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PEOPLE & AAA V CA
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, 21ST DIVISION,
MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, AND MOISES
ALQUIZOLA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated June 6, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN. The CA reversed and set aside the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, dated
February 28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 21-1211, and acquitted private respondents Raymund
Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises Alquizola of the crime of rape for the prosecutions failure
to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private respondents Carampatana, Oporto
and Alquizola were charged, together with Christian John Lim, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel
Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph Villame, for allegedly raping AAA, 3 to wit:
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That on or about 10:30 oclock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at Alsons Palace, Maranding, Lala,
Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with an
intoxicating liquor and once intoxicated, brought said AAA at about dawn of March 26, 2004 at
Alquizola Lodging house, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, and once inside said lodging house, accused RAYMUND CARAMPATANA and
JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA while accused
MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed her against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels, entered a plea of not guilty to the
offense charged.5
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Following pre-trial,6 trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian John Lim, however, remains atlarge.
The factual antecedents follow:
On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school graduation ceremony.
Afterwards, they had a luncheon party at their house in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte. AAA then
asked permission from her mother to go to the Maranding Stage Plaza because she and her
bandmates had to perform for an election campaign. She went home at around 4:00 p.m. from the
plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her father that she would be attending a graduation dinner
party with her friends. AAA, together with Lim, Oporto, and Carampatana, ate dinner at the house
of one Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan, Maranding. After eating, Lim invited them to go to Alsons
Palace, which was merely a walking distance away from Gemenos house. Outside the Alsons
Palace, they were greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae Fiel. After a while,
they went inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor where they again saw Montesco
with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one
Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they have a drinking session to celebrate their graduation, to which
the rest agreed.
They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks two (2) bottles of
Emperador Brandy. Then they arranged themselves in a circle for the drinking spree. Two (2)
glasses were being passed around: one glass containing the sweetener (Pepsi) and the other glass
containing the liquor. At first, AAA refused to drink because she had never tried hard liquor before.
During the session, they shared their problems with each other. When it was AAAs turn, she
became emotional and started crying. It was then that she took her first shot. The glasses were
passed around and she consumed more or less five (5) glasses of Emperador Brandy.
Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oportos lap. Oporto then started kissing her
head and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop, and
simply tried to hide her face with the cap. But they just laughed at her. Then, Roda also kissed
her. At that time, AAA was already sleepy, but they still forced her to take another shot. They
helped her stand up and make her drink. She even heard Lim say, Hubuga na, hubuga na, (You
make her drunk, you make her drunk). She likewise heard someone say, You drink it, you drink
it. She leaned on Oportos lap again, then she fell asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her the
Emperador Brandy bottle to drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse but they insisted,
so she drank directly from the bottle. Again, she fell asleep.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs, and then she was
asleep again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola
Lodging House. She recognized that place because she had been there before. She would
thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one of the times that she was conscious,
she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and having intercourse with
her. She started crying. She tried to resist when she felt pain in her genitals. She also saw
Carampatana and Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as Oporto abused her. At one point,
AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ. She cried and told
him to stop. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00 a.m. of the next day. She was all alone. Her body felt
heavy and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but without her lower garments. The
upper half of her body was on top of the bed but her feet were on the floor. There were also red
stains on her shirt. After dressing up, she hailed a trisikad and went home. When AAA reached
their house, her father was waiting for her and was already furious. When she told them that she
was raped, her mother started hitting her. They brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a
report. Thereafter, they proceeded to the district hospital for her medical examination.
Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the morning of March 26,
2004, and found an old hymenal laceration at 5 oclock position and hyperemia or redness at the
posterior fornices. The vaginal smear likewise revealed the presence of sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the defense witnesses, in the
evening of March 25, 2004, Oporto, Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had dinner at Gemenos house.
Gemeno then invited Oporto to attend the graduation party hosted by Montesco at Alsons Palace,
owned by the latters family. When they reached the place, Oporto told Montesco that they had to
leave for Barangay Tenazas to fetch one Arcie Ariola. At about 11:30 p.m., Oporto and
Carampatana returned to Alsons Palace but could not find AAA and Lim. The party subsequently
ended, but the group agreed to celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas, Dela Cruz, Lim, and Oporto
contributed for two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy and one (1) liter of Pepsi.
Several persons were in the room at that time: AAA, Carampatana, Oporto, Dela Cruz, Rudinas,
Roda, Batoctoy, Villame, and Lim. Also present but did not join the drinking were Gemeno,
Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia, Al Jalil Diego, Mohamad Janisah Manalao, one Caga, and a certain
Bantulan. Gemeno told AAA not to drink but the latter did not listen and instead told him not to tell
her aunt. During the drinking session, AAA rested on Oportos lap. She even showed her scorpion
tattoo on her buttocks. And when her legs grazed Batoctoys crotch, she remarked, What was
that, penis? Roda then approached AAA to kiss her, and the latter kissed him back. Oporto did the
same and AAA also kissed him. After Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other again.
Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola was at the Alquizola Lodging
House drinking beer with his cousin, Junver, and Fiel. They stopped drinking at around midnight.
Fiel then requested Alquizola to accompany her to Alsons Palace to see her friends there. They
proceeded to the second floor and there they saw AAA lying on Oportos lap. Fiel told AAA to go
home because her mother might get angry. AAA could not look her in the eye, just shook her head,
and said, I just stay here. Alquizola and Fiel then went back to the lodging house. After thirty
minutes, they went to Alsons Palace again, and saw AAA and Oporto kissing each other. AAA was
lying on his lap while holding his neck. Subsequently, they went back to the lodging house to
resume drinking.
After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and instead instructed them to
take her to the Alquizola Lodging House because she has a big problem. AAA, Lim, and
Carampatana rode a motorcycle to the lodging house. When they arrived, AAA approached
Alquizola and told him, Kuya, I want to sleep here for the meantime. Alquizola then opened Room
No. 4 where AAA, Oporto, and Carampatana stayed. There were two beds inside, a single bed and a
double-sized bed. AAA lay down on the single bed and looked at Carampatana. The latter
approached her and they kissed. He then removed her shirt and AAA voluntarily raised her hands
to give way. Carampatana likewise removed her brassiere. All the while, Oporto was at the foot of
the bed. Thereafter, Oporto also removed her pants. AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier
for him to pull her underwear down. Oporto then went to AAA and kissed her on the lips.
Carampatana, on the other hand, placed himself in between AAAs legs and had intercourse with
her. When he finished, he put on his shorts and went back to Alsons Palace to get some sleep.
When he left, Oporto and AAA were still kissing. Alquizola then entered the room. When AAA saw
him, she said, Come Kuya, embrace me because I have a problem. Alquizola thus started kissing
AAAs breasts. Oporto stood up and opened his pants. AAA held his penis and performed fellatio on
him. Then Oporto and Alquizola changed positions. Oporto proceeded to have sexual intercourse
with AAA. During that time, AAA was moaning and calling his name. Afterwards, Oporto went
outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. Oporto then had intercourse with AAA two more
times. At 3:00 a.m., he went back to Alsons Palace to sleep. At around 6:00 a.m., Oporto and
Carampatana went back to the lodging house. They tried to wake AAA up, but she did not move so
they just left and went home. Alquizola had gone outside but he came back before 7:00 a.m.
However, AAA was no longer there when he arrived.
On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It, however, acquitted Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda,
Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the indivisible prison term ofreclusion perpetua; to
pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;
b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and the
court hereby sentences him to suffer a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years also of prision mayor as maximum; to pay AAA the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages and another amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as ACCOMPLICE in the
commission of the crime charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to pay AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as moral
damages and another sum of P30,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;
d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy and Joseph
Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt therefor
beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court acquits them of said charge; and
e) Ordering accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola to pay, jointly and severally, the amount of
P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and expenses of litigations; and the costs of suit.
The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola shall
be credited to them and deducted from their prison terms provided they comply with the
requirements of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained since then
up to the present. Accused Alquizola also surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained
since then up to this time, while accused Joefhel Oporto who likewise surrendered voluntarily on 26
March 2004 was ordered released to the custody of the DSWD, Lala, Lanao del Norte on 31 March
2004, and subsequently posted cash bond for his provisional liberty on 17 September 2004 duly
approved by this court, thus resulted to an order of even date for his release from the custody of
the DSWD.
Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on the prosecution to
prosecute the case against accused Christian John Lim as soon as he is apprehended.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the case to the CA. On June 6, 2008,
the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the trial courts ruling and,
consequently, acquitted private respondents. The decretal portion of said decision reads:
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WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the Decision on appeal is

herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants
RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO and MOISES ALQUIZOLA are instead ACQUITTED of
the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.8
In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the version of the defense and ruled that AAA
consented to the sexual congress. She was wide awake and aware of what private respondents
were doing before the intercourse. She never showed any physical resistance, never shouted for
help, and never fought against her alleged ravishers. The appellate court further relied on the
medical report which showed the presence of an old hymenal laceration on AAAs genitalia, giving
the impression that she has had some carnal knowledge with a man before. The CA also stressed
that AAAs mothers unusual reaction of hitting her when she discovered what happened to her
daughter was more consistent with that of a parent who found out that her child just had premarital
sex rather than one who was sexually assaulted.
On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for Certiorari9 under Rule 65,
questioning the CA Decision which reversed private respondents conviction and ardently contending
that the same was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her petition:
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

ACQUITTING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.10
The private respondents present the following arguments in their Comment dated November 7,
2008 to assail the petition:
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I.
A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND THE PROSECUTION
CANNOT APPEAL THE ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST
DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II.
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT.
III.
CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS FIRST FILED.
IV.
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE APPELLATE COUNSEL OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES IN ALL CRIMINAL CASES.11
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on April 1, 2009. It assigns the
following errors:
I.
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY APPEAL AN ORDER OF ACQUITTAL AS TO THE CIVIL
ASPECT OF THE CRIME.
II.
THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN RENDERED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AN
EXCEPTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.12
The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.
At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and
orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving
substantial justice. As long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due process and
fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally construed. 13 Liberal construction of the rules is
the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. The relaxation or suspension of procedural
rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted when compelling reasons exist
or when the purpose of justice requires it. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided
on their merits and not on sheer technicalities.14
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As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment
rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a judgment of acquittal is
immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.15 Section 21, Article III of the Constitution
provides:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act
is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but only with
respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a
petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting
the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering
the assailed judgment null and void.16 If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting petitioners
prayer is not tantamount to putting private respondents in double jeopardy.17
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As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action, the Court said in People v.
Santiago:18
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It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution.
If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on
the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the
Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party
or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may
appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack
of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state thatthe petition may be filed by
the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private
offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case
so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the
respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the
action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in [the]
name of said complainant.19
Private respondents argue that the action should have been filed by the State through the OSG.
True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can
only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. This is because the
authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA
is solely vested in the OSG.20
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Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of her private counsel,
primarily imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA when it acquitted private
respondents. As the aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the right to bring the action in her name and
maintain the criminal prosecution. She has an immense interest in obtaining justice in the case
precisely because she is the subject of the violation. Further, as held in Dela Rosa v. CA,21 where
the Court sustained the private offended partys right in a criminal case to file a special civil action
forcertiorari to question the validity of the judgment of dismissal and ruled that the Solicitor
Generals intervention was not necessary, the recourse of the complainant to the Court is proper
since it was brought in her own name and not in that of the People of the Philippines. In any event,
the OSG joins petitioners cause in its Comment,22 thereby fulfilling the requirement that all criminal
actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.23
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Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the sake of argument, that AAA
can file the special civil action for certiorari without violating their right against double jeopardy,
still, it must be dismissed for petitioners failure to previously file a motion for reconsideration.
True, a motion for reconsideration is a condicio sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Its purpose is for the court to have an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed
to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. This rule, however, is not
absolute and admits well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as
where the courta quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in
the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for
the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under
the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived
of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an
order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where
the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings
were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised
is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. 24
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Here, petitioners case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises the same questions as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court, essentially revolving on the guilt of the private
respondents. There is also an urgent necessity to resolve the issues, for any further delay would
prejudice the interests, not only of the petitioner, but likewise that of the Government. And, as will
soon be discussed, the CA decision is a patent nullity for lack of due process and for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An acquittal is considered tainted
with grave abuse of discretion when it is shown that the prosecutions right to due process was
violated or that the trial conducted was a sham. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly
demonstrate and establish that the respondent court blatantly abused its authority such as to
deprive itself of its very power to dispense justice. 25
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AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse of judicial discretion, totally
disregarded her testimony as well as the trial courts findings of fact, thereby adopting hook, line,
and sinker, the private respondents narration of facts.
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only
be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility.26 There is grave abuse of discretion when the disputed
act of the lower court goes beyond the limits of discretion thus effecting an injustice. 27
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The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that the
respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting private respondents.
It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence presented by the
defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. At first, it may seem that its narration of
the facts28 of the case was meticulously culled from the evidence of both parties. But a more careful
perusal will reveal that it was simply lifted, if not altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the
accused, especially that of Oporto,29 Carampatana,30 and Alquizola,31 the accused-appellants in the
case before it. The appellate court merely echoed the private respondents testimonies, particularly
those as to the specific events that transpired during the crucial period - from the dinner at
Gemenos house to the following morning at the Alquizola Lodging House. As a result, it presented
the private respondents account and allegations as though these were the established facts of the
case, which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling of acquittal.
Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire evidence
presented, regardless of the party who offered the same.32 It simply cannot acknowledge that of
one party and turn a blind eye to that of the other. It cannot appreciate one partys cause and
brush the other aside. This rule becomes particularly significant in this case because the parties
tendered contradicting versions of the incident. The victim is crying rape but the accused are saying
it was a consensual sexual rendezvous. Thus, the CAs blatant disregard of material prosecution
evidence and outward bias in favor of that of the defense constitutes grave abuse of discretion
resulting in violation of petitioners right to due process. 33
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Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC and made its own
flimsy findings to justify its decision of acquittal.
First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the whole ordeal. The fact
that she never showed any physical resistance, never cried out for help, and never fought against
the private respondents, bolsters the claim of the latter that the sexual acts were indeed
consensual.
But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of the assault. Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
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Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of
the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age. 34
Here, the accused intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They
still forced her to drink even when she was already obviously inebriated. They never denied having
sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the
time the private respondents ravished her. The CA, however, readily concluded that she agreed to
the sexual act simply because she did not shout or offer any physical resistance, disregarding her
testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission
of the crime.35 The appellate court never provided any reason why AAAs testimony should deserve
scant or no weight at all, or why it cannot be accorded any credence. In reviewing rape cases, the
lone testimony of the victim is and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of
conviction if found to be credible. Also, it has been established that when a woman declares that
she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she has been raped, and
where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis
alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can usually be offered
to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainants testimony itself.36 The trial court correctly
ruled that if AAA was not truthful to her accusation, she would not have opened herself to the rough
and tumble of a public trial. AAA was certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of those who were
listening as she narrated her harrowing experience.37
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AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated her. She tried to resist,
but because of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed. The RTC found AAAs testimony
simple and candid, indicating that she was telling the truth. The trial court likewise observed that
her answers to the lengthy and humiliating questions were simple and straightforward, negating the
possibility of a rehearsed testimony.38 Thus:
Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):

xxxx
Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went asleep, when did you regain your
consciousness?
A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine inside the bottle of Emperador
Brandy.
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Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the remaining contained (sic) of the bottle of
Emperador Brandy?
A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they insisted.
Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you can remember?
A: It was Christian John Lim, sir.
Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly from the bottle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after that?
A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Q: When did you regain your consciousness?
A: When somebody was carrying me down to the spiral stairs.
Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were carrying you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who?
A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy.
Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy carry you?
A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic), sir:
xxxx
Q: After that, what happened, if any?
A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went downstairs.
Q: You mean to say that you cannot remember anymore?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when again did you regain your consciousness?
A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I was awakened by the flash of
light.
Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were awakened that (sic) flash of light.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir.
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xxxx
Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light, what happened?
A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.
Q: So, you fell asleep again?
A: Yes, sir.
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xxxx
Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again?
A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir.
Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see?
A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir.
Q: He was on top of you?
A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering)
Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto was on top of you?
A: I was starting to cry, sir.
Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic) your reaction?
A: I was saying dont because I feel pain my private organ (sic).
Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?
A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he sexually abused me.
ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that the witness is crying.
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xxxx
ATTY. GENERALAO: May I continue, Your Honor.
COURT: Continue.
ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on top of you, who else was there
inside that room?
A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund Carampatana, sir.
Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana, what was he doing?
A: He was at my feet while looking at us.
Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed?
A: Dressed up, sir.
Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he doing?
A: He was beside us standing and looking at me, sir.
Q: Was he dressed up or undressed?
A: I could not remember, sir.
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xxxx
Q: After that, what happened?
A: I went asleep again, sir.
Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up?
A: When I feel (sic) pain something inside my private part (sic), I saw Raymund Carampatana, sir.
Q: On top of you?
A: No, sir, because he was in between my legs, sir.
Q: What was your reaction?
A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him dont.
Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found Raymund Carampatana?
A: Only the three of them, sir.
Q: Including Moises Alquizola?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was he doing?
A: He was started (sic) to kiss me.
Q: Where in particular?
A: In my face, sir.
Q: Then after that, what happened?
A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when you said that you feel (sic)
something in your private part when you saw Raymund Carampatana?
A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir.
Q: Then after that you fell asleep again?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When did you wake-up (sic)?
A: I woke up at about 7:00 oclock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir.39
On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the defense. It noted that
their account of the events was seemingly unusual and incredible. 40 Besides, the defense of
consensual copulation was belatedly invoked and seemed to have been a last ditch effort to avoid
culpability. The accused never mentioned about the same at the pre-trial stage. The trial court only
came to know about it when it was their turn to take the witness stand, catching the court by
surprise.41 More importantly, it must be emphasized that when the accused in a rape case claims
that the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was consensual, as in this case, the
burden of evidence shifts to him, such that he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to
prove the relationship. Being an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof, it must be
established with sufficient evidence that the intercourse was indeed consensual. 42 Generally, the
burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every element of the crime and that it
is the accused who is responsible for its commission. This is because in criminal cases, conviction
must rest on a moral certainty of guilt.43 Burden of evidence is that logical necessity which rests on
a party at any particular time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favor or to
overthrow one when created against him. A prima faciecase arises when the party having the
burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of the
issue in litigation.44 However, when the accused alleges consensual sexual congress, he needs
convincing proof such as love notes, mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the romantic or
sexual relationship between the offender and his supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal
knowledge of the complainant, the burden now shifts to the accused to prove his defense by
substantial evidence.45
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Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge of AAA but unfortunately failed
to discharge the burden required of them. Carampatana narrated that upon reaching the room at
the lodging house, AAA lay down on the bed and looked at him. He then approached her and they
kissed. He removed her shirt and brassiere. Thereafter, Oporto also removed AAAs lower garments
and then went to kiss AAA. Carampatana then placed himself in between AAAs legs and had
intercourse with her.46 On the other hand, Oporto himself testified that he had sexual intercourse
with AAA three times. While Carampatana was removing AAAs shirt and brassiere, Oporto was
watching at the foot of the bed. Then he removed her pants and underwear, and AAA even lifted
her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull the clothes down. When Carampatana left after
having sexual intercourse with AAA, according to Oporto, he then stood up, opened his pants, and
took out his penis so that AAA could perform fellatio on him. Then he proceeded to have sexual
intercourse with AAA. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. After
a few minutes, he woke up and went back to the room and again had intercourse with AAA. He
went back to sleep and after some time, he woke up to the sound of AAA vomitting. Shortly
thereafter, he made love with AAA for the third and last time. 47 Despite said shameless admission,
however, the accused failed to sufficiently prove that the lack of any physical resistance on AAAs
part amounts to approval or permission. They failed to show that AAA had sexual intercourse with
them out of her own volition, and not simply because she was seriously intoxicated at that time, and
therefore could not have given a valid and intelligent consent to the sexual act.
The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was showy and exaggerated when
testifying, even flashing a thumbs-up to some of the accused after her testimony, an indication of a
rehearsed witness.48 To be believed, the testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness; it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the attending circumstances. 49
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When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even
conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the
witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the
appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence. 50 Matters of credibility are addressed
basically to the trial judge who is in a better position than the appellate court to appreciate the
weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared before
him.51 The appellate courts are far detached from the details and drama during trial and have to
rely solely on the records of the case in its review. On the matter of credence and credibility of
witnesses, therefore, the Court acknowledges said limitations and recognizes the advantage of the
trial court whose findings must be given due deference. 52 Since the CA and the private respondents
failed to show any palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial
court, these findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and binding. 53
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The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician found old hymenal laceration
on AAAs private organ. The lack of a fresh hymenal laceration, which is expected to be present
when the alleged sexual encounter is involuntary, could mean that AAA actually consented to the
fornication. According to Dr. Acusta, when sex is consensual, the vagina becomes lubricated and
the insertion of the penis will not cause any laceration. It presumed that complainant, therefore,
was no longer innocent considering the presence of old hymenal laceration that could have resulted
from her previous sexual encounters. The defense, however, failed to show that AAA was sexually
promiscuous and known for organizing or even joining sex orgies. It must be noted that AAA was a
minor, barely 17 years old at the time of the incident, having just graduated from high school on
that same day. In a similar case,54the Court held:
x x x Indeed, no woman would have consented to have sexual intercourse with two men
or three, according to Antonio Gallardo in the presence of each other, unless she were a
prostitute or as morally debased as one. Certainly, the record before Us contains no indication
that Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year high school student, can be so characterized. On the
contrary, her testimony in court evinced the simplicity and candor peculiar to her youth. In fact,
appellants could not even suggest any reason why Farmacita would falsely impute to them the
commission of the crime charged.55
No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination
of her private parts, and be subjected to public trial and humiliation if her claim were not true. 56
And even if she were indeed highly promiscuous at such a young age, the same could still not prove
that no rape was actually committed. Even a complainant who was a woman of loose morals could
still be the victim of rape. Even a prostitute may be a victim of rape. The victims moral character
in rape is immaterial where, as in this case, it is shown that the victim was deprived of reason or
was rendered unconscious through intoxication to enable the private respondents to have sex with
her. Moreover, the essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman against her consent. 57 A
freshly broken hymen is not one of its essential elements. Even if the hymen of the victim was still
intact, the possibility of rape cannot be ruled out. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of
the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for
rape. To repeat, rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the womans genitalia is not
indispensable to a conviction for rape.58
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Neither does AAAs mothers act of hitting her after learning about the rape prove anything. It is a
truism that the workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable, and the people react differently.59 Different people react differently to a given type
of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a
strange, startling or frightful experience.60 At most, it merely indicates the frustration and dismay
of a mother upon learning that her daughter had been defiled after partying late the night before.
It is a settled rule that when there is no showing that private complainant was impelled by improper
motive in making the accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled to full faith and
credence.61 So if AAA in fact consented to the sexual act, why did she still need to immediately tell
her parents about it when she could have just kept it to herself? Why did she ever have to shout
rape? She was not caught in the act of making love with any of the private respondents, 62 nor was
she shown to have been in a relationship with any of them of which her family disapproved. 63 She
never became pregnant as a result of the deed. And if AAA cried rape to save her reputation, why
would she have to drag the private respondents into the case and identify them as her rapists?
Absent any circumstance indicating the contrary, she brought the charge against the private
respondents simply because she was, in fact, violated and she wants to obtain justice. Her zeal in
prosecuting the case, even after the CA had already acquitted the private respondents, evinces the
truth that she merely seeks justice for her honor that has been debased. 64 Unfortunately, the CA
chose to ignore these telling pieces of evidence. Its findings are against the logic and effect of the
facts as presented by AAA in support of her complaint,65contrary to common human experience, and
in utter disregard of the relevant laws and jurisprudence on the crime of rape.
Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy because his
participation in the crime was uncertain,66 citing People v. Lobrigo.67 It found that his participation
was not in furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit the crime of rape. 68 The Court, however, finds
that the RTC erred in ruling that Alquizolas liability is not of a conspirator, but that of a mere
accomplice. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement
to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to
the same objective. Conspiracy is proved if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that
the malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert. 69
Proof of conspiracy need not even rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the
collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the crime indicating a
common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. 70
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In Lobrigo, the Court declared:
We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to Gregorio's and Dominador's participation
in the crime conflict on material points.
Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were carrying weaponsduring the
mauling and whether they participated in the mauling by more than just boxing the victim. Noel
stated that they did not, Domingo stated that they did.
In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is not necessary. In this case, the
rule is not applicable because conspiracy with respect to Gregorio and Dominador is not proven.
Their exact participation in the crime is uncertain.71 (Emphasis Supplied)
In People v. Dela Torre,72 the Court upheld the findings of the lower courts that there was
conspiracy:
The RTC held that:
While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually ravished the victim based on the
testimony of the private complainant that Amoroso succeeded in inserting his penis to her private
parts and that Reynaldo dela Torre and Ritchie Bisaya merely kissed her and fondled her
private parts, accused [D]ela Torre can likewise be held liable for the bestial acts of Amoroso as it
is quite apparent that the three of them conspired and mutually helped one another in raping the
young victim.
The Court of Appeals held that:
[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his tacit and spontaneous
participation and cooperation of pulling her towards the parked jeep, molesting her and doing
nothing to prevent the commission of the rape, made him a co-conspirator. As such, he was
properly adjudged as a principal in the commission of the crime. 73
Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo, Alquizolas participation in the crime is not at all
uncertain. As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room so the rape could
be accomplished with ease and furtiveness. He was likewise inside the room, intently watching,
while Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused AAA. He did not do anything to stop the bestial
acts of his companions. He even admitted to kissing AAAs lips, breasts, and other parts of her
body. Indubitably, there was conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually
abuse AAA. Hence, the act of any one was the act of all, and each of them, Alquizola including, is
equally guilty of the crime of rape. While it is true that the RTC found Alquizola guilty as mere
accomplice, when he appealed from the decision of the trial court, 74 he waived the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and threw the whole case open to the review of the appellate
court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the accused-appellant.75
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Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single Information, it, however,
actually charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint or information must
charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective. 76 The rationale behind this rule
prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of
the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not
heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense. 77 Noncompliance with this rule is a ground78 for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under
Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to
quash before he enters his plea,79 otherwise, the defect is deemed waived. 80 The accused herein,
however, cannot avail of this defense simply because they did not file a motion to quash questioning
the validity of the Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have waived
their right to question the same. Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are
merely different counts specifying the acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case,
there is no duplicity to speak of.81 There is likewise no violation of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against them because the Information, in fact, stated that they took turns
in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA on March 25, 2004. 82 Further, allegations made
and the evidence presented to support the same reveal that AAA was indeed raped and defiled
several times. Here, according to the accused themselves, after undressing AAA, Carampatana
positioned himself in between her legs and had intercourse with her. On the other hand, Oporto
admitted that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three times. When two or more offenses are
charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the
court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the
proper penalty for each offense.83 Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola can then be held liable for
more than one crime of rape, or a total of four (4) counts in all, with conspiracy extant among the
three of them during the commission of each of the four violations. Each of the accused shall thus
be held liable for every act of rape committed by the other. But while Oporto himself testified that
he inserted his sexual organ into AAAs mouth, the Court cannot convict him of rape through sexual
assault therefor because the same was not included in the Information. This is, however, without
prejudice to the filing of a case of rape through sexual assault as long as prescription has not yet
set in.
Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or more persons is punishable
byreclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the RPC. But in view of the presence of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the absence of an aggravating circumstance to
offset the same, the lighter penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon them,84 for each
count. With regard to Oporto, appreciating in his favor the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, the proper imposable penalty upon him is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower
to reclusion perpetua to death. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
applicable. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Oporto can be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty the minimum of which shall be within the range of prision mayor (the penalty next lower in
degree toreclusion temporal) and the maximum of which shall be within the range of reclusion
temporal in its minimum period, there being the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance.85 With that, the Court shall impose the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each count
of rape committed.86 However, Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51,
R.A. No. 9344,87 which extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21)
years, so long as he committed the crime when he was still a child, 88 and provides for the
confinement of convicted children as follows:89
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Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training
Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be
made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the foregoing provision should be
taken into consideration by the judge in order to accord children in conflict with the law, who have
already gone beyond twenty-one (21) years of age, the proper treatment envisioned by law.
As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
another P50,000.00 as moral damages, in each case. Exemplary damages of P30,000.00 shall
likewise be imposed by way of an example and to deter others from committing the same bestial
acts.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN is REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The Court hereby renders judgment:
a)
b)
c)
Finding accused-respondent Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case;
Finding accused-respondent Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum, in each case; and
Finding accused-respondent Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case.
The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA, jointly and severally, the amounts
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, for each of the four (4) counts of rape. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for
its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
Let the records of this case be forwarded to the court of origin for the execution of judgment.
SO ORDERED.
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Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Mendoza,* and Reyes, JJ., concur.
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March 23, 2015
N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on ___February 25, 2015___ a Decision, copy attached herewith, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by
this Office on March 23, 2015 at 2:45 p.m.
Very truly yours,

(SGD)
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per Special Order No.
1896 dated November 28, 2014.
*
Penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybaez, with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Mario V.
Lopez; concurring; rollo, pp. 69-103.
1
Penned by Judge Jacob T. Malik; rollo, pp. 28-67.
In line with the Court's ruling in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502
SCRA 419, 426; citing Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children, Sec. 40; Rules and
Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 9262, Rule XI, Sec. 63, otherwise known as the "AntiViolence Against Women and their Children Act," the real names of the rape victims will not be
disclosed. The Court will instead use fictitious initials to represent them throughout the decision. The
personal circumstances of the victims or any other information tending to establish or compromise
their identities will likewise be withheld.
3
Records, pp. 39-40.
Id. at 58, 86, 157-162.
Id. at 157-172.
Rollo, pp. 66-67.
Id. at 102. (Emphasis in the original)
Id. at 3-27.
10
Id. at 10.
11
Id. at 241-242.
12
Id. at 292, 298.
Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. CA, G.R. No. 165155, April 13, 2010, 618 SCRA
181, 184.
13
Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc., G.R. No. 188051, November 22, 2010, 635 SCRA
637, 645.
14
15
M. GUBAT, THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED 481 (3rd ed. 2009).
16
Id. at 481-482.
Goodland Company, Inc. v. Co and Chan, G.R. No. 196685, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 692,
701.
17
18
255 Phil. 851 (1989).
19
People v. Santiago, supra, at 861-862. (Emphasis ours)
20
Bautista v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 189754, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 521, 534.
21
323 Phil. 596 (1996).
22
Rollo, pp. 272-301.
23
Merciales v. CA, 429 Phil. 70, 79 (2002).
24
Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 313, 323.
25
People v. CA, G.R. No. 198589, July 25, 2012.
26
Yu v. Reyes Carpio, G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011, 652 SCRA 341, 348.
Dissenting Opinion of then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee in Chemplex (Phils.), Inc. v. Hon.
Pamatian, 156 Phil. 408, 457 (1974).
27
28
Rollo, pp. 72-78.
29
Id. at 38-41.
30
Id. at 46-48.
31
Id. at 42-43.
32
33
Equitable PCIBank v. Caguioa, 504 Phil. 242, 249 (2005).

Id.
34
People v. Padigos, G.R. No. 181202, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 245, 255.
35
People v. Hon. Cabral, 362 Phil. 697, 712 (1999).
36
37
People v. Rivera, 414 Phil. 430, 453 (2001).

Rollo, p. 55.
38
Id.
39
Rollo, pp. 49-53.
40
Id. at 58-59.
41
Id. at 57-58.
42
People v. Alcober, G.R. No. 192941, November 13, 2013, 709 SCRA 479, 488.
43
Timbal v. CA, 423 Phil. 617, 623 (2001).
44
People v. Mirandilla, G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 761, 772.
45
People v. Mantis, 477 Phil. 275, 287 (2004).
46
Rollo, p. 48.
47
Id. at 40-41.
48
Id. at 60.
49
People v. Dejillo, G.R. No. 185005, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 537, 553.
50
People v. Apattad, G.R. No. 193188, August 10, 2011, 655 SCRA 335, 349.
51
Valbueco, Inc. v. Province of Bataan, G.R. No. 173829, June 10, 2013, 698 SCRA 57, 77.
52
People v. Vergara, G.R. No. 177763, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 412, 421.
53
People v. Apattad, supra note 50, at 350.
54
People v. Soriano, 146 Phil. 585 (1970).
55
56
57
Id. at 589. (Emphasis ours)

People v. Zabala, 456 Phil. 237, 243.
People v. Baluya, 430 Phil. 349. 363 (2002).
58
People v. Dimacuha, 467 Phil. 342, 350 (2004).
59
People v. Buenviaje, 408 Philo. 342, 346 (2001).
60
People v. Jorolan, 452 Phil. 698. 714 (2003).
61
62
People v. Balya, supra note 57.

People v. Singson, G.R. No. 194719, September 21, 2011, 658 SCRA 185, 192.
63
People v. Ramos, 467 Phil 376, 389 (2004).
64
People v. Baluya, supra note 57, at 364.
65
Chempex (Phils.), Inc. v. Hon. Pamatian, supra note 27.
66
67
68
69
Rollo, p. 63.
410 Phil. 283, 291 (2001).
Rollo, p. 62.
People v. Peralta, 134 Phil. 703, 722-723 (1968).
70
People v. Gambao, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013, 706 SCRA 508, 527.
71
People v. Jabonera, supra note 67. (Emphasis ourts)
72
73
588 Phil. 937 (2008).

People v. Dela Torre, supra, at 943. (Citations omitted)
74
Rollo, p. 81.
75
Supra note 44.
76
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, Section 13.
77
Supra note 15, at 90.
Section 3. Grounds. The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of
the following grounds:
78
xxxx
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is
prescribed by law;
xxxx
Section 1. Time to move to quash. At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move
to quash the complaint or information.
79
80
People v. Lucena, 408 Phil. 172, 191 (2001).
81
Supra note 15, at 91; citing Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 2, 9 th ed., p. 271.
82
Supra note 4.
83
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 120, Section 3.
84
Revised Penal Code, Art. 63, par. 3.
85
Revised Penal Code, Art. 64 (2).
86
People v. Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013.
Entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM,

CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
87
88
People v. Jacinto, G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011.
89
People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009.
PEOPLE V LAOAG
FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.R. No. 178321

Present:
- versus -
CORONA, C.J.,
CONRADO LAOG y RAMIN,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Accused-Appellant.
Promulgated:
October 5, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
For our review is the March 21, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234 which affirmed appellants conviction
for murder in Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000 and rape in Criminal Case
No. 2308-M-2000.
Appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin was charged with murder before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, of Malolos, Bulacan. The
Information,[2] which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000,
alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of San
Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a lead pipe
and with intent to kill one Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, did then and there
wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse
of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and hit with the said lead
pipe the said Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, thereby inflicting upon said
Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal serious physical injuries which directly caused
her death.
Contrary to law.
He was likewise charged before the same court with the crime of rape of
AAA.[3] The second Information,[4] which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 2308-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of San
Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, by
means of force, violence and intimidation, that is, by attacking and hitting
with a lead pipe one [AAA] which resulted [in] her incurring serious
physical injuries that almost caused her death, and while in such
defenseless situation, did then and there have carnal knowledge of said
[AAA] against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The two cases
were thereafter tried jointly because they arose from the same incident.
The prosecution presented as its principal witness AAA, the rape
victim who was 19 years old at the time of the incident. Her testimony was
corroborated by her grandfather BBB, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, and her
neighbor CCC.
AAA testified that at around six oclock in the evening of June 6, 2000, she
and her friend, Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, were walking along the rice
paddies on their way to apply for work at a canteen near the National
Highway in Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan. Suddenly, appellant, who was
holding an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and forcibly brought them
to a grassy area at the back of a concrete wall. Without warning, appellant
struck AAA in the head with the lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to
fall down. When Jennifer saw this, she cried out for help but appellant also
hit her on the head with the lead pipe, knocking her down. Appellant stabbed
Jennifer several times with the ice pick and thereafter covered her body with
thick grass.[5] Appellant then turned to AAA. He hit AAA in the head several
times more with the lead pipe and stabbed her on the face. While AAA was
in such defenseless position, appellant pulled down her jogging pants,
removed her panty, and pulled up her blouse and bra. He then went on top of
her, sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping
AAA, appellant also covered her with grass. At that point, AAA passed out.
[6]
When AAA regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining

hard. She crawled until she reached her uncles farm at daybreak on June 8,
2000.[7]When she saw him, she waved at him for help. Her uncle, BBB, and
a certain Nano then brought her to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where
she stayed for more than three weeks. She later learned that Jennifer had
died.[8]
During cross-examination, AAA explained that she did not try to run away
when appellant accosted them because she trusted appellant who was her
uncle by affinity. She said that she never thought he would harm them.[9]
BBB testified that on June 8, 2000, at about six oclock in the morning, he
was at his rice field at Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan when he saw a
woman waving a hand and then fell down. The woman was about 200
meters away from him when he saw her waving to him, and he did not mind
her. However, when she was about 100 meters away from him, he
recognized the woman as AAA, his granddaughter. He immediately
approached her and saw that her face was swollen, with her hair covering
her face, and her clothes all wet. He asked AAA what happened to her, and
AAA uttered, Si Tata Coni referring to appellant who is his son-in-law.
[10]
With the help of his neighbor, he brought AAA home.[11] AAA was later
brought to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan where she recuperated for
three weeks.
CCC, neighbor of AAA and Jennifer, testified that sometime after June 6,
2000, she visited AAA at the hospital and asked AAA about the whereabouts
of Jennifer. AAA told her to look for Jennifer somewhere at Buenavista. She
sought the assistance of Barangay Officials and they went to Buenavista
where they found Jennifers cadaver covered with grass and already bloated.
[12]
Meanwhile, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, a medico-legal officer of

the Province of Bulacan, conducted the autopsy on the remains of
Jennifer. His findings are as follows:
the body is in advanced stage of decomposition[;] eyeballs and to[n]gue

were protru[d]ed; the lips and abdomen are swollen; desquamation and
bursting of bullae and denudation of the epidermis in the head, trunks and
on the upper extremities[;] [f]rothy fluid and maggots coming from the
nose, mouth, genital region and at the site of wounds, three (3) lacerations
at the head[;] two (2) stab wounds at the submandibular region[;] four [4]
punctured wounds at the chest of the victim[.]
cause of death of the victim was hemorrhagic shock as result of stab
wounds [in] the head and trunk.[13]
The prosecution and the defense also stipulated on the testimony of

Elizabeth Patawaran, Jennifers mother, as to the civil aspect of Criminal
Case No. 2162-M-2000. It was stipulated that she spent P25,000 for
Jennifers funeral and burial.[14]
Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against
him. Appellant testified that he was at home cooking dinner around the time
the crimes were committed. With him were his children, Ronnie, Jay, Oliver
and Conrado, Jr. and his nephew, Rey Laog. At around seven oclock, he was
arrested by the police officers of San Rafael, Bulacan. He learned that his
wife had reported him to the police after he went wild that same night and
struck with a lead pipe a man whom he saw talking to his wife inside their
house. When he was already incarcerated, he learned that he was being
charged with murder and rape.[15]
Appellant further testified that AAA and Jennifer frequently went to
his nipa hut whenever they would ask for rice or money. He claimed that in
the evening ofJune 5, 2000, AAA and Jennifer slept in his nipa hut but they
left the following morning at around seven oclock. An hour later, he left his
house to have his scythe repaired. However, he was not able to do so
because that was the time when he went wild after seeing his wife with
another man. He admitted that his nipahut is more or less only 100
meters away from the scene of the crime.[16]
The defense also presented appellants nephew, Rey Laog, who testified that
he went to appellants house on June 5, 2000, at around three oclock in the
afternoon, and saw AAA and Jennifer there. He recalled seeing AAA and
Jennifer before at his uncles house about seven times because AAA and his
uncle had an illicit affair. He further testified that appellant arrived
before midnight on June 5, 2000 and slept with AAA. The following
morning, at around six oclock, AAA and Jennifer went home. He and
appellant meanwhile left the house together. Appellant was going to San
Rafael to have his scythe repaired while he proceeded to his house in
Pinakpinakan, San Rafael, Bulacan.[17]
After trial, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision [18] on June 30, 2003 finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes. The dispositive
portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2162-M-2000, this court finds the
accused Conrado Laog GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the
heirs of Jennifer Patawaran, the following sums of money:
a. P60,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2308-M-2000, this Court hereby
finds the accused Conrado Laog GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Rape under Art. 266-A par. (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and
to pay the private complainant the following sums of money.
a. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[19]
Appellant appealed his conviction to this Court. But conformably with

our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[20] the case was referred to the CA
for appropriate action and disposition.
In a Decision dated March 21, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification the
trial courts judgment. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Joint

Decision, dated June 30, 2003, of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 11, inCriminal Case Nos. 2162-M-2000 & 2308-M-2000,
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case [No.]
2162-M-2000, Accused-Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of
Jennifer Patawaran [an] additional P25,000.00 as actual damages. The
exemplary damages awarded by the Trial Court in 2162-M-2000 & 2308M-2000 are hereby reduced to P25,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Appellant is now before this Court assailing the CAs affirmance of his
conviction
for
both
crimes
of
rape
and
murder. In
a
[22]
Resolution dated August 22, 2007, we required the parties to submit their
respective Supplemental Briefs, if they so desire. However, the parties
submitted separate Manifestations in lieu of Supplemental Briefs, adopting
the arguments in their respective briefs filed in the CA. Appellant had raised
the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS [AAA].
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.[23]
Appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the killing of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal and the rape of
AAA.He assails AAAs credibility, the prosecutions main witness, and points
out alleged inconsistencies in her testimony. Appellant also contends that the
prosecution failed to establish that he carefully planned the execution of the
crimes charged. According to him, AAAs narration that he waylaid them
while walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply for work negates
evident premeditation since there was no evidence that the said path was
their usual route.
Appellant further contends that the trial court and CA erred in

appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. He
argues that for abuse of superior strength to be appreciated in the killing of
Jennifer, the physical attributes of both the accused and the victim should
have been shown in order to determine whether the accused had the capacity
to overcome the victim physically or whether the victim was substantially
weak and unable to put up a defense.Additionally, he attempts to cast doubt
upon AAAs testimony, arguing that it lacked some details on how, after she
was raped and stabbed by appellant, she was still able to put on her clothes
and crawl to her grandfathers farm.
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellant principally attacks the credibility of prosecution witness
AAA. Jurisprudence has decreed that the issue of credibility of witnesses is
a question best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its
unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying which
opportunity is denied to the appellate courts[24] and absent any substantial
reason which would justify the reversal of the trial courts assessments and
conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the formers findings,
particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have
been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have affected
the outcome of the case.[25] This rule is even more stringently applied if the
appellate court concurred with the trial court.[26]
Here, both the trial and appellate courts gave credence and full probative
weight to the testimony of AAA, the lone eyewitness to Jennifers killing and
was herself brutally attacked by appellant who also raped her. Appellant had
not shown any sufficiently weighty reasons for us to disturb the trial courts
evaluation of the prosecution eyewitness credibility. In particular, we defer
to the trial courts firsthand observations on AAAs deportment while
testifying and its veritable assessment of her credibility, to wit:
From the moment [AAA] took the stand, this Court has come to
discern in her the trepidations of a woman outraged who is about to
recount the ordeal she had gone through. She took her oath with trembling
hands, her voice low and soft, hardly audible. Face down, her eyes were
constantly fixed on the floor as if avoiding an eye contact with the man
she was about to testify against. After a few questions in direct, the
emotion building up inside her came to the fore and she burst into tears,
badly shaken, unfit to continue any further with her testimony. Thus, in
deference to her agitated situation, this Court has to defer her directexamination. When she came back, however, to continue with her aborted
questioning, this time, composed and collected, direct and straightforward
in her narration, all vestiges of doubt on her credibility vanished.[27]
Indeed, records bear out that AAA became so tense and nervous when
she took the witness stand for the first time that the trial court had to cut
short her initial direct examination. However, during the next hearing she
was able to narrate her harrowing ordeal in a clear and straightforward
manner, describing in detail how appellant waylaid them and mercilessly hit
and attacked her and Jennifer with a lead pipe and ice pick before raping her.
We quote the pertinent portions of her testimony:
Q: During your previous testimony, Madam Witness, you said that youre
not able to reach your place of work on June 6, 2000, what is the
reason why you did not reach your place of work?
A: We were waylaid (hinarang) by Conrado Laog, sir.
Q: In what manner were you waylaid by Conrado Laog?
A: Conrado Laog hit me with the pipe on my head, sir.
xxxx
Q: Where were you when you were hit?
A: We were walking along the rice puddies (sic), Your Honor.
Fiscal:
Q: And what happened to you when you were hit with the lead pipe by
Conrado Laog?
A: I fell down (nabuwal) because I felt dizzy, sir.
Q: Now, what happened next, if any?
A: I heard Jennifer crying, sir.
Q: And you heard Jennifer but did you see her?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was Conrado Laog when you heard Jennifer crying?
A: He was beside me, sir.
Court:
Q: How about Jennifer, where was she when you heard her crying?
A: She was standing on the rice puddies, (sic), Your Honor.
Fiscal:
Q: And what was Conrado Laog doing?
A: He approached Jennifer, sir.
Q: Then, what happened next?
A: He hit Jennifer with the pipe, sir.
Q: And what happened to Jennifer?
A: She fell down, sir.
Q: What did Conrado Laog do next?
A: He stabbed Jennifer, sir.
Q: After Conrado Laog stabbed Jennifer, what happened next?
A: He covered Jennifer with grasses, sir.
Q: And after that, what did Conrado Laog do?
A: He came back to me, sir.
Q: When Conrado Laog came back to you, what did you do, if any?
A: He hit me with the pipe several times, sir.
Q: And what happened to you?
A: And he stabbed me on my face, sir.
Q: Then, what happened to you?
A: After that, he pulled down my jogging pants, sir. He removed my panty
and my blouse and my bra.
Q: After that, what did he do next?
A: And then, he went on top of me, sir.
Q: Then, what happened?
A: He sucked my breast, sir.
Q: And after that?
A: He was forcing his penis into my vagina, sir.
Q: Did he suc[c]eed in putting his penis into your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: For how long did the accused Conrado Laog insert his penis into your
vagina?
A: For quite sometime, sir.
Q: After that, what happened?
A: After that, he stood up, sir.
Q: And where did he go?
A: After that, he covered me with grasses, sir.
Q: And after that, what did you do?
A: I fell unconscious, sir.
Q: Now, if Conrado Laog is inside the courtroom, will you be able to point
to him?
Interpreter:
Witness is pointing to a man wearing an inmates uniform and when asked
his name, answered: Conrado Laog.
x x x x[28]
On the other hand, appellant merely interposed the defense of denial and
alibi. He claimed that at the time of the incident, he was at his house with his
children and nephew cooking dinner. His defense, however, cannot prevail
over the straightforward and credible testimony of AAA who positively
identified him as the perpetrator of the murder and rape. Time and again, we
have held that positive identification of the accused, when categorical and
consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of the
appellant whose testimony is not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.[29] AAA was firm and unrelenting in pointing to appellant as the
one who attacked her and Jennifer, stabbing the latter to death before raping
AAA. It should be noted that AAA knew appellant well since they were
relatives by affinity. As correctly held by the CA, with AAAs familiarity and
proximity with the appellant during the commission of the crime, her
identification of appellant could not be doubted or mistaken. In fact, AAA,
upon encountering appellant, did not run away as she never thought her own
uncle would harm her and her friend. Moreover, the most natural reaction of
victims of violence is to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of
the crime and observe the manner in which the crime is being committed.
[30]
There is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of AAA to
testify falsely against appellant or to falsely implicate him in the commission
of a crime. Thus, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of
full faith and credence.[31]
In People v. Nieto,[32] we reiterated that -It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any
strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive
declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in
the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise unavailing.
Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct
and difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing
proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any

weight in law. Secondly, alibi is unacceptable when there is a positive
identification of the accused by a credible witness. Lastly, in order that
alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has been
somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it must also be
shown that it would have been impossible for him to be anywhere within
the vicinity of the crime scene.
Appellant does not dispute that he was near the vicinity of the crime on the
evening of June 6, 2000. In fact, during his cross-examination, appellant
admitted that his house was more or less only 100 meters from the crime
scene. Thus, his defense of alibi is not worthy of any credit for the added
reason that he has not shown that it was physically impossible for him to be
at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
In view of the credible testimony of AAA, appellants defenses of
denial and alibi deserve no consideration. We stress that these weak defenses
cannot stand against the positive identification and categorical testimony of
a rape victim.[33]
Appellant attempts to discredit AAA's accusation of rape by pointing out
that while she testified on being very weak that she even passed out after she
was raped by appellant, she nevertheless stated that when she crawled her
way to her grandfather's farm she was wearing her clothes. Appellant also
contends that the prosecution should have presented the physician who
examined AAA to prove her allegations that she was beaten and raped by
appellant.
We are not persuaded.
Based on AAAs account, appellant did not undress her completely -her blouse and bra were merely lifted up (nililis) while her undergarments
were just pulled down, which therefore explains why she still had her
clothes on when she crawled to her grandfathers farm. Nonetheless, this
matter raised by appellant is a minor detail which had nothing to do with the
elements of the crime of rape. Discrepancies referring only to minor details
and collateral matters -- not to the central fact of the crime -- do not affect
the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of witnesses

declarations, as long as these are coherent and intrinsically believable on the
whole.[34] For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to
serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of
the appellant for the crime charged.[35] It cannot be overemphasized that the
credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone impaired, by minor
inconsistencies in her testimony.[36]
As to the fact that the physician who examined AAA at the hospital
did not testify during the trial, we find this not fatal to the prosecutions case.
It must be underscored that the foremost consideration in the
prosecution of rape is the victims testimony and not the findings of the
medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical examination of the victim is not
indispensable in a prosecution for rape; the victims testimony alone, if
credible, is sufficient to convict.[37]Thus we have ruled that a medical
examination of the victim, as well as the medical certificate, is merely
corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element for conviction
in rape. What is important is that the testimony of private complainant about
the incident is clear, unequivocal and credible,[38] as what we find in this
case.
While we concur with the trial courts conclusion that appellant indeed was
the one who raped AAA and killed Jennifer, we find that appellant should
not have been convicted of the separate crimes of murder and rape. An
appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question,
including one not raised by the parties.[39] The facts alleged and proven
clearly show that the crime committed by appellant is rape with homicide, a
special complex crime provided under Article 266-B, paragraph 5 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.[40]
In People v. Larraaga,[41] this Court explained the concept of a special
complex crime, as follows:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is
imperative. Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more
component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex
crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code
are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3)kidnapping with
serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide,
and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the
prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses
with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the
subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659
amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this
provision: When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed;[] and that this provision gives rise to
a special complex crime. In the cases at bar, particularly Criminal Case
No. CBU-45303, the Information specifically alleges that the victim
Marijoy was raped on the occasion and in connection with her detention
and was killed subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof.
Considering that the prosecution was able to prove each of the component
offenses, appellants should be convicted of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape. x x
x[42] (Emphasis supplied.)
A special complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its own
definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case of People v. Barros,
[43]
explained that composite crimes are neither of the same legal basis as nor
subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal
Code], since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more
grave or less grave felonies [compound crimes] nor do they involve an
offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex crime proper].
However, just like the regular complex crimes and the present case of
aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for
each of such composite crimes although composed of two or more offenses.[44]
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a
single penalty for the composite acts of rape and the killing committed by
reason or on the occasion of the rape.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon

or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
become insane, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason
or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape
of AAA and the killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable
for rape with homicide under the above provision. There is no doubt that
appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA or calling for help
once she is able to run away, and also to silence her completely so she may
not witness the rape of AAA, the original intent of appellant. His carnal
desire having been satiated, appellant purposely covered AAAs body with
grass, as he did earlier with Jennifers body, so that it may not be easily
noticed or seen by passersby. Appellant indeed thought that the savage blows
he had inflicted on AAA were enough to cause her death as with Jennifer.
But AAA survived and appellants barbaric deeds were soon enough
discovered.
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with
homicide were consummated, and it is immaterial that the person killed in
this case is someone other than the woman victim of the rape. An analogy
may be drawn from our rulings in cases of robbery with homicide, where the
component acts of homicide, physical injuries and other offenses have been
committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery. In People v. De Leon,
[45]
we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as
follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the
malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must

precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before,
during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference
or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons
intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into
consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through
reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of
the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere
accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of
robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the
homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is
committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial
is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony
would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by
or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery
with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the
occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony
of robbery with homicide. The word homicide is used in its generic
sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.[46]
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term homicide is to
be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical
injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the rape. [47] Hence, even if
any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and
evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established
by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the
crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of
robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be
considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled
in People v. Macabales[48]
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding
that the aggravating circumstance of treachery is present. They aver that
treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes against
property. However, we find that the trial court in this case correctly
characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying,
circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in defending
himself when his arms were held by two of the attackers before he was
stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales, as their other companions
surrounded
them. In People
v.
Salvatierra, we
ruled that
when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of robbery

with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating
circumstance. Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own
definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. There is no
special complex crime of robbery with murder under the Revised
Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the circumstances proven
concerning the actual commission of the complex crime. Logically it
could not qualify the homicide to murder but, as generic aggravating
circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be imposed.
[49]
(Emphasis supplied.)
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered

whenever there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor and
purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the
crime.[50] It is taken into account whenever the aggressor purposely used
excessive force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to
the person attacked.[51]
In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in
the head with a lead pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was
dead. Clearly, the manner by which appellant had brutally slain Jennifer with
a lethal weapon, by first hitting her in the head with a lead pipe to render her
defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly, unmistakably
showed that appellant intentionally used excessive force out of proportion to
the means of defense available to his unarmed victim. As aptly observed by
the appellate court:
It has long been established that an attack made by a man with a deadly
weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the
circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon
used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to
defend herself. Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the
opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage of
superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely
defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the
aggressors natural strength over that of the victim, considering the
momentary position of both and the employment of means weakening the
defense, although not annulling it. By deliberately employing deadly
weapons, an ice pick and a lead pipe, [a]ccused-[a]ppellant clearly took
advantage of the superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave him
over his unarmed victim. The accused-appellants sudden attack caught the
victim off-guard rendering her defenseless.[52]
Abuse of superior strength in this case therefore is merely a generic

aggravating circumstance to be considered in the imposition of the penalty.
The penalty provided in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is death. However, in view of the passage on June 24, 2006 of
R.A. No. 9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death
Penalty in the Philippines the Court is mandated to impose on the appellant
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.[53]
The aggravating/qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and
use of deadly weapon have greater relevance insofar as the civil aspect of
this case is concerned. While the trial court and CA were correct in holding
that both the victim of the killing (Jennifer) and the rape victim (AAA) are
entitled to the award of exemplary damages, the basis for such award needs
further clarification.
Articles 2229 and 2230 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way
of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the
civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct
from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
In view of the presence of abuse of superior strength in the killing of

Jennifer, her heirs are entitled to exemplary damages pursuant to Article
2230. With respect to the rape committed against AAA, Article 266-B of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that a man who shall have
carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat or intimidation under
Article 266-A (a), whenever such rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death. Since the use of a deadly weapon raises the penalty for
the rape, this circumstance would justify the award of exemplary damages to
the offended party (AAA) also in accordance with Article 2230.
Article 266-B likewise provides for the imposition of death penalty if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the aggravating/qualifying
circumstances enumerated therein. Among these circumstances is minority
of the victim and her relationship to the offender:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse
of the parent of the victim. (Emphasis supplied.)
AAAs relationship to appellant, who is his uncle by affinity, was not alleged
in the information but admitted by appellant when he testified in court:
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF
CONRADO LAOG By:
Atty. Roque:
xxxx
Q Do you know a person by the name of [AAA]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know her?
A Because she is our neighbor. Her house is just adjacent to ours, sir.
Q How are you related to [AAA]?
A Her mother and my wife are sisters.
Q So she is your niece-in-law?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x[54] (Emphasis supplied.)
The failure of the prosecution to allege in the information AAAs relationship

to appellant will not bar the consideration of the said circumstance in the
determination of his civil liability. In any case, even without the attendance
of aggravating circumstances, exemplary damages may still be awarded
where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender. Citing our earlier ruling in the case
of People v. Catubig,[55] this Court clarified in People v. Dalisay[56]:
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
courts generally awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases when an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, had been
proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if the same
was not alleged in the information. This is in accordance with the
aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the promulgation of the Revised
Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not alleged
and proven in the determination of the penalty and in the award of
damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but
was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. Pertinent are
the following sections of Rule 110:
xxxx
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that
courts may still award exemplary damages based on the
aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance has
not been alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases
instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules which remained
pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive application of
the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of the
private offended party.
Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases,
especially those involving rape, dichotomized: one awarding exemplary
damages, even if an aggravating circumstance attending the commission
of the crime had not been sufficiently alleged but was consequently proven
in the light of Catubig; and another awarding exemplary damages only if
an aggravating circumstance has both been alleged and proven following
the Revised Rules. Among those in the first set are People v.
Laciste, People v. Victor, People v. Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v.
Magbanua, People of the Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y
Fortada, People of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People of
the Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in the second set are People v.
Llave, People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, and People of
the Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the difference between the two sets
rests on when the criminal case was instituted, either before or after the
effectivity of the Revised Rules.
xxxx
Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for
the grant of exemplary damagestaking into account simply the attendance
of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime, courts have

lost sight of the very reason why exemplary damages are
awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this point, thus
Also known as punitive or vindictive damages, exemplary or
corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious
wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton
invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of
outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used
interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of
exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings
and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as
a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted,
the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by
the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendantassociated with such
circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or
recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraudthat intensifies the
injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to
refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a
person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these
damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and
others like him from similar conduct in the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be
awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but
also where the circumstances of the case show the highly
reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same
way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may
be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of
the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary
damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual
behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v.
Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral
corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually
assaulting a pregnant married woman. Recently, inPeople of the
Philippines v. Cristino Caada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito
Neverio and The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court
awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent
to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from
sexual abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis
Article 2229, rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary
damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales words in her separate
opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, [t]he
application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such
cases, as in the present one, defeats the underlying public policy behind
the award of exemplary damagesto set a public example or correction for
the public good.[57] (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the brutal manner by which appellant carried out his lustful
design against his niece-in-law who never had an inkling that her own uncle
would do any harm to her and her friend, justified the award of exemplary
damages. Appellants sudden and fierce attack on AAA -- hitting her several
times on the head with a lead pipe before stabbing her face until she fell
down, hurriedly lifting her bra and blouse and pulling down her
undergarments, raping her while she was in such a defenseless position,
covering her body with grasses and abandoning her to die in a grassy field -was truly despicable and outrageous. Such vicious assault was made even
more reprehensible as it also victimized Jennifer, who sustained more stab
wounds and beatings, causing her violent death. Article 2229 of the Civil
Code allows the award of exemplary damages in order to deter the
commission of similar acts and to allow the courts to forestall behavior that
would pose grave and deleterious consequences to society.[58] In line with
current jurisprudence, the amount of P30,000 each for AAA and the heirs of
Jennifer as exemplary damages was correctly awarded by the trial court.
We also affirm the trial court and CA in ordering appellant to pay the
heirs of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal the amounts of P50,000 as moral
damages. In cases of murder and homicide, the award of moral damages is
mandatory, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the
victim.[59] Anent the award of civil indemnity, the same is increased
to P75,000 to conform with recent jurisprudence.[60] As to expenses incurred
for the funeral and burial of Jennifer, the CA correctly awarded her heirs the
amount of P25,000 as actual damages, said amount having been stipulated
by the parties during the trial.
Lastly, we affirm the award of P50,000 to AAA as civil indemnity for the
crime of rape, as well as the award of P50,000 as moral damages. Civil
indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape while
moral damages are awarded upon such finding without need of further proof,
because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries
entitling the victim to such award.[61]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
March 21, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00234
isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Accused-appellant
Conrado Laog y Ramin is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of Rape With Homicide under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 8353, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer
Patawaran-Rosal P75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral
damages,P25,000 as actual damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages. He
is further ordered to pay to the victim AAA the sums of P50,000 as civil
indemnity ex delicto,P50,000 as moral damages and P30,000 as exemplary
damages.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 3-16. Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam with Associate Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso
and Sesinando E. Villon concurring.
[2]
Records, Vol. I, p. 1.
[3]
Consistent with our decision in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502
SCRA 419, the real name of the rape victim in this case is withheld and instead fictitious initials are
used to represent her. Also, the personal circumstances of the victim or any other information tending
to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household
members, are not disclosed in this decision.
[4]
Records, Vol. II, p. 1.
[5]
TSN, June 20, 2001, pp. 3-4; TSN, December 12, 2001, pp. 3-7.
Id. at 4-5.
[7]
Id. at 6; TSN, December 12, 2001, pp. 12-13.
[8]
Id. at 6-7.
[9]
TSN, December 12, 2001, p. 7.
[10]
TSN, January 16, 2002, pp. 5-7.
[11]
Id. at 8.
[12]
TSN, May 22, 2002, pp. 4-7.
[13]
TSN, February 27, 2002, p. 5.
[14]
CA rollo, p. 31.
[15]
TSN, December 4, 2002, pp. 3-5.
[16]
Id. at 4-7.
[17]
TSN, March 26, 2003, pp. 3-5.
[18]
CA rollo, pp. 29-33.
[19]
Id. at 32-33.
[20]
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[21]
Rollo, p. 15.
[22]
Id. at 20.
[23]
CA rollo, p. 70.
[24]
People v. Nieto, G.R. No. 177756, March 3, 2008, 547 SCRA 511, 524.
[25]
People v. Dominguez, Jr., G.R. No. 180914, November 24, 2010, 636 SCRA 134, 161.
[26]
Id.
[27]
[28]
TSN, June 20, 2001, pp. 3-5.
[29]
People v. Caada, G.R. No. 175317, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 378, 393.
[30]
People v. Honra, Jr., G.R. Nos. 136012-16, September 26, 2000, 341 SCRA 110, 127, citing People v.
Pulusan, G.R. No. 110037, May 21, 1998, 290 SCRA 353, 372.
[31]
See People v. Malate, G.R. No. 185724, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 817, 827.
[32]
Supra note 24 at 527-528.
[33]
People v. Orande, G.R. Nos. 141724-27, November 12, 2003, 415 SCRA 699, 708.
[34]
People v. Suarez, G.R. Nos. 153573-76, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 333, 345.
[35]
People v. Villarino, G.R. No. 185012, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 372, 387, citing People v.
Masapol, G.R. No. 121997, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 371, 377.
[36]
People v. Wasit, G.R. No. 182454, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA 721, 729.
[37]
People v. Cadap, G.R. No. 190633, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 655, 663, citing People v. Espino, Jr., G.R.
No. 176742, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 682, 700-701.
[38]
People v. Tamano, G.R. No. 188855, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 672, 688, citing People v.
Arivan, G.R. No. 176065, April 22, 2008, 552 SCRA 448, 468-469.
[39]
People v. Madsali, G.R. No. 179570, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 596, 613-614, citing Esqueda v.
People, G.R. No. 170222, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 489, 506.
[40]
The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22, 1997.
[41]
G.R. Nos. 138874-75, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 530.
[42]
Id. at 580.
[43]
G.R. Nos. 101107-08, June 27, 1995, 245 SCRA 312, 323-332.
[44]
Id. at 328-329.
[45]
G.R. No. 179943, June 26, 2009, 591 SCRA 178.
[46]
Id. at 192-193, citing People v. Salazar, G.R. No. 99355, August 11, 1997, 277 SCRA 67; People v.
Abuyen, G.R. No. 77285, September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA 569, 582; People v. Ponciano, G.R. No.
86453, December 5, 1991, 204 SCRA 627, 639; and People v. Mangulabnan, et al., 99 Phil. 992, 999
(1956).
[47]
People v. Nanas, G.R. No. 137299, August 21, 2001, 363 SCRA 452, 469-470, citing People v.
Penillos, G.R. No. 65673, January 30, 1992, 205 SCRA 546, 564 and People v. Sequio, G.R. No.
117397, November 13, 1996, 264 SCRA 79, 101.
[48]
G.R. No. 111102, December 8, 2000, 347 SCRA 429.
[49]
Id. at 442, citing People v. Salvatierra, G.R. No. 111124, June 20, 1996, 257 SCRA 489, 507 and People
v. Vivas, G.R. No. 100914, May 6, 1994, 232 SCRA 238, 242.
[6]
[50]
See People v. Beduya, G.R. No. 175315, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 275, 284.
Id.
[52]
Rollo, pp. 13-14.
[53]
People v. Villarino, supra note 35 at 389.
[54]
[55]
G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621.
[56]
G.R. No. 188106, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 807.
[57]
Id. at 817-821.
[58]
People v. Villarino, supra note 35 at 390.
[59]
People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009, 580 SCRA 436, 457.
[60]
People v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 180915, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 383, 393.
[61]
Supra note 38 at 475.
[51]
PEOPLE V VILLAFLORES
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF
THEPHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus -
G.R. No. 184926

Present:
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES Promulgated:

y OLANO,
Accused-Appellant.
April 11, 2012
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Circumstantial evidence is admissible as proof to establish both the
commission of a crime and the identity of the culprit.
Under review is the conviction of Edmundo Villaflores for rape with

homicide by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 128,
in Caloocan City based on circumstantial evidence. The Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the conviction with modification on February 22, 2007.[1]
The victim was Marita,[2] a girl who was born on October 29,
1994 based on her certificate of live birth. [3] When her very young life was
snuffed out by strangulation on July 2, 1999, she was only four years and
eight months old.[4] She had been playing at the rear of their residence in
Bagong Silang, CaloocanCity in the morning of July 2, 1999 when Julia, her
mother, first noticed her missing from home. [5] By noontime, because Marita
had not turned up, Julia called her husband Manito at his workplace
in Pasig City, and told him about Marita being missing.[6] Manito rushed
home and arrived there at about 2 pm,[7] and immediately he and Julia went
in search of their daughter until 11 pm, inquiring from house to house in the
vicinity. They did not find her.[8] At 6 am of the next day, Manito reported to
the police that Marita was missing. [9] In her desperation, Julia sought out a
clairvoyant (manghuhula) in an adjacent barangay, and the latter hinted that
Marita might be found only five houses away from their own. Following the
clairvoyants direction, they found Maritas lifeless body covered with a blue
and yellow sack[10] inside the comfort room of an abandoned house about
five structures away from their own house.[11] Her face was black and blue,
and bloody.[12] She had been tortured and strangled till death.
The ensuing police investigation led to two witnesses, Aldrin Bautista
and Jovy Solidum, who indicated that Villaflores might be the culprit who
had raped and killed Marita.[13] The police thus arrested Villaflores at
around 5 pm of July 3, 1999 just as he was alighting from a vehicle.[14]
On July 7, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City filed in the
RTC
the
information charging Villaflores
with rape
with
[15]
homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1999 in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused with lewd design and by means of force, violence and
intimidation employed upon the person of one Marita, a minor of five (5)
years old, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and
have sexual intercourse with said Marita, against the latters will and
without her consent, and thereafter with deliberate intent to kill beat the
minor and choked her with nylon cord which caused the latters death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Arraigned on August 19, 1999, Villaflores pleaded not guilty to the

crime charged.[16]
The CA summarized the evidence of the State in its decision, viz:
After pre-trial was terminated, the trial proceeded with the prosecution
presenting witnesses namely, Aldrin Bautista, Jovie Solidum, Manito, Dr.
Jose Arnel Marquez, SPO2 Protacio Magtajas, SPO2 Arsenio Nacis, PO3
Rodelio Ortiz, PO Harold Blanco and PO Sonny Boy Tepase.
From their testimonies, it is gathered that in the afternoon of July 3, 1999,
the lifeless body of a 5-year old child, Marita (hereinafter Marita) born on
October 21, 1994, (see Certificate of Live Birth marked as Exhibit K) was
discovered by her father, Manito (hereinafter Manito) beside a toilet bowl
at an unoccupied house about 5 houses away from their residence in Phase
9, Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. The day before at about noon time his
wife called him up at his work place informing him that their daughter was
missing, prompting Jessie to hie home and search for the child. He went
around possible places, inquiring from neighbors but no one could provide
any lead until the following morning when his wife in desperation,
consulted a manghuhula at a nearby barangay. According to the
manghuhula his daughter was just at the 5th house from his house. And that
was how he tracked down his daughter in exact location. She was covered
with a blue sack with her face bloodied and her body soaked to the
skin. He found a yellow sack under her head and a white rope around her
neck about 2 and a half feet long and the diameter, about the size of his
middle finger. There were onlookers around when the NBI and policemen
from Sub-station 6 arrived at the scene. The SOCO Team took pictures of
Marita. Jessie was investigated and his statements were marked Exhibits
C, D and D-1. He incurred funeral expenses in the total amount of
P52,000.00 marked as Exhibit L and sub-markings. (See other expenses
marked as Exhibit M and sub-markings).
Two (2) witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum, came forward and
narrated that at about 10:00 oclock in the morning of July 2, 1999, they
saw Edmundo Villaflores, known in the neighborhood by his Batman tag
and a neighbor of the [victims family], leading Marita by the hand
(umakay sa bata). At about noon time they were at Batmans house where
they used shabu for a while. Both Aldrin and Jovie are drug users. Aldrin
sports a sputnik tattoo mark on his body while Jovie belongs to the T.C.G.
(through crusher gangster). While in Batmans place, although he did not
see Marita, Jovie presumed that Batman was hiding the child at the back
of the house. Jovie related that about3:00 oclock in the afternoon of the
same day, he heard cries of a child as he passed by the house of Batman
(Narinig ko pong umiiyak ang batang babae at umuungol). At about 7:00
oclock in the evening, Jovie saw again Batman carrying a yellow sack
towards a vacant house. He thought that the child must have been in the
sack because it appeared heavy. It was the sack that he saw earlier in the
house of Batman.
Among the first to respond to the report that the dead body of a child was
found was SPO2 PROTACIO MAGTAJAS, investigator at Sub-station 6
Bagong Silang, CaloocanCity who was dispatched by Police Chief
Inspector Alfredo Corpuz. His OIC, SPO2 Arsenio Nacis called the SOCO
Team and on different vehicles they proceeded to Bagong Silang, Phase 9
arriving there at about 2 o:clock in the afternoon of July 3, 1999. They saw
the body of the child at the back portion of an abandoned house where he
himself recovered pieces of evidence such as the nylon rope (Exhibit N)
and the yellow sack inside the comfort room. The child appeared black
and blue, (kawawa yong bata wasak ang mukha). He saw blood stains on
her lips and when he removed the sack covering her body, he also saw
blood stains in her vagina. The yellow sack that he was referring to when
brought out in court had already a greenish and fleshy color. The sack was
no longer in the same condition when recovered, saying, when asked by
the Court: medyo buo pa, hindi pa ho ganyang sira-sira. There was another
sack, colored blue, which was used to cover the face of the child while the
yellow sack was at the back of the victim. He forgot about the blue sack
when SOCO Team arrived because they were the ones who brought the
body to the funeral parlor. He had already interviewed some person when
the SOCO Team arrived composed of Inspector Abraham Pelotin, their
team leader, and 2 other members. He was the one who took the statement
of the wife of Edmundo Villaflores, Erlinda, and turned over the pieces of
evidence to Police Officer SPO2 Arsenio Nacis who placed a tag to mark
the items. When the SOCO Team arrived, a separate investigation was
conducted by Inspector Pelotin.
PO3 RODELIO ORTIZ, assigned at Station 1, Caloocan City Police
Station, as a police investigator, took the sworn statement of Aldrin
Bautista upon instruction of his chief, SPO2 Arsenio Nacis, asked Aldrin
to read his statement after which he signed the document then gave it to
investigator, SPO2 Protacio Magtajas. During the investigation, he caused
the confrontation between Aldrin Bautista and Edmundo
Villaflores. Aldrin went closer to the detention cell from where he
identified and pointed to Villaflores as the one who abducted the child.
Villaflores appeared angry.
SPO2 ARSENIO NACIS participation was to supervise the preparation of
the documents to be submitted for inquest to the fiscal. He asked the
investigator to prepare the affidavit of the victims father and the statement
of the two witnesses and also asked the investigator to prepare the referral
slip and other documents needed in the investigation. He ordered the
evidence custodian, PO3 Alex Baruga to secure all the physical evidence
recovered from the scene of the crime composed of 2 sacks. In the
afternoon of July 3, the suspect, Edmundo Villaflores was arrested by PO3
Harold Blanco, SPO1 Antonio Alfredo, NUP Antonio Chan and the
members of Bantay Bayan in Bagong Silang.
PO1 HAROLD BLANCO of the Sangandaan Police Station, Caloocan
City, as follow-up operative, was in the office at about 1:00 oclock in the
afternoon of July 3, 1999, together with PO3 Alfredo Antonio and Police
Officer Martin Interia, when Police Inspector Corpuz, as leader formed a
team for them to go to the scene of the crime. They immediately
proceeded to Phase 9. Inspector Corpuz entered the premises while he
stayed with his companions and guarded the place. SPO3 Magtajas was
already investigating the case. They were informed that the group of
Aldrin could shed light on the incident. Blanco and the other police
officers returned to the crime scene and asked the people around, who kept
mum and were elusively afraid to talk. When he went with SPO1 Antonio
Chan accompanied by councilman Leda to the house of Batman, it was
already padlocked. They went to the place of SPO1 Alfredo Antonio
nearby to avoid detection and asked a child to look out for
Villaflores. Soon enough, a jeep from Phase 1 arrived and a commotion
ensued as people started blocking the way of Villaflores, who alighted
from the said jeep. The officers took him in custody and brought him to
Sub-station 6 and SPO3 Nacis instructed them to fetch his wife. He was
with police officer Antonio Chan and they waited for the arrival of the
wife of Villaflores from the market. When she arrived, it was already night
time. They informed her that her husband was at Sub-station 6 being a
suspect in the killing of a child. There was no reaction on her part. She
was with her 3 minor children in the house. She went with them to the
precinct. When Sgt. Nacis asked Mrs. Villaflores if she knew anything
about what happened on the night of July 2, initially, she denied but in the
course of the questioning she broke down and cried and said that she saw
her husband place some sacks under their house. He remembered the wife
saying, noong gabing nakita niya si Villaflores, may sako sa silong ng
bahay nila, tapos pagdating ni Villaflores, inayos niya yong sako at

nilapitan niya raw, nakita niya may siko, tapos tinanong niya si Villaflores,
ano yon? Sabi niya, wala yon, wala yon. The wife was crying and she said
that her husband was also on drugs and even used it in front of their
children. She said that she was willing to give a statement against her
husband. Their house is a kubo the floor is made of wood and there is
space of about 2 feet between the floor and the ground. She saw the sack
filled with something but when she asked her husband, he said it was
nothing. She related that before she went outside, she again took a look at
the sack and she saw a protruding elbow inside the sack. She went inside
the house and went out again to check the sack and saw the child. It was
Sgt. Nacis who typed the statement of Erlinda Villaflores which she
signed. He identified the sworn statement marked as Exhibit X and submarkings.
PO1 SONNY BOY TEPACE assigned at the NPD Crime Laboratory,
SOCO, Caloocan City Police Station also went to the crime scene on July
3, 1999 at about 2:50 in the afternoon with Team Leader Abraham Pelotin,
at the vacant lot of Block 57, Lot 12, Phase 9, Caloocan City. He cordoned
the area and saw the dead child at the back of the uninhabited house. She
was covered with a blue sack and a nylon cord tied around her neck. There
was another yellow sack at the back of her head. He identified the nylon
cord (Exhibit N) and the yellow sack. He does not know where the blue
sack is, but he knew that it was in the possession of the officer on
case. The blue sack appears in the picture marked as Exhibits S, T, and R,
and was marked Exhibits T-3-A, S-1 and R-2-A. Thereafter they marked
the initial report as Exhibit U and sub-markings. They also prepared a
rough sketch dated July 3, 1999 with SOCO report 047-99 marked as
Exhibit V and the second sketch dated July 3, 1999 with SOCO report
047-99 marked as Exhibit W.
DR. ARNEL MARQUEZ, Medico Legal Officer of the PNP Crime
Laboratory with office at Caloocan City Police Station conducted the
autopsy on the body of Marita upon request of Chief Inspector
Corpus. The certificate of identification and consent for autopsy executed
by the father of the victim was marked as Exhibit G. He opined that the
victim was already dead for 24 hours when he conducted the examination
on July 3, 1999 at about 8 oclock in the evening. The postmortem
examination disclosed the following:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished female child cadaver in
secondary stage of flaccidity with postmortem lividity at the
dependent portions of the body.Conjunctivae are pale. Lips and

nailbeds are cyanotic.
HEAD, NECK AND TRUNK
1) Hematoma, right periorbital region, measuring 4 x 3.5 cm;
3.5 cm from the anterior midline.
2) Area of multiple abrasions, right zygomatic region,
measuring 4 x 2.2 cm, from the anterior midline.
3) Abrasion, right cheek, measuring 1.7 x 0.8 cm, 3 cm from
the anterior midline.
4) Area of multiple abrasions, upper lip, measuring 4 x 1 cm,
bisected by the anterior midline.
5) Contusion, frontal region, measuring 6 x 4 cm, 6.5 cm left
of the anterior midline.
6) Punctured wound, left pre-auricular region, measuring 9.2
x 0.1 cm, 11.5 cm from the anterior midline.
7) Ligature mark, neck, measuring 24 x 0.5 cm, bisected by
the anterior midline.
8) Abrasion, right scapular region, measuring 0.7 x 0.4 cm, 6
cm from the Posterior midline.
9) Abrasion, left scapular region, measuring 1.2 x 0.8 cm, 6.5
cm from the posterior midline.
There are multiple deep fresh lacerations at the hymen. The
vestibule is abraded and markedly congested, while the posterior
fourchette is likewise lacerated and marked congested.
The lining mucosa of the larynx, trachea and esophagus are
markedly congested with scattered petecchial hemorrhages.
Stomach is full of partially digested food particles mostly
rice.
Cause of death is asphyxia by strangulation.
There were multiple deep laceration at the hymen and the vestibule was
abraded and markedly congested while the posterior fourchette was
likewise lacerated and markedly congested, too. It could have been caused
by an insertion of blunt object like a human penis. The cause of death was
asphyxia by strangulation, in laymans term, sinakal sa pamamagitan ng
tali. The external injuries could have been caused by contact with a blunt
object like a piece of wood. The abrasion could have also been caused by a
hard and rough surface. He prepared the Medico Legal Report No. M-25099 of the victim, Marita _____ marked as Exhibit H and sub-markings. He
issued the death certificate marked as Exhibit E. The anatomical sketch
representing the body of the victim was marked as Exhibit I and submarkings. The sketch of the head of the victim was marked Exhibit J. The
injuries on the head could have been caused by hard and blunt object
while other injuries were caused by coming in contact with a hard or
rough surface. There were also punctured wounds which could have been
caused by a barbecue stick or anything pointed. The ligature mark was
congested and depressed.
On cross-examination, among others, he explained the stages of flaccidity
which is the softening of the body of a dead person. The first 3 hours after
death is the primary stage of flaccidity and after the third hour, the body
will be in rigor mortis and after the 24 hours, it is the secondary stage. The
victim could have been dead at least 9 oclockin the morning on July 2. As
regards the multiple lacerations of the hymen, it is possible that two or
more persons could have caused it.
The CA similarly summed up the evidence of Villaflores, as follows:

EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES, testifying in his behalf, denied the charge
of raping and killing the child saying he did not see the child at anytime
on July 2, 1999. At around10:00 oclock in the morning of July 2, 1999, he
was at the market place at Phase 10 to get some plywood for his Aunt
Maring. His Aunt called him at 8:30 in the morning and stayed there for
about 5 hours and arrived home at around 5:00 in the afternoon. His Aunt
was residing at Phase 10 which is about a kilometer from his place. His
residence is some 5 houses away from the place of the child. He knows the
child because sometimes he was asked by the wife of Manito to fix their
electrical connection. He corrected himself by saying he does not know
Marita but only her father, Manito. He denied carrying a sack and
throwing it at the vacant lot. He was arrested on July 3, 1999 and does not
know of any reason why he was charged. He has witnesses like Maring,
Sherwin, Pareng Bong and Frankie to prove that he had no participation in
the killing.
On cross-examination, among others, he admitted being called Batman in
their place and that Aldrin and Jovie are his friends. They go to his house
at Package 5, Phase 9, Lot32 in Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. They are
his close friends being his neighbors and they usually went to his house
where they used shabu (gumagamit ng bato). At 42, he is older than Aldrin
and Jovie. He knew Marita who sometimes called him to his house to fix
electrical wiring. He also knew his wife, but does not know their children.
On the night of July 2, Aldrin and Jovie went to his house. He was arrested
on July 3 in a street near the precinct while walking with his wife. They
came from Bayan. His wife works in a sidewalk restaurant. Two of his
children were in Phase 3, the other two were in his house and two more
were left with his siblings. When he was arrested, he was carrying some
food items which they brought in Bayan. They did not tell him why he
was being arrested. He saw his wife once at Police Station 1 before he was
brought to the city jail. Aldrin and Jovie harbored ill feelings against him
because the last time they went to his house he did not allow them to use
shabu. He admitted using shabu everytime his friends went to his
house. He is not legally married to his wife. She visited him for the last
time on July 19, 1999. He denied that the door of his house had a sack
covering neither was it locked by a piece of string. He has not talked with
the father or mother of the child nor did he ask his wife for help. He just
waited for his mother and she told him, they will fight it out in court,
ilalaban sa husgado.
On re-direct he said that Aldrin and Jovie often went in and out of his
house. His bathroom is in front of his house.
SHERWIN BORCILLO, an electronic technician and neighbor of
Edmundo Villaflores told the court that the charges against Villaflores
were not true, the truth being, that on the night of July 2, 1999 he saw
Aldrin and Jovie at the back of his house holding a sack containing
something which he did not know. They were talking to Batman and
offering a dog contained in the sack and then they left the sack near the
comfort room outside the door of the house of Batman. They came back
and took the yellow sack. He followed them up to the other pathwalk and
then he went home. The following day he learned that Villaflores was
being charged with the killing of Marita. At first, he just kept quiet
because he thought Villaflores should be taught a lesson for being a drug
user, but later when he had a drinking spree with his father and uncle, he
told them what he knew because he could not trust any policeman in their
place. He told them what really happened and they advised him to report
the matter to the barangay. So he went to the purok and made a statement
in an affidavit form. He executed the Salaysay in the presence of their
Purok secretary and barangay tanod. It was the Purok secretary who gave
him the form. He saw Aldrin and Jovie about midnight of July 2,
1999. There was also another person with them, one Jose Pitallana, who is
the eldest in the group and considered their Amo-amo. In his affidavit, he
said: Ako ay lumabas ng bahay at sinundan ko siya at nakita ko si Jose na
tinalian ng nylon and bata. Tapos po ay may narinig po akong kung sino
man ang titistego sa akin ay papatayin ko, basta kayo ang saksi sa ginawa
in Batman. He said he was sure that the sack contained the child because
he saw the head of the child, it seemed like she was staring at him and
asking his help. He executed the statement after the arrest of the
accused. He did not go to the police station to narrate his story. He made
his statement not in the barangay hall but only at their purok.
On cross-examination, among others, he said that on July 2, 1999 he left
the house at about 11:00 oclock in the morning to go to school in PMI at
Sta. Cruz, Manila. He did not see Batman, nor Aldrin, or Jovie
about noon time of July 2. He arrived home at about 8:00 oclock in the
evening because he passed by the Susano Market in Novaliches to see his
mother who was a vendor there. They closed the store at about 6:30, then
they bought some food stuffs to bring home. He was not sure of the date
when Batman was arrested. He admitted that Batman is his uncle being the
brother of his mother. His uncle is a known drug addict in the area. He
usually saw him using shabu in the company of Jose Pitallana, his wife,
Aldrin and Jovie. After he was informed that his uncle was arrested, he did
not do anything because he was busy reviewing for his exam. He did not
also visit him in jail. After he made his statement, he showed it to their
Purok Leader, Melencio Yambao and Purok Secretary, Reynaldo
Mapa. They read his statement and recorded it in the logbook. It was not
notarized. He had no occasion to talk with Aldrin and Jovie. Jose Pitallana
is no longer residing in their place. He did not even know that Aldrin and
Jovie testified against his uncle. He never went to the police to tell the
truth about the incident.
As earlier stated, on May 27, 2004, the RTC convicted Villaflores

of rape with homicide, holding that the circumstantial evidence led to no
other conclusion but that his guilt was shown beyond reasonable doubt.
[17]
The RTC decreed:
Wherefore, the Court finds accused Edmundo Villaflores guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of raping and killing Marita and hereby
sentences him to the Supreme penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the sum of P75,000.00, moral damages in the sum
of P30,000.00 and exemplary damages in the sum of P20,000.00, and to
pay the cost if this suit, to be paid to the heirs if the victim.
The City Jail Warden of Caloocan City is hereby ordered to bring the
accused to the National Penitentiary upon receipt hereof after the
promulgation of the decision.
Let the records of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review.
SO ORDERED.
On intermediate review, the CA affirmed the conviction,[18] disposing:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the RTC Caloocan City, Branch 128

finding the accused Edmundo Villaflores guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape with homicide is affirmed with modification in the
sense that (a) the death penalty imposed by the trial court is commuted to
reclusion perpetua and the judgment on the civil liability is modified by
ordering the appellant to pay the amount of P100,000.00 civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 moral damages and P52,000.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
Villaflores now reiterates that the RTC and the CA gravely erred in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide because
the State did not discharge its burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt
every fact and circumstance constituting the crime charged.
In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General counters that the guilt
of Villaflores for rape with homicide was established beyond reasonable
doubt through circumstantial evidence.
Ruling
We sustain Villaflores conviction.
I
Nature of rape with homicide
as a composite crime, explained
The felony of rape with homicide is a composite crime. A composite

crime, also known as a special complex crime, is composed of two or more
crimes that the law treats as a single indivisible and unique offense for being
the product of a single criminal impulse. It is a specific crime with a specific
penalty provided by law, and differs from a compound or complex crime
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand,

and a complex or compound crime under Article 48, supra, on the other
hand. In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law;
in a complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not
specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense
being the necessary means to commit the other. For a composite crime, the
penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific; for a complex or
compound crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious
offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that
accompanies a composite crime is absorbed; a light felony that accompanies
the commission of a complex or compound crime may be the subject of a
separate information.
Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997) pertinently provides:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstance mentioned
above be present.
xxx
Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by

reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.
xxx
The law on rape quoted herein thus defines and sets forth the
composite crimes of attempted rape with homicide and rape with homicide.
In both composite crimes, the homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion of rape. As can be noted, each of said composite crimes is
punished with a single penalty, the former with reclusion perpetua to death,
and the latter with death.
The phrases by reason of the rape and on the occasion of the rape are
crucial in determining whether the crime is a composite crime or a complex
or compound crime. The phrase by reason of the rape obviously conveys the
notion that the killing is due to the rape, the offense the offender originally
designed to commit. The victim of the rape is also the victim of the killing.
The indivisibility of the homicide and the rape (attempted or
consummated) is clear and admits of no doubt. In contrast, the import of the
phrase on the occasion of the rape may not be as easy to determine. To
understand what homicide may be covered by the phrase on the occasion of
the rape, a resort to the meaning the framers of the law intended to convey
thereby is helpful. Indeed, during the floor deliberations of the Senate on
Republic Act No. 8353, the legislative intent on the import of the phrase on
the occasion of the rape to refer to a killing that occurs
immediatelybefore or after, or during the commission itself of the attempted
or consummated rape, where the victim of the homicide may be a person
other than the rape victim herself for as long as the killing is linked to the
rape, became evident, viz:
Senator Enrile. x x x
I would like to find out, first of all, Mr. President, what is the
meaning of the phrase appearing in line 24, or on the occasion?
When the rape is attempted or frustrated, and homicide is committed

by reason of the rape, I would understand that. But what is the meaning of
the phrase on the occasion of rape? How far in time must the commission
of the homicide be considered a homicide on the occasion of the rape?
Will it be, if the rapists happen to leave the place of rape, they are drunk
and they killed somebody along the way, would there be a link between
that homicide and the rape? Will it be on the occasion of the rape?
Senator Shahani. x x x It will have to be linked with the rape itself,
and the homicide is committed with a very short time lapse.
Senator Enrile. I would like to take the first scenario, Mr. President:
If the rapist enters a house, kills a maid, and rapes somebody inside the
house, I would probably consider that as a rape on the occasion of. Or if
the rapists finished committing the crime of rape, and upon leaving, saw
somebody, let us say, a potential witness inside the house and kills him,
that is probably clear. But suppose the man happens to kill somebody, will
there be a link between these? What is the intent of the phrase on the
occasion of rape? x x x
xxx
Senator Shahani. Mr. President, the principal crime here, of course,
is rape, and homicide is a result of the circumstances surrounding the rape.
So, the instance which was brought up by the good senator from
Cagayan where, let us say, the offender is fleeing the place or is
apprehended by the police and he commits homicide, I think would be
examples where the phrase on the occasion thereof would apply. But the
principal intent, Mr. President, is rape.[19]
II
The State discharged its burden of
proving the rape with homicide
beyond reasonable doubt
As with all criminal prosecutions, the State carried the burden of

proving all the elements of rape and homicide beyond reasonable doubt in
order to warrant the conviction of Villaflores for the rape with
homicide charged in the information.[20] The State must thus prove the
concurrence of the following facts, namely: (a) that Villaflores had carnal
knowledge of Marita; (b) that he consummated the carnal knowledge
without the consent of Marita; and (c) that he killed Marita by reason of the
rape.
Under Article 266-A, supra, rape is always committed when the
accused has carnal knowledge of a female under 12 years of age. The crime
is commonly called statutory rape, because a female of that age is deemed
incapable of giving consent to the carnal knowledge. Maritas Certificate of
Live Birth (Exhibit K) disclosed that she was born on October 29, 1994,
indicating her age to be only four years and eight months at the time of the
commission of the crime on July 2, 1999. As such, carnal knowledge of her
by Villaflores would constitute statutory rape.
We have often conceded the difficulty of proving the commission of
rape when only the victim is left to testify on the circumstances of its
commission. The difficulty heightens and complicates when the crime
is rape with homicide, because there may usually be no living witnesses if
the rape victim is herself killed. Yet, the situation is not always hopeless for
the State, for the Rules of Court also allows circumstantial evidence to
establish the commission of the crime as well as the identity of the culprit.
[21]
Direct evidence proves a fact in issue directly without any reasoning or
inferences being drawn on the part of the factfinder; in contrast,
circumstantial evidence indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the
factfinder must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence.
[22]
To be clear, then, circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when to
insist on direct testimony would ultimately lead to setting a felon free.[23]
The Rules of Court makes no distinction between direct evidence of a
fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may
be inferred; hence, no greater degree of certainty is required when the
evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, the trier of
fact must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused.[24] Nor has the quantity of circumstances sufficient to convict an
accused been fixed as to be reduced into some definite standard to be
followed in every instance. Thus, the Court said in People v. Modesto:[25]
The standard postulated by this Court in the appreciation of

circumstantial evidence is well set out in the following passage
from People vs. Ludday:[26] No general rule can be laid down as to the
quantity of circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.
Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court specifies when

circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, viz:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (5)
In resolving to convict Villaflores, both the RTC and the CA

considered several circumstances, which when appreciated together and not
piece by piece, according to the CA, [27] were seen as strands which create a
pattern when interwoven, and formed an unbroken chain that led to the
reasonable conclusion that Villaflores, to the exclusion of all others, was
guilty of rape with homicide.
We concur with the RTC and the CA.
The duly established circumstances we have considered are the
following. Firstly, Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum saw Villaflores holding
Marita by the hand (akay-akay) at around 10:00 am on July 2, 1999,
[28]
leading the child through the alley going towards the direction of his
house about 6 houses away from the victims house.[29] Secondly, Marita went
missing after that and remained missing until the discovery of her lifeless
body on the following day.[30] Thirdly, Solidum passed by Villaflores house at
about 3:00 pm of July 2, 1999 and heard the crying and moaning (umuungol)
of a child coming from inside. [31] Fourthly, at about 7:00 pm of July 2,

1999 Solidum saw Villaflores coming from his house carrying a yellow sack
that appeared to be heavy and going towards the abandoned house where the
childs lifeless body was later found.[32] Fifthly, Manito, the father of Marita,
identified the yellow sack as the same yellow sack that covered the head of
his daughter (nakapalupot sa ulo) at the time he discovered her body;
[33]
Manito also mentioned that a blue sack covered her body.[34]Sixthly, a
hidden pathway existed between the abandoned house where Maritas body
was found and Villaflores house, because his house had a rear exit that
enabled access to the abandoned house without having to pass any other
houses.[35] This indicated Villaflores familiarity and access to the abandoned
house. Seventhly, several pieces of evidence recovered from the abandoned
house, like the white rope around the victims neck and the yellow sack, were
traced to Villaflores. The white rope was the same rope tied to the door of
his house,[36] and the yellow sack was a wall-covering for his toilet.
[37]
Eighthly, the medico-legal findings showed that Marita had died from
asphyxiation by strangulation, which cause of death was consistent with the
ligature marks on her neck and the multiple injuries including abrasions,
hematomas, contusions and punctured wounds. Ninthly, Marita sustained
multiple deep fresh hymenal lacerations, and had fresh blood from her
genitalia. The vaginal and periurethral smears taken from her body tested
positive for spermatozoa.[38] And, tenthly, the body of Marita was already in
the second stage of flaccidity at the time of the autopsy of her cadaver at 8
pm of July 3, 1999. The medico-legal findings indicated that such stage of
flaccidity confirmed that she had been dead for more than 24 hours, or at the
latest by 9 pm of July 2, 1999.
These circumstances were links in an unbroken chain whose totality
has brought to us a moral certainty of the guilt of Villaflores for rape with
homicide. As to the rape, Marita was found to have suffered multiple deep
fresh hymenal lacerations, injuries that Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, the medicolegal officer who had conducted the autopsy of her cadaver on July 3, 1999,
attributed to the insertion of a blunt object like a human penis. The fact that
the vaginal and periurethralsmears taken from Marita tested positive for
spermatozoa confirmed that the blunt object was an adult human penis. As to
the homicide, her death was shown to be caused by strangulation with a
rope, and the time of death as determined by the medico-legal findings was
consistent with the recollection of Solidum of seeing Villaflores going
towards the abandoned house at around 7 pm of July 2, 1999 carrying the
yellow sack that was later on found to cover Maritas head. Anent the
identification of Villaflores as the culprit, the testimonies of Solidum and
Bautista attesting to Villaflores as the person they had seen holding Marita
by the hand going towards the abandoned house before the victim went
missing, the hearing by Solidum of moaning and crying of a child from
within Villaflores house, and the tracing to Villaflores of the yellow sack and
the white rope found at the crime scene sufficiently linked Villaflores to the
crime.
We note that the RTC and the CA disbelieved the exculpating
testimony of Borcillo. They justifiably did so. For one, after he stated during
direct examination that Villaflores was only his neighbor,[39] it soon came to
be revealed during his cross-examination that he was really a son of
Villaflores own sister.[40] Borcillo might have concealed their close blood
relationship to bolster the credibility of his testimony favoring his uncle, but
we cannot tolerate his blatant attempt to mislead the courts about a fact
relevant to the correct adjudication of guilt or innocence. Borcillo deserved
no credence as a witness. Also, Borcillos implicating Solidum and Bautista
in the crime, and exculpating his uncle were justly met with skepticism. Had
Borcillos incrimination of Solidum and Bautista been factually true,
Villaflores could have easily validated his alibi of having run an errand for
an aunt about a kilometer away from the place of the crime on that morning
of July 2, 1999. Yet, the alibi could not stand, both because the alleged aunt
did not even come forward to substantiate the alibi, and because the Defense
did not demonstrate the physical impossibility for Villaflores to be at the
place where the crime was committed at the time it was committed.
The CA reduced the penalty of death prescribed by the RTC
to reclusion perpetua in consideration of the intervening enactment on June
24,
2006 of Republic Act No. 9346.[41] Nonetheless, we have also to specify in
the judgment that Villaflores shall not be eligible for parole, considering that
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 expressly holds persons whose

sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act not
eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law), as
amended.
The awards of damages allowed by the CA are proper. However, we
add exemplary damages to take into account the fact that Marita was below
seven years of age at the time of the commission of the rape with homicide.
Article 266-B, Revised Penal Code has expressly declared such tender age
of the victim as an aggravating circumstance in rape, to wit:
Article 266-B. Penalties. xxx.
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
xxx
5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;
xxx
Pursuant to the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed in a

criminal case as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances.[42] The Civil Code permits such
award by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. [43] Granting
exemplary damages is not dependent on whether the aggravating
circumstance is actually appreciated or not to increase the penalty. As such,
the Court recognizes the entitlement of the heirs of Marita to exemplary
damages as a way of correction for the public good. For thepurpose,
P30,000.00 is reasonable and proper as exemplary damages,[44] for a lesser
amount would not serve genuine exemplarity.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by
the Court of Appeals on February 22, 2007 finding and
pronouncing EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES y OLANO guilty of rape with
homicide, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS, namely: (a) that he
shall suffer reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility for parole under Act No.
4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law), as amended; (b) that he shall pay to the
heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in addition
to the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals; and (c) that all the awards
for damages shall bear interest of 6% per annumreckoned from the finality
of this decision.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA
J.
LEONARDO-DE
C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CASTRO MARIANO

Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 4-33; penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa (retired), with Associate Justice
Marina L. Buzon (retired) and Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam (deceased) concurring.
[2]
The real names of the victim and members of her immediate family are withheld pursuant to Republic
Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act)
and Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004). In place of the
real names, fictitious names are used. See People v. Cabalquinto, G..R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006,
502 SCRA 419.
[3]
Records, p. 285 (Certificate of Live Birth, Exhibit K).
[4]
Id., p. 278 (Certificate of Death, Exhibit E).
[5]
TSN, August 3, 2000, p. 14.
[6]
[7]
Id., p. 6.
[8]
Id., p. 7.
[9]
Id., p. 10.
[10]
Id., p. 12.
[11]
Id., p. 11.
[12]
Id., p. 13.
[13]
[14]
Id., p. 17.
[15]
Records, p. 1.
[16]
Id., pp. 11-12.

Records, pp. 345-368.
[18]
Supra, note 1.
[19]
Record of the Senate (10 th Congress), Individual Amendments S. No. 950, Volume I, No. 8, August 7,
1996, pp. 254-255.
[20]
See People v. Nanas, G..R. No. 137299, August 21, 2001, 363 SCRA 452, 464.
[21]
Id.
[22]
People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 104497, January 18, 1995, 240 SCRA 191, 198; citing Gardner, Criminal
Evidence, Principles, Cases and Readings, West Publishing Co., 1978 ed., p. 124.
[23]
Amora v. People, G.R. No. 154466, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 485, 491.
[24]
People v. Ramos, supra, note 22; citing Robinson v. State, 18 Md. App. 678, 308 A2d 734 (1973).
[25]
No. L-25484, September 21, 1968, 25 SCRA 36, 41.
[26]
61 Phil. 216, 221-222 (1935).
[27]
Rollo, p. 28.
[28]
TSN, October 14, 1999, p. 5; and November 4, 1999, pp.5-6.
[29]
[30]
[31]
TSN, December 3, 2001, pp..5, 16.
[32]
TSN, November 4, 1999, pp. 8-9.
[33]
TSN, May 24, 2001, p. 5.
[34]
[35]
[36]
Id., p. 21.
[37]
Id., p. 20.
[38]
TSN, February 10, 2000, pp. 5-6.
[39]
TSN, September 8, 2001, p. 3.
[40]
Id., p. 16.
[41]
An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, repealing Republic Act 8177
otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection, Republic Act 7659 otherwise known as
the Death Penalty Law and All Other Laws, Executive Orders and Decrees.
[42]
Article 2230, Civil Code.
[43]
Article 2229, Civil Code.
[44]
See People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 188353, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 738, 752, People v. Del
Rosario, G.R. No. 189580, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 625, 637-638.
[17]
PEOPLE V CATAYTAY
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 196315, October 22, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEONARDO CATAYTAY Y
SILVANO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an Appeal1 from the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32275 dated August
11, 2010 affirming the conviction of accused-appellant Leonardo Cataytay y Silvano for the crime of
rape.
Accused-appellant Cataytay was charged of said crime in an Information dated September 9,

2003:
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 07th day of September 2003, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs[,] and
by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have
carnal knowledge [of AAA],3 19 years of age but with a mental age of a 5 year old, hence, a
retardate, or demented, which is known to accused at the time of the commission of the offense,
against her will and consent and to her damage and prejudice. 4
Accused-appellant Cataytay entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment on October 3, 2003.
Trial thereafter ensued.
BBB (AAAs mother) testified that she knew accused-appellant Cataytay as her neighbor in their
compound in Mandaluyong City. Accused-appellant was a shoe repairman who had a shop six
houses away from BBBs house.5
On September 7, 2003, at around 6:30 p.m., BBB left AAA in their house to look for BBBs youngest
daughter. Thirty minutes later, when she reached the bridge near Block 37, her neighbor, Lito, told
her that there was a problem, and brought her to the barangay outpost. AAA and the accusedappellant were already at the outpost. Lito told the persons at the outpost that she was the mother
of the victim. When BBB saw AAA, the latter told her, Mommy, ni-rape po ako. BBB asked her
who raped her. AAA responded by pointing to accused-appellant. During the interviews made by
the barangay officials, AAA narrated how she was raped by accused-appellant, which ended when a
certain Mimi knocked at the door. When accused-appellant answered the knock, Mimi told the
former that she will shout if he does not leave the house. AAA went out of the house and sought
help from their neighbors. One of their neighbors, Amelita Morante, called the barangay officials at
the outpost.6
BBB identified a Psychological Evaluation Report from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) dated May 25, 1999, which was conducted in connection with another rape
case. The report stated that AAA had the mental capacity of an eight-year-old child. 7 BBB also
identified AAAs birth certificate which showed that she was biologically 19 years old at the time of
the incident.8
On cross-examination, BBB confirmed that AAA was the victim in a rape case in 1999 against a
certain Norberto Lerit. BBB admitted that she did not personally witness the alleged rape
committed by the accused-appellant.9
When AAA appeared as the second witness for the prosecution, the prosecution manifested that by
merely looking at her, it was apparent that she was mentally retardate. 10 AAA, who was crying
while being asked questions, testified that she was raped by accused-appellant by inserting his
penis into her, despite her protestations. After the deed, she was given money by accusedappellant. She knew the accused-appellant before the incident as a shoe repairman. 11
DSWD Social Worker Arlene Gampal testified that she referred AAA to the National Center for
Mental Health (NCMH) for psychological examination. She also conducted a Social Case Study upon
AAA in relation to the incident of sexual abuse at the hands of the accused. 12 NCMH Psychologist
Susan Sabado was presented as a prosecution witness, but her testimony was dispensed with
when the defense agreed to a stipulation regarding her expertise and that the tests conducted on
AAA affirmed that the latter had a mental capacity of a seven-year-old child. 13
Police Chief Inspector (PC/Insp.) Bonnie Chua, the medico-legal officer who examined AAA on
September 8, 2003 was likewise presented as a prosecution witness. The defense agreed to a
stipulation that the findings of the examination were consistent with recent sexual intercourse. 14
For the defense, accused-appellant testified that on September 7, 2003, at around 7:00 p.m., he
was in his house together with his brother, feeding his four-year-old daughter. He then went out
and proceeded to a videoke bar, which was around 20 meters from his house.15 He stayed at
the videokebar for less than 15 minutes, as barangay officers suddenly arrived and arrested him.
Upon asking why he was being arrested, the officers told him that he was the suspect in the rape of
AAA. He was brought to the Barangay Hall, where he denied the accusations against him. He
estimated that the house of BBB was more or less 50 meters away from his house, 16 and that it
would take more or less a one minute walk from the videoke bar to the house of AAA.17 Accusedappellant admitted that by merely looking at AAA, he could tell that she has a mental disability.18
Accused-appellants brother, Jose Fresco Cataytay (Jose), testified that at 6:30 p.m. of
September 7, 2003, accused-appellant was inside their house feeding his daughter. At around 7:00
p.m., accused-appellant told Jose that he will go to the videoke bar, which was around 30 meters
away from their house. Accused-appellant stayed in the videoke bar for 5 to 10 minutes, then went
back to their house and watched television. Accused-appellant was arrested that night within the
vicinity of their house by the barangay tanods. He estimated that AAAs house is 20 to 30 meters
away from the videoke bar, and that it would take less than five minutes to reach the house of AAA
from the videoke bar.19
Alicia Panaguitol (Alicia), a neighbor of AAA and accused-appellant, testified that she lives two
meters away from AAAs house and 60 meters away from that of accused-appellant. She was inside
her house at around 7:00 p.m. of September 7, 2003, during which time she heard AAA shouting
that she was raped. She asked AAA who raped her. AAA replied Pilay, apparently referring to
their neighbor who was called Jun Pilay. Alicia saw Jun Pilay run from AAAs house towards a dark
area.20
On February 5, 2009, the RTC rendered its Judgment finding accused-appellant guilty as charged,
and disposing of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, accused LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO is hereby

found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape against one [AAA] defined and
penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 266-B
paragraph 10 of the same Code.
As a consequence thereof, accused LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of from TWENTY YEARS (20) and ONE (1) DAY to FORTY (40) YEARS
of reclusion perpetua.
Further, accused LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO is hereby ordered to indemnify the victim [AAA],
the amount of SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) as and by way of moral damages
and SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) by way of exemplary damages.
Finally, the period of detention of accused LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO at the Mandaluyong City
Jail is hereby fully credited to his account.21
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32275.
On August 11, 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that an additional award of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity is granted to the victim and the award of exemplary damages of P75,000.00 is reduced to
P30,000.00. The penalty of imprisonment to be served is simply reclusion perpetua.22
Hence, this appeal, where accused-appellant Cataytay adopted his Appellants Brief with the Court
of Appeals, which contained the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FACT
THAT HE WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED.23
In his appellants brief, accused-appellant claims that BBBs testimony concerning the details of the
commission of the rape as narrated by AAA is hearsay and therefore has no probative value.
Accused-appellant also points out that the Psychological Evaluation Report dated May 25, 1999 and
Psychological Report dated June 29, 2009 illustrate that AAA can be easily influenced.
At the outset, we agree with accused-appellant that the details concerning the manner of the
commission of the rape, which was merely narrated by AAA at the barangay outpost, is hearsay and
cannot be considered by this Court. A witness can testify only on the facts that she knows of his
own personal knowledge, or more precisely, those which are derived from her own perception. 24 A
witness may not testify on what she merely learned, read or heard from others because such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what she has
learned, read or heard.25
cralawre dchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the details of the rape which BBB merely heard from AAAs
narration, we nevertheless find no reason to disturb the findings of fact of the trial court. Despite
lacking certain details concerning the manner in which AAA was allegedly raped, the trial court,
taking into consideration the mental incapacity of AAA and qualifying her to be a child
witness,26 found her testimony to be credible and convincing:
Q-
Uulitin ko sa iyo yung unang tinanong ko sayo ha, bakit ka nandito sa office
ni Judge, para ano?
APara magsumbong.
QSinong isusumbong mo?
ALeonardo Cataytay.
INTERPRETER:
Witness at this moment is now crying.
QNandito ba si Leonardo Cataytay, [AAA], nandito ba siya ngayon sa office ni
Judge? Tingin ka sa office ni Judge kung nandito ngayon si Leonardo, sabi
mo isusumbong mo siya kay Judge, diba?
COURT:
Ituro mo nga kung nandiyan siya, sige.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to the male person seated in the first row of the gallery,
wearing white t-shirt, who when asked to identify himself, answered to the
name of LEONARDO CATAYTAY Y SILVANO.
PROS. LAZARO:
Q[AAA], itinuro mo si Leonardo, sabi mo kanina isusumbong mo siya, bakit
mo siya isusumbong, anong ginawa niya sayo?
ANi-rape po ako.
QIlang beses ka niya ni-rape?
AIsa lang po.
QPapaano ka niya ni-rape?
APinasok niya yung ari niya sa akin.
QAnong sinabi mo sa kanya nung ni-rape ka niya, anong sinabi mo kay
Leonardo?
AAyaw ko na po.
QAnong sinabi naman ni Leonardo habang nire-rape ka niya?
AWag daw po ako maingay.
QKasi pag maingay ka, ano daw ang gagawin sayo?
AUulitin daw niya po.
QAnong sinabi ni Leonardo sayo pagkatapos ka niyang ni-rape, [AAA]? May
sinabi sayo pagkatapos ka niya ni-rape? Meron o wala?
AWala po.
QMay binigay sya sayo?
AOpo.
QAQA-
Anong binigay niya? Punasan mo ang luha mo.

Pera po.
Alam mo kung magkano?
Hindi po.27
AAAs mental condition may have prevented her from delving into the specifics of the assault in her
testimony almost three years later, unlike the way she narrated the same when she was asked at
thebarangay outpost merely minutes after the incident. However, as we have ruled in a litany of
cases, when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says, in effect, all
that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Youth and, as is more applicable in the case at
bar, immaturity are generally badges of truth.28 Furthermore, the report of PC/Insp. Chua that the
findings of the physical examination were consistent with recent sexual intercourse, provide
additional corroboration to the testimonies of AAA and BBB. It should be noted that this report was
stipulated upon by the prosecution and the defense.
We have pronounced time and again that both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which
cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused
committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one
hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. 29 For the
defense of alibi to prosper, it must be sufficiently convincing as to preclude any doubt on the
physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at
the time of the incident.30 In the case at bar, accused-appellant and his brother, second defense
witness Jose, claim that the former was taking care of his daughter in his house at around 7:00
p.m. of September 7, 2003. He then went out and proceeded to a videoke bar, which was merely
20 meters away from his house. Accused-appellant and his brother admitted that their house was
merely 50 meters away, or around a one-minute walk, from the house of AAA, where the alleged
incident occurred. Accused-appellant was therefore clearly in the immediate vicinity of the locus
criminis at the time of the commission of the crime, and thus accused-appellants defense of alibi
must fail.
Other than alibi and denial, accused-appellant presented the testimony of Alicia, a neighbor of AAA
and accused-appellant, to prove that another person raped AAA. However, the record is clear that
AAA positively identified accused-appellant as the culprit both at the barangay outpost minutes after
the incident, and in open court. It is furthermore axiomatic that when it comes to evaluating the
credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses, great respect is accorded to the findings of the trial
judge who is in a better position to observe the demeanor, facial expression, and manner of
testifying of witnesses, and to decide who among them is telling the truth. 31 The trial court, which
was able to carefully observe the testimony of Alicia, was not adequately convinced by her
allegations.
To recall, the Information charged accused-appellant of committing the following act: by means of
force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal
knowledge [of AAA], 19 years of age but with a mental age of a 5 year old, hence, a retardate, or
demented, which is known to accused at the time of the commission of the offense, against her will
and consent and to her damage and prejudice.32 The Information, as worded, can conceivably
comprehend rape under either paragraph 1(b) or 1(d) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
cralawlawlibrary
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
chanrobleslaw
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
chanrobleslaw
chanrobleslaw
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Caoile,33 we differentiated the terms deprived of reason and demented, as

follows:
The term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated
mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual's former intellectual level and often
by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under
paragraph 1 (b) has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency,
or retardation. Thus, AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly
classified as a person who is deprived of reason, and not one who is demented.
In the case at bar, AAA was clinically diagnosed to have mental retardation with the mental capacity
of a seven-year old child.34 The prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate on the conclusion
of the psychologist that the mental age of the victim whose chronological age at the time of the
commission of the offense is nineteen (19) years old x x x is that of a seven (7) year old child.35
Accused-appellant is therefore criminally liable for rape under paragraph 1(b) of Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code. The appropriate penalty is provided for by Article 266-B, which relevantly
provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
cralawlawlibrary
xxxx
10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of
the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.
Since the accused-appellants knowledge of AAAs mental retardation was alleged in the Information
and admitted by the former during the trial, the above special qualifying circumstance is applicable,
and the penalty of death should have been imposed. With the passage, however, of Republic Act
No. 934636prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall
instead be imposed.
The RTC sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twenty years and one
day to forty years of reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals correctly modified the penalty to be
simply reclusion perpetua. Since reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law cannot be applied.37
As regards accused-appellants civil liability, the RTC ordered him to pay AAA in the amount of
P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. The Court of Appeals
modified the trial courts decision by granting the additional award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
and reducing the award of exemplary damages to P30,000.00. In accordance, however, to People
v. Lumaho,38where the penalty for the crime committed is death which cannot be imposed because
of Republic Act No. 9346, we increase the amounts of indemnity and damages to be imposed as
follows: P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages. In addition, we impose 6% interest per annum from finality of judgment until
fully paid.39
WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 32275 dated August 11, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION increasing the
amounts of indemnity and damages to be imposed as follows: P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. All amounts are
furthermore subject to interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, CJ., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
Rollo, p. 17-18.
Id. at 2-16; penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. with Associate Justices Mario L.
Guaria III and Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring.
2
The Court withholds the real name of the victim-survivor and uses fictitious initials instead to
represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other
information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well as those of their immediate
families or household members, are not to be disclosed. (See People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703
[2006].)
3
Records, p. 1.
TSN, April 27, 2004, pp. 3-4.
Id. at 4-12.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 13.
TSN, May 25, 2004, pp. 2-14.
10
TSN, June 22, 2004, p. 3.
11
Id. at 6-7, 10.
12
13
TSN, August 4, 2005, p. 5.
14
TSN, November 14, 2005, pp. 4-5.
Accused-appellant stated in the direct examination that the videoke bar was more than 20 meters
away from his house. On cross-examination, he testified that the videoke bar was more or less 20
meters away from his house (TSN, November 20, 2006, p. 3).
15
16
TSN, October 30, 2006, pp. 2-5.
17
TSN, November 20, 2006, p. 4.
18
Id. at 7.
19
TSN, May 24, 2007, pp. 4-9.
20
TSN, March 27, 2008, pp. 2-5.
21
CA rollo, p. 33.
22
Rollo, p. 16.
23
CA rollo, p. 69.
24
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 36.
D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 409 Phil. 275, 285 (2001); Miro v. Mendoza Vda. De
Erederos, G.R. Nos. 172532 & 172544-45, November 20, 2013, 710 SCRA 371, 390.
25
cralawre d
26
TSN, June 22, 2004, pp. 3-4.
27
Id. at 5-7.
28
See People v. De Guzman, 423 Phil. 313, 331 (2001).
29
People v. Narido, 374 Phil. 489, 508 (1999).
30
People v. Sulima, 598 Phil. 238, 254 (2009).
31
People v. Estoya, G.R. No. 200531, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 376, 383.
32
Records, p. 1.
33
G.R. No. 203041, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 638, 649-650.
34
TSN, August 4, 2005, p. 5; records, p. 126.
35
Id.
36
An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.
37
People v. Valdez, 363 Phil. 481, 494 (1999).
G.R. No. 208716, September 24, 2014, citing People v. Gambao, G.R. No. 172707, October 1,
2013, 706 SCRA 508, 533.
38
Roallos v. People, G.R. No. 198389, December 11, 2013, citing People v. Veloso, G.R. No. 188849,
February 13, 2013, 690 SCRA 586, 600.
39
PEOPLE V OBOGNE
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 199740, March 24, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. JERRY OBOGNE, AccusedAppellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Appellant Jerry Obogne was charged with the crime of rape in an Information that reads as
follows:
That on or about the 29th day of July 2002, in the afternoon, in barangay Ogbong, municipality of
Viga, province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said
accused by means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously x x x succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of AAA,1 a 12year old mentally retarded person, to the damage and
prejudice of the said AAA.2
When arraigned on December 17, 2004, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.3 On March 13, 2008,
the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, rendered a Judgment, 4viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is, hereby, rendered finding Jerry Obogne guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of simple rape committed against AAA and, hereby, sentences him to suffer a penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00
as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.5
The trial court did not consider AAAs mental retardation as a qualifying circumstance considering
that the Information failed to allege that appellant knew of AAAs mental disability.
Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. 6 In its Decision7 of March 28, 2011, the
appellate court affirmed the trial courts ruling with modifications, viz:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Judgment, dated March 13, 2008, of the Regional Trial
Court of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 34,8 in Criminal Case No. 3303, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that accusedappellant is further ordered to pay AAA the additional amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity apart from the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages and of
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, this appeal.
In a Resolution10 dated February 15, 2012, we required both parties to file their Supplemental
Briefs. However, they opted to adopt the briefs they filed before the Court of Appeals as their
Supplemental Briefs.11
Appellant argues that the testimony of AAA deserves no credence because she was incapable of
intelligently making known her perception to others by reason of her mental disability.
We are not persuaded.
Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.
xxxx
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The following persons
cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they
are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
In this case, AAA is totally qualified to take the witness stand notwithstanding her mental
condition. As correctly observed by the trial court:
When AAA was presented on November 14, 2006, defense counsel manifested his objection and
called the Courts attention to Rule 130, Section 21 of the Rules of Court, which lists down persons
who cannot be witnesses; i.e. those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for
examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others
x x x.
During the continuation of AAAs testimony x x x she was able to recall what [appellant] did to her x
x x.
AAA recalled that while she was playing, [appellant] saw her and asked her to go with him
because he would give her a sugar cane. [Appellant] brought AAA to his house and while inside,
he removed her panty, and then inserted his penis into her vagina and he got the knife and then he
took a sugar cane and then he gave it to her and then she went home.
xxxx
This Court finds AAA a very credible witness, even in her mental condition. Contrary to defense
counsels objection that AAA was not capable of intelligently making known her perception to
others, AAA managed to recount the ordeal she had gone through in the hands of the accused,
though in a soft voice and halting manner x x x.
AAAs simple account of her ordeal clearly reflects sincerity and truthfulness.
While it is true that, on crossexamination, AAA faltered in the sequence of events x x x this is
understandable because even one with normal mental condition would not be able to recall, with a
hundred percent accuracy, events that transpired in the past. But AAA was certain that it was a
long time x x x after the incident when it was reported to the police. Likewise, she was very certain
that the accused inserted his penis into her vagina x x x. 12
In the same vein, the appellate court found AAA qualified to take the witness stand, viz:
Our own evaluation of the records reveals that AAA was shown to be able to perceive, to make
known her perception to others and to remember traumatic incidents. Her narration of the incident
of rape given in the following manner is worthy of note:
xxxx
Private complainant AAA provided a clear, convincing and competent testimonial evidence to prove
the guilt of the accusedappellant of the crime of rape beyond reasonable doubt. As found by the
trial court, the testimony of AAA was replete with consistent details, negating the probability of
fabrication.
We stress that, contrary to accusedappellants assertions, mental retardation per se does not affect
a witness credibility. A mental retardate may be a credible witness.13
Appellants assertion that the trial court and the appellate court should have considered his alibi
must likewise fail. For alibi to prosper, it must not only be shown that appellant was at another
place at the time of the commission of the crime but that it was also impossible for him to be
present at the crime scene. In this case, appellant attempted to show that he was
at barangay Ananong at the time of the rape incident. However, as found by the trial court, the
distance between barangay Ananong andbarangay Ogbong is only four kilometers and could be
traversed in one hour or even less.14
Finally, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly found appellant guilty of simple rape and
properly imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266B, par. 1 of
the Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly ruled that AAAs mental disability could not be
considered as a qualifying circumstance because the Information failed to allege that appellant knew
of such mental condition at the time of the commission of the crime. As held in People v. Limio:15
By itself, the fact that the offended party in a rape case is a mental retardate does not call for the
imposition of the death penalty, unless knowledge by the offender of such mental disability is
specifically alleged and adequately proved by the prosecution.
For the AntiRape Law of 1997, now embodied in Article 266B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
expressly provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with the qualifying circumstance of (10) when the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional
disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.
Said knowledge x x x qualifies rape as a heinous offense. Absent said circumstance, which must be
proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction of appellant for qualified rape
under Art. 266B (10), RPC, could not be sustained, although the offender may be held liable
for simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.16
xxxx
[T]he mere fact that the rape victim is a mental retardate does not automatically merit the
imposition of the death penalty. Under Article 266B (10) of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by
the offender of the mental disability, emotional disorder, or physical handicap at the time of the
commission of the rape is the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death
penalty. As such this circumstance must be formally alleged in the information and duly proved by
the prosecution.
Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both qualifying and aggravating
circumstances to be alleged with specificity in the information. x x x But in the absence of a
specific or particular allegation in the information that the appellant knew of her mental disability or
retardation, as well as lack of adequate proof that appellant knew of this fact, Article 266B (10),
RPC, could not be properly applied x x x
Hence, the appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, as defined under Article 266A of the
[Revised] Penal Code, for which the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.17
However, it must be mentioned that appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 18 of
Republic Act No. 9346.19
The awards of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity are likewise proper.
However, the award of exemplary damages must be increased to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.20 Also, interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed from date of finality of
this judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the March 28, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR H.C. No. 03270
finding appellant Jerry Obogne guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA civil indemnity of
P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that appellant
is not eligible for parole; the amount of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00; and all
damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Reyes,* JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
Per Special Order No. 1650 dated March 13, 2014.
The real names of the victim and of the members of her immediate family are withheld pursuant
to Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act) and Republic Act No. 9262 (AntiViolence Against Women and Their Children Act
of 2004.) People v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 175876, February 20, 2013, 691 SCRA 324, 326.
1
Records, p. 4.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 172179; penned by Judge Lelu P. Contreras.
Id. at 179.
CA rollo, p. 30.
Id. at 125139; penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam and concurred in by Associate Justices
Marlene GonzalesSison and Leoncia R. Dimagiba.
7
Should be 43.
Id. at 138139. It would appear that the Court of Appeals mistakenly thought that the trial court
did not award civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. Perusal of the dispositive portion of the
trial courts Judgment would show that it awarded civil indemnity of P50,000.00.
9
10
Rollo, p. 23.
11
Id. at 25, 29.
12
Records, pp. 173177.
13
CA rollo, pp. 132134.
14
Records, p. 177.
15
473 Phil. 659 (2004).
16
Id. at 661662. Emphasis supplied.
17
Id. at 675676.
Sec. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
18
AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES. Approved June
24, 2006.
19
20
People v. Vergara, G.R. No. 199226, January 25, 2014
PEOPLE V JOSON
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 206393, January 21, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL JOSON Y ROGANDO, DefendantAppellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For consideration by the Court is the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated 31 August 2012 that affirmed
the judgment2 of conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Dasmarinas (RTC), Cavite, Branch 90
sitting in Imus, Cavite, convicting appellant Michael Joson y Rogando of the crime or rape of his 14year old sister.
Appellant was charged with violation of Articles 266-A of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610 in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 14th day of May 2009, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the biological
brother and thus a relative within the second degree of consanguinity of [AAA], 3 a minor fourteen
(14) years of age and born on March 24, 1995, motivated by lust and with lewd design, with the use
of force and intimidation and taking advantage of his moral ascendancy over her, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said [AAA], against her will and
consent, thereby debasing, degrading and demeaning her intrinsic worth and integrity as a child, to
the damage and prejudice of said complainant.4
cralawlawlibrary
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The prosecutions evidence is based on
the sole testimony of the victim. AAA lives with appellant and his common-law partner. AAA testified
that at around 1:00 in the morning of 14 May 2009, and while appellants wife was away, AAA was
awakened by appellant undressing her. AAA tried to struggle but appellant was tightly holding her
arms. After undressing her, appellant kissed and mounted her. Appellant was able to insert his
penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain in her genitalia. Thereafter, appellant went back to sleep leaving
AAA crying. At about 6:00 or 7:00 in the morning, appellant left AAA with a letter apologizing for
what happened and begging her not to tell on his wife. The letter reads:
Ne!
Sorry Ne. Patawarin mo ko. Dala lang ng kalasingan kaya ko nagawa ang ganung bagay. Sana po
wala ng ibang makaalam nito lalu na si Ate Cindy mo. Ayokong masira na naman ang pamilya ko
at mga buhay natin. Paki tapon muna to pag tapos mong basahin. 5
cralawla wlibrary
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of that same date, AAA related to appellants wife the rape
incident.6And on 1 June 2009, AAA, accompanied by her father, reported the incident to the police
and she executed a sworn statement detailing the rape. 7
cralawre d
The prosecution presented a provisional medico-legal report on the examination conducted on AAA
by Irene D. Baluyut of Philippine General Hospital which essentially states that there is no evident
injury on AAA at the time of the examination.
Also submitted as part of the prosecutions evidence is the birth certificate of AAA to prove that she
was still a minor at the time the rape was committed on 14 May 2009.
Appellant admitted that AAA is his sister but he proffered the defense of alibi and claimed that he
was staying in Alfonso, Cavite on 14 May 2009 and only went back to his house in Dasmarias on
26 May 2009. Appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and speculated that AAA
resented him because he was strict with his sister. Appellant also denied writing the apology letter
and presented his specimen handwriting in court.8
cralawred
After evaluating the evidence, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape and meted out the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused MICHAEL JOSON y ROGANDO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape as defined in Article 266-A paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Republic Act No. 7610, and hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and the said accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the victim by way of
moral damages in the amount of Php50,000.00, civil indemnity ex-delicto in the amount of
Php50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of Php25,000.00. 9
cralawlawlibrary
The trial court found credible the testimony of AAA. It noted that appellant even wrote to the victim
that he was sorry for what he has done. The trial court considered the letter as admission against
appellants interest.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.10 On 31 August 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
decision affirming the judgment of conviction.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal11 with the appellate court. In a Resolution12 dated 19 June 2013,
the Court ordered the elevation of the records and directed the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs should they so desire. However, appellant and the Office of the SolicitorGeneral both manifested that they were adopting their respective appeal briefs previously filed with
the Court of Appeals.13
cralawre d
In his Appeal Brief, appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of rape
as defined under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, particularly the elements of force, threat
or intimidation. Appellant argues that AAA did not allege that she was threatened by appellant with
the use of any firearm or any bladed weapon nor did appellant say anything to threaten or
intimidate her. With respect to moral ascendancy, appellant contends that the Court in a recent
case did not consider a brother as one of those close kin who has moral ascendancy over a victim
that would substitute for force and intimidation. Appellant further points out that there was no
showing of any resistance on the part of AAA to his alleged sexual advances.
Upon a careful evaluation of the case, we find no reason to reverse appellants conviction.
For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the prosecution
must prove that: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished this
act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented. 14
cralawre d
AAA gave a complete account of her ordeal in the hands of her own brother, to wit:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
Do you know one Michael Joson?

Opo.
Why do you know him?
He is my brother.
Is he inside the courtroom?
Opo.
Please point to him. (Witness points to a man wearing a yellow tshirt, who
when asked what his name is, answered Michael Joson.)
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
On May 14, 2009, around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, where were you?
Nasa bahay po.
What were you doing in your house?
Tulog po.
What time did you wake up?
Sa tingin ko po mga 1:00 oclock.
Will you please tell this Honorable Court the reason why you woke up early?
Hinuhubaran po niya ako.
Who are you referring to?
Ng kapatid ko.
He was undressing you? So what did you do while he was undressing you,
while you were lying or sleeping? Thats why you were awakened?
Opo.
So what happened next when you felt that he was undressing you?
Pumalag po ako, kasi hinihigpitan po niya ako sa braso ko.
So what else did you do?
Sabi po niya kasi, wag daw po ako maingay.
Who was your companion in the house, aside from your brother?
Who else was there in the house?
Wala po.
Where were they?
Yung asawa niya po, umuwi sa kanila.
What about your parents, where were they?
Yung tatay ko po, nagtatrabaho.
Your mother?
Patay na po.
What happened next when you were told not to shout?
Hinubaran niya po yung ibaba ko, tapos pumatong po siya sa ibabaw ko
tapos pinaghahalikan niya ko.
Was he able to undress you?
Opo.
Totally?
Opo.
Thereafter, what did you do?
Pinaghahalikan niya po ako.
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
What were you doing?

Umiiyak lang po ako.
What about the accused, what did he do to you?
Pumatong po siya sa ibabaw ko.
He went on top of you? Thereafter what did the accused do next?
Pilit niya pong ipinapasok ang ari niya sa ari ko.
Was he able to insert his penis?
Opo.
For how long?
Matagal po.
How did you feel when his organ was inside your organ?
Masakit po.
And what (sic) you trying to do while his organ was inside?
Umiiyak lang po ako.
After that, what happened next?
Pinaghahalikan niya pa rin po ako, tapos tumayo po siya sandali tapos
humiga po uli siya. Natulog po.
What about you, you went to sleep also?
Hindi po, umiiyak lang po ako.
The following day, in the morning, were you not able to sleep after that
incident?
Hindi po.
What did you do?
Doon lang po, umiiyak lang po.
What about the accused?
Doon lang din po siya.
Beside you?
Opo.
And what happened next, at 6:00 oclock in the morning or 7:00 oclock?
May iniwan po siyang sulat.
Where did he go, if you know?
Sa trabaho po.
What was the letter all about?
Humihingi po siya ng sorry.15
cralawla wlibrary
Her testimony has established all the elements of rape required under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code. First, appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA positively identified her own
brother as the assailant. She was likewise unwavering in her narration that appellant inserted his
penis into her vagina. Second, appellant employed threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his lust.
At this juncture, we quote with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals on this point:
The Supreme Court has, time and again, ruled that the force or violence that is required in rape
cases is relative; when applied, it need not be overpowering or irresistible. That it enables the
offender to consummate his purpose is enough. The parties relative age, size and strength should
be taken into account in evaluating the existence of the element of force in the crime of rape. The
degree of force which may not suffice when the victim is an adult may be more than enough if
employed against a person of tender age.
In the case at bench, the accused-appellant employed that amount of force sufficient to
consummate the rape. It must be stressed that, at the time of the incident, AAA was only 14 years
old. Considering the tender years of the offended party as compared to the accused-appellant who
was in the prime of his life, the act of the accused-appellant in pinning the arms of AAA to avoid any
form of resistance from her suffices. Force or intimidation is not limited to physical force. As long as
it is present and brings the desired result, all consideration of whether it was more or less
irresistible is beside the point.
chanrobleslaw
xxxx
We are not persuaded by the accused-appellants insistence that the absence of any resistance on
the part of AAA raised doubts as to whether the sexual congress was without her consent. The
failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the rapist is not tantamount to
consent. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are
employed and the victim submits herself to her attackers of because of fear.
Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman voluntarily
succumbed to the lust of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction. Some may offer
strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. After all,
resistance is not an element of rape and its absence does not denigrate AAAs claim that the
accused-appellant consummated his bestial act.16
cralawlawlibrary
Anent appellants argument that as a brother he lacks moral ascendancy over her sister, the victim,
that could substitute for force and intimidation, our ruling in People v. Villaruel,17 as cited by the
Court of Appeals, has rejected such proposition.
The fact remains that Myra positively testified in court that her brother sexually molested her in the
morning of February 21, 1996. The accused-appellant was her older brother who had definitely
moral ascendancy over her. He, being the eldest had definitely moral ascendancy over her. He,
being the eldest among the children since both of their parents were dead, the accused-appellant
stood as guardian of the siblings. Thus, when the complainant was roused from her sleep to
accompany the accused-appellant to buy bread, the complainant obediently followed him. To the
accused-appellant, this was highly improbable that the complainant would entertain his plea to go
out with him at such an unholy hour or even allegedly knowing fully well that the latter had taken
shabu and liquor. There is nothing incredible with the complainants story. Notwithstanding the time
or the physical condition of her brother, Myra certainly did not expect that he had other ill motives
against her. It certainly is not normal for a brother to take out his lust on his sister. Myra also
testified that she did not resist his advances for fear of her life as her brother had two (2) fan knives
poking at her as she was being raped. More importantly, the moral ascendancy and influence the
accused-appellant has over the complainant sufficiently substitute for the force and intimidation
required in rape.18
cralawlawlibrary
Moreover, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals found AAAs testimony credible. The trial
court, having the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during the trial, can best
assess the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies. Thus, the trial courts findings are
accorded great respect unless the trial court has overlooked or misconstrued some substantial facts,
which if considered might affect the result of the case.19
cralawre d
With respect to appellants defense of denial and alibi, it is an oft- repeated rule that positive
identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill-motive on the part of
the eyewitness testifying on the matter prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear
and convincing evidence is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They
cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.20
cralawred
We likewise agree that appellant should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree,
or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 which
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, however, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
In conformance with the prevailing jurisprudence, we deem it proper to modify the amount of
damages awarded in this case. In People v. Gambao,21 we increase the amounts of indemnity and
damage where the penalty for the crime committed is death but which cannot be imposed because
of Republic Act No. 9346, as follow:
1.
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2.
P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus
needs no proof; and
3.
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.
All damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality
of judgment until fully paid.22
cralawred
cralawla wlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' decision dated 31 August 2012 finding appellant Michael
Joson yRogando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The civil indemnity awarded is increased to
P100,000.00; moral damages to P100,000.00; and the exemplary damages to P100,000.00. The
award of damages shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of the
SO ORDERED.
cralawla wlibrary
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican with Associate Justices Michael P. Elbinias and
Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, concurring. Rollo, pp. 2-13.
1
Presided by Executive Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller. CA rollo, pp. 9-1 I.
The victims real name is withheld pursuant to Sec. 29 of Republic Act No. 7610; Sec. 44 of
Republic Act No. 9262 and Sec. 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC. See People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil.
703 (2006).
3
Records, p. 1.
Id. at 25.
TSN, 2 June 2010, pp. 2-6.
Records, p. 9.
TSN, 10 November 2010, pp. 2-4.
CA rollo, p. 11
10
11
Id. at 13.
Rollo, p. 14.
12
Id. at 19.
13
Id. at 21-25.
14
Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed:
1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
15
16
TSN, 2 June 2010, pp. 2-5.

Rollo, pp. 7-8.
17
428 Phil. 449 (2002).
18
Id. at 462-463.
People v. Fernandez, 561 Phil. 287, 291 (2007) citing People v. Oliquino, 546 Phil. 410, 419
(2007); People v. Diunsay-Jalandoni, 544 Phil. 163, 175 (2007); Navarrete v. People, 452 Phil. 496,
506 (2007); Nombrefia v. People, 542 Phil. 355, 363 (2007); People v. Arnaiz, 538 Phil. 479, 492
(2006).
19
People v. Piosang, G.R. No. 200329, 5 June 2013 citing People v. Agcanas, G.R. No. 174476, 11
October 2011, 658 SCRA 842, 847 citing further People v. Caisip, 352 Phil. 1058, 1065 (1998).
20
21
G.R No. 172707, 1 October 2013.
People v. Buclao, G.R. No. 208173, 11 June 2014; People v. Santiago, G.R. No. 196970, 2 April
2014.
22
PEOPLEVCANDELLADA
PEOPLEVCIAL
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191362, October 09, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARCIANO CIAL Y LORENA, AccusedAppellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed before this Court is the November 24, 2009 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 03162 which affirmed with modifications the November 26, 2007 Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62 finding appellant Marciano Cial y Lorena
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape.
On February 5, 2004, appellant was charged with the crime of rape. The Information 3 reads as
follows:
That on or about the month of December, 2002, at Barangay Balubad, Municipality of Atimonan,
Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of AAA,4 a minor, 13 years old, against her will.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
That the commission of the rape was attended by the qualifying circumstances of minority, the
victim being less than 18 years old, and relationship, the accused being the common-law husband
of complainants mother.
Contrary to law.
chanrob1esvirtualawlibrary
During his arraignment on June 29, 2004, appellant pleaded not guilty.5 After pre-trial, trial on the
merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The version of the prosecution as summarized in the Appellees Brief 6 is as follows:
AAA is one of the six (6) children born to BBB and CCC. After CCC died, BBB cohabited with
appellant Marciano Cial (also known as Onot). Appellant and BBB have two (2) children.
chanroble svirtualawlibrary
In 2002, AAA, then thirteen (13) years old, was a Grade I pupil and was residing with her family
and appellant in x x x Quezon Province. AAA calls appellant Papa.
Sometime in December 2002, appellant called AAA and told her to go to the bedroom inside their
house. Once inside, appellant took off AAAs shorts and panty and spread her legs. Appellant
pulled his pants down to his thighs and inserted his penis into the little girls vagina. AAA felt
intense pain but she did not try to struggle because appellant had a bolo on his waist. After
satiating his lust, appellant threatened to kill AAA and her family if she reported the incident to
anyone. At that time, AAAs maternal grandmother was in the house but was unaware that AAA
was being ravished.
xxxx
Unable to endure the torment, AAA confided her ordeal to her mother. But AAAs mother did not
believe her. AAA ran away from home and went to her maternal uncles house. There, she
disclosed her harrowing experience to her mothers siblings. Her uncle appeared to be angered by
appellants wrong doing. But nonetheless, her uncle allowed appellant to bring her home when
appellant fetched her.
For fear that she might be raped again, AAA ran away and went to the house of her aunt. Her aunt
helped her file the complaint against her stepfather.
On March 19, 2003, AAA was brought to Doa Marta Memorial District Hospital in Atimonan,
Quezon where she was physically examined by Dr. Arnulfo Imperial. Dr. Imperial issued a MedicoLegal Report which essentially states that:
1) she was negative to pubic hair; there was a negative physical injury at the pubic area, with
normal external genitalia;
2) the hymen has an old laceration on the 12 oclock and 5 oclock positions, introitus admits one
examining finger with ease; and
3) spermatozoa determination result was negative for examination of spermatozoa.
According to Dr. Imperial, the negative result for pubic hair as indicated in his report means that the
victim has not yet fully developed her secondary characteristics which usually manifests during
puberty. Dr. Imperial explained that the easy insertion of one finger into her vagina means that the
child was no longer a virgin and that it would be difficult to insert even the tip of the little finger into
the private part of a virgin as she would have suffered pain. On the absence of spermatozoa on the
victims genitals, Dr. Imperial explained that a sperm has a life span of three (3) days. The lapse of
almost four months from the time of the rape would naturally yield negative results for
spermatozoa.
chanrob1esvirtualawlibrary
On April 7, 2003, AAA and her aunt sought the assistance of the Crisis Center for Women at
Gumaca, Quezon. AAA was admitted to the said center and still continued to reside therein at the
time of her testimony.7
Version of the Defense
As to be expected, appellant denied the charge. He alleged that he treated AAA as his own
daughter. He also claimed that AAAs aunt fabricated the charge because appellant called her a
thief.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The trial court lent credence to the testimony of AAA especially considering that the same is
corroborated by the medical findings. On the other hand, the RTC found appellants defense not only
laughable and sickening but also completely untrue. 8
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The court a quo also found the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship to be present.
Thus, on November 26, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty of qualified
rape. Considering, however, the proscription on the imposition of the death penalty, the trial court
instead sentenced appellant to reclusion perpetua.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, accused Marciano Cial is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
and he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and the complainant AAA is
awarded moral and exemplary damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.
Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.9
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Appellant appealed to the CA but the appellate court found the appeal to be without merit and
dismissed the same. The appellate court thus affirmed the RTC finding appellant guilty of qualified
rape but with modifications as to the damages, viz:
FOR THESE REASONS, the decision dated November 26, 2007 of the RTC is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1. MARCIANO CIAL y LORENA is sentenced to reclusion perpetua conformably with R.A. No. 9346,
without eligibility for parole; and
2. He is ordered to indemnify AAA (a) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P75,000.00 as moral
damages; and (c) P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA found that the elements of rape have been duly established. AAAs testimony proved that
appellant had carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent. The examining
doctor corroborated AAAs narration by testifying that the hymenal lacerations could have been
possibly caused by an erect penis. The CA disregarded appellants contention that he could not have
raped AAA in the presence of AAAs grandmother as lust is no respecter of time and
place.11 Moreover, the appellate court found that the prosecution satisfactorily established AAAs
minority as well as the qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant being the common-law
husband of AAAs mother.
Hence, this appeal raising the following arguments, viz:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIRCUMSTANCES CLEARLY
POINTING TO THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE.12
Appellant argues that if he indeed raped AAA in the manner that she narrated, it would be
improbable for AAAs maternal grandmother not to have noticed the same. Appellant also claims
that it was illogical for AAAs uncle to allow AAA to return home after learning about the alleged
rape incident. Appellant also insists that the examining physician was unsure as to what actually
caused AAAs hymenal lacerations.
Our Ruling
In this appeal, appellant assails the factual findings of the trial court and the credibility it lent to the
testimony of the victim. As a general rule, however, this Court accords great respect to the factual
findings of the RTC, especially when affirmed by the CA. We find no cogent reason to depart from
this rule.
Time and again, we have held that when it comes to the issue of credibility of the victim or the
prosecution witnesses, the findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect and, generally,
the appellate courts will not overturn the said findings unless the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will alter
the assailed decision or affect the result of the case. This is so because trial courts are in the best
position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual
observation of the witnesses manner of testifying, her furtive glance, blush of unconscious shame,
hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath all
of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness honesty and sincerity. Trial
judges, therefore, can better determine if such witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal
position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Again, unless certain facts of substance and value were
overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be
respected, for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the
said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. (Citations omitted.) 13
Besides, it would not be amiss to point out that AAA was only 13 years of age when she testified in
court.14
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly
if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts
are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative
vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified
is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender
age, AAA could not have invented a horrible story. x x x15
We are not persuaded by appellants argument that if he indeed raped AAA inside their house,
then AAAs maternal grandmother would have noticed the same. It is settled jurisprudence that
rape can be committed even in places where people congregate. As held by the CA, lust is no
respecter of time and place.16 Thus, the presence of AAAs grandmother would not negate the
commission of the rape; neither would it prove appellants innocence.
There is also no merit to appellants contention that it was irrational for AAAs uncle to allow her to
return home even after learning about the rape incident. The considerations or reasons which
impelled AAAs uncle to allow her to return home are immaterial to the rape charge. Such have no
bearing on appellants guilt.
Likewise undeserving of our consideration is appellants imputation that the examining physician
was unsure as to what caused AAAs hymenal lacerations. It must be stressed that the examining
physician was presented to testify only on the fact that he examined the victim and on the results of
such examination. He is thus expected to testify on the nature, extent and location of the wounds.
Dr. Arnulfo Imperial (Dr. Imperial) found, among others, that AAA suffered hymenal lacerations.
This refers to the location and nature of the wounds suffered by the victim. Dr. Imperial could not be
expected to establish the cause of such lacerations with particularity because he has no personal
knowledge of how these hymenal lacerations were inflicted on AAA. He could only surmise that the
lacerations could have been caused by activities like cycling, horseback riding x x x or the insertion
of [a] hard object [into] the vagina of the victim x x x [such as] the penis.17 In any case, a medical
examination is not even indispensable in prosecuting a rape charge. In fact, an accuseds conviction
for rape may be anchored solely on the testimony of the victim. At best, the medical examination
would only serve as corroborative evidence.
We find however that both the trial court and the CA erred in convicting appellant of the crime of
qualified rape. According to both courts, the twin qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship attended the commission of the crime. We rule otherwise.
In its Formal Offer of Evidence,18 the prosecution mentioned AAAs Certificate of Live Birth. Also
attached to the Folder of Exhibits marked as Exhibit B is AAAs Certificate of Live Birth showing
that AAA was born on October 31, 1991. However, upon closer scrutiny, we note that the said
Certificate of Live Birth was never presented or offered during the trial of the case. During the
March 28, 2006 hearing, the prosecution manifested before the RTC that it will be presenting
AAAs Certificate of Live Birth at the next setting. In its Order 19 dated June 27, 2006, the trial court
reset the hearing of the case to allow the prosecution to present evidence with respect to AAAs
Certificate of Live Birth. However, up until the prosecution rested its case, nobody was presented to
testify on AAAs Certificate of Live Birth. Records show that the prosecution presented only AAA
and Dr. Imperial as its witnesses. Dr. Imperial never testified on AAAs age. On the other hand,
AAA even testified on the witness stand that she does not know her age, viz:
Q.
A.
Do you remember how old were you during that time?

I do not know, maam.
Q.
A.
Do you know your birthday?

I do not know, maam.20
Clearly, the prosecution failed to prove the minority of AAA.

The same is true with respect to the other qualifying circumstance of relationship. The prosecution
likewise miserably failed to establish AAAs relationship with the appellant. Although the
Information alleged that appellant is the common-law husband of AAAs mother, AAA referred to
appellant as her step-father.
Q.
A.
And who is Onot?

He is my step father, maam.
Q.
A.
What do you mean step father, what is his relation to your mother?
He is the husband of my mother, maam.
xxxx
Q.
A.
When did this Onot become the husband of your mother?

I could no longer remember, maam.
Q.
A.
Were you still small or big when he [became] the husband of your mother?
I was still small when he [became] the husband of my mother, maam.
Q.
A.
And how do you call this Onot?

Papa, maam.
Q.
A.
Is this Onot whom you called Papa inside this room now?
Yes, maam. (Witness pointed [to] the bald man who when asked his name
responded that he is Mar[c]iano Cial).
Q.
A.
Do you know that person?

Yes, maam.
Q.
A.
Why do you know him?

Because he is the husband of my mother, maam.21
Q.
You [identified] yourself Mr. Witness as married. You are married to the mother
of AAA?
Yes, Your Honor.
Meanwhile, appellant claimed that he is married to AAAs mother:
A.
xxxx
Q.
A.
So, you mean to say that you are the step father of AAA?
Yes, sir.22
Even the RTC interchangeably referred to appellant as the common-law husband of AAAs
mother23 as well as the step-father of AAA.24 Moreover, the RTC failed to cite any basis for its
reference to appellant as such. In fact, the RTC Decision is bereft of any discussion as to how it
reached its conclusion that appellant is the common-law husband of AAAs mother or that AAA is
his step-daughter.
The CA committed the same error. Notwithstanding appellants claim that he is married to AAAs
mother, it went on to declare, without any explanation or justification, that appellant is the
common-law husband of AAAs mother, viz:
x x x Also, given that Marciano and AAAs mother were not legally married, the qualifying
circumstance that the accused is the common-law husband of the victims mother may be properly
appreciated.25
The terms common-law husband and step-father have different legal connotations. For appellant
to be a step-father to AAA, he must be legally married to AAAs mother.26
cralawlibrary
Suffice it to state that qualifying circumstances must be proved beyond reasonable doubt just like
the crime itself. In this case, the prosecution utterly failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. As such, appellant should only be convicted of
the crime of simple rape, the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua.27
cralawlibrary
As regards damages, AAA is entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00. In
addition, interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The November 24, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03162 is MODIFIED. Appellant Marciano Cial y Lorena is hereby found
guilty of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant is ordered to
pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
CA rollo, pp. 104-111; penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez and concurred in by Associate
Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.
1
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Records, pp. 193-199; penned by Judge Hector B. Almeyda.

Id. at 2.
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The real names of the victim and of the members of her immediate family are withheld pursuant
to Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act) and Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
of 2004). People v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 175876, February 20, 2013.
4
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Records, p. 11.
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Id. at 75-78.
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Records, p. 195.
Id. at 199.
10
11
12
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CA rollo, p. 110.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 47.
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13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
People v. Amistoso, G.R. No. 201447, January 9, 2013, 688 SCRA 376, 387-388.
TSN, March 28, 2006, p. 2.
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People v. Piosang, G.R. No. 200329, June 5, 2013.

CA rollo, p. 109.
Records, p. 128.
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TSN, March 28, 2006, p. 12.

Id. at 3-4.
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TSN, November 9, 2004, p. 6.
Id. at 122.
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Records, p. 193.
Id. at 199.
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CA rollo, p. 107.
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People v. Salazar, G.R. No. 181900, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA, 307, 324.
cranad
REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 266-B.
PEOPLE V LUCENA
G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. MANOLITO LUCENA Y VELASQUEZ,
ALIAS MACHETE, AccusedAppellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The subject of this appeal is the Decision1 dated 24 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R.
CRH.C. No. 03371 affirming the Decision2 dated 30 April 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Paraaque City, Branch 260, in Criminal Cases Nos. 030763 to 030765, finding herein appellant
Manolito Lucena y Velasquez alias Machete guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of
rape, thereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count and ordering
him to pay AAA3 the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
also for each count.
Three (3) similarly worded Informations,4 all dated 24 June 2003 allege:
That on or about the 28th day of April 2003, in the City of Paraaque, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed [appellant], a Barangay Tanod Volunteer,
who took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of the crime, by means of force,
threat or intimidation and with the use of a gun did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant AAA, a minor, 17 years of age,
against her will and consent. (Emphasis and italics supplied).
The appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to all the charges against
him.5Thereafter, the cases were jointly tried.
The prosecution presented AAA, the victim herself; and Dr. Merle Tan (Dr. Tan) of the Child
Protection Unit, University of the Philippines Philippine General Hospital (UPPGH), who examined
the victim.
The testimonies of the abovenamed prosecution witnesses established that on 28 April 2003, at
around 11:30 p.m., while AAA, who was then 17 years old, having been born on 10 July 1986, was
walking and chatting with her friends along one of the streets of San Dionisio, Paraaque City, two
(2) barangay tanods, one of whom is the appellant, approached and informed them that they were
being arrested for violating a city ordinance imposing curfew against minors. AAAs companions,
however, managed to escape, thus, she alone was apprehended. 6 AAA was then ordered by
the barangay tanods to board the tricycle. Afraid that she might spend the night in jail, AAA pleaded
with them and protested that she did not commit any offense as she was just chatting with her
friends. AAAs plea, however, remained unheeded.7
AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay tanods within the vicinity of the San
Dionisio BarangayHall. Afterwards, one of them alighted from the tricycle and went inside
the barangay hall. The appellant, on the other hand, stayed in the tricycle to guard AAA. After a
while, the barangay tanod, the one who went inside the barangay hall, returned. But, the appellant
told the former that he will just be the one to bring AAA back to her house. 8
But, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, the appellant brought her to Kabuboy Bridge in
San Dionisio, Paraaque City. While on their way, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill
her once she resists or jumps off the tricycle. Upon arrival, the appellant ordered AAA to alight from
the tricycle. AAA asked the appellant what he would do with her but the former did not respond. The
appellant then took out the backseat of the tricycle and positioned it in a grassy area. He
subsequently pointed a gun at AAA and commanded her to lie down and to take off her clothes. The
appellant later put the gun down on the ground and inserted his penis into AAAs vagina despite the
latters plea not to rape her. Satisfied, the appellant stopped. But, after a short while, or after about
five (5) minutes, the appellant, once again, inserted his penis into AAAs vagina. Thereafter, he
stopped. On the third time, the appellant inserted again his penis into AAAs vagina. Fulfilling his
bestial desire, the appellant stopped and finally ordered AAA to dress up. The appellant even
threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell anyone about what happened between them. 9
The appellant, thereafter, directed AAA to board the tricycle. He then brought AAA in front of a
school in Paraaque City. But, before allowing AAA to get off, the appellant repeated his threat to kill
her should she tell anyone about the incident.10
The following day, AAA took the courage to seek the assistance of their barangay kagawad, who
simply advised her to just proceed to the barangay hall to lodge her complaint against the
appellant. AAA and her mother subsequently went to PGH, where she was subjected to physical
examination by Dr. Tan,11which resulted in the following findings:
Tanner Stage 3, healing laceration[s] 3 and 5 oclock area with petechiae,

HYMEN fresh laceration at 9 oclock area with eccymosi at 810 oclock area, Type
of Hymen: Crescentic
xxx
ANAL EXAMINATION
xxx
Perianal Skin: fresh laceration[s] at 12 and 1 oclock area.

No evident injury at the time of examination.
IMPRESSIONS
Disclosure of sexual abuse.
Genital findings show clear Evidence Of Blunt Force Or Penetrating
Trauma.12 (Emphasis supplied).
AAA also went to the Coastal Road Police Headquarters, where she executed her sworn statement
accusing the appellant of rape. AAA was able to identify the appellant as her assailant because the
former was wearing a jacket emblazoned with Barangay Police, as well as
a Barangay Identification Card, at the time of the incident.13
The appellant and Rodel Corpuz (Corpuz) took the witness stand for the defense.
In the course of Corpuzs direct examination, however, the parties made the following stipulations:
(1) that the [herein appellant] was the assigned barangay radio operator on that date, [28 April
2003], and he stayed at the barangay hall from 12:00 midnight to 5:00 a.m.; (2) that the witness
was there up to 12:00 midnight, but at about past 12:00, he left and returned after two (2) hours,
at 2:00 oclock a.m.; and (3) that when he woke up at 5:00 oclock in the morning, the [appellant]
was still there. With these stipulations, Corpuzs testimony was dispensed with. 14
The appellant, for his part, could only muster the defenses of denial and alibi. He, thus, offered a
different version of the story.
On 28 April 2003, the appellant claimed that he was on duty as a radio operator at
the barangay hall. His task as such was to receive complaints from the residents of the barangay, as
well as to receive calls from fellow barangay officials who are in need of assistance. On the same
day, he received a call from his companion, who is also a barangay tanod. He cannot, however,
recall any unusual incident that transpired on that day.15
The appellant admitted that he knew AAA as the one who lodged a complaint against him but he
denied that he knew her personally. He also vehemently denied the following: (1) that he raped
AAA; (2) that he was one of those barangay tanods who apprehended AAA for violating the curfew
ordinance of theirbarangay; and (3) that he was the one driving the tricycle in going to
the barangay hall. Instead, the appellant claimed that after 12:00 midnight of 28 April 2003, he
went home already. In fact, he was shocked when he was arrested on 25 September 2003 as he did
not commit any crime.16
In its Decision dated 30 April 2008, the trial court, giving credence to the categorical,
straightforward and positive testimony of AAA, coupled with the medical findings of sexual abuse,
convicted the appellant of three (3) counts of rape as defined and penalized under paragraph 1(a) of
Article 266A, in relation to Article 266B, of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as
amended. The trial court, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the [herein appellant] MANOLITO
LUCENA yVELASQUEZ alias MACHETE, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts
ofRape (under Art. 266a par. 1(a) in relation to Art. 266B of the RPC as amended by RA
8353) and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of
Rape. In addition, the [appellant] is ordered to pay [AAA] the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count.17 (Emphasis and italics theirs).
The appellant appealed18 the trial courts Decision to the Court of Appeals with the following
assignment of errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE [HEREIN APPELLANT] OF RAPE DESPITE
THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE THE ELEMENT OF FORCE AND INTIMIDATION.
II.
GRANTING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE [APPELLANT] COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED, THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF THREE (3) COUNTS OF RAPE. 19
After a thorough study of the records, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision dated
24 August 2009 sustaining appellants conviction for three (3) counts of rape, as well as the
damages awarded to AAA. In doing so, the Court of Appeals explained that the facts revealed that
the appellant succeeded thrice in inserting his penis into AAAs vagina. The said three (3)
penetrations happened one after another at an interval of five (5) minutes, wherein the appellant
would take a rest after satiating his lust and after regaining his strength would again rape AAA.
Undoubtedly, the appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault on
AAA. Thus, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is irrefutable. 20
Hence, this appeal.21
Both parties in their manifestations22 before this Court adopted their respective appeal briefs23 filed
with the Court of Appeals in lieu of Supplemental Briefs.
In his Brief, the appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that force or intimidation
attended the commission of rape. Records revealed that AAA did not even attempt to resist his
alleged sexual advances over her person. Instead, AAA opted to remain passive throughout her
ordeal despite the fact that during the three (3) episodes of their sexual intercourse he was
unarmed and she, thus, had all the opportunity to escape, which she never did. These reactions of
AAA were contrary to human experience, thus, cast serious doubts on the veracity of her testimony
and on her credibility as a witness.
The appellant similarly argues that the result of AAAs medical examination is quite disturbing as it
appears that her anal orifice was also penetrated by a hard object though nothing was said to this
effect in her testimony.
The appellant likewise avers that he cannot be convicted of three counts of rape. The intervening
period of five (5) minutes between each penetration does not necessarily prove that he decided to
commit three separate acts of rape. He maintains that what is of prime importance is that he was
motivated by a single criminal intent.
With the foregoing, the appellant believes that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt;
hence, his acquittal is inevitable.
This Court holds otherwise. The conviction of the appellant, thus, stands but the damages awarded
in favor AAA must be modified.
Primarily, in reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided with three settled principles: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even
more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the intrinsic
nature of the crime, only two persons being usually involved, the testimony of the complainant
should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.24
Rape is a serious transgression with grave consequences both for the accused and the complainant.
Following the above principles, this Court is dutybound to conduct a thorough and exhaustive
evaluation of a judgment of conviction for rape.25
After a careful scrutiny of the entire records, however, this Court finds no justifiable reason to
reverse the rulings of the lower courts.
All the Informations in this case charged the appellant with rape under paragraph 1(a), Article 266
A, in relation to paragraph 2, Article 266B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. These
provisions specifically state:
ART. 266A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
circumstances:
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the offended party
is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
xxxx
ART. 266B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. (Emphasis supplied).
Certainly, carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following instances constitutes rape: (1)
whenforce or intimidation is used; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious; and (3) when she is under twelve (12) years of age. 26
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or irresistible
when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation be so great or be of
such character as could not be resisted it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be
sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.27 Further, it should be
viewed from the perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the commission of the
crime.What is vital is that the force or intimidation be of such degree as to cow the
unprotected and vulnerable victim into submission. Force is sufficient if it produces fear
in the victim, such as when the latter is threatened with death.28
In the case at bench, as can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes and as observed
by the trial court, which the Court of Appeals sustained, AAAs categorical, straightforward and
positive testimony revealed that the appellant was armed with a gun and the same was pointed at
her while she was ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to which she acceded because of
fear for her life and personal safety. The appellant then put the gun down on the ground and
successfully inserted his penis into AAAs vagina, not only once but thrice. This happened despite
AAAs plea not to rape her. And, after satisfying his lust, the appellant threatened AAA that he would
kill her should she tell anyone about the incident. This same threat of killing AAA was first made by
the appellant while the former was still inside the tricycle on their way to Kabuboy Bridge.29 It
cannot be denied, therefore, that force and intimidation were employed by the appellant upon AAA
in order to achieve his depraved desires.
While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the ground the moment he
inserted his penis into AAAs vagina and was actually unarmed on those three (3) episodes of sexual
intercourse, the same does not necessarily take away the fear of being killed that had already been
instilled in the mind of AAA. Emphasis must be given to the fact that the gun was still within
appellants reach, therefore, he could still make good of his threat on AAA at anytime the latter
would show any resistance to his evil desires. AAAs lack of physical resistance, therefore, is
understandable and would not in any way discredit her testimony.
It must be borne in mind that when a rape victim becomes paralyzed with fear, she cannot be
expected to think and act coherently. Further, as has been consistently held by this Court, physical
resistance is not an essential element of rape and need not be established when intimidation is
exercised upon the victim, and, the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapists embrace
because of fear for her life and personal safety. The victims failure to shout or offer tenacious
resistance did not make voluntary her submission to the criminal acts of her aggressor. It bears
stressing that not every rape victim can be expected to act with reason or in conformity with the
usual expectations of everyone. The workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable; people react differently. Some may shout, some may faint, while others may be
shocked into insensibility.30
In his attempt to ruin AAAs credibility in order to exculpate himself from all the charges, the
appellant puts stress on the portion of the result of AAAs medical examination disclosing that even
her anal orifice was also penetrated by a hard object, which she never mentioned in her testimony.
To the mind of this Court, such argument is flimsy and totally misplaced. It would not even work to
appellants advantage and would not in any way cast doubt on the veracity of AAAs testimony. As
this Court has previously stated, a medical examination and a medical certificate, albeit
corroborative of the commission of rape, are not indispensable to a successful prosecution for
rape.31 Moreover, even though AAA made no mention of any anal penetration, such omission would
not change the fact that she was, indeed, raped by the appellant. As succinctly found by both lower
courts, AAA categorically, straightforwardly, clearly and positively narrated her harrowing experience
in the hands of the appellant. She recounted in detail how the appellant took advantage of her by
bringing her to Kabuboy Bridge, where nobody was present; commanding her to lie down and
undress herself at a point of a gun; and successfully inserting his penis into her vagina, not only
once but thrice. AAA stated that after the first penetration the appellant stopped. After about five
minutes, however, the appellant, once again, inserted his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, the
appellant stopped. For the third and last time, the appellant again inserted his penis into her vagina.
This narration was consistent with the rest of the medical findings showing fresh hymenal
lacerations on AAAs vagina, which according to Dr. Tan is a clear evidence of blunt force or
penetrating trauma a disclosure of sexual abuse.
For his ultimate defense, the appellant puts forward denial and alibi. Notably, these defenses are
totally inconsistent with his line of argument that the rape was committed without force or
intimidation thereby implying that the sexual intercourse between him and AAA was consensual.
Time and again, this Court has viewed denial and alibi as inherently weak defenses, unless
supported by clear and convincing evidence, the same cannot prevail over the positive declarations
of the victim who, in a simple and straightforward manner, convincingly identified the appellant as
the defiler of her chastity.32 Simply put, the positive assertions of AAA that he raped her are entitled
to greater weight. While denial and alibi are legitimate defenses in rape cases, bare assertions to
this effect cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim, 33 as in this case.
Also, appellants alibi that on the night the rape incident happened, he was at the barangay hall
doing his job as radio operator and at 12:00 midnight he already went home, failed to sufficiently
establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was
committed. Moreover, the corroborating testimony of defense witness Corpuz that the appellant left
at about past 12:00 midnight, almost the same time the rape incident happened, and then returned
after two (2) hours, even bolster the possibility of the appellants presence at the scene of the
crime.
This Court also notes that the appellant failed to show any illmotive on the part of AAA to testify
falsely against him. This bolsters the veracity of AAAs accusation since no woman would concoct a
tale that would tarnish her reputation, bring humiliation and disgrace to herself and her family, and
submit herself to the rigors, shame, and stigma attendant to the prosecution of rape, unless she is
motivated by her quest to seek justice for the crime committed against her.34
In light of the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the appellants guilt for the crime of
rape has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As to the number of rapes committed. The appellant, citing People v. Aaron (Aaron Case),35 insists
that he cannot be convicted of three (3) counts of rape despite the three (3) penetrations because
he was motivated by a single criminal intent. This Court finds this contention fallacious.
In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victims vagina; he then withdrew it and
ordered the latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time, he inserted again his penis into
the victims vagina; the accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the victim to lie near the
headboard of the makeshift bed and, for the third time, he inserted again his penis into the victims
vagina and continued making pumping motions. From these sets of facts, this Court convicted the
accused therein for only one count of rape despite the three successful penetrations because there
is no indication in the records from which it can be inferred that the accused decided to commit
those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful desire to change
positions inside the room where the crime was committed. This Court, thus, viewed that the
three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of rape in which the accused was obviously
motivated by a single criminal intent.
The circumstances in the present case, however, are far different from the Aaron Case. Here, we
quote with approval the observations of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the trial court,
to wit:
We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be convicted of three (3) counts of
rape. It appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the
private part of [AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other at an interval of five
(5) minutes wherein the [appellant] would rest after satiating his lust upon his victim and,
after he has regained his strength, he would again rape [AAA]. Hence, it can be clearly
inferred from the foregoing that when the [appellant] decided to commit those separate and
distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he was not motivated by a single impulse[,]
but rather by several criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is
indubitable.36 (Emphasis supplied).
This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the three insertions into AAA were
in satiation of successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the appellants conviction for
three counts of rape is proper.
As to penalty. The second paragraph of Art. 266B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
provides that [w]henever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon x x x the
penalty shall bereclusion perpetua to death. As it was properly alleged and proved that the
appellant used a gun in order to consummate his evil desires, thus, both lower courts correctly
imposed upon him the penalty ofreclusion perpetua for each count of rape.
As to damages. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory in a finding of rape is distinct from and should
not be denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural foundations and assessed
by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.37 The award of moral damages, on the other hand,
is automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other than the commission of
the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her
to such award.38 Hence, this Court upholds the P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral
damages, for each count of rape, that were awarded by both lower courts in favor of AAA.
In addition, this Court deems it proper to award exemplary damages in favor of AAA. The award of
exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the Civil Code if there is an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying.39 In this case, since the qualifying circumstance of the
use of a deadly weapon was present in the commission of the crime, exemplary damages in the
amount of P30,000.00, for each count of rape, is awarded in favor of AAA. Moreover, in line with
recent jurisprudence, the interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all damages
awarded from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid. 40
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CRH.C. No.
03371 dated 24 August 2009 finding herein appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three
counts of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that: (1) the exemplary damages
in the amount of P30,000.00, for each count of rape, is awarded in favor of AAA; and (2) the
appellant is ordered to pay AAA the interest on all damages at the legal rate of 6% per annum from
the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio,* Acting C.J., Del Castillo, Mendoza** and Leonen,*** JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
Per Special Order No. 1644 dated 25 February 2014.
**
Per Raffle dated 13 January 2014.
***
Per Special Order No. 1636 dated 17 February 2014.
Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with Associate Justices Estela M. PerlasBernabe
(now a member of this Court) and Stephen C. Cruz, concurring. Rollo, pp. 213.
1
Penned by Judge Jaime M. Guray. CA rollo, pp. 2033.
This is pursuant to the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703 (2006), wherein
this Court resolved to withhold the real name of the victimsurvivor and to use fictitious initials
instead to represent her in its decisions. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims
survivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well as
those of their immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed. The names of such
victims, and of their immediate family members other than the accused, shall appear as AAA,
BBB, CCC, and so on. Addresses shall appear as XXX as in No. XXX Street, XXX District, City
of XXX.
3
The Supreme Court took note of the legal mandate on the utmost confidentiality of proceedings
involving violence against women and children set forth in Sec. 29 of Republic Act No. 7610,
otherwise known as Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act; Sec. 44 of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as AntiViolence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004; and Sec. 40 of A.M. No. 041011SC, known as Rule on
Violence Against Women and Their Childreneffective 15 November 2004.
4
Records, pp. 13.
Per Certificate of Arraignment and RTC Order both dated 24 September 2004. Id. at 34 and 3637.
Testimony of AAA, TSN, 3 March 2005, pp. 46.
chanrobleslaw
Testimony of AAA, TSN, 6 May 2005, p. 7.
Testimony of AAA, TSN, 3 March 2005, pp. 67.
Testimony of AAA, id. at 710; Testimony of AAA, TSN, 6 May 2005, pp. 1013.
10
Testimony of AAA, id. at 10.
11
Testimony of AAA, id. at 1112; Testimony of Dr. Merle Tan, TSN, 24 June 2005, p. 6.
12
Per MedicoLegal Report Number 2003040078. Records, p. 11; Id. at 918.
Testimony of AAA, TSN, 3 March 2005, pp. 1316; Court of Appeals Decision dated 24 August
2009. Rollo, p. 5.
13
14
RTC Order dated 13 September 2007. Records, pp. 119120.
15
Testimony of the appellant, TSN, 7 September 2006, p. 5.
16
Id. at 34, 79 and 1316.
17
CA rollo, p. 33.
18
Per Notice of Appeal dated 20 May 2008. Id. at 34.
19
Appellants Brief dated 16 December 2008. Id. at 48.
20
Rollo, p. 12.
21
Per Notice of Appeal dated 11 September 2009. Id. at 1415.
22
Id. at 2930 and 3840.
23
CA rollo, pp. 4661 and 88113.
24
People v. Celocelo, G.R. No. 173798, 15 December 2010, 638 SCRA 576, 583584.
25
Id. at 584.
26
Id.
27
People v. Javier, 370 Phil. 128, 145 (1999).
28
People v. Caada, G.R. No. 175317, 2 October 2009, 602 SCRA 378, 392.
29
Testimony of AAA, TSN, 6 May 2005, p. 10.
30
People v. Alberio, G.R. No. 152584, 6 July 2004, 433 SCRA 469, 475.
31
People v. Linsie, G.R. No. 199494, 27 November 2013.
32
People v. Mercado, 419 Phil. 534, 543 (2001).
33
34
Id.
People v. Linsie, supra note 31.
35
438 Phil. 296 (2002).
36
Rollo, p. 12.
37
People v. Montemayor, 444 Phil. 169, 190 (2003).
38
People v. Dimaanao, 506 Phil. 630, 652 (2005).
39
People v. Montemayor, supra note 37 at 190.
40
People v. Linsie, supra note 31.
PEOPLE V JUMAWAN
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 187495
April 21, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish and protect his
wife, to give her a home, to provide her with the comforts and the necessities of life within his
means, to treat her kindly and not cruelly or inhumanely. He is bound to honor her x x x; it is
his duty not only to maintain and support her, but also to protect her from oppression and
wrong."
1
REYES, J.:
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit
within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy
expressly legislated in Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The Case
This is an automatic review of the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353, which affirmed the Judgment dated April 1, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, in Criminal Case Nos. 99668 and 99-669 convicting him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
2
The Facts
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married on October 18, 1975. They Ii ved
together since then and raised their four (4) children as they put up several businesses over
the years.
5
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the
accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Phase
2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accusedappellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
7
On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Joint
Resolution, finding probable cause for grave threats, less serious physical injuries and rape
and recommending that the appropriate criminal information be filed against the accusedappellant.
8
On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC respectively docketed
as Criminal Case No. 99-668 and Criminal Case No. 99-669. The Information in Criminal
Case No. 99-668 charged the accused-appellant as follows:
9
10
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan
de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the
latter[']s will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan
de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the
latter's will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21, 1999. On August
18, 1999, the accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, which was denied by the
trial court in an Order dated August 19, 1999. On even date, the accused-appellant was
arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty to both charges.
11
12
13
14
On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information averring
that the name of the private complainant was omitted in the original informations for rape.
The motion also stated that KKK, thru a Supplemental Affidavit dated November 15,
1999, attested that the true dates of commission of the crime are October 16, 1998 and
October 1 7, 1998 thereby modifying the dates stated in her previous complaint-affidavit. The
motion was granted on January 18, 2000. Accordingly, the criminal informations were
amended as follows:
15
16
17
Criminal Case No. 99-668:

That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon
person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the
private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
Criminal Case No. 99-669:
18
That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon
person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the
private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
19
The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not guilty plea to both
indictments and a joint trial of the two cases forthwith ensued.
Version of the prosecution
The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her daughters MMM
and 000, which, together with pertinent physical evidence, depicted the following events:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one of the
laborers. They got married after a year of courtship. When their first child, MMM, was born,
KKK and the accused-appellant put up a sari-sari store. Later on, they engaged in several
other businesses -trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK managed the businesses except for
the rice mill, which, ideally, was under the accused-appellant's supervision with the help of a
trusted employee. In reality, however, he merely assisted in the rice mill business by
occasionally driving one of the trucks to haul goods.
20
21
22
Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as KKK's
dedication. Even the daughters observed the disproportionate labors of their parents. He
would drive the trucks sometimes but KKK was the one who actively managed the
businesses.
23
24
She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on the other hand, did not
acquiesce with that objective.
25
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in Villa Ernesto,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Three of the children transferred residence therein while KKK,
the accused-appellant and one of their sons stayed in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She shuttled
between the two places regularly and sometimes he accompanied her. In 1998, KKK stayed
in Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City most of the days of the week. On Wednesdays, she went to
Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure supplies for the family store and then returned to Cagayan
de Oro City on the same day.
26
27
28
29
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the accusedappellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course,
responded with equal degree of enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in
bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in
her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would
resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.
30
31
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his complaint that
she failed to attend to him. She was preoccupied with financial problems in their businesses
and a bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at home because "a woman must stay in the house
and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She disobeyed his wishes and focused on her goal of
providing a good future for the children.
32
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and the accusedappellant slept together in Cebu City where the graduation rites of their eldest daughter were
held. By October 14, 1998, the three of them were already back in Cagayan de Oro City.
33
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about
their nightly routine. The family store in their residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m. before
supper was taken. Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the girls' bedroom at the
mezzanine of the house to pray the rosary while the accused-appellant watched television in
the living room. OOO and MMM then prepared their beds. Soon after, the accusedappellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with him to their conjugal bedroom in the third
floor of the house. KKK complied.
34
35
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did
not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the
bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: "[W]hy are you lying on the
c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously order: "You transfer here [to] our bed."
36
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain
due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier.
He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the
floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.
37
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to
copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his
hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.
38
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by
holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK
stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.
39
40
The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster, stretched her legs apart and rested his
own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in
penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by
desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."
41
42
With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other enclosing the
spouses' bedroom, KKK's pleas were audible in the children's bedroom where MMM lay
awake.
43
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to me, have
pity on me," MMM woke up 000 who prodded her to go to their parents' room. MMM
hurriedly climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her parents' bedroom and
inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is crying?" The accused-appellant then quickly put on his
briefs and shirt, partly opened the door and said: "[D]on 't interfere because this is a family
trouble," before closing it again. Since she heard her mother continue to cry, MMM ignored
his father's admonition, knocked at the bedroom door again, and then kicked it. A furious
accused-appellant opened the door wider and rebuked MMM once more: "Don't interfere us.
Go downstairs because this is family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK crouching and crying on top
of the bed, MMM boldly entered the room, approached her mother and asked: "Ma, why are
you crying?" before asking her father: "Pa, what happened to Mama why is it that her
underwear is torn[?]"
44
45
46
47
48
49
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother get up in
order to bring her to the girls' bedroom. KKK then picked up her tom underwear and covered
herself with a blanket. However, their breakout from the room was not easy. To prevent KKK
from leaving, the accused-appellant blocked the doorway by extending his arm towards the
knob. He commanded KKK to "[S]tay here, you sleep in our room," when the trembling KKK
pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to go out." He then held KKK's hands but she pulled them back.
Determined to get away, MMM leaned against door and embraced her mother tightly as they
pushed their way out.
50
51
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to what
happened. KKK relayed: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with
him when I'm not feeling well." The girls then locked the door and let her rest."
52
53
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the family
store on October 17, 1998, KKK and the children took their supper. The accused-appellant
did not join them since, according to him, he already ate dinner elsewhere. After resting for a
short while, KKK and the children proceeded to the girls' bedroom and prayed the rosary.
KKK decided to spend the night in the room's small bed and the girls were already fixing the
beddings when the accused-appellant entered.
"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK, who responded that she
preferred to sleep with the children. He then scoffed: "Its alright if you will not go with me,
anyway, there are women that could be paid [P] 1,000.00." She dismissed his comment by
turning her head away after retorting: "So be it." After that, he left the room.
54
55
He returned 15 minutes later and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became
infuriated. He lifted her from the bed and attempted to carry her out of the room as he
exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here[?] Lets go to our bedroom." When she defied him, he
grabbed her short pants causing them to tear apart. At this point, MMM interfered, "Pa, don't
do that to Mama because we are in front of you."
56
57
58
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who yelled,
"[E]ven in front of you, I can have sex of your mother [sic J because I'm the head of the
family." He then ordered his daughters to leave the room. Frightened, the girls obliged and
went to the staircase where they subsequently heard the pleas of their helpless mother
resonate with the creaking bed.
59
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly pulled
KKK's short pants and panties. He paid no heed as she begged, "[D]on 't do that to me, my
body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do [sic]. I
cannot withstand sex."
60
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands, mounted
her and forced himself inside her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short
pants and briefs, stood up, and went out of the room laughing as he conceitedly uttered: "[I]t
s nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex." He then retreated to
the masters' bedroom.
61
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried upstairs
but found the door locked. MMM pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her arm, reached for
the doorknob inside and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the room, MMM and OOO found
their mother crouched on the bed with her hair disheveled. The girls asked: "Ma, what
happened to you, why are you crying?" KKK replied: "[Y}our father is a beast and animal, he
again forced me to have sex with him even if I don't feel well. "
62
Version of the defense

The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father owned a land adjacent to
that of KKK's father. He came to know KKK because she brought food for her father's
laborers. When they got married on October 18, 1975, he was a high school graduate while
she was an elementary graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a comfortable life.
Through their joint hard work and efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal properties
and established their own businesses that included a rice mill managed by the accusedappellant. He also drove their trucks that hauled coffee, copra, or com.
63
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed that
on those dates he was in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling com. On October 7, his truck met
an accident somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He left the
truck by the roadside because he had to attend MMM's graduation in Cebu on October 12
with KKK. When they returned to Bukidnon on October 14, he asked KKK and MMM to
proceed to Cagayan de Oro City and just leave him behind so he can take care of the truck
and buy some com.
64
Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until June 1999 corroborated the
above claims. According to him, on October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was within the
vicinity of the rice mill's loading area in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-up truck. On
October 17, 1998, he and the accused-appellant were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading
sacks of com into the truck. They finished loading at 3 :00 p.m. The accused-appellant then
instructed Equia to proceed to Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon while the former attended a
fiesta in New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m., Equia, together
with a helper and a mechanic, left for Maluko in order to tow the stalled truck left there by the
accused-appellant in October 7 and thereafter, bring it to Cagayan de Oro City together with
the separate truck loaded with com.
They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to turn the truck around and
hoist it to the towing bar of the other truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the accused-appellant
arrived in Maluko. The four of them then proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City where they
arrived at 3 :00 a.m. of October 18, 1998. The accused-appellant went to Gusa while the
other three men brought the damaged truck to Cugman.
65
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her
revenge because he took over the control and management of their businesses as well as
the possession of their pick-up truck in January 1999. The accused-appellant was provoked
to do so when she failed to account for their bank deposits and business earnings. The
entries in their bank account showed the balance of P3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but
after only a month or on November 30, 1996, the amount dwindled to a
measly P9,894.88. Her failure to immediately report to the police also belies her rape
allegations.
66
67
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually
detected from her odd behavior. While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for MMM's graduation
rites, the accused-appellant and KKK had sexual intercourse. He was surprised when his
wife asked him to get a napkin to wipe her after having sex. He tagged her request as "hightech," because they did not do the same when they had sex in the past. KKK had also
become increasingly indifferent to him. When he arrives home, it was an employee, not her,
who opened the door and welcomed him. She prettied herself and would no longer ask for
his permission whenever she went out.
68
Bebs, KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the accused-appellant
several love letters purportedly addressed to Bebs but were actually intended for KKK.
69
70
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant came to know as:
Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey, somebody from the military or the Philippine National
Police, another one is a government employee, a certain Fernandez and three other
priests. Several persons told him about the paramours of his wife but he never confronted
her or them about it because he trusted her.
71
72
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on November 2,
1998. At that time, OOO was listening loudly to a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch
a television program, he asked OOO to tum down the volume of the cassette player. She got
annoyed, unplugged the player, spinned around and hit the accused-appellant's head with
the socket. His head bled. An altercation between the accused-appellant and KKK thereafter
followed because the latter took OOO's side. During the argument, OOO blurted out that
KKK was better off without the accused-appellant because she had somebody young,
handsome, and a businessman unlike the accused-appellant who smelled bad, and was old,
and ugly.
73
KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths thereof going to her
and one-fourth to the accused-appellant. However, the separation did not push through
because the accused-appellant's parents intervened. Thereafter, KKK pursued legal
separation from the accused-appellant by initiating Barangay Case No. 00588-99 before the
Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City and thereafter obtaining a
Certificate to File Action dated February 18, 1999.
74
75
Ruling of the RTC

In its Judgment dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by the
prosecution by giving greater weight and credence to the spontaneous and straightforward
testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. The trial court also upheld as sincere and
genuine the two daughters' testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to
testify against their own father for a crime such as rape if the same was not truly committed.
76
The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the accusedappellant's accusations of extra-marital affairs and money squandering against KKK. The
trial court shelved the accused-appellant's alibi for being premised on inconsistent
testimonies and the contradicting declarations of the other defense witness, Equia, as to the
accused-appellant's actual whereabouts on October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC ruling
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY" beyond
reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate charges of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each, to pay complainant [P]50,000.00 in each case as
moral damages, indemnify complainant the sum of (P]75,000.00 in each case, [P]50,000.00
as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
77
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA held that
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the amendment of the
original informations. Further, the accused-appellant was not prejudiced by the amendment
because he was re-arraigned with respect to the amended informations.
78
The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of the victim
herself and the corroborative declarations of MMM and OOO, was able to establish, beyond
reasonable doubt, all the elements of rape under R.A. No. 8353. The accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of KKK by using force and intimidation.
The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical examination did not negate
the commission of the crime because a medical certificate is not necessary to prove rape.
The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he and KKK are husband and
wife with mutual obligations of and right to sexual intercourse, there must be convincing
physical evidence or manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation used upon KKK
such as bruises. The CA explained that physical showing of external injures is not
indispensable to prosecute and convict a person for rape; what is necessary is that the victim
was forced to have sexual intercourse with the accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are spouses only
reinforces the truthfulness of KKK's accusations because no wife in her right mind would
accuse her husband of having raped her if it were not true.
The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by KKK when she
stated that she only found out that a wife may charge his husband with rape when the fiscal
investigating her separate complaint for grave threats and physical injuries told her about it.
Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of convincing evidence that it
was physically impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time
of the commission of the crimes, considering that Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place where he
allegedly was, is only about four or five hours away. Accordingly, the decretal portion of the
decision read:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
79
Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution dated July 6, 2009, the Court notified the
parties that, if they so desire, they may file their respective supplemental briefs. In a
Manifestation and Motion dated September 4, 2009, the appellee, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, expressed that it intends to adopt its Brief before the CA. On April 16,
2012, the accused-appellant, through counsel, filed his Supplemental Brief, arguing that he
was not in Cagayan de Oro City when the alleged rape incidents took place, and the
presence of force, threat or intimidation is negated by: (a) KKK's voluntary act of going with
him to the conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998; (b) KKK's failure to put up resistance or
80
81
seek help from police authorities; and ( c) the absence of a medical certificate and of blood
traces in KKK's panties.
82
Our Ruling
I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices of 'bride
capture' whereby a man conquered a woman through rape and 'stealing an heiress' whereby
a man abducted a woman and married her.
83
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman's chastity but
rather to punish the act of obtaining the heiress' property by forcible marriage or to protect a
man's valuable interest in his wife's chastity or her daughter's virginity.
84
85
If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her father's property and if a
man raped his wife, he was merely using his property.
86
Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment was
justified under three ideologies.
Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the property of her
father until she marries to become the property of her husband. If a man abducted an
unmarried woman, he had to pay the owner, and later buy her from the owner; buying and
marrying a wife were synonymous.
87
88
From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon marriage and the
law denied her political power and status under the feudal doctrine of coverture.
89
A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved, allowing him to
bring order within the family.
90
This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar concept. Upon
marrying, the woman becomes one with her husband. She had no right to make a contract,
sue another, own personal property or write a will.
91
II. The marital exemption rule

In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in England, conceived the
irrevocable implied consent theory that would later on emerge as the marital exemption rule
in rape. He stated that:
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by
their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto
her husband, which she cannot retract.
92
The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of America (USA)
and England. It gives legal immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, an act
which would be rape if committed against a woman not his wife. In those jurisdictions, rape
is traditionally defined as "the forcible penetration of the body of a woman who is not the wife
of the perpetrator."
93
94
The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was Commonwealth v.
Fogerty promulgated in 1857. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pronounced
that it would always be a defense in rape to show marriage to the victim. Several other
courts adhered to a similar rationale with all of them citing Hale's theory as basis.
95
96
The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A husband was
endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife. The privilege was
personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be
liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her.
97
98
In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the USA demanding for its
abolition for being violative of married women's right to be equally protected under rape
laws.
99
In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing the application
of the rule in cases where the husband and wife are living apart pursuant to a court order
"which by its terms or in its effects requires such living apart," or a decree, judgment or
written agreement of separation.
100
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the Court of Appeals
of New York declared the same unconstitutional in People v. Liberta for lack of rational
basis in distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. The decision, which also
renounced Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, ratiocinated as follows:
101
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital
rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are
either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident to marriage
or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny. We therefore declare the
marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional.
Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to sexual
intercourse has been cited most frequently in support of the marital exemption. x x x Any
argument based on a supposed consent, however, is untenable. Rape is not simply a sexual
act to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates
the bodily integrity of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and
psychic harm x x x. To ever imply consent to such an act is irrational and absurd. Other than
in the context of rape statutes, marriage has never been viewed as giving a husband the
right to coerced intercourse on demand x x x. Certainly, then, a marriage license should not
be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married
woman has the same right to control her own body as does an unmarried woman x x x. If a
husband feels "aggrieved" by his wife's refusal to engage in sexual intercourse, he should
seek relief in the courts governing domestic relations, not in "violent or forceful self-help x x
x."
The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the common-law doctrines
that a woman was the property of her husband and that the legal existence of the woman
was "incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband x x x." Both these doctrines, of
course, have long been rejected in this State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the common-law world [or] in any modem society - is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a
separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being x
x x." (Citations omitted)
102
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the District of
Columbia, outlawing the act without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted
some exemptions to a husband from prosecution such as when the wife is mentally or
physically impaired, unconscious, asleep, or legally unable to consent.
103
III. Marital Rape in the Philippines

Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until now. It
appears, however, that the old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to
Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form. According to Chief Justice
Ramon C. Aquino, a husband may not be guilty of rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815
but, in case there is legal separation, the husband should be held guilty of rape if he forces
his wife to submit to sexual intercourse.
104
105
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW). Hailed as the
first international women's bill of rights, the CEDAW is the first major instrument that contains
a ban on all forms of discrimination against women. The Philippines assumed the role of
promoting gender equality and women's empowerment as a vital element in addressing
global concerns. The country also committed, among others, to condemn discrimination
against women in all its forms, and agreed to pursue, by all appropriate means and without
delay, a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertook:
106
107
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national
constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to
ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this
principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where
appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women;
xxxx
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish
existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination
against women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against
women.
108
In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the Philippines enshrined the
principle of gender equality in the 1987 Constitution specifically in Sections 11 and 14 of
Article II thereof, thus:
Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.
xxxx
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. The Philippines also acceded to
adopt and implement the generally accepted principles of international law such as the
CEDA W and its allied issuances, viz:
Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all
nations. (Emphasis ours)
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In 1997,
R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC. The law
reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes against
chastity. More particular to the present case, and perhaps the law's most progressive proviso
is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and
criminalizing its perpetration, viz:
109
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as
the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the
crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab
initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in defining
rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's
legal relationship with his victim, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
circumstances:
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of
the 10th Congress on the law's progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In
spite of qualms on tagging the crime as 'marital rape' due to conservative Filipino
impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include and
penalize marital rape under the general definition of 'rape,' viz:
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point
of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill No. 6265, we never agreed
to marital rape. But under Article 266-C, it says here: "In case it is the legal husband who is
the offender... " Does this presuppose that there is now marital rape? x x x.
MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very limited 17 years of
private practice in the legal profession, Madam Speaker, and I believe that I can put at stake
my license as a lawyer in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits a husband from being
sued by the wife for rape. Even jurisprudence, we don't have any jurisprudence that prohibits
a wife from suing a husband. That is why even if we don't provide in this bill expanding the
definition of crime that is now being presented for approval, Madam Speaker, even if we
don't provide here for marital rape, even if we don't provide for sexual rape, there is the right
of the wife to go against the husband. The wife can sue the husband for marital rape and she
cannot be prevented from doing so because in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits
her from doing so. This is why we had to put second paragraph of 266-C because it is the
belief of many of us. x x x, that if it is true that in this jurisdiction there is marital rape even if
we don't provide it here, then we must provide for something that will unify and keep the
cohesion of the family together that is why we have the second paragraph.
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House version specifically House
Bill No. 6265 our provision on a husband forcing the wife is not marital rape, it is marital
sexual assault.
MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no crime of sexual assault. So,
Your Honor, direct to the point, under Article 266-C, is it our understanding that in the second
paragraph, quote: "In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, this refers to marital
rape filed against the husband? Is that correct?
MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no.
MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do you call- it?
MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we have already stated
that. Because under 1 and 2 it is all denominated as rape, there is no crime of sexual
assault. That is why I am sorry that our House version which provided for sexual assault was
not carried by the Senate version because all sexual crimes under this bicameral conference
committee report are all now denominated as rape whether the penalty is from reclusion
perpetua to death or whether the penalty is only prision mayor. So there is marital rape, Your
Honor, is that correct?
xxxx
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of this. I am in favor of
punishing the husband who forces the wife even to 30 years imprisonment. But please do
not call it marital rape, call it marital sexual assault because of the sanctity of marriage. x x
x. (Emphasis ours)
110
HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape but marital rape is not
excluded.
HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.
HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this marital rape can be
implicitly contained in the second paragraph. x x x So marital rape actually was in the House
version x x x. But it was not another definition of rape. You will notice, it only says, that
because you are the lawful husband does not mean that you cannot commit rape.
Theoretically, I mean, you can beat up your wife until she's blue. And if the wife complains
she was raped, I guess that, I mean, you just cannot raise the defense x x x[:] I am the
husband. But where in the marriage contract does it say that I can beat you up? That's all it
means. That is why if we stop referring to it as marital rape, acceptance is easy. Because
parang ang marital rape, married na nga kami. I cannot have sex. No, what it is saying is
you're [the] husband but you cannot beat me up. x x x. That's why to me it's not alarming. It
was just a way of saying you're [the] husband, you cannot say when I am charged with rape
x x x.
PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do you propose it if we put it in[?]
HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful husband does not mean
you can have carnal knowledge by force[,] threat or intimidation or by depriving your wife
reason, a grave abuse of authority, I don't know how that cannot apply. Di ba yung, or putting
an instrument into the, yun ang sinasabi ko lang, it is not meant to have another
classification of rape. It is all the same definition x x x.
xxxx
HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x x x, we can say that this
rule is implicit already in the first proviso. It implies na there is an instance when a husband
can be charged [with] rape x x x.
HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.
HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete natin ito. But it is understood
that this rule of evidence is now transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect of pardon.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of pardon. We will remove
marital rape.
HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3 but we will retain the one
on page 8, the effect of pardon. x x x [I]t is inferred but we leave it because after all it is just a
rule of evidence. But I think we should understand that a husband cannot beat at his wife to
have sex. Di ha? I think that should be made clear. x x x.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape. All we are saying is that if
you're [the] legal husband, Jesus Christ, don't beat up to have sex. I almost want, you are my
wife, why do you have to beat me up.
So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred in proviso, I mean, we
can face up, I hope, to the women and they would understand that it is half achieved.
HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are not defining or creating
a new crime but instead, we are just defining a rule of evidence. x x x.
HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule of evidence the fact
that he is husband is not, does not negate.
111
CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the point in discussion. The only
disagreement now is where to place it. Let us clear this matter. There are two suggestions
now on marital rape. One is that it is rape if it is done with force or intimidation or any of the
circumstances that would define rape x x x immaterial. The fact that the husband and wife
are separated does not come into the picture. So even if they are living under one roof x x x
for as long as the attendant circumstances of the traditional rape is present, then that is
rape.
112
PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x x [t]his provision on marital

rape, it does not actually change the meaning of rape. It merely erases the doubt in
anybody's mind, whether or not rape can indeed be committed by the husband against the
wife. So the bill really says, you having been married to one another is not a legal
impediment. So I don't really think there is any need to change the concept of rape as
defined presently under the revised penal code. This do[es] not actually add anything to the
definition of rape. It merely says, it is merely clarificatory. That if indeed the wife has
evidence to show that she was really brow beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated into
having sexual intercourse against her will, then the crime of rape has been committed
against her by the husband, notwithstanding the fact that they have been legally married. It
does not change anything at all, Mr. Chairman.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no change on this x x x.
113
The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No.
9262, which regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be
committed by a man against his wife within or outside the family abode, viz:
114
Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts committed by
any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in. physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a
woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her

child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks,
physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to
watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her
child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same
room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual
activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or
other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other forms of nonpersonal violence are the most common type of spousal violence accounting for 23%
incidence among ever-married women. One in seven ever-married women experienced
physical violence by their husbands while eight percent (8%) experienced sexual violence.
115
IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments

The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied consent
theory. In his appeal brief before the CA, he posits that the two incidents of sexual
intercourse, which gave rise to the criminal charges for rape, were theoretically consensual,
obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK, were a legally married and cohabiting
couple. He argues that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and
wife unless the contrary is proved.
The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and treated differently
from ordinary rape cases and that the standards for determining the presence of consent or
lack thereof must be adjusted on the ground that sexual community is a mutual right and
obligation between husband and wife.
116
The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.

The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent theory
evolved have already been superseded by modem global principles on the equality of rights
between men and women and respect for human dignity established in various international
conventions, such as the CEDAW. The Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW,
recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in
society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between them. Accordingly, the
country vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of
conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs
and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. One of such measures is
R.A. No 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist
because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife's body and thus her consent
to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.
117
Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration on the

Elimination of Violence Against Women, which was Promulgated by the UN General
Assembly subsequent to the CEDA W. The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of gender118
based violence that constitute acts of discrimination against women, identified 'marital rape'
as a species of sexual violence, viz:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any act of
gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or
psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.
Article 2
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the
following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering,
sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape,
female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal
violence and violence related to exploitation; (Emphasis ours)
119
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within
marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits
sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDA W and its
accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has
sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital
consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal to that he accords himself. He
cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without
her full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its international
commitments and accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on marital activities that
have lost their relevance in a progressive society.
120
121
It is true that the Family Code, obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule
sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous
and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.
122
123
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife
excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is
a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion.
It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the
other and it can go a long way in deepening marital relationship. When it is egoistically
utilized to despoil marital union in order to advance a felonious urge for coitus by force,
violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and
protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his
indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally
seek the court's intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential
marital obligation. But he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her
coercively or violently.
124
125
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the
elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal
protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection of the laws ordains that
similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others; no person or class of persons shall be denied the same
protection of laws, which is enjoyed, by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances.
126
127
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape,
as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the
perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the
law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those committed without a
marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by their husband and those
raped by any other man alike.
The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates against married
rape victims over unmarried rape victims because it withholds from married women raped by
their husbands the penal redress equally granted by law to all rape victims.
Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting the
argument akin to those raised by herein accused-appellant. A marriage license should not be
viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman
has the same right to control her own body, as does an unmarried woman. She can give or
withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully
wrestle such consent from her in case she refuses.
128
Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely
and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive
health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence. Women do not divest themselves of
such right by contracting marriage for the simple reason that human rights are inalienable.
129
130
In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor
provide for different definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply
what the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and
unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth. Neither can the Court frame distinct or stricter
evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it would inequitably burden its victims and
unreasonably and irrationally classify them differently from the victims of non-marital rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the
evidentiary rules on rape any differently if the aggressor is the woman's own legal husband.
The elements and quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in rape cases
should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship between the accused and his
accuser.
Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance with the established
legal principles and evidentiary policies in the prosecution and resolution of rape cases and
found that no reversible error can be imputed to the conviction meted the accused-appellant.
The evidence for the prosecution was
based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim.
Hence, the strict mandate that all courts must examine thoroughly the testimony of the
offended party. While the accused in a rape case may be convicted solely on the testimony
of the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless, duty-bound to establish that their
reliance on the victim's testimony is justified. Courts must ensure that the testimony is
credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent with human nature. If the testimony of the
complainant meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis
thereof.
131
It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to the highest respect. This is in view of its inimitable opportunity to
directly observe the witnesses and their deportment, conduct and attitude, especially during
cross-examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its evaluation was tainted with arbitrariness
or certain facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied, the same will not be disturbed on appeal.
132
After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of the entire
records of the trial proceedings and the transcript of each witnesses' testimony, the Court
found no justification to disturb its findings.
Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both credible and
spontaneous. Hailed to the witness stand on six separate occasions, KKK never wavered
neither did her statements vacillate between uncertainty and certitude. She remained
consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid during the rigorous cross-examination
and on rebuttal examination, she was able to convincingly explain and debunk the
allegations of the defense.
She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him despite her
refusal on October 16, 1998. He initially ordered her to sleep beside him in their conjugal bed
by violently throwing the cot where she was resting. In order not to aggravate his temper,
KKK obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated for them to have sex. When she rejected his
advances due to abdominal pain and headache, his request for intimacy transformed into a
stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK held her panties but the accused-appellant forcibly pulled
them down. The tug caused the small clothing to tear apart. She reiterated that she was not
feeling well and begged him to stop. But no amount of resistance or begging subdued him.
He flexed her two legs apart, gripped her hands, mounted her, rested his own legs on hers
and inserted his penis into her vagina. She continued pleading but he never desisted.
133
Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 1 7, 1998 is likewise
unmistakable. After the appalling episode in the conjugal bedroom the previous night, KKK
decided to sleep in the children's bedroom. While her daughters were fixing the beddings,
the accused-appellant barged into the room and berated her for refusing to go with him to
their conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted to stay in the children's bedroom, the accusedappellant got angry and pulled her up. MMM's attempt to pacify the accused-appellant further
enraged him. He reminded them that as the head of the family he could do whatever he
wants with his wife. To demonstrate his role as patriarch, he ordered the children to go out of
the room and thereafter proceeded to force KKK into sexual intercourse. He forcibly pulled
down her short pants and panties as KKK begged "Dont do that to me, my body is still
aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand
sex." But her pleas fell on deaf ears. The accused-appellant removed his shorts and briefs,
spread KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted her and inserted his penis into her
134
vagina. After gratifying himself, he got dressed, left the room as he chuckled: "Its nice, that is
what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex."
135
Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that must
be proved is the absence of the victim's consent to the sexual congress.
136
Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by force, threat or
intimidation, fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is
incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because he/she is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.
Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was wrestled from her
through force and intimidation both of which were established beyond moral certainty by the
prosecution through the pertinent testimony of KKK, viz:
On the October 16, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO:
Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your husband, do you remember
what happened?
A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.
Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you?
A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I warded off his hand.
Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?
A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by touching or knocking
her lap which means that he wanted to have sex."
Q So, what did you do after that?
A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at this juncture the
witness is sobbing)
Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex with you?
A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie [sic] was tom.
Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?
A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he is so strong.
xx xx
Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband, what else did he do?
A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.
Q So after that what else did he do?
A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands no matter how I
wrestled but I failed because he is stronger than me.
COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her testimony.
ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.)
Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two legs and rode on you
and held your two hands?
A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my whole body is aching."
Q How did you say that to your husband?
A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."
Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?
xxxx
A I shouted when I uttered that words.
xxxx
Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?
xxxx
A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything.
137
(Cross-Examination)
ATTY. AMARGA;
Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband normally remove your
panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty because according to you
he normally do that if he have sex with you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?
A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty because I don't want to
have sex with him at that time.
Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time?
A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.
xxxx
Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he also remove your
nightgown?
A No, Sir.
Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?
A He raised my duster [sic] up.
Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster [sic]?
A No, only on the breast level.
138
On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:

(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO
Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?
A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short pant and pantie forcible.
Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?
A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot
do what you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex."
Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?
A It was tom.
Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband, what did he do?
A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and mounted on me and
succeeded in having sex with me.
139
The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by gripping her
hands, flexing her legs and then resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the
consummation of his much-desired non-consensual sexual intercourse.
Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient intimidation upon KKK.
His actuations prior to the actual moment of the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed
his distorted sense of moral authority on his wife. He furiously demanded for her to lay with
him on the bed and thereafter coerced her to indulge his sexual craving.
The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on their bed,
when she insisted to sleep in the children's bedroom and the fact that he exercises
dominance over her as husband all cowed KKK into submission.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal bedroom on
October 16, 1998 cannot be stretched to mean that she consented to the forced sexual
intercourse that ensued. The accused-appellant was KKK's husband and hence it was
customary for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No consent can be deduced from such
act of KKK because at that juncture there were no indications that sexual intercourse was
about to take place. The issue of consent was still irrelevant since the act for which the same
is legally required did not exist yet or at least unclear to the person from whom the consent
was desired. The significant point when consent must be given is at that time when it is clear
to the victim that her aggressor is soliciting sexual congress. In this case, that point is when
the accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK comprehended to be an
invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she refused.
Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces.
We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK should have hit him
to convey that she was resisting his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an element of rape
and the law does not impose upon the victim the burden to prove resistance much more
requires her to raise a specific kind thereof.
140
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accusedappellant to recognize that she seriously did not assent to a sexual congress. She held on to
her panties to prevent him from undressing her, she refused to bend her legs and she
repeatedly shouted and begged for him to stop.
Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be just
enough to bring about the desired result. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation
be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind or is of such a
degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to bow into submission.
141
142
Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKK's panties
or the lack of a medical certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of
blood on the victim's underwear that determines the fact of rape inasmuch as a medical
certificate is dispensable evidence that is not necessary to prove rape. These details do not
pertain to the elements that produce the gravamen of the offense that is -sexual intercourse
with a woman against her will or without her consent.
143
144
145
The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v. Godoy, the evidentiary
circumstances of which are, however, disparate from those in the present case. In Godoy,
the testimony of the complainant was inherently weak, inconsistent, and was controverted by
the prosecution's medico-legal expert witness who stated that force was not applied based
on the position of her hymenal laceration. This led the Court to conclude that the absence of
any sign of physical violence on the victim's body is an indication of consent. Here,
however, KKK's testimony is, as discussed earlier, credible, spontaneous and forthright.
146
147
The corroborative testimonies of

MMM and OOO are worthy of credence.
The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked probative value
as they did not witness the actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is
essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim who can testify
with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse. Hence, the probative value of MMM
and OOO's testimonies rest not on whether they actually witnessed the rape but on whether
their declarations were in harmony with KKK's narration of the circumstances, preceding,
subsequent to and concurrent with, the rape incidents.
148
MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's narration. MMM heard
KKK shouting and crying: "Eddie, dont do that to me, have pity on me" on the night of
October 16, 1998 shortly after KKK and the accused-appellant went to their conjugal
bedroom. When MMM went upstairs to check on her mother, the accused-appellant
admonished her for meddling. Frustrated to aid her mother who persistently cried, MMM
kicked the door so hard the accused-appellant was prompted to open it and rebuke MMM
once more. OOO heard all these commotion from the room downstairs.
149
MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair disheveled while her
tom panty lay on the floor. After a brief struggle with the accused-appellant, MMM and KKK
were finally able to escape and retreat to the children's bedroom where KKK narrated to her
daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm
not feeling well. "
KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night after the accusedappellant barged inside the children's bedroom. The couple had an argument and when
MMM tried to interfere, the accused-appellant ordered her and OOO to get out after bragging
that he can have sex with his wife even in front of the children because he is the head of the
family. The girls then stayed by the staircase where they afterwards heard their mother
helplessly crying and shouting for the accused-appellant to stop.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the accusedappellant, through the use of force and intimidation, had non-consensual and forced carnal
knowledge of his wife, KKK on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her verbal and
physical resistance were clear manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when MMM saw
her on the bed after the accused appellant opened the door on October 16, 1998, her
conduct towards the accused-appellant on her way out of the room, and her categorical
outcry to her children after the two bedroom episodes - all generate the conclusion that the
sexual acts that occurred were against her will.
Failure to immediately report to the

police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.
The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because they failed
to report the rape incidents to the police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the rape
charges. Delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults does not necessarily
impair their credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained.
150
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife to
submit to sexual intercourse is considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that she could
sue his husband for rape when Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique) told
her about it when she filed the separate charges for grave threats and physical injuries
against the accused-appellant.
151
It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353
abolishing marital exemption in rape cases hence it is understandable that it was not yet
known to a layman as opposed to legal professionals like Prosecutor Tabique. In addition,
fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common factor that deter rape victims from
reporting the crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape cases. This is in
view of the popular yet outdated belief that it is the wife's absolute obligation to submit to her
husband's carnal desires. A husband raping his own wife is often dismissed as a peculiar
occurrence or trivialized as simple domestic trouble.
Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the stigma and
public scrutiny that could have befallen KKK and her family had the intervention of police
authorities or even the neighbors been sought, are acceptable explanations for the failure or
delay in reporting the subject rape incidents.
The victim -S testimony on the
witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.
The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit for rape is not fatal in view
of the credible, candid and positive testimony of KKK on the witness stand. Testimonial
evidence carries more weight than the affidavit since it underwent the rudiments of a direct,
cross, re-direct and re-cross examinations. Affidavits or statements taken ex parte are
generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to
testimony given in court.
152
Ill motive imputed to the victim

The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not inspire belief as it is
riddled with loopholes generated by incongruent and flimsy evidence. The prosecution was
able to establish that the P3 Million deposit in the spouses' bank account was the proceeds
of their loan from the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI). Exhibit J, which is a BPI ML instruction
sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the amount of P3,149,840.63 is the same amount the
accused-appellant claimed to have entrusted to her wife. Although the accused-appellant
denied being aware of such loan, he admitted that approximately P3 Million was spent for
the construction of their house. These pieces of evidence effectively belie the accused
appellant's allegation that KKK could not account for the money deposited in the bank.
153
Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed to explain how Bebs
could be his wife KKK when the letter-sender greeted Bebs a "happy birthday" on October 28
while KKK's birthday is June 23. The accused-appellant also did not present Bebs herself,
being a more competent witness to the existence of the alleged love letters for KKK. He
likewise failed, despite promise to do so, to present the original copies of such love letters
neither did he substantiate KKK's supposed extra-marital affairs by presenting witnesses
who could corroborate his claims. Further, the Court finds it unbelievable that an able man
would not have the temerity to confront his wife who has fooled around with 10 men - some
of whom he has even met. The accused-appellant's erratic statements on the witness stand
are inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital romance making it reasonable to infer that he
merely made up those malicious stories as a desperate ploy to extricate himself out of this
legal quandary.
At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-appellant's unfounded
suspicions that hold no evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent to destroy KKK's
credibility and that of her testimony. In sum, the defense failed to present sufficiently
convincing evidence that KKK is a mere vindictive wife who is harassing the accusedappellant with fabricated rape charges.
Alibi
It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent theory as defense, the
accused-appellant has essentially admitted the facts of sexual intercourse embodied in the
two criminal informations for rape. This admission is inconsistent with the defense of alibi
and any discussion thereon will thus be irrelevant.
At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but
also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses who had no improper motive to testify
falsely.
154
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some
other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical
impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between the place where the
accused was and the place where the crime was committed when the crime transpired, but
more importantly, the facility of access between the two places.
155
Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed attended a fiesta in
Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was hauling com with Equia on the dates of commission of the
crime, the same will not easily exonerate him. The accused-appellant failed to adduce clear
and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at his residence in
Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crime. Dangcagan, Bukidnon can
be traversed by about four or five hours from Cagayan de Oro City, and even less by private
vehicle which was available to the accused appellant at any time. Thus, it was not
physically impossible for him to be at the situs criminis at the dates and times when the two
rape incidents were committed.
156
Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the positive identification and credible
testimony of the victim, and her two daughters, the Court must give weight to the latter,
especially in the absence of ill motive on their part to falsely testify against the accusedappellant.
Conclusion
All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was sufficiently
overcome by KKK's clear, straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two
separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, without her consent
and against her will. Evidence of overwhelming force and intimidation to consummate rape is
extant from KKK's narration as believably corroborated by the testimonies of MMM and OOO
and the physical evidence of KKK's tom panties and short pants. Based thereon, the reason
and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the accused-appellant is guilty of raping
his wife on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
Penalties
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted upon the
accused-appellant for being in accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC.
Further, he shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which
states that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible
for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended."
157
The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount of P50,000.00. Moral
damages are granted to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape under
the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent.
158
The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding that rape took
place. Considering that the crime committed is simple rape, there being no qualifying
circumstances attendant in its commission, the appropriate amount is P50,000.00 and
not P75,000.00 as awarded by the RTC.
1wphi1
159
To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar form of domestic
violence, an award ofP30,000.00 as exemplary damages is imperative.
160
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum to
be reckoned from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
161
A Final Note
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman's
value and dignity as a human being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or
social status. It can happen anywhere and it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown in the
present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored fortress, the family home, committed against
her by her husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The herein pronouncement is
an affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their
sexually coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives.
A husband does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not
divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she
can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his
wife's unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or
coercion to make her yield. He can seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine
whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the
marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological
communion that achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and selfgiving and as such it contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual
coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement, menacing
personalities may use this as a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be
stressed that safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place to spot and scrutinize
fabricated or false marital rape complaints and any person who institutes untrue and
malicious charges will be made answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC and/or
other laws.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count,
without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of
PS0,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, for each count of rape. The award of damages shall earn legal interest at the rate
of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSMAIN
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
26 Am Jur SSS, p. 636.
Pursuant to People v. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640,
653-658.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, with Associate Justices

Edgardo A. Camello and Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 5-30.
3
Issued by Judge Anthony E. Santos; records, pp. 760-769.
The real name of the victim, her personal circumstances and other information
which tend to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of their
immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed to protect her
privacy and fictitious initials shall, instead, be used, in accordance with People v.
Cabalquinto (533 Phil. 703 [2006]), and A.M. No. 04-11-09-SC dated September 19,
2006.
5
Pre-trial Order dated November 16, 1999, records, pp. 71-74.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 3-5.
Id. at 2.
10
Id. at 13.
11
Id. at 27.
12
Id. at 44-48.
13
Id. at 50.
14
Id. at 49.
15
Id. at 84-85.
16
Exhibit "7".
17
Records, p. 89.
18
Id. at 86.
19
Id. at 87.
20
TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 93-95.
21
Id. at 98-99.
22
Id. at 101; TSN, July 3, 2000, p. 5.
23
TSN, February 10, 2000, pp. 26-27.
24
TSN, August 2, 2000, p. 21.
25
TSN, May 24, 2000, p. 99.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 100; TSN, August 2, 2000, p. 21-22.
28
29
TSN, August 2, 2000, p. 23.
30
TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 95-97.
TSN, July 3, 2000, p. 17; TSN, July 13, 2000, p. 14; KKK's Complaint Affidavit
dated February 19, 1999, records, pp. 10-11.
31
32
TSN, July 3, 2000, pp. 6-7.
33
TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 8-9; TSN, February 4, 2000, pp. 45-47; TSN, August 2,
2000, pp. 5-6.
34
35
TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 9-10; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 74-75.
36
TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 75-76.
37 38
Id. at 76-77.
38
Id. at 77-78.
39
Id. at 78-79; Exhibit "A".
40
TSN, July I 3, 2000, p. 11.
41
Id.
42
TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 79-81.
43
TSN, February 4, 2000, pp. 46-47.
44
Id. at 49-50.
45
TSN, August 2, 2000, p. 8.
46
TSN, February 3, 2000, p. 11
47
Id. at 12; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 81-82.
48
TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 11-13; TSN, August 2, 2000, p. 8.
49
TSN, February 3, 2000, Id.
50
Id. at 14; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 82-83.
51
TSN, February 4, 2000, pp. 56-59.
52
TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 14-15.
53
Id. at 16; TSN, May 24, 2000, p. 83; TSN, August 2, 2000, pp. 9-10.
TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 17-19; TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 84-86; TSN, August 2,
2000, pp. 11-13.
54
55
TSN, February 10, 2000, pp. 40-41.
56
Id. at 44-45.
57
Exhibit "B".
2000, pp. 13-14.
58
2000, pp. 14-16.
59
60
TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 88-89.
61
Id. at 89-90.
62
Id. at 90; TSN, February 3, 2000, pp. 23-24; TSN, August 2, 2000, pp. I 6, 18-19.
63
TSN, October 24, 2000, pp. 4-7.
64
Id. at 17.
65
TSN, April 30, 2001, pp. 6-8.
66
TSN, October 24, 2000, pp. 7, 10-11; Exhibit" I".
67
Id. at 7.
68
Id. at 12-13.
69
Also referred to as Bebie in the other parts of the records.
70
Id. at 14; Exhibit "3".
[[71] TSN, February 2, 2001, pp. 14-15.

72
Id. at 16-17.
73
TSN, October 24, 2000, pp. 19-21; TSN, March 12, 2001, p. 155.
74
TSN, October 24, 2000, p. 18.
75
Id. at 18-19; Exhibit "2".
76
77
Id. at 769.
78
Rollo, pp. 5-30.
79
Id. at 29.
Id. at 35-36; The contents of the Resolution was reiterated in another Resolution
dated November 15, 2010, id. at 47-48.
80
81
Id. at 37-38.
82
Id. at 78-93.
Cassandra M. DeLaMothe, Liberta Revisited: A Call to Repeal the Marital

Exemption for All Sex Offenses in New York's Penal Law, 23 Fordham Urban Law
Journal, p. 861 (1995). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj, last accessed on March 31,
2014.
83
Maria Pracher, The Marital Rape Exemption: A Violation of a Woman's Right of

Privacy, 11 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., p. 725 (1981 ).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol 11/iss3/1, last accessed on March 31,
2014.
84
85
Supra note 83.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 860.
Id. at 860-861, citing Arthur R. Cleveland, Woman Under the English Law 71 (Fred
B. Rothman 7 Co. 1987) (1896), p. 24.
88
89
Id. at 859-860.
Id. at 860, citing l William Blackstone Commentaries *432 and Katherine M.

Schelong, Domestic Violence and the State: Responses to and Rationales for
Spousal Battering, Marital Rape and Stalking, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 81 (1994).
90
91
Id., citing Schelong, 86. (Other citations omitted)
1 Hale, History of Pleas of the Crown, pp. 628-629 (1736), as cited in People v.
Liberta, Court of Appeals of New York, 474 N.E. 2D 567 (1984).
92
93
Supra note 84, at 717. (Citations Omitted)
Julie Allison and Lawrence Wrightsman, Rape, The Misunderstood Crime, United
States, Sage Publications, Inc., p. 87 ( 1993).
94
95
74 Mass 489, as cited in People v. Liberta, supra note 92.
96
See People v. Liberta, supra note 92.
DeLaMothe, supra note 83, at 862, citing N.Y. Penal Law SS 2010 (Consol. 1909),
viz:
97
"A person who penetrates an act of sexual intercourse with a female not his
wife, against her will or without her consent. .. [i]s guilty of rape in the first
degree and punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty years.
A person who penetrates an act of sexual intercourse with a female, not his
wife, under the age of eighteen years, under circumstances not amounting to
rape in the first degree, is guilty of rape in the second degree, and punishable
with imprisonment for not more than ten years."
Id., citing the 1922 case of People v. Meli (193 N .Y.S. 365 [Sup. Ct. 1922]). John
Meli was convicted of rape for aiding and abetting another man in raping his wife.
Meli did not commit the rape himself but he was present while the rape was being
committed and he actually helped to overcome his wife.
98
Racquel Kennedy Bergen, Ph.D., Marital Rape, Applied Research Forum, National
Electronic Network on Violence Against Women, p. 2 (1999).
www.hawaii.edu/hivandaids/Marital Rape.pdf, last accessed on April 1, 2014, citing
Bidwell, L., & White, P., The family context of marital rape. The Journal of Family
Violence, I, pp. 277-287 (1986) and Finkelhor, D., & Yllo, K., License to Rape: Sexual
Abuse of Wives, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston (1985).
99
100
People v. Liberta, supra note 92.
101
Id.
102
Id.
Bergen, supra note 99, citing Bergen, R.K., Wife Rape: Understanding the
Response of Survivors and Service Providers. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage (1996) and
Russell, D.E.H., Rape in Marriage, New York, Macmillan Press (1990).
103
104
Tenure: November 20, 1985 to March 6, 1986.
Ramon C. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Volume Ill, Central Lawbook Supply,
Inc. (1988 Ed.), pp. 382-383.
105
http://pcw.gov.ph/intemational-commitments/cedaw/state-obligations, last visited on

March 20, 2014; CEDAW came into effect on September 4, 1981, the Philippines has
signed it on July 17, 1980 and ratified it on July 19, 1981, the first Association of
South East Asian Nation country to do so.
106
CA Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal, Women Empowerment,

http://ca.judiciary.gov.ph/index.php?action=mnuactual_contents&ap=j8040&p=y, last
accessed on April 1, 2014.
107
108
CEDA W, Article 2, Part I.
Also known as The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the law took effect on October 22,
1997; See People v. Maceda, 405 Phil. 698, 721 (2001).
109
110
Consideration of the Conference Committee Reports, September 3, 1997.
Bicameral Conference Committee Meeting, Committee on Revision of Laws J/W

Committee on Women, March 17, 1997.
111
Sub-committee on Disadvantaged Women (Committee on Women) JT. Subcommittee on Criminal Laws Committee on Revision of Laws), November 15, 1995.
112
113
Committee on Revision of Laws J/W Committee on Women, January 29, 1996.
114
ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004.
http://pcw.gov. ph/statistics/201304/statistics-vio lence-against-filipino-women, last

visited on March 18, 2014.
115
116
117
CEDAW, Article 5, Part I.
UN General Assembly, December 20, 1993.

http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48rl 04.htm, last accessed on April 1, 2014.
118
119
Id.
120
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article I:

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in
a spirit of brotherhood.
121
UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, Article 4:

States should condemn violence against women and should not invoke any
custom, tradition or religious consideration to avoid their obligations with
respect to its elimination. States should pursue by all appropriate means and
without delay a policy of eliminating violence against women x x x.
Article 68. - The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. (Emphasis ours)
122
123
See Tsai v. CA, 334 Phil. 294, 304 (1997).
124
Id. at 304.
Refusal to have sexual intercourse must be rooted on psychological incapacity

which in turn must be established by the requirements of gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability; Baccay v. Baccay, G.R. No. 173138, December 1,
2010, 636 SCRA 350, 368-369; See also the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice
Arturo D. Brion in the case stating that: "The failure to consummate the marriage by
itself, however, does not constitute as a ground to nullify the marriage. The spouse's
refusal to have intimate sexual relations must be due to causes psychological in
nature, i.e., the psychological condition of the spouse renders [her] incapable of
having intimate sexual relations with the other. x x x." 636 SCRA 350, 375.
125
126
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 1.
127
City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 326 (2005).
128
Supra note 92.
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, The Fourth World Conference on
Women, September 15, 1995, paragraph 96.
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/pdf/BDPfA%20E.pdf, last accessed on
April 3, 2014. According to the Philippine Commission on Women, the Philippines
acceded to the commitments set forth in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for
Action.
129
http://www.pcw.gov.ph/intemational-commitments, last accessed on April 3,

2014.
130
R.A. No. 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women), Section 3:
Principles of Human Rights of Women. - Human rights are universal and

inalienable. All people in the world are entitled to them. The universality of
human rights is encompassed in the words of Article l of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which states that all human beings are free
and equal in dignity and rights. (Emphasis ours)
131
People v. Publico, G.R. No. 183569, April 13, 2011, 648 SCRA 734, 742.
132
People v. Agustin, G.R. No. 194581, July 2, 2012, 675 SCRA 424, 434.
133
TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 75-81.
134
Id. at 87-89.
135
Id. at 89-90.
136
Sison v. People, G.R. No. 187229, February 22, 2012, 666 SCRA 645, 659.
137
TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 77-81.
138
TSN, July 13, 2000, pp. 10-11.
139
TSN, May 24, 2000, pp. 88-89.
140
People v. Estoya, G.R. No. 200531, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 376, 386.
141
People v. Dimanawa, G.R. No. 184600, March 9, 20 I 0, 614 SCRA 770, 778.
142
People v. Magtibay, 435 Phil. 353, 365 (2002).
143
v. Baltazar, 397 Phil. 277, 288 (2000).
144
People of the Philippines v. Joey Bacatan, G.R. No. 203315, September 18, 2013.
145
Id.
146
321 Phil. 279 ( 1995).
147
Id. at 318.
148
People v. Cias, G.R. No. 194379, June I, 2011, 650 SCRA 326, 337.
149
TSN, February 3, 2000, p. IO; TSN, February 4, 2000, pp. 48-50.
150
People v. Satioquia, 460 Phil. 167, 173 (2003).
151
TSN, July 3, 2000, pp. 13-14.
See People v. Cabtalan, G.R. No. I 75980, February I 5, 2012, 666 SCRA 174,
192-193.
152
153
TSN, November 21, 2000, pp. 13-14.
People v. Ogarte, G.R. No. 182690, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 395, 413, citing
People v. Palomar, 343 Phil. 628, 663-664 (1997).
154
People v. Viojela, G.R. No. 177140, October 17, 2012, 684 SCRA 241, 257-258.
156
155
156
TSN, May 11, 2001, p. 171.
157
People of the Philippines v. Joey Bacatan, supra note 144.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
RICALDE V PEOPLE
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015
RICHARD RICALDE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Even men can become victims of rape.
Before us is a criminal case for rape through sexual assault committed against a 10-year-old boy.
Accused Richard Ricalde (Ricalde) was charged with rape as described under the second paragraph
of Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, committed [b]y any person who, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting
his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or
anal orifice of another person.1
cralawre d
This is a Petition for Review2 assailing the Court of Appeals August 28, 2013 Decision 3 affirming
Ricaldes conviction for rape through sexual assault and January 15, 2014 Resolution 4 denying
reconsideration.
The Provincial Prosecutor of Bian, Laguna filed an Information charging Ricalde of rape through
sexual assault:
That on or about January 31, 2002, in the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Province of Laguna, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Richard Ricalde, prompted with lewd
design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inserting [sic] his penis into the anus
of XXX who was then ten (10) years of age against his will and consent, to his damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
cralawred
cralawla wlibrary
Ricalde pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on August 21, 2002. 6 The prosecution presented
the victim (XXX),7 his mother, and the medico-legal as witnesses, while the defense presented
Ricalde as its sole witness.8
cralawred
The facts as found by the lower courts follow.

On January 30, 2002, XXX requested his mother to pick up Ricalde at McDonalds Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa
at past 8:00 p.m.9 Ricalde, then 31 years old,10 is a distant relative and textmate of XXX, then 10
years old.11
cralawred
After dinner, XXXs mother told Ricalde to spend the night at their house as it was late. 12 He slept
on the sofa while XXX slept on the living room floor.13
cralawred
It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as he felt pain in his anus and stomach and something
inserted in his anus.14 He saw that Ricalde fondled his penis.15 When Ricalde returned to the
sofa, XXX ran toward his mothers room to tell her what happened. 16 He also told his mother that
Ricalde played with his sexual organ.17
cralawre d
XXXs mother armed herself with a knife for self-defense when she confronted Ricalde about the
incident, but he remained silent.18 She asked him to leave.19
cralawre d
XXXs mother then accompanied XXX to the barangay hall where they were directed to report the
incident to the Sta. Rosa police station.20 The police referred them to the municipal health center
for medical examination.21 Dr. Roy Camarillo examined22 XXX and found no signs of recent trauma
in his anal orifice23 that was also NEGATIVE for [s]permatozoa.24
cralawred
On February 4, 2002, XXX and his mother executed their sworn statements at the Sta. Rosa police
station, leading to the criminal complaint filed against Ricalde. 25
cralawred
Ricalde denied the accusations.26 He testified that he met XXX during the 2001 town fiesta of
Calaca, Batangas and learned that XXXs mother is the cousin of his cousin Arlan Ricalde. 27 He and
XXX became textmates, and XXX invited him to his house. 28 On January 30, 2002, XXXs mother
picked him up to sleep at their house.29 He slept at 10:00 p.m. on the living room sofa while XXX
slept on the floor.30 He denied the alleged rape through sexual assault. 31
cralawred
The Regional Trial Court in its Decision32 dated June 20, 2011 found Ricalde guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape through sexual assault:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Richard Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape by sexual assault and, accordingly, sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day ofprision correccional as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum. Accused is ordered to pay [XXX] the
sums of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
33
cralawla wlibrary
cralawlawlibrary
The Court of Appeals in its Decision34 dated August 28, 2013 affirmed the conviction with the
modification of lowering the amounts of damages awarded:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 20 June 2011 of Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna, in Crim. Case No. 11906-B, is AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATION as to the award of
damages. Accused-appellant RICHARD RICALDE is ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity in the
amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos and moral damages likewise in the amount of Thirty
Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos, both with interest at the legal rate of six (6%) percent per annum
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. 35
cralawla wlibrary
Ricalde filed this Petition praying for his acquittal.36
cralawred
Petitioner argues the existence of reasonable doubt in his favor. First, the medico-legal testified
that he found no physical signs or external signs of recent trauma [in XXXs] anus,37 or any trace
of spermatozoa.38 He contends that physical evidence ranks high in [the courts] hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence. 39
cralawre d
Second, XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal orifice, or that he saw
a penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice. 40 XXX was also able to immediately push
him away.41 Thus, no push and pull movement happened that would explain XXXs alleged stomach
ache.42 Petitioner submits that the alleged stomach ache was an attempt to aggravate the charge
against him.43
cralawred
Petitioner argues that XXXs inconsistent testimony raises reasonable doubt on his guilt. 44 XXX
claimed that he immediately pushed petitioner away, but in another instance, he testified as follows:
I felt that he was inserting his penis inside my anus because I was even able to hold his penis. He
was also playing with my penis.45 XXX also stated in his salaysay that the penis reached only the
periphery of his anal orifice.46
cralawred
Third, XXX testified that after he had pushed petitioner away, he saw that petitioner was wearing
pants with the zipper open.47 Petitioner submits that performing anal coitus while wearing pants
with an open zipper poses a challenge the risk of injuring the sexual organ or having pubic hair
entangled in the zipper. 48 Petitioner argues that the court must consider every circumstance
favoring the innocence of an accused.49
cralawred
Assuming he committed an offense, petitioner contends that the court should have applied the
variance doctrine in People v. Sumingwa,50 and the court would have found him guilty for the
lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. 51 The petition
then enumerated circumstances showing possible homosexual affections between petitioner and
XXX.52 These include the fact that they were textmates and that petitioner played with XXXs
penis.53
cralawre d
Petitioner argues that this masturbation could have caused an irritation that XXX mistook as
penetration.54 XXX could also have mistaken the overreaching fingers as a male organ trying to
enter his [anus].55 Assuming these acts took place, these would only be considered as acts of
lasciviousness.56
cralawre d
The People of the Philippines counters that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt all
elements of the crime charged.
The Comment57 discussed that it is neither improbable nor contrary to human experience that XXXs
mother allowed her son to be left alone with a stranger.58 Petitioner was not a complete stranger,
and she could not have foreseen such abuse since rape by sexual assault or any form of sexual
abuse of a boy by a grown man is fairly uncommon in our culture.59
cralawred
Petitioners reliance on the medico-legals findings deserves scant consideration. 60 The Comment
quotedPeople v. Penilla61 in that [a] medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the
accused of the crime.62 In any case, the medico-legal testified on the sphincters flexibility and how
an insertion into the anal orifice would not necessarily cause injury.63
cralawred
Lastly, the prosecution established all elements of rape through sexual assault based on XXXs clear
and categorical testimony.64 Petitioners defense of mere denial cannot outweigh positive
testimony.65 Consequently, petitioners contention that the incident only amounts to acts of
lasciviousness lacks merit.66
cralawre d
The issue before us for resolution is whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt
petitioner Richard Ricaldes guilt for the crime of rape through sexual assault.
We affirm petitioners conviction with modification on the penalty imposed.
The Anti-Rape Law of 199767 classified rape as a crime against persons68 and amended the Revised
Penal Code to include Article 266-A on rape through sexual assault:
Article 266A. Rape; When and How Committed.Rape is Committed

circumstances:
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphasis supplied)
cralawla wlibrary
Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as instrument or object
rape,69gender-free rape,70 or homosexual rape.71 The gravamen of rape through sexual assault
is the insertion of the penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into another persons genital or anal orifice.72
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Jurisprudence holds that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored
on said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect.73
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The trial court found that XXXs straightforward, unequivocal and convincing
testimony74 sufficiently proved that petitioner committed an act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into XXXs anal orifice.75 There was no showing of ill motive on the part of XXX to falsely
accuse petitioner.76 The Court of Appeals accorded great weight to the trial courts findings and
affirmed petitioners conviction.77
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No cogent reason exists for this court to overturn the lower courts findings.
First, petitioners argument highlighting alleged inconsistencies in XXXs testimony fails to convince.
In a long line of cases,78 this court has given full weight and credit to the testimonies of child
victims. Their [y]outh and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.79 XXX, then
only 10 years old, had no reason to concoct lies against petitioner.80
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This court has also held that [l]eeway should be given to witnesses who are minors, especially
when they are relating past incidents of abuse.81
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Petitioner contends that XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal orifice,
or that he saw a penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice.
This contradicts petitioners earlier statement in his appellants brief 82 that [a]lthough it is true that
the Supreme Court, in a long line of cases, did not rule out the possibility of rape in cases where the
victim remained physically intact at the time she or he was physically examined, still, it bears
stressing that in the instant case, the private complainant testified that the accused-appellants
penis fully penetrated his anus.83
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The trial court also quoted portions of the transcript of XXXs testimony in that he felt something
was inserted in [his] anus.84
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Q:
A:
....
Q:
A:
That early morning of January 31, 2002, while you were sleeping at your
house, do you recall any unusual incident that happened to you?
Yes sir, I felt something was inserted in my anus.
When you said that you felt something was inserted in your anus, what did
you do?
I felt that he was inserting his penis inside my anus because I was even able
to hold his penis. He was also playing with my penis.
Q:
A:
So when you said he was inserting his penis to your anus and he was even
playing with your private part, who is this person you are referring to as
he?
Richard, sir.85
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In People v. Soria,86 this court discussed that a victim need not identify what was inserted into his
or her genital or anal orifice for the court to find that rape through sexual assault was
committed:
We find it inconsequential that AAA could not specifically identify the particular instrument or
object that was inserted into her genital. What is important and relevant is that indeed something
was inserted into her vagina. To require AAA to identify the instrument or object that was inserted
into her vagina would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of due process. 87
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Second, petitioners reliance on the medico-legals finding of no recent trauma in XXXs anal orifice,
or any trace of spermatozoa, lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in XXXs anal orifice does
not negate the possibility of an erection and penetration. This result does not contradict the
positive testimony of XXX that the lower courts found credible, natural, and consistent with human
nature.
This court has explained the merely corroborative character of expert testimony and the possibility
of convictions for rape based on the victims credible lone testimony.88
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In any case, the medico-legal explained that his negative finding of trauma in the anal orifice does
not remove the possibility of an insertion considering the flexibility of the sphincter:
Q:
A:
Now, a while ago you testified that he was sodomized and your findings
states [sic] that you did not find any congestion or abrasion, can you explain
to this court why you stated in your findings that you did not find any
congestion or abrasion?
Again, based on my examination[,] there were no external signs of recent
trauma to the anus. It should be realized that the sphincter, that is the
particular portion of the anus controlling the bowel movement, it exhibits a
certain flexibility such that it can resist any objected [sic] inserted and that
area is very vascular, meaning to say, it is rich in blood supply, such that any
injuries would be healed in 24 hours or less than 24 hours, sir?89
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Lastly, we address petitioners invocation of the variance doctrine citing People v. Sumingwa.90
cralawred
Section 4 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the
variance doctrine:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former continue or form part of
those constituting the latter.
cralawlawlibrary
In Sumingwa, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654 was charged with qualified rape but
was convicted for the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness committed against a child under Article
III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 761091 since there was no penetration, or even an attempt to
insert [the accuseds] penis into [the victims] vagina.92
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In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what was proven during
trial. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of rape
through sexual assault.
XXX testified that he felt something was inserted [into his] anus.93 The slightest penetration into
ones sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape. People v.
Bonaagua94discussed this distinction:
It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the slightest penetration of
the male organ or even its slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora of the vagina
already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the
outer lip of the vagina, the act should also be considered as already consummating the crime of
rape through sexual assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the present
case, such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must be pointed out that the victim
testified that Ireno only touched her private part and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her
vagina. This testimony of the victim, however, is open to various interpretation, since it cannot be
identified what specific part of the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the
principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the statement
cannot be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual assault. 95 (Emphasis
supplied)
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People v. Bonaagua considers a womans private organ since most if not all existing jurisprudence
on rape involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation can apply by analogy when the
victim is a man in that the slightest penetration to the victims anal orifice consummates the crime
of rape through sexual assault.
The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victims dignity. The degree of penetration is not
important. Rape is an assault on human dignity.96
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People v. Quintos97 discussed how rape causes incalculable damage on a victims dignity, regardless
of the manner of its commission:
The classifications of rape in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are relevant only insofar as
these define the manners of commission of rape. However, it does not mean that one manner is
less heinous or wrong than the other. Whether rape is committed by nonconsensual carnal
knowledge of a woman or by insertion of the penis into the mouth of another person, the damage to
the victims dignity is incalculable. Child sexual abuse in general has been associated with negative
psychological impacts such as trauma, sustained fearfulness, anxiety, self-destructive behavior,
emotional pain, impaired sense of self, and interpersonal difficulties. Hence, one experience of
sexual abuse should not be trivialized just because it was committed in a relatively unusual manner.
The prime purpose of [a] criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others
from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate
him or, in general, to maintain social order. Crimes are punished as retribution so that society
would understand that the act punished was wrong.
Imposing different penalties for different manners of committing rape creates a message that one
experience of rape is relatively trivial or less serious than another. It attaches different levels of
wrongfulness to equally degrading acts. Rape, in whatever manner, is a desecration of a persons
will and body. In terms of penalties, treating one manner of committing rape as greater or less in
heinousness than another may be of doubtful constitutionality.
However, the discriminatory treatment of these two acts with the same result was not raised in this
case. Acknowledging that every presumption must be accorded in favor of accused in criminal
cases, we have no choice but to impose a lesser penalty for rape committed by inserting the penis
into the mouth of the victim.98 (Citations omitted)
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We affirm petitioners conviction but modify the penalty imposed by the lower court to the penalty
under Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 known as the Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act: 99
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SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpertua shall be imposed upon
the following:
....
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and
Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as
the case maybe: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; (Emphasis
supplied)
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The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7610 defines lascivious conduct:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade,
or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of
the genitals or pubic area of a person.100
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In People v. Chingh,101 the accused was charged with rape for inserting his fingers and afterwards
his penis into the private part of his minor victim[.]102 The Court of Appeals found the accused
guilty of two counts of rape: statutory rape and rape through sexual assault. 103 This court modified
the penalty imposed for rape through sexual assault to the penalty provided in Article III, Section
5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, discussing as follows:
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, VVV was ten (10) years
old. This calls for the application of R.A. No. 7610, or The Special Protection of Children Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, which defines sexual abuse of children and
prescribes the penalty therefor in Section 5(b), Article III, to wit:
....
In this case, the offended party was ten years old at the time of the commission of the offense.
Pursuant to the above-quoted provision of law, Armando was aptly prosecuted under paragraph 2,
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, for Rape Through Sexual
Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty prescribed therein, which is prision
mayor, considering that VVV was below 12 years of age, and considering further that Armandos act
of inserting his finger in VVVs private part undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct, the
appropriate imposable penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
which is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who commits acts of
lasciviousness under Article 366, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
suffers the more severe penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period than the one
who commits Rape Through Sexual Assault, which is merely punishable by prision
mayor. This is undeniably unfair to the child victim. To be sure, it was not the intention of the
framers of R.A. No. 8353 to have disallowed the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to sexual abuses
committed to children. Despite the passage of R.A. No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which
must be applied when the victims are children or those persons below eighteen (18) years of age
or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition.104 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
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Thus, for Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A, [the accused Chingh was]
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-
one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months, and twenty
(20) days ofreclusion temporal, as maximum.105
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The imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 7610, Section 5(b) for lascivious conduct when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period. This
penalty is higher than the imposable penalty of prision correccional for acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.
In enacting Republic Act No. 7610, the legislature intended to impose a higher penalty when the
victim is a child.
The fact that XXX was only 10 years old when the incident happened was established by his birth
certificate, and this was admitted by the defense.106 His age of 10 years old was alleged in the
Information.107 The higher penalty under Republic Act No. 7610, as discussed in People v.
Chingh,applies in this case.
Having sex with a 10-year-old is child abuse and is punished by a special law (Republic Act No.
7610). It is a progression from the Revised Penal Code to provide greater protection for children.
Justice Velasco suggests that this is not so. He anchors his view on his interpretation that Republic
Act No. 7610 requires a showing that apart from the actual coerced sexual act on the 10-year-old,
the child must also be exploited by prostitution or by other sexual acts. This view is inaccurate on
grounds of verba legis and ratione legis.
The first paragraph of Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 clearly provides that
children . . . who . . . due to the coercion . . . of any adult . . . indulge in sexual intercourse . . . are
deemed to bechildren exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. The label children
exploited in . . . other sexual abuse inheres in a child who has been the subject of coercion and
sexual intercourse.
Thus, paragraph (b) refers to a specification only as to who is liable and the penalty to be imposed.
The person who engages in sexual intercourse with a child already coerced is liable.
It does not make sense for the law not to consider rape of a child as child abuse. The proposal of
Justice Velasco implies that there has to be other acts of a sexual nature other than the rape itself
that will characterize rape as child abuse. One count of rape is not enough. Child abuse, in his
view, is not yet present with one count of rape.
This is a dangerous calculus which borders on judicial insensitivity to the purpose of the law. If we
adopt his view, it would amount to our collective official sanction to the idea that a single act of rape
is not debilitating to a child. That a single act of rape is not a tormenting memory that will sear into
a childs memory, frame his or her view of the world, rob him or her of the trust that will enable him
or her to have full and diverse meaningful interactions with other human beings. In my view, a
single act of sexual abuse to a child, by law, is already reprehensible. Our society has expressed
that this is conduct which should be punishable. The purpose and text of the law already punish
that single act as child abuse.
Rape is rape. Rape of a child is clearly, definitely, and universally child abuse.
Justice Velasco further observes that the right to due process of the accused will be violated should
we impose the penalty under Republic Act No. 7610. I disagree.
The Information was clear about the facts constitutive of the offense. The facts constitutive of the
offense will suggest the crime punishable by law. The principle is that ignorantia legis non excusat.
With the facts clearly laid out in the Information, the law which punishes the offense should already
be clear and the accused put on notice of the charges against him.
Additionally, there is no argument that the accused was not represented by counsel. Clear from the
records is the entry and active participation of his lawyer up to and including this appeal.
On the award of damages, we maintain the amount of P30,000.00 in favor of XXX as a victim of
rape through sexual assault, consistent with jurisprudence. 108
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This court has stated that jurisprudence from 2001 up to the present yields the information that
the prevailing amount awarded as civil indemnity to victims of simple rape committed by means
other than penile insertion is P30,000.109
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This statement considered the prevailing situation in our jurisprudence where victims of rape are all
women. However, as in this case, men can also become victims of rape through sexual assault, and
this can involve penile insertion.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 34387 dated August 28, 2013
isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that for rape through sexual assault under Article 266-A,
paragraph 2, accused-appellant Richard Ricalde is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum,
to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He
is ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 and moral damages
likewise in the amount of P30,000.00, both with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the
date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
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Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Velasco, Jr.,* J., please see concurring & dissenting opinion
Endnotes:
Designated acting member per S.O. No. 1910 dated January 12, 2015.
Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997) introduced this new provision.
Rollo, pp. 1024. The Petition was filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Id. at 3140. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda and concurred in by
Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. of the First Division.
3
Id. at 4243. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda and concurred in
by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
4
Id. at 32 and 54.
Id.
The fictitious initials XXX represent the victim-survivors real name. In People v.
Cabalquinto (533 Phil. 703 (2006) [Per J. Tinga , En Banc]), this court discussed the need to
withhold the victims real name and other information that would compromise the victims identity,
applying the confidentiality provisions of: (1) Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act and its implementing rules; (2) Republic
Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004) and its implementing
rules; and (3) this courts October 19, 2004 Resolution in A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC (Rule on Violence
Against Women and their Children).
7
Id. at 32 and 55.
Rollo, pp. 33 and 55.
10
Id. at 20.
11
Id. at 12.
12
Id. at 33 and 55.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 55.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 33 and 55.
17
Id. at 33.
18
Id. at 33 and 55.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 33.
Id. at 55. Dr. Camarillo examined XXX at the Regional Crime Laboratory in Camp Vicente Lim,
Calamba, Laguna.
22
23
Id. at 33 and 57.
24
Id. at 33.
25
Id. at 33 and 55.
26
Id. at 34.
27
Id. at 34 and 57.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 34 and 58.
30
Id. at 33 and 55.
31
Id. at 34.
Id. at 5464. The Decision was penned by Presiding Judge Wilhelmina B. Jorge-Wagan, Branch
34, Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna.
32
33
Id. at 64.
34
Id. at 3140.
35
Id. at 3940.
36
Id. at 23.
37
Id. at 16.
38
Id.
Id. at 17, quoting Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Reyes, et al., 568 Phil. 188, 204 (2008) [Per J.
Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
39
40
Id. at 17.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 21.
45
Id. at 60, citing TSN, September 11, 2003.
46
Id. at 21.
47
Id. at 18.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
618 Phil. 650, 668 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
51
Rollo, p. 19.
52
Id. at 2021.
53
Id. at 20.
54
Id. at 21.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 124138.
58
Id. at 129.
59
Id. at 128.
60
Id. at 129.
61
G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 141, 166 [Per J. Perez, Second Division].
62
Id. at 130.
63
Id. at 38 and 130.
64
Id. at 131132.
65
Id. at 135.
66
Id. at 131132.
67
Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997).
68
Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), sec. 2.
People v. Abulon, 557 Phil. 428, 454 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc], citing People v. Silvano, 368
Phil. 676, 696 (1999) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
69
People v. Abulon, 557 Phil. 428, 454 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc], citing Deliberations of the
Senate on Senate Bill No. 950, Special Law on Rape, August 6, 1996, pp. 1215; Deliberations of
the House of Representatives, Committee on Revision of Laws and Committee on Women on House
Bill No. 6265 entitled An Act to Amend Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Sexual Assault, August 27, 1996, pp. 4450; See also People
v. Garcia, G.R. No. 206095, November 25, 2013, 710 SCRA 571, 580 [Per J. Mendoza, Third
Division].
70
People v. Abulon, 557 Phil. 428, 454 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc], citing Deliberations of the
Senate on Senate Bill No. 950, Special Law on Rape, August 6, 1996, pp. 1215.
71
Pielago v. People, G.R. No. 202020, March 13, 2013, 693 SCRA 476, 488 [Per J. Reyes, First
Division].
72
People v. Vitero, G.R. No. 175327, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 54, 6465 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro,
First Division].
73
74
Rollo, p. 59.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 62.
77
Id. at 3637.
See Pielago v. People, G.R. No. 202020, March 13, 2013, 693 SCRA 476, 488 [Per J. Reyes, First
Division]; Campos v. People, 569 Phil. 658, 671 (2008) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third Division],
quoting People v. Capareda, 473 Phil. 301, 330 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]; People
v. Galigao, 443 Phil. 246, 260 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].
78
People v. Oliva, 616 Phil. 786, 792 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division], citing People v. De
Guzman, 423 Phil. 313, 331 (2001) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
79
80
Rollo, pp. 37 and 62.
People v. Dominguez, G.R. No. 191065, June 13, 2011, 651 SCRA 791, 802 [Per J. Sereno (now
C.J.), Third Division].
81
82
Rollo, pp. 4453.
83
Id. at 5051.
84
85
G.R. No. 179031, November 14, 2012, 685 SCRA 483 [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
Justice Brion penned a dissenting opinion.
86
87
Id. at 504505.
People v. Colorado, G.R. No. 200792, November 14, 2012, 685 SCRA 660, 673 [Per J. Reyes, First
Division], citing People v. Balonzo, 560 Phil. 244, 259260 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third
Division]; See also People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 188352, September 1, 2010, 629 SCRA 784, 799
[Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
88
89
Rollo, p. 38, citing TSN, January 22, 2003, p. 9.
90
618 Phil. 650 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
91
Id. at 666.
92
Id. at 667.
93
Rollo, p. 59, citing TSN, September 11, 2003.
94
G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 620 [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
95
Id. at 640.
96
People v. Jalosjos, 421 Phil. 43, 54 (2001) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].
97
G.R. No. 199402, November 12, 2014 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
98
Id.
99
Rep. Act No. 7610 was approved on June 17, 1992.
See Garingarao v. People, G.R. No. 192760, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA 243, 254 [Per J. Carpio,
Second Division]; See also People v. Chingh, G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011, 645 SCRA 573, 587
[Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
100
101
G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011, 645 SCRA 573 [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
102
Id. at 577.
103
Id. at 580.
104
Id. at 586588.
105
Id. at 589.
106
Rollo, p. 62.
107
Id. at 54.
See People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 206095, November 25, 2013, 710 SCRA 571, 588 [Per J. Mendoza,
Third Division]; People v. Lomaque, G.R. No. 189297, June 3, 2013, 697 SCRA 383, 410 [Per J. Del
Castillo, Second Division]; Pielago v. People, G.R. No. 202020, March 13, 2013, 693 SCRA 476, 488
and 489 [Per J. Reyes, First Division]; People v. Soria, G.R. No. 179031, November 14, 2012, 685
SCRA 483, 508 [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
108
People v. Dominguez, G.R. No. 191065, June 13, 2011, 651 SCRA 791, 806 [Per J. Sereno (now
C.J.), Third Division], citing People v. Soriano, 436 Phil. 719, 757 (2002) [Per Curiam, En
Banc], People v. Palma, 463 Phil. 767, 784 (2003) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc], People v. Olaybar, 459
Phil. 114, 129 (2003) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc], People v. Suyu, 530 Phil. 569, 597 (2006) [Per J.
Callejo, Sr., First Division], People v. Hermocilla, 554 Phil. 189, 212 (2007) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago,
Third Division], People v. Fetalino, 552 Phil. 254, 279 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third
Division], People v. Senieres, 547 Phil. 674, 689 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division], Flordeliz v.
People, 628 Phil. 124, 143 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division], People v. Alfonso, G.R. No.
182094, August 18, 2010, 628 SCRA 431, 452 [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].
109
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CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
I fully agree with the ponencia in affirming the finding of guilt of the accused-petitioner Richard
Ricalde (Ricalde) for rape through sexual assault. However, I also wish to express my disagreement
over theponencia's holding regarding the penalty to be imposed on him, as well as its ruling on
which law governs the conviction of the petitioner.
To recall, the accused was charged with an Information which reads:
That on or about January 31, 2002, in the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Province of Laguna, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Richard Ricalde, prompted with lewd
design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously inserting [sic] his penis into the anus
of XXX who was then ten (10) years of age against his will and consent, to his damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW1
cralawlawlibrary
An examination of the evidence presented by both prosecution and accused would show that,
indeed, the trial court correctly convicted the petitioner of the offense charged.
The ponencia's application of Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 (R.A. No.
7610),2 however, I believe, is misplaced. In the first place, such a charge is not embodied in the
Information filed against the accused, and his conviction for such an offense would result in a
violation of his right to due process and his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusations against him. The Information plainly alleges rape through sexual assault, which is a
violation of Article 226-A (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Rightfully then, the petitioner can be
convicted of rape, the following elements of which having been stated in the Information and proven
during trial:
(1)
(2)
(a)
xx
That the offender commits an act of sexual assault;

That the act of sexual assault is committed by any of the following means:
By inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice; or
xx
(3) That the act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:
(a) By using force or intimidation;
(b) When a woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. 3
cralawla wlibrary
A violation of R.A. No. 7610, on the other hand, is not specifically stated in the Information. The
Court had, in previous cases, stated the following elements of child abuse under Sec. 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610:
1.
The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2.
The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.
3.
The child whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 4
cralawla wlibrary
While the Information stated that the petitioner "[inserted] his penis in the anus of XXX" and that
the victim "was then 10 years of age," which satisfies the first and third elements of child abuse
under Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, nowhere is it stated that the said act was performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse-the second element of the offense.
Therefore, even assuming that such element was proven during trial, the accused can nevertheless
claim constitutional protection, and his conviction will not stand in light of the constitutionally
protected rights of the accused to due process,5 as well as his right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.6 This Court had long held that each and every element of the
offense must be alleged in the Information. As the Court reasoned in Noe S. Andaya v. People:
It is fundamental that every element constituting the offense must be alleged in the information.
The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to
enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense because he is presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. The allegations of facts constituting the offense
charged are substantial matters and an accused's right to question his conviction based on facts not
alleged in the information cannot be waived. No matter how conclusive and convincing the evidence
of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted of any offense unless it is charged in the
information on which he is tried or is necessarily included therein. To convict him of a ground not
alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and
underhanded. The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof
adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused
so much so that it affects his substantial rights.7
cralawla wlibrary
I am fully aware that, in the past, the Court had upheld the convictions of those charged with
similarly-worded Informations under Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. In 2005, in the case of Olivarez v.
Court of Appeals,8 this Court said that "a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the
child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult."
I believe, however, that the said interpretation is incorrect, and the Court must re-examine the
same. What I find most enlightening regarding the controversy is the dissenting opinion offered by
our colleague, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in Olivarez, where he makes sense of the phrase "other
sexual abuse" mentioned in Section 5 (b) ofR.A. No. 7610. He discussed:
The majority opinion correctly enumerates the essential elements of the crimes of acts of
lasciviousness under Section 5 of RA 7610. The majority opinion states:
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 are as follows:
1.
The accused commits the acts of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2.
The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.
3.
The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
The majority opinion correctly distinguishes the first element from the second element. The first
element refers to acts of lasciviousness that the accused performs on the child. The second element
refers to the special circumstance that the "child (is) exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse." This special circumstance already exists when the accused performs acts of
lasciviousness on the child. In short, the acts of lasciviousness that the accused performs on the
child are separate from the child's exploitation in prostitution or subjection to "other sexual abuse."
Under Article 336 of the RPC, the accused performs the acts of lasciviousness on a child who is
neither exploited in prostitution nor subjected to "other sexual abuse. " In contrast, under Section 5
of RA 7610, the accused performs the acts of lasciviousness on a child who is either exploited in
prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse."
Section 5 of RA 7610 deals with a situation where the acts of lasciviousness are committed on a
child already either exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse." Clearly, the acts
of lasciviousness committed on the child are separate and distinct from the other circumstance that the child is either exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse."
The phrase "other sexual abuse" refers to any sexual abuse other than the acts of lasciviousness
complained of and other than exploitation in prostitution. Such "other sexual abuse" could fall under
acts encompassing "[O]bscene publications and indecent shows" mentioned in Section 3(d)(3) of RA
7610.9
cralawla wlibrary
I fully subscribe to this reasoning and logic employed by Justice Carpio in Olivarez. While now, as
then, his opinion remains to be in the minority, as the Court continues to uphold the convictions
under R.A. No. 7610 whenever the victim is underage or below 18 years of age, I believe it is high
time for the Court to re-examine this doctrine, and, perhaps, give way to a more level-headed
interpretation of the law, as offered by Justice Carpio in Olivarez.
Given this doubtful interpretation of Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the Court must uphold the
interpretation which is more beneficial to the accused. Thus, instead of imposing the higher penalty
imposable under R.A. No. 7610, he must instead be made to suffer the penalty imposable under
Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
A final note I wish to make is the fact that the ponencia did not discuss whether the issue of the
applicability of R.A. No. 7610 was ever put in issue in the lower court before or during trial. It seems
to me that it is only now, and only the Court, on its own initiative, deemed that R.A. No. 7610 is
applicable to the case at bar. It appears to me that in the lower court, as well as in the Court of
Appeals, the only main issue resolved is whether or not the petitioner is guilty of rape. Thus, the
petitioner was never given the opportunity to defend himself against a charge of violation of R.A.
No. 7610, because, in the first place, it was never put in issue. The Court cannot now suddenly
determine that the proper offense is R.A. No. 7610 and not the Revised Penal Code, without giving
the petitioner the chance to be heard and defend himself, especially considering that R.A. No. 7610
is not only a separate and distinct offense from rape under the Revised Penal Code, but also that the
former imposes a stiffer penalty than the latter.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, I vote that the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 8, 2013 be affirmed in toto, finding the petitioner guilty of rape punishable under Article
266-A, paragraph of the Revised Penal Code.
Endnotes:
Rollo. pp. 32, 54.
"Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
People v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada, G.R. No. 151952, March 25,2009.
Id.
Sec. I, Article III, 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Sec. 14(2), Article III, 1987 Philippine Constitution.
G.R. No. 168486, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 539.
G.R. No. 163866, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 465.
Id. at 487-488.
GARINGARAO V PEOPLE
SECOND DIVISION
JOJIT GARINGARAO, G.R. No. 192760

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*

BRION,
PERALTA,** and
PEREZ, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. July 20, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the 26 November 2009
Decision2 and 22 June 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 31354.The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 56 (trial
court), finding JojitGaringarao (Garingarao) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 (RA
7610).4
The Antecedent Facts
The facts of the case, as can be gleaned from the decision of the Court of
Appeals, are as follows:
On 28 October 2003, AAA5 was brought to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical

Center by her father BBB and mother CCC due to fever and abdominal pain.
Dr. GeorgeMorante (Dr. Morante), the attending physician, recommended that
AAA be confined at the hospital for further observation. AAA was admitted at
the hospital and confined at a private room where she and her parents stayed for
the night.
On 29 October 2003, BBB left the hospital to go to Lingayen, Pangasinan to

process his daughters Medicare papers. He arrived at Lingayen at around 8:00
a.m. and left the place an hour later. CCC also left the hospital that same
morning to attend to their store at Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, leaving AAA alone
in her room.
When BBB returned to the hospital, AAA told him that she wanted to go home.
Dr. Morante advised against it but due to AAAs insistence, he allowed AAA to
be discharged from the hospital with instructions that she should continue her
medications. When AAA and her parents arrived at their house around 11:30
a.m., AAA cried and told her parents that Garingarao sexually abused her. They
all went back to the hospital and reported the incident to Dr. Morante. They
inquired from the nurses station and learned that Garingarao was the nurse on
duty on that day.
On 20 January 2004, the City Prosecutor filed an

Information against Garingarao for acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA
7610, as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of October 2003,
at Virgen Milagrosa University Hospital, San Carlos City, Pangasinan,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd designs, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously touched the breast of AAA, 16 years of age, touched her
genitalia, and inserted his finger into her vagina, to the damage and
prejudice of said AAA who suffered psychological and emotional
disturbance, anxiety, sleeplessness and humiliation.
Contrary to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to RA

7610.6
During the trial, AAA testified that on 29 October 2003, between 7:00 a.m. and
8:00 a.m., Garingarao, who was wearing a white uniform, entered her room and
asked if she already took her medicines and if she was still experiencing pains.
AAA replied that her stomach was no longer painful. Garingarao then lifted
AAAs bra and touched her left breast. Embarrassed, AAA
asked Garingarao what he was doing. Garingarao replied that he was just
examining her. Garingarao then left the room and returned 15 to 30 minutes
later with a stethoscope. Garingarao told AAA that he would examine her
again. Garingarao lifted AAAs shirt, pressed the stethoscope to her stomach
and touched her two nipples. Garingarao then lifted AAAs pajama and
underwear and pressed the lower part of her abdomen. Garingarao then slid his
finger inside AAAs private part. AAA instinctively crossed her legs and again
asked Garingarao what he was doing. She asked him to stop and informed him
she had her monthly period. Garingarao ignored AAA and continued to insert
his finger inside her private part. Garingarao only stopped when he saw that
AAA really had her monthly period. He went inside the bathroom of the private
room, washed his hands, applied alcohol and left. When BBB arrived at the
hospital, AAA insisted on going home. She only narrated the incident to her
parents when they got home and they went back to the hospital to report the
incident to Dr. Morante.
Dr. Morante testified on AAAs confinement to and discharge from the hospital.
The prosecution presented the following documents before the trial court:
(a) AAAs birth certificate to establish that she was 16 years old at the
time of the incident;
(b) AAAs medical records establishing her confinement to and discharge

from Virgen Milagrosa Medical Center;
(c) the schedule of duties of the nurses at the hospital showing

that Garingarao was on duty from 12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. on 29 October
2003;
(d) a certificate from the Department of Education Division Office

showing that BBB was present at the office from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m.
on 29 October 2003;
(e) AAAs Medical Payment Notice;
(f) the incident report filed by AAAs parents with the police; and
(g) a letter from the hospital administrator requiring Garingarao to

explain why no administrative action should be filed against him in view
of the incident.
For the defense, Garingarao gave a different version of the

incident. Garingarao alleged that on 29 October 2003, he and his nursing
aide Edmundo Tamayo (Tamayo) went inside AAAs room to administer her
medicines and check her vital signs. BBB then accused them of not
administering the medicines properly and on time.Garingarao told BBB that
they should not be told how to administer the medicines because they knew
what they were doing and that they would be accountable should anything
happen to AAA. A heated argument ensued between BBB and Garingarao.

BBB told Garingarao he was an arrogant nurse. Garingarao replied that if BBB
had any complaint, he could report the matter to the
hospital. Garingarao denied that he inserted his finger into AAAs private part
and that he fondled her breasts.Garingarao alleged that the filing of the case
was motivated by the argument he had with BBB.
Tamayo testified that he was with Garingarao when they went to AAAs room
between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. of 29 October 2003. He alleged that BBB was
present and he accused Garingarao of not administering the medications
properly. Tamayo alleged that Garingarao and BBB had an argument. Tamayo
stated that he would always accompany Garingarao whenever the latter would
visit the rooms of the patients.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In its Decision7 dated 5 November 2007, the trial court found Garingarao guilty
as charged. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of AAA
over Garingaraosdenial. The trial court ruled that Garingarao was positively
identified by AAA as the person who entered her room, touched her breasts and
inserted his finger into her private part. The trial court also found that the
prosecution was able to establish that BBB and CCC were not in the room
when Garingarao went inside.
The trial court found as baseless Garingaraos defense that the case was only
motivated by the argument he had with BBB. The trial court ruled that it was
illogical for BBB to convince his daughter to fabricate a story of sexual abuse
just to get even at Garingarao over a heated argument.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

finding the accused Jojit Garingarao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act 7610,
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
12 years to 1 day of Reclusion Temporal as minimum to 14 years and 8
months of Reclusion Temporal as maximum.
The accused is ordered to pay to the minor victim [AAA] P20,000.00 as

moral damages and P10,000.00 as fine.
SO ORDERED.8
Garingarao appealed from the trial courts Decision.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 26 November 2009 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
courts decision with modifications.
The Court of Appeals ruled that while Garingarao was charged for acts of
lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610, he should be convicted under RA 7610
because AAA was 16 years old when the crime was committed. The Court of
Appeals ruled that under Section 5(b) of RA 7610, the offender shall be
charged with rape or lascivious conduct under the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
only if the victim is below 12 years old; otherwise, the provisions of RA 7610
shall prevail.
The Court of Appeals ruled that based on the evidence on record and the
testimony of AAA, the decision of the trial court has to be affirmed. The Court
of Appeals ruled that under Section 2(h) of the Rules and Regulations on the
Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases, the introduction of any
object into the genitalia of the offended party as well as the intentional touching
of her breasts when done with the intent to sexually gratify the offender qualify
as a lascivious act. AAAs testimony established that Garingarao committed the
lascivious acts.
The Court of Appeals found no reason for AAA or her family to fabricate the
charges against Garingarao. The Court of Appeals ruled that Garingaraos claim
that the case was filed so that BBB could get even with him because of the
argument they had was too shallow to be given consideration. The Court of
Appeals likewise rejected Garingaraos defense of denial which could not
prevail over the positive testimony of AAA.
The Court of Appeals modified the penalty imposed by the trial court. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the duration of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period should be 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years and not 14 years and
8 months as imposed by the trial court. The Court of Appeals also raised the
award of moral damages and fine, which was deemed as civil indemnity, to
conform with recent jurisprudence.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated November

5, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan in
Criminal Case No. SCC-4167 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
1. The penalty imposed on the accused-appellant is 14 years

and 8 months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20
years of reclusion temporal as maximum[;]
2. The award of moral damages is raised from P20,000.00
to P50,000.00; and
3. The award of indemnity is raised
from P10,000.00 to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.9
Garingarao filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 June 2010 Resolution,

the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in affirming with modifications the trial courts decision.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Garingarao alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts
decision finding him guilty of acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA
7610. Garingaraoinsists that it was physically impossible for him to commit the
acts charged against him because there were many patients and hospital
employees around. He alleges that AAAs room was well lighted and that he had
an assistant when the incident allegedly occurred. Garingarao further alleges
that, assuming the charges were correct, there was only one incident when he
allegedly touched AAA and as such, he should have been convicted only of acts
of lasciviousness and not of violation of RA 7610.
We do not agree.
Credibility of Witnesses
The Court has ruled that in case of acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of
the offended party, if credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the
accused.10 In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the
testimony of AAA credible over Garingaraos defense of denial and alibi. It is a
settled rule that denial is a weak defense as against the positive identification
by the victim.11 Both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and
constitute self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater
evidentiary weight than the positive declaration by a credible
witness.12 Garingaraos defense of denial and alibi must fail over the positive
and straightforward testimony of AAA on the incident. Further, like the trial
court and the Court of Appeals, we find incredible Garingaraos defense that the
case was an offshoot of a heated argument he had with AAAs father over the
manner Garingarao was giving AAAs medications. It is hard to believe that
AAAs parents would expose her to a public trial if the charges were not
true.13 In addition, the prosecution was able to establish that, contrary
to Garingaraos allegation, both BBB and CCC were not in AAAs room at the
time of the incident.
Violation of RA 7610
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children,

whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed
to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period

to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse;
Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape
and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code,
for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the
penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) yeas of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period, x x x
(c) x x x
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are the
following:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious

conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 14
Under Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
RA 7610, lascivious conduct is defined as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of

the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with the intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area of a person.15
In this case, the prosecution established that Garingarao touched AAAs breasts
and inserted his finger into her private part for his sexual
gratification. Garingarao used his influence as a nurse by pretending that his
actions were part of the physical examination he was
doing. Garingarao persisted on what he was doing despite AAAs objections.
AAA twice asked Garingarao what he was doing and he answered that he was
just examining her.
The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse when
the child is the victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of
any adult.16 In lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult,
there must be some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which
subdues the free exercise of the offended partys free will. 17 In this
case, Garingarao coerced AAA into submitting to his lascivious acts by
pretending that he was examining her.
Garingarao insists that, assuming that the testimonies of the prosecution

witnesses were true, he should not be convicted of violation of RA 7610
because the incident happened only once. Garingarao alleges that the single
incident would not suffice to hold him liable under RA 7610.
Garingaraos argument has no legal basis.
The Court has already ruled that it is inconsequential that sexual abuse under
RA 7610 occurred only once.18 Section 3(b) of RA 7610 provides that the abuse
may be habitual or not.19 Hence, the fact that the offense occurred only once is
enough to hold Garingarao liable for acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610.
Indemnity and Moral Damages
In view of recent jurisprudence, we deem it proper to reduce the amount of

indemnity to P20,00020 and moral damages awarded by the Court of Appeals
to P15,000.21We also impose on Garingarao a fine of P15,000.22
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 26 November 2009

Decision and 22 June 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 31354 with MODIFICATIONS. The Court
finds Jojit Garingarao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of acts of
lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. He is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20
years of reclusion temporal as maximum and ordered to pay AAA P20,000 as
civil indemnity, P15,000 as moral damages and a fine of P15,000.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1006 dated 10 June 2011.
** Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1040 dated 6 July 2011.
1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 Rollo, pp. 42-62. Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo with Associate Justices Mario
L. Guaria III and Jane Aurora C. Lantion, concurring.
3 Id. at 63-64.
4 An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation, and for Other Purposes.
5 The real names of the victim and her family were not disclosed pursuant to the ruling of this Court
in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419.
6 Rollo, p. 43.
7 Id. at 68-76. Penned by Presiding Judge Hermogenes C. Fernandez.
8 Id. at 75-76.
9 Id. at 61.
10 People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 180501, 24 December 2008, 575 SCRA 616.
11 People v. Fetalino, G.R. No. 174472, 19 June 2007, 525 SCRA 170.
12 People v. Candaza, G.R. No. 170474, 16 June 2006, 491 SCRA 280.
13 People v. Ortoa, G.R. No. 174484, 23 February 2009, 580 SCRA 80.
14 Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 421 (2005).
15 Id. at 431-432. Emphasis in the original text.
16 Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 14.
17 People v. Abello, G.R. No. 151952, 25 March 2009, 582 SCRA 378.
18 Olivarez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 14.
19 Id.
20 Flordeliz v. People, G.R. No. 186441, 3 March 2010, 614 SCRA 225.
21 Id.; People v. Montinola, G.R. No. 178061, 31 January 2008, 543 SCRA 412.
22 Id.
PEOPLE V DULAY
ROSALDES V PEOPLE

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 173988
October 8, 2014
FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The petitioner, a public schoolteacher, was charged with and found guilty of child abuse, a
violation of Republic Act No. 7610. The victim was her own Grade 1 pupil whom she
physically maltreated for having accidentally bumped her knee while she was drowsing off on
a bamboo sofa as he entered the classroom. Her maltreatment left him with physical injuries,
as duly certified by a physician.
1
Whether or not the petitioner thereby committed child abuse is the question that this appeal
must determine, in light of the Court's pronouncement in Bongalon v. People of the
Philippines that:
2
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse
under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown
beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the
intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child
abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Antecedents
The State, through the Office ofthe Solicitor General, summed up the factual antecedents in
its comment, as follows:
3
On February 13, 1996, seven yearold Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at
Pughanan Elementary School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly
entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner
Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa (TSN, March 14, 1997, pp. 5-6).
Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael did not
obey but instead proceeded to his seat (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6), petitioner went to
Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him
to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryans body hit a desk. As a result, he lost consciousness.
Petitioner proceeded topick Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down
on the floor. Michael Ryan cried (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6; TSN, November 13, 1997, p. 7).
After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break, Michael Ryan,
accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went home
crying and told his mother about the incident (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 7). His mother and
his Aunt Evangeline Gonzales reported the incident to their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo
Larroza (TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4) who advised them to have Michael Ryan examined by
a doctor. Michael Ryans aunt and Barangay Councilman Ernesto Ligante brought him to the
Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Hospital where he was examined by Dr. Teresita Castigador. They,
likewise, reported the incident to the Police Station (TSN, July 27, 1997, p. 6; TSN, February
1, 1999, p. 4).
The medical certificate issued by Dr. Teresita Castigador reads, in part:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;

4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.
The petitioner was criminally charged with child abusein the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo City
(RTC), and the case was assigned to Branch 27 of that court. The information alleged as
follows: The Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo, upon approval and Directive of the Deputy
OMBUDSMAN for the Visayas accuses FELINA ROSALDES of the crime of VIOLATION OF
CHILD ABUSE LAW
(Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610), committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of February 1996, in the Municipality of Lambunao, Province
of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being a public school teacher in Grade 1 of Pughanan Elementary School, with a
Salary Grade below 26, under the DECS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously maltreat her pupil Michael Ryan Gonzales, a seven year old child, by pinching
him on different parts of his body, and thereafter slumping him to the ground, thereby
causing Michael Ryan Gonzales to lose his consciousness and has suffered injuries on
different parts of his body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On June 26, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of child
abuse, disposing as follows:
5
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section
10 (a), Article VI of R.A. 7610, the Court sentences her to an indeterminate prison term
ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the
costs.
No pronouncement as to civil liability, the same not having been proved.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the petitioner through its assailed decision
promulgated on May 11, 2005, with a modification of the penalty, viz: WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the appeal filed in
this case and AFFIRMING the decision rendered on June 26, 2003 by the court a quo in
Criminal Case No. 46893 with the MODIFICATION that the accusedappellant is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as the minimum of it, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the
maximum thereof.
7
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In her petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner submits that:

9
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that the acts of the
petitioner constitute child abuse penalized under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610[,]
and notunder the Revised Penal Code.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that petitioners
constitutional right to due process and her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against her was not violated when the essential elements of the crime charged
were not properly recited in the information.
10
Countering, the State, through the OSG, insists that the issues the petitioner is raising are
mainly factual and, therefore, not reviewable under the mode of appeal chosen; that the
affirmance of her conviction by the CA was in accord with the pertinent law and
jurisprudence, and supported by the overwhelming evidence of the trial; and that the
information charging her with child abuse was sufficient in form and substance.
11
Ruling of the Court

First of all, the State correctly contends that the petitioner could raise only questions of law in
her present recourse. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the appeal is limited to
questionsof law. The immediate implication of the limitation is to have the findings of fact by
the CA, which affirmed the findings of fact by the trial court, conclude the Court by virtue of
its not being a trier of fact. As such, the Court cannot analyze or weigh the evidence all over
again.
It is true that the limitation of the review to errors of law admits of exceptions. Under Section
4, Rule 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, the following situations are the
exceptions in which the Court may review findings of fact by the lower courts, to wit: (a) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (b) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (c) there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) the findings of fact are conflicting; (f)
the collegial appellate courts went beyond the issues of the case, and their findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) the findings of fact of the
collegial appellate courts are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) said findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) the facts set
forth in the petition aswell as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; (j) the findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are premised on the
supposed evidence, but are contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) all other similar
and exceptional cases warranting a review of the lower courts findings of fact. A further
exception is recognized when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed bythe parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion. Yet, none of the exceptions applies herein.
12
Secondly, the petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries
suffered by MichaelRyan to maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase, demean
or degrade his dignity. She characterizes her maltreatment as anact of discipline that she as
a school teacher could reasonably do towards the development of the child. She insists that
her act further came under the doctrine of in loco parentis.
The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft of merit.

Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil,
her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy
even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands. She could not justifiably claim that she
acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely
prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of
corporal punishmentby a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care
exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis), viz:
13
Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority
over the person of the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care
exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)
Proof of the severe results of the petitioners physical maltreatment of Michael Ryan was
provided by Dr. Teresita Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido
Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who examined the victim at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of
February 13, 1996, barely three hours from the timethe boy had sustained his injuries. Her
Medical Report stated as follows:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.
Reflecting her impressions of the physical injuries based on the testimonial explanations of
Dr. Castigador, the trial judge observed in the decision of June 26, 2003:
A petechiae (wound no. 1), according to Dr. Castigador is a discoloration of the skin caused
by the extravasation of blood beneath it. She opined that the petechiae and tenderness of
the ears of the victim could have been caused by pinching. As to the lumbar pain and
tenderness at the third and fourth level of the vertebrae (wound no. 2), the doctor testified
that during her examination of the victim the latter felt pain when she put pressure on the
said area. She stated that this could be caused by pressure or contact with a hard object.
Wound No. 3 is located on the victimsleft inner thigh. According to her this could not have
been caused by ordinary pinching with pressure. Wound No. 4 is located on the upper part of
the left thigh. Dr. Castigador testified that she noticed that the boy was limping as he
walked.
14
Section 3 of RepublicAct No. 7610 defines child abusethusly:

xxxx
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and
shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in
serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or
death.
xxxx
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act
by deedsor by wordsthat debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner
"went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she
pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the armpits and threw
him on the floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose
consciousness [but instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further
held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the floor." On her part, the trial judge
said that the physical pain experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an emotional
trauma that caused him to stop going to school altogether out of fear of the petitioner,
compelling his parents to transfer him to another school where he had to adjust again. Such
established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt thatthe petitioner was guilty of
child abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael
Ryan as a human being.
15
16
It was also shown that Michael Ryans physical maltreatment by the petitioner was neither
her first or only maltreatment of a child. Prosecution witness Louella Loredo revealed on
cross examination that she had also experienced the petitioners cruelty. The petitioner was
also convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City (Branch 39) in Criminal Case No. 348921 for
maltreatment of another childnamed Dariel Legayada. Such previous incidents manifested
that the petitioner had "a propensity for violence," as the trial judge stated in her decision of
June 26, 2003.
17
18
19
Thirdly, the petitioner submits that the information charging her with child abuse was
insufficient in form and substance, in that the essential elements of the crime charged were
not properly alleged therein; and that her constitutional and statutory right to due process of
law was consequently violated.
The petitioners submission deserves scant consideration.
Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
proximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
The information explicitly averred the offense of child abusecharged against the petitioner in
the context of the statutory definition of child abuse found in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No.
7610, supra, and thus complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court. Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain the petitioners challenge against the
sufficiency of the information in form and substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge
was prior to the time she pleaded to the information through a motion to quash on the ground
that the information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not charge an
offense. She did not do so, resulting in her waiver of the challenge.
Fourthly, the RTC did not grant civil damages as civil liability ex delictobecause no evidence
had been adduced thereon. The CA saw nothing wrong with the omission by the trial court.
The explanation tendered by the trial judge for the omission was misplaced, however,
because even without proof of the actual expenses, or testimony on the victims feelings, the
lower courts still had the authority to define and allow civil liability arising from the offense
and the means to fix their extent. The child abuse surely inflicted on Michael Ryan physical
and emotional trauma as well as moral injury. It cannot also be denied that his parents
necessarily spent for his treatment. We hold that both lower courts committed a plain error
that demands correction by the Court. Indeed, as the Court pointed out in Bacolod v.
People, it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the
accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has
been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery," explaining
the reason for doing so in the following manner:
20
21
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate
under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Courtto have the judgment, if it was of conviction,
state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the
accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2)
the participation ofthe accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory
after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages
caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended
party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has
been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to actas we now do lest the Court be
unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not
themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action
because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty
to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.
1wphi1
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties
are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will
not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of
the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and
obligations would they betrue to the judicial office of administering justice and equity for all.
Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of conviction in
criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and
the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be
invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil
liability ex delictoof the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are
always entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement
of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.
22
Moral damages should be awarded to assuage the moral and emotional sufferings of the
victim, and in that respect the Court believes and holds that P20,000.00 is reasonable. The
victim was likewise entitled to exemplary damages, considering that Article 2230 of the Civil
Code authorizes such damages if at least one aggravating circumstance attended the
commission of the crime. The child abuse committed by the petitioner was aggravated her
being a public school teacher, a factor in raising the penalty to its maximum period
pursuantto Section 31(e) of Republic Act No. 7610. The amount of P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages is imposed on in order to set an example for the public good and as a deterrent to
other public school teachers who violate the ban imposed by Article 233 of the Family Code,
supra, against the infliction of corporal punishment on children under their substitute parental
authority. The lack of proof of the actual expenses for the victims treatmentshould not hinder
the granting of a measure of compensation in the formof temperate damages, which,
according to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has
been suffered butits amount cannot be proved with certainty. There being no question
aboutthe injuries sustained requiring medical treatment, temperate damages ofat
least P20,000.00 are warranted, for it would be inequitable not to recognize the need for the
treatment. Lastly, interest of 6% per annum shall be charged on all the items of civil liability,
to be reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment.
The penalty for the child abusecommitted by the petitioner is that prescribed in Section 10(a)
of Republic Act No. 7610, viz:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child's Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those
covered by Atiicle 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period.
xxxx
The CA revised the penalty fixed by the R TC by imposing the indeterminate penalty of four
years, two months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and one
day of prision mayor, as the maximum, on the ground that the offense was aggravated by the
petitioner being a public schoolteacher. It cited Section 3 l(e) of Republic Act No. 7610,
which commands that the penalty provided in the Act "shall be imposed in its maximum
period if the offender is a public officer or employee." Her being a public schoolteacher was
alleged in the information and established by evidence as well as admitted by her. The
revised penalty was erroneous, however, because Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610
punishes the crime committed by the petitioner with prision mayor in its minimum period,
whose three periods are six years and one day to six years and eight months, for the
minimum period; six years, eight months and one day to seven years and four months, for
the medium period; and seven years, four months and one day to eight years, for the
maximum period. The maximum of the indeterminate sentence should come from the
maximum period, therefore, and the Court fixes it at seven years, four months and one day
of prision mayor. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence should come from prision
correccional in the maximum period, the penalty next lower than prision mayor in its
minimum period, whose range is from four years, two months and one day to six
years. Accordingly, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is four years, nine months
and 11 days, and the maximum is seven years, four months and one day of prision mayor.
23
1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 11, 2005, subject to
the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven
(7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of pr is ion mayor, as the maximum; (b) the
petitioner shall pay to Michael Ryan Gonzales P20,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00
as exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest at the rate of
6% per annum on each item of the civil liability reckoned from the finality of this decision until
full payment; and (c) the petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.
Chief Justice
Footnotes
An Act Providing for Strong Deterrence and Special Protection of Children Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes (Approved on
June 17, 1992).
1
G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 12, 14-15.
Rollo, pp. 73-74.
Records, p. 1.
Id. at 33.
Rollo, pp. 41-58; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with Associate
Justice Vicente L. Yap (retired) and Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas (retired)
concurring.
7
Id. at 57.
Id. at 4-17.
10
Id. at 7-8.
11
Id. at 75.
12
Madrigal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142944, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 247, 255.
13
TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6; November 13, 1997, p. 7.
14
TSN, January 30, 1997, pp. 8-10.
15
Rollo, p. 46.
16
Id. at 26.
17
18
Rollo, p. 27.
19
20
Id. at 351.
21
G.R. No. 206236, July 15, 2013, 701 SCRA 229.
22
Id. at 239-240 (the bold underscoring is part of the original text).
23
CA rollo, p. 296.

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PEOPLE & AAA V CA

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:

WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the Decision on appeal is

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed

Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):

A: I could not remember, sir.

In Lobrigo, the Court declared:

The RTC held that:

Finding accused-respondent Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond

March 23, 2015

Very truly yours,

Penned by Judge Jacob T. Malik; rollo, pp. 28-67.

Records, pp. 39-40.

Id. at 58, 86, 157-162.

Rollo, pp. 66-67.

Id. at 102. (Emphasis in the original)

Id. at 292, 298.

255 Phil. 851 (1989).

People v. Santiago, supra, at 861-862. (Emphasis ours)

323 Phil. 596 (1996).

Rollo, pp. 272-301.

Merciales v. CA, 429 Phil. 70, 79 (2002).

People v. CA, G.R. No. 198589, July 25, 2012.

Rollo, pp. 72-78.

Equitable PCIBank v. Caguioa, 504 Phil. 242, 249 (2005).

People v. Hon. Cabral, 362 Phil. 697, 712 (1999).

People v. Rivera, 414 Phil. 430, 453 (2001).

Rollo, pp. 49-53.

Timbal v. CA, 423 Phil. 617, 623 (2001).

People v. Mantis, 477 Phil. 275, 287 (2004).

People v. Apattad, supra note 50, at 350.

People v. Soriano, 146 Phil. 585 (1970).

Id. at 589. (Emphasis ours)

People v. Dimacuha, 467 Phil. 342, 350 (2004).

People v. Buenviaje, 408 Philo. 342, 346 (2001).

People v. Jorolan, 452 Phil. 698. 714 (2003).

People v. Balya, supra note 57.

People v. Ramos, 467 Phil 376, 389 (2004).

People v. Baluya, supra note 57, at 364.

Chempex (Phils.), Inc. v. Hon. Pamatian, supra note 27.

People v. Jabonera, supra note 67. (Emphasis ourts)

588 Phil. 937 (2008).

Supra note 44.

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, Section 13.

Supra note 15, at 90.

People v. Lucena, 408 Phil. 172, 191 (2001).

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 120, Section 3.

Revised Penal Code, Art. 63, par. 3.

Revised Penal Code, Art. 64 (2).

People v. Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013.

Entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM,

People v. Jacinto, G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011.

People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009.

G.R. No. 178321

CONRADO LAOG y RAMIN,

When AAA regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining

Meanwhile, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, a medico-legal officer of

the body is in advanced stage of decomposition[;] eyeballs and to[n]gue

The prosecution and the defense also stipulated on the testimony of

Appellant appealed his conviction to this Court. But conformably with

WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Joint