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BACKGROUND
This paper surveys and assesses the writings of selected African scholars on what they
regard to be pan-African culture and personality traits, and patterns and processes of African
James E Lassiter is currently a Senior Refugee Program Manager in the U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), Office of International Affairs in Washington, D.C. He was trained in anthropology and
African Studies at the University of Oregon (M.S., 1975; Ph.D., 1983) and has published in his area of expertise. In
addition to conducting anthropological research in Swaziland from 1980-83, he served as a Peace Corps administrator
in Tanzania and Ghana and as a Senior Desk Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya.
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ISSN: 2152-2448
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cultural adaptation 1. Suggestions are also made for reinventing the study of African social,
cultural and psychological characteristics, and using such knowledge to help solve
socioeconomic problems in Africa. Finally, comments are made regarding the impact of
sociocultural particularism and Western individualism on the study of culture and cultural
evolution.
During the late 1950s and 1960s, national character and typical personality studies were
broadly condemned, breathed their last gasp, and were ultimately relegated to the dustbin of
bad social science. Since that time, various African scholars outside the social sciences have
nevertheless been sustaining and redirecting group personality inquiry. They are not, however,
approaching their subject as did Western social scientists in the first half of this century who
used questionnaire instruments to determine if Africans were "traditional" or "modern" 2. This
was a particularly popular approach among Western occupational psychologists working in
Africa in the 1950s and 1960s who sought to scientifically assign statistical coefficients of
modernization to African populations. They did this, for the most part, to find out which
African groups were better suited for white or blue collar work in the colonial and postindependence socioeconomic setup 3. The majority of prior culture and personality researchers
focusing on Africa were interested in creating and testing a "traditional/Western measuring
device" (Dawson 1967), "assaying psychological modernization" (Doob 1967), or "measuring
individual modernity" (Smith and Inkeles 1966, Kahl 1968, and Gough 1975 and 1976).
African scholars writing on these subjects since the early 1960s have taken a humanistic,
liberating or empowering approach. They have been specifically interested in identifying and
explaining African psychological processes, personality characteristics, and the processes of
African cultural adaptation to indigenous social conditions and exotic influences. For example,
the work of University of Nairobi philosophy professor Joseph M. Nyasani (1997), which
features prominently in this paper, is a recent attempt to define the "African psyche."
CURRENT WESTERN PERSPECTIVES AND METHODS
Since the 1960s, the predominant approach to social and cultural research among social
scientists has been to examine a clearly defined society, population, sector, geographically
defined area, or topic. Such research tends to steer away from cultural and psychological
generalizations at higher levels of social organization such as the ethnic group, society, nation
or geographical regions such as sub-Saharan Africa. Culture and personality and broad cultural
adaptation studies became and remain the target of the most severe criticism by social scientists
and social advocates. Many, in fact, consider such inquiry to be no more than unscientific
stereotyping, usually with malevolent intent and effect. Some argue that group personality
studies are an anathema to cultural relativism and the particularistic study of singular
populations and topics. Still others go as far as to assert that all culture and personality studies
obscure the uniqueness of the individual, and divert attention and resources from more fruitful
lines of inquiry such as the dynamics of class struggle and the scientific study of particular
social structures and functions. At its worst, critics and social advocates say, group personality
studies and inquiry into broad patterns of cultural adaptation on the part of social scientists
exacerbate racism and bigotry. So, for the sake of not giving legitimacy to broad cultural
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training and nurturing of highly-skilled scholars in this area, but are poised to make a unique
contribution to the overall development of post-colonial Africa (1997:180).
AFRICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS
All the scholars surveyed believe there are categories and processes of thought that are
unique to Africa. African scholars also believe that the African way of organizing and
cognitively engaging the world derives from a strongly restrictive indigenous sociocultural
milieu, and that this approach to social life and the broader world has been negatively effected
by Western cultural influences. Regrettably, however, the African scholars surveyed sometimes
use what is normally regarded to be social scientific terminology in making reference to what
they regard to be widespread African psychological and cultural characteristics, yet do not
clearly define or qualify such usage. With the exception of Geyekye (1988), they also fail to
clearly and consistently link their assertions and arguments to historical and ethnographic data.
For example, political scientist and historian Ali A. Mazrui, in his most recent attempt to place
Kiswahili language as a crucial element in East Africa's political and economic development
and ultimate regional integration, refers to the "East African mind" as follows:
"The psychology of living together is also undergoing a change - and Kiswahili is part of
the new East African mind in communion with the modern world" (Mazrui and Mazrui
1995:134). Further, Mazrui's collaborator and linguist, Alamin M. Mazrui, in a discussion of
nationalism and the contributions of African Americans to Africa, states that "African
Americans have made important philosophical and political contributions to the formation of
movements like Negritude, pan-Africanism, and the African personality" (1995:161, emphasis
mine).
Nyasani (1997) is no more reticent in his vaguely defined references to the "African mind"
and its characteristics. He believes that "in the same way reference is made to the Greek or
Roman civilization, it must be quite appropriate and legitimate to refer to a particular strand of
mind that is quite peculiar to Africa and which shapes the prevailing conditions or permits itself
to adapt to those conditions. ... (T)here is a distinctive feature about the African mind which seems
to support the claim that the mind in black Africa may not necessarily operate in the same strict
pattern as minds elsewhere in the world.... (I)t is the way our mind functions and operates under
certain conditions that we are able to arrogate to ourselves a peculiar status, social identification
and geographical label" (1997:51-55, emphases mine).
According to Nyasani (1997:56-57), African, Asian and European minds are products of
unique "cultural edifices" and "cultural streams" that arose from environmental conditioning
and long-standing cultural traditions. Within the African cultural stream, Nyasani claims, are
psychological and moral characteristics pertaining to African identity, personality and dignity.
Makgoba (1997) goes further and argues that throughout the African Diaspora peoples of
African descent:
"are linked by shared values that are fundamental features of African identify and culture.
These, for example, include hospitality, friendliness, the consensus and common frameworkseeking principle, ubuntu, and the emphasis on community rather than on the individual. These
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more correct to describe that order as amphibious, for it manifests features of both communality
and individuality. African social thought seeks to avoid the excesses of the two exaggerated
systems, while allowing for a meaningful, albeit uneasy, interaction between the individual and
the society" (1988:31-32).
Agreeing with Gyekye, Senegalese philosopher Leopold Senghor (1966) regards traditional
African society to be "based both on the community and on the person and in which, because it
was founded on dialogue and reciprocity, the group had priority over the individual without
crushing him, but allowing him to blossom as a person" (1966:5).
South African philosophy professor Augustine Shutte (1993), citing the Xhosa proverb
umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (a person is a person through persons), writes:
This (proverb) is the Xhosa expression of a notion that is common to all African languages
and traditional cultures.... (It) is concerned both with the peculiar interdependence of persons
on others for the exercise, development and fulfilment of their powers that is recognised in
African traditional thought, and also with the understanding of what it is to be a person that
underlies this.... In European philosophy of whatever kind, the self is always envisaged as
something "inside" a person, or at least as a kind of container of mental properties and powers.
In African thought it is seen as "outside," subsisting in relationship to what is other, the natural
and social environment. In fact the sharp distinction between self and world, a self that controls
and changes the world and is in some sense "above" it, this distinction so characteristic of
European philosophy, disappears. Self and world are united and intermingle in a web of
reciprocal relations (1993:46-47).
In contrast to Gyekye's mutually enhancing understanding and Shutte's idea that the
community empowers and inculcates "personness," Nyasani (1997) possesses a far less
egalitarian view of the individual in African society. According to Nyasani, the African
individual hardly knows how to act outside the context of his community's prescriptions and
proscriptions. For Nyasani, the existence of the individual in African society is a "quasidissolution into the reality of others for the sake of the individual's existence" (1997:60). For him,
"everything boils down to the 'me' in the 'we' or rather to the survival of the self through the
enhancement and consolidation of the 'we' as a generic whole....Thus, in Africa, the individual
will go to all lengths to ascertain the condition of the corporate 'we' and to play his part, if
necessary, to restore the balance of wholesomeness" (1997:81-82).
There are many particularistic studies of the attitudes and values of Africans by African
and non-African scholars that support the assertions made by Nyasani and others regarding
African concepts of self and the place of the individual in African societies 6.
THE AFRICAN FAMILY AND COMMUNITY
Nyasani (1997) identifies the traditional African family as a setting wherein the vertical
power structure of the society is introduced and sustained as predominant over the freedom of
individuals. For Nyasani there is a "fundamental difference between the traditional African
child and a child in the Western culture. The child in Africa was muzzled right from the outset
and was thereby drilled into submission to authority from above" (1997:129).
Within the communal context, Nyasani (1997) argues that Africans exhibit an
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From Nyasani's (1997:97-100) perspective, the world view of the African under colonialism
became one where African cultural traditions, beliefs and behaviors were regarded by Africans
to be inferior when compared to non-African ways. This, he says, resulted in self-loathing
among Africans. In fact, he asserts, the world view of most contemporary Africans was replaced
by and therefore is in many ways indistinguishable from the European world view.
AFRICAN RESPONSES TO FOREIGN INFLUENCES
In general, the authors surveyed argue that the African individual's response to
overpowering foreign influences has been and remains derived from the personal strategy he
uses for survival within the African family and community context--unquestioning acceptance
and conformity. Therefore, the larger world, like his family and communal milieu, presents the
African individual with an equally formidable set of circumstances and requirements he is
conditioned not to challenge, is dependent on and from which he cannot escape.
Makgoba (1997) clearly identifies the motives behind the interest of this larger world of
non-Africans as follows:
"Knowledge about African people is always political, useful in maintaining intellectual
neo-colonialism, propagates Western culture, helps generate and perpetuate an inferiority
complex (in Africans), fosters individualism amongst Africans, disrupts organisation and unity
in the (African) community because there is inherent fear of a united, organised Afrocentric
community, or a combination of all of the above. In short, we are (regarded to be) a people who
can only succeed, realise our potential and destiny by being controlled, policed, nursed and
guided by Europeans. We are (therefore) incapable of being masters of our own destiny"
(1997:205).
Concerning the impact of foreign socioeconomic ideology, Gyekye (1988) argues that
preeminent African leaders such as Senghor, Nyerere and Nkrumah, all of whom underwent
advanced Western education, incorrectly regarded Western socialism to be compatible with
traditional African communalism. The consequences of their efforts to use Western socialist
ideology as a framework for nation-building in Africa were devastating, he says. Gyekye argues
that African communalism is "essentially and basically a socio-ethical doctrine, not economic;
whereas socialism, as I understand it, is primarily an economic arrangement, involving the
public control of all the dynamics of the economy.... (Not) everything that can be asserted of
communalism can be asserted also for socialism, and vice-versa" (1988:24-26).
Kenyan philosopher D. A. Masolo (1995) agrees that "the failures of Nyerere's ujamaa were
due, more than anything else, to the poor sociological assessment of the causes of the apparent
communalistic 'attitudes' in African traditional social relations. ... Taking the communalistic
phenomenon of African traditional society as a given, Nyerere proceeded to inappropriately
build upon it a social-political structure--the ujamaa system" (1995:27-28).
Culturally, it is as if the traditional African script of "submit to family and community
authority and immerse yourself in and partake of all group values and norms" was rewritten
during the colonial period. Through force, Western education and missionary proselytization,
the colonialists subordinated traditional African authority and the values and norms of African
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African values and their wholesale and uncritical adoption of Western ideologies and
institutions.
One of the most unusual efforts among contemporary African scholars to apply traditional
African concepts to national development is that of South African Lovemore Mbigi of the
Ubuntu Institute near Pretoria. Professor Mbigi (1997), freely using expressions such as "ancient
African wisdom," argues that the traditional African concept ubuntu ("I am because we are. I
can only be a person through others.") is useful for African corporate and organizational
executives, managers and others pursuing organizational or national transformation. Mbigi
argues that "birthing rituals are important in African societies....Leaders must carry out the
birthing rituals of creativity and innovation in organisations. They must have a sense of legacy
and selflessness if they are going to define the ultimate mystery and meaning of human
existence to their followers" (1997:37).
The emphasis on Africa's traditional past as found in the writings of Nyasani and the other
African scholars reviewed in this paper, however, is not without its African detractors. Kenyan
philosopher Masolo (1995), for example, in his discussion of "ethnophilosophy" (formal efforts
to systematically describe traditional African beliefs and practices) finds little in Africa's past
that can be applied to the present and future of the continent. He believes that
"philosophers who are seeking to revive and reinstate the traditional African philosophy as
the appropriate philosophy for Africa today are doing disservice to Africa in trying to
pretend that that philosophy is still sufficient or useful or applicable to Africa's needs, i.e., that it
is able to cope with the new and modern problems and issues facing Africa today as brought in
with encroaching modernization. And because this encroachment requires new methods of
investigation and analysis, which must be diversified due to the complexity of the situation,
ethnophilosophy just has no place in it" (1995:225).
Similarly, Gyekye (1996) abhors the fact that ancestors continue to be of paramount
importance in modern and traditional African life. He also recommends that for Africa to
progress scientifically and technologically, "science should be rescued from the morass of
(traditional) African religious and mystical beliefs" (1996:174). Nevertheless, Gyekye insists
there are many "cultural values and practices of traditional Africa (that) can be considered
positive features of the culture and can be accommodated in the scheme of African modernity,
even if they must undergo some refinement and pruning to become fully harmonious with the
spirit of modern culture and to functionsatisfactorily within that culture" (ibid.). He discusses
these traditional African values at length under the following chapter headings: humanity and
brotherhood, communalism and individualism, morality, the family, economic system,
chiefship and politics, human rights, knowledge and wisdom, and aesthetics.
Kenyan social commentator Mwiti Mugambi (1998) pragmatically argues that the future of
Africa can only be forged from accepting and mending the sociocultural present. For Mugambi
it is only from aggressively addressing the practical problems found within African nations that
improvements in Africa can be made. Colonial cultural hangovers, pervasive Western cultural
inundation, and aid-giving arm-twisting donors are, he argues, here to stay and no amount of
looking into Africa's past will make them go away. He asserts that:
"Colonisation and westernisation have brought a permanent and irreversible change in
Africa. As long as we continue talking of Africanisation and 'going back to our roots' yet we
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manner with which the African scholars surveyed in this paper, for example, use social
scientific terms and concepts. Despite the lack of social scientific interest in this form of inquiry
and the fact that there is no unanimity regarding the meaning of culture and personality terms
and concepts, there are nevertheless many terminological and conceptual usages cited in the
foregoing excerpts that easily exceed or violate the most liberal of social scientific definitions.
This is of concern because the high intellectual status of the writers legitimizes such usage. It
also misinforms and misleads non-social scientists and other readers of their works. For
example, an editorial essay in the March 23-29, 1998 edition of The East African, East Africa's best
English weekly newspaper, made the following comment on U.S. president Clinton's 1998 visit
to Rwanda:
"His aim in Kigali will be to condemn the 1994 genocide and to stress that ethnic killing
must be rooted out of the African psyche. Genocide is by no means unique to Africa but our
record of violence stemming from tribalism is a bad one, as recent incidents in Kenya, for instance,
attest. If President Clinton can convey the repugnance of the international community for this
shameful and recurring madness that afflicts Africa, more power to him" (emphases mine).
This reference to the "African psyche" may well have been derived from someone on the
East African's editorial staff having read and been convinced of the validity of such usage as it
appears in Nyasani's (1997) book of the same title 7.
I do not agree with those who argue that the non-participation of social scientists in group
culture and personality studies is as it should be. I do accept and agree that purposeful
insensitivity to the validity of any social group's ethnicity, values and beliefs is never acceptable
and should be challenged from all quarters. However, cultural relativity, social science
particularism, and social activism should not be allowed to block, overtly or subtly, responsible
inquiry into the patterns and processes of contemporary global cultural adaptation. The African
scholars, as evidenced by their generalistic yet persuasive works cited in this paper, are
obviously undeterred by such inhibiting influences. As such, they should be encouraged and
joined by social scientists in these areas of inquiry. Both levels of inquiry, the particular and
general, are needed if for no other reason than to promote more informed, accurate, and
effective international discourse and relations. An emphasis on sociocultural differences and
uniqueness is important and, in fact, essential for enhancing individual identity and social
cohesion, and furthering sociopolitical goals.
Particularism, however, needs to be counterbalanced and contextualized by studies that
emphasize cross-cultural similarities such as the works cited in this paper. If not, the evils of
cultural stereotypes, ethnocentrism and bigotry spawned by past culture and personality
studies will be replaced by particularism's negative outcomes of greater cultural exclusivity,
arrogance, intolerance, xenophobia, mistrust, and inter-group conflict. Put simply, it is generally
recognized that conflict is more likely to arise among peoples who accentuate their differences
and uniqueness rather than among those who acknowledge and celebrate their similarities. If
nothing else, there should be a freeing-up of academic and public discourse such that
sociocultural uniqueness is respected and the characteristics shared by related or similar
sociocultural groups are acknowledged, discussed, and used to find common ground for
resolving conflict and sustaining cooperation. Regrettably, free discourse of this kind does not
widely characterize the current state of discourse within academia. Such discourse and goals are
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If social scientists, as Makgoba (1997) asserts, have a crucial and practical role to play in
African socioeconomic development, we must identify particular and general themes and
patterns of cultural adaptation and their attendant psychological processes throughout subSaharan Africa. The first step in expanding what are acceptable social science areas of inquiry is
to look at what scholars in the lesser developed societies such as those in Africa are focusing on.
This paper has made an attempt to move discussion and debate in this direction. The second
step is to investigate the validity of specific claims of pan-African cultural and psychological
traits and adaptive responses. The assertions made by the African scholars surveyed above
suggest new areas of research as follows:
1. Do traditional African authority structures and communal proscriptions and prescriptions
give rise to psychological handicaps, such as "natural benign docility" or "mental encapsulation"
(Nyasani 1997:113, 130-131), that have and continue to put Africans at a disadvantage when
confronting non-African cultural influences? Or, is Gyekye (1988:31-32) correct in asserting that
African communalism allows for and demands individual expression and accountability; and
that the causes of Africa's cultural maladaptations are to be found elsewhere? Are Masolo (1995)
and Mugambi (1998) correct in insisting that the solutions to Africa's problems and its future are
not to be found in Africa's traditional past, rather in addressing the problems of the present,
using contemporary methods?
2. Is Nyasani (1997:51-55) justified in insisting there is such a thing as an African "mentality" or
"psyche" that arose from and reflects a long history of social, cultural and environmental
adaptation and acculturation? Is he justified in positing the existence of African, European and
Asian "cultural streams and edifices" (1997:57)?
3. Mazrui and Mazrui (1995:1-3) argue that Kiswahili has promoted "detribalization" in East
Africa in the sense of "declining 'ethnic behavior'". Yet, they say there is "stable or even
increasing ethnic loyalty in terms of emotional attachment". Do ethnographic and other sources
support this? Attitude and values surveys should be conducted to test this assertion. If true,
how widespread and intense are these ethnic "behaviors" and "loyalties"?
4. Are prominent Kenyan social commentator Philip Ochieng's (1998) assertions about Luo
culture, group personality and origins valid? Has Luo cultural arrogance undermined their
pursuit of political power in Kenya? How do Luos view their history and culture vis-a-vis other
tribes and ethnic groups?
CONCLUSION
Numerous core values, cultural themes and patterns of cultural adaptation unique to
Africa have been presented in this paper, as identified in the writings of selected African
scholars. Most of the writers effectively argue that there is a widespread pattern of social and
cultural maladaptation within African societies evidenced by continuing national development
under-achievement and less than optimal regional socioeconomic integration. This is regarded
by the majority of the writers to be a post-colonial legacy, the result of ongoing external
interference, and a now endemic and intense African admiration of Western culture over
African culture. The African scholars' prescriptions for Africa's future focus on economic
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Notes
1. The opinions and conclusions expressed in this paper are solely those of the author.
They in no way reflect or otherwise represent the policies or official positions of the
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service or any other U. S. Government
entity. I wish to express my sincere appreciation to the following African scholars and
educators who reviewed and commented on this paper in the earliest stages of its
preparation: Howard University Education Professor Emeritus Paul Emoungu, Mr. Yves
Kore, M.Ed., M.P.A., and Ms. Immy Rose Namutosi, B.A., D.S.E. I am also most grateful
to Anthropology Professor Vernon R. Dorjahn and Assistant Anthropology Professor
Jerry Marr of the University of Oregon who reviewed and provided comments on early
and later drafts of the paper. Their candid and at times sharp criticism were invaluable
and greatly improved the paper in many ways. The fact that they reviewed and
commented on drafts of the paper does not mean that they necessarily endorse all the
opinions I have expressed, approaches I have taken, or conclusions I have drawn. The
shortcomings that remain, and opinions expressed, in this article are mine alone and for
which, I am fully responsible.
2. The terms "tradition" and "traditional" occur frequently in the writings of the Western
social scientists and contemporary African scholars cited in this paper. However, all the
scholars seldom, if ever, define the terms outright. "Tradition" and "traditional" are
usually presented in contrast to terms that represent the scholars' research aims, namely
how "modern" or "Western" their subjects are. For example, Smith and Inkeles (1966)
defined "modern" as a "set of attitudes and values, and ways of feeling and acting,
presumably of the sort either generated by or required for participation in a modern
society..." (1966:353). Similarly, the African scholars surveyed give much attention to and
examples of African "traditions" and "traditional African culture", yet seldom if ever
clearly define the terms. For the sake of clarity and the general purposes of this paper,
and as an expression of what I understand the general definition of the term to mean to
the African scholars I have cited, I have employed the following working definition of
"traditional African culture": generally widespread sub-Saharan African core values,
beliefs, cultural themes and behaviors as they existed prior to European contact; and as
they still exist, especially in the rural areas and to a lesser extent in the urban areas of
Africa; and upon which many, if not most, fundamental thought processes and
behaviors of contemporary sub-Saharan Africans are based and continue to be derived
from.
3. See for example the works of Biesheuval (1954), Smith and Inkeles (1966), Dawson (1964
and 1967), Doob (1967), Kahl (1968), Hoogvelt (1974), and Gough (1975 and 1976).
4. Most of the African scholars' works cited in this paper have not come from social
scientists. African scholars I have spoken with believe the lack of social science
involvement in this area of research is due, in large part, to an inadequacy of resources
in African university social science departments to support indigenous social research.
They also believe it is due to the generally oppressive nature of post-independence
African central governments when it comes to academics and their students studying
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6. See for example Vilakazi (1979), Decalo (1980) and Lassiter (1983) regarding Swazi and
Batswana secondary school students and university graduates.
7. The reference to "violence stemming from tribalism" is also noteworthy. Ethnically
defined conflict is a symptom not a cause. It is fomented and used by individuals and
groups seeking wealth and/or political power. It does not arise inherently, as the writer
and many others imply, from ethnicity or ethnic values, identity, loyalty or behavior.
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Reference Style: The following is the suggested format for referencing this article:
Lassiter, J. E. 1999. African Culture and Personality: Bad Social Science, Effective Social
Activism, or a Call to Reinvent Ethnology? 3(2): 1. [online] URL:
http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v3/v3i2a1.htm