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Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal

for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences
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Concluding Remarks
a

Mark Solms Ph.D. & Edward Nersessian M.D.

a

Academic Department of Neurosurgery, Royal London Hospital, London El IBB, England,

e-mail:
b

72 East 91st Street, New York, NY 10128, e-mail:

Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Mark Solms Ph.D. & Edward Nersessian M.D. (1999) Concluding Remarks, Neuropsychoanalysis: An
Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 1:1, 91-96, DOI: 10.1080/15294145.1999.10773249
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91

Concluding Remarks

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Mark Solms (London) and

Edward Nersessian (New York)

When embarking on a journey into unchartered territory, curiosity tinged with apprehension is to be expected. This first endeavor to bring neuroscientists and
psychoanalysts into closer dialogue has evoked mixed
feelings. Clearly psychoanalysts are as much in the
dark and affected by misconceptions about neuroscience as are neuroscientists about psychoanalysis, and
the lack of reciprocal knowledge is inevitably complicated by an unshared vocabulary. Under the circumstances, therefore, it is most encouraging to see that
the initial phase of what is hoped will become an ever
increasing and deepening dialogue is already so rich
and fertile. In this regard, Damasio's warning against
premature closure is very pertinent. Much remains
tentative in both fields, and much more remains to be
learned at the interface between them. Unprejudiced
and open-ended research, sharing of data, discussion,
and debate, seem the only viable paths to take forward.
Psychoanalysis and neuroscience provide two
different perspectives (subjective and objective, respectively) on the functions of the mental apparatus.
Although we may be studying the same underlying
entity, these two complementary observational perspectives are irreducible to one another. This is abundantly illustrated by the problem of affect, where, even
at the basic level of taxonomic classification, the' 'natural kinds" of subjective feelings and their associated
neurochemical circuitry can only be clearly discerned
when viewed together, with each casting light on the
other.
Panksepp has eloquently argued for consilience
between these different perspectives within the new
Mark Solms, Ph.D., is Hon. Lecturer, Academic Department of Neurosurgery, St. Bartholomew's and Royal London School of Medicine; and
Associate Member of the British Psycho-Analytical Society.
Edward Nersessian, M.D., is Training and Supervising Psychoanalyst,
New York Psychoanalytic Institute; and Clinical Associate Professor, Cornell University Medical College.

field that he calls affective neuroscience. In our view

this requires, as a first step, an effort to reconcile the
theoretical yields of the different approaches-to correlate the different functional "maps" that each perspective has produced. In the process of attempting
this correlation, it will of course be found that the
elements of the one map do not correspond isomorphically with those of the other. That should come as no
surprise. It is precisely the lack of correspondence that
acts as a mutual corrective of viewpoint-dependent errors, and thereby helps us to gradually draft a more
accurate, unified map. Once the disparities between
the theoretical models are exposed, the only way to
reconcile them is to return once more to the observational data, both psychoanalytic and neuroscientific,
with these new questions in mind, in order to see
where we might previously have been led astray.
Nothing else can determine whether and to what extent a century of psychoanalytic inquiry into emotional
life might contribute to the scientific elucidation of
"the emotional brain." Likewise, nothing else can determine whether and to what extent the mass of knowledge currently emanating from neuroscience might
contribute to psychoanalytic understanding of affect.
Naturally, one of the tempting goals of this type
of interdisciplinary endeavor is to test aspects of psychoanalytic metapsychology against the newly emerging neuroscientific findings. However, it is important
to emphasize that psychoanalytic theories cannot be
tested against neuroscientific data (or vice versa) unless we have validly and definitively identified the neural correlates of the psychological component
functions in question. A psychological model only becomes accessible to physical methods of investigation
once the neural correlates of the components of the
model have been identified. To do otherwise is to risk
testing apples by measuring pears. But as the neural
correlates are incrementally determined, a host of

92
powerful new research tools for testing and refining
the original model become available. To this end, then,
it seems appropriate to round off this preliminary interchange with some provisional conclusions in respect of the goal that we set for ourselves at the
outset-which was to begin to clarify the neural correlates of the basic ideas and most general concepts of
psychoanalysis.

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I
Freud's conceptualization of affect as an internally
directed perceptual modality is relatively easy to reconcile with current neuroscientific views. Although
LeDoux questions this conceptualization at one point
in his commentary, his reservations evidently apply
equally to all perceptual modalities. Accordingly, he
states that "the conscious experience of being in danger (the feeling of being afraid) is mediated in the
same way as the conscious experience that an apple
is red." He states in addition that affect can be subdivided into a number of distinct "submodalities"
(SEEKING, RAGE, FEAR, PANIC, etc.) which, incidentally, applies equally to some exteroceptive modalities. I LeDoux's conclusion in this respect, then, is
simply that the multiple overlapping networks underlying all the perceptual modalities (including affect)
are ultimately represented in the "global workspace"
of working memory. This conclusion, in itself, will
not attract much controversy.
However, there is sharp disagreement between
LeDoux and Panksepp over the question as to whether
each of the subcortical systems serving the various
affective submodalities is imbued with a primary consciousness of its own. In Panksepp's view, all of these
systems discharge into a core brain-stem system, and
this generates the different varieties of primary affective consciousness; working memory merely
blends, modifies, complexifies, and (perhaps above all)
inhibits these background states, which are fundamentally generated elsewhere. 2 In LeDoux's view, on the
other hand, the entire subcortical process is fundamentally unconscious. Using the FEAR system as an example, he argues that:
1 Similar considerations apply to Damasio's remarks about affect being not only a perceptual modality but also an "action" modality. As
Panksepp mentions at one point, all perceptual systems presumably
evolved for purposes of modulating motor output. Indeed, this might be a
useful way of conceptualizing the causal efficacy of emotions.
2 A similar proposal regarding multiple levels of consciousness arose,
from a different point of view, in Shevrin's interesting commentary.

Solms-Nersessian
When working memory becomes occupied with the
fact that the amygdala is active (either by way of
direct connections from the amygdala to cortical areas, by way of connections from the amygdala to
brain stem areas that then flood the cortex with nonspecific neurochemical messages, or by way of connections from the amygdala to areas controlling
peripheral responses that then feedback to the brain),
then we have some of the ingredients that turn an
experience into a fearful experience ... the various
networks that the amygdala activates ultimately provide working memory with inputs that are labeled
as fear.

LeDoux goes on to point out that' 'this is all compatible with the Freudian notion that conscious emotion
is the awareness of something that is basically unconscious."
The anatomical distribution, and chemical coding
of the subcortical' 'command systems," together with
their generalized efferent connections, as set out in
detail by our neuroscientific correspondents, therefore
go some way toward clarifying the anatomical correlates of the unconscious mechanisms that generate affect. This speaks directly to a question that Freud
posed in one of his last discussions of this problem:
"it is hard to say, to be sure, by what means and
with the help of what sensory terminal organs these
perceptions [affective feelings] come about" (Freud,
1940, p. 198). However, in our attempt to delineate
in broad outline the anatomical correlates of Freud's
functional topographic concepts, we are still left with
a question as to whether the perceptual system which
registers primary affective consciousness is to be located in deep subcortical structures (principally in the
region of the PAG) or in neocortical forebrain structures (principally the prefrontal lobes). LeDoux accepts that core brainstem structures play a crucial
quantitative role in sustaining every form of consciousness (see quotations above and below), but he
attributes the generation of conscious quality itself to
working memory alone. A different solution-which
Panksepp seems to accept-is suggested by Damasio's
distinction between animals having feelings (generated subcortically) and knowing that they have feelings (which requires additional forebrain processing).
The distinction between subcortical and cortical
consciousness-generating systems leads Panksepp to
make the further proposal that consciousness should
be divided into two broad types-"cognitive" and
"affective" (or "somatic" and "visceral")-which
are generated by distinct dorsal/neocortical and ven-

93

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Concluding Remarks
tral/limbic systems. This comes closest to Freud's own
conclusion to the effect that consciousness is registered by two perceptual surfaces, one oriented outward
toward the external object world, and the other inward
toward the interior of the body (cf. the statement,
quoted by both Yorke and Panksepp, to the effect that
"the id, cut off from the external world, has a world
of perception of its own"). However, it should be remembered that the "inner surface" of consciousness
in Freud's model is further divisible into two subcomponents, only one of which registers primary affective
qualia (the perceptual world of the id). The other part
involves internal activation of the external surface-generating inner speech (thinking) and other
forms of mental imagery, including hallucinations (see
Solms, 1997). Only the former subcomponent would
correspond to what Panksepp calls the emotional (or
visceral) type of consciousness.
It cannot be emphasized enough that Freud's
"two perceptual surfaces" model of consciousness,
like all his topographical constructs, is a functional
model, which need not map onto anatomical structures
in a simple, isomorphic fashion (cf. Damasio's warning concerning "neophrenology"). More important
from the functional standpoint than the question of
localization, is the idea, which found general agreement from both Panksepp and LeDoux, that affect is
generated by "global state (mass-action) control systems," whereas external object perceptions (and the
cognitive processes derived from them) involve' 'relatively discrete information transfer systems." Panksepp endorsed this aspect of Freudian affect theory
explicitly, but the idea seemed to be implicit also in
LeDoux's remarks to the effect that working memory
becomes occupied with feeling states by way of connections to brainstem areas and peripheral response
loops which flood the cortex with nonspecific neurochemical messages. It was also implicit in his conclusion that "emotions feel different from nonemotions
because the former involve more brain and body systems, which adds intensity and duration to warking
memory systems" (see also footnote 4 below). These
distinctions coincide quite closely with Freud's fundamental distinction between "ideas" and "quotas of
affect," and with his inferences about the very different mechanisms underlying them. 3
3 Green rightly pointed out that in our introductory summary of
Freud's affect theory we conftated this distinction with the (closely related)
quality/quantity distinction, which, properly speaking, cannot be applied
to unconscious mental processes.

II
This leads directly to the crucial question: What are
affects perceptions of? and therefore to a consideration of Freud's claim that emotions are perceptions of
oscillations in the tension of instinctual needs (drives).
Damasio answered this question unequivocally:
, 'the answer to the question ... is that they are perceptions of body states along a number of biological dimensions, chemical as well as macrostructural. The
state of the flesh, real and as-if, as determined in part
by the very process of emotion, is the 'thing' represented in feelings." Bearing in mind Freud's (1915a)
definition of "drive" ("the psychical representative
of the stimuli originating from within the organism
and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand
made upon the mind for work by virtue of its connection with the body"), Damasio's view approximates
very closely indeed to Freud's understanding of the
essential mechanism of affect. It is therefore not surprising that Damasio considered Freud's general
model to be "consonant with the most advanced contemporary neuroscience views."
Damasio went on to explain that: "The body,
real, and as represented in the brain, is the theater for
the emotions" and that "feelings are read-outs of
body changes 'really' enacted in the body and 'really'
constructed in an 'as-if' mode in body mapping structures. The body mapping structures begin in spinal
cord but coalesce most dramatically in the brain stem
and hypothalamus before arriving in the telencephalon. ' ,
A similar view was elaborated in more detail in
Panksepp's theory of a body-mapping neurosymbolic
SELF system, and his suggestion that "the resting
level of reverberation within this system is an epicenter (homeostatic settling point) upon which the various
basic pleasures and unpleasures of life may be predicated." LeDoux did not offer a general theory of emotion, but his remarks on the neuroanatomy of the
FEAR system at least did not contradict Damasio's
and Panksepp's models in this respect. 4
Both Panksepp and Damasio emphasize that the
body-mapping homeostatic control system operates
above all through discharge mechanisms, and that it
is a "stable motor representation of the body (a basic
4 "Once the amygdala responds, it broadcasts to the cortex, to brain
stem areas that control bodily responses, and to brain stem reticular formation arousal areas that then activate the forebrain ... the sensory systems
and their representations in the thalamus and cortex provide the amygdala
with 'quality' and the amygdala, by way of triggering the brain stem,
participates in the generation of 'quantity'."

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94

action system)"; thus "feelings may ultimately reflect

the various types of action readiness that permeate the
extended neurodynamics of the SELF." Regarding this
point, Green commented that Panksepp "might be surprised to read here that this is probably the closest
assessment of what Freud meant by the cardinal role
he attributed to the drives (which, as he stated, are
always active). Drives are internalized patterns of unsuccessful attempts at motor discharge."
Notwithstanding the different emphases of the different authors, then, what all seem to agree about is that
affect is a motivational mechanism which is closely tied
to changes in the state of the body-as-represented-inthe-brain; and this view is clearly consonant with
Freud's. The putative consensus view would appear to
be that emotions are g.enerated when various quasi-instinctual, limbic, ideomotor command circuits discharge into a brain stem homeostatic control system,
which represents the current state of the body in the
form of a basic action-readiness matrix, and which in
turn influences the state of the higher corticothalamic
systems in a motivated fashion. Leaving aside the controversy as to whether affective consciousness itself is
generated near the beginning of this process, or only at
the end, all the specific empirical findings discussed by
the various authors can be systematically arranged
around this generic picture. This provides a first, rough
approximation of how the relationship between affects
and drives-as conceptualized by Freud-might be
represented in the tissues of the brain.
In this connection, the illuminating dialogue between Panksepp and Yorke on the nature of drives and
their relation to affects demonstrates most clearly how
an attempt to correlate Freud's model of affect with
contemporary neuroscientific views might contribute
directly to the advancement ofpsychoanalytic metapsychology. As Panksepp observed, the internal composition of the id remains one of the most obscure and
unresolved areas of psychoanalytic theory. Accordingly, we have good reason to grasp eagerly the opportunities that beckon in Panksepp' s remarks to the effect
that "affective neuroscience has now provided an empirically based set of neuropsychological conceptualizations by which some of the subcomponents of the id
can be more systematically discussed.... We are finally in a position to construct new and neuroscientifically substantive images of the id."
Panksepp has laid a useful groundwork for the deliberations that must now follow. He accepts that
"something like 'drive' surely exists in the brain" and
that" 'drives,' in their broader meaning, can govern all
brain and psychological activities." However, he sug-

Solms-Nersessian
gests that' 'in the crucible of neuroscience [the 'drive'
concept] may fragment into many subsidiary processes." He concludes that it should be replaced by a
more differentiated set of functional constructs, principally including, (1) his basic emotion' 'command systerns,' , which make sense of the intrinsic action
readiness that is so evident in animal and human emotions; (2) interoceptive homeostatic detectors, by means
of which the organic forces of bodily imbalances become reflected in psycho-behavioral urges; and (3)
mechanisms for widely broadcasting nonspecific consequences of these urges within the brain.
Of necessity, similar considerations would apply
to Freud's pleasure-unpleasure principle, closely
linked as it is to his conception of drive. In fact, Panksepp points out that there are many varieties of "pleasure" and "unpleasure" in the brain, each of which
is governed by its own command system and modulated by its own regulatory principle. All of these narrower constructs can be linked empirically with the
anatomy, physiology, and chemistry of various specific brain systems, which is of crucial importance in
relation to our stated goal.
Although Panksepp makes clear that he personally believes that the Freudian' 'drive" concept incorporates all of the subsidiary constructs he enumerates,
he leaves open the possibility that it correlates more
narrowly with (1) the SEEKING command system; (2)
the homeostatic detectors alone; or (3) the generalized
broadcasting systems. On close assessment, however,
as Panksepp himself acknowledges, none of these latter possibilities seems altogether tenable.
Yorke is therefore surely right to point out that
the concept of "drive" as Freud came to understand it,
is a deep, inferential construct concerning the mental
representation of the fundamental processes of organic
life, which is too far removed from direct observational data to be meaningfully linked with anything as
concrete as a specific command system or detector
mechanism (Freud, 1920). However, by the same token, one has to take very seriously Panksepp's appeal
for the parsing of such general concepts into a range of
more specific constructs which lend themselves more
readily to detailed scientific research. This would specify in neuroscientific terms the complex vicissitudes
that drive energies (in Freud's sense) undergo during
their phylogenetic and ontogenetic passage through
the differentiating structures of the mental apparatus.
A careful consideration of these issues might start
from the observation that much of the theoretical work
done by Freud's' 'drive" concept is done by the bodyrepresenting homeostatic control system in Pank-

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Concluding Remarks
sepp's (and Damasio's) model. A heuristic correlation
of these two concepts would at least reproduce the
relationships that exist in Freud's model between affect (Panksepp's "emotion command systems"),
drive (Panksepp's "virtual body"), and psychical energy in general (Panksepp's "generalized broadcasting" mechanisms). 5
We will not speculate any further on these matters here; we would rather invite our readers and contributors to take up these very difficult and extremely
important questions by submitting original theoretical
and research papers, which can be collected together
in a future issue of this journal devoted to the topic
of "drive." If we all approach these problems with
the spirit of open-mindedness, tolerance of doubt, admission of ignorance, and willingness to learn from
one another that Panksepp himself has displayed, then
we cannot but make substantial progress in this extremely important area.

III
One aspect of the present interchange about which there
seems to be no disagreement at all is the idea that affects
release innate patterns of ideomotor discharge, and that
these patterns reflect "the major evolutionary passages ... through which our ancestors progressed." Indeed, the bulk of Panksepp' s work in this field, as summarized in his breathtaking new (1998) textbook, may
readily be described as a detailed account of the precise
anatomical, physiological, and chemical processes underlying just these ideomotor discharge mechanisms.
As most of the commentators note, in this respect the
degree of overlap between Freud's model and contemporary neuroscientific perspectives is almost uncanny.
The overlap seems to extend even to the central mechanisms of affect discharge that Freud intuitively deduced
in his 1895 "Project for a Scientific Psychology"
(1950, pp. 320-21).6
In this respect, one fruitful area for future neuropsychoanalytic inquiry would be the elucidation of the
epigenetic developmental processes by which the innate discharge patterns (id predispositions) are transformed through experience into personal ego
5 Compare the "putative consensus view"
described above with
Freud's various descriptions of these relationships, as quoted in our introductory summary of his 1895 theory (1900, pp. 467-468; 1915b, p. 179n;
1950, pp. 320-321).
6 That is, the experience-dependent centripetal release of excitation
into the interior of the body through "affect innervation keys," and the
subsequent conveyance upward of fresh excitation in the form of endogenous "chemical products, of which there may be a considerable number."

95
acquisitions-processes around which individual differences (and varieties of psychopathology) coalesce.
In his commentary LeDoux barely touched on his important work on emotional learning.
Another area of research which seems particularly promising derives from Freud's intriguing suggestion (neglected by almost all the commentators) to
the effect that hysterical conversion involves a mechanism akin to that of affect generation. This suggestion
has important implications, not only for a neurological
understanding of the central mechanisms underlying
conversion disorders, but also for psychosomatic medicine as a whole.
Freud's ideas concerning the inhibition of affect
and the concept of "signal" affects also seemed to
enjoy general endorsement from all our commentators.
Damasio's and LeDoux's comments on the relation
between these functions and the physical maturation
(and life-long plasticity) of the frontal lobes, in particular, suggests some promising avenues for future
neuro-psychoanalytic research. In this connection,
Yorke's discussion of the "developmental line" for
anxiety serves as a useful reminder that valuable preliminary work in this area has been conducted by child
psychoanalysts which might now prove useful to neuroscientific investigators. Allan Schore's (1994) wideranging book, also barely mentioned in his commentary, demonstrates that the same applies to a number
of related developmental psychology paradigms.

IV
It seems appropriate to close with one or two remarks
about interdisciplinary neuro-psychoanalytic research
methodology. Notwithstanding. the shortcomings of
the psychoanalytic method, as Shevrin and Panksepp
note there are certain phenomena that can only be
accessed subjectively, and in the area of "affective
neuroscience" these include some of the more important phenomena at issue. This is the most obvious
contribution that psychoanalysis can make to contemporary neuroscience: It has elaborated sophisticated
methods for analyzing human subjective experience
in a controlled naturalistic setting. In this connection,
Panksepp made the proposal that the psychological
effects of various psychopharmacological agents
might be systematically explored by psychoanalytic
investigators. Yorke, in turn, pointed to some of the
specifically psychoanalytic difficulties that are introduced by research of this kind.

Solms-Nersessian

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96
We have found that the psychoanalytic method
can be usefully applied within a clinico-anatomical
paradigm, for understanding the subjective experiences of patients with focal brain lesions (Solms, 1995,
1998, 1999; Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 1996, 1999).
This approach has proved useful not only for clarifying
complex, hidden mechanisms that underlie some standard neuropsychiatric syndromes, but also for elucidating the anatomical and physiological correlates of
some basic metapsychological concepts. For example,
in shedding new light on the neuropsychological
mechanisms underlying anosognosia and neglect
(Solms, 1995, 1999; Kaplan-Solms and Solms, in
press), psychoanalytic investigations of patients with
right perisylvian lesions simultaneously shed light on
the neural correlates of such fundamental psychoanalytic concepts as word versus thing representation and
narcissistic cathexis versus object cathexis. 7
The neurological patients that we studied in this
way were not experimental subjects in the conventional sense. Their lesions were' 'experiments of nature," as a result of which they suffered disturbing
psychological disorders. Our psychoanalytic research
into the subjective structure of these disorders coincided, as psychoanalytic research always must, with
attempts to alleviate psychological suffering by means
of psychoanalytical therapy.
This research program primarily involved neuropsychological syndromes associated with cortical lesions. Obviously the clinico-anatomical paradigm is
less suitable for research into the densely packed and
interdigitated limbic and brainstem mechanisms that
underlie central affective functions. In this respect, as
Panksepp suggests, certain pharmacological interventions have more focused effects on the neural systems
in question. There is therefore good reason to accept
his suggestion that we use selected psychopharmaceuticals as experimental probes into the various emotional command systems that he describes. Much
could be learned by studying carefully, in a psychoanalytically informed setting, the differential emotional
effects of the various pharmacological agents. There
is no reason not to begin doing so with the large numbers of psychoanalytic patients who already receive
adjunctive pharmacotherapy for independent, clinical
reasons. A systematic descriptive investigation along
these lines would provide extremely valuable informaIncidentally, this body of research casts considerable doubt on the
equation commonly tnade (in Schore' s commentary too) between right
hemisphere functioning and the special characteristics of Freud's system
Unconscious.
7

tion of a kind that cannot be obtained by any other

method. Just as we found with our clinico-anatomical
research, such an investigation is bound simultaneously to elucidate the neurophysical correlates of some
basic psychoanalytic concepts. Few tasks are more important at this stage in the development of the interdisciplinary field to which this new journal is dedicated.

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Mark Solms, Ph.D.
Academic Department of Neurosurgery
Royal London Hospital
London E1 1BB, England
e-mail: mlsolms@mds.qmw.ac.uk
Edward Nersessian, M.D.
72 East 91st Street
New York, NY 10128
e-mail: enerss@worldnet.att.net