plant nursery

business
through sheer
hard work
flourished and
with that,
itbecame more
and more

difficult for
petitioner to
haul the plants
and gardensoil
to and from the
nursery and the
highway with
the use of

pushcarts.
In January,
1984, petitioner
was able to buy
an owner-type
jeep which he
coulduse for
transporting his

plants.
However, that
jeep could not
pass throughthe
roadpath and so
he approached
the servient
estate owners

andrequested
that they sell to
him one and
one-half (1 1/2)
meters of
theirproperty to
be added to the
existing

pathway so as
to allow
passage for
his jeepney.
The request
was turned
down by the two
widows and

furtherattempts
at negotiation
proved
futile.Petitioner
then instituted
an action before
the Regional
Trial Court

of Batangas, to
seek the
issuance of a
writ of
easement of a
right of way
overan
additional width

of at least two
(2) meters over
the De Saguns'
405-squaremeter parcel of
land. During the
trial, the
attention of the

lower courtwas
called to the
existence of
another exit to
the highway,
only eighty
(80)meters
away from the

dominant
estate, hence,
dismissing
petitioner'scomp
laint.On appeal,
the Court of
Appeals
affirmed the

decision of the
trial court
andrejected
petitioner's
claim for an
additional
easement.ISSU
E: Whether or

not petitioner is
entitled to a
widening of an
alreadyexisting
easement of
right-ofway.HELD: The
Court finds that

petitioner has
sufficiently
established his
claim foran
additional
easement of
right of way,
holding that

where a private
propertyhas no
access to a
public road, it
has the right of
easement over
adjacentservien
t estates as a

matter of
law.Article 651
of the Civil
Code provides
that "(t)he width
of the easement
of right of way
shall be that

which is
sufficient for the
needs of the
dominantestate,
and may
accordingly be
changed from
time to time."

This is taken
tomean that
under the law, it
is the needs of
the dominant
property
whichultimately
determine the

width of the
passage. And
these needs
may varyfrom
time to
time.When
petitioner
started out as a

plant nursery
operator, he
and his
familycould
easily make do
with a few
pushcarts to
tow the plants

to the
nationalhighway
. But the
business grew
and with it the
need for the use
of
modernmeans

of conveyance
or transport.
Manual hauling
of plants and
garden soil
and use of
pushcarts have
become

extremely
cumbersome
and
physicallytaxing
. To force
petitioner to
leave his
jeepney in the

highway,
exposed tothe
elements and to
the risk of theft
simply because
it could not
passthrough the
improvised

pathway, is
sheer
pigheadedness
on the part of
theservient
estate and can
only be counterproductive for

all the
peopleconcerne
d. Petitioner
should not be
denied a
passageway
wide enough
toaccommodate

his jeepney
since that is a
reasonable and
necessary
aspect of the
plant nursery
business.Inasm
uch as the

additional one
and one-half (1
1/2) meters in
the width of the
pathway will
reduce the area
of servient
estate, and the

petitioner
hasexpressed
willingness to
exchange an
equivalent
portion of his
land
tocompensate

private
respondents for
their loss,
perhaps, it
would be well
forrespondents
to take the offer
of petitioner

seriously. But
unless and until
thatoption is
considered, the
law decrees
that petitioner
must indemnify
theowners of

the servient
estate including
Mamerto
Magsino from
whoseadjoining
lot 1/2 meter
was taken to
constitute the

original path
severalyears
ago. Since the
easement to be
established in
favor of
petitioner is of
acontinuous

and permanent
nature, the
indemnity shall
consist of the
value of the
land occupied
and the amount
of the damage

caused to the
servientestate
pursuant to
Article 649 of
the Civil Code.
LAUREANA
A. CID vs.
IRENE P.

JAVIER, ET
AL.
G.R. No. L14116 ; June
30, 1960FACTS
: Respondents
own a building
with windows

overlooking the
adjacentlot,
owned by the
petitioners.
Allegedly, in
1913 or 1914,
before the
NewCivil Code

took effect, the

predecessorsin-interest of the
petitioner
wereverbally
prohibited by
the respondent
to obstruct view

and light. When

theCourt of
Appeals
adjudicated the
case, it found
out that the two
estates
arecovered by

Original
Certificates of
Title, both
issued by the
Register
of Deeds. The
court further
observed that in

both of the title,

any
annotationdoes
not appear in
respect to the
easement
supposedly
acquired

byprescription
which, counting
the twenty (20)
years from 1913
or 1914,
wouldhave
already ripened
by 1937, date of

the decrees of
registration.ISS
UE: Whether
the owners of a
building
standing on
their lot with
windowsoverloo

king the
adjacent lot,
had acquired by
prescription an
enforceable
easement of
light and view
arising from a

verbal
prohibition to
obstruct
suchview and
light, to
petitioner's
predecessor-ininterest as

owner of
theadjoining lot,
both of which
lots being
covered by
Torrens
titles.HELD:
Inasmuch as

the alleged
prohibition
having been
avowedly made
in1913 or 1914,
before the
present Civil
Code took

effect, the
applicable
legalprovision is
Article 538 of
the Spanish
Civil Code
which provides
thatnegative

easements are
acquired, from
the day on
which the owner
of thedominant
estate has, by a
formal act,
forbidden the

owner of the
servientestate
to perform any
act which would
be lawful
without the
easement. The
law requires not

any form of
prohibition, but
exacts, in a
parentheticalex
pression, for
emphasis, the
doing not only
of a specific,

particular act,
buta formal act.
The phrase
"formal act"
would require
not merely any
writing,but one
executed in due

form and/or with

solemnity. That
this is
theintendment
of the law
although not
expressed in
exact language

is thereason for
the clarification
made in Article
621 of the new
Civil Code
whichspecificall
y requires the
prohibition to be

in "an
instrument
acknowledgedb
efore a notary
public".Easeme
nts are in the
nature of an
encumbrance

on the servient
estate.
Theyconstitute
a limitation of
the dominical
right of the
owner of the
subjectedproper

ty. Hence, they

can be acquired
only by title and
by prescription,
inthe case of
positive
easement, only
as a result of

some sort
of invasion,app
arent and
continuous, of
the servient
estate. By the
same
token,negative

easements can
not be acquired
by less formal
means. Hence,
therequirement
that the
prohibition (the
equivalent of

the act of
invasion)should
be by "a formal
act", "an
instrument
acknowledged
before a
notarypublic."C

onceding
arguendo that
such an
easement has
been acquired
byprescription
which, counting
the twenty (20)

years from 1913

or 1914,
wouldhave
already ripened
by 1937, it had
been cut off or
extinguished by
theregistration

of the servient
estate under the
Torrens System
without
theeasement
being annotated
on the
corresponding

certificate of
title, pursuantto
Section 39 of
the Land
Registration
Act.
MANUEL
SORIANO vs.

OSCAR
STERNBERG
G.R. No. L15628;
November 18,
1920

FACTS: The
wall of the

house of
defendant
Oscar
Sternberg, have
fourwindows
and a gallery
(upper story),
two windows,

one door and

an openingwith
wooden lattice
(lower story),
which is 1 meter
and 36
centimeters
(1.36m.) distant

from the
dividing line
between the lot
on which said
buildingstands
and the lot of
the plaintiff. The
building of the

defendant has
stoodwith the
identical
openings before
mentioned,
since the year
1905.
Thedefendant

claims to have a
direct view over
plaintiff's lot,
and that
thewindows and
the gallery of
plaintiff's edifice
have direct

views on
defendant'slot.
In the Torrens
titles which both
parties have to
their respective
buildings,there
does not appear

any easement
of view in
plaintiff's title,
nor any rightto
easement in
defendant's. Th
e plaintiff then
filed an action

before the
court, to compel
the defendant
toclose the
windows in the
wall of his
house adjacent
to the formers

property,becaus
e the wall of
defendant's
house is less
than 2 meters
from the
divisionline. The
defendant

pleads
prescription as
his defense.
The lower
courtagreed
with the
plaintiff's
contention and

ordered the
windows of
thedefendant's
house to be
closed. Hence,
this
appeal.ISSUE:
Whether or not

a right of action
to enforce
article 582 of
the CivilCode
may be lost by
failure to
prosecute within
the prescriptive

period fixedby
the Code of
Civil
Procedure.HEL
D: The Court
held that the
plaintiff right of
action under

Article 582 of
theCivil Code
accrued in 1905
when the
windows in
defendant's
house
wereopened,

and that, in
accordance with
Chapter III of
the Code of
CivilProcedure,
his action has
prescribed.
Article 582 of

the Civil Code

provides:"No
windows or
balconies or
other similar
projections
which directly
overlookthe

adjoining
property may be
opened or built
without leaving
a distance
of not less than
2 meters
between the

wall in which
they are built
and
suchadjoining
property.It
should first be
noted that the
defendant in

this case has

never
prohibitedthe
plaintiff from
building on his,
the plaintiff's,
own land, any
wall that hemay

desire to
construct.
Further, it
should be noted
that the
offending
edificeof the
defendant was

constructed in
1905. This was
the year when
thedefendant
violated the law.
This was the
date when the
cause of

actionaccrued.
Nevertheless,
the windows
complained of
were permitted
to beopen for
thirteen years
without protest.

The plaintiff
must,
consequently,
by
reason of his
own laches, be
considered to
have waived

any right which

hemay have
had to compel
the windows to
be closed. The
argument of
plaintiff that it
was only in

1917, when he
bought the land
in question, that
thestatute of
limitations
began to run, is
not convincing,
for the general

rule is,that once

the statute
begins to run, it
never stops,
and the transfer
of thecause of
action does not
have the effect

of suspending
its
operation.HIDA
LGO
ENTERPRISES
, INC. vs.
GUILLERMO
BALANDAN,

ET AL.G.R. No.
L-3422; June
13,
1952FACTS:
Petitioner
Hidalgo
Enterprises, Inc.
was the owner

of an iceplantfactory in
the City of San
Pablo, Laguna,
in whose
premises were
installedtwo
tanks full of

water, nine feet

deep, for
cooling
purposes of its
engine.While
the factory
compound was
surrounded with

fence, the
tanksthemselve
s were not
provided with
any kind of
fence or top
covers.
Theedges of the

tanks were
barely a foot
high from the
surface of the
ground. Throug
h the wide gate
entrance, which
is continually

open, motor
vehicleshauling
ice and persons
buying said
commodity
passed, and
any one
couldeasily

enter the said

factory, as he
pleased. There
was no guard
assigned onthe
gate.At about
noon of April 16,
1948, plaintiff's

son, Mario
Balandan, a boy
barely8 years
old, while
playing with and
in company of
other boys of
his ageentered

the factory
premises
through the
gate, to take a
bath in one of
saidtanks; and
while thus
bathing, Mario

sank to the
bottom of the
tank, only tobe
fished out later,
already a
cadaver, having
been died of
"asphyxiasecon

dary to
drowning." The
Court of
Appeals, and
the Court of
First Instance of
Laguna, took
theview that the

petitioner
maintained an
attractive
nuisance (the
tanks),
andneglected to
adopt the
necessary

precautions to
avoid accidents
to
personsentering
its premises. It
applied the
doctrine of
attractive

nuisance,
stated
asfollows: One
who maintains
on his premises
dangerous
instrumentalities
orappliances of

a character
likely to attract
children in play,
and who fails
toexercise
ordinary care to
prevent children
from playing

therewith
orresorting
thereto, is liable
to a child of
tender years
who is injured
thereby,even if
the child is

technically a
trespasser in
the
premises. The
principal reason
for the doctrine
is that the
condition or

appliance
inquestion
although its
danger is
apparent to
those of age, is
so enticing
oralluring to

children of
tender years as
to induce them
to approach, get
on or