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Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal

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Analyzing First-Person Experience: The Value of

Phenomenal Reflection in Providing Signposts for
Investigating Its Neural Correlates: Commentary by
Richard Stevens (Milton Keynes, U.K.)
a

Richard Stevens
a

Psychology Department, The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA,
United Kingdom, e-mail: , Phone: 01908-654-545, Fax: 01908-654-488
Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Richard Stevens (2000) Analyzing First-Person Experience: The Value of Phenomenal Reflection
in Providing Signposts for Investigating Its Neural Correlates: Commentary by Richard Stevens (Milton Keynes,
U.K.), Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 2:1, 45-48, DOI:
10.1080/15294145.2000.10773282
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Commentary on the Unconscious Homunculus

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Analyzing First-Person Experience: The Value of Phenomenal Reflection in Providing Signposts for
Investigating Its Neural Correlates: Commentary by Richard Stevens (Milton Keynes, U.K.)

What I find particularly valuable about Crick and

Koch's paper is the rich and lucid discussion of issues
relating to our understanding of consciousness. Let me
take up three core issues the authors raise and then
conclude with brief comments on two others.

The Importance of Developing a Phenomenal

Description of Consciousness
While Crick and Koch may be correct that it would
be premature to advance a definition of consciousness,
I appreciate their realization of how crucial it is, in
the search for neural correlates of consciousness, to
try to be clear about what precisely constitutes phenomenal consciousness. Although, as they state, we
may all have a rough idea of what is meant by being
conscious, this is not enough for effective investigation of the topic. Too often the term consciousness
is used loosely to cover any cognitive functions of
sufficient complexity or personal significance.
Richard Stevens is Head of Psychology, The Open University, Milton
Keynes, England, UK.

How we move to a clearer and more effective

description of phenomenal consciousness is of course
problematic. This is an empirical (in the broad sense
of the term) though not a logical or philosophical problem. Finding rigorous ways of exploring and articulating what we are consciously aware of is at the heart
of the problem. I am reluctant here to use the term
introspection. Usually when philosophers talk about
introspecting, they refer to examples they derive from
thinking about experience in retrospect. Unfortunately, this is not an adequate basis for claims about
the nature of phenomenological experience and is
likely to be readily influenced by preconceptions. I
know this from my own experience. I had initially
assumed, for example, that there is a phenomenal distinctiveness between conscious experience and reflexive or self-consciousness. (Such a distinction I note is
also assumed by the authors of this paper.) However,
systematic phenomenal reflection convinced me that
there is no such distinction in the quality of phenomenal experience itself. It is a conceptual rather than
phenomenological distinction-to do with implicit
meanings (see below) attached to experiencing rather
than conscious experience itself.

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46

By "phenomenal reflection" I mean the endeavor to reflect on what one is experiencing at the
time or shortly after, with a focus on the actual experience and the interpolation of as little conceptual
thought as possible (for discussion of this and phenomenological methodologies in general see Stevens,
2000). This is far removed from merely "thinking
about an experience." Not only is the latter done in
retrospect, it usually does not even involve an attempt
to use memory as a basis to reconstruct systematically
the remembered experience in present awareness (e.g.,
through visualization). The danger of preconceptions
having more sway than they otherwise might is thus
greatly increased. (Incidentally, I suspect the problem
may be compounded here because the philosopher's
training and practice in conceptual clarification and
argument may actually be counterproductive in this
area by making it all the more difficult to circumvent
thought when attempting to go into "phenomenological reflection mode.")
Of course, I am only too aware of the difficulty of
establishing the validity of phenomenological accounts
and the critique applied to the work of the early introspectionists which was to pave the way for behaviorism. However, I believe that the critique was too
sweeping in its conclusion that phenomenal methodology has no place in scientific investigation. Phenomenological methodology is crucial for progress in
research on consciousness. Possibly one way forward
here (which is analogous to demonstrating empirical
findings in general) may be to articulate the sequences
of mental operations required in order to experience
a particular phenomenon. This would be akin to the
way in which Buddhist training involves learning techniques in order to engender specific mental states; perhaps somewhat analogous also to Wundt's insistence
on using observers specifically trained to reflect on
and articulate what they were consciously experiencing. Whether or not such an approach has any promise,
some effective phenomenological methods must be developed if a science of consciousness is to really get
off the ground.

Richard Stevens
thinking is primarily unconscious. Note that the term
thinking here refers not only to the processes involved
in thought but to thoughts themselves (ideas and beliefs, for example). These form no part of phenomenal
experience. At the time of my own study, I was not
aware of Jackendoffs work and I found it all the more
remar kable that, through the very different method of
phenomenal reflection, I also came (much to my own
surprise at the time) to an essentially similar counterintuitive conclusion.
In discussing other suggestions similar to those
of Jackendoff, Crick and Koch see Lashley and Freud,
as well as myself, as arriving "at the same conclusion." I think this needs comment. While Lashley's
position is not incompatible with Jackendoffs view,
as the authors acknowledge, he is making a somewhat
different point, i.e., that the computational processes
on which thought depends are not conscious. The three
quotes taken from Freud are interesting. In themselves,
they might seem to imply a similar position to Jackendoffs and my own. However, they have been selected
from a mass of writing by Freud on the nature of
conscious and unconscious thought. His particular emphasis is on the dynamic and motivational nature of
unconscious feelings. Their inaccessibility to consciousness, in his view, does not so much result from
the intrinsic limits of phenomenal consciousness as to
processes of repression. In terms of Freudian ideas,
unconscious thoughts, while they may be blocked
from awareness, are in principle accessible. Indeed
access is thought to be facilitated by the processes of
psychoanalytic therapy. This position seems to me to
be fundamentally different from that of Jackendoff and
myself. Indeed, in some respects, I believe that Freud,
by institutionalizing the notion of the unconscious in
this specific, dynamic way, may have done a disservice
to our understanding of the nature of conscious awareness (in Jackendoffs terms the "phenomenological
mind") and unconscious processing (in Jackendoffs
terms "the computational mind") and the relation between them.

The Significance of Implicit Meanings

So What Can We Say about the Nature of
Phenomenal Consciousness? Do the Accounts
Cited in the Paper Come to Similar
Conclusions?
The authors draw primarily on the work of Jackendoff
to establish the thesis that phenomenal consciousness
is constituted by sensory representations and that

As Crick and Koch point out, what my co-researcher

Jane Nolan and I discovered from our systematic phenomenological reflections was that conscious experience is essentially sensory: i.e., it is constituted by
immediate sensory images or recollected memories of
these. Such sensory representations include the sounds
or visual or auditory images of words or other symbol

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Commentary on the Unconscious Homunculus

systems. What is crucial here, of course, is that such

sensory representations signify meanings. However,
such meanings are not in themselves available to phenomenal awareness but are essentially implicit. (I prefer the word implicit here rather than unconscious for
reasons of the kind outlined in the preceding paragraph.) It is notable that, as the implicit meanings of
a sensory representation change (for example, through
continued exposure to or interaction with a particular
stimulus), so too does the phenomenal experience of
the sensory representation. For want of a better term,
it develops a different feel. Implicit feels (to use this
rather uncomfortable term) denoting different underlying meanings are familiar in our perceptual experience of course. The same plate of steak and french
fries may have very similar forms of sensory representation on two different occasions but the implicit feel
of the representation will be very different if on one
occasion the perceiver was hungry and on the other
she wasn't, or if she had become a vegetarian meantime. While the meanings underlying such shifts are
not themselves explicit in phenomenal consciousness,
they give each of the similar experiences on the two
occasions a different quality. Empirical studies in the
psychology of perception in the areas of the effects of
set, of past experience and of motivation, etc., cast
light on some of the psychological processes involved
here and would make a good base for exploring further
this phenomenon of implicit "feels."
I would like to conclude by briefly commenting
on two further issues which Crick and Koch raise in
their paper.

Why Should "Phenomenal" Consciousness

Have Evolved?
While not purporting to answer it, the authors touch
on Chalmers's "hard problem" in the course of their
discussion. In doing so, they lay the basis of an idea
which I think may help us to begin to penetrate it.
As they argue, a single, complex representation made
available for sufficient time could have evolved as a
useful basis for action planning and choices. From a
phenomenological standpoint, I think an important
point in this respect is to emphasize that there is more
to phenomenal consciousness than qualia. Phenomenal
experience does not just consist in fragmented experiences of pain, color, taste etc. These are almost always

contextualized in a integrated and multifaceted phenomenal world. An intrinsic feature of phenomenal

consciousness is that it constitutes a perspectival (i.e.,
viewed from a particular personal perspective) integrated, multimodal experiential world. For an organism capable of processing and constructing
representations from interrelated, multisensory inputs,
phenomenal consciousness may well be the most effective (if not the only) way of constructing a complex
representation of the external world.

The Idea of an Unconscious Homunculus

The idea of an unconscious homunculus that Crick
and Koch eventually come to in their paper is an intriguing one. They point to Attneave's attempt to resurrect the notion of homunculus and the value it may
have. It is notable that the history of psychology contains many useful ideas that have disappeared from
currency because they are felt to go against the grain
of prevailing dogmas. Another example of this kind is
"will." This was dropped as a meaningful topic for
psychology with the advent of behaviorism, and is
now long overdue for revival. Nevertheless, I think
that there are some conceptual problems with the idea
of an unconscious homunculus. For example, Crick
and Koch use the notion to refer to the integrative
and generative processes underlying experience and
action. But, as the authors make clear, these are likely
to be multiple processes rather than a single mechanism so one may question the value of designating
them with such a singular concept as homunculus.
It is not very clear to me how the authors link
the idea of the unconscious homunculus to the final
speculations in the paper about the possible neural
basis for qualia, nor do I feel qualified to comment on
the specific suggestions that they make there. But I
applaud the approach they adopt of trying to interrelate
findings from experimental results from neurophysiological research to ideas, such as those of Marr and
lackendoff about the nature of perception and conscious experience. The careful attempt to interrelate
phenomenological analysis, computational understanding, and neurophysiological data, as Crick and
Koch demonstrate in this paper, is surely the approach
most likely to increase understanding of the nature
and basis of consciousness.

Crick-Koch

48

Reference
Stevens, R. (2000), Phenomenal approaches to the study
of conscious awareness. In: Investigating Phenomenal
Consciousness: Methodologies and Maps, ed. M. Velmans. Advances in Consciousness Research Series. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Richard Stevens
Psychology Department
The Open University
Walton Hall
Milton Keynes MK7 6AA
United Kingdom
e-mail: R.J.Stevens@open.ac.uk
Phone: 01908-654-545
Fax: 01908-654-488

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The Unconscious Homunculus: Response to the Commentaries by Francis Crick and Christof Koch

Introduction
We are grateful to the various commentators for their
remarks, which have helped us rethink our own ideas
and have given us the opportunity to enlarge on them.
Let us first restate the general thrust of our paper. We
think that qualia are the hard problem, and that, to
begin with, the best tactic is to try to find the neural
correlate of particular kinds of qualia, and especially
the activity that correlates with the content of each
kind. To search for this in the brain it might help to
know which psychological processes are likely to be
associated, or not associated, with qUalia. For example, it seems rather unlikely that retinal neural activity,
by itself, is enough to produce any sort of qualia and
we have argued that activity in VI is also not sufficient. We suggested (following others) that while sensory neural activity could produce qualia, thoughts

could not.
In reply to the commentaries, we shall first deal
with several general points, and later consider more
particular ones. The comments by Schall and Stevens
are discussed at the end, after the Addendum, as they
were received after the Addendum was written.

What Are Qualia?

To approach the general points, let us first list some
of the psychological activities that might conceivably
have qualia associated with them. For example:
Francis Crick is the co-discoverer, with James Watson, of the double
helical structure of DNA. Since 1976, he has been at the Salk Institute for
Biological Studies in San Diego.
Christof Koch was awarded his Ph.D. in biophysics at the University
of Tiibingen in Germany (with a minor in philosophy). He joined the
California Institute of Technology in 1986, where he is a Professor of
Computation and Neural Systems.

Sensations
Percepts
Images (produced by imagination) not necessarily
visual
Thoughts
Intentions
Actions
Emotions
Mfect (in Freud's sense)
Fringe experiences
Valuations (such as novelty)
This list may well be incomplete. For example,
some might add "the self," or "meaning" as Baars
and McGovern do in their contribution. We suggested
that sensory activities produced qualia, but thoughts
do not. We opted to leave emotions and valuations to
one side, and did not discuss intentions, actions, or
the self. Whether these nonsensory activities can lead
to qualia is an open issue that we did not address. The
primary reason for our reluctance to discuss these is
the current absence of a clear experimental program
or model system to study intentions, valuations, fringe
experiences, and the like (introspection by itself being
an unreliable guide).

Marr's Ideas
Instead, we suggested that, in the visual system, we
were directly conscious of something like Marr's
2_1hD sketch. In other terminology, we thought that
what we were conscious of was view-dependent, not
view-independent. The latter included Marr's 3D
model.