Heirs of Labanon v.

Heirs of Labanon | GR 160711 | August

14,2004 | J. Velasco, Jr.FACTS
: Constancio Labanon settled upon a piece of alienable anddisposable
public agricultural land situated in Kidapawan, Cotabato.
Hecultivated the said lot and introduced permanent improvements.Const
ancio asked his brother, Maximo, who was better educated to filea public land
application under the express agreement that they willdivide the said lot as
soon as it would be feasible for them to do so.During the time of the
application it was Constancio who continued tocultivate the said lot. The
Homestead Application was approved and an
Original Certificate of Title over said lot was issued in favor of
MaximoLabanon. Maximo Labanon executed a document denominated as
Assignmentof Rights and Ownership to safeguard the ownership and interest
of his brother Constancio Labanon. Later on, Maximo executed a sworn
statement reiterating his desire that his elder brother Constancio, hisheirs and
assigns shall own the eastern portion of the Lot.. After the death of Constancio, his heirs
executed an [e]xtra-judicial settlement of estate with simultaneous sale over the
aforesaid easternportion of the lot in favor of Alberto Makilang, the husband of
Visitacion Labanon, one of the children of Constancio. Subsequently, the parcel
of land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Alberto. The defendants
heirs of Maximo caused to be cancelled from the records
of t h e d e f e n d a n t P r o v i n c i a l A s s e s s o r o f C o t a b a t o t h e a f o r e s a i d t
a x declaration and the latter, without first verifying the legality of
thebasis for said cancellation, cancelled the same. The heirs of Constancio
demanded the owners copy of the certificate of title covering the
aforesaid Lot to be surrendered to the Register of Deeds.
ISSUES
:1. W/N the OCT issued the name of MAXIMO LABANON benow considered
indefeasible and conclusive; and 2. W/N the Trust Agreement allegedly made
by ConstancioLabanon and Maximo Labanon prescribed

HELD:
1.No. Section 32 of PD 1529 does not totally deprive a party of any
remedy to recover the property fraudulently registered in the name of another. It
merely precludes the reopening of the registration proceedings for titles covered
by the Torrens System, but does not foreclose other remedies for the
reconveyance of the property to itsrightful owner. While it is true that Section 32
of PD 1529 provides that the decree of registration
becomes incontrovertible after a year, it does not altogether deprive an
aggrieved party of a remedy in law. The acceptability of the Torrens System
would be impaired, if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real owners. The
actionfor Recovery of Ownership before the RTC is indeed the
appropriateremedy.2.No. Maximo Labanon maintained the title over the
property while acknowledging the true ownership of Constancio Labanon over
the eastern portion of the land. The existence of an express trust cannot
be doubted nor disputed. In the case at bar, Maximo never repudiated the express
trust instituted between him and Constancio .And after Maximos death, the trust could
no longer be renounced; thus, respondents right to enforce
the trust agreement can
nolonger be restricted nor prejudiced by prescription. In addition,p e t i t i
o n e r s c a n n o l o n g e r q u e s t i o n t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e p o s i t i v e declarati
on of Maximo Labanon in the
Assignment of Rights andO w n e r s h i p i n f a v o r o f t h e l a t e C o n s t
a n c i o L a b a n o n , a s t h e agreement was not impugned during the formers
lifetime and there cognition of his brothers rights over the eastern portion of the
lotw a s f u r t h e r a f f i r m e d a n d c o n f i r m e d i n t h e s u b s e q u e n t S w o r n St
atement.

Javier v Concepcion
Facts:
Lim Chua, Tan Tian On and Tan Sick Tan filed for the reconveyance of a parcel of land
(Lot 12) against Urbano Javier and Leonila Albiela. Lot 12 is allegedly a portion of a big
parcel of land (Lot 6) located in Quezon. It was alleged that Lot 12 was ordered excluded
from Lot 6 by Chua et. al. They said that Lot 12 can never be a part of Lot 6 because the
Guhit River serves as a natural boundary between the Lot 12 (which was located in
Dolores, Quezon) and Lot 6 (located in Candelaria, Quezon).
As a defense, Javier alleged that they acquired Lot 12 by part-purchase and partinheritance; that they have a Spanish title to the lot; that the lot was adjudicated to their
predecessors-in-interest in Land Registration Cases, that they have declared the land for
tax purposes; that they planted the land with numerous fruits w/o interference from Chua
et. al; and that Chua et. al, were never owners of Lot 12 as they have acquired their title
through fraud and deceit.

The court a quo rendered judgment in favor of Chua et. al. It held that Lot 12 was part of
Lot 6 as evidenced by the records of the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Office.
Javier knew of this fact. His contention that the Commissioners report and the plotted
area should not be admitted has no merit because of the manifestation of the Chief
Surveyor.
The CA affirmed the decision thus the certiorari.
Issue:
1.
Whether or not there was fraud in the registration of Lot 12.
2.
Whether or not Chua et. als. cause of action has not been barred by prescription/laches.
1.

2.

Held:
No. Fraud as a legal basis for review of a decree means actual/positive fraud as
distinguished from constructive/legal fraud. Actual fraud is a question of fact. Lot 12
was found to be part of Lot 6 under TCT 16817 issued in the name of Chua.
Furthermore, the decree of registration has long become final. Under sec 38 of Land
Registration Act: the person allegedly deprived of the land by a decree of registration
under fraud should file in the CFI a petition for review w/in 1 yr. after the entry of the
decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Granting that
there was no actual/ positive fraud in securing the title, Javier is barred from questioning
it.
Without merit. The rule is one cannot acquire title to a registered land by prescription or
adverse possession. There are no intervening rights of 3 rd persons w/c may be affected by
a decision directing the return of Lot 12 to Chua et. al. The defense of laches will not
apply in this case.
*SC affirms CA.

Halili v CIR (136 SCRA 112)

Facts:The cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than five hundred
bus drivers andconductors of Halili Transit. The disputes were eventually settled when the
contending parties reached an Agreement where the Administratrix would transfer to
the employees the title to a tract of land in Caloocan,Rizal. The parcel of land was
eventually registered in the name of the Union.The Union, through Atty. Pineda, filed an urgent
motion with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE)requesting for authority to sell and
dispose of the property. Atty. Espinas, (the original counsel) established the award of
897 workers' claim. When Atty. Pineda appearedfor the Union in these cases, still an
associate of the law firm, his appearance carried the firm name B.C.Pineda and Associates,"
giving the impression that he was the principal lawyer in these cases. Atty. Pineda, without
authority from the Supreme Court but relying on the earlier authority given him
by theMinistry of Labor, filed another urgent motion, praying that the Union be authorized to
sell the lot. The sale wasfinally consummated, resulting in the execution of an escrow
agreement.Issue:Whether or not Atty. Pineda and Arbiter Valenzuela should be held in
contempt.
Held:
YES.
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as
tends tobring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant
or their witnesses during litigation.The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts
and is essential to the preservation of order in judicialproceedings and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to thedue administration of
justice.The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his
unfitness for the confidenceand trust which characterize the attorney and client relations, and
the practice of law before the courts, orshowing such a lack of personal honesty or of good

moral character as to render him unworthy of publicconfidence.In the case, the expeditious
manner by which Arbiter Valenzuela granted Atty. Pineda's motion for suchauthority to sell the
property makes the entire transaction dubious and irregular.Significantly Atty. Pineda's act of
filing a motion praying for authority to sell was by itself an admission on hispart that he did not
possess the authority to sell the property. He could not and did not even wait for validauthority
but instead previously obtained the same from the labor arbiter whom he knew was not
empoweredto so authorize.
Atty. Pineda is found guilty of indirect contempt of court for which he
is sentenced to imprisonment anddirected to show cause why he should not
be disbarred
_---------------------------------------------------

Carbonilla v Abiera (Right of Possession Arising from Title)

Facts
Petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment against respondents alleging
that he is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Maasin City. He
also alleged that he owns the building standing on said land by virtue
of a Deed of Extrajudicial settlement of Estate with Waiver
and Quitclaim of Ownership executed by the Garcianos. He
maintained that the building was being occupied by respondents by
mere tolerance of the
previous owners. Petitioner asserted that he sent a demand letter to
respondents asking them to leave the premises within 15 days from
receipt of the letter, but they failed and refused to do so. The MTCC
ruled that Carbonilla is the lawful owner of the subject land. However it
held that the defendants to have the better rights of (material)
possession to the assailed building and deemed as possessors in good
faith and are legally entitled to its possession and occupancy.

The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTCC with respect to the land,
however it ruled that petitioner, as owner of the land, would have
every right to evict respondents from theland. The CA reversed the RTC
decision and ordered the dismissal of petitioner's complaint for failure
of the plaintiff (herein respondent) to prove that the case at bar is for
unlawful detainer or forcible entry.
Issue
Won petitioner has sufficiently established his ownership of the subject
properties and has the right to recover possession thereof
Held.
No. While petitioner may have proven his ownership of the land, as
there can be no other piece of evidence more worthy of credence than
a Torrens certificate of title, he failed to present any evidence to
substantiate his claim of ownership or right to the possession of the
building. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Residential
Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership executed by the
Garcianos as proof that petitioner acquired ownership of the building
cannot be accepted by the court. There is no showing that the
Garcianos were the owners of the building or that they had any
proprietary right over it. Ranged against respondents' proof of
possession of the building since 1977, petitioner's evidence pales in
comparison and leaves the court totally unconvinced.
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its
possession. However, the owner cannotsimply wrest possession
thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover
possession,he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he
chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions
necessary for such action to prosper. In the present case, petitioner
opted to file an ejectment case against respondents. Ejectment casesforcible entry and unlawful detainer-are summary proceedings
designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or
the right to possession of the property involved.calaw The only
question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is

entitled to thephysical possession of the premises, that is, to the

possession de facto and not to the possession de jure.

It doesnot even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable.

For this reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in
favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject
property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular
ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently
proven. The statements in the complaint that respondents' possession
of the building was by mere tolerance of petitioner clearly make out a
case for unlawful detainer.Here, petitioners failed to prove that the
possession of respondents was by mere tolerance. Petitioners
must file either an action reivindicatoria, a suit to recover ownership
to property or file an accion publiciana, a plenary action to recover
based on the better right to possess

Chavez v. Pea and Amari

Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim
areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the
Philippines (CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D.
1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were
transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road
and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement
that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to
PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the
Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands
known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a
Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another
250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said
lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the
agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known
as the mother of all scams).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ
of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA
to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under
President Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and
Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the
stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art.
XII of the 1987 Constitution

Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the
public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not
sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only
sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the
1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable
lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service.

The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has
reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as
agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the
government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged
areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify
the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no
longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable

lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain.

REPUBLIC VS. CA AND NAGUIT

FACTS:
C o r a z o n N a g u i t fi l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r re g i s t r a t i o n o f t i t l e w h
i c h s e e k s j u d i c i a l confirmation of her imperfect title over a parcel of
land in Nabas, Aklan. It was allegedthat Naguit and her predecessorsin-interest have occupied the land openly and in theconcept of owner
without any objection from any private person or even the governmentuntil she
filed her application for registration. The MCTC rendered a decision
confirmingthe title in the name of Naguit upon failure of Rustico Angeles to
appear during trial after filing his formal opposition to the petition.The Solicitor
General, representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed a motionfor
reconsideration on the grounds that the property which is in open,
continuous andexclusive possession must first be alienable. Naguit
could not have maintained a
bonafide
claim of ownership since the subject land was declared as alienable and
disposableonly on October 15, 1980. The alienable and disposable
character of the land shouldhave already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the Property
RegistrationDecree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and
disposable beforethe applicants possession under a
bona fide
claim of ownership could even start.
RULING:
S e c t i o n 1 4 ( 1 ) m e re l y re q u i re s t h a t t h e p ro p e r t y s o u g h t t
o b e re g i s t e re d a s already alienable and disposable at the
time the application for registration of title is filed There are
three requirements for registration of title, (1) that the subject
propertyis alienable and disposable; (2) that the applicants and
their predecessor-in-interesthave been in open, continuous,
and exclusive possession and occupation, and; (3) thatthe possession is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.There must be a
positive act of the government through a statute or proclamationstating the
intention of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property,thus, declaring the land as alienable and disposable.
However, if there has been none,it is presumed that the government is
still reserving the right to utilize the property and

the possession of the land no matter how long would not ripen into
ownership through acquisitive prescription. To follow the Solicitor
Generals argument in the construction of Section 14 (1)would render the
paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for it would mean that alllands of
public domain which were not declared as alienable and
disposable beforeJune 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original
registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the
occupant. In effect, it precludes the government
frome n f o r c i n g t h e s a i d p r o v i s i o n a s i t d e c i d e s t o r e c l
a s s i f y l a n d s a s a l i e n a b l e a n d disposable.The land in question
was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut
trees now over fifty years old. The inherent nature of the land but
confirms its certifi cation in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural.

There is no impediment to the application of Section 14 (1) of the

Property Registration Decree. Naguit had the right to apply for registration
owing to the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-ininterest of the land since 1945

Heirs of Lacamen v Heirs of Laruan

65 SCRA 605
Facts: Laruan executed a deed of sale in favor of Lacamen which was duly notarized.
Immediately after the sale, Laruan delivered the certificate of title to Lacamen.
Thereupon, Lacamen entered in possession and occupancy of the land, introduced
improvements therein, without securing the corresponding certificate of title. The
document was also not approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes
whose approval is necessary in order for the Deed to be valid. This rule bounds the
contracting parties considering that they belong to the illiterate non-Christians. Later on,
after the death of Laruan, his heirs discovered that Laruans heirs were able to obtain a
new owners certificate of title. Hence, they sued Laruans heirs for reconveyance. The
Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the heirs of Laruan whose decision was
affirmed by the CA.
Issue: WON estoppel by laches applies.

Held: Laruans sale of the subject lot to Lacamen could have been valid were it not for
the sole fact that it lacked the approval of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes considering
that there was impressed upon its face full faith and credit after it was notarized.
However, notwithstanding the invalidity of the sale, the fact that when the Lacamens
succeeded to the estate of their father, the Laruans kept silent, never claiming that the lot

is their own. Even granting that no prescription lies against their fathers record title, their
inaction for almost 30 years commands the imposition of laches. Hence, the Lacamens
were declared as the owners of the land.

BINALAY VS. MANALO

A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is not the alluvial process
contemplated in Art. 457. The accumulation of the soil deposits must be slow and
hardly imperceptible in order for the riparian owner to acquire ownership thereof.
Also, the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the
rivers (or the sea coast).
FACTS
Manalo acquired 2 lots which were originally owned by Judge Taccad from 2
different people (the latters daughter and from an earlier purchaser). These lots
were later consolidated into Lot 307, a total of 10.45 hectares. The lot was beside
the Cagayan River, which, due to flooding, would place a portion of the land
underwater during the rainy season (September to December). On sunny days,
however, the land would be dried up for the entire dry season (January to
August). When a survey of the land was conducted on a rainy month, a portion of
the land that Manalo bought was then underwater and was thus left unsurveyed
and excluded from Lot 307.

The big picture is this: Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a
certain point to form two braches (western and eastern) and then unites at the
other end, further north, to form a narrower strip of land. The eastern branch of
the river cuts through Lot 307, and is flooded during the rainy season. The
unsurveyed portion, on the other hand, is the bed of the eastern branch. Note
that the fork exists only during the rainy season while the island/elongated strip
of land formed in the middle of the forks becomes dry and perfect for cultivation
when the Cagayan river is at its ordinary depth. The strip of land in the middle of
the fork totaled 22.7 hectares and was labeled Lot 821-822. Lot 821 is directly
opposite Lot 307 and is separated by the eastern branch of the rivers fork.

Manalo claims that Lot 821 belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged
portion of the land to which it is adjacent. Petitioners (Binalay, et al) who possess
the Lot 821, on the other hand, insist that they own it. They occupy the other
edges of the lot along the river bank (i.e. the fertile portions on which they plant
tobacco and other agricultural products) and also cultivate the western strip
during the summer.

Manalo filed 2 cases for forcible entry which were both dismissed. Later on, he
filed a complaint for quieting of title, possession, and damages against petitioner.
The trial court and the CA ruled in favor of Manalo, saying that Lot 821 and Lot
307 cannot be considered separate and distinct from each other. They reasoned
that when the land dries up for the most part of the year, the two are connected.
[Note: The CA applied the ruling in Govt of the Phil Islands vs. Colegio de San
Jose, which was actually inappropriate because the subject matter in this case
was a lake so that the definition of a bed was different.]
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manalo owns Lot 821 by way of accretion

RULING: No.
The disputed property is not an accretion. It is the action of the heavy rains that
cause the highest ordinary level of waters of the Cagayan River during the rainy
season. The depressed portion is a river bed and is thus considered property of
public domain.
The SC observed the following:

a) The pictures identified by Manalo during his direct examination depict the
depressed portion as a river bed. The dried up portion had dike-like slopes
(around 8m) on both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are vertical
and very prominent.
b) The eastern bed already existed even before Manalo bought the land. It was
called Rio Muerte de Cagayan.
c) Manalo could not have acquire ownership of the land because article 420 of
the civil code states that rivers are property of public dominion. The word river
includes the running waters, the bed, and the banks. [The seller never actually
owned that part of the land since it was public property]
d) The submerged area (22.72 ha) is twice the area of the land he actually
bought. It is difficult to suppose that such a sizable area could have been brought
about by accretion.

More importantly, the requisites of accretion in article 457 were not satisfied.
These are: 1) that the deposition of the soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; 2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or
sea); and 3) the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of
the rivers (or the sea coast). The accretion shouldve been attached to Lot 307 for
Manalo to acquire its ownership. BUT, the claimed accretion lies on the bank of
the river; not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite it across the river. Aside
from that, the dike-like slopes which were very steep may only be formed by a
sudden and forceful action like flooding. The steep slopes could not have been
formed by the river in a slow and gradual manner.

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998
FACTS:
On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all
municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own
expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore
lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair
proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and
chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for
the reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an
agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.

Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the

agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the
contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the
commerce of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term
foreshore land than that in the definition provided by the dictionary.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was
affirmed by the CA with modifications.
ISSUE:
I.
Whether or not the term foreshore land includes the submerged area.
II.
Whether or not foreshore land and the reclaimed area is within the commerce
of man.

HELD:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the
opinion of the respondent court that the term foreshore land includes the
submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a
seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide
terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach
scarp or berm. (Webster's Third New International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we
cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the
intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided
expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of
submerged areas from the term foreshore lands.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as
amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been
found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra
vires and null and void.

####################################################
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs IAC (1986)
FACTS:

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo
Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe
5 parcels of land

possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines
was discovered by Magellan

land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting

absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them
or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within
the public domain
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth
of improvements
ownership and possession of the land sought to be
registered was duly recognized by the government when the
Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc

ISSUES:

1.
2.

W/N the land is already a private land - YES

W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporations or associations applies- NO
HELD:
1. YES

already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order
that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient

it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private
property, at least by presumption

The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the
Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.

The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law

2. NO

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the
Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme
acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right
to make such acquisition

The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or
lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioners,

vs.
LILIA A. ABAIRO, CELSO ABAIRO and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF ISABELA, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Eligio A. Labog for private respondents.
(FULL TEXT huhuhuhu)
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated September 27,
1971 (pp. 17-18, rec.), of respondent Court of First Instance of Isabela confirming
the ownership by Lilia A. Abairo and Celso Abairo, of a parcel of land.

The facts of this case are undisputed. On March 1, 1971, respondent Lilia Abairo
filed an application for registration under the Land Registration Act of a parcel of
land containing an
Isabela, alleging open, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession thereof in
the concept of owner by herself and through her predecessors-in- interest since
time immemorial up to the present (p. 12, rec.).
Respondent Lilia Abairo and her counsel appeared at the initial hearing but
nobody appeared to oppose the petition for registration of her title, except the
assistant provincial fiscal who entered his opposition in behalf of the Bureau of
Lands and the Bureau of Forestry, but who subsequently withdrew his opposition
on the ground that there was a new law extending the period for filing registration
petitions up to 1976. The fiscal submitted a report of the Director of Lands to the
effect that he is withdrawing his opposition. The fiscal likewise submitted a letter
from the Bureau of Forestry showing that it has no opposition to the application
for registration of title. These facts are embodied in the Order of Judge Andres
Plan, to wit:

When this case was called for initial hearing, the applicant, assisted
by counsel, appeared. The Fiscal manifested in open Court that
due to the amended bill which extends the period of filing
registration petitions up to 1976, the serious opposition filed has
become moot and academic. The Fiscal also submitted a report of
the Director of Lands to the effect that the Bureau of Lands is
withdrawing its opposition. The Fiscal also submitted a letter from
the Bureau of Forestry showing that they have no opposition to the
application for registration of title,
With these manifestations of the fiscal, the Bureau of Lands and the
Bureau of Forestry, the lot has become non-contested.
Upon motion of counsel for the applicant, let an order of general
default issue against the whole world. Upon his petition, the Clerk
of Court, Atty. Raymundo B. Neris Jr., is hereby appointed

Commissioner to receive the evidence in support of the petition for

registration. (p. 16, rec.).

After the case was heard, respondent Court rendered a decision dated
September 27, 1971, confirming the ownership of respondent Abairo over the
land in question after finding that the original owner of the land in dispute was a
certain Pablo Rivera, who possessed the land which formed part of his estate
since 1912 or even much prior thereto; that he sold said land to Inocencia Accad
sometime in 1939 and the latter had been in possession of said land up to the
time when she sold it to her daughter, Lilia A. Abairo, on December 31, 1969; that
respondent has a residential house on the land and that she has declared the lot
for taxation purposes in her name and has been religiously paying taxes thereon;
that respondent Abairo and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the land in the concept of
owners since 1912 up to the present; that the land is free from all liens and
encumbrances; and that the land is the conjugal property of spouses Lilia and
Celso Abairo (pp. 17-18, rec.).

A motion for reconsideration dated November 18, 1971 (p. 19, rec.) was filed by
the Solicitor General on the ground that respondent Court did not have
jurisdiction to entertain the application for registration of title as it was filed on
March 1, 1971, after December 31, 1968, the date set by R.A. No. 2061 as the
time limit for the judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles like that of
applicant, and before the effectivity on June 19, 1971, of R.A. No. 6236
extending the time limit for such purpose.
Respondent Court denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration in an order
dated December 15, 1971 (p. 28, rec.). Hence, this petition.
It is the contention of petitioners that respondent Court should have dismissed
the application of respondent Lilia Abairo because it has no jurisdiction over it

inasmuch as it was filed on March 1, 197 1, that is, after December 31, 1968, the
expiry date for filing such kind of applications based on imperfect or incomplete
titles under RA No. 2061.
Petitioner's contention is without merit.
R.A. No. 6236, enacted on June 19, 1971, further amended Section 47 of C.A.
No. 141 (which was previously amended by R.A. No. 2061) by extending to
December 31, 1976 the time limit for the filing of applications for the judical
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
As amended by R.A. No. 2061, Section 47 of C.A. No. 141 reads:
Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are
hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December thirty-one,
nineteen hundred and sixty-eight within which to take advantage of
the benefit of this chapter: Provided, That the several periods of
time designated by the President in accordance with section fortyfive of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the
provisions of this chapter, but this section shall not be construed as
prohibiting any of said persons from acting under this chapter at
any time prior to the period fixed by the President (emphasis
supplied).

As amended by R.A. No. 6236, the aforesaid Section 47 states:

Sec. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are
hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December thirty-one,
nineteen hundred and seventy-six, within which to take advantage
of the benefit of this chapter: Provided, That this extension shall
apply only where the area applied for does not exceed 144
hectares: Provided further, That the several periods of time
designated by the President in accordance with section forty-five of
this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of
this chapter, but this section shall not be construed as prohibiting

any of said persons from acting under this chapter at any time prior
to the period fixed by the President(emphasis supplied).
As amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, promulgated on January 25,
1977, the filing of such application has been extended to December 31, 1987.
It is clear from the law itself that those who applied for judicial confirmation of
their titles at any time prior to the cutoff date of December 31, 1976 (as provided
for in R.A. No. 6236) did so on time, even if such application were filed during the
intervening period from January 1, 1969 to June 18, 1971, like the application of
respondent Abairo, who instituted the same on March 1, 197 1.
All the amendments to Section 47 of C.A. 141 expressly includes the proviso that
"this section shall not be construed as prohibiting any of said persons from acting
under this chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President." No
period has been fixed by the President despite the authority granted him by the
aforesaid proviso.

But even in the absence of the aforesaid proviso of Section 47, as amended, the
basis of the petition is too technical to merit serious consideration. The extension
until December 31, 1976 by R.A. No. 6236 for the filing of such application,
retroacted to, and covered the applications filed after January 1, 1969 and before
June 19, 1971. Moreover, the application which private respondent filed on
March 1, 1971, could be considered as re-filed after the effectivity of R.A. No.
6236 on June 19, 1971, less than four months thereafter.
Respect should be given to the obvious intention of the lawmaker in extending
the period for filing such applications time and time again, to give full opportunity
to those who are qualified under the law to own disposable lands of the public
domain and thus reduce the number of landless among the citizenry.
Considering the area of the lot applied for only about 573 square meters it
was quite unfair, if not oppressive, to put the private respondent to such expense

and anxiety, after the Director of Lands withdrew his opposition, while the
Director of Forestry interposed no opposition to private respondent's application.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IS HEREBY
AFFIRMED AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. NO COSTS. ()

OH CHO vs Director of Lands

FACTS:
Oh Cho is appealing from the rejection of his application based
on disqualification as alien (Chinese) from acquiring lands of the public domain.

He had open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880
to filing of the application for registration on January 17, 1940
ISSUE: W/N Oh Cho entitled to decree or registration of the lot.

HELD: NO.

GR: All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or
by grant below to the public domain

Exception: in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest

since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the
land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property
even before the Spanish conquest. (Cario v. Insular Government) - not applicable
since only from 1880

His immediate possesor failed to comply with the condition precedent to apply for
the registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July
26, 1894 so what was transferred to Oh Cho is merely possesory right which cannot
ripen to ownership by prescription (aliens disqualified to own by prescription)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND

SPOUSES MARIO B.LAPIA AND FLOR DE VEGA
FACTS:On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as
their residence with atotal area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one
Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At thetime of the purchase, respondent spouses where
then natural-born Filipino citizens.On February 5, 1987,the spouses filed an application
for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the RegionalTrial Court of
San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino
citizensand have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.An
opposition was filed by theRepublic and after the parties have presented their respective
evidence, the courta quo rendered adecision confirming private respondents' title to the
lots in question.
.

On appeal, respondent court affirmedthe decision of the trial court based on the following
ratiocination: In the present case, it is undisputed thatboth applicants were still Filipino
citizens when they bought the land in controversy from its formerowner. For this reason,
the prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by aliens could not apply.In justice
and equity, they are the rightful owners of the subject realty considering also that they
had paidfor it quite a large sum of money.
Issue: Whether or not a foreign national can apply for registration of title over a parcel of
land which heacquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor
who has complied with therequirements for registration under the Public Land Act
(CA 141).
Held: The Court disagreed on the petition to seek to defeat respondents' application for
registration of titleon the ground of foreign nationality.
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated: As could begleaned from the
evidence adduced, the private respondents do not rely on fee simple ownership based on
a Spanish grant or possessory information title under Section 19 of the Land Registration
Act; the privaterespondents did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-ininterest derived title from an oldSpanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal grant
(b) the "concession especial" or especial grant; (c)the "composicion con el estado" title or
adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de compra" or title by purchase;and (e) the "informacion
posesoria" or possessory information title, which could become a "titulogratuito" or a
gratuitous title (Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]).

The primary basisof their claim is possession, by themselves and their predecessors-ininterest,since time immemorial.
.Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of
which provides:Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship and who has thelegal capacity to enter into a contract under
Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to amaximum area of one
thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of ruralland,
to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail
of theprivilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total

area acquired shall notexceed the maximum herein fixed.In case the transferee already
owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be entitledto be
a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, when
added to thosealready owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein
authorized.The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not
apply in the instant case sincesaid requirements are primarily directed to the register of
deeds before whom compliance therewith is tobe submitted. Nowhere in the provision is
it stated, much less implied, that the requirements mustlikewise be submitted before the
land registration court prior to the approval of an application forregistration of title. An
application for registration of title before a land registration court should not beconfused
with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only when the
judgment of the land registration court approving the application for registration has
become final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is the time when the
requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be complied with by
the applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is submitted tothe office of the
register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior tothe
issuance of the decree of registration, the register of deeds has no participation in the
approval of the application for registration of title as the decree of registration is yet to be
issued. The petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED