(Motion to Quash)

(CAPTION)
MOTION TO QUASH
COME NOW defendants, by counsel and unto this Honorable Court, most
respectfully move to quash the information filed against the defendants on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
ARGUMENTS
Defendants are indicted for committing the crime of "Unjust Vexation" that is
punished under the Article 287, Paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code; Said
provision states that:
"Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto menor
or a fine ranging from 5 pesos to 200 pesos, or both."(emphasis ours)

Defendants, however, most respectfully submit that this Honorable Court

lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense for the reason that
article 287, paragraph 2 of the revised penal code that punishes "unjust
vexations" cannot be a basis of any criminal prosecution for being NULL AND
VOID AND patently unconstitutional on its face because of the FOLLOWING
reasons:
a)Said penal provision condemns no specific or definite act or omission thus
failing to define any crime or felony;

b)Said penal provision is so indefinite, vague and overbroad as not to enable

it to be known what ACT is forbidden;
c)Such vagueness and overbreadth result to violation of the due process
clause and the right to be informed of the nature of the offense charged;
d) such vagueness and overbreadth likewise amount to an invalid delegation
by Congress of legislative power to the courts to determine what acts should
be held to be criminal and punishable.
e) a criminal or penal legislation must clearly define or specify the particular
act or acts punished
It is a well-established doctrine that a criminal or penal legislation must
clearly define or specify the particular acts or omissions punished. As early
as 1916, in the case of "United States vs. Luling, 34 Phil. 725, our Honorable
Supreme Court had the occasion to hold that:
"In some of the States, as well as in England, there exist what are known as
common law offenses. In the Philippine Islands no act is a crime unless it is
made so by statute. The state having the right to declare what acts are
criminal, within certain well defined limitations, has a right to specify what
act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what act or acts shall
constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima facie
evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant the burden of showing
that such act or acts are innocent and are not committed with any criminal
intent or intention."(emphasis and underscoring ours, cited in the fairly
recent case of Dizon-Pamintuan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
111426, July 11, 1994) (emphasis and underscoring ours).

Two years later, this was followed by a scholarly exposition by Justice

Johnson in the case of In re: R. MCCULLOCH DICK, 38 Phil. 41, April 16,
1918, where he stated that:
"x x x In the Philippine Islands no act is a crime unless it is made so by law.
The law must specify the particular act or acts constituting the crime. If that
were not so, the inhabitants could not know when they would be liable to be
arrested, tried and punished. Otherwise the mandatory provisions of the law,
that all criminal laws shall be prescribed, would prove to be a pitfall and a
snare. The inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, whether citizens, denizens
or friendly aliens, have a right to know, in advance of arrest, trial and
punishment, the particular acts for which they may be so tried. They cannot
be arrested and tried, and then be informed for the first time that their acts
have been subsequently made a crime, and be punished therefor. x x
x"(emphasis and underscoring ours).
Justice (later Chief Justice) Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of
PEOPLE v. CABURAL, G.R. No. L-34105, February 4, 1983, also made a
similar observation, stating that:
"The maxim Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege has its roots in history. It is
in accordance with both centuries of civil law and common law tradition.
Moreover, it is an indispensable corollary to a regime of liberty enshrined in
our Constitution. It is of the essence then that while anti-social acts should
be penalized, there must be a clear definition of the punishable offense as
well as the penalty that may be imposed - a penalty, to repeat, that can be
fixed by the legislative body, and the legislative body alone. So
constitutionalism mandates, with its stress on jurisdictio rather than
guvernaculum. The judiciary as the dispenser of justice through law must be
aware of the limitation on its own power." (emphasis and underscoring ours).

The rationale of said doctrine that a criminal or penal legislation must clearly
define or specify the particular act or acts punished is ably explained by the
United Stated Supreme Court in the case of LANZETTA v. STATE OF NEW
JERSEY, 306 U.S. 451, where it held that:
"x x x It is the statute, not the accusation under it, that prescribes the rule
to govern conduct and warns against transgression. x x x No one may be
required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of
penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State
commands or forbids. x x x" (emphasis and underscoring ours).
Article 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code condemns no SPECIFIC act or
omission!Therefore, it does not define any crime or felony.
Paragraph 2 of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code does not define, much
less specify, the acts constituting or deemed included in the term "unjust
vexations" resulting to making the said provision a sort of a "catch-all"
provision patently offensive to the due process clause;
The right to define and punish crimes is an attribute of sovereignty. Each
State has the authority, under its police power, to define and punish crimes
and to lay down the rules of criminal procedure. Pursuant to this power to
define and punish crimes, the State may not punish an act as a crime unless
it is first defined in a criminal statute so that the people will be forewarned
as to what act is punishable or not. The people cannot be left guessing at
the meaning of criminal statutes;
Moreover, Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code defines felonies (delitos) as
"acts or omissions" punishable by law. Article 287, Par. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code condemns no specific act or omission! Therefore, it does not
define any crime or felony!

Philippine Jurisprudence is replete with examples that would readily show

that Art. 287, Par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code has not been used to
prosecute a well-defined or specific criminal act.Instead, it was used as a
"catch-all" provision to prosecute acts which are not expressly made criminal
by any other provision of the Revised Penal Code. This is anathema to
criminal due process that requires notice of what specific act or omission is
punished by law;
An examination of the annals of our jurisprudence would likewise show that
Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code has not been used to punish a
specific act:
a)In People v. Reyes, 60 Phil. 369, August 23, 1934, accused were found
guilty of unjust vexation by their act of disturbing or interrupting a ceremony
of a religious character;
b)In Lino v. Fugoso, 77 Phil. 983, January 30, 1947, it was used to prosecute
the accused of unjust vexation committed by stopping the jeep driven by the
complainant in a threatening attitude and without any just cause therefor
and telling him to stop driving for the City of Manila while the strike of city
laborers was still going on;
c)In People v. Reyes, 98 Phil. 646, March 23, 1956, it was held that the act
of seizing, taking and holding possession of passenger jeep belonging to
complainant, without the knowledge and consent of the latter, for the
purpose of answering for the debt of the said owner, constitutes unjust
vexation;
d)In People v. Yanga, 100 Phil. 385, November 28, 1956, accused was
convicted of unjust vexation for the act of compelling the complainant to do

something against his will, by holding the latter around the neck and
dragging him from the latter's residence to the police outpost;
e)In People v. Abuy, G.R. No. L-17616, May 30, 1962, the accused was
prosecuted for unjust vexation for the act of embracing and taking hold of
the wrist of the complainant;
f)In People v. Carreon, G.R. No. L-17920, May 30, 1962, accused was
convicted of unjust vexation by the act of threatening the complainant by
holding and pushing his shoulder and uttering to the latter in a threatening
tone the following words: "What inspection did you make to my sister in the
mountain when you are not connected with the Bureau of Education?"
g)In People v. Gilo, G.R. No. L-18202, April 30, 1964, the Court held that the
absence of an allegation of "lewd design" in a complaint for acts of
lasciviousness converts the act into unjust vexation;
h)In Andal v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-29814, March 28, 1969,
accused were found guilty of unjust vexation under an information charging
them with the offense of offending religious feelings, by the performance of
acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful;
i)In People v. Maravilla, G.R. No. L-47646, September 19, 1988, a accused
was convicted of unjust vexation for the act of grabbing the left breast of the
complainant against her will; and
j) Recently in Kwan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113006, November 23,
2000, the act of abruptly cutting off the electric, water pipe and telephone
lines of a business establishment causing interruption of its business
operations during peak hours was held as unjust vexation;

From the above-cited cases, it clearly appears that Art. 287, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code does not punish a specific act.Instead, any and all kind
of acts that are not specifically covered by any other provision of the Revised
Penal Code and which may cause annoyance, irritation, vexation, torment,
distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed may
be punished as unjust vexation; art. 287, par. 2 of the revised penal code
suffers from A CONGENITAL DEFECT OF vagueness and must be stricken
down.
The term "unjust vexation" is a highly imprecise and relative term that has
no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or
administrative precedents; Thus, for its vagueness and overbreadth, said
provision violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize;
This kind of challenge to the constitutionality of a penal statute on ground of
vagueness and overbreadth is not entirely novel in our jurisdiction. In an en
banc decision in the case of GONZALES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-27833, April
18, 1969, re: Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 4880, our Honorable
Supreme Court had the occasion to rule that the terms "election campaign"
and "partisan political activity" which are punished in said R.A. 4880 would
have been void for their vagueness were it not for the express enumeration
of the acts deemed included in the said terms. The Supreme Court held:
"The limitation on the period of "election campaign"or "partisan political
activity" calls for a more intensive scrutiny. According to Republic Act No.
4880: "It is unlawful for any person whether or not a voter or candidate, or
for any group or association of persons, whether or not a political party or
political committee, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political
activity except during the period of one hundred twenty days immediately

preceding an election involving a public office voted for at large and ninety
days immediately preceding an election for any other elective public office.
The term 'candidate' refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective
public office regardless of whether or not said person has already filed his
certificate of candidacy or has been nominated by any political party as its
candidate. The term 'election campaign' of 'partisan political activity' refers
to acts designed to have a candidate elected or not or promote the
candidacy of a person or persons to a public office . . ."
"If that is all there is to that provision, it suffers from the fatal constitutional
infirmity of vagueness and may be stricken down. x x x x x x x x x x x x.
"There are still constitutional questions of a serious character then to be
faced. The practices which the act identifies with "election campaign"
or"partisan political activity" must be such that they are free from the taint
of being violative of free speech, free press, freedom of assembly, and
freedom of association. What removes the sting from constitutional objection
of vagueness is the enumeration of the acts deemed included in the terms
"election campaign" or "partisan political activity." (emphasis and
underscoring ours).
Article 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code punishes "unjust vexations" and
that is all there is to it! As such, applying the incontestable logic of the
Supreme Court in said case of GONZALES v. COMELEC would lead us to the
inescapable conclusion that said penal provision suffers from the fatal
constitutional infirmity of vagueness and must be stricken down;
In the case of Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, cited by
our own Supreme Court en banc in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Assn., Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. L-24693, July
31, 1967), the United States Supreme Court ruled:

"That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be

sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on
their part will render them liable to its penalties is a well-recognized
requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the
settled rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the
first essential of due process of law." (emphasis and underscoring ours).
In fact, it is worst in the case of the 2nd Paragraph of Article 287 of the
Revised Penal Code because it punishes "unjust vexations" without even
defining or enumerating the acts constituting the said crime thus leaving
men of common intelligence necessarily guessing at its meaning and
differing as to its application in complete disregard of constitutional due
process;
Our Supreme Court in the case of U.S. v. NAG TANG HO, 43 Phil. 1, held that
one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law that fails to set up an
ascertainable standard of guilt. Said ruling cites the landmark case of U.S. v.
L. COHEN GROCERY CO., 255 U.S. 81, where the United States Supreme
Court in striking down Section 4 of the Federal Food Control Act of August
10, 1917, as amended, as unconstitutional, stated that:
"The sole remaining inquiry, therefore, is the certainty or uncertainty of the
text in question, that is, whether the words 'that it is hereby made unlawful
for any person willfully ... to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge
in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries,' constituted a fixing by
Congress of an ascertainable standard of guilt and are adequate to inform
persons accused of violation thereof of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them. That they are not, we are of opinion, so clearly

results from their mere statement as to render elaboration on the subject

wholly unnecessary. Observe that the section forbids no specific or definite
act. It confines the subject matter of the investigation which it authorizes to
no element essentially inhering in the transaction as to which it provides. It
leaves open, therefore, the widest conceivable inquiry, the scope of which no
one can foresee and the result of which no one can foreshadow or
adequately guard against. In fact, we see no reason to doubt the soundness
of the observation of the court below in its opinion to the effect that, to
attempt to enforce the section would be the exact equivalent of an effort to
carry out a statute which in terms merely penalized and punished all acts
detrimental to the public interest when unjust and unreasonable in the
estimation of the court x x x (emphasis and underscoring ours).
Recently, in COATES v. CITY OF CINCINNATI, 402 U.S. 611, the United
States Supreme Court passed upon the issue of constitutionality of a
Cincinnati, Ohio, ordinance that provides that:
It shall be unlawful for three or more persons to assemble, except at a public
meeting of citizens, on any of the sidewalks, street corners, vacant lots, or
mouths of alleys, and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to
persons passing by, or occupants of adjacent buildings. Whoever violates
any of the provisions of this section shall be fined not exceeding fifty dollars
($50.00), or be imprisoned not less than one (1) nor more than thirty (30)
days or both. Section 901-L6, Code of Ordinances of the City of Cincinnati.
(emphasis and underscoring ours).
In hammering down the constitutionality of the above-cited Cincinnati, Ohio
ordinance in its landmark decision, the United States Supreme Court held
that:

Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus, the
ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his
conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather
in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all. As a result, men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. Connally v.
General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391.
It is said that the ordinance is broad enough to encompass many types of
conduct clearly within the city's constitutional power to prohibit. And so,
indeed, it is. The city is free to prevent people from blocking sidewalks,
obstructing traffic, littering streets, committing assaults, or engaging in
countless other forms of antisocial conduct. It can do so through the
enactment and enforcement of ordinances directed with reasonable
specificity toward the conduct to be prohibited. It cannot constitutionally do
so through the enactment and enforcement of an ordinance whose violation
may entirely depend upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed.(emphasis
and underscoring ours).
Same things can be said of Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code that
punishes unjust vexations. As previously shown, the term"unjust vexations"
is broad enough to encompass many types of acts or conduct. But while
these acts of types of conduct are within the State's police power to prohibit
and punish, it cannot however constitutionally do so when its violation may
entirely depend upon whether or not another is vexed or annoyed by said
act or conduct and whether or not said act or conduct is unjust is the
estimation of the court;
ARTICLE 287, PAR. 2 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IS AN INVALID
DELEGATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER to DEFINE what acts should be
held to be criminal and punishable.

The failure of Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code to define or specify
the act or omission that it punishes likewise amounts to an invalid delegation
by Congress of legislative power to the courts to determine what acts should
be held to be criminal and punishable. Potestas delegata non delegare
potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based
on the ethical principle that such as delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality
of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another
(United States v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327, 330);
Congress alone has power to define crimes. This power as an attribute of
sovereignty may not be delegated to the courts. When a criminal legislation
leaves the halls of Congress, it must be complete in itself in that it must
clearly define and specify the acts or omissions deemed punishable; and
when it reaches the courts, there must be nothing left for the latter to do,
except to determine whether person or persons indicted are guilty of
committing the said acts or omissions defined and made punishable by
Congress. Otherwise, borrowing the immortal words of Justice Isagani Cruz
in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court (148 SCRA 659), the law becomes a
"roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers;
Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code fails to set an immutable and
ascertainable standard of guilt, but leaves such standard to the variant and
changing views and notions of different judges or courts which are called
upon to enforce it. Instead of defining the specific acts or omissions
punished, it leaves to the courts the power to determine what acts or types
of conduct constitute "unjust vexation". Moreover, liability under the said
provision is also made dependent upon the varying degrees of sensibility and

emotions of people. It depends upon whether or not another is vexed or

annoyed by said act or conduct. As previously intimated, one cannot be
convicted of a violation of a law that fails to set up an immutable and an
ascertainable standard of guilt.
Conclusion
In view of all the foregoing, Defendants submit that Art. 287, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code that punishes "unjust vexations" is unconstitutional on
its face for its fatal failure to forbid a specific or definite act or conduct
resulting to its congenital vagueness and overbreadth which are anathema
to constitutional due process and the right to be informed of the nature of
the offense charged;
Moreover, by leaving it to the judiciary to determine the "justness" or
"unjustness" of an act or conduct that is not clearly defined or specified by
law constitutes a fixing by Congress of an unascertainable standard of guilt
and therefore an invalid delegation, if not an abdication, of legislative power;
Therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, being facially unconstitutional, cannot be a basis of any criminal
prosecution. As such, there is no offense to speak of and consequently, this
Honorable Court cannot acquire any jurisdiction whatsoever to try the
defendants of the charge of "unjust vexation".
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed that
the information be quashed, and defendants discharged.
Other relief just and equitable are likewise prayed for.

_____________, Philippines, __Date__.

(COUNSEL)
(NOTICE OF HEARING)
(EXPLANATION)
COPY FURNISHED:
OPPOSING COUNSEL

Republic of the Philippines

National Capital Judicial Region
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Branch 1, Manila
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,
-versus-

Crim Case No.

_____
For
___________________
______________________,
Accused.
x------------------x

MOTION TO QUASH
Accused, by his undersigned attorney, respectfully moves to quash the information filed
against him on the ground that:

(state one or more grounds provided for in Rule 117, Rules of Court)
ARGUMENTS
(state the reasons in support of the ground/s mentioned)

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the information filed against the accused be
dismissed.
Other just and equitable reliefs are also prayed for.
Manila, 29 November 2013

Atty. Y
Counsel for Accused

(With Notice of Hearing, Proof of Service and Explanation)