MARIANO ET AL. v.

COMELEC, 242 SCRA

211, 3/7/95 Puno, J.
Facts: Petitioners TAXPAYERS assail section
2 of R.A. 7854 as unconstitutional on the
ground that it did not properly identify the
land area or terri- torial jurisdiction of Makati
by metes and bounds, in violation of Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution in relation to
Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government
Code.
SEN. OSMEA also filed another case
assailing RA 7854 as unconstitutional for the
same reasons.
(also assailed the attempt of RA 7854 to
restart or alter the three consecutive term
limit for local elective officials violating the
constitution, increasing legislative district of
Makati and its lack of mention in the title of
the bill, and the addition of another
legislative district not in accord with the
constitution because it does not comply with
the population requirement)
Held: We find no merit in the petition. The
delineated land area of the proposed city of
Makati provides that: SEC. 2. City of Makati.
The Municipality of Makati shall be
converted into a highly urban- ized city to be
known as the City of Makati, hereinafter
referred to as the City, which shall comprise
the present territory of the Municipal- ity of
Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over
which it has jurisdic- tion bounded on the
northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the
City
of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of
Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities
of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by
the City of Pasay and the Municipality of
Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of
Manila.
The importance of drawing the precise
strokes of territorial boundaries cannot be
over emphasized. The boundaries must be
clear for they define the limits of the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government
unit. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra
vire& Any uncertainty in the boundaries will
sow costly conflicts in the exercise of
governmental powers which ultimately will
prejudice the peoples welfare. This is the evil
sought to be avoided by the Local Govern.
ment Code in requiring that the land area be
spelled out in metes and bounds, with

technical description.
Given the facts, we cannot perceive how this
evil can be brought about by the description
made in section 2. Petitioners have not dem_
onstrated that the delineation of the land
area of the proposed City of Makati will cause
confusion as to its boundaries. The
delineation
did not change even by an inch the land area
previously covered. Sec- tion 2 did not add,
subtract, divide or multiply the established
land area of Makati. In language that cannot
be any clearer, the city's land area shall
comprise the present territory of the
municipality? We take judicial notice of the
fact that Congress has also refrained from
using the metes and bounds description of
land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary disputes.
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE
ASSOCIATION, INC.
328 SCRA 836, 3/27/00
PUNO, J.
Facts: Petitioner MMDA is a government
agency tasked with the de- livery of basic
services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a nonstock, non-profit corporation whose members
are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private
subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA
is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a
road beside Bel-Air Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received
from petitioner, through its Chairman, a
notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting
respondent to open Neptune Street to public
vehicular traffic start- ing January 2, 1996.
On the same day, respondent was apprised
that the perimeter wall separating the
subdivision from the adjacent
Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
Respondent instituted against petitioner
before the RTC of Makati City, a Civil Case for
injunction which the court denied.
The appellate court held that the MMDA has
no authority to order the opening of Neptune
Street, a private subdivision road and cause
the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held
that the authority is lodged in the City
Council of Makati by ordinance.
Held: There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924
that grants the MMDA police power, let alone

legislative power. Even the Metro Manila

cowl. cil has not been delegated any
legislative power. Unlike the legisia. tive
bodies of the local government units, there is
no provision in RA.
No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its
Council to "enact ordi- nances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. The MMDA is not a po. litical unit of
government. The power delegated to the
MMDA is that
given to the Metro Manila Council to
promulgate administrative rules and
regulations in the implementation of the
MMDA's functions. The MMDA has no power
to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
corn. munity. It is the local government units,
acting through their respee.
tive legislative councils, that possess
legislative power and police power.
HEIRS OF ALBERTO SUGUITAN, petitioner, vs.
CITY OF MANDALUYONG
Facts: October 13, 1994 Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued
Resolution No. 396, S-1994[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
authorizing then Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos to
institute expropriation proceedings over the
property of Alberto Suguitan for the
expansion of the Mandaluyong Medical
Center. Mayor Benjamin Abalos wrote Alberto
Suguitan a letter dated January 20, 1995
offering to buy his property, but Suguitan
refused to sell. Consequently, on March 13,
1995, the city of Mandaluyong filed a
complaint[ for expropriation with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig.
Suguitan filed a motion to dismiss[if the
complaint based on the following grounds (1) the power of eminent domain is not being
exercised in accordance with law; (2) there is
no public necessity to warrant expropriation
of subject property; (3) the City of
Mandaluyong seeks to expropriate the said
property without payment of just
compensation; (4) the City of Mandaluyong
has no budget and appropriation for the
payment of the property being expropriated;
and (5) expropriation of Suguitan' s property
is but a ploy of Mayor Benjamin Abalos to
acquire the same for his personal use.
Respondent filed its comment and opposition
to the motion. On October 24, 1995, the trial

court denied Suguitan's motion to dismiss.

On November 14, 1995, acting upon a
motion filed by the respondent, the trial
court issued an order allowing the City of
Mandaluyong to take immediate possession
of Suguitan's property upon the deposit of
P621,000 representing 15% of the fair
market value of the subject property based
upon the current tax declaration of such
property. On December 15, 1995, the City of
Mandaluyong assumed possession of the
subject property by virtue of a writ of
possession issued by the trial court on
December 14, 1995.[On July 28, 1998, the
court granted the assailed order of
expropriation.
Petitioner assert that the city of
Mandaluyong may only exercise its
delegated power of eminent domain by
means of an ordinance as required by section
19 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160,[if ! and not
by means of a mere resolution.[if ! Respondent
contends, however, that it validly and legally
exercised its power of eminent domain; that
pursuant to article 36, Rule VI of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
RA 7160, a resolution is a sufficient
antecedent for the filing of expropriation
proceedings with the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent's position, which was upheld by
the trial court,
Petitioners refute respondent's contention
that only a resolution is necessary upon the
initiation of expropriation proceedings and
that an ordinance is required only in order to
appropriate the funds for the payment of just
compensation, explaining that the resolution
mentioned in article 36 of the IRR is for
purposes of granting administrative authority
to the local chief executive to file the
expropriation case in court and to represent
the local government unit in such case, but
does not dispense with the necessity of an
ordinance for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain under section 19 of the
Code.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
Issue: whether or not a resolution is sufficient
to institute expropriation proceedings:
Held: No, Resolution is insufficient, In the
present case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks
to exercise the power of eminent domain
over petitioners' property by means of a
resolution, in contravention of the first

requisite. The law in this case is clear and

free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code
requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for
the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
We reiterate our ruling in Municipality of
Paraaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation
PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR
THE PREVENTION OF
CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, v. COA
The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical
entity over one hundred years ago by virtue
of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19,
1905, by the Philippine Commission. The
petitioner, at the time it was created, was
composed of animal aficionados and animal
propagandists. The objects of the petitioner,
as stated in Section 2 of its charter, shall be
to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted
upon animals or the protection of animals in
the Philippine Islands, and generally, to do
and perform all things which may tend in any
way to alleviate the suffering of animals and
promote their welfare.
For the purpose of enhancing its powers in
promoting animal welfare and enforcing laws
for the protection of animals, the petitioner
was initially imbued under its charter with
the power to apprehend violators of animal
welfare laws. In addition, the petitioner was
to share one-half (1/2) of the fines imposed
and collected through its efforts for violations
of the laws related thereto. Subsequently,
however, the power to make arrests as well
as the privilege to retain a portion of the
fines collected for violation of animal-related
laws were recalled by virtue of
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 148. On
December 1, 2003, an audit team from
respondent Commission on Audit (COA)
visited the office of the petitioner to conduct
an audit survey pursuant to COA Office Order
No. 2003-051 dated November 18, 2003[if !
supportFootnotes][5][endif]
addressed to the petitioner.
The petitioner demurred on the ground that
it was a private entity not under the
jurisdiction of COA, citing Section 2(1) of
Article IX of the Constitution which specifies
the general jurisdiction of the COA, viz:
Section 1. General Jurisdiction. The
Commission on Audit shall have the power,
authority, and duty to examine, audit, and
settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue

and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of

funds and property, owned or held in trust
by, or pertaining to the Government, or any
of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including governmentowned and controlled corporations with
original charters, and on a post-audit basis:
(a) constitutional bodies, commissions and
officers that have been granted fiscal
autonomy under the Constitution; (b)
autonomous state colleges and universities;
(c) other government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d)
such non-governmental entities receiving
subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from
or through the government, which are
required by law or the granting institution to
submit to such audit as a condition of
subsidy or equity.
Petitioner explained thus:
Although the petitioner was created by
special legislation, this necessarily came
about because in January 1905 there was as
yet neither a Corporation Law or any other
general law under which it may be organized
and incorporated, nor a Securities and
Exchange Commission which would have
passed upon its organization and
incorporation.
[if !supportLists]b.
[endif]That Executive
Order No. 63, issued during the
Commonwealth period, effectively deprived
the petitioner of its power to make arrests,
and that the petitioner lost its operational
funding, underscore the fact that it exercises
no governmental function. In fine, the
government itself, by its overt acts,
confirmed petitioners status as a private
juridical entity.
Hence, herein
grounds:

Petition

on

the

following

A.

RESPONDENT
COMMISSION
ON
AUDIT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE
OF
DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR

EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO
ITS AUDIT AUTHORITY.

B.

PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF

SOUGHT, THERE BEING NO APPEAL, NOR ANY
PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN
THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW AVAILABLE
TO IT.
essential question before this Court is
whether the petitioner qualifies as a
government agency that may be subject to
audit by respondent COA.
Held: The amendments introduced by C.A.
No. 148 made it clear that the petitioner was
a private corporation and not an agency of
the government. This was evident in
Executive Order No. 63, issued by then
President of the Philippines Manuel L.
Quezon, declaring that the revocation of the
powers of the petitioner to appoint agents
with powers of arrest corrected a serious
defect in one of the laws existing in the
statute books. Charter test (test of
determining if a corporation is gov-owned or
controlled, or private in nature by looking at
its own charter whether it is for the
exercise of a public function, or is it
incorporated under the general corporation
law? Those with special charters are gov.
corporations with its employees compulsory
members
of
GSIS.
And
since
the
underpinnings of the charter test had been
introduced by the 1935 Constitution and not
earlier, it follows that the test cannot apply
to the petitioner, which was incorporated by
virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January
19, 1905. Settled is the rule that laws in
general have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided.
The petitioner is correct in stating that the
charter test is predicated, at best, on the

legal regime established by the 1935

Constitution, Section 7, Article XIII, which
states:
Sec. 7. The National Assembly shall not,
except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of
private
corporations,
unless
such
corporations are owned or controlled by the
Government
or
any
subdivision
or
instrumentality thereof.[if !supportFootnotes][14]
As a curative statute, and based on the
doctrines so far discussed, C.A. No. 148 has
to be given retroactive effect, thereby freeing
all doubt as to which class of corporations
the petitioner belongs, that is, it is a quasipublic corporation, a kind of private domestic
corporation, which the Court will further
elaborate on under the fourth point.
Second, a reading of petitioners charter
shows that it is not subject to control or
supervision by any agency of the State,
unlike government-owned and -controlled
corporations. No government representative
sits on the board of trustees of the petitioner.
Third. The employees of the petitioner are
registered and covered by the Social Security
System at the latters initiative, and not
through the Government Service Insurance
System, which should be the case if the
employees are considered government
employees.
Fourth. The respondents contend that the
petitioner is a body politic because its
primary purpose is to secure the protection
and welfare of animals which, in turn,
redounds to the public good.
This argument, is, at best, specious. The fact
that a certain juridical entity is impressed
with public interest does not, by that
circumstance alone, make the entity a public
corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may
be private although its charter contains
provisions of a public character, incorporated
solely for the public good.
Fifth. The respondents argue that since the
charter of the petitioner requires the latter to
render periodic reports to the Civil Governor,
whose functions have been inherited by the
President, the petitioner is, therefore, a

government instrumentality.
This contention is inconclusive. By virtue of
the fiction that all corporations owe their
very existence and powers to the State, the
reportorial requirement is applicable to all
corporations of whatever nature, whether
they are public, quasi-public, or private
corporationsas creatures of the State, there
is a reserved right in the legislature to
investigate the activities of a corporation to
determine whether it acted within its powers.
Moday v. CA
Facts: On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang
Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in
Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89,
Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate
the Petition for Expropriation of a One (1)
Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along
the National Highway Owned by Percival
Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers
Center and Other Government Sports
Facilities.
In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was
approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio
C. Bustillo and transmitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval
Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved
said Resolution and returned it with the
comment that expropriation is unnecessary
considering that there are still available lots
in Bunawan for the establishment of the
government center.
The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public
respondent, subsequently filed a Petition for
Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival
Moday before the RTC
, public respondent municipality filed a
Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession
of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it
had already deposited with the municipal
treasurer the necessary amount in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the
Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in
the governments best interest for public
respondent to be allowed to take possession
of the property
the Regional Trial Court granted respondent
municipalitys motion to take possession of
the land
o that the Sangguniang Panlalawigans
failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves
it effective.
o that the duty of the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan is merely to review the

ordinances and resolutions passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan under the old LGC
o that the exercise of eminent domain is not
one of the two acts enumerated in Section
19 thereof requiring the approval of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan
CA upheld the trial court. Meanwhile, the
Municipality of Bunawan had erected three
buildings on the subject property.

The main issue presented in this case is

whether a munici- pality may expropriate
private property by virtue of a municipal
reso- lution which was disapproved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Held: The Municipality of Bunawan's (Agusan
del Sur) power to ex- ercise the right of
eminent domain is not disputed as it is
expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337, the Local Government Code in force
at the time expropriation proceedings were
initiated.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval
of Municipal Reso- lution No. 43-89 is an
infirm action which does not render said
reso- lution null and void. The law, as
expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337,
grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the
power to declare a mu- nicipal resolution
invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond
the power of the Sangguniang Bay:an or the
Mayor to issue. Thus, the Sanggu- niang
Panlalawigan was without the authority to
disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality
of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise
the right of eminent domain and its
Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to
promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the
earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337.
Perforce; it follows that Reso- lution No. 4389 is valid and binding and could be used.
TORIO v. FONTANILLA, 85 SCRA 599,
Facts: The Municipal Council of Malasiqui
managed the celebration of the town fiesta
of the municipality. They ordered a stage to
be con- structed for a zarzuela. As the stage
was not strong enough, it col-lapsed during
the zarzuela and the deceased was pinned to
death. His heirs sued the municipality and
the councilors for damages. The Municipality

of Malasiqui argued that since it was

performing a governmental function in
managing the celebration of the fiesta, it is
not
liable for damages.
Held: The holding of the fiesta was an
exercise of a proprietary func- tion. It is an
act for the special benefit of the community
and not for the general welfare of the public
performed in pursuance of a policy of the
state. Hence, the municipality is liable for
damages. However the councilors should be
absolved from liability. The liability of pub, lic
officers for damages under Article 27 of the
Civil Code applies to nonfeasance and not to
negligence or misfeasance. The councilors
are
similar to the board of directors of a
corporation, since the celebra. tion of the
town fiesta is not a governmental function.
As such, they are not liable for damages for
negligence of the agent and employees of
the municipality unless there is a showing of
bad faith or gross
negligence on their part.
TORAYNO, SR. v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574,
Facts: During the 1995 elections, Vicente Y.
Emano was re-elected provincial governor of
Misamis Oriental. It was his third consecutive
term as governor of the province. In his
Certificate of Candidacy dated March 12,
1995, his residence was declared to be in
Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.
On June 14, 1997, while still the governor of
Misamis Oriental, Emano executed a Voter
Registration Record in Cagayan de Oro City
(geographically located in the Province of
Misamis Oriental), a highly
urbanized city, in which he claimed twenty
(20) years of residence. On March 25, 1998,
he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
mayor of the city, stating therein that his
residence for the preceding two (2) years
and five (5) months was at 1409 San Jose
Street, Capistrano
Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.
Petitioners claim that in discharging his
duties as provincial gov- ernor, private
respondent remained a resident of the
province. They aver that residence is a
continuing qualification that an elective offi-

cial must possess throughout his term. Thus,

private respondent could
not have changed his residence to Cagayan
de Oro City while he was still governor of
Misamis Oriental.
Held: The pertinent provision sought to be
enforced is Section 39 of the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991, which
provides for the qualifications of local
elective officials.
The COMELEC found that private respondent
and his family had actually been residing in
Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de
Oro City, in a house he had bought in 1973.
Furthermore, during
the three (3) terms (1988-1998) that he was
governor of Misamis Ori- ental, he physically
lived in that city, where the seat of the
provincial government was located. In June
1997, he also registerid as voter of the same
city. He paid his 1998 Community Tax in the
city. These facts
indubitably prove that Vicente Y. Emano was
a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a
period of time sufficient to quality him to run
for public office therein. Moreover, the
COMELEC did not find any bad
faith on the part of Emano in his choice of
residence. Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City
was once an integral part of Misamis Oriental
and remains a geographical part of the
province. Not only it is at the center of the
province; more importantly, it is itself the seat of the provincial government. As
a consequence, the pro- vincial officials who
carry out their functions in the city cannot
avoid residing therein; much less, getting
acquainted with its concerns and interests.
Vicente Y. Emano, having been the governor
of Misamis
Oriental for three (3) terms and consequently
residing in Cagayan de Oro City within that
period, could not be said to be a stranger or
new- comer to the city in the last year of his
third term, when he decided
to adopt it as his permanent place of
residence.
To all intents and purposes of the
Constitution and the law, he is a resident of
Cagayan de Oro City and eligible to run for
mayor thereof.
There is no question that private respondent
was the overwhelming choice of the people
of Cagayan de Oro City. He won by a margin
of about 30,000 votes. Thus, we find it apt to
reiterate the principle that the manifest will

of the people as expressed through the ballot

must be given fullest effect.