Oslo, April 2010

Sigmund Karterud

Anthony Bateman

8.1.

Mentalization

Definition
Mentalization-based treatment (MBT) is grounded in the theory of mentalization.
Mentalization is both a self-reflective and an interpersonal affair (the problem of other
minds). It refers to the act of understanding oneself and others, and ones own experiences
and actions, in terms of mental phenomena, i.e. assumptions, affects, attitudes, wishes, hopes,
knowledge, intentions, plans, dreams, false beliefs, deceptions, etc. The alternative to a
mentalized understanding of self and others is a person who is driven by outer forces, by
simple stimulus-responses, by coincidences, by crude drives and instincts, by disease
processes, etc. Mentalizing can be so simple and obvious that we overlook it, but it can also
be a very challenging business. It presupposes the ability to direct ones attention to relevant
aspects of intrapsychic and interpersonal phenomena, and for the most part it is implicit and
automatic. In daily life we mentalize each other constantly by attributing intentions to each
other, consciously or unconsciously. Explicit mentalizing means that we engage in a
conscious reflection upon our own and others motives and self states. Because of the very
nature of our minds, it will often be the case that our mentalizing endeavours will fail in the
sense that we often misunderstand ourselves and others. We can never be absolutely sure of
what other people are thinking or feeling, and our own thoughts and feelings are also often
vague and unclear. The less proficient we are in mentalizing, the more often we
misunderstand.
Historical roots
The concept of mentalization belongs to a tradition within French psychoanalysis,
understood as the process whereby drives and affects are transformed into symbols (Bouchard
& Lecours 2008). There is also an important link to the British psychoanalyst Wilfred Bions
theory (1971) of thinking. The main contributors to the modern content of the concept,
however, are Professor Peter Fonagy and co-workers (2002). The epicentre has been
University College and the Anna Freud Centre in London, but the ongoing discussion about
mentalization in the literature has engaged a wide range of researchers and clinicians (Leuten
et al., 2010). The concept is embedded in a theoretical network containing elements from
evolutionary theory, attachment theory, developmental psychology, psychoanalysis,
neurobiology, group dynamics and personality pathology, to mention the most important.
Historically, it is closely connected to John Bowlbys theories (1969) concerning internal
working models in the mind of young children, contingent upon internal representations of
their attachment experiences. Fonagy and co-workers have developed a general theory of self
development which is rooted in the attachment relationship (Fonagy 1991, 1995, Fonagy &
Target 1997). The theory implies that the attachment relationship among Homo Sapiens is
expanded in scope and function. In addition to providing a system for dealing with fears that
can threaten the security and survival of children, it has become the most important arena for
developing the self and the ability to reflect upon mental states.
Mentalizing, self-development and attachment
The theory of self development and mentalization is thoroughly explained in the
volume Affect regulation, mentalization and the development of the self (Fonagy et al.
2002). Basic questions concerning self development are discussed: How is the self -- which is
the prerequisite for subjectivity and self-reflection -- constituted? (e.g. the experience of being

separated from other people and things, to be the origin of ones own actions, to be the agent
and owner of ones own thoughts and affects, to be able to reflect upon these affects and
thoughts as ones own) The most important thesis is that the attachment relationship is an
arena where the childs mental states are experienced, interpreted and mirrored/reflected by an
empathic other; and that it is in this arena the child develops an awareness of himself/herself.
A considerable body of research demonstrates that insecure attachment relationships are
associated with a diminished ability to understand the intentions of others and leads to a
generally lower level of social competence. In particular, disorganized attachment in
childhood is associated with psychopathology in adulthood.
The general theory of self development is in a process of expansion. One important
contributor is the Hungarian psychologist Gyrgy Gergely, particularly on the problem of
how the core self (which is found among other primates as well) develops into the humane
reflective self (Gergely & Unoka 2008). This development is closely linked to the formation
of self representations and object representations, and to the integration with primary
emotional systems. In order to be able to reflect over oneself and others (objects), the self and
other (and the relationship to important others) must be represented in the memory system.
These representations must be retrievable in the working memory and must be able to be
linked to the past, present and future, and to feelings and relevant alternatives. Moreover, a
consistent self requires there being a unified actor who directs the various selfrepresentations, object representations and affect states. Without a reflexive distance, the
individual risks being lost in emotions.
Mentalization theory describes how an individual -- through interaction with a
mentalizing other -- achieves a reflexive dialogue with himself or herself. The individual
learns social tools that permit him/her to direct pressures arising from activation of the
primary emotional systems into culturally acceptable forms of expression. It is a theory that
integrates self-consciousness with temperament.
Concepts from developmental psychology that are important to be familiar with
(because they are also used in the clinical treatment literature) are teleological understanding,
psychic equivalence thinking, pretend mode, prementalistic thinking and representational
thinking.
Starting at the age of approximately 9 months, children develop the ability to
differentiate goals from the means to the goal, adapt actions to new situations and select the
means (among various options) that most effectively lead to the goal. One can speak about
the self as a goal-oriented (teleological) actor. The capacity for goal-oriented action does not
require the capacity for cause-effect thinking or the ability to understand intention as cause,
but it links the action to a goal. The term teleological is also used about the mode of
thinking in regressive conditions when patients have difficulties believing anything else than
concrete goal-oriented actions: I wont believe it until I see it and If you care about me,
then you will.
From the age of about two years, the child develops the ability to understand that
others can have intentions (wishes, needs) that can lead to action, without having to
experience the action in real time. For example, the child is now able to contribute in relation
to others preferences and to comfort others. We are now talking about the self as an
intentional actor. This ability to think in mentalistic terms is also called a nave theory of
mind. The child is now able to attribute generalised intentions to others, but is governed by a
principle of mental coherence, i.e. that he or she still does not grasp the concept that others

can contain contradicting intentions. At about this time the child establishes the concept of
me. Action impulses, thoughts and feelings become more and more mine. The self is
beginning to take form as a self-reflecting actor.
The theory of prementalistic thinking is central to the developmental model. Initially,
thinking is assumed to be at the level of psychic equivalence, which means that the child is
unable to differentiate between inner and outer worlds or between fantasy and reality. These
perspectives are yet to be acquired. One way they are acquired is through play. The nature of
play is precisely to simulate contrasting perspectives on reality. In play, the child imagines
that others are different than they really are. Through play the child learns to juggle between
fantasy and reality. It is most amusing when the two are close together and it is difficult to
differentiate fantasy from reality, e.g. when daddy is almost like the evil troll. When the
ability to differentiate fantasy from reality is not properly developed, the individual continues
to alternate between psychic equivalence thinking where the world might become too real,
and a pretend mode thinking which is too separated from reality.
From about the age of four, the child begins to develop a more mature theory of
mind, meaning that intentions are understood as parts of a complex network of
representations of self and other. Such representations motivate behaviour and can more or
less be grounded in reality. The reference now is to the self as a representational actor and it
is at this stage that children first have the capacity to mentalize reasonably accurately.
Infantile amnesia (prior to the age of approximately three) is due to the inability to code
personal experiences as uniquely personal events, i.e. that happened to me in an
autobiographical sense. From now on, the mentalization capacity is growing quickly. The
challenge is to be able to differentiate fantasy from reality in an even more sophisticated
manner, i.e. that thoughts and feelings are representations of reality and not reality itself.
The autobiographical self (from approx. 6 years) is based on the self as a
representational actor. This represents a more thorough transition from procedural memory to
declarative memory (it happened to me). Now one can construct more realistic and coherent
stories about ones own actions and experiences. This ability, however, presupposes the
capacity to maintain multiple representations of oneself and others so that time sequences and
causal and meaningful relations can be made between them. In general, one can say that the
developmental course has as its goal the establishment of the structures and abilities that are
the preconditions for a representational and autobiographical self. To attain this goal depends
on the emotional interaction between the child and attachment figures.
Mentalization theory emphasizes mentalizing ability as the most important aspect of
the self. It provides the self with cohesion. Without mentalization, the individual would be
subject to changing and inconsistent self states constantly at the mercy of inner and outer
events. Mentalization provides meaning and context to these changing self-states. It puts them
in the perspective of ones own life history and ones impressions of other people, ongoing
interactions and the future. The ability to mentalize is genetically grounded, but must be
realized through others in order to become manifest.
Mentalization and personality disorders
Mentalization theory is closely associated with the concept and theories of borderline
personality disorder (BPD). This connection reflects the close working relationship between
Peter Fonagy and Anthony Bateman in London, both analysts and active clinicians who
treat

and carry out research on difficult-to-treat borderline patients. Together they developed
mentalization-based treatment (MBT) (Bateman and Fonagy 2004). It is however important to
emphasize that impaired mentalization ability is something that characterizes all personality
disorders. To a certain extent this is self-evident since one of the general criteria for a
personality disorder is that the person suffers from maladaptive thought patterns, e.g. a
tendency to distort and/or interpret interpersonal events in a rigid manner. Mentalization
theory explicates what characterizes distorted and rigid interpretational patterns. The focus is
on prementalistic thought patterns: psychic equivalence thinking and pretend mode. Psychic
equivalence thinking is schematic, concrete, black-white and insisting. The reality it refers to
is too real. There is no room for other perspectives. In pretend mode the relationship to
reality is diffuse. Thought (and speech) is vague, metaphoric and emotionally flat. Cognitive
theory describes distorted and rigid interpretations as maladaptive cognitive schema.
Mentalization theory is less schematic. It emphasizes the importance of affect, context and
attachment more strongly and the therapeutic consequences are different. But the main point
is the same: in all personality disorders the ability to properly interpret interpersonal events
intersubjectively, is impaired to some degree.
An individual suffering from paranoid personality disorder will, for example, interpret
other people as more evil than they actually are, and themselves as more vulnerable to a
conspiracy than that which is actually the case. This is a consequence of the persons impaired
mentalization ability. But the theory goes even further. It also refers to unmentalized
affects. In the case of paranoid PD, there is a chronic narcissistic rage, an alien self and
projective identification (Fonagy et al. 2002). An individual suffering from paranoid PD
attracts every manner of humiliation without ever being able to forget them. Total
irreconcilability is at its heart and the individuals thoughts revolve around the theme of
vengeance. It is this interwoven complex of self representations, affects and representations of
others which is poorly mentalized. This means that when the individual experiences new or
old humiliations, he/she quickly resorts to psychic equivalence thinking and becomes rigid,
unreasonable and insisting on his/hers own version of reality. Previous humiliating
experiences and the resulting rage take centre stage and block out nuanced intersubjective
thinking. Accordingly, mentalization-based treatment will necessarily focus on affects.
Mentalization theory emphasizes the general phenomenon which the example of
paranoid PD illustrates: that thinking is influenced by ones emotional state. If one is
interested and curious, then one is likely to have optimistic thoughts. If one is depressed, one
is likely to have sad and distressing thoughts. If one is manic, one has lofty and unrealistic
thoughts. If one is scared, one may have disconcerting thoughts, and if one is angry, the focus
may be on revenge. Mentalization theory integrates both a bottom-up and a top-down
perspective. Emotions influence us from below in a way that can make us lose a more
overall perspective on reality. The ability to mentalize allows us to approach emotions from
above and put them into perspective. Mental health depends on a balance between the two
extremes: lost in emotions or lost in cognition.
Dimensions of mentalizing
Mentalizing is a multi-dimensional construct and breaking it down into dimensional
components is helpful in understanding mentalization based treatment (MBT). Broadly
speaking mentalization can be considered as four intersecting dimensions: automatic/
controlled or implicit/ explicit, internal/ externally based, self/other orientated, and

cognitive/affective process. Each of these dimensions possibly relates to a different

neurobiological system (REF).
None of us, manage to integrate all components of mentalizing all of the time and nor
should we. Normal people will at times move from understanding themselves and others
according to their perceptions of what is in the mind to explanations based on the physical
environment I must have wanted to because I did it; If they behave like that they
obviously want to spoil everything. This is particularly the case in powerful affective states
when our cognitive processes fragment in the face of a wave of emotion. So, personality
pathology does not simply arise because of a loss of mentalizing. It occurs for a number of
reasons.
First it matters how easily we lose it. Some individuals are sensitive and reactive,
rapidly moving to non-mentalizing modes in a wide range of contexts.
Second it matters how quickly we regain mentalizing once it has been lost. We have
suggested that a combination of frequent, rapid and easily provoked loss of mentalizing
within interpersonal relationships with associated difficulties in regaining mentalizing and the
consequent lengthy exposure to non-mentalizing modes of experience is characteristic of
borderline personality disorder (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). Individuals with borderline
personality disorder may be normal mentalisers except in the context of attachment
relationships. They tend to misread minds, both their own and those of others, when
emotionally aroused. As their relationship with another person moves into the sphere of
attachment the intensification of relationships means that their ability to think about the
mental state of another can rapidly disappear. When this happens, prementalistic modes of
organising subjectivity emerge, psychic equivalence and pretend mode, which have the
power to disorganise these relationships and destroy the coherence of self-experience that the
narrative provided by normal mentalization generates.
Third, mentalizing can become rigid, lacking flexibility. People with paranoid
disorder often show rigid hypermentalization with regard to their own internal mental states
and lack any real understanding of others {Nicolo, 2007 #9372} (Dimaggio et al., 2008). At
best they are suspicious of motives and at worst they see people as having specific malign
motives and cannot be persuaded otherwise. The mental processes of people with antisocial
personality disorder (ASPD) are less rigid than those found in paranoid people. Their
mentalizing shows flexibility at times but when uncertainty arises they structure within prementalistic ways of organising their mental processes and how they understand the world and
their relationships.
Finally the balance of the components of mentalizing can be distorted. Patients with
narcissistic personality have a well-developed self focus but a very limited understanding of
others. In contrast patients with ASPD are experts at reading the inner states of others, even to
the point that they misuse this capacity to coerce or manipulate them, whilst being unable to
develop any real understanding of their own inner world. In addition they lack abilities to read
accurately certain emotions, an externally based component of mentalizing, and fail to
recognise fearful emotions from facial expressions. This implicates dysfunction in neural
structures such as the amygdala that subserve fearful expression processing. Marsh and Blair
{, 2008 #9354} in a meta-analysis of 20 studies showed a robust link between antisocial
behaviour and specific deficits in recognizing fearful expressions. This impairment was not
attributed solely to task difficulty.

Implicit/explicit mentalizing
Most of us mentalize automatically in our everyday lives - not to do so would be
exhausting. Automatic or implicit mentalizing allows us to rapidly form mental
representations based on previous experience and to use those as a reference point as we
gather further information to confirm or disconfirm our tentative understanding of
motivations. This is reflexive, requires little attention and is beneath the level of our
awareness (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006). If it does not seem to be working we move to more
explicit or controlled mentalizing which requires effort and attention. It is therefore slower
and more time-consuming and most commonly done verbally. Our capacity to manage this
controlled mentalizing varies considerably and the threshold at which we return to automatic
mentalizing is, in part, determined by the response we receive to our explicit attempts to
understand someone in relation to ourselves and the secondary attachment strategies we
deploy when aroused and under stress.
Behavioural, neurobiological and neuroimaging studies suggest that the move from
controlled to automatic mentalizing and thence to non-mentalizing modes is determined by a
switch between cortical and sub-cortical brain systems (Arnsten, 1998) (Lieberman, 2007)
and that point at which we switch is determined by our attachment patterns. Different
attachment histories are associated with attachment styles that differ in terms of the associated
background level of activation of the attachment system, and the point at which the switch
from more prefrontal, controlled to more automatic mentalizing occurs [Luyten, submitted
#3361]. Dismissing individuals tend to deny attachment needs, asserting autonomy,
independence and strength in the face of stress, using attachment deactivation strategies. In
contrast, a preoccupied attachment classification or an anxious attachment style are generally
thought to be linked with the use of attachment hyperactivating strategies [Mikulincer, 2008
#3342]. Attachment hyperactivating strategies have been consistently associated with the
tendency to exaggerate both the presence and seriousness of threats, and frantic efforts to find
support and relief, often expressed in demanding, clinging behavior. Both AAI and self-report
studies have found a predominance of anxious-preoccupied attachment strategies in BPD
patients [e.g. \Fonagy, 1996 #2899; Levy, 2005 #2343]. In borderline patients we and others
have noted a characteristic pattern of fearful attachment (attachment-anxiety and relational
avoidance), painful intolerance of aloneness, hypersensitivity to social environment,
expectation of hostility from others, and greatly reduced positive memories of dyadic
interactions [e.g. \Gunderson, 2008 #3125; Critchfield, 2008 #3451; Fonagy, 1996 #2899].
An important cause of anxious attachment in BPD patients is the commonly observed
trauma history of these individuals. Attachment theorists, in particular Mary Main and Erik
Hesse, have suggested that maltreatment leads to the disorganization of the childs attachment
to the caregiver because of the irresolvable internal conflict created by the need for
reassurance from the very person who also (by association perhaps) generates an experience
of lack of safety. The activation of the attachment system by the threat of maltreatment is
followed by proximity seeking, which drives the child closer to an experience of threat
leading to further (hyper)activation of the attachment system [Hesse, 2008 #3371]. This
irresolvable conflict leaves the child with an overwhelming sense of helplessness and
hopelessness. Congruent with these assumptions, there is compelling evidence for
problematic family conditions in the development of borderline personality disorder,
including physical and sexual abuse, prolonged separations, and neglect and emotional abuse,
although their specificity and etiological import has often been questioned [e.g., \ZweigFrank, 2006 #3452; New, 2008 #3227]. Probably a quarter of BPD patients have no
maltreatment histories [Goodman, 2002 #3470] and the vast majority of individuals with
abuse histories show a high rate of resilience and no personality pathology [McGloin, 2001

#3471; Paris, 1998 #3472]. Early neglect may be an underestimated risk factor [Watson, 2006
#3394; Kantojarvi, 2008 #3398], as there is some evidence from adoption and other studies
to suggest that early neglect interferes with emotion understanding [e.g. \Shipman, 2005
#3397] and this plays a role in the emergence of emotional difficulties in preschool [Vorria,
2006
#3396] and even in adolescence [Colvert, 2008 #3395]. One developmental path to
impairments in mentalizing in BPD may be a combination of early neglect, which might
undermine the infants developing capacity for affect regulation, with later maltreatment or
other environmental circumstances, including adult experience of verbal, emotional, physical
and sexual abuse [Zanarini, 2005 #3457], that are likely to activate the attachment system
chronically [Fonagy, 2008 #2949].
BPD patients who mix deactivating and hyperactivating strategies, as is characteristic
of disorganized attachment, show a tendency for both hypermentalization and a failure of
mentalization. On the one hand, because attachment deactivating strategies are typically
associated with minimizing and avoiding affective contents, BPD patients often have a
tendency for hypermentalization, i.e., continuing attempts to mentalize, but without
integrating cognition and affect. At the same time, because the use of hyperactivating
strategies is associated with a decoupling of controlled mentalization, this leads to failures of
mentalization as a result of an overreliance on models of social cognition that antedate full
mentalizing [Bateman, 2006 #10690].
This has important clinical implications for MBT. The therapist needs to develop
strategies related to excessive demand and dependent behaviour as well as ensuring ability to
manage sudden therapeutic ruptures, often characterised by dismissive statements about the
therapists inadequacies with the accompanying danger of leaving treatment
Internal and External mentalizing
The dimension of internal and external mentalizing refers to the predominant focus of
mentalizing (Lieberman, 2007). Internal mentalizing refers to a focus on ones own or others
internal states, that is thoughts, feelings, desires; external mentalizing implies a reliance on
external features such as facial expression and behaviour. This is not the same as the
self/other dimension which relates to the actual object of focus. Mentalization focused on a
psychological interior may be self or other oriented. Again, this distinction has important
consequences for MBT. Patients with BPD have a problem with internal mentalizing but they
also have difficulties with externally focussed mentalizing. Inevitably both components of
mentalizing inform each other so borderline patients are doubly disadvantaged. The difficulty
is not so much that patients with BPD necessarily misinterpret facial expression, although
they might sometimes do so, but more that they are highly sensitive to facial expressions and
so tend to react rapidly and without warning (Wagner & Linehan, 1999) (Lynch et al., 2006).
Any movement of the therapist might trigger a response glancing out of the window, for
example, might lead to a statement that the therapist is obviously not listening and so the
patient might feel compelled to leave; a non-reactive face is equally disturbing as patients
continuously attempt to deduce the therapists internal state using information derived from
external monitoring. Anything that disrupts this process will create anxiety, which leads to a
loss of mentalizing and the re-emergence of developmentally earlier ways of relating to the
world.
A reduced ability to arrive at an emotional understanding of others by reading their
facial expressions accurately exaggerates a compromised ability in BPD to infer mental states
from focusing on internal states . To maintain or repair cooperation during
social/interpersonal exchange and interaction, we have to understand social gestures and the

likely interpersonal consequences when shared expectations about fair exchange or social
norms are violated by accident or intent. To do this we have to integrate external mentalizing
with an assessment of the underlying internal state of mind of the other person. The
importance of this interactional process in the pathology of BPD has been creatively
demonstrated experimentally. Using a multi-round economic exchange game played between
patients with BPD and healthy partners, King-Casas and colleagues (King-Casas et al., 2008)
have shown that behaviorally, individuals with BPD showed a profound incapacity to
maintain cooperation, and were impaired in their ability to repair broken cooperation on the
basis of a quantitative measure of coaxing. They failed to understand the intentions of others
an internally based task. They expected their partners to be mean to them and they were
unable to change this understanding even when evidence suggested it was incorrect, for
example when their partner was generous. In other words they were unable to read the
intentions of their partner and to alter their own behaviour reciprocally. This gradually led
their partner in the game to become mean, suggesting that they were provoked to become the
very person they were being seen as. Analogously, therapists working with patients with BPD
must bear in mind the risk of being provoked into becoming the very therapist that their
patient accuses them of being
Self and Other Mentalizing
Impairments and imbalances in the capacity to reflect about oneself and others are
common and it is only when they become more extreme that they begin to cause problems.
Some people become experts at reading other peoples minds and if they misuse this ability
or exploit it for their own gain we tend to think they have anti-social characteristics; others
focus on themselves and their own internal states and become experts in what others can do
for them to meet their requirements and we then suggest they are narcissistic. Thus excessive
concentration on either the self or other leads to one-sided relationships and distortions in
social interaction. Inevitably this will be reflected in how patients present for treatment and
interact with their therapists. Patients with BPD may be over-sensitive, carefully monitoring
the therapists mind at the expense of their own needs and being what they think the therapist
wants them to be. They may even take on the mind of the therapist and make it their own.
Therapists should be wary of patients who eagerly comply with everything said to them.
Such compliance may alternate with a tendency to become preoccupied and overly
concerned about internal states of mind, leaving the therapist feeling left out of the
relationship and unable to participate effectively.
Cognitive and Affective mentalizing
The final dimension to consider relates to cognitive and emotional processing belief,
reasoning, and perspective taking on the one hand and emotional empathy, subjective self
experience, and mentalized affectivity on the other (Jurist, 2005). A high level of mentalizing
requires integration of both cognitive and affective processes. But some people are able to
manage one aspect to a greater degree than the other. Patients with BPD are overwhelmed by
affective processes and cannot integrate them with their cognitive understanding they may
understand why they do something but feel unable to use their understanding to manage their
feelings; they are compelled to act because they cannot form representations integrating
emotional and cognitive processes. Others, such as people with antisocial personality
disorder, invest considerable time in cognitive understanding of mental states to the detriment
of affective experience.
Mentalization measured as reflective functioning (RF)

An operationalised measure has been developed for mentalization: reflective

functioning (RF) (Fonagy et al. 1998). RF is scored on the basis of a transcript of the adult
attachment interview (AAI) on a scale from -1 (negative or bizarre mentalization) to +9
(sophisticated mentalization). It is possible to achieve good reliability when scoring RF, but it
requires long training. Since scoring is quite time- consuming, the RF-scale is primarily a
research instrument and not suitable for everyday clinical use. Efforts are underway to make
RF scoring easier. Levy et al. (2005) are testing out a scale containing 53 items (Reflective
Function Questionnaire), which can be used in various contexts, such as psychotherapy
sessions. A similar scale (RFQ54) is being tested by Fonagy and co-workers. Low RF has
been found for borderline PD and antisocial PD, and low RF in young mothers predicts
insecure attachment patterns for their children (Fonagy et al., 200x). In a recent study,
borderline patients who underwent transference-focused psychotherapy were shown to
increase their RF score (Clarkin et al., 200x).
Recommended reading
A considerable literature is available on mentalization. The following sources are
highly recommended: Mentalization-based therapy. A practical guide (Bateman & Fonagy
2008), Psychotherapy for borderline patients. A mentalization-based approach (Bateman &
Fonagy 2004), Handbook of mentalization (Allen et al., 2007), Mentalizing in clinical
practice (Allen et al., 2008) and Mentalization in mental health services (Bateman et al.,
2010). The website www.mentalisering.no provides access to an updated wide range of
articles on mentalization.