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Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal

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J. Allan Hobson and Edward Pace-Schotts Response:

Commentary by Beatrice W. Smirnow (Washington,
DC)
Beatrice W. Smirnow Ph.D.

635 S. Washington Street, Alexandria, VA 22314, 703-683-5167, e-mail:

Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Beatrice W. Smirnow Ph.D. (2000) J. Allan Hobson and Edward Pace-Schotts Response: Commentary
by Beatrice W. Smirnow (Washington, DC), Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the
Neurosciences, 2:2, 216-218, DOI: 10.1080/15294145.2000.10773309
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2000.10773309

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216
record of discussions and debates, often without specific resolution (pp. 55a et seq. of the Tractate Berakhoth of the Babylonian Talmud records extensive
discussions of dream interpretation).
Second, in the ancient world, dreams were examined for their prophetic value and these discussions
were concerned with the validity of such predictions.
(In a few instances, the dreams were interpreted as a
revelation of secrets that the dreamer was concealing.)
Third, there is no statement that the dream is its own
interpretation. That is probably a variant of the observation that "All dreams follow the mouth." That
statement is reported to have been found in a dream
manual (56a) and to have been repeated by an observer who had presented the same dream to each of
24 professional dream interpreters in Jerusalem and
found that all the prophecies came true. What the
statement means, in that context, is that whatever the

Beatrice Smirnow
interpreter infers from the dream, will be fulfilled.
That really has no relevance to interpretation in the
sense of discerning from the dream the unconscious
thoughts of the dreamer.

References
Ostow, M. (1992), The interpretation of apocalyptic
dreams. Dreaming, 2:1-14.
- - - (1995), Ultimate Intimacy. The Psychodynamics of
Jewish Mysticism. Madison, CT: International Universities Press.
- - - (1998), Mood regulation: Spontaneous and pharmacologically induced. Paper presented to International
Psychoanalytic Congress, Santiago, Chile.
Mortimer Ostow, M.D.
5021 Iselin Avenue
Riverdale, NY 10471

J. Allan Hobson and Edward Pace-Schott's Response

Commentary by Beatrice W. Smirnow (Washington, DC)

In Neuro-Psychoanalysis (Vol. 1, No.2) Drs. Braun

and Hobson both question the validity of Freud's formulation of the dream's censoring function, in view
of the results of recent imaging studies demonstrating
that areas of the frontal cortex involved in secondary
process mentation were inactive during dreaming
(Braun, 1999; Hobson and Pace-Schott, 1999). Their
conclusion to the effect that the concept of censorship
(or defense) is incompatible with these data is based
on their assumption that aspects of censorship, such as
condensation, displacement, and distortion, represent
secondary processes that originate in the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex.
I found myself thinking that a clinical-developmental perspective might be useful in clarifying this
apparent discrepancy. I say apparent, because I believe their perception of a discrepancy may reside in
the fact that Freud modified his own thinking about
defensive operations based on his clinical experience.
Thus, in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Freud
describes ' 'two psychical forces ... one of these
forces constructs the wish which is expressed by the
Beatrice Smirnow is on the faculty of Washington Psychoanalytic
Institute, Washington, DC.

dream, while the other exercises a censorship upon

this dream-wish and, by the use of that censorship,
forcibly brings about a distortion in the expression
of the wish ... it seems plausible to suppose that the
privilege enjoyed by the second agency is that of permitting thoughts to enter consciousness" (p. 144).
Later, he modified this idea:
[T]he notion of forcing a way through into consciousness must be kept carefully free from any idea of a
change of locality. Again, we may speak of a preconscious thought being repressed or driven out and then
taken over by the unconscious. These images, derived
from a set of ideas relating to a struggle for a piece
of ground, may tempt us to suppose that it is literally
true that a mental grouping in one locality has been
brought to an end and replaced by a fresh one in
another locality. Let us ... say instead that some particular mental grouping has had a cathexis of energy
attached to it or withdrawn from it, so that the structure in question has come under the sway ofa particular agency or been withdrawn from it. What we are
doing here is once again to replace a topographical
way of representing things by a dynamic one [po 610;
emphasis added].

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Ongoing Discussion: Hobson and Pace-Schott

Here, Freud antIcIpates current psychoanalytic
ways of thinking about defensive operations, that is,
that any aspect of psychic functioning-including actions, affects, impulses, memories, somatic symptoms,
and thoughts-can serve a defensive purpose (Brenner, 1982). As may be evident, Freud's revision is also
consistent with the idea that different parts of the brain
may be activated (cathected) at different times during
an individual's defensive response to an internal or
external threat.
Condensation, displacement, and distortion of reality-all of which Freud associated with censorship
during dreaming-are considered fairly primitive defenses, characteristic of the immature minds of young
children. In fact, apart from fairly impaired individuals, we rarely find these modes of thinking in adults
in a waking state when frontal cortices are fully active.
(When they are evident, as Freud himself pointed out,
it is usually at moments of cognitive slippage and creativity.) Only with maturation of the frontal cortex,
do children develop capacities of self-monitoring, abstraction, and symbolic encoding, which then become
available to be used defensively. Because earlier, immature ways of thinking remain part of our developmental history, they never fully disappear. They may
reappear in times of extreme stress, when an individual adult's mechanisms of defense and adaptation are
insufficient to cope with overwhelming circumstances.
And, they reappear during the dream state when
higher-order defense mechanisms associated with the
functions of the frontal cortex are deactivated.
Dr. Solms suggests that the ventromesial frontal
cortex generates the dream as a defensive reaction
to the emergence of a wish, even as the dream itself
produces anxiety that has to be defended against
(Solms, 1999); this suggestion is not as implausible as
Dr. Braun seems to think, if we consider the above.
The idea that a mental event can serve more than one
purpose is entirely consistent with the well-established
psychoanalytic idea that mental phenomena are multiply determined (Waelder, 1930; Brenner, 1982). Analysts come across such apparent contradictions all the
time in their work with patients. I would also posit
that other parts of the brain that we know to be activated during dreaming may be involved in defense
against the wish, even as they contribute to the affect
provoked by the wish. In particular, Dr. Reiser's
(1999) elegant explication on the role of memory in
dreaming opens the way to further elaboration of these
ideas. He writes that "percepts encoding memories in
the brain are inextricably linked by circuitry in corticolimbic circuits to the affects that accompanied their

registration" (p. 203). Clinical experience has shown

that intense affects are linked invariably to defense
mechanisms, beginning with primitive mechanisms in
early childhood that make it possible for the individual
to tolerate and integrate affects that otherwise would
be overwhelming. It is a reasonable assumption that
these various mechanisms are encoded in procedural
memory along with their associated affects. In terms
of Freud's conflict model of dreaming, we might speculate that the emergence of a libidinal wish leads not
only to the stimulation of material in memory related
to the wish but also to the defense associated with
keeping anxiety at bay. I am suggesting that the memory associated with a defense in a prior situation might
contribute to the use of that defense in the course of
a dream. While the bizarre nature of dreaming may
be determined by deactivation of the frontal cortex,
as Hobson maintains, the use to which the mind puts
this property of dreams may be determined by the
need to defend against anxiety and by memory traces
of similar use of early modes of cognition. Of course,
it could be argued that the individual's experience of
employing higher-order defenses also would be stored
in procedural memory and activated during dreaming.
True, but the dreaming mind is unable to make use of
these memories to employ the more mature defenses
involved, as those parts of the brain that might make
such usage possible are inactive. However, trace memories of such usage may explain something many analysts have observed clinically about the dreams of
persons who have developed characteristic ways of
defending against anxiety. Often, these characteristic
defense mechanisms are evident in some manner in
the manifest content of their dreams.
I hope these ideas have contributed something
toward finding the "common ground" that Dr. Braun
believes, as I do, underlies the differences of opinion
that have been raised in this excellent latest issue of
the journal.

References
Braun, A. (1999), Commentary on Hobson. This Journal,
1(2): 196-201.
Brenner, C. (1982), The Mind in Conflict. New York: International Universities Press.
Freud, S. (1900), The Interpretation of Dreams. Standard
Edition, 4&5. London: Hogarth Press, 1953.
Hobson, J. A., & Pace-Schott, E. (1999), Response to commentaries. This Journal, 1(2):206-229.
Reiser, M. F. (1999), Commentary on J. Allan Hobson. This
Journal, 1(2):201-206.

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Solms, M. (1999), Commentary on Hobson. This Journal,

1(2): 183-196.
Waelder, R. (1930), The principle of multiple function: Observations on overdetermination. In: Psychoanalysis:
Observation, Theory, Application, ed. S. A. Guttman.
New York: International Universities Press, 1968.

Beatrice Smirnow
Beatrice W. Smirnow, Ph.D.
635 S. Washington Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
703-683-5167
e-mail: bwsmirnow@erols.com