JAYSON R.

ABABA
ASSIGNMENT NO. 3
ADOMA VS. GATCHECO
Facts:
The instant administrative complaint filed against respondents for violation
of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and conduct unbecoming a court
employee, arose from the execution of a writ of replevin for recovery of
possession of motor vehicle with prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin.
Petitioner alleged that a writ of replevin was issued in his favor, but when
respondents implemented the said writ of replevin, the latter asked for
payment of money in return to such service. However, petitioner insists and
filed an adiminstrative complaint.
Issue: WON the procedure for the return of property subject of writ of
replevin was properly followed.
Held: No. Under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the procedure for
the execution of writs and other processes are: first, the sheriff must make
an estimate of the expenses to be incurred by him; second, he must obtain
court approval for such estimated expenses; third, the approved estimated
expenses shall be deposited by the interested party with the Clerk of Court
and ex-oficio sheriff; fourth, the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount to
the executing sheriff; and fifth, the executing sheriff shall liquidate his
expenses within the same period for rendering a return on the writ. Any
amount received by the sheriff in excess of the lawful fees allowed by the
Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction which renders him liable for grave
misconduct and gross dishonesty.
In the instant case, respondent sheriff totally disregarded the aforecited
procedure. He failed to make and submit estimate of the sheriffs expenses.
The amounts received and demanded by him are therefore unauthorized
fees. His acts of accepting and soliciting said monetary considerations make
him liable not only for conduct unbecoming a court employee but also for
grave misconduct and dishonesty.

YANG VS. VALDEZ

Facts:
Respondent spouses Ricardo and Milagros Morante brought an action in the
RTC of General Santos City against petitioner Thomas Yang and Manuel
Yaphockun, to recover possession of two Isuzu-cargo trucks. In their
complaint, the Morante spouses alleged that they had actual use and
possession of the two cargo trucks. The trucks were, however, registered in
the name of petitioner Thomas Yang who was the Treasurer in the Morante
spouses' business of buying and selling corn. The Morante spouses further
alleged that they were deprived of possession of the vehicles when petitioner
Yang had the vehicles taken from where they were parked in front of the
Coca-Cola Plant in General Santos City, to the warehouse of Manuel
Yaphockun and there they were thereafter held. Despite repeated demands,
the complaint alleged, petitioner Yang refused to release the trucks to
respondent spouses.
To obtain immediate possession of the Isuzu trucks, respondent spouses
applied for a writ of replevin and put up a replevin bond of P560,000.00.
RTC Judge issued the writ, however, petitioner asked for repossession
provided that a bond will be issued. The court rejected the bond.
Issue: WON replevin bond posted was defective.
Held:
No. A bond that is required to be given by law is commonly understood to
refer to an obligation or undertaking in writing that is sufficiently secured. It
is not indispensably necessary, however, that the obligation of the bond be
secured or supported by cash or personal property or real property or the
obligation of a surety other than the person giving the bond. Most generally
understood, a "bond" is an obligation reduced to writing binding the obligor
to pay a sum of money to the obligee under specified conditions. The
sufficiency of a bond is a matter that is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court which must approve the bond. In the case at bar, the replevin bond
given by the respondent Morante spouses was properly secured by the
sureties themselves who declared their solvency and capacity to answer for
the undertaking assumed, Petitioner also contends that since the respondent
spouses are not the registered owners of the cargo trucks involved, the writ
of replevin should not have been issued. We do not think so. The provisional
remedy of replevin is in the nature of a possessory action and the applicant
who seeks immediate possession of the property involved need not be holder
of the legal title to the property. It suffices, if at the time he applies for a

writ of replevin, he is, in the words of Section 2, Rule 60, "entitled to the
possession thereof. Petition for Review on Appeal by Certiorari is DENIED.

SERGS PRODUCTS VS. PCI LEASING

Facts:
PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint
for sum of money, with an application for a writ of replevin. The judge issued
a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries
and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon payment of the
necessary expenses. The sheriff proceeded to petitioner's factory and seized
one machinery. Petitioner filed a motion for special protective order invoking
the power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and
control its processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer
enforcement of the writ of replevin. The motion was opposed by PCI on the
ground that the properties were personal and therefore still subject to
seizure and writ of replevin. In their reply, petitioners asserted that the
properties were immovable. They further stated that PCI was estopped from
treating these machineries as personal because the contracts were totally
sham and farcical. Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals via an original
action for certiorari. The CA ruled that the subject machines were personal
property as provided by the agreement of the parties. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the property subject of replevin was proper.
Held: Yes. The Court ruled that the contracting parties may validly stipulate
that a real property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such
stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under
the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from
denying the truth of any material fact found therein. In the present case, the
lease agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are to be
considered as personal properties. Clearly then, petitioners were estopped
from denying the characterization of the subject machines as personal
property. Under the circumstances, they are proper subject of the writ of
seizure. Accordingly, the petition was denied and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals was affirmed.

SAN JUAN VS. VALENZUELA

Facts:
This pertains to the support pendent lite filed by the former wife against the
husband. The court granted it but, the husband asked for the changes in the
amount because the support previously ordered was now beyond his
capability.
Issue: WON the trial courts order fixing the amount of support final.
Held: No. Dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court held that petitioner's
willingness to pay the amount of support pendente lite in the manner
indicated in his manifestation, and the approval thereof by the respondent
judge have rendered the petition moot and academic; and that the amount
of support pendente lite is not final in character but the factual issue as to
the ability of the obligor to pay the support previously fixed should be
resolved by the lower court on the basis of evidence to be presented at the
proper hearing.
Petition dismissed.

ESTANISLAO VS. EAST WEST

Facts:
Petitioners obtained a loan from the respondent evidenced by a promissory
note and secured by two deeds of chattel mortgage, one covering two dump
trucks and a bulldozer to secure the loan amount of P2,375,000.00, and
another covering bulldozer and a wheel loader to secure the loan amount of
P1,550,000.00. Petitioners defaulted in the amortizations and the entire
obligation became due and demandable.
Respondent bank filed a suit for replevin with damages, praying that the
equipment covered by the first deed of chattel mortgage be seized and
delivered to it. In the alternative, respondent prayed that petitioners be
ordered to pay the outstanding principal amount of P3,846,127.73 with
19.5% interest per annum. Subsequently, respondent moved for suspension
of the proceedings on account of an earnest attempt to arrive at an amicable
settlement of the case. Respondent likewise claimed that petitioners were
given a chance to submit a refinancing scheme that would allow them to
keep the remaining two heavy equipment, but they failed to come up with
such a scheme despite repeated promises to do so.
A deed of assignment and delivery of heavy equipment have been done by
the petitioners. Petitioners sought to dismiss the amended complaint. They
alleged that their previous payments on loan amortizations, the execution of
the deed of assignment and respondent's acceptance of the three units of
heavy equipment, had the effect of full payment or satisfaction of their total
outstanding obligation which is a bar on respondent bank from recovering
any more amounts from them.
Issue: WON the deed of assignment operate to extinguish petitioners' debt
to respondent, such that the replevin suit could no longer prosper.
Held: Yes. The appellate court erroneously denominated the replevin suit as
a collection case. A reading of the original and amended complaints show
that what the respondent initiated was a pure replevin suit, and not a
collection case. Recovery of the heavy equipment was the principal aim of
the suit; payment of the total obligation was merely an alternative prayer
which respondent sought in the event manual delivery of the heavy
equipment could no longer be made.
Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy and a
provisional relief. It may refer either to the action itself, or to the provisional
remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency
of the action and hold it pendente lite.
The deed of assignment was a perfected agreement which extinguished
petitioners' total outstanding obligation to the respondent. The deed
explicitly provides that the assignor petitioners in full payment of its
obligation shall deliver the three units of heavy equipment to the

respondent, which accepts the assignment in full payment of the abovementioned debt. This could only mean that should petitioners complete the
delivery of the three units of heavy equipment, respondent's credit would
have been satisfied in full.

DAVID VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Petitioner Daisie David worked as secretary of private respondent
Ramon Villar, a businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married
man and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the
relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed into an
intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J. He was followed by
two more children, both girls, namely Christine, and Cathy Mae.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie
took Christopher J. to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime
in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife. After this, the children of
Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually
accepted by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher, then six
years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the
trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled
Christopher at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year. Daisie filed
a petition for habeas corpus.
Issue: WON support is proper pending the filing of an action for support.
Held: Yes. Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for
that purpose, the grant of support in this case is justified by the fact that
private respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor child. The
order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him
of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged
to give support can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed
by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the
person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is a moral
or legal obstacle thereto.
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being
less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the
RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is
over seven years of age the mother's custody over him will have to be
upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his
mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice
of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and
here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have
custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should
not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to
private respondent.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE

PORT OF SUBIC vs HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION
FACTS:
On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO
27-2003. Under the Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was classified
according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin;
and (3) port of discharge. The regulation provided an exclusive list of
corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of
origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be classified either as food
grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%,
for feed grade, 7%.
CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or
Valuation and Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this
procedure, the release of the articles that were the subject of protest
required the importer to post a cash bond to cover the tariff differential.
A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December 2003,
respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Las Pias City. It anticipated the implementation of the regulation on
its imported and perishable Chinese milling wheat in transit from
China. Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003 was issued without
following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public
participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University
of the Philippines Law Center.
Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to
be a feed grade supplier without the benefit of prior assessment and
examination; thus, despite having imported food grade wheat, it would be
subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing them to
pay 133% more than was proper.
Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of
the Constitution was violated when the regulation treated non-flour millers
differently from flour millers for no reason at all.
Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the
regulation was confiscatory in nature.

On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order

(TRO) effective for twenty (20) days from notice.
Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss. They alleged that: (1)
the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case,
because respondent was asking for a judicial determination of the
classification of wheat; (2) an action for declaratory relief was improper; (3)
CMO 27-2003 was an internal administrative rule and not legislative in
nature; and (4) the claims of respondent were speculative and premature,
because the Bureau of Customs (BOC) had yet to examine respondents
products. They likewise opposed the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction on the ground that they had not inflicted any injury through the
issuance of the regulation; and that the action would be contrary to the rule
that administrative issuances are assumed valid until declared otherwise.
On 28 February 2005, the parties agreed that the matters raised in the
application for preliminary injunction and the Motion to Dismiss would just
be resolved together in the main case. Thus, on 10 March 2005, the RTC
rendered its Decision without having to resolve the application for
preliminary injunction and the Motion to Dismiss.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent. Dissatisfied with the
Decision of the lower court, petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same
allegations in defense of CMO 27-2003. The appellate court, however,
dismissed the appeal. It held that, since the regulation affected substantial
rights of petitioners and other importers, petitioners should have observed
the requirements of notice, hearing and publication. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND PREVAILING
JURISPRUDENCE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.

HELD:
The Petition has no merit. We shall first discuss the propriety of an action for
declaratory relief.
Rule 63, Section 1 provides:
Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance,
or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1)
there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking
declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the
issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. We find that the
Petition filed by respondent before the lower court meets these
requirements.

First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of CMO 272003 issued by petitioner Commissioner of Customs. In Smart
Communications v. NTC, we held:
The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules
issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the
constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial
review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international
or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts,
including the regional trial courts. This is within the
scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of
the courts to determine in an appropriate action the
validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and

enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile, in Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v.
Department of Finance Secretary, we said:
xxx [A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate
legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof. xxx
In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand,
interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law
which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court
is free to make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is
within the delegated authority of the administrative
agency; (ii)whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it
was issued pursuant to proper procedure. But the court is
not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or
wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of
administrative judgment, has committed those questions to
administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments. In the
case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity
but into the correctness or propriety of the rule. As a matter of
power a court, when confronted with an interpretative rule, is
free to (i) give the force of law to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite
extreme and substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some
intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the interpretative
rule. (Emphasis supplied)
Second, the controversy is between two parties that have adverse
interests. Petitioners are summarily imposing a tariff rate that respondent is
refusing to pay.
Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive interest in
the implementation of CMO 27-2003. Respondent has adequately shown
that, as a regular importer of wheat, on 14 August 2003, it has actually
made shipments of wheat from China to Subic. The shipment was set to
arrive in December 2003. Upon its arrival, it would be subjected to the
conditions of CMO 27-2003. The regulation calls for the imposition of

different tariff rates, depending on the factors enumerated therein. Thus,

respondent alleged that it would be made to pay the 7% tariff applied to
feed grade wheat, instead of the 3% tariff on food grade wheat. In addition,
respondent would have to go through the procedure under CMO 27-2003,
which would undoubtedly toll its time and resources. The lower court
correctly pointed out as follows:
xxx As noted above, the fact that petitioner is precisely
into the business of importing wheat, each and every
importation will be subjected to constant disputes which
will result into (sic) delays in the delivery, setting aside of
funds as cash bond required in the CMO as well as the
resulting expenses thereof. It is easy to see that business
uncertainty will be a constant occurrence for petitioner.
That the sums involved are not minimal is shown by the
discussions during the hearings conducted as well as in
the pleadings filed. It may be that the petitioner can later on
get a refund but such has been foreclosed because the Collector
of Customs and the Commissioner of Customs are bound by their
own CMO. Petitioner cannot get its refund with the said agency.
We believe and so find that Petitioner has presented such a stake
in the outcome of this controversy as to vest it with standing to
file this petition. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial
determination, because litigation is inevitable for the simple and
uncontroverted reason that respondent is not included in the enumeration of
flour millers classified as food grade wheat importers. Thus, as the trial court
stated, it would have to file a protest case each time it imports food grade
wheat and be subjected to the 7% tariff.
It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is the right
remedy given the circumstances of the case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

LERMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Petitioner Lerma and private respondent Diaz are husband and wife,
married in 951. In 1969 petitioner filed a criminal complaint for adultery
against the respondentl. Three months after the said filing, the respondent
filed with the lower court, a complaint against the petitioner for legal
separation and/or separation of properties, custody of their children and
support, with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for her and their
youngest son. The respondents complaint for legal separation is based on
two grounds: concubinage and attempt against her life. The petitioner filed
his opposition to the respondents application for support pendente lite,
setting up as defense the adultery charge he had filed against the
Respondent. The Judge granted the respondents application for support
pendente lite. Petitioner then filed with respondent CA a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the order of
the trial court on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of
discretion. The next day the respondent court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction to stop the Judge from enforcing his order. Respondent court set
aside the assailed orders and granted the petitioner an opportunity to
present evidence before the lower court. This is now the subject of the
instant petition for review by certiorari. During the pendency of the petition,
petitioner filed an urgent motion for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order, alleging among others that the respondents action for
support should be dismissed on the ground that the respondent and her coaccused, Teddy Ramirez, had been convicted by CFI and said judgment of
conviction was pending appeal in the CA.
Issue: WON adultery is a good defense against the respondents claim for
support pendente lite.
Held: Yes, adultery is a good defense against an action for support pendente
lite. This ruling has been adopted by the Court in various cases. However,
while adultery may be a defense in an action for personal support, that is,
support of the wife by the husband from his own funds, it is not a defense
when the support is to be taken from the conjugal partnership property. The
procedural law on support pendente lite is Rule 61 of the Revised Rules of
Court, specifically Section 5 thereof, which partly provides that the court
shall determine provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render such order
as equity and justice may require, having due regard to the necessities of
the applicant, the means of the adverse party, the probable outcome of the
case, and such other circumstances as may aid in the proper elucidation of
the questions involved. "
The question of whether or not the petitioner should be allowed to present
evidence in the lower court in support of his defense that his wife had
committed adultery has become moot and academic. The respondent Court
of Appeals, in upholding the questioned orders of the lower court, relied on
Article 292 of the Civil Code, which states that during the proceedings for

legal separation, or for annulment of marriage, the spouses and children

shall be supported from the conjugal partnership property. After the final
judgment of legal separation, or of annulment of marriage, the obligation of
mutual support between the spouses ceases.

OLAYVAR VS. OLAYVAR

Facts: Rosita Veloso De Olayvar instituted an action against Aristoteles
Olayvar in the Court of First Instance of Leyte praying that support be given
her and her four children coupled with a petition for support pendente lite.
But earlier, defendant filed a case for legal separation in Cebu between the
same parties on the ground of adultery wherein the right of plaintiff to
demand support is incidentally involved. Defendant in his answer to the later
case set up as special defense about their pending case for legal separation
in Cebu.
While the separation case in Cebu is pending, the court deemed it proper to
hold in abeyance further action on the case for support for the reason that
the case in Cebu "should have priority in order to ascertain the rights of the
parties with particular reference to support in favor of the plaintiff." The
court however modified later this ruling on the premise that, as the legal
separation case might take a long time before it is finally disposed of, it is
imperative that the matter of support be given preferential consideration.
After the failed attempt of the defendant to have this ruling reconsidered, he
filed a motion to dismiss predicated on the same plea that there is between
the same parties a case for legal separation in the CFI of Cebu invoking in
his favor the rule that a complaint may be dismissed where "there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause.
Issue: WON defendants claim that an action (support pendente lite) may be
dismissed on the ground that "there is another action pending (legal
separation) between the same parties for the same cause" tenable.
Held: Yes. The defendants claim is tenable, thus the present action must be
dismissed.
In order that an action may be dismissed on the ground that "there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause" [Rule
8, section 1 (d)], the following requisites must concur: (1) identity of
parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions;
(2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (3) the identity in the two cases should be such that
the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party
is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the other.
Note that the present action is for support not only of plaintiff but of her
children. The action is predicated on the infidelity of defendant who because
of his propensity towards other women made him neglectful of his marital
duties. The case of legal separation, on the other hand, asserts adultery on
the part of plaintiff which is a valid defense against an action for support.

PERKINS VS. PERKINS

Facts: Appeal against an order of CFI of Manila in Special Proceedings No.
29636 authorizing the special administrator of the testate estate of the late
Eugene Arthur Perkins to sell at public auction certain personal properties
left by the deceased. It appears that said special proceedings were
commenced by a petition presented by Dora Perkin Anderson for the probate
of the supposed last will and testament of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins,
who died in Manila who allegedly possessed of personal and real properties.
On the same date of the filing of the aforesaid petition, petitioner Dora
Perkins Anderson also filed a urgent petition for the appointment of Alfonso
Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate, and on the same day, the
court issued an order appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile. Idonah Slade Perkins,
surviving spouse of the deceased entered an opposition to the probate of the
will presented by petitioner. Special administrator submitted an inventory of
all the assets which have come to his knowledge as belonging to the
deceased Eugene Arthur Perkins at the time of his death.
Special administrator submitted to the court a petition seeking authority to
sell, or give away to some charitable or educational institution or institutions,
certain personal effects left by the deceased in order to avoid their further
deterioration and to save whatever value might be obtained in their
disposition. Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposition to the proposed sale.
Reasons, for the opposition were that most of the properties sought to be
sold were conjugal properties of herself and her deceased husband that
unauthorized removal of fine pieces of furniture belonging to the estate had
been made.
Issue: WON the sale of the personal items were proper.
Held: No. Indeed the records show that up to the time the propose sale was
asked for and judicially approved, no proceeding had as yet been taken, or
even started, to segregate the alleged exclusive property of the oppositorappellant from the mass of the estate supposedly left by the deceased or to
liquidate the conjugal partnership property of the oppositor-appellant and
the deceased. Until, therefore the issue of the ownership of the properties
sought to be sold is heard and decided, and the conjugal partnership
liquidated; or, at least, an agreement be reached with a appellant as to
which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not mind being sold
to preserve their value the proposed sale is clearly premature. After all, most
of the items sought to be sold pieces of furniture, kitchen and dinner
ware, electrical appliances, various gadget and books can easily be
protected and preserved with proper care and storage measures

NAVARRO VS. ESCOBIDO

Facts: Respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints before the RTC for
replevin and/or sum of money with damages against Navarro. In these
complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the
seizure of 2 motor vehicles in Navarros possession. In his Answers, Navarro
alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no
cause of action, since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements
with Option to Purchase, the actionable documents on which the complaints
were based. RTC dismissed the case but set aside the dismissal on the
presumption that Glenn Gos (husband) leasing business is a conjugal
property and thus ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the inclusion of
Glenn Go as co-plaintiff as per Rule 4, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.
Navarro filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. According to Navarro, a
complaint which failed to state a cause of action could not be converted into
one with a cause of action by mere amendment or supplemental pleading.
CA denied petition.
Issue: WON Karen Go is a real party in interest.
Held: Karen Go is the registered owner of the business name Kargo
Enterprises, as the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the
party who will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case.
Thus, contrary to Navarros contention, Karen Go is the real party-ininterest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a
cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement
that her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises.
Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the
properties registered under this name; hence, both have an equal right to
seek possession of these properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners,
namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned
property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not
indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete
relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the
suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
We hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the
action to recover possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be
impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the
Rules. Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action,
misjoinder or non-joinder of indispensable parties in a complaint is not a
ground for dismissal of action as per Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of
Court.

ADVENT CAPITAL VS. YOUNG

Facts: The present controversy stemmed from a replevin suit instituted by
petitioner Advent against respondent Young to recover the possession of a
1996 Mercedes Benz E230 which is registered in Advents name. Prior to the
replevin case, Advent filed for corporate rehabilitation with the rehabilitation
court. The court issued an Order (stay order) which states that the
enforcement of all claims whether for money or otherwise, and whether such
enforcement is by court action or otherwise, against Advent, its guarantors
and sureties not solidarily liable with it, is stayed.
Young claimed among others, several employee benefits allegedly due him
as Advents former president and chief executive officer. Advent's
rehabilitation plan was approved which included in its assets the subject car
which remained in Young's possession at the time. The trial court issued a
Writ of Seizure directing the Sheriff to seize the subject car from Young.
Young filed an Answer alleging that as a former employee of Advent, he had
the option to purchase the subject car. The trial court dismissed the replevin
case and Young's counterclaim. The CA ruled in favor of Young and directed
the returning the car to him.
Issue: WON CA committed reversible error in directing the return of the
seized car to Young.
Held: The petition is partially meritorious. We agree with the Court of
Appeals in directing the trial court to return the seized car to Young since
this is the necessary consequence of the dismissal of the replevin case for
failure to prosecute without prejudice. Upon the dismissal of the replevin
case for failure to prosecute, the writ of seizure, which is merely ancillary in
nature, became functus officio and should have been lifted. There was no
adjudication on the merits, which means that there was no determination of
the issue who has the better right to possess the subject car. Advent cannot
therefore retain possession of the subject car considering that it was not
adjudged as the prevailing party entitled to the remedy of replevin.
The dismissal of the replevin case for failure to prosecute results in the
restoration of the parties status prior to litigation, as if no complaint was
filed at all. To let the writ of seizure stand after the dismissal of the
complaint would be adjudging Advent as the prevailing party, when precisely
no decision on the merits had been rendered. Accordingly, the parties must
be reverted to their status quo ante. Since Young possessed the subject car
before the filing of the replevin case, the same must be returned to him, as
if no complaint was filed at all.

EUFEMIA VS. BATHALA

Facts: Respondent Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee,
represented by its president renewed its Contract of Lease with Almeda, as
lessor, husband of petitioner Eufemia and father of petitioner Romel Almeda.
Under the said contract, Ponciano agreed to lease a portion of the Almeda
Compound. The contract of lease stated that in case of extraordinary
inflation, the value of Philippine peso at the time of the establishment of the
obligation shall be the basis of payment.
During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. Thereafter, respondent
dealt with petitioners. Petitioners advised respondent that the former shall
assess and collect VAT on its monthly rentals. Respondent opposed
petitioners' demand and insisted that there was no extraordinary inflation to
warrant the application of Article 1250 in light of the pronouncement of this
Court in various cases. Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted
rentals as demanded by petitioners but continued to pay the stipulated
amount set forth in their contract.
Respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of
determining the correct interpretation of conditions of the lease contract to
prevent damage and prejudice. Petitioners in turn filed an action for
ejectment, rescission and damages against respondent for failure of the
latter to vacate the premises after the demand made by the former.
Petitioners later moved for the dismissal of the declaratory relief case for
being an improper remedy considering that respondent was already in
breach of the obligation and that the case would not end the litigation and
settle the rights of the parties. The trial court, however, was not persuaded,
and consequently, denied the motion.
Issue: WON the action for declaratory relief is proper
Held: Yes. Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested
in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or
resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from
the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a
declaration of his rights and duties thereunder.
After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months
that followed, respondent complied with the terms and conditions set forth in
their contract of lease by paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent
religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the pendency of
the present suit. There is no showing that respondent committed an act
constituting a breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is
not barred from instituting before the trial court the petition for declaratory
relief. Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to
entertain the instant declaratory relief action instead of dismissing it,
notwithstanding the pendency of the ejectment/rescission case before the
trial court.With premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the CA is affirmed.

MALANA VS. TAPPA

Facts: Petitioners Malana, et al. alleged to be the owners of a land in
Tugegarao which they inherited from Anastacio Danao. During the lifetime of
Danao, he allowed Consuelo Pauig to build on and occupy the southern
portion of the subject property. Danao and Consuelo agreed that the latter
would vacate the said land at any time that Danao and his heirs might need
it. Danaos heirs claimed that respondents Tappa, et al. continued to occupy
the subject property even after Consuelos death, building their residences
thereon using permanent materials. Danaos heirs also learned that Tappa,
et al. were claiming ownership over the subject property. Averring that they
already needed it, Danaos heirs demanded that respondents vacate the
same. The call was unheeded. Meanwhile, Danaos heirs referred their land
dispute to the Lupong Tagapamayapa. During the conciliation proceedings,
respondents asserted that they owned the subject property and presented
documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership. The heirs opposed
this, saying that the documents were falsified and highly dubious. This
notwithstanding, Tappa, et al. created a cloud upon the heirs title to the
property. Thus, the heirs filed a case for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and
Damages in the RTC.
Issue: WON the judge commit grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio
dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Held: No. Petition is dismissed. RTC should remand the records to the MTC.
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a
deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The
relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and
determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial
declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder. Petitions for
declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63. Section 1 states that an action
for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title, and to consolidate
ownership in a sale with a right to repurchase may be brought under the
RTC. These remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because
they result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often
without the need of execution. Whereas the Rules of Court uses may, the
amended Judicial Reorganization Act uses the word shall in determining
jurisdiction. MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil
actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the
assessed value does not exceed P20,000 (OMM) or P50,000 (MM). Here, the
value of the property is only P410.00; therefore, the jurisdiction is with the
MTC. Further, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has
been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising
thereunder. The purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a
statute, deed or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, and

not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof. Since the heirs
had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper
remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. HYPER MIX FEEDS

Facts: The Commissioner of Customs issued CM 27-2003 classifying wheat
as (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge
and depending on these factors, wheat would be classified further as either
food grade with a tariff rate of 3% or feed grade with a tariff rate of 7%. The
regulation also provides for an exclusive list of corporations, ports of
discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Respondent filed
a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Las Pinas contending the
following: (1) the regulation was issued without following the mandate of the
Revised Administrative Code, (2) that the regulation classified them to be a
feed grade supplier without prior assessment and examination, (3) the equal
protection clause of the Constitution was violated when the regulation
treated the non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at
all, and (4) the retroactive application of the regulation is confiscatory. The
petitioners thereafter filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1) the RTC
does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter, (2) an action for declaratory
relief was improper, (3) CM 27-2003 was an internal administrative rule and
not legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of the respondent were
speculative and premature. RTC rendered a decision ruling in favor of the
respondent. It held that the jurisdiction is properly held because the subject
matter is quasi-legislative in nature. It also held that the petition for
declaratory relief was proper remedy and that the respondent was the
proper party to file it. On matters relating to the validity of the regulation,
the court held that the regulation is invalid because the basic requirements
of hearing and publication were not complied with. The petitioners then
appealed to Court of Appeals but it was, however, dismissed. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
Issue: WON declaratory relief was the proper action made.
Held: Yes. The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as
follows: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy
must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and
(4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. We find that
the Petition filed by respondent before the lower court meets these
requirements.

DIAZ VS. SEC. OF FINANCE

Facts: Petitioners Renato V. Diaz and Aurora Ma. F. Timbol (petitioners) filed
this petition for declaratory relief assailing the validity of the impending
imposition of VAT by the BIR on the collections of tollway operators. Court
treated the case as one of prohibition.
Petitioners hold the view that Congress did not, when it enacted the NIRC,
intend to include toll fees within the meaning of "sale of services" that are
subject to VAT; that a toll fee is a "user's tax," not a sale of services; that to
impose VAT on toll fees would amount to a tax on public service; and that,
since VAT was never factored into the formula for computing toll fees, its
imposition would violate the non-impairment clause of the constitution.
The government avers that the NIRC imposes VAT on all kinds of services of
franchise grantees, including tollway operations; that the Court should seek
the meaning and intent of the law from the words used in the statute; and
that the imposition of VAT on tollway operations has been the subject as
early as 2003 of several BIR rulings and circulars. The government also
argues that petitioners have no right to invoke the non-impairment of
contracts clause since they clearly have no personal interest in existing toll
operating agreements between the government and tollway operators. At
any rate, the non-impairment clause cannot limit the State's sovereign
taxing power which is generally read into contracts.
Issue: WON the Court may treat the petition for declaratory relief as one for
prohibition.
Held: Yes. Court issued a resolution, treating the petition as one for
prohibition rather than one for declaratory relief, the characterization that
petitioners Diaz and Timbol gave their action. The government has sought
reconsideration of the Courts resolution, however, arguing that petitioners
allegations clearly made out a case for declaratory relief, an action over
which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Petition does not meet the
requirements of Rule 65 for actions for prohibition since the BIR did not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions when it sought to
impose VAT on toll fees. Besides, petitioners Diaz and Timbol has a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the BIR
action in the form of an appeal to the Secretary of Finance. However, it has
also held that a petition for prohibition is a proper remedy to prohibit or
nullify acts of executive officials that amount to usurpation of legislative
authority.
Here, the imposition of VAT on toll fees has far-reaching implications. Its
imposition would impact, not only on the more than half a million motorists
who use the tollways everyday, but more so on the governments effort to
raise revenue for funding various projects and for reducing budgetary
deficits. To dismiss the petition and resolve the issues later, after the

challenged VAT has been imposed, could cause more mischief both to the
tax-paying public and the government. A belated declaration of nullity of the
BIR action would make any attempt to refund to the motorists what they
paid an administrative nightmare with no solution. Consequently, it is not
only the right, but the duty of the Court to take cognizance of and resolve
the issues that the petition raises.

WILSON GAMBOA VS. FINANCE SEC.

Facts: PLDT was granted a franchise to engage in the telecommunications
business in 1928 through Act No. 3436. During the Martial Law 26 percent of
the outstanding common shares were sold by GTE an American Company to
Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation , who in turn
assigned 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC (46 percent of outstanding capital
stock) to Prime Holdings Inc. (PHI). These shares of PTIC were later
sequestered by PCGG and adjudged by the court to belong to the Republic.
54% shares were sold to Hong Kong-based firm First Pacific, and the
remaining 46% was sold through public bidding by the Inter-agency
Privatization Council, and eventually ended up being bought by First Pacific
subsidiary. Metro Pacific Assets Holdings Inc. (MPAH) after the corporation
exercise its first refusal. The transaction was an indirect sale of 12 million
shares or 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT, making
First Pacifics common shareholdings of PLDT to 37 percent and the total
common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to 81.47%. Japanese NTT
DoCoMo owns 51.5 of the other foreign shareholdings.
Petitioner Gamboa alleged that the sale of shares to MPAH violates Sec. 11
of Art. XII of the Constitution, which limits foreign ownership of the capital of
a public utility to not more than 40%.
Issue: WON declaratory relief was proper remedy.
Held: No. However, since the threshold and purely legal issue on the
definition of the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
has far-reaching implications to the national economy, the Court treats the
petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus. It is well settled that this
Court may treat a petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus if the
issue involved has far-reaching implications.

VERSOZA VS. CARAGUE

Facts: OSG filed its Comment reiterating its position that petitioner should
not have been made liable for the disallowed amount since there was no
substantial evidence of his direct responsibility. It contends that the decision
should not have ordered petitioner to reimburse the disallowed amount on
account of "overpricing of purchased equipment" because he did not have
any participation in the bidding that was conducted by the PBAC, nor did he
have any participation in influencing Mr. A. Quintos, Jr., the DAP-TEC
evaluator, to change the evaluation results. As to the acts cited by the COA
in holding petitioner liable for the disallowed amount, these cannot be the
"clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence" required by law to
hold public officers liable for acts done in the performance of his official
duties. There was no contrary evidence presented by the COA to overcome
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. The OSG
also cites the discussion in the dissenting opinion of Justice Sereno that the
standards set in Arriola should have been observed by the COA, i.e., it
should have compared the same brand of equipment.
Respondents filed their Comment asserting that the arguments raised by the
petitioner in his motion for reconsideration do not warrant reversal of the
decision rendered by this Court. They point out that the bad faith of
petitioner was satisfactorily established when he prevailed upon DAP-TEC to
modify the initial result of the technical evaluation of the bidders computer
units. As to the contention that petitioners act of signing the documents for
the processing of the purchase was merely a ministerial function,
respondents noted that the Certification in the Disbursement Voucher for the
payment of the computer states that "Expenses necessary, lawful and
incurred under my direct supervision." Such certification definitely involves
the exercise of discretion and is not a ministerial act.
Issue: WON COA is in the position to rule on the determination of
overpricing.
Held: Yes. The COA, under the Constitution, is empowered to examine and
audit the use of funds by an agency of the national government on a postaudit basis. For this purpose, the Constitution has provided that the COA
"shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to
define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and
methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules
and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of
irregular, unnecessary,
excessive,
extravagant,
or
unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties."8 As such, CDAs
decisions regarding procurement of equipment for its own use, including
computers and its accessories, is subject to the COAs auditing rules and

regulations for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,

excessive and extravagant expenditures.

VELOSO VS. COA

Facts: On December 7, 2000, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 8040 entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Conferment of Exemplary
Public Service Award to Elective Local Officials of Manila Who Have Been
Elected for 3 Consecutive Terms in the Same Position. Section 2 thereof
provides that EPSA shall consist of a Plaque of Appreciation, retirement and
gratuity pay remuneration equivalent to the actual time served in the
position for 3 consecutive terms, subject to the availability of funds as
certified by the City Treasurer.
Atty. Espina, Supervising Auditor of the City of Manila, issued Audit
Observation stating that the payment made was without legal basis,
excessive and classified as Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
instead of Personal Services. Due to this, a notice of disallowance by the
Director of Legal Adjudication Office was issued. The councilors filed for the
lifting of the notice of disallowance which was favored by the Legal
Adjudication Office. However, the motion for reconsideration was denied. The
COA opined that the monetary reward under the EPSA is covered by the
term "compensation." Though it recognizes the local autonomy of LGUs, it
emphasized the limitations thereof set forth in the Salary Standardization
Law. It explained that the SSL does not authorize the grant of such
monetary reward or gratuity. It also stressed the absence of a specific law
passed by Congress which ordains the conferment of such monetary reward
or gratuity to the former councilors.
Petitioners through special civil action for certiorari alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COA claiming that The respondent Commission
on Audit did not only commit a reversible error but was, in fact, guilty of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
ruled that the monetary award given under the EPSA partakes of the nature
of an additional compensation prohibited under SSL.
Issue: WON COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
disallowance notice.
Held: No. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect
but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness
or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion.[
It is only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that
this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. There is grave
abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in
contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based
on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism. In this

case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA in issuing
the assailed decisions

NAZARETH VS. VILLAR

Facts:
Being assailed by petition for certiorari on the ground of its being issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is
the decision rendered by COA, for petition filed by Ms. Brenda L. Nazareth,
Regional Director, DOST, in Zamboanga City, for on disallowances of
subsistence, laundry, hazard and other benefits of covered officials and
employees of DOST for calendar year (CY) 2001 out of the savings of the
DOST.
The petitioner DOST Regional Director hereby seeks to declare the decision
"null and void," and prays for the lifting of the disallowance of the payment
of the benefits for CY2001 for being within the ambit of Republic Act No.
8439 (R.A. No. 8439), otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Scientists,
Engineers, Researchers, and other Science and Technology Personnel in the
Government (Magna Carta, for short), and on the strength of the
Memorandum of Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora authorizing the use
of the savings for the purpose.
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari, with the petitioner insisting that
the COA gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in affirming the disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits for CY
2001 despite the provisions of R.A. No. 8439.
Issue: Whether the special civil action for certiorari is meritorious.
Held: No. The COA is endowed with sufficient latitude to determine, prevent,
and disallow the irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds. Only when the COA has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court entertain and
grant a petition for certiorari brought to assail its actions. Section 1 of Rule
65, Rules of Court, demands that the petitioner must show that, one, the
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an
appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law for the purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding. Inasmuch as
the sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner should establish that the
COA gravely abused its discretion. The abuse of discretion must be grave,
which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or
that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or

virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of

law. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the
writ.
The petitioner dismally failed to discharge her burden. We conclude and
declare, therefore, that the COAs assailed decision was issued in steadfast
compliance of its duty under the Constitution and in the judicious exercise of
its general audit power conferred to it by the Constitution.