities,
Inc., 30 and
remitting
to
private
respondent
through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. 31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the
normal activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to
request or even command his child to run errands for him. In the present case,
however, considering the nature of these transactions, as well as the property values
and monetary sums involved, it is unlikely that private respondent would leave the
matter to just anyone. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by someone
who can be trusted or at least be held accountable therefor, and who is familiar with
the terms, specifications and other details relative thereto, such as an employee. If
indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by
private respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of place, to expect or to oblige
petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to or expected of him with respect
to what would then be his past and terminated employment. It is hard to imagine what
further authority an employer can have over a dismissed employee so as to compel
him to continue to perform work-related tasks:
It is also significant that the special power of attorney 32 executed
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating

xxx xxx xxx

That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a
resident of Hda. Manucao, hereinafter called and referred to as
PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill District, and a
duly accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA
PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with
BIPA representing payment for all checks and papers to which I am
entitled to (sic) as such planter-member;
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these
presents
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and
lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME
and in my name, place and stead, my check/checks
aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given the
power and authority to sign for me and in my name, place and
stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said check/checks.
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot
cash the said check/checks, but to turn the same over to me for my
proper disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the
receipts therefor.
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a
"CROSSED CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx
remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been
terminated by reason of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests
for an explanation regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits, 33 the issuance
of withholding tax reports, 34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and
readiness to go back to work, 35 and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal
dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.

We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for
private respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the
latter's intention to abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of
such deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of private
respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby
foreclosing
his
opportunity
to
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on
the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative
Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera of said office. 36 Fair play dictates that at such an
important stage of the proceedings, which involves the taking of testimony, both
parties must be afforded equal opportunity to examine and cross-examine a witness.

The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set
out in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this
wise:

As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as

salary, pension, allowance orex gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioner's
entitlement thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as
farm administrator. The change in description of said amounts contained in the pay
slips or in the receipts prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to be
determinative of petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances
above set out. Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given
by a parent out of concern for his child's welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts
therefor 37 should be necessary and required as if they were ordinary business
expenditures.

Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. The worker may answer the

allegations as stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a
reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall
afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.

Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged

abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the
father's agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we have
determined that no abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums received
by petitioner, regardless of designation, were in consideration for services rendered
emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that
can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. We
are also hard put to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly converted into a
voluntary resignation without any positive act on the part of the employee conveying a
desire to terminate his employment. The very concept of resignation as a ground for
termination by the employee of his employment 38 does not square with the elements
constitutive of abandonment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private
respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice
and hearing. 39 Private respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV,
Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases
where the employer seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the
grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation
obtaining in this case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any
ground since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his employment. 40

Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss

a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts
or omission(s) constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of
abandonment of work, notice shall be served at the worker's last
known address.
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately

notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly
the reasons therefor.
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. Any decision taken by the
employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to
contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint
with the Regional Branch of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. The employer shall submit a
monthly report to the Regional Office having jurisdiction over the
place of work at all dismissals effected by him during the month,
specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers, the reasons
for their dismissal, the dates of commencement and termination of
employment, the positions last held by them and such other
information as may be required by the Ministry for policy guidance
and statistical purposes.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that
petitioner was denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice
about his impending dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be
heard. Even as private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin
requirements of procedural due process in this particular case, he in effect admits that
no notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the certification

issued on September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the

Department of Labor that no notice of termination of the employment of petitioner was
submitted thereto. 41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be
denied that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed,
as the second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly
requires service thereof at the employee's last known address, by way of substantial
compliance. While it is conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an
employee, especially when there is just cause therefor, the requirements of due
process cannot be lightly taken. The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise
of such a power or prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the fundamental
guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the employee. 42
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor
General rejoins as follows:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
While we are in full agreement with the
respondent as to his defense of implied
resignation
and/or
abandonment,
records
somehow showed that he failed to notify the
Department
of
Labor and Employment for his sons'
(sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment as
required by BP 130. And for this failure, the other
requisite for a valid termination by an employer
was not complied with. This however, would not
work to invalidate the otherwise (sic) existence of
a valid cause for dismissal. The validity of the
cause of dismissal must be upheld at all times
provided however that sanctions must be
imposed on the respondent for his failure to
observe the notice on due process requirement.
(Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80587).
(Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C"
Petition), . . .
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation
v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is:
once an employee is dismissed for just cause, he must not be
rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to

observe procedural due process. The public policy behind this is

that, it may encourage the employee to do even worse and render
a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be observed.
However, the employer must be penalized for his infraction of due
process. In the present case, however, not only was petitioner
dismissed without due process, but his dismissal is without just
cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he has
a justifiable excuse. 43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory
provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed
employee to reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the imposition of
the penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the due process
requirements. Private respondent, for his part, maintains that there was error in
imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the
employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office, as required
under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the implementing rules, and not the
failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of
every worker to security of tenure. 44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory
mandates, the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its
denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for
a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits of
their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of actual
reinstatement.
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the
absence of just cause for dismissal. 45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions
has tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing
that in some cases certain events may have transpired as would militate against the
practicability of granting the relief thereunder provided, and declares that where there
are strained relations between the employer and the employee, payment of back
wages and severance pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement, 46 and more
particularly when managerial employees are concerned. 47 Thus, where reinstatement
is no longer possible, it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee be given
his fair and just share of what the law accords him. 48

We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to
wit:
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and to his backwages computed from the time his
compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement.
(Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement
Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this Honorable Court
held that when it comes to reinstatement, differences should be
made between managers and the ordinary workingmen. The Court
concluded that a company which no longer trusts its managers
cannot operate freely in a competitive and profitable manner. The
NLRC should know the difference between managers and ordinary
workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the reinstatement of
managers with the same ease and liberality as that of rank and file
workers who had been terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may
not be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism
between the parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be
reinstated as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The present
relationship of petitioner and private respondent (is) so strained that
a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer relationship is
hardly possible. 49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal
from employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or
was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. He further prays for exemplary
damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other
employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate
one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, and social humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act
or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof. 50Exemplary
damages, under Article 2229, are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
They are not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the court to decide
whether or not they should be adjudicated. 51
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing
recovery of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by
bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner

contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, 52 and of exemplary damages if the
dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. 53 We do not
feel, however, that an award of the damages prayed for in this petition would be
proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their allowance. In the
aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary damages were
awarded, the dismissed employees were genuinely without fault and were
undoubtedly victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power.
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally
be faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this
controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate
claims. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and
the undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that either of them acted
in good faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the other.
For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be
awarded to petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following
recommendation of the Solicitor General:
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be
modified. There was no voluntary abandonment in this case
because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his absence, or such
absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and
hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal dismissal.
He should be ordered to pay backwages for a period not exceeding
three years from date of dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement,
petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month('s) salary for every year of service, a fraction of six months
being considered as one (1) year in accordance with recent
jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for
damages should be dismissed, for both parties are equally at
fault. 54
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records,
sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded
that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal 55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is
just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts
to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration
of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again,
we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to
avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often
called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of

life. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather
than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation. 56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a)
lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit
of a fair settlement." On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what
was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The
records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a
rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted
exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have
found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case
has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a
labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute
within his jurisdiction." 57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the
copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of
the same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged
to make. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family
leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful

and enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced
that we have adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and
jurisprudence, sanssentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that we may have
failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to
this dispute, and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute
to the breaking, instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the
parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore,
that with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of their respective rights in
this decision, the parties may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution
of their differences on more convivial terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is
hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages
for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, 58 and, in
lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of
service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.