COMMENDADOR v DE VILLA

FACTS:
[NOTE: They were tried in court martials
and not in ordinary courts]
Petitioners are officers of the Armed
Forces
of
the
Philippines
facing
prosecution
for
their
alleged
participation in the failed coup d'
etat that took place on December 1 to 9,
1989.
CHARGES: violation of Articles of War (AW)
67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming
an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94
(Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).
They are questioning he conduct of the
Pre-Trial investigation and the creation of
the General COurt Martial (GCM).
Before the charges were referred to GCM
No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI
Panel had been constituted pursuant
to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14,
1990, TO INVESTIGATE THE PETITIONERS
IN G.R. NOS. 93177 AND 96948. The PTI
Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated
January 30, 1990, individually addressed
to the petitioners.
CONTENTION: There was no pre-trial
investigation of the charges as
mandated by Article of War 71 (No
charge will be referred to a general courtmartial for trial until after a thorough and
impartial investigation thereof shall have
been made.. )
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot
applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the
application was denied by GCM No.14. .
After considering the petition and the
answer thereto filed by the president and
members of GCM No.14, Judge Maximiano
C. Asuncion issued an order granting
provisional liberty to Ligot.
RTC: bail - the assailed orders of General
Court- Martial No. 14 denying bail to
petitioner
and
intervenors
on
the

mistaken assumption that bail does not

apply to military men facing court-martial
proceedings on the ground that there is no
precedent, are hereby set aside and
declared null and void.
Private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed
with this Court a petition for habeas
corpus on the ground that they were
being detained
in Camp
Crame
without charges. Finding after hearing
that no formal charges had been filed
against the petitioners after more than a
year after their arrest, the trial court
ordered their release.
In G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were
given several opportunities to present
their side at the pre-trial investigation
The said petitioners cannot now claim
they have been denied due process
because the investigation was resolved
against them owing to their own failure to
submit their counter-affidavits.
There is SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE with
Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel.
Moreover, it is now settled that "even a
failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation
does not deprive a general court- martial
of jurisdiction.
PRE-TRIAL INVESTIGATION is that it is
directory, not mandatory, and in no
way affects the jurisdiction of a courtmartial. Pre-trial investigation is NOT an
indispensable pre-requisite to the exercise
of the Army General court martial
jurisdiction.
A trial before a general court-martial
convened
without
any
pretrial
investigation under article of war 71 would
of course be altogether irregular but the
court-martial
might
nevertheless
have
jurisdiction.
Absence
of
preliminary investigation does not go into
the jurisdiction of the court but merely to
the regularity of the proceedings.
Article of War GCM: The President of the
Philippines, the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of
Constabulary and, when empowered by

the President, the commanding officer of a

major command or task force, the
commanding officer of a division, the
commanding officer of a military area, the
superintendent of the Military Academy,
the commanding officer of a separate
brigade or body of troops may appoint
general courts-martial.
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE. Article 18 of
Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as
amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12,
1948. Members of general or
special
courts-martial
MAY
BE
CHALLENGED by the accused or the
trial judge advocate for cause stated
to the court. The court shall determine
the relevancy and validity thereof, and
shall not receive a challenge to more than
one member at a time. Challenges by
the
trial
judge
advocate
shall
ordinarily be presented and decided
before those by the accused are
offered. Each side shall be entitled to the
peremptory challenge, but the law
member of the court shall not be
challenged except for cause.
History: Martelino v. Alejandro (there was
a complete dearth of officers learned in
military law, its aside from the fact that
the officer corps of the developing army
was numerically made equate for the
demands of the strictly military aspects of
the national defense program; Because of
these considerations it was then felt that
peremptory challenges should not in the
meanwhile be permitted and that only
challenges for cause, in any number,
would be allowed.)
On
September
27,1972,
President
Marcos issued General Order No. 8,
empowering the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces to create military
tribunals "to try and decide cases of
military personnel and such other cases as
may be referred to them.
On November 7,1972, he promulgated
P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation,
Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and
other
matters
relevant
to
military

Tribunals). This decree disallowed the

peremptory challenge.
With the TERMINATION OF MARTIAL LAW
and the dissolution of the military
tribunals created thereunder, the reason
for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased
automatically. STATCON: that when the
reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat
ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed
in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the
reason of law is its soul.
RIGHT TO BAIL IN MILITARY AN
EXCEPTION .We find that the right to bail
invoked by the private respondents in G.R.
Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been
recognized and is not available in the
military, as an exception to the general
rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This
much was suggested in Arula, where we
observed that "the right to a speedy trial
is given more emphasis in the military
where the right to bail does not exist.
RATIONALE: The unique structure of the
military should be enough reason to
exempt
military
men
from
the
constitutional coverage on the right to
bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital
to note that mutinous soldiers operate
within the framework of democratic
system, are allowed the fiduciary use of
firearms by the government for the
discharge
of
their
duties
and
responsibilities and are paid out of
revenues collected from the people. All
other insurgent elements carry out their
activities outside of and against the
existing political system.
National security considerations should
also impress upon this Honorable Court
that release on bail of respondents
constitutes a damaging precedent.

But, the truly disquieting thought is

that they could freely resume their
heinous activity which could very well
result in the overthrow of duly
constituted authorities, including this
Honorable Court, and replace the same
with a system consonant with their own
concept of government and justice.

After a hearing during which the retracting

witness (del Rosario) presented by
petitioner made another turn-about and
declared against the latter, respondent
Judge Melecio B. Borja denied the motion
for bail on the finding that the evidence of
petitioner's guilt is strong and his minority
was not proved.

NOT VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTETION.

The accused officers can complain if they
are denied bail and other members of the
military are not. But they cannot say they
have been discriminated against because
they are not allowed the same right that is
extended to civilians.

Petitioner then filed an MR stating his

minority in his birth cert. he was born on
February 26, 1967, that his minority had
never been challenged by the fiscal, and
that the offense charged, as regards
petitioner, is not capital because even if
convicted, he could not be sentenced to
death because of his minority. Again,
attached to the motion for reconsideration
was a duly certified copy of petitioner's
birth certificate. The Fiscal opposed the
motion on the ground that the evidence of
guilt is strong, but did not contest the
minority of petitioner. MR denied.

RULING: G.R. No. 93177, the petition is

DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No.
96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the
respondents are DIRECTED to allow the
petitioners to exercise the right of
peremptory challenge under Article 18 of
the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and
97454, the petitions are also GRANTED,
and the orders of the respondent courts
for the release of the private respondents
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
BRAVO v BORJA
FACTS:
In the Regional Trial Court of Naga
City, petitioner Jojo Pastor Bravo, Jr.,
is charged with murder for the killing
of one Ramon.
Detained in the city jail of Naga after his
arrest, petitioner filed a motion for bail
based on two reasons: (a) that the
evidence against him is not strong in
view of the retraction by Ferdinand
del Rosario, one of the prosecution
witnesses, of his previous statement
naming petitioner as the assailant;
and (b) that he is a minor of 16 years,
entitled as such to a privileged
mitigating circumstance under Article
68 of the Revised Penal Code which
would make the murder charge
against him non-capital.

Failing in his bid for bail, petitioner then

filed a motion with the lower court praying
that he be placed in the care and custody
of the Ministry of Social Services and
Development (MSSD) pursuant to Article
191 of Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child
and Youth Welfare Code)
Above motion was denied. Explaining the
denial later, he said that the quoted Article
191 is not applicable since it could be
invoked only where the minor is charged
with a bailable offense, as could be
gleaned from the phrase "if unable to
furnish bail."
Motion for Renvestigaiton that as per NBI
Report, it was Ferdinand del Rosario,
prosecution witness, who killed deceased.
It does not appear what action, if any, the
court has taken on this motion. Neither
does it appear that the City Fiscal of Naga
has taken any move to reinvestigate the
case.
PETITION for certiorari and mandamus
praying for: release of petitioner on bail or
transfer to the custody of MSSD pending
trial pursuant to Article 191 of PD No. 603
ISSUE: W/N petitioner is entitled to bail as
a matter of right

HELD:
Under the Constitution, "all persons,
except those charged with capital offenses
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties."
(Article
IV,
Section
18.)
Generally, therefore, bail is a matter of
right before conviction, unless the accused
is charged with a capital offense and the
evidence of guilt is strong.
The charge against petitioner is murder
qualified by treachery and attended by
two aggravating circumstances: evident
premeditation and nocturnity. Punishable
by reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death, the crime is therefore a
capital offense.
CONTENTION: even assuming that the
evidence of guilt against him is strong, the
charge of murder, as to him who is only 16
years old, cannot be capital because the
death penalty cannot be imposed on
account of his minority which entitles him
to a penalty reduction of one degree. In
effect, under petitioner's submission, the
test to determine whether the
offense charged is capital, is the
penalty to be actually imposed on
him in view of the attendant
circumstances untenable
. Under Section 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court, a capital offense is "an offense
which, under the law existing at the time
of its commission, and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, may be
punished by death." It is clear from this
provision that the capital nature of an
offense
is
determined
by
the
penalty prescribed by law, with reference
to which it is relatively easy to ascertain
whether the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. Moreover, when the
Constitution or the law speaks of evidence
ofguilt, it evidently refers to a finding of

innocence or culpability, regardless of the

modifying circumstances.
RATIONALE: To allow bail on the basis of
the penalty to be actually imposed would
require a consideration not only of the
evidence of the commission of the crime
but also evidence of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. There would
then be a need for a complete trial, after
which the judge would be just about ready
to render a decision in the case. As
perceptively observed by the Solicitor
General, such procedure would defeat the
purpose of bail, which is to entitle the
accused to provisional liberty pending
trial.
ON MINORITY. Petitioner alleged that he
was a minor of 16 and this averment was
never challenged by the prosecution.
Subsequently, in his memorandum in
support of the motion for bail, petitioner
attached a copy of his birth certificate.
And finally, after respondent Judge had
denied the motion for bail, petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration, attaching
thereto a certified true copy of his birth
certificate. (Respondent judge acted w/
grave abuse of discretion)
Bail is a matter of right for the accused.
RULING: In the interest of dispatch, bail for
petitioner is fixed at P15,000.00 and his
release is ordered upon the posting
thereof and its approval by the trial judge,
unless petitioner is held for some other
cause. The petition for mandamus to
compel reinvestigation of the case is
denied. This decision is immediately
executory.