Sunteți pe pagina 1din 17

This article was downloaded by: [Gazi University] On: 19 August 2014, At: 08:08 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

This article was downloaded by: [Gazi University] On: 19 August 2014, At: 08:08 Publisher: Routledge Informahttp://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rnpa20 On Preventing Another Century of Misunderstanding: Toward a Psychoethology of Human Experience and a Psychoneurology of Affect: Commentary by Jaak Panksepp (Bowling Green, Ohio) Jaak Panksepp Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403, e-mail: Published online: 09 Jan 2014. To cite this article: Jaak Panksepp (2000) On Preventing Another Century of Misunderstanding: Toward a Psychoethology of Human Experience and a Psychoneurology of Affect: Commentary by Jaak Panksepp (Bowling Green, Ohio), Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 2:2, 240-255, DOI: 10.1080/15294145.2000.10773315 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2000.10773315 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions " id="pdf-obj-0-6" src="pdf-obj-0-6.jpg">

Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

On Preventing Another Century of Misunderstanding:

Toward a Psychoethology of Human Experience and a Psychoneurology of Affect: Commentary by Jaak Panksepp (Bowling Green, Ohio)

Jaak Panksepp a

a Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403, e-mail:

Published online: 09 Jan 2014.

To cite this article: Jaak Panksepp (2000) On Preventing Another Century of Misunderstanding: Toward a Psychoethology of Human Experience and a Psychoneurology of Affect: Commentary by Jaak Panksepp (Bowling Green, Ohio), Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences, 2:2, 240-255, DOI:

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any

form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Downloaded by [Gazi University] at 08:08 19 August 2014

240

Jaak Panksepp

Most of our group were just tourists, peering at one culture from the capsule of another. Only Bob was prepared to live on the border. But he was full of ambivalence. Like the Zairean medical students, he did not much like Chinese society; for him it lacked warmth. At the same time he was deeply attracted to the tradition of Chinese medicine. So, although it is perhaps a scandal that the two aspects of psychology are distrustful of each other. Whittle is right, these are not just aspects, but self- sufficient cultures. In Canada, for all our talk of multi- culturalism, we have not yet managed to become com-

fortable with the fault-line that runs between the Anglos and the French, let alone with our many other cultural splits. Within psychology, we are not comfort- able with our split, but perhaps by recognizing it as a cultural one, we psychologists can know that the move to make is toward multiculturalism.

Keith Oatley Dept. of Human Development & Applied Psychology OISE-University of Toronto 252 Bloor Street West Toronto, Canada M5S IV6

On Preventing Another Century of Misunderstanding: Toward a Psychoethology of Human Experience and a Psychoneurology of Affect Commentary by Jaak Panksepp (Bowling Green, Ohio)

Whittle's gentle complaint provides fertile ground for sharing some of my own thoughts on this contentious topic-the chasm between analytic-dissective and synthetic-integrative approaches to understanding the mind. I will take this opportunity to share what has been on my mind for the last 30 years rather frankly concerning our continuing failure to have a unified and coherent mind-brain-behavior science. The one thing all might agree on is that the exper- imental psychology that emerged during the past cen- tury has yet to give us a lasting and coherent science of the human or animal condition. In my estimation, this is largely due to the fact that it never really came to terms with the evolutionary dynamics and epige- netic complexities of ancient regions of the mamma- lian brain. All too often it skirted the most profound and central issues of our lives-the clarification of the many internal impulses and feelings that guide the intentional actions and choices we routinely make each day. For quite a while, neuroscience has also followed that same pattern, pretending that the dy- namic, evolutionarily provided integrative states of the nervous system are of little importance for under- standing what the brain does. In fact, the probability is high that the brain generates a great deal of its "magic" not simply through "information transmis-

Jaak Panksepp is Distinguished Research Professor of Psychobiology, Emeritus, Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State University, Ohio.

sion," but through massive, coordinated operations of enormous ensembles of neurons that create global and organic neurodynamics (states of being) that constitute the forms of affective consciousness, not capable of being reproduced, so far as we know, on digital com- puters. Those global, evolutionary dynamics are the fundamental fabric of mind, which comes to be richly embellished and besmirched by the vast complexities of individual experiences-information that is more readily reproducible computationally. Psychoanalysis addressed many of these issues but all too rarely in ways that helped create a rigorous culture of consensual "truth" that is the hallmark of modern scientific thought (Macmillan, 1997). Experi- mental psychology became a fledgling member of the scientific community early in the twentieth century, not because of any coherent sc'ientific insight and syn- thesis it generated concerning the nature of mind or the natural behaviors organisms exhibit, but rather be- cause of its willingness to implement generally ac- cepted experimental and statistical methodologies in its search for lasting knowledge. Indeed, its analytic success during the twentieth century was largely based on barring the door to the darker affective corners of the mind and keeping its attention focused obsessively on those peppercorns of behavioral and cognitive evi- dence that strict-minded experimentalists could agree upon. Both behaviorism and cognitivism agreed, at times all too explicitly, that emotions and other af- fective processes were issues too murky or difficult to

Downloaded by [Gazi University] at 08:08 19 August 2014

Ongoing Discussion: Paul Whittle

241

understand. Psychoanalysis never chose those paths of psychic trivialization to create empirical consensus. Its reputation suffered accordingly. Considering the seemingly antithetical premises of experimental psychological and psychoanalytic ap- proaches, as well as the more-apparent-than-real dual- ities of the human brain-mind, the polarity between the two disciplines was inevitable but it need not be irreversible. However, a great deal of conceptual stitching, often through some remarkably tough intel- lectual hides (e.g., see Uttal, 2000), will be needed in order to mend the widening rift that has emerged (Panksepp, 1999). This may be achieved more rapidly if we better recognize the degree to which our mind sciences are molded by personalities that are attracted to the stark positivistic aesthetics of various intellec- tual--experimental schools, commonly well insulated from each other, that today continue to rule the aca- demic landscape in cognitive science and neurosci- ence. What may eventually coax investigators of vastly different persuasions to return to a shared intel- lectual table is the increasingly evident fact that a com- prehensive understanding of psychological and behavioral subtleties cannot be achieved simply by viewing them from a single vantage point, whether by positivistic behaviorism, cognitivism, functionalism, computationalism, eliminativism, naturalism, men- talism, or mysterianism. Multiple and synergistic non- dualistic points of view are essential, including behavioral, psychological, and neurological ones, taken all together-a bitter medicine that most have not been ready to swallow. However, the times they may be changing. The idea that the way we can best understand the brain-mind is by simply emulating the physical sciences is gradually losing force. The recog- nition that the mind is not only caused by but also realized in various brain activities, with unique types of self-organizing' complexity not capable of being replicated by silicone-based digital computers, is tak- ing hold (Searle, 1992; Clar k, 1997).

Slowly Toward a Coherent Mind-Brain-Behavior Science

The failure of too many in the various psychological, psychoanalytic, and neuroscience communities to con- currently embrace the full hierarchical complexity of the human brain-mind with a full devotion to concep- tual flexibility and scientific rigor, has saddened many generations of students who wanted a deep and realis- tic understanding of the human condition. After a cen-

tury of remarkable research effort in experimental psychology, almost five decades of cognitivism, and three decades of modern neuroscience, we still have no unified community of scholars that tries to bring all the relevant issues openly into consideration-perhaps the recently emerging consciousness studies programs come closest. In any event, since we are close to solv- ing some substantive psychological issues scientifi- cally (e.g., the nature of attention, memory, and perhaps even emotions), we should no longer ignore the many remaining issues that have long been ne- glected-from the fundamentally affective dimensions of mind to subtle feelings of volition and free-will. In experimental psychology, the most poignant orphan of our intellectual practices has been primary process or core consciousness----our deeply animalian--emo- tional nature-an issue that psychoanalysis accepted (see Solms and Nersessian, 1999) but which, at least during the past century, it did not nurture toward a vigorous scientific maturity. However, because of the recent revolutions in neuroscience and molecular biol- ogy, along with emerging psychobehavioral and dy- namic perspectives, we may finally be in a position to deal credibly with some of those long-neglected issues using rather standard, albeit somewhat more theoreti- cally flexible, scientific approaches. The only thing that should matter in this scientific game is the capac- ity to make predictions that can be empirically verified or falsified, whether they be traditional third-person measures or various indirect measures of first-person experience. A broad neuropsychobehavioral probing of the nature of the basic emotional and motivational sys- tems of the mammalian brain, and the layers of con- sciousness they regulate, has considerable potential to help heal the rifts between these troubled fields of ours. I think the evidence, read correctly, is over- whelming that our most immediate psychobehavioral concerns, from our fundamental instinctual actions to our more subtle life choices, are based upon funda- mental biological values that our brains express as feelings (MacLean, 1990; Panksepp, 1998a; Damasio, 1999). We will only make meager progress on a vari- ety of higher mental issues (e.g., see Uttal, 2000) until those foundational values are better clarified. Unfortunately, the powerful cultural, intellectual, and emotional forces that would seek to counter such efforts remain alive and well. Indeed, those forces probably arise naturally from the deep polarities and animosities of human nature. The reactionaries who brought Galileo to his knees four centuries ago, con- tinue to thrive within our own scientific communities,

Downloaded by [Gazi University] at 08:08 19 August 2014

242

Jaak Panksepp

although they no longer command the old tools of torture. But all too often they do control the purse strings for furthering empirical inquiries. Obviously, the scientific community is not immune to everyday power politics and the skewering influence of bull- headed, alpha-type personalities who have commonly had too little hands-on experience with relevant as- pects of life or laboratory to make the best scientific choices. Indeed, all long-standing scholarly traditions seem to be conservative in nature, with a class of ill- prepared "priests" who recite traditional catechisms to protect the status quo. To try to shed some light, admittedly dim, on such issues, I will aspire to characterize (and shall, no doubt, caricature) the personalities that may be imped- ing progress at the present time. My aim is not pejora- tive, but I would highlight the intellectual stagnation that can result when too many scientific practitioners take excessive pride in the rigor of their logic and the precision of their methods rather than their willingness to confront nature as she truly presents herself in ani- mate life. I will here call them, perhaps rather too gratuitously, left-hemisphere types, and contrast their approaches with the growing minority who aspire to grapple with the whole brain, with all of its diverse and often irrational riches.

The Sociobiology of the Psychological Sciences

As Whittle emphasizes, there are many subtle reasons for the schisms that characterize the various scholarly traditions that aspire to understand the psyche, the mind, and behavior. Although I largely agree with Whittle's analysis, I will toy further with the possibil- ity that rather straightforward human cultural and per- sonality issues may lie at the heart of the various intellectual disharmonies and discontents he described so poignantly. I also believe many of our troubles arise from ancient group dynamics that any competitive group of highly intelligent anthropoid apes is bound to exhibit when they are competing for limited re- sources and their minds are split between fundamen- tally different, culturally shaped worldviews, such as the willingness to consider objective versus subjective forms of data, experimental versus insightful-intuitive approaches to human nature, and the resulting disputes concerning the scientific credibility of third versus first person points of view. I do believe that the mentalistic position to which most intelligent people subscribe has been so widely rejected by mind-brain specialists to some extent for primitive group solidarity rea-

sons-partly because their limited but rigorous spe- cialist positions set them apart as uniquely qualified experts who supposedly have privileged perspectives to adjudicate on the nature of psychological reality. At some point, most investigators, probably be- cause of their cognitive and emotional strengths but also because of the reward structures in which they must pursue their activities, select which approach they most admire either for deep intellectual and, not uncommonly, for straightforward opportunistic rea- sons. During the past half-century of advancing mate- rialism, there have been clear and differential rewards for selecting positivistic analytic paths over deeper in- tegrative-synthetic ones. As a result, the middle way, which accepts the importance of both approaches, of both deductive reason and inductive insight, for any coherent understanding, has become the road least traveled. I remain puzzled at how little commerce cur- rently exists on that byway, especially in my own field of behavioral neuroscience, a powerful animal brain- research discipline that has so much rigorous evidence and evolutionary hypotheses to offer for the creation of a lasting psychobiological understanding of the hu- man mind (Panksepp and Panksepp, 2000). It seems that to some yet unmeasured extent, pre- vailing intellectual positions reflect desires to establish group and individual identities. Every human has a need to feel that he or she is best at something. If one is a farmer or builder, the evidence is often immediately evident to the eye. Hence, grantsmanship all too often becomes a skilled exercise in deceptive practices. If one is an academic or a therapist, then it is only evi- dent in the praise and attention that others are willing to grant. Thus, in intellectual matters, the strengths of our alliances may be as important as the coherence of our ideas. Without social coalitions, we put ourselves at risk of being marginalized in the competition for the necessary resources to continue scientific work. And it is much easier to agree on the factual pepper- corns than the big-ticket integrative items. Accord- ingly, most scientists are committed to views held by long-established scientific groups, most of which in order to survive as traditions are bound to be intellec- tually conservative. Unless a field is in the midst of technological-eonceptual breakthroughs (such as mo- lecular biology during the past few decades), most in- vestigators are bound to remain constrained by the leaden weight of the status quo even if they have won- derful and productive ideas they would personally like to pursue. The federal granting establishment in the United States has become a remarkable exemplar of a system that encourages conceptual conservatism and

Downloaded by [Gazi University] at 08:08 19 August 2014

Ongoing Discussion: Paul Whittle

243

rewards run-of-the-mill empIrICIsm (at least at the funding application stage, since what one does scien- tifically with the provided support is rarely subject to accountability) . One reason there has been remarkably little prog- ress in understanding some of the key issues of human nature is because the study of emotions and motiva- tions has long been devalued in the biological, psycho- logical, and brain sciences. For current cultural reasons, emotions and psychoanalytic approaches are deemed of much less importance than cognitions and information processing approaches to understanding the human mind. Although the reasons for that are many (perhaps the most important being the ascen- dancy of the digital computer model of mind), the one dimension that has rarely been discussed is the poten- tial skewing influences of the typical personalities that are attracted to scientific endeavors. I will now weave a blunt hypothesis-that there has been a massive left- hemisphere bias operating in the scientific arena and a right-hemisphere bias in the psychoanalytic one. Al- though this hypothesis remains to be empirically eval- uated, the mere fact that it has been so difficult to get substantive programs of emotion research off the ground in mainstream psychology and neuroscience will be taken as prima facia evidence that some rather unusual personality and cultural forces have shaped the ways in which the mind has been studied over the past five decades.

Can Left-Brain Sciences Understand Whole- Brain Minds?

As Whittle implies, the causes of the intellectual dis- sensions that have been evident in the twentieth-cen- tury mind sciences probably go deeper into human nature than we are typically wont to admit. Tempera- mental style surely has an enormous influence on guiding the scholarly and professional choices of the participants. The scientific structures built by those who enjoy the chaotic right-hemispheric play of diver- gent ideas and the resulting intuitive flashes, and those who admire more rigorously straight-furrowed left- hemispheric forms of convergent thinking and the re- sulting logical inferences are bound to differ. Could one of the major dilemmas in the brain-mind sciences be that most practitioners, because of student selection pressures, are remarkably proficient in left-hemi- sphere linear thinking skills while being rather impov- erished in right-hemisphere pattern-recognition abilities? Might it be largely the reverse in psychoana-

lytic circles, where open listening (surely a right-hemi- sphere attitude) must be cultivated? Might such biases, if they could be demonstrated to exist, lead inexorably to remarkably skewed conceptions of the brain-mind? For didactic purposes, I will here utilize a vastly oversimplified conception of right- and left-hemi- sphere functions to make some general points about scientific personalities that may need to be made in rather glaring terms. Although there is abundant evi- dence that the right hemisphere is more capable of extracting nondominant patterns and meanings from available information stores (Fiore and Schooler, 1998), the attitudinal dichotomy I will pursue surely runs deeper in the brain-mind than just right-left hemi- spheric biases. Still, recent attempts to put everything of obvious cognitive value into the left hemisphere (Gazzaniga, 1998), without fully recognizing the psy- chologically more subtle and emotionally deep contri- butions of the right (Beeman and Chiarello, 1998), encourage me to proceed with my oversimplified tongue-in-cheek analysis. A great deal of the controversy concerning whether we can empirically study mental states is based on our philosophical position concerning the empirical accessibility of such states. Some claim that such states, although they surely exist within the brain, are simply not open to substantive empirical analysis at the present time (Uttal, 2000). I suspect that such philosophic positions are created as much by the af- fective inclinations, or lack thereof, of their purveyors as the intellectual rigor of their arguments. In any event, if we consider that the generation and apprecia- tion of inductive inferences is promoted more by the synthetic flow of right-hemisphere associations (my- thos) while the power of deductive logic is promoted more by left-hemispheric analytic skills (logos), we may come to understand why linear, left-hemisphere mental styles have prevailed so overwhelmingly in the sciences, including those that have sought to under- stand behavior and mental life. The rules of scientific agreement are much more certain and clear-cut for deductively logical left-hemispheric thought than for the creative inferential leaps that emerge more from the right. Indeed, the traditional linear analytic thinking of the natural sciences has paid enormous dividends in generating systematic understanding of our world and in harnessing its material resources. However, those modes of left-hemispheric thought that have worked so well at unraveling the dynamics of the physical world, have not succeeded as dramatically in the brain-mind sciences. Perhaps this is because the brain-

Downloaded by [Gazi University] at 08:08 19 August 2014

244

Jaak Panksepp

mind is not simply the unfeeling type of linear infor- mation processing computational device that many left-hemisphere types would like to believe, but rather, at its foundation it is a fundamentally organic and globally holistic integrator and blender of past evolu- tionary solutions and present environmental chal- lenges. Perhaps for any comprehensive understanding, the two views need to be judiciously combined, so that the capacity of a mode of thought to generate coherent predictions rather than logically airtight arguments be- comes the main arbiter of how we allow a fundamen- tally organic mind science to evolve. We should also recall that left and right hemi- spheres have rather different affective styles and social priorities. Most of us tend to present ourselves to the world with our left-hemisphere linguistic skills, to the point where we commonly speak out of one side of our mouth----often remarkably logically in a propositional left-hemisphere way, but quite unreasonably from a more integrative right-hemisphere perspective. The left hemisphere, in its appointed role of projecting an image of positive social desirability into the world, is not only an "interpreter" (Gazzaniga, 1998), but also a skilled confabulator, especially when it comes to trying to deal with emotional experiences, which are felt more intensely by its more passive and silent part- ner. Clearly, it is the right hemisphere that provides the greater depth to our emotional narratives and affective experiences (Ross, Homan, and Buck, 1994; Ornstein, 1997; Beeman and Chiarello, 1998), and perhaps the left hemisphere is a specialist in emotional repression. If so, there is reason to believe that the left hemi- sphere, divorced from the fundamental anchoring of the full spectrum of human emotional experiences elaborated subcortically and within the other side of the brain, could easily become adept at helping con- struct simple-minded "dreams of reason that create monsters" -my least favorite examples being the "radical behaviorism" that denied mind and brain any place in the behavioral sciences and all "eugenics" movements past and present. Also, the mere fact that women are better than men in coordinating the activi- ties of the two hemispheres (Shaywitz, Shaywitz, Pugh, and Constable, 1995), may go a long way to- ward explaining why females are underrepresented in the natural sciences, as well as why holistic and fluid right-hemispheric modes of psychoanalytic thought have prevailed in feminist theory and the arts. There is much to be discovered about the person- alities that are attracted to an uncompromisingly left- hemisphere (logic-reason) view of the world as well as those who selectively view life through the prism

of the right (intuition-insight). I would wager that, could it be empirically evaluated, the majority of tradi- tional scientists would tend to fall in the former cate- gory, helping explain why twentieth-century psychology offered us so many linear and logically simplified, and ultimately incomplete views of human

nature. Indeed,

might the star k Machiavellian egotism

that all too commonly prevails in high-powered left- hemisphere science (see Pert [1997] for a recent de- scription of the take-as-you-can types that pervade so much of present-day science), reflect a functional dis- connection syndrome when the left-hemisphere abili- ties are excessively divorced from right-hemisphere values? To put the hypothesis bluntly: A larger than nor- mal proportion of the most successful scientists, in- cluding experimental psychologists, may be remarkably self-centered, highly competitive, and all too often, not very agreeable types. As a population, they may have less than normal levels of emotional sensitivity, with a predilection for exhibiting notewor- thy symptoms of "academic autism." They are satis- fied to know more and more about less and less, with little heed for social and emotional sensitivities that concern most other people. Whether the incidence of such personality styles is actually higher than that found in the humanities or other professions would be a most interesting issue to evaluate empirically, and if the data support the hypothesis, to discuss psychoana- lytically. To my knowledge, no substantive empirical analysis of differential personality styles in different academic disciplines has been conducted, but I suspect the topic may be a rich mine for some eager psycholo- gist, sociologist, or cultural anthropologist. In any event, I offer this psychoanalytic hypothesis to explain the chaotic state of our mind sciences only half in jest. In any event, the Janus-faced nature of our cognitive and affective proclivities has surely exerted yet un- measured effects on the forms of our various mind-brain science.

Future Speculations about the Personality Styles of Scientists and the Sciences They Create

If there is some type of selective funneling of different personalities into different disciplines, it is bound to have remar kable consequences for the way whole fields of thought and inquiry are framed, most espe- cially in the psychological sciences. For instance, might the massive intolerance for talk about inner psy-

Downloaded by [Gazi University] at 08:08 19 August 2014

Ongoing Discussion: Paul Whittle

245

chological causes among behavioral psychologists be based not only on the methodological difficulties posed by the study of the subjective life, but also on their lopsided emotional skills? From my own 40 years of experiences in the field, that does not seems a far- fetched possibility. Despite recent advances in deci- phering how emotional learning transpires in certain areas of the brain such as the amygdala (e.g., LeDoux, 1996), one is still hard put to find a behavioral scientist who seems constitutionally able to openly discuss the potential role of affective feelings in the instigation and guidance of behavioral responses and regulation of behavioral choices. The majority, at least in my experience, tend to believe that type of talk borders on the absurd. Only begrudgingly will most entertain the idea that other animals actually experience pain and fear-preferring to phrase their ideas in terms of nociceptive stimuli and "anxietylike" behaviors. The radical behaviorism of the middle part of the twentieth-century-the mode of thought that aspired to kill psychoanalysis-was an exemplar of that kind of thought. It was deeply logical in its limited domain, but in my estimation, it yielded a fundamentally mis- guided view of animate nature. Despite the behaviorist desire to aspire to nothing but visually observable ob- jectivity, there is still every reason to believe that ani- mals' lives revolve around many comparatively invisible inner causes, evolutionarily constructed, that cannot be unambiguously observed in the behavioral acts of organisms but must be neurotheoretically in- ferred. I did my part to coax Skinner to change his radically antagonistic and limited ways of thinking (i.e., Panksepp, 1990), but, in the final accounting, he was not coaxed into reconsidering the possibility that emotional and motivational feelings are not simply "excellent examples of the fictional causes to which we commonly attribute behavior" (Skinner, 1953, p.

160).

To this day, his ultrapositivistic way of viewing the animate life prevails in behavioral neuroscience, even though the more skilled thinkers will now tend to espouse terminal agnosticism (typically of the' 'closed door" variety) on the topic of emotional and motiva- tional affective experiences in animals. In the face of the massive amount of data indicating that various subcortical areas of the mammalian brain mediate va- lenced affective states, arising from essentially the same circuits in all species that have been studied (Panksepp, 1998a), I find "closed door" agnosticism to be either opportunistic or remarkably half-minded. If physicists had taken such positions to the internal structure of atoms, we would still be ignorant of the

physical nature of matter. We will remain as ignorant of the true organizational principles of the mammalian brain if we continue to ignore the central role of af- fective states in the governance of animal behavior and human mind. Considering the deep neuroanatomi- cal homologies in the organization of subcortical re- gions of the brain, it is likely that our capacity to decipher the circuitry that generates emotional pro- cesses in animals (e.g., as indexed by approach and avoidance, and conditioned place preferences and aversions) can provide an essential platform for un- derstanding which types of brain systems govern af- fective states, and perhaps the foundations of consciousness, in humans. At least, it will yield coher- ent theoretical propositions that can be empirically evaluated in humans using various biological (e.g., pharmacological) maneuvers. Thus, the type of agnos- ticism we should aspire to should be of the "open- door" variety. In any event, affective processes are still widely considered insubstantial by most neuroscientists, while considerably more dubious procedural concepts such as "reinforcement" are commonly discussed as if they are substantive biological realities simply be- cause animal behavior in prisonlike environments can be molded remarkably effectively by systematically applied "whips" and "carrots," all too commonly wielded by experimenters who relish the concept of linear control as opposed to chaotic neurodynamics. Need it be pointed out that to this day no one has yet demonstrated a "reinforcement" process to be oper- ate in molding the real-world behaviors of animals? If one really looked at all the evidence, one would be forced to conclude that concepts such as "reinforce- ment" are more likely to be the phlogiston of psychol- ogy than are the basic emotional value systems of ancient regions of the mammalian brain. The notion of reinforcement may simply be an inevitable hangover of the assumption that we could obtain clear conceptions of the major causes of animal actions simply by studying stimulus-control of behav- ior in semistarved animals tested under conditions where there were no effective behavioral alternatives other than those provided by the experimenter. This is a classic methodological flaw-an experimenter-im- posed demand characteristic-that introductory psy- chology students are trained to recognize and avoid in designing their own fledgling experiments. Although it is understandable why many would deem it to be an exquisitely desirable form of "experimental con- trol," we should not accept the delusion that such methodologies provide general insights into how the

Downloaded by [Gazi University] at 08:08 19 August 2014

246

Jaak Panksepp

spontaneous behavior of animals is regulated. Throughout the behaviorist era, the instruments of measurement were essential for creating the system- atic response patterns that were observed. The natural spontaneous behaviors of animals were neglected, and when those urges did rear their wondrous heads, they were deemed to reflect the "misbehavior of organ- isms." Today, a similar type of control-oriented mind- set is leading to a massive overdiagnosis of Attention Deficit -H yperacti vity "Disorders" in our American society (Panksepp, 1998c). Obviously, when animals have no reasonable be- havioral options, they are likely to take the single one offered to them by the experimenter. The remar kably robust and consistent patterns of behavior in starved animals within Skinner Boxes did provide a clear im- age of how most organisms will behave under strin- gent economic constraints, but we should be under no illusion that those methodologies provided powerful and deeply meaningful "general laws of behavior." Paradoxically, the realistic alternative-that evolu- tionarily provided instinctive feelings typically guide behavioral choices in the real world-remains as rare in the prevailing forms of dustbowl cognitivism as in the preceding behavioristic varieties. Although af- fective explanations would require us to specify rather precisely what we mean by internally valenced feel- ings, that is now an option that can be realistically envisioned (Panksepp, 1998b; Berridge, 2000). Feel- ings are not simply vague concepts that emerge from our linguistic abilities (Rolls, 1999) nor from our vast abilities to remember events transpiring in our brains (LeDoux, 1996) or to perceive events in our bodies (Damasio, 1994). They appear to be fundamental birth- rights of ancient centromedial regions of the human brain (Damasio, 1999) that we share with all the other mammals (Panksepp, 1998a). I do believe that brain evolution represented the animal's point of view much more than most behav- ioral neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists were ever willing to consider. To the best of our knowledge, all other mammals have basic emotional feelings and neurosymbolic "selves" based on neural foundations that are homologous to our own (Panksepp, 1998a,b). Affective or core consciousness is a very old brain function (Damasio, 1999; Panksepp, 1998a, 2000). Once we begin to provisionally entertain and to exper- imentally evaluate the existence of such brain pro- cesses, a coherent psychological science may emerge that is more accurate and more conceptually satisfying than the ones we now have (Watt, 1999). Such ap- proaches to mental life may also provide an intellec-

tual structure that can be more easily respected by many other disciplines, and it can be incorporated readily into revitalized forms of psychoanalytic thought.

Continuing Intellectual Polarities

From a psychoanalytic point of view, the stark, skele- tonlike structure of behavioristic thought often resem- bled a monstrosity that had not come to terms with many essential aspects of either human or animal life. As Whittle poignantly highlighted, the minds of stu- dents were all too often numbed at sacrificial altars of intellectual traditions that disenfranchised themselves from vast swaths of human experience and animal existence. The absence of any substantive or even- handed discussion of animate emotions in the behav- iorist literature was only the most evident case in point, and such attitudes remain alive and well today in both cognitively and neuroscientifically oriented disciplines. Indeed, our most recent attempt-to-publish experience has revealed to us once more how vital the antiemotional forces are within the scientific commu- nity-our discovery of what appears to be animal "laughter" has been most difficult to publish in tradi- tional scientific outlets (Panksepp and Burgdorf, 1999), as were our studies of animal "play" 20 years earlier, and of separation-induced "crying" before that (Panksepp, 1998a, chapters 14 and 15). The ac- ceptance of coherent primordial forces in the animal brain is apparently not welcome news in those disci- plines, for many practitioners would still like to con- ceptualize animals as mindless, nonconscious reflex machines rather than the spontaneously active agents that they are. The fact that basic emotions and motivations were so thoroughly devalued in twentieth-century ex- perimental psychology (including current cognitive varieties) remains the most tangible symbolic token, perhaps even a fundamental cause, of our' 'century of misunderstanding." At present, there are a remar kable number of investigators who still scoff at the idea that a variety of affective feelings may be intrinsic func- tions of the mammalian brain. Since the study sections of granting agencies are abundantly populated by such skeptics, work on many of the most important basic emotional systems of the mammalian brain, such as those that mediate anger, grief, and joy, continue to receive essentially no support, and thereby are receiv- ing remarkably little experimental attention. Likewise, pharmaceutical firms, whose research departments re-

Downloaded by [Gazi University] at 08:08 19 August 2014

Ongoing Discussion: Paul Whittle

247

main well populated by unreasonably radical behav- iorists (who brought them many slick behavioral technologies, but few productive ideas), are not devot- ing sufficient resources to trying to discover medica- tions for regulating specific emotions. Meanwhile exhorbitant amounts of money are being squandered, to put it bluntly but symbolically, on severely stressing animals to determine how nociceptive responses in their tails are modified by local spinal mechanisms. During the twentieth century, experimental psy- chology became a discipline that expected productive minds to subsist at the meager table of facts with which all reasonably alexithymic left-hemisphere types can agree. At the same time, psychoanalytic thought insisted that we must seek to deal with the full complexity of the human condition, but sadly, it did not encourage investigators to invest in compelling new empirical paradigms to clarify the ideas and con- cepts it wished to disseminate. Through that failure, it disenfranchised itself from the available sources of scientific support and respect. All too often, psychoan- alytic thought wished to capture the full circus carni- val life, and thereby found its most welcome home among literary theorists who felt no need to have their thought tempered by the purifying fire of experimental analysis. After all, humans do "love" a great story, and as often as not, the facts be damned. All too many proponents of psychoanalytic views have insisted that the diversity of individual lives can- not (and often, should not) be subjected to the dehu- manizing tools and perspectives of available experimental disciplines; for the subtleness of mind might not emerge unscathed from that. Indeed, there is much to be said against human sciences that wish to force the vast diversity of human mind and behavior into statistically constructed pigeonholes such as few- factor theories of personality and massive evolution- arily dictated modularities that all too often do not respect the remar kable plasticities and potentialities of the human brain. However, to the extent that psy- choanalytic thought is to be taken seriously in scien- tific circles, it will need to be linked to empirical observations. As many behaviorists might claim from their starkly ascetic perspectives-it is better to have an honest kernel of replicable knowledge rather than a banquet of verbally generated' 'understanding" laid out on quicksand. Fortunately, what was quicksand only a few decades ago, has become firm ground for theory building because of the neuroscience and mo- lecular biology revolutions. The fact that many emo- tions and motivations have specific circuits and molecular codes is the single most important finding

that allows us clear access into the neuronal nature of a growing number of primitive mental processes (Panksepp, 1986, 1993). In any event, what is needed now is for us to leave those old intellectual battles for dominance be- hind, and to seek new ways of thinking that allow multiple viewpoints a voice around a widening intel- lectual table. As Freud suspected, fundamental mental tendencies are realized within neuronal systems. As we come to absorb the lessons from neuroscience, we should also come to respect the need for accurate em- pirical descriptions of the human mind. We should not allow established dogma to be the arbiter of what constitutes generally accepted understanding-we should be guided by prediction generated by our ideas. Perspectives that yield no predictions must continue to be deemed sterile or premature.

Toward Reconciliations

Thus, we now stand at an intellectual juncture where there is enormous room for fruitful compromise, pro- ductive synthesis, and the development of robust new hybrid research strategies. Psychoanalytic thought without a new level of empiricism and experimental psychology without a fuller confrontation with the an- cient foundational value substrates of the mind, will only sustain needless polarities. As long as our intel- lectual systems sustain and nurture those polarities (e.g., in the structures of academic subdisciplines where one area need not pay attention to the relevant work of other areas), we will continue to discourage and alienate the best students who come to us still adept at using both of their cerebral hemispheres-at times miraculously so, considering the current domi- nance of left-brain oriented educational systems within our society. Thus, any future curriculum in psy- choanalysis should absorb the best psychobiology, neuroscience, and evolutionary psychology of the last few decades. Indeed, all the social sciences must come to terms with the evolved, epigenetic ally refined abili- ties of the brain. In therapy also, we must better recognize that there are two distinct personalities in each individual, of both right and left hemispheric varieties (Ross et aI., 1994; Schore, 1994), as well as deeper, subcortical affective ones. One aim of therapeutic enterprises, as well as our educational ones, should be to introduce them to each other (Schiffer, 1998). Obviously, the styles of both hemispheres need to be acknowledged not only in therapy but also in

Downloaded by [Gazi University] at 08:08 19 August 2014

248

Jaak Panksepp

our educational systems, as we reverse the sustained "misunderstandings" that characterized the twentieth century. Perhaps that can be achieved by all sides in- vesting in new empirically based perspectives with which all can agree. As argued eloquently by Uttal (2000), a newly refined form of behaviorism must be a player, but not the only player, in any future synthe- sis. I sometimes think that an emerging functional neu- roscience, based on evolutionary principles, can become a sufficiently robust and lasting foundation where all modes of thought can consiliate within the dynamics of the enchanted loom. The emerging evi- dence has now demonstrated that all brains contain a set of emotional and motivational value-creating sys- tems around which a great deal of behavior, both ratio- nal and irrational, revolves. The evolutionary divergences and progressions within these core pro- cesses among mammalian lines have probably been so modest that remarkable homologies still exist in brain systems that help regulate basic human and animal ac- tions. The continuous historical thread of DNA that still ties us to all other forms of life, is providing a richness of underlying controls, shared with all other animals, that should be satisfying to both hemispheres for many millennia (Raff, 1996), especially when it is viewed from the perspective of the environmental contexts in which it must unfurl its magic in remarkably plastic ways (Oyama, 1985). At the same time, the interactive mind-brain processes allow us to envision, all too eas- ily, evolved cerebral modules (e.g., Tooby and Cos- mides, 2000) where only general cerebral abilities may exist (Samuels, 1998; Panksepp and Panksepp, 2000). Thus, the major danger of theoretical approaches, as behaviorism always claimed (as a result of the multi- plication of "instincts" at the turn of the century), is the ease with which after-the-fact "just so" stories can be generated. Without strong corroborative evi- dence of conclusions, they just constitute plausible ex- amples of a vast number of theoretical possibilities, and it should be the responsibility of each investigator to cast potential explanations in ways that can be em- pirically falsified. Neuroscientific thought can anchor our theorizing realistically better than any other con- straint at the present time. For the foreseeable future, a most important so- cial and educational question will be: How shall we build modes of thought and educational systems that respect and convey the fullness of the shared seeds that evolution has provided not only for us but all our brethren creatures, without in any way demeaning the sustaining environments, both natural and cultural,

that allow those seeds to grow fruitfully? Parentheti- cally, we must now consider, with renewed energy, how we might discourage those who would flirt with disasters-for instance, the new eugenicists who would meddle with our germ lines, no doubt for the

betterment of the human spirit.

Could we really geneti-

cally engineer humans who feel the hedonic caress of bliss more than the sting of loss (e.g.,. wireheading. com), without doing irreparable harm to the social fab- ric? Surely sociocultural problems require sociocultu- ral solutions (e.g., Panksepp, 1998c), even though there should also be many biological aids for individu- als whose emotional processes are deficient or trouble- some. But we are only at the verge of realistically discussing such possibilities. The levels of genetic and epigenetic complexity that we must deal with are stag- gering (Oyama, 1985; Raff, 1996), and many of us find it troublesome that the analytically adept left- hemisphere types, with their dreams of reason, are once again contemplating playing carelessly with our most precious heritage. New and refined versions of neuropsychoanalytic thought could be one of the most powerful antidotes to blindly meddling with the human spirit. But to be effective, that may require a new and rigorous attitude to take hold--one where the full array of analytic tools from the experimental disciplines are fully imple- mented to demonstrate the general foundational out- lines and the individual details of human minds. That is exactly where experimental psychology has failed quite miserably during our past' 'century of misunder- standing." It has given us rather little knowledge about our ultimate concerns-the nature of the pericons- cious affective processes that surround and support our more acute forms of awareness. We must come to terms with the many deep and insistent feelings that guide the life choices we must make. We need to cre- ate cultural supports for encouraging a full scientific confrontation with those deep neuropsychological issues. We are now in a position to take some major steps along the path that Freud sketched in sparse out- line, and all too often in very preliminary and, at least from our present vantage, rather perplexing ways. I believe that we could have a major healing process-a synthesis that takes full advantage of the scientific- analytic traditions of the twentieth century-if we build a new and robust psychoanalytic science. I would like to share two views, one philosophical, and one practical, that may help us construct a unified sci- ence of human mind, based partly on animal brain research, where neuropsychological and psychoana-

Downloaded by [Gazi University] at 08:08 19 August 2014

Ongoing Discussion: Paul Whittle

249

lytic thought, not to mention scientific and humanistic thought in general, can subsist and support each oth- er's endeavors.

Philosophical Issues

I am fond of the possibility that we may be able to make progress if we only have a solid foundation of knowledge about biological values with which most reasonable thinkers could agree. I think that the neuro- psychic world, at least in the long run, is constructed largely as it appears to us subjectively-we make an enormous number of life choices based upon the way those choices make us feel. We avoid cold, hunger, thirst, fear, and loneliness. We all aspire to engage creatively with the world, seeking material and social resources and interactions that produce pleasures and satisfactions, to avoid all kinds of harm. Our adult social behavior is often so confusing only because we commonly do not follow the immediate dictates of our

feelings, but rather the paths

that seem instrumentally /

cognitively most propitious for our long-term goals. This leads to all varieties of conflicts and thwarting, which establish layers of emotional complexity upon our more basic urges. Accordingly, it has been a di- lemma to conceptualize adequately what those more ancient species of psychic activity, the basic feelings, consist of. However, now we have some credible hypotheses-they reflect the actions of ancient neural systems that were constructed, during long-spans of evolutionary time to generate various "intentions in action" (Searle, 1983)-which are ultimately experi- enced as dynamic value codes (i.e., feelings with a psychodynamic "shape") to guide our behavioral ac- tions (for summary, see Panksepp, 1998a). With addi- tional layers of cognitive evolution, as our ancestors came to compete more and more for the same limited resources, the options for effective behavioral action became ever more complex, yielding the possibility that we could have real intentions to act in voluntary ways (Spence and Frith, 1999). And now we hu- mans-the top predators-have hierarchically ar- ranged neural systems unparalleled in brain evolution, creating a subtlety of mind accompanied by a sense of power and dominion over the world that is unrivaled. This does not mean that the manner in which the brain achieves psychological capacities is transparent, and it is all too easy to acknowledge defeat, in princi- ple, and regress to behaviorist solutions that were re- markably successful for helping us address certain limited problems in rigorous empirical ways. It is all

too easy to have the type of psychobiological despair recently expressed by William Uttal (2000):

However, behaviorists generally argue that all re- sponses (or behaviors) are measures of the totality of the experience or awareness of the behaving organism and are the resultant of a combination of many differ- ent stimulus, organism, and response variables as well as the past experiences and (to an unknown, but usu- ally lesser, degree) the genetic heritage of the individ- ual. The combination is irretrievably tangled, according to behaviorists, and little if anything can be done to disentangle the combination. According to this viewpoint, behavior cannot tell us anything about the component processes or mechanisms that underlie the mental events. Indeed, because many possible mechanisms could lead to the same psychological event and there are many obscuring and transforming factors between behavior and mental processes, the barrier between the two domains is impenetrable as a matter of both deep principles and practical consider- ations [po 5].

Well, true enough, as long as we choose to leave the evolved circuitry of subcortical regions of the brain out of our overall analysis. Clearly, it is our newfound knowledge of the brain that can now save us from the endless quandary of the behaviorist nightmare de- scribed so poignantly above. We do have one robust path out of that bog of despair, and it is paved by neuroscientific knowledge that recognizes that basic psychological processes can be both caused by and realized in complex brain systems (Searle, 1983)-a path that has been resisted, until recently, by both psy- chology and psychoanalysis. However, a true understanding of affective pro- cesses in the mammalian brain allows us a conceptual path of remarkable clarity. The reality of both human and animal minds is based upon the dynamics of our ancient, and hence often shared, value systems. Those behavioral actions that make us feel good internally, in the many ways that have so rarely been discussed in modern neuroscience and experimental psychology, will be advanced. Those actions that make us feel worse internally, in the many ways that have hardly been discussed in modern experimental psychology or neuroscience, will be diminished. It may be as "sim- pIe" as that. Behaviorism may have had it backwards all along--environments mold behavior only to the extent that they can recruit the self-organizing affective func- tions of organisms. The only reason reinforcement

Downloaded by [Gazi University] at 08:08 19 August 2014

250

Jaak Panksepp

procedures work so well, especially in highly con- strained prisonlike circumstances, is because they tap into the dynamics of various underlying emotional sys- tems. There really is no unified brain function such as "reinforcement," only environmentally induced changes in our perception of world events, and our endeavors to maximize positive feelings and to mini- mize distress within those perceptual fields. However, as psychoanalytic thought has always recognized, to feel better, sometimes we must make psychological detours of enormous proportions, with many subtle interactive and often conflictual layers of being. The mind is like an onion. As we peel off the outside cog- nitive layers (many of which are less conscious and less intentional than most believe) we get closer and closer to the ancient animalian centers of gravity, the basic emotional and motivational barometers, that guided the evolution and epigenetic emergence of the surrounding complexities. As we peel away the thick cortical layers of cognitive potentials (the "tool boxes" of consciousness), the evolved animal mind (' 'id structures" full of a nonpropositional form of affective consciousness) reveals itself within the hu- man brain. If this is a realistic picture, it will, of course, be of foremost importance to come to terms with the fundamental nature of feelings. That is a project that has barely begun, and prominent investigators are still trying to conceptualize feelings as epiphenomenal spe- cies within the higher memorial and linguistic reaches of the brain (LeDoux, 1996; Rolls, 1999) where our highest levels of intentionality are elaborated (Spence and Frith, 1999), rather than in the evolutionary an- cient emotional processes of the brainstem where the core of mammalian consciousness emerged. I believe those forms of neodualism, that are yielding such won- derful peppercorns of fact, are fundamentally mis- guided. They do not adequately recognize the natural psychological kinds that arise from intrinsic, evolu- tionarily provided brain activities, and they continue to be lumbered by a form of dualism that could be resolved straightfowardly if they recognized how men- tal processes are not only caused by but also realized in certain operations of the brain (Searle, 1983, chap- ter 10). But there is now a robust alternative view, coherent with the general philosophic path laid out by Searle-that our values are fundamentally created by the ancient instinctual operating systems of the brain that we share with other animals (Panksepp, 1998a; Damasio, 1999). I believe the evidence has become overwhelm- ing-our basic feelings are fundamentally the reflec-

tions of certain brain stem neural systems in action. The experience of thirst arises from plasma volume and osmotic receptors in specific areas of the hypothal- amus, and their influence is distributed widely in sub- cortical regions of the brain, including those specific zones where many other forms of affect are generated (Panksepp, 1998b). The pleasure of taste is instanti- ated by specific subcortical systems of the mammalian brain (Berridge, 2000). Hunger, in both mouse and man, reflects some yet uncomputed combination of activities in brain Neuropeptide Y, dynorphin, orexin, and melanocyte stimulating hormone, glutamate, and GABA systems in action (Kalra et aI., 1999), with general modulation of all systems by the biogenic amines. Hunger and all the other basic feelings pene- trate the higher layers of the brain-mind, making it an issue of utmost cognitive concern when the primordial psychic ' 'powers" are sustained for any length of time. Also such feelings can also be "tokens," like any perceptual tokens such as the redness of apples, in our cognitive deliberations. However, it is funda- mentally incorrect, at least in my reading of the evi- dence, to believe that evolution left such ultimate concerns as biological values to be mere tokens within cognitive planning systems. Evolution, just as our sub- jective experience would suggest, made them "pow- ers" that are global state variables in diverse parliamentary lobbies of the mind-brain. Compelling hypotheses along these lines can fi- nally be generated for a host of basic feelings-emo- tions. If we take these perspectives seriously, we may finally be approaching a substantive understanding of

the shared foundations of human and animal nature,

although most of the hard experimental work and novel neuro-psychoanalytic theorizing lie ahead. It will be an exciting chapter of science when we learn to sift the basic genetically guided abilities from deriv- ative socially constructed processes in the analysis of how brain generates mind stuff. In any event, it would be most wonderful, if we were willing to invest the effort to make sure that we now head toward a century of mutually beneficial understanding rather than a furtherance of the types of polarization and misunderstanding that character- ized our recent past. This may require an intellectual rebirth-one that abandons outdated modes of thought that were acceptable in a previous era. Perhaps the most dangerous ghosts from the past are the varieties of Cartesian mind-body dualism that attempt to funda- mentally divide that which is indivisible (for review, see Damasio, 1994).

Downloaded by [Gazi University] at 08:08 19 August 2014

Ongoing Discussion: Paul Whittle

251

The cabalistic delusion that mind can exist with- out material dynamics is, I believe, the single most destructive idea that we have ever had in the brain-mind sciences. Although humans can buffer their affective processes, with volitional, working memory processes of their frontal, parietal, and tempo- ral cortices, and thereby withhold vario\ls primitive emotional reactions, most animals do not have such options, at least anywhere close to our human abilities, for emotional repression and regulation. The sustained emotional responses of animals probably reflect direct read-outs of their emotional states. The reason such isomorphisms are not accepted are largely because the neuroscientific behaviorists still believe that an analy- sis of the behavioral and physiological responses are the sole issues of importance in any neural analysis. Affect, they believe, can be deemed to be a superfluous issue. For some reason, they fail to accept or acknowl- edge that affect is the foremost personal concern that people have when they are in emotional states, and that animal affective neuroscience is essentially the only way we can find out, in any detailed way, how the basic human feelings are truly constructed in the brain. In any event, mind, brain, and behavior are com- pletely interpenetrant-and we cannot understand the resulting integrated processes unless we are willing to take all three perspectives concurrently to the study of animate actions. If behaviorists continue to just study emotional behaviors, with no concern for the affective experiences of animals, we will continue to have a dualistic view of the brain. If experimental psycholo- gists and psychoanalysts choose to pursue only the psychic reflections of brain processes, when the obvi~ ous three-pronged solution is readily available, we shall surely continue with another century of misun- derstanding. However, if we come to terms with the full tridimensional complexities, accepting that there are various unified psychic states arising from neuro- dynamic processes that arouse behavioral urges, then we may eventually have unified approaches to knowl- edge that can truly nourish the intellectual curiosity of future generations of students. In following such paths, we may also eventually generate psychiatric di- agnostic categories that are based on our knowledge of brain emotional and motivational systems, and their neural substrates (Panksepp, 1988, 2001), rather than those that are simply based on catalogs of external symptoms.

A Practical Proposal-A Psychoethology

Considering the high likelihood that all mammals share the same fundamental value structures in their

brains, from various motivational processes to the more subtle emotional ones, we can anticipate that animal brain research will clarify the fundamental na- ture of our biological values with a remar kable degree of clarity. Unfortunately, it will not be able to say much about our wider concerns-the cognitive atti- tudes and strategies that constitute the details of our mental lives. For that, there is no substitute for careful and insightful exploration of the human mind, which experimentally, at least, has barely begun. At the men- tal levels, there is bound to be much greater species variability (Budiansky, 1998), especially among the evolved cognitive adaptations of which evolutionary psychologists speak so persistently and eloquently (Tooby and Cosmides, 2000), even as they tend to disregard the primitive evolved systems of the brain- mind that have already been revealed (Panksepp, 1998a; Panksepp and Panksepp, 2000). Even though the debate concerning the experimental analyzability and accessibility of the mind is by no means resolved, and despite the failures of previous introspective tradi- tions (Uttal, 2000), in fact a credible form of experi- mental mentalism has barely started to be implemented. We must study the human mind as it naturally presents itself, and there is no better tool than free association. Although the narrative data streams that will need to be analyzed are bound to be hypercomplex, it is time to begin evaluating the affective-eognitive ramifications of the human mind with the best empirical approaches available-not only to describe group tendencies but also the unique- ness of individuals. New methodologies-naturalistic approaches in which scientists and humanists can be equally involved-may help in such endeavors. I would call one such new approach psychoethology. While traditional ethology consisted of the care- ful and detailed study of animal and human behavioral actions, psychoethology could aspire to do the same for the human mind. What is desperately needed is a generally acceptable methodology whereby mental contents can be observed without all the interference that the flow of life provides. Of course, the prototypic psychoanalytic couch, with a human actively listening at the head but not intruding actively in the narrative flow, seems to be an ideal methodology. The human narrative, unhindered by the momentary pressures of life, needs to be the initial database upon which addi- tional layers of substantive analysis may eventually be experimentally imposed. The reason such data, especially from regular ev- eryday folks, have not been collected is obvious-the data stream is so rich, and an empirical analysis so

Downloaded by [Gazi University] at 08:08 19 August 2014

252

Jaak Panksepp

complex, that only a few have had the heart to begin (Dahl, 1998; Dahl, 1998). As always, there is the per- sistent problem-that the listener might unduly bias the mental flow with their own remarks, with the smallest nuance being able to sway the stream of free associations into different eddies and currents. There is also the possibility that without the natural verbal give and take that can only occur between humans, only a chaotic, unsystematic stream of data might emerge. Perhaps a few well-placed standardized ques- tions would help steer the mind into desired channels that can be more easily analyzed. In any event, to my way of thinking, we need to give the strategy a vigor- ous try, before abandoning hope. At present, the meth- odological problems are not insurmountable. Now that we are in a computational age, where voice-recognition technologies and automated tran- scription of ongoing narratives is possible, and content analysis programs have been created, even for the evaluation of emotional issues (Pennebaker, Mayne, and Francis, 1997), the concept has a realistic chance of being widely implemented. Also, for the more sub- tle psychodynamic issues, where layers of meaning are embedded in the narrative that no computer could yet decode, there may be many individuals, from the humanities, with remarkable language skills, who might be willing to participate as decoders in such projects. The data stream also needs to be analyzed from traditional psychoanalytic perspectives, and the three types of analysis need to be contrasted. Obvi- ously, participants in such studies would have to agree to longer term time and emotional commitment than is common in most psychological experiments, and there might have to be a considerable learning phase in order for people to become comfortable in such situations. Participants will have to feel themselves to be compatriots in the search for knowledge, as op- posed to being mere "subjects" as has long been de rigueur in more traditional psychological studies. As experimental manipulations, one might con- sider various mood and motivational induction proce- dures prior to analytic episodes. Also, instead of allowing a totally free stream of associations, it may be wise to utilize a few existential questions (e.g., What kind of person would you like to be?) to help guide the narrative flow onto some common issues. Eventually investigators may be able to devise a vari- ety of standard challenges to systematically evaluate resulting emotional tendency. It would be important to have good emotional-personality measures on sub- jects to evaluate output differences as a function of temperament. It would also be good to monitor the

facial expressions and changes in vocal prosody as people systematically share their lives. The utility of drug manipulations will, of course, be enormous, es- pecially if stable baselines can be established (e.g., Knutson et aI., 1998). Indeed, an enormous number of psychobiological predictions from animal studies can already be generated for such interventions (Pank- sepp, 1998a). The systematic study of psychiatric and neurological patients should be highly informative (e.g., Solms, 1997). In any event, the establishment of adequate psychological descriptions of normal human mental activities, in their full richness, seems to be a project deserving a great deal of experimental atten- tion. If such methodologies proved to be effective, they may eventually be capable of being used for diag- nostic and prognostic purposes in a new era of human- istic psychiatry. The issue of how accessible the human mind is to systematic measurement (i.e., Uttal, 2000) must re- main an open issue until a great deal more research has been conducted. I am optimistic that some credible and replicable signals, especially in the study of basic emotional systems, will emerge from such analyses once they are adequately implemented. Psychoanalytic approaches, as molded by the constraints of empiri- cism, provide an excellent model of how we might proceed. Of course, it will be impossible to fathom the internal structures of mind simply from an analysis of input and output functions (since there are an infin- ity of intervening possibilities). However, with solid neuroscience conceptions concerning the sources of the basic emotions and motivations shared by all mam- malian brains (e.g., MacLean, 1990; Panksepp, 1998a; Damasio, 1999), we should be able to make great strides in analyzing the Niagara of psychoanalytic data that could be extracted from human narratives. It will be fascinating to see how basic affective processes, the natural kinds of the mind, guide the environmentally constructed meanderings of the cognitive stream. It will be interesting to see whether many psychoanalytic concepts like the defense mechanisms of repression and reaction formation can be demonstrated to be nat- ural kinds of the brain-mind, or whether they are sim- ply derivative processes of how memory fields are constructed. Also, when we begin to take a deep emo- tional-motivational perspective to human mind, the notion that introspective reports have to be veridical descriptions of relationships in the external world be- comes less relevant than they might be from more strictly cognitive vantages (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982; Nisbett and Wilson, 1997). The

Downloaded by [Gazi University] at 08:08 19 August 2014

Ongoing Discussion: Paul Whittle

253

human mind may have more affective "irrationality" in it than logical clarity. Experimental psychologists have too often wished to ignore that, but it should be studied rather than being seen as a shortcoming. In any event, to determine whether stable patterns of cog- nitive activities emerge during emotional states, psy- choethology needs to be given a fair empirical hearing.

Coda

I am in complete agreement with Whittle in his call for a new pluralism in the way in which we approach the systematic study of the human mind, especially its emotional forces. Brain psychodynamics can only be realistically approached from many concurrent, and mutually respectful, points of view. A long time ago, physicists realized that they could not understand the hidden underbelly of nature by simply ascribing to one perspective. Subatomic entities needed to be conceptu- alized not only as particles but also as wave dynamics. We are now approaching a comparable stage of intel- lectual development in the brain-mind sciences. Every brain-mind phenomenon must be approached from multiple points of view. The idea that one should dis- card psychological analysis completely in preference for a neural eliminativism (Churchland, 1995), al- though rather popular among neuroscientists and per- haps even appropriate for many brain phenomena, is a view that encourages polarization of attitudes as op- posed to a realistic, multidimensional confrontation with many of the most important mind-brain issues. Although mental events, as typically conceptual- ized in psychology, often do not help much in ex- plaining specific behavioral acts, we often fail to acknowledge that adaptive actions are often long-term processes rather than ones that can be captured by brief laboratory experiments. If we recognized that mind is just another way of viewing the complexity of the brain in action (Searle, 1983), we would be more tempted to open up the intellectual campfire round which we share our perspectives rather than narrowing it. Unfortunately, a penetrating institutionalized strength of will to stand behind the utility of pluralist points of view has yet to emerge within our prevailing scientific disciplines. This, I believe, simply reflects our desire to divide and conquer rather than our desire to create a rich banquet of mind-brain science that can nourish our desire to understand the human condition. The basic emotions are a poignant case in point. Experimental psychology, especially its cognitive and behavioral neuroscience forms, have not been able to

construct a realistic way to discuss and analyze such important issues. We are stuck in dualistic modes of thought where emotional feelings supposedly have no causal efficacy (because they are matters of "mind") and all of the weight of responsibility is placed on supposedly nonfeeling neural circuits, with perhaps a causally inefficacious (epiphenomenal) form of "feel- ing" emerging from higher cortical systems that deal informationally with "tokens" of subcortical infor- mation (e.g., LeDoux, 1996). Is it not much more reasonable, at least from an evolutionary point of view, that emotional feelings are part and parcel of ancient instinctual neural systems in action? In other words, emotional feelings arise rather directly from the arousal of certain primitive neural systems (Panksepp, 1998b). That is the view that most of the critical evidence is pointing toward. In my esti- mation, no dualistic-type readout by a higher mind is needed to create affective states, even though higher memorial abilities are surely able to extend those neu- ral activities, those feelings, in space and time, as to- kens in working memory so as to permit more sophisticated cognitive strategies. A moving image for one fundamental emotional process that I have studied extensively by focusing on the separation-distress circuitry of the vertebrate brain comes from James Saunders' play Next Time I'll Sing For You, and it goes like this:

There lies behind every thing, and you can believe this or not as you wish, a certain quality which we may call grief. It's always there, just under the sur- face, just behind the fa~ade, sometimes very nearly exposed, so that you can dimly see the shape of it as you can see sometimes through the surface of an ornamental pond on a still day, the dark, gross, inhu- man outline of a carp gliding slowly past; when you realize suddenly that the carp were always there be- low the surface, even while the water sparkled in the sunshine, and while you patronized the quaint ducks and the supercilious swans, the carp were down there, unseen. It bides its time, this quality. And if you do catch a glimpse of it, you may pretend not to notice or you may turn suddenly away and romp with your children on the grass, laughing for no reason. The name of this quality is grief.

By studying the neural shapes and dynamics of these' 'carp" that glide under the surface of our every- day experiences, we can come to terms with the intrin- sic coherences of the affective mechanism that evolution created with the mammalian brain. We can

Downloaded by [Gazi University] at 08:08 19 August 2014

254

Jaak Panksepp

finally understand the urges and pleasures of sex, the pains of hunger and cold, and the pleasures of food and warmth. We can come to terms with the fundamental nature of our desires, our anxieties, our grief and joy. We can understand what exhilaration and fatigue are all about. They are the centers of gravity around which the massive interweaving of higher cognitive activities revolve and from where our spontaneous intentions in action emerge. Although we cannot always see those ancient emotional "carp" as readily as the "supercilious swans" of our cognitive activities, there should be no question, they are there. They constitute universal human and animal feelings that all normal mammals experience. Their organic sources go back to an ances- tral past with which we in neuroscience, psychoanaly- sis and evolutionary psychology are still struggling to understand in scientific terms. Their nature can finally be penetrated by pursuing the types of animal brain research that Freud pursued as a young man. They are issues that should not be shunned by any of the sci- ences of the mind, for the patterns of cognitive arousal, as expressed in the natural meanderings of the human mind, may tend to fall into place once we recognize those forces. There is a great deal to be learned from the past "century of misunderstanding" but only if all of us-Ieft-, right-, and both-hemisphere types-gather respectfully around the same intellectual banquet to discuss all relevant issues openly. As we do this, we could plan rigorous studies that have a chance of re- vealing the multifaceted dynamics of the affective pro- cesses-the ancestral "voices of the genes" (Buck, 1999; Panksepp, 1998a)-that evolution built into our brains a very long time ago.

References

Beeman, M., & Chiarello, C., Ed. (1998), Right Hemisphere Language Comprehension: Perspectives from Cognitive Neuroscience. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Berridge, K. C. (2000), Microstructure of affective taste reactivity patterns. Neurosci. & Behav. Rev., 24: 173-

198.

Budiansky, S. (1998), If a Lion Could Talk: Animal Intelli- gence and the Evolution of Consciousness. New York:

Free Press. Buck, R. (1999), The biological affects: A typology. Psy- cholog. Rev., 106:301-336. Churchland, P. M. (1995), The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Clark, A. (1997), Being There, Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Dahl, H. (1998), The voyage of el Rubaiyat to the discovery of FRAMES. In: Empirical Studies of the Therapeutic Hour, ed. R. F. Bornstein & J. M. Masling. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, pp. 179-227. Damasio, A. R. (1994), Descartes' Error. New York: G. P. Putnam's.

  • -- (1999), The Feeling of What Happens: Body and

Emotions in the Making of Consciousness. New York:

Harcourt Brace. Fiore, S. M., & Schooler, J. W. (1998), Right hemisphere

contributions to creative problem solving: Converging evidence for divergent thinking. In: Right Hemisphere Language Comprehension: Perspectives from Cognitive

Neuroscience, ed. M. Beeman & C. Chiarello. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 349-371. Gazzaniga, M. S. (1998), The Mind's Past. Berkeley: Uni- versity of California Press. Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982), Judgment Under Certainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Kalra, S. P., Dube, M. G., Pu, S., Xu, B., Horvath, T. L., &

Kalra, P. S. (1999), Interacting appetite-regulating path- ways in the hypothalamic regulation of body weight. Endocrine Rev., 20:68-100. Knutson, B., Wolkowitz, O. M., Cole, S. W., Chan, T., Moore, E. A., Johnson, R. C., Terpstra, J., Turner, R. A., & Reus, V. I. (1998), Selective alteration of personal- ity and social behavior by serotonergic intervention. Amer. J. Psychiatry, 155:373-379. LeDoux, J. E. (1996), The Emotional Brain. New York:

Simon & Schuster. MacLean, P. D. (1990), The Triune Brain in Evolution: Role in Paleocerebral Functions. New York: Plenum Press. Macmillan, M. (1997), Freud Evaluated, rev. ed. Cam- bridge, MA: MIT Press. Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, R. D. (1997), Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psy- cholog. Rev., 84:231-259. Ornstein, R. (1997), The Right Mind: Making Sense of the Hemispheres. New York: Harcourt Brace. Oyama, S. (1985), The Ontogeny of Information: Develop- mental Systems and Evolution. Cambridge, U.K.: Cam- bridge University Press. Panksepp, J. (1986), The neurochemistry of behavior. Ann. Rev. Psychology, 37:77-107.

--- (1988), Brain emotional circuits and psychopathol- ogies. In: Emotions and Psychopathology, ed. M. Clynes & J. Panksepp. New York: Plenum Press. --- (1990), Can "mind" and behavior be understood

without understanding the brain?: A response to Bunge.

New Ideas in Psychology, 8:139-149.

--- (1993), Neurochemical control of moods and emo- tions: Amino acids to neuropeptides. In: The Handbook of Emotions, ed. M. Lewis & J. Haviland. New York:

Guilford Press, pp. 87-107.

Downloaded by [Gazi University] at 08:08 19 August 2014

Ongoing Discussion: Paul Whittle

255

--- (1998a), Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions. New York: Oxford

University Press.

tions. Neuropsychiatry, Neuropsychol., & Behav. Neu- rol., 7:1-19.

Samuels, R. (1998), Evolutionary psychology and the mas-

---

(1998b), The periconscious substrates of conscious-

sive

modularity

hypothesis.

Brit.

J.

Philos.

Sci.,

ness: Affective states and the evolutionary origins of the

49:575-602.

 

SELF. J. Consciousness Studies, 5:566-582.

--- (1998c), Attention deficit disorders, psychostimu- lants, and intolerance of childhood playfulness: A trag-

edy in the making? Curro Direct. Psycholog. Sci.,

7:91-98.

--- (1999), Emotions as viewed by psychoanalysis and neuroscience: An exercise in consilience (and accompa-

nying commentaries). This Journal, 1:15-89.

--- (2000), Affective consciousness and the instinctual motor system: The neural sources of sadness and joy. In:

The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-organization, Advances in Consciousness Research,

ed. R. Ellis & N. Newton. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. --- (2001), The long-term psychobiological conse- quences of infant emotions: Prescriptions for the 21 st

century. J. Infant Ment. Health, 22:132-173.

--- Burgdorf, J. (1999), Laughing rats? Playful tickling arouses high-frequency ultrasonic chirping in young ro-

dents. In: Toward a Science of Consciousness, Vol. 3,

ed. S. Hameroff, D. Chalmers, & A. Kazniak. Cam-

bridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 231-244.

  • --- Panksepp, J. B. (2000), The seven sins of evolution-

ary psychology. Evolution & Cognition, 6:108-131.

Pennebaker, J. W., Mayne, T. J., & Francis, M. E. (1997), Linguistic predictors of adaptive bereavement. J. Per-

sonality & Soc. Psychol., 72:863-871. Pert, C. B. (1997), Molecules of Emotion: Why You Feel

the Way You Do. New York: Scribner.

Raff, R. A. (1996), The Shape of Life: Genes, Development and the Evolution of Animal Form. Chicago: University

of Chicago Press. Rolls, E. T. (1999), The Brain and Emotion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ross, E. D., Homan, R. W., & Buck, R. (1994), Differential

hemispheric lateralization of primary and social emo-

Schiffer, F. (1998), Of Two Minds: The Revolutionary Sci- ence of Dual-Brain Psychology. New York: Free Press. Schore, A. N. (1994), Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self: The Neurobiology of Emotional Development.

Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Searle, J. R. (1983), Intentionality: An Essay in the Philoso-

phy of Mind. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

--- (1992), The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge,

MA: MIT Press. Shaywitz, B. A., Shaywitz, S. E., Pugh, K. R., & Constable, R. T. (1995), Sex differences in the functional organiza- tion of the brain for language. Nature, 373:607-609.

Skinner, B. F. (1953), Science and Human Behavior. New

Yor k: Macmillan.

Solms, M. (1997), The Neuropsychology of Dreams: A Clin-

ico-Anatomical Study. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. --- Nersessian, E. (1999), Freud's theory of affect:

Questions for neuroscience. This Journal, 1(1 ):5-14. Spence, S. A., & Frith, C. D. (1999), Towards a functional anatomy of volition. J. Consciousness Studies, 6: 11-29. Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2000), Toward mapping the evolved functional organization of mind and brain. In:

The New Cognitive Neuroscience, ed. M. S. Gazzaniga.

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 1167-1178.

Uttal, W. R. (2000), The War between Mentalism and Be- haviorism: On the Accessibility of Mental Processes.

Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Watt, D. F. (1999), Consciousness and emotion. J.

sciousness Studies, 6: 191-200.

Con-

Jaak Panksepp Department of Psychology Bowling Green State University

Bowling Green, OB 43403

e-mail: jpankse@bgsu.net

Commentary by Howard Shevrin (Ann Arbor)

Whittle has written an incisive and often witty explo- ration of the ways to answer the question posed in his title. Essentially he tells us to "mind the gap," an expression familiar to London Underground passen-

Howard Shevrin, Ph.D., is Professor of Psychology, Department of Psychiatry, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

gers that warns them to avoid stepping into the space between train and platform. But Whittle is doing more than warning us about the "gap" between experimen- tal psychology and psychoanalysis, he wants us to un- derstand why there is a gap, and if it is worth closing, or if the gap itself constitutes a potentially fruitful divergence between the two fields.