CASES ON JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS

**JUDGEMENT ON PLEADINGS
SPOUSES HONTIVEROS VS. RTC OF ILOILO and SPOUSES HONTIVEROS
FACTS: Herein petitioners filed a complaint for damages against the private respondents
before the RTC of Iloilo, alleging that they were deprived of income from their land as a result
of the filing of a land registration case by the private respondents against them and that said
land case and dispossession of land was made in bad faith. In their Answer, among other
things, the private respondents allege that petitioners failed to allege that earnest efforts
towards compromise had been made, considering that one of the respondents is the
petitioners brother. Thus, an amended complaint was filed to insert such allegation. Again, in
their Answer, private respondents denied, among other things, that earnest efforts had been
made. This prompted the petitioners to move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that
the respondents Answer did not tender an issue or that it otherwise admitted the material
allegations of the complaint. Private respondents opposed said motion, alleging that they had
actually denied petitioners claim. The TC denied the motion inasmuch as the respondents
denied the claim and because of the rule that the claimant must prove the amount of damages
first, which necessarily, requires a trial first. But, at the same time, dismissed the case on the
ground that the complaint was not verified as required by Article 151 of the FC and, therefore,
it did not believe that earnest efforts had been made.
ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings and
ordering a trial on the merits and, ultimately, dismissing motu proprio the complaint.
HELD: NO. Correct in dismissing the motion!!! (But erred in dismissing the complaint!!)
THERE ARE STILL ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED EH, like the amount of damages,
etc.: Under the rules, if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer
is filed, the trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the
pleadings filed by a party. Where there are actual issues raised in the answer, such
as one involving damages, which require the presentation of evidence and
assessment thereof by the trial court, it is improper for the judge to render
judgment based on the pleadings alone.
In this case, aside from the amount of damages, the following factual issues have to
be resolved, namely, (1) private respondent Teodora Aysons participation and/or
liability, if any, to petitioners and (2) the nature, extent, and duration of private
respondents possession of the subject property. The trial court, therefore, correctly
denied petitioners motion for judgment on the pleadings.
As to the dismissal of the case WRONG!! Article 151 is not applicable because
the suit is not exclusively between family members. The inclusion of private
respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes
the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the
phrase members of the same family refers to the husband and wife, parents and

children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or
half-blood. Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the
complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros,
who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered
strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151.
**SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. AND/OR CHEMICAL BANK VS. RAFAEL MA.
GUERRERRO
FACTS: Respondent Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against herein petitioners Bank,
seeking payment of damages allegedly for illegally withheld taxes charged against interests
on his checking account with the Bank, a returned check due to signature verification
problems, and the unauthorized conversion of his account. In its Answer, the Bank alleged
that Guerrerros account is governed by the New York law, which does not permit his claim
except for actual damages. Subsequently, it filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
seeking the dismissal of his claim for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral, and
exemplary damages. In support thereto, it filed an affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a NY attorney.
The RTC denied said motion, which order of denial was sustained upon appeal to CA. The
appellate court held that the Walden Affidavit does not serve as proof of the NY law asserted.
It considered the NY law and jurisprudence as public documents defined under the Rules on
Evidence, and hence, in order to prove the same, a proof of official record must be submitted.
Also, the Walden Affidavit is not the supporting affidavit referred to in the ROC that would
prove the lack of genuine issue between the parties.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in holding that the Banks proof of facts to support it motion for
summary judgment may not be given by affidavit.
HELD: NOOOOOooooo!! There are genuine issues to be resolved!
Under the Rules, in a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the
issues raised in the pleadings genuine, sham or fictitious, as shown by affidavits,
depositions or admissions accompanying the motion? A genuine issue means an
issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from
an issue which is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue for
trial.
In this case, THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT THAT NECESSIATE
FORMAL TRIAL! There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact
are in issue or where material allegations of the pleadings are in dispute. The
resolution of whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a
question of fact as far as the trial court is concerned since foreign laws do not prove
themselves in our courts. Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any
other fact, they must be alleged and proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as
to whether New York law or Philippine law applies to Guerreros claims present a

clear dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the
merits.
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the Banks motion for partial summary
judgment as supported by the Walden affidavit does not demonstrate that
Guerreros claims are sham, fictitious or contrived. On the contrary, the Walden
affidavit shows that the facts and material allegations as pleaded by the parties are
disputed and there are substantial triable issues necessitating a formal trial.
As to the Walden Affidavit: The Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of
New York law on damages not only because it is self-serving but also because it
does not state the specific New York law on damages. The citations in the Walden
affidavit of various U.S. court decisions do not constitute proof of the official records
or decisions of the U.S. courts. While the Bank attached copies of some of the U.S.
court decisions cited in the Walden affidavit, these copies do not comply with
Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of official records or decisions of foreign courts.
**DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
RODOLFO VELASQUEZ VS. CA and PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL
BANK, INC.
FACTS: Pick-up Fresh Farms, Inc. (PUFFI), of which petitioner Velasquez was an officer and
stockholder, obtained a loan from PCIB, secured by promissory notes, chattel mortgage, and
deeds of suretyship. When PUFFI defaulted in its payment, PCIB foreclosed the chattel
mortgage. For the remaining balance, it filed an action for sum of money. Petitioner (and
Canilao) filed a joint answer denying personal liability and interposing the defense of novation.
At the pre-trial, petitioner and counsel did not appear. Thus, upon motion by PCIB, the
petitioner was declared in default and the TC granted the motion for summary judgment as
against Canilao. The TC rendered a summary judgment in favor of PCIB holding petitioner
and Canilao to solidarily pay PCIB of their remaining balance from the loan. Petitioner filed a
MR praying that the order of default be lifted and that the summary judgment be set aside.
The TC denied the same. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC judgment. Petitioner
insists that the party who moves for a summary proceeding has the burden of demonstrating
clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, and which burden was not duly satisfied in
this case.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in sustaining the summary judgment despite the existence of
genuine triable issues of facts.
HELD: NOOOOOOOOOoooo!!
While this rule is true in the summary proceedings under Rule 34 of the Revised
Rules of Court, it does not apply to summary proceedings under Rule 35. A
different rationale operates in the latter for it arises out of facts already
established or admitted during the pre-trial held beforehand, unlike in the

former where the judge merely relies on the merits of the movant's
allegations. Rule 34 pertains to a judgment on the pleadings while Rule 35 relates
to a summary judgment which was the holding in this case.
As to personal liability in the suretyship deeds: A mere perusal of the deed of
suretyship readily shows petitioners personal liability under the loan contract, hence,
proper for summary judgment. Applying the complementary contracts construed
together doctrine leaves no doubt that it was the intention of the parties that
petitioner would be personally liable in the deed of suretyship because the loan
agreement, among others, so provided.
At this point, it must be stressed that insofar as petitioner is concerned, the RTC
decision was not a summary judgment but a judgment by default as hearing was
held ex parte against him. Even so, the RTC decision is still without grave abuse of
discretion. Thus, the CA could not be in error in upholding it despite claims by
petitioner that the default order should have been set aside because he could not be
bound by the negligence of his counsel.
**
ELAND PHILIPPINES INC. VS. AZUCENA GARCIA, ET. AL.
FACTS: Herein respondents filed a complaint for quieting of title with writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioner Eland Philippines. They claimed that they are the owners of a
parcel of land in Tagaytay by occupation and possession. When they requested that the lot be
declared for tax purposes, they found out that the lot was subject of a land registration
proceeding that had already been decided by the same court, and which Decree was already
issued to petitioner. They averred that they were not notified of said land registration case and
that they were also entitled to a writ of PI in order to restrain or enjoin petitioner from
committing acts of dispossession. Eland moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
respondents stated no cause of action. The TC denied the MD and its subsequent MR.
Meanwhile, respondents filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, which motion was
granted by the TC. Eventually, respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which
motion was also granted by the TC. It rendered a summary judgment in favor of respondents,
holding them as the lawful owners. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the judgment. Thus, the
present petition to the SC. Eland insists that the CA erred when it ruled that the respondents
motion for Summary Judgment did not violate the 10-day notice rule under Rule 35,
considering that it received a copy of their motion on the very same day that the motion was
set for hearing, and that no requisite hearing was conducted by the TC. Further, petitioner also
argued that a summary judgment is not available to cases of quieting of title
ISSUE: WON (a) respondents motion for summary judgment violated the 10-day notice rule
and (b) that summary judgment is inapplicable to cases of quieting title and (c) the grant of
summary judgment is improper.
HELD:

 (A) As to the 10-day notice rule: COMPLIED!!!! The CA was correct in its
observation that there was substantial compliance with due process. The CA ruled,
as the records show, that the ten-day notice rule was substantially complied with
because when the respondents filed the motion for summary judgment on August 9,
1999, they furnished petitioner with a copy thereof on the same day as shown in the
registry receipt and that the motion was set for hearing on August 20, 1999, or 10
days from the date of the filing thereof.
Due process, a constitutional precept, does not, therefore, always and in all
situations a trial-type proceeding. The essence of due process is found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit one's evidence in support of his
defense. What the law prohibits is not merely the absence of previous notice, but
the absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard
(B) As to the inapplicability of summary judgment to cases of quieting title:
APPLICABLE!!!!! This Court has already ruled that any action can be the subject of
a summary judgment with the sole exception of actions for annulment of marriage or
declaration of its nullity or for legal separation.
(C) As to propriety of the summary judgment: THE GRANT OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT WAS NOT PROPER!!!! A summary judgment is permitted only if
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings
on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions
presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine. It must be
remembered that the non-existence of a genuine issue is the determining factor
in granting a motion for summary judgment, and the movant has the burden of
proving such nonexistence.
In this case THERE IS GENUINE ISSUE!! the respondents failed to clearly
demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of fact. They merely reiterated their
averments in the complaint for quieting of title and opposed some issues raised by
the petitioner in its Answer Ad Cautelam. On the other hand, the facts pleaded by
the respondents in their motion for summary judgment have been duly disputed and
contested by petitioner, raising genuine issues that must be resolved only after a
full-blown trial. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial. In the present
case, the petitioner was able to point out the genuine issues. A genuine issue is an
issue of fact that requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a
sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.