Womens Studies, 39:238261, 2010

Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 0049-7878 print / 1547-7045 online
DOI: 10.1080/00497871003595794

RIGHTS AND JUSTICE IN EDITH WHARTONS THE REEF

1547-7045Studies
0049-7878
GWST
Womens
Studies, Vol. 39, No. 3, Jan 2010: pp. 00

RightsMischa
Alicia
and Justice
Renfroe
in Whartons The Reef

ALICIA MISCHA RENFROE

Middle Tennessee State University

We are all bound together in this coil . . . .

Anna Leath, Edith Whartons The Reef

In this comment to her fianc, George Darrow, Anna Leath succinctly summarizes the tangled connections that bind the characters together in Edith Whartons The Reef (1912). Often
described as the most Jamesian of Whartons novels, The Reef
tracks the complicated relationships among Anna Leath, her
childhood sweetheart George Darrow, her step-son Owen Leath,
and her daughters governess Sophy Viner. Anna and Darrow
reunite by chance after the death of Annas husband, Fraser
Leath. While on his way to see Anna, Darrow meets Sophy Viner
during a Paris stop where they have a brief affair, and when Darrow
finally arrives at Givr (Annas home), he discovers that Sophy is
actually Annas young daughters governess and that she is also
engaged to Owen. In a conversation with Sophy shortly after they
are reunited at Givr, Darrow describes their relationship in a way
that highlights several of the novels concerns:
As to my reasons for wanting to help you, a good deal depends on the
words one uses to define rather indefinite things. Its true enough that I
want to help you; but the wish isnt due to . . . to any past kindness on your
part, but simply to my own interest in you. Why not put it that our friendship gives me the right to intervene for what I believe to be your benefit?
(165, ellipses in original)

I would like to thank John Hart, Mary Papke, Allen Dunn, Charles Maland, and Otis
Stephens for commenting on various versions of this article. I would also like to thank audiences at the Association for the Study of Law, Culture, and the Humanities conference
and at the John J. College of Criminal Justices Law and Literature conference for their
perceptive questions and comments on earlier versions of several parts of this article.
Address correspondence to Alicia Mischa Renfroe, English Department, MTSU P.O.
Box 70, 1301 East Main Street, Murfreesboro, TN 37132. E-mail: mrenfroe@mtsu.edu

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As the emphasis in this passage on Darrows right suggests,

Wharton often employs the language of the lawin this example,
rightsto define the indefinite things central to her narrative.
Here, Darrow asserts a right that stems from friendship as he
pledges to become an advocate, of sorts, for Sophy. Indeed, these
characters bind themselves to each other in quasi-contractual
relationships that create a dizzying array of competing rights,
duties, and obligations and that raise questions about the possibility
of justice itself. Although William Moddelmog has noted convincingly of The House of Mirth that the law serves as one of the discourses structuring Whartons narrative, only a few critics have
explored the significance of legal discourse in Whartons other
works (340).1 This article will argue that, for Wharton, legal discourse plays an important role in constituting identity by providing a language through which choices can be justified for ones
self as well as be judged by others and by defining conceptions of
justice and what it means to be a just person. Indeed, her characters
often justify themselves and their actions through appeals to
rights, duties, and privileges that seem to provide inherent
justifications for their decisions. By rendering several shifting
love triangles (AnnaDarrowSophy; AnnaOwenDarrow;
DarrowSophyOwen) and the ensuing complications, Wharton
highlights the limitations of an absolute conception of justice

1
For instance, Laura K. Johnson argues that The House of Mirth (1905) and Glimpses of
the Moon (1922) evaluate competing claims within the legal definition of marriage and
that Whartons preoccupation with the laws terms created an unresolved tension in her
fiction (947). Taking a different approach, Elaine N. Orr suggests that The House of Mirth
provides an alternative model of negotiation to the legalistic contractual negotiation (55)
in which human interaction is adversarial, competitive, and self-interested (56). For Orr,
relational or empathetic problem solving, on the other hand, is the alternative pattern of
negotiation whispered in Whartons novel through Lilys desire for friendship and her
dawning awareness of the need for emotional, and not merely monetary, connections
(56). Several pieces have also appeared on Summer (1918), including my Prior Claims and
Sovereign Rights: The Sexual Contract in Edith Whartons Summer. In this article, I situate rights-claims specifically in the context of the social contract and its underlying sexual
contract. See also Rhonda Skillerns Becoming a Good Girl: Law, Language, and Ritual
in Edith Whartons Summer for an account of Charitys integration into the Law of the
Father as well as its manifestation in our patriarchal legal system. On The Reef, Anne MacMaster
notes that Whartons plots often feature two women who assert competing claims for the
possession of one man, the legal claim (like marriage or engagement) usually preceding
the otherillegitimateclaim (29); however, MacMaster does not provide an in-depth
analysis of the way that law or legal language might work in the text.

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predicated on competing rights and problematizes the version of

the self underlying that account of justice.
Though philosophical and legal debates about rights fall
outside the scope of this article, it is important to understand, in
general terms, how rights work. One potentially useful, if reductive, description of rights is Isaiah Berlins account of positive
and negative liberty in his essay Two Concepts of Liberty. For
Berlin, these two types of liberty involve different versions of
rights, and he focuses his analysis on two key questions. He
claims that negative liberty concerns itself with this question:
What is the area within which the subjecta person or a
groups of personsis or should be left to do or be what he is
able to do or be, without interference from other persons[?]
(2). In contrast, positive liberty has a different concern: what,
or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that? (2). Put in
simple terms, negative liberty depends upon precisely this kind
of rightthe freedom from something or someonewhile
positive liberty depends upon the freedom to act or not act. As
several scholars suggest, Berlins account privileges negative liberty and defines freedom as a right not to be interfered with by
others.2
Feminist critics target this tendency to emphasize negative
liberty at the expense of positive liberty as a major flaw in classical
liberalism. Describing the general direction of feminist jurisprudence, Martha Minow notes:
Feminist work specifically reflects upon relationships between people
rather than treating people as autonomous, with identities existing prior
to their social relationships. Feminists criticize the assumption of autonomous individualism behind American economic and political theory and
legal and bureaucratic practice, for this assumption rests on a picture of
public and independent man rather than private and often dependent, or
interconnected, woman. (194)

Carol Gilligans important critique, In a Different Voice, identifies a

foundational opposition between a masculine ethic of justice
2

Numerous political theorists and legal scholars take issue with Berlins approach. See
Michael Sandels Liberalism and the Limits of Justice for one example.

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conceptualized primarily in terms of rights and a feminine ethic

of care conceptualized primarily in terms of responsibility and
self-sacrifice (64105).3 This ethic of justice emphasizes rights
rather than responsibilities and privileges rights that limit interference from others. Questioning the idea that justice is a complete
virtue, Gilligan argues:
The notion that virtue for women lies in self-sacrifice has complicated the
course of womens development by pitting the moral issue of goodness
against the adult questions of responsibility and choice. In addition, the
ethic of self-sacrifice is directly in conflict with the concept of rights that
has, in the past century, supported womens claim to a fair share of social
justice. (132)

In her follow-up article Remapping the Moral Domain: New Images

of Self and Relationship, Gilligan calls attention to different ideas
about responsibility as commitment to obligations and responsiveness in relationships (4). Those operating within an ethic of
justice view responsibility in terms of personal commitment and
contractual obligation (7). For those operating within an ethic
of care, responsibility resonates differently as as acting responsively in relationships, and the selfas a moral agenttakes the
initiative to gain awareness and respond to the perception of need
(7). Gilligan ultimately argues for an integrated conception of
justice.
Wai Chee Dimock highlights a similar problem in Residues of
Justice: Literature, Law, Philosophy by calling our attention to the
conceit of the scales, an essential component of the Western
conception of justice as equivalence (1). For Dimock,
this conceit, with its attendant assumptions about the generalizability,
proportionality, and commensurability of the world, . . . underwrites the
self-image of justice as a supreme instance of adequation, a fitness at
once immanent and without residue, one that perfectly matches burdens
and benefits, action and reaction, resolving all conflicting terms into a
weighable equivalence. (12)

Dimock and others note some problems with Gilligans gendering of justice without
analyzing possible social aspects that may produce the difference between men and women.
I agree with Dimocks claim that Gilligans approach is unduly polarizing (8) even as it
highlights an important distinction.

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Focusing more specifically on an adversarial system of justice

and the language of rights upon which it relies, Dimock argues
that in describing the world (and dividing the world) always in
categorical terms, always in terms of those with right and those
with no right, such a language can render only a categorical
verdict: an unconditional victory for one party and an unconditional
defeat for the other (183). Using Kate Chopins The Awakening
(1899) as a key example, Dimock points out that Chopins Edna
Pontellier operates on an just such an adversarial grammar
which assumes that an individual either has a right or not; in
her [Ednas] particular syntax, the right holder turns out to be a
nonsubject, a nonentity, a nobody [who] has any right (193).4
Further, since the defeated party is a threat to the victor, its
consignment to a nobody is likewise necessary (193). For
Dimock, this adversarial grammar typifies the classical liberal
conception of rights:
A right so forcefully . . . claimed must be felt, from the other side, as a
highly unsubtle pressure. Theorists from Bentham to Hohfield thus speak
of a correlativity activated by the concepts of rights, the complementary
genesis of a positive and a negative term, so that whenever their exists a
right holder entitled to a benefit, there must also exist a complying party
obligated to yield that benefit. (196)

This account of rights, with its emphasis on winners and losers,

on those who have a right or a no-right, produces a concept of
justice as absolute in its vision of a world exactly equal to the
verdict it sees fit to pronounce (197). Such a vision presumes
stability and equivalence that Wharton denies in The Reef. Indeed,
Wharton reveals the ways in which this adversarial grammar
facilitates not the claiming of a right but the erasure or renunciation of some rights.
For Wharton, rights operate not only in the public sphere of
political conversations but also in the private sphere of close personal relationships. Interestingly, though many critics see The Reef
as Whartons attempt to come to terms with her affair with Morton
Fullerton, these critics overlook Whartons tendency to describe
her relationship with Fullerton in the same legalistic terms that
4

Dimock quotes Ednas language. See The Awakening (147).

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she often deploys in the novel.5 In a letter to Fullerton dated May,

1909, Wharton acknowledged that the affair was likely over and
proposed a renegotiation of the terms of their relationship: the
situation is changed, & I, who like to walk up to things, recognize
it [sic], & am ready to accept itonly it must be nettement
[clearly]! (Letters 179). Wharton continued, employing the contractual language of conditions and exchanges, I recognize, also,
perfect freedom in loving and in un-loving; but only on condition
that it is associated with equal sincerity. . . . I look on you as free
to carry your soucis cardiaques [affairs of the heart] where you
please; but on condition that you & I become again . . . the good
comrades we were two years ago (Letters 180). For Wharton,
changing the terms of the relationship would prevent resentment
on both sides and would provide stability and predictability in
their relationship. She reiterated this point in a letter written
sometime late in the summer of 1909 and again characterized
their relationship as an exchange: I know how unequal the
exchange is between us, how little I have to give that a man like
you can care for, & how ready I am, when the transition comes, to
be again the good comrade you once found me (Letters 189). By
winter, the relationship clearly had changed as Wharton pointed
out that though she has offered friendship, Fullerton merely
avoided her and sometimes did not answer her letters. In a letter
written in the winter of 1910, Wharton complained that he had
lied to her to avoid seeing her. Apparently, Fullerton told her
that he was sick, and when she went to his hotel to check on him,
he was not there. As she wrote the letter, she constructed a dialogue in which each of them asserted his or her rights:
I hear you say: What! I havent the right to be absent from my hotel at 9
in the morning, or any other hour?You have every right, Dear, over
every moment of your time & every feeling.Only dont tell me the night
5
For an account of Whartons relationship with Fullerton, see R. W. B. Lewiss Edith
Wharton, especially the Paris and MF section (159266). With regard to The Reef, several
critics, including Erlich, Keyser, Jones, and Tuttleton to name a few, pay close attention to
Whartons relationship with Fullerton but do not discuss Whartons use of legal language
in her letters. For instance, James Tuttleton sees the novels theme as the tortured frustrations
of inhibited love, a theme he connects to Whartons much-discussed affair with Fullerton;
accordingly, Anna Leath is a partial portrait of Wharton (465). Wendell Jones also suggests
that Whartons creation of Anna might well have been influenced by her own conflicts
with regard to her relationship with Fullerton (86).

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before: I am too ill to see you. Dont you understand that what hurts me
is not the fact of the change, which I find myself able to accept with a kind
of cheerful stoicism that reassures me?Its not that, Dear, but the pain,
the unutterable pain of thinking you incapable of understanding my
frankness & my honest desire to let you lead your own life.You say:
I will be all you have the right to expect.If I have any rights, I
renounce them. (Letters 19697)

In this imagined conversation, both Fullerton and Wharton claim

their rights in the negative. Casting her dilemma in the language
of rights, Wharton imagined Fullerton protesting her implied
claim that he had no right to be away from his hotel and claiming
that he would be what she had the right to expect while implicitly suggesting that she too had no right to expect anything. In
this strange standoff of negative rights, Wharton renounced her
rights even as she recognized that those rights might be mere
fiction. With this renunciation, Wharton hoped that they might
remain friends if nothing else, though she pointed out that
Fullertons behavior had complicated any such transition. Whartons
renunciation of her rights is a move that her fictional characters
often duplicate, particularly in The Reef. Indeed, renouncing ones
rights seems the only act of agency available when it becomes
clear that competing rights will lead to a standoff where justice
cannot be served.
The Reef opens with Anna Leaths cryptic telegram to her
childhood sweetheart, George Darrow: Unexpected obstacle.
Please dont come till thirtieth. Anna (17). For Darrow, the telegram takes on a legalistic character as a statement that carefully
breaks a preexisting contractual agreement. Darrows reaction to
this obstacle provides a perfect example of Berlins negative
conception of liberty with its emphasis on rights as a protection
against infringements by others; the obstacle infringes on Darrows
liberty by preventing him from following through on his plans.
This attention to negative liberty and negative rights persists
throughout the novel. As we later learn, the obstacle in this
instance turns out to be a competing claim, another obligation,
that Anna must fulfill. Thus, Darrows implied contract with Anna
is already shaped by obligations that precede it. The telegram
comes after Darrow and Anna have rekindled their relationship
when they accidentally meet after 12 years apart. Darrow views
Annas attention after their long separation as granting him a

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privilege; when he left her after their most recent reunion, he did
so with the sense that he was a being singled out and privileged,
to whom she had entrusted something precious to keep (20).
For Darrow, this exchange amounts to a gift left to him to do
with as he willed (20). Though he does not explain what the
something precious actually is, his language makes it clear that
he believes Anna has given something up so that his privilege is
derived from her corresponding loss.
Darrows reaction to her delay of their plans to meet at
Givr, the ancestral home of Annas deceased first husband,
Arthur Leath, suggests the extent of the privilege he believes that
she has granted him. Darrow, then, sees their relationship in
highly legalistic terms in which his privilege is clearly defined in
relation to Annas corresponding duty. Following a rights-based
conception of justice and its account of the person, Darrow privileges clear-cut contractual obligations in which promises should
be kept. Such a conception of their relationship fosters a sense of
stability undermined by Annas telegram and the unexpected
nature of the obstacle. Though it is not entirely clear what Annas
duty may be, at least a part of it may include Annas relinquishment of the right to change her mind, a right which is essential
to her own agency. Later, as he hopes for a letter from Anna, he
imagines that its contents might annul the writers telegraphed
injunction, and call him to her side at once (55). It is significant
that Darrow does not merely want Anna to change her mind
again and then to summon him to Givr; instead, he wants an
annulment, a legal instrument designed to nullify whatever agreement preceded it, which would completely negate her act of
agency. Indeed, Blacks Law Dictionary defines annul generally as
to reduce to nothing, a definition that suggests Darrows desire
to reduce Annas act of agency to nothing.6 In Darrows imagination, Anna becomes, in this sense, a non-entity with no rights.
In legal terms, her telegram would no longer exist, and the
annulment would erase the evidence that Anna did, in fact,
change her mind. Since Wharton opens the novel in Darrows
6

The full definition is even more telling: to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate;
to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. To cancel; destroy;
abrogate. To annul a judgment or judicial proceeding is to deprive it of all force and
operation, either ab inito [from the first act] or prospectively as to future transactions.

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point of view and alternates between Darrow and Anna for the
rest of the novel, readers do not know Annas reason for the
change until much later when her perspective becomes the focus.
As the language in the opening section suggests, contractual logic
infuses Darrows perception of their relationship and enables
him to reduce it to clear-cut rights and privileges that erase
Annas prior obligations.
Wharton complicates this initial account of Darrows relationship with Anna by creating the first in a series of triangles:
Darrow, Anna, and Sophy. Through a chance meeting, Darrow
falls into an affair with Sophy, a beautiful young woman he
had briefly met during an earlier visit to her former employer,
Mrs. Murrett. Like Darrow, Sophy also uses the language of
rights in the classical liberal sense (as a way to claim a right to
a particular thing), and she clearly connects rights with ownership
and property. When Sophy and Darrow discuss Darrows past
relationship with Lady Urlica, another member of Mrs. Murretts
circle, Sophy explains:
YesI was envious of Lady Urlica . . . because she had almost all the things
Ive always wanted: clothes and fun and motors, and admiration and
yachting and Paris. . . . And how do you suppose a girl can see that sort of
thing about her day after day, and never wonder why some women, who
dont seem to have any more right to it, have it all tumbled into their laps,
while others are writing dinner invitations, and straightening out accounts,
and copying visiting lists, and finishing golf-stockings, and matching ribbon,
and seeing that the dogs get their sulphur? One looks in ones glass after
all! (32, ellipses in original)

Sophys language suggests her belief that ownership should be

based on some entitlement to the things owned, some sense of
fundamental fairness, of justice, in the distribution of wealth.
Sophys situation also provides a compelling example of the paradox that rights claims have historically presented for women and
other disenfranchised groups. On one hand, the extension of
many legal rights to such groups provide important recognitions
of claims to personhood (the right to vote, the right to own
property, etc.); however, on the other hand, such rights become
empty claims lacking the weight of enforcement and recognition
by others. Sophys logic simultaneously mirrors and critiques the
legal systems faith in its ability to negotiate competing rights and

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render justice. According to this logic, the assertion of a right

invokes an inherent assertion of the justice of the claim.
However, as Sophys economic situation suggests, material
conditions often limit such an absolute exercise of justice. The
economic difference between Sophy and Darrow is obvious from
their first exchange in which Darrow plays the hero and searches
for Sophys lost trunk. When Darrow comments, Youve lost a
trunk, Sophy immediately corrects him: Not a trunk, but my trunk
(26 emphasis in the original). Unlike Darrow, Sophy is not so
well-off as to afford a cavalier attitude toward her somewhat meager
belongings. Darrow later views Sophys economic situation as an
injustice that he felt the desire to right (60). By characterizing
her situation as an injustice, Darrow can justify their affair as
the means through which Sophy can improve her situation (60).
Darrow offers Sophy a deal that couches their relationship in
legal terms:
Dont you think one friend may accept a small service from another without
looking too far ahead or weighing too many chances? The question turns
entirely on what you think of me. If you like me well enough to be willing
to take a few days holiday with me, just for the pleasure of the thing, and
the pleasure youll be giving me, lets shake hands on it. If you dont like
me well enough well shake hands too; only I shall be sorry. (77)

Darrows offer consciously evokes legalistic language and reasoning,

and much like an actual legal case, a single point becomes the
crux of the issue; in effect, he reduces their situation to a single
fact that the question turns entirely on (77), and this version
makes his earlier actions irrelevant.
The legalistic language also enables him to transform their situation into a contractual one created by talking as man to man;
by gaining her consent, he can replace his earlier sense of guilt
with a contract formed between equals. Sophy sees only the
promise of their agreement; she states that Darrow is giving her
the only chance she has ever had (77). For Darrow, the agreement fixes the relationship in terms he can handle: At the outset,
he had felt no special sense of responsibility. He was satisfied he
had struck the right note, and convinced of his power of sustaining
it (81). This supposedly simple sexual contract then becomes the
basis of the explosive revelations at Givr. The relationship

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between Darrow and Anna cannot then be separated from Darrows

relationship with Sophy.
In Book II, Wharton shifts the point of view to Anna Leath
and her home, Givr, which Wharton consistently presents in terms
of balance and symmetry. The first description is of a grassy
court from the entrance of which a level drive leads to a gate
that opens on to an equally level avenue of grass (87). Givr,
situated in middle France (88), sits upon this level ground, and
a double flight of steps meets at its front door (87). Wharton
repeats the word court several times in this opening description
which suggests that Givr symbolically represents the seat of
justice. Similarly, in Whartons Reef: Inscriptions of Female
Sexuality, Rebecca Blevins Faery proposes that Givr represents
a web of law and custom (94). This reading is reinforced by Givrs
name in an earlier manuscript version; in Fairy Tale Love and
The Reef, Elizabeth Ammons reports that Wharton originally named
Givr Blincourt which Ammons reads as blin[d]court[ship],
hence the reef (617). An equally plausible reading, especially
in terms of Whartons use of the word court and the descriptions emphasizing balance in the final version, is Blin[d]court, a
name which evokes the adage, Justice is Blind, and its most familiar
icon, Justitia, the blindfolded goddess who holds a scale in one
hand and a sword in the other. While this expression generally
indicates fairness, Wharton inverts it to suggest that blindness
does not guarantee such fairness and to call our attention to the
importance of perception in judgment.
Like Givr, Anna Leaths first appearance in the novel is also
described in terms of balance: In the court, half-way between
house and drive, a lady stood (87). Annas identity is also directly
linked to that of Givr; when Anna first saw it as Fraser Leaths
young bride, Givr seemed . . . to hold out to her a fate as noble
and dignified as its own mien (88). In her reading of the binary
pair Nature/Culture, Sherrie Inness links Anna with Culture,
which represents, among other things, the web of law (77). Similarly, Moira Maynard associates Anna with justice, noting that
her love of justice constantly harries and thwarts her. Unlike the
unaffiliated Sophy, Anna feels the impingement of other peoples
opinions and needs upon her desires (289). The young Anna is
partially attracted to Fraser Leath because his scale of values is
the same as hers (95), and at first, the sober symmetry of Givr

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249

had suggested only her husbands neatly balanced mind (96).

Years later, the house becomes the place one came back to, the
place where one had ones duties until eventually Anna believes
that one could hardly, after so long a time, think ones self away
from it without suffering a certain loss of identity (89). Anticipating
Darrows arrival and conscious of that equipoise of bliss which
the fearful human heart scarcely dares acknowledge, Anna attempts
to see the house through the eyes of an old friend . . . and in so
doing she seemed to be opening her own eyes upon it after a long
interval of blindness (89). Her descriptions of both blindness
and a scale of values in relation to herself suggest a version of
Anna herself as Justitia.
Whartons linking of Anna with Justitia also indicates the
importance of perception in making judgments. In Images of
Justice, Dennis E. Curtis and Judith Resnik trace artistic representations of justice in Western culture. Their study highlights
several tensions in interpretations of Justitias blindfold: Interpretations of the blindfold as representing separation and distance, as
a sign of the judge apart, connote a justice somehow barred from
receiving some kinds of information. . . . But to judge requires
knowledge, some kind of sight (1760). Anna faces precisely this
dilemma; she must make judgments without access to all of the
relevant information. Though, metaphorically speaking, Anna
loses her blindfold and now may see clearly, she is left with the
scales, the conceit Dimock identifies as central to the idea of justice as equivalence.
Against the backdrop of Givr as a kind of court of justice,
the language of rights becomes increasingly prominent, and as I
will discuss in a moment, Sophy Viner is put on trial. Though
critics often see Anna and Sophy as opposites, Anna, like Sophy,
often relies on legal language to define herself and her relationships with others, and for Anna, the language of rights operates
in several different ways. Like Sophy, the young Anna Summers
links rights with property ownership, in particular, property in
the person. When the young Anna sees Darrow exchanging a
look with another girl, she feels a rage of possessorship that
inspires her to assert her right to him at any price (93). Anna
believes that none but she had a right to be so looked at (93),
and here, her logic reduces Darrows other love interests to
non-entities with no rights, a move she will replicate as an adult

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in her treatment of Sophy. However, while Sophys focus is

clearly material possessions, Anna claims a property right in
Darrows personhood, which, in turn, facilitates her own selfobjectification based on Darrows right to look at her. Annas
logic mirrors Darrows original interpretation of their contract
in which he viewed his privilege as derived from Annas corresponding loss.
Though critics often discuss the SophyAnnaDarrow triangle,
few note the significance of Annas relationship with Owen, and
another important triangle is that of AnnaOwenDarrow.
Unlike her younger self, the adult Anna views rights in concurrence with her obligations to her child, Effie, and her step-son,
Owen Leath; these duties to others alter her conception of her
relationship with Darrow. In this sense, the adult Anna comes
much closer to the ethic of care described by Gilligan. For
instance, as Anna contemplates marriage, she questions her
right to introduce into her life any interests and duties which
might rob Effie of a part of her time, or lessen the closeness of
their daily intercourse (298). Before Darrows arrival at Givr,
Anna has an important conversation with Owen, and in order to
understand the duty Anna feels for Owen and the ways in which
that duty influences her actions, a close evaluation of their relationship is helpful. In contrast to the symmetry of Givr and
Fraser Leath, Owen has a charmingly unbalanced face and a
quaintly twisted reflection of Fraser Leaths mind (100). During her marriage to Owens father, Anna sees Owen as the
voice of her secret rebellions (101). These descriptions place
Owen in an antithetical position to the justice of Givr. Anna
later explains their relationship to Darrow as based on odd
brother and sister terms (116). The terms seem odd indeed
when Anna further describes their relationship to Darrow as a
strange connection now based on a parent/child bond: Owens
like my sonif youd seen him when I first came here youd
know why. We were like two prisoners who talk to each other by
tapping on the wall (235). This strange closeness is also
implied in Annas conversations with Owen. In one instance,
while she watches from the court as Owen approaches, she recalls
fancying that Owens response was warmer than that of her own
child (102). Owen understands things in a tacit way that yet
perpetually spoke to her (102). Anna thinks:

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this sense of his understanding was the deepest element in their feeling
for each other. There were so many things between them that were never
spoken of, or even indirectly alluded to, yet that, even in their occasional
discussions and differences, formed the unadduced arguments making
for final agreement. (102)

Their connection defies reduction to a simple exchange that produces corresponding rights and duties in the parties. By establishing
this strange connection between Anna and Owen, Wharton introduces yet another triangle, AnnaOwenDarrow, that further
complicates any attempt to describe these relationships in terms
of clear-cut rights, duties, or contractual obligations between two
parties. As these relationships become more and more complicated,
it becomes more and more difficult to determine the justness of a
particular action or decision.
Both Anna and Darrow have pre-existing commitments that
impact their relationship, particularly when they make additional
promises to Owen and to Sophy. In both cases, contractual logic
falters when confronted with this web of complex, interconnected
relationships. Darrow becomes uneasy when he realizes that Anna
has obligations to Owen, just as he has obligations to Sophy, that
complicate their obligations to each other. Indeed, Darrows logic
follows the legal systems attempt to rank relationships based on
legal categories. He seems troubled by Annas sense of duty to
Owen and states that when Owen is settled, Owen must recognize
that Darrow has the first claim on Anna (120). In spite of Darrows
uncertainty, Anna refuses to offer further explanations, again
asserting her promise to Owen: Ive promised Owen not to tell
anyone (121). Eventually, Darrow promises to help Anna secure
Owens future happiness, though Darrow does not know that this
promise involves Sophy Viner; Darrow states that together they
cant fail to pull it off! (131). At the end of this exchange, they
share a long kiss of communion (127) that Darrow may see as at
least a partial fulfillment of the girlhood promises which her
lips were afraid to keep (41). This sexual promise awakens Darrow
to the high privilege of possessing her, and he likens her to a
picture so hung that it can be seen only at a certain angle: an
angle known to no one but its possessor. The thought flattered
his sense of possessorship . . . (128, ellipses in original). His
sense of ownership is later echoed by Anna as she experiences

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feelings that are richer, deeper, more enslaving than any she
had known before (292). Here, this informal contract, with its
sexual overtones, facilitates the commodification of the self,
and it is not surprising that Wharton describes these feelings as
enslaving for Anna.7
Darrows promise to help Anna to aid Owen creates yet another
triangle: DarrowSophyOwen. At Annas request and without
knowledge that Sophy is involved with Owen, Darrow becomes an
advocate, of sorts, for Owen by seeking the approval of Owens
marriage by Madame de Chantelle, the representative of the
forces of order and tradition (132). Here, Darrow simultaneously
occupies two conflicting and presumably mutually exclusive roles
Sophys former lover who vaguely promised to help her and
Annas fianc who promised to serve as Owens advocate. Caught
in these competing roles, Darrow quickly realizes that his relationships can no longer be understood as rights or obligations
between two parties. As he laments his plight, he realizes that the
situation, detestable at best, would have been relatively simple if
protecting Sophy Viner had been the only duty involved in it
(148). Though Darrow believes his duty to Sophy is paramount,
he must still recognize his contingent obligations (148).8
Legalistic language becomes increasingly prominent in the
conversations between Sophy and Darrow as the situation becomes
increasingly more complex. These conversations foreshadow
Sophys trial. According to Darrow, when Sophy arrives, her first
impulse was to defend her right to the place she had won, and to
learn as quickly as possible if he meant to dispute it (147 emphasis
mine). However, Darrow soon realizes that he lacks the necessary
facts to make a judgment about her (164), and, somewhat at a
loss, he appeals to her to listen to his reasons because theres
7
See Carol Patemans The Sexual Contract for an account of the sexual contract that
precedes and underpins the social contract and the legal contracts that flow from it.
Patemans emphasis on the sexual contract highlights that moment when women become
subordinated to man as men instead of as paternalistic fathers (3).
8
Darrow reiterates this dilemma: He had patched up as decent a conclusion as he
could to an incident that should obviously have no sequel; but he had known all along
that with the securing of Miss Viners peace of mind only a part of his obligation was
discharged, and that with that part of his obligation his remaining duty was in conflict. It
had been his first business to convince the girl that their secret was safe with him; but it
was far from easy to square this with the equally urgent obligation of safe-guarding Annas
responsibility toward her child (161).

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253

been time, on both sides, to think them over (164). This attention to both sides reinforces the adversarial nature of the situation as well as the conception of justice as a way to resolve
competing claims, one of which must trump the other. Sophy
assumes that he is renewing his offer to help her out of more
than a sense of personal obligation to her; she implies that he
offers his help because he believes he owes something to Anna
Leath (165). Darrow, refusing to respond directly to her allegation, points out that, when it comes to reasons, a good deal
depends on the words one uses to define rather indefinite things,
and he appeals to what he calls a right granted by their friendship to intervene in her benefit (165). Here, their competing
visions of their respective rights set the stage for a standoff.
Like a good courtroom lawyer presenting her own case
with cold lucidity (166), Sophy uses Darrows own words against
him and, after getting Darrow to admit his friendship with Anna,
makes the logical leap that, just as his friendship with her affords
him certain rights, his friendship with Anna might create the
justification, or even the duty, for his advising Anna not to keep
Sophy as Effies governess (16566). Sophy finally explains that
she will not, in any case, be Effies governess long because she has
had another offer (167); however, Sophy does not explain that
this offer is a marriage proposal from Owen. When Sophy later
learns that Darrow has spoken to Madame de Chantelle about
Sophys potential marriage, Sophy powerfully asserts the language of
rights in her own defense and questions Darrow: By what right, I
should like to know? What have you to do with me, or anything in
the world that concerns me? (193). When Darrow explains that
Madame de Chantelle is against the marriage, Sophy reminds
him of his earlier promise to say nothing about their affair and
accuses him of believing that she has no right to marry Owen
(19394). Thus, Darrow finds himself torn between his obligation
to Sophy and his obligation to Anna. As this confusing series of
agreements suggests, complex relationships cannot be reduced
easily to clearly defined rights and duties that dictate a particular
course of action.
These competing rights require an outside arbiter of justice,
Madame de Chantelle, to make a final determination and pass
judgment on the charges against Sophy (185). Darrows first
perception of her is quite telling; he notes that she thought a

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great deal of measure, and approved of most things only up to a

certain extent (132). Indeed, Madame de Chantelle possesses
the inanimate elegance of a figure introduced into a still life to
give the scale (132). Put another way, she provides the standard
of measurement, and as Owens grandmother, she must approve
his marriage. Darrows access to Madame de Chantelles court
depends on his tie to Anna as well as his background. His ancestral
link to the Everards provides incontestable claims for acceptance
as Annas husband:
The fact that they offered such firm footingformed, so to speak, a friendly
territory on which opposing powers could meet and treathelped him
through the task of explaining and justifying himself as the successor of
Fraser Leath. (134)

The diplomat Darrow can evoke his lineage to secure the ground
from which to make his case.
Indeed, this characterization of opposing powers again
echoes the sense of Givr as a court, here with Madame de Chantelle
as judge. Her power becomes apparent through Whartons quite
interesting use of the legally significant term summons. Blacks
Law Dictionary defines a summons as: a means of acquiring jurisdiction over a party.9 Significantly, Darrow is somewhat disconcerted by the summons he receives to meet with Madame de
Chantelle (179). Caught between competing claims and cast in
the role of reluctant advocate, Darrow clings to his promise to
Anna and defines his position in contractual terms even as he
admits that he promised her his helpbut before he knew what
he was promising (202). Acknowledging this promise, he admits
that he wants to speak on Sophys behalf and claims, I dont see
how I can make it either for or against her (202). Once again,
his language implies a standoff between two sides. Lacking both
property and social position, Sophy has no standing in the
court that will decide her fate. She is excluded and left without
a true advocate until the intervention of Adelaide Painter, Madame
de Chantelles pragmatic American friend, who is also frequently
9

The Blacks Law Dictionary definition of summon is also significant: to serve a

summons; to cite a defendant to appear in court to answer a suit which has been begun
against him; to notify the defendant that an action has been instituted against him, and
that he is required to answer it at a time and place named.

Rights and Justice in Whartons The Reef

255

summoned to Givre for every domestic crisis (153). Though

Sophy is the object of this dispute over Owens potential marriage, she is not a party to it and thus does not receive a summons
of her own. In Madame de Chantelles court, Sophys claims,
whatever they may be, simply do not exist.
Adelaide subtly criticizes Madame de Chantelles approach
by highlighting its adversarial nature; she points out that Madame
de Chantelle seems to imagine . . . that a young American girl
ought to have a dossiera police record (203) and admits that
Sophy could be traced, as they call it in detective stories to
uncover damaging information (204). Adelaide finally convinces
Madame de Chantelle to approve the marriage by yoking legal
and ethical justifications. She argues, when I say that if you part
two young things who are dying to be happy in the lawful way, its
ten to one theyll come together in an unlawful one? Im insinuating shocking things against you . . . in suggesting for a moment
that youll care to assume such a responsibility before your
Maker (205). Adelaides interpretation of the case plays to
Madame de Chantelles view of the situation as an adversarial one
by implying that the couple might step outside the law if the law,
here represented by Madame de Chantelle, does not provide an
adequate solution.
The situation itself exceeds this final judgment. Owens revelation that Darrow and Sophy have had an affair reveals the
impossibility of justice in this complex series of relationships. At
first, Anna is skeptical of Owens grievance (229), and Darrow
temporarily convinces Anna that Owens accusations are the
result of a misunderstanding, even though her intuition suggests
otherwise. In his defense, he calls up his original promise to Anna
to help Owen as the basis for his questionable interactions with
Sophy and further claims that this promise pledges him to
silence (236) so that he cannot provide any explanation to Owen.
Eventually, Darrow can no longer evade Annas questions, and
she finally accepts that Owens allegations are true. Darrow then
asserts his promise to Sophy to justify his silence; he argues that
he was bound not to reveal that he had met Sophy in Paris
(251). In both examples, Darrow relies on a rights-based account
of justice predicated on contractual obligations to justify his decisions and his own view of his obligations. Also, Darrow evokes
legalistic language to assert his right to a fair hearing. For instance,

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Alicia Mischa Renfroe

Darrow complains that Anna will not allow him a voice (265)
when she dismisses him without a hearing (266). He urges Anna,
be just to me; it is your right (267). Here, Darrows remark conflates Annas identity as a just person with the very language that
renders that model of the self a paradox. Here, her right simply
masks what Darrow views as an obligation, a duty, to do him justice.
As these promises consume the text, Wharton describes the
court as having been damaged; indeed, Darrow noticed that the
gale of two days before had nearly stripped the tops of the lime
trees in the court (253). Annas viewpoint suggests a similar
mutilation of justice; she states that it was as though he and she
had been looking at two sides of the same thing, and the side she
had seen had been all light and life, and his a place of graves . . .
(255, ellipses in original). Annas shifting view of the complex
series of promises further suggests the intensity of her relationship with Owen. At first, she recognizes her connections to both
Owen and Darrow, claiming that Were all bound together in
this coil (253). However, like Darrow, she later attempts to categorize her obligations. Her duty to Owen soon reasserts itself as
she contends that she owed herself first to himshe was bound to
protect him not only from all knowledge of the secret she had
surprised but alsoand chiefly!from its consequences (256).
Similarly, Anna also implicitly acknowledges her duty to Owen as
she places Owens rights ahead of her own. When Sophy explains
that she plans to leave Givr, she describes her mistake as daring
to dream I had a right (284) and indicates that she is informing
Anna before Owen due to her obligations as Effies governess.
Anna responds thus: Owen has a right to ask that you should
consider him first before you think of his sister (222). For Sophy,
confessing her love for Darrow is an act of self justification; as she
puts it, it is that that justifies me (284). In contrast, Anna asserts
a negative conception of liberty, arguing that Sophy had no
right to let Owen love her (284). Just as Darrow earlier reduced
Anna to a non-entity with no right, so to does Anna erase Sophys
act of self-justification. In this sense, The Reef offers a powerful
critique of rights by highlighting a central paradox: the language
that articulates a claim to selfhood makes possible the erasure of
the self it calls into being.
As the novel nears its conclusion, then, it seems that Wharton
has resolved the problem of justice in the way that the legal system

Rights and Justice in Whartons The Reef

257

doesby simply erasing the parties whose claims do not fit the
structure and privileging those with rights that do. Indeed, the
structure of the novel itself highlights this problem. Because
point of view alternates between Darrow and Anna, neither Sophy
nor Owen may testify on their own behalf. Both characters may
be erased because they are not granted control of the narrative.
With Sophy and Owen absent, it seems that justice can be served
in the usual fashionAnna and Darrow can resolve their dispute
supposedly apart from the many obligations they have incurred
with Sophy and Owen. Anna acknowledges that there were certain dishonors with which she had never dreamed that any pact
could be made because she had had an incorruptible passion
for good faith and fairness (277). However, Anna comes to an
important recognition: how can there be a best for you thats
made of someone elses worst? (289). In this moment, Anna
seems to recognize the threat to the self that is produced by
claiming a right defined through and created by a corresponding
loss to another.
However, Anna cannot completely escape the logic of this
system. Later, she recalls Darrows prediction that when she had
explored the intricacies and darknesses of her own heart her
judgment of others would be less absolute (293), and she realizes that she and Darrow belonged to each other (292).10 Only
after Anna sexually consummates their relationship does she
come to feel that they were bound together as two trees with
interwoven roots (328). Their new relationship subsumes Annas
sense of duty to Effie and, by implication, to Owen as well. Anna
states that she was his [Darrows] now, for life: there could never
be any question of sacrificing herself to Effies welfare, or to any
abstract sense of duty (315). Anna recognizes then that Darrow
gains new rights when she acknowledges that the sexual contact
confers privileges that however deferentially and tenderly he
claimed them . . . marked a difference and proclaimed a right
(324). With this comes the recognition that his right derives its
content from her loss.
10
Anna in part justifies her decision by universalizing Darrows behavior as she imagines
that her first husband might have had affairs as well: she wanted to think that all men
were like that because Darrow was like that; she wanted to justify her acceptance of the fact
by persuading herself that only through such concessions could women like herself hope
to keep what they would not give up (295).

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Their sexual relationship appears to provide full performance

of the unspoken terms of their original agreement, yet it is the
performance of this contract that leads Anna to question not only
the equivalence of the exchange itself but also the idea of justice
as equivalence. Some part of Anna still remains troubled because
she does not keep her word; that is, Anna reminds herself that
Sophy had kept her word, lived up to the line of conduct she had
set herself; and Anna had failed in the same attempt (315). In
measuring herself against Sophy, Anna finds herself lacking.
Anna highlights one of the fundamental justifications for the
lawits ability to provide some sense of stability by encouraging
(or sometimes forcing) people to follow through on the promises
they make. Though Anna concedes to herself that Darrow had
been right in saying that their sacrifice would benefit no one,
she seemed dimly to discern that there were obligations not to
be tested by that standard (328). This need of some standard
for evaluating obligations that do not fit the existing categories
sends Anna once again in search of Sophy Viner. Anna turns to
Sophy, who represents an external chance that provides Annas
only escape (328). Only Sophy, now absent, can provide justice
for Anna.
Through a perverse inversion of Sophys trial, Whartons
bizarre conclusion highlights once again the familiar debate about
the nature of justice. What happens when justice cannot be
served by defining and adjudicating among rights, privileges, and
duties? In contrast to the balance of Givr and Madame de
Chantelles elegant figure to give the scale, a different space
entirely awaits Anna when she follows a winding passage to Sophys
sisters apartment. Unlike Givr, this space is characterized by its
unbalanced dcor, for example, a sofa in one corner and a grand
piano in the other (330). As several critics point out, Anna also
cannot identify the people in the room; the parties in this court
defy categorization, and Annas experience has left her completely unprepared for such an environment. Anna then enters
Lauras very pink bedchamber, a color scheme that has provoked
much commentary. For instance, Rebecca Blevins Faery notes that
pink has been, throughout the novel, the sign of illicit sexuality
(95 n4). However, the bedchamber is also strangely reminiscent
of Madame de Chantelles sitting-room which is described, in arguably more subtle terms, as decorated with purple satin upholstery

Rights and Justice in Whartons The Reef

259

and a rose-wood fire screen (178), and even Madame de Chantelle

herself has a slight pinkness of the eye-lids (180) which reinforces some connection between the characters. However, while
Madame de Chantelles summons are always answered, Laura
calls for Jimmy Brance, another associate of Mrs. Murretts and a
link to Sophys past, and receives no response from the person
summoned (334). In this perverse scene of justice turned upside
down, then, summonses are ignored, and all is stagecraft and
empty gestures. Anna can find no standards, absolute or otherwise, to guide her behavior so that she simply fades out with an
inaudible farewell and a murmured word of thanks (334). The
lack of a straightforward endingof closuresuggests the tension inherent in a conception of justice that depends primarily
on the language of rights to adjudicate claims.11 As The Reef suggests, some relationships, with their complex rights and duties,
escape this structure and point us to what Dimock calls the very
domain of the incommensurate (10). As Dimock explains, literary
justice is a point of commensurability rationally arrived at, but it is
simultaneously registered as a loss, a strain, a necessary abstraction
that necessarily does violence to what it abstracts (9). In elucidating competing rights predicated on a complex array of promises,
Wharton reveals precisely how this language of commensurability
and absolutes-ness facilitates the erasure of the very self it seeks to
call into being and to protect at all costs.
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