I Sentences, Distinction 8, Question 4

Concerning God's Simplicity

ARTICULUS PRIMUS
Utrum Deus sit omnino simplex.

First Article
Whether God is entirely simple.

Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod

Deus non sit simplex omnino. Ens enim
cui non fit additio, est ens commune
praedicatum de omnibus de quo nihil
potest vere negari. Sed Deus non est
hujusmodi. Ergo ad esse suum fit aliqua
additio. Non est ergo simplex.

We proceed thus to the first issue. 1. It seems that

God is not entirely simple. For the being to which an
addition is not made is the common being that is
predicated of all things and about which nothing can
be truly denied. But God is not this kind of being.
Some addition, therefore, is made to his being.
Therefore, he is not simple.

2. Praeterea, Boetius, lib. De hebdom.:

Omne quod est, esse participat ut sit; alia
autem participat, ut aliquid sit. Sed Deus
verissime est ens et est aliquid, quia
bonus et sapiens et hujusmodi. Ergo
Deus habet esse suum quo est, et super
hoc habet aliquid aliud quo aliquid est.
Ergo non est simplex.

2. Furthermore, in De Hebdomadibus, Boethius says:

Every thing that exists participates in being so that it
may exist, while it participates in other things so that
it may be a determinate thing. But God is most truly a
being and is a determinate thing, because he is
good, wise, and such things. Therefore, God has his
being by which he exists, and on top of this he has
something else by which he is a determinate thing.
He is not, therefore, simple.

3. Item, de quocumque praedicatur aliquid 3. Moreover, a thing is not simple that has something
quod non est de substantia sua, illud non predicated of it that does not belong to its substance.
est simplex. Sed quidquid praedicatur de But whatever is predicated of any thing after it was
aliquo postquam non praedicabatur, illud not predicated does not belong to that thing's
non est de substantia sua, cum nulli rei
substance, since its own substance comes anew to
substantia sua de novo adveniat. Cum
no thing. Therefore, since something is predicated of
igitur de Deo praedicetur aliquid
God after it was not predicated - for example, that he
postquam non praedicabatur, ut esse
is "Lord" and "Creator," which are said of him on
dominum et creatorem quae dicuntur de account of time - it seems that he is not simple.
ipso ex tempore, videtur quod ipse non sit
simplex.
4. Praeterea, ubicumque sunt plures res
in uno, ibi oportet esse aliquem modum
compositionis. Sed in divina natura sunt
tres personae realiter distinctae,
convenientes in una essentia. Ergo
videtur ibi esse aliquis modus
compositionis.

4. Furthermore, wherever there are many things in

one, there must be some mode of composition in that
thing. But in the divine nature, there are three really
distinct Persons, who agree in one essence. It
seems, therefore, that there is some mode of
composition in the divine nature.

Contra, omne compositum est posterius

suis componentibus: quia simplicius est
prius in se quam addatur sibi aliquid ad
compositionem tertii. Sed primo
simpliciter nihil est prius. Cum igitur Deus
sit primum principium, non est

On the contrary, every composite thing is posterior to

its components, because, in order for a third thing to
be composed, something is added to a more simple
thing that is prior in itself. But, absolutely speaking,
nothing is prior to the first. Therefore, since God is the
first principle, he is not composite.

compositus.
Praeterea, illud quod est primum dans
Furthermore, that which is first, which gives being to
omnibus esse, habet esse non
all things, has being that does not depend on
dependens ab alio: quod enim habet esse something else. For what has being that depends on
dependens ab alio, habet esse ab alio, et something else has being from something else, and
nullum tale est primum dans esse. Sed
no such thing is the first, which gives being. But God
Deus est primum dans omnibus esse.
is the first, who gives being to all things. His being,
Ergo suum esse non dependet ab alio.
therefore, does not depend on something else. But
Sed cujuslibet compositi esse dependet the being of any composite thing depends on
ex componentibus, quibus remotis, et
components, and when those components have
esse compositi tollitur et secundum rem et been removed, the being of the composite thing is
secundum intellectum. Ergo Deus non est destroyed both in the thing as well as in the mind.
compositus.
God is, therefore, not composite.
Item, illud quod est primum principium
essendi, nobilissimo modo habet esse,
cum semper sit aliquid nobilius in causa
quam in causato. Sed nobilissimus
modus habendi esse, est quo totum
aliquid est suum esse. Ergo Deus est
suum esse. Sed nullum compositum
totum est suum esse, quia esse ipsius
sequitur componentia, quae non sunt
ipsum esse. Ergo Deus non est
compositus. Et hoc simpliciter
concedendum est.

Moreover, that which is the first principle of being

possesses being in the noblest way, since something
is always nobler in a cause than in an effect. But the
noblest way of possessing being is the way by which
the entirety of something is its own being. God is,
therefore, his own being. But the entirety of no
composite thing is its own being, because its being
results from components that are not being itself. God
is, therefore, not composite. And this should be
conceded without qualification.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliquid To the first, therefore, it should be said that something
esse sine additione dicitur dupliciter. Aut is called 'being without an addition' in two ways. On
de cujus ratione est ut nihil sibi addatur: et the one hand, the concept of the thing may be such
sic dicitur de Deo: hoc enim oportet
that nothing may be added to it, and in this way it is
perfectum esse in se ex quo additionem said about God that he is without an addition. This is
non recipit; nec potest esse commune,
indeed proper for being that is perfect in itself, on
quia omne commune salvatur in proprio, account of which it does not receive an addition. Nor
ubi sibi fit additio. Aut ita quod non sit de can this be common being, because every common
ratione ejus quod fiat sibi additio, neque thing is preserved in a particular thing, where an
quod non fiat, et hoc modo ens commune addition is made to it. On the other hand, something
est sine additione. In intellectu enim entis is called 'being without an addition' in such a way
non includitur ista conditio, sine additione; that it does not belong to the concept of the thing that
alias nunquam posset sibi fieri additio,
an addition may be made to it or that an addition may
quia esset contra rationem ejus; et ideo
not be made to it. And in this way, common being is
commune est, quia in sui ratione non dicit without an addition. For the condition - 'without an
aliquam additionem, sed potest sibi fieri addition' - is not included in the understanding of
additio ut determinetur ad proprium; sicut being. Otherwise, an addition could never be made to
etiam animal commune dicitur esse sine it, because that would be contrary to the concept of
ratione, quia de intellectu ejus non est
being. For this reason, it is common because, in its
habere rationem, neque non habere;
concept, one does not signify any addition, but an
asinus autem dicitur sine ratione esse,
addition can be made to it so that it may be
quia in intellectu ejus includitur negatio
determined to a particular thing. For example,
rationis, et per hoc determinatur
'animal' is said in common of beings that lack reason,

secundum differentiam propriam. Ita etiam because it does not belong to the concept of animal
divinum esse est determinatum in se et ab to have reason or not to have reason. An ass,
omnibus aliis divisum, per hoc quod sibi however, is called 'a being that lacks reason,'
nulla additio fieri potest. Unde patet quod because the negation of reason is included in its
negationes dictae de Deo non designant concept, and by this fact, it is determined according to
in ipso aliquam compositionem.
a proper difference. In the same way, the divine being
is determined in itself and separated from all other
things by the fact that no addition can be made to it.
Hence, it is evident that negations said of God do not
signify any composition in him.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod in rebus
creatis res determinatur ut sit aliquid,
tripliciter: aut per additionem alicujus
differentiae, quae potentialiter in genere
erat; aut ex eo quod natura communis
recipitur in aliquo, et fit hoc aliquid; aut ex
eo quod additur aliquid accidens, per
quod dicitur esse vel sciens vel albus.
Nullus istorum modorum potest esse in
Deo, quia ipse non est commune aliquid,
cum de intellectu suo sit quod non
addatur sibi aliquid; nec etiam ejus natura
est recepta in aliquo, cum sit actus purus;
nec etiam recipit aliquid extra essentiam
suam, eo quod essentia sua continet
omnem perfectionem. Remanet autem
quod sit aliquid determinatum per
conditionem negandi ab ipso omnem
additionem, et per hoc removetur ab eo
omne illud quod possibile est additionem
recipere. Unde per suum esse absolutum
non tantum est, sed aliquid est. Nec differt
in eo quo est et aliquid esse, nisi per
modum significandi, vel ratione, ut supra
dictum est de attributis. Dictum autem
Boetii intelligitur de participantibus esse,
et non de eo qui essentialiter est suum
esse. Ex quo patet quod attributa nullam
compositionem in ipso faciunt. Sapientia
enim secundum suam rationem non facit
compositionem, sed secundum suum
esse, prout in subjecto realiter differens
est ab ipso; qualiter in Deo non est, ut
dictum est.

To the second, it should be said that, in created

things, a thing is determined in three ways so that it
may be a determinate thing: either by the addition of
some difference that existed potentially in the genus;
or from the fact that a common nature is received in
something and is made this determinate thing; or
from the fact that some accident is added by which it
is said to be knowing or white. None of these ways
can exist in God. For he is not something common,
since the concept of God is such that something is
not added to him. Nor again is his nature received in
something, since it is pure act. Nor does he receive
something beyond his essence, because his
essence contains every perfection. It remains,
however, that he is a thing determined by the
condition of denying from him every addition, and
consequently, every thing that can be received as an
addition is removed from him. Hence, by his own
independent being, he not only exists but is a
determinate thing. Nor in him does what he is and the
determinate thing that exists differ, except by mode of
signification or by reason, as was said above about
the divine attributes. Boethius' statement, however, is
understood with respect to things that participate in
being, and not with respect to the one who is
essentially his own being. For this reason, it is
evident that attributes produce no composition in him.
For wisdom does not produce composition according
to its concept, but according to its being in proportion
as, in a subject, it differs in reality from being. As was
said, it is not this way in God.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod hujusmodi

relationes quae dicuntur de Deo ex
tempore, non ponunt aliquid in ipso

To the third, it should be said that the kinds of

relations that are said of God on account of time do
not establish something in him in reality but only in a

realiter sed tantum in creatura. Contingit

enim, ut dicit Philosophus, V Metaph.,
aliquid dici relative, non quod ipsum
referatur, sed quia aliquid refertur ad
ipsum; sicut est in omnibus quorum unum
dependet ab altero, et non e contrario;
sicut scibile non est relativum, nisi quia
scientia refertur ad ipsum; scibile enim
non dependet a scientia, sed e converso.
Sed quia intellectus noster non potest
accipere relationem in uno relativorum,
quin intelligatur in illo ad quod refertur,
ideo ponit relationem quamdam circa
ipsum scibile, et significat ipsum relative.
Unde illa relatio quae significatur in
scibili, non est realiter in ipso, sed
secundum rationem tantum; in scientia
autem realiter. Ita etiam relatio importata
per hoc nomen Deus, vel Creator, cum de
Deo dicatur, non ponit aliquid in Deo nisi
secundum intellectum, sed tantum in
creatura. Ex quo patet quod diversitas
relationum ipsius Dei ad creaturas non
ponit compositionem in ipso.

creature. For, as the Philosopher says in Book 5 of

the Metaphysics, it happens that something is called
"relative," not because something else is referred to
it, but because it refers to something else, as is the
case, for example, in all the things of which one
depends on another but not the reverse. For instance,
a knowable thing is relative only because knowledge
refers to it. For a knowable thing does not depend on
knowledge but vice versa. But because our intellect
cannot understand a relation in one of relative things
without understanding in that one thing the
something else to which it refers, it therefore
establishes a certain relation concerning a thing as
knowable and signifies it as relative. Hence, the
relation that is signified in a knowable thing does not
exist in it in reality, but only according to the mind; in
knowledge, however, the relation exists in reality. In
the same way, a relation expressed by the name
"God" or "Creator" when said of God does not
establish something in God except according to the
mind, but it establishes something only in a creature.
For this reason, it is evident that the diversity of
relations of God himself to creatures does not
establish composition in him.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod, sicut supra To the fourth, it should be said, as was said above,
dictum est, proprietas personalis
that a personal property, when compared to the
comparata ad essentiam, non differt re ab divine essence, does not differ from it in reality, and
ipsa, et ideo non facit compositionem cum for this reason, it does not produce a composition
ea; sed comparata ad suum correlativum, with it. But when a personal property is compared to
facit distinctionem realem; sed ex illa
its own correlative property, it produces a real
parte non est aliqua unio, et ideo nec
distinction. But in that respect, no union exists and,
compositio. Unde relinquitur ibi tres esse therefore, no composition. Hence, it remains that
res et tamen nullam compositionem. Ex three things exist in the divine essence and
hoc patet nomina personalia nullam in
nonetheless no composition. It is evident,
Deo compositionem significare.
accordingly, that the personal names signify no
composition in God.

John Laumakis
(jlamakis@hilltop.ic.edu)

The Aquinas Translation Project

(http://www4.desales.edu/~philtheo/loughlin/ATP/index.html)