EN BANC

G.R. No. 34840

September 23, 1931

NARCISO GUTIERREZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BONIFACIO GUTIERREZ, MARIA V. DE GUTIERREZ, MANUEL GUTIERREZ, ABELARDO VELASCO,
and SATURNINO CORTEZ, Defendants-Appellants.
MALCOLM, J.:

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(Summary: Narciso Gutierrez was a passenger of the bus that collided with the automobile driven by Bonifacio Gutierrez. The cause of the accident was
pure and simple negligence. The question is who will pay the civil damages? The Supreme Court ruled that Bonifacio Gutierrez was driving at high speed
and therefore by negligence, contributed to the accident. The Oblicon priniciple here is that since Bonifacio was still 18 years old, who will shoulder the
payment? The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of the owner's
business, so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant. (Huddy On Automobiles, 6th ed., sec. 660;
Missell vs. Hayes [1914], 91 Atl., 322.) This is also pursuant to the provisions of Art 1903 of the Civil Code. So since the father allowed his son to drive
the vehicle, he alone, not the son nor the mother, is liable to pay the amount stipulated. The Supreme Court reduced the amount recoverable to 5,000
and held both the owner of the truck and the father of Bonifacion jointly and severally liable.)
This is an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the five defendants, to recover damages in the amount of
P10,000, for physical injuries suffered as a result of an automobile accident. On judgment being rendered as prayed for by the plaintiff, both sets of
defendants appealed.
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On February 2, 1930, a passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the
Manila South Road in the municipality of Las Pias, Province of Rizal. The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and was owned by
Saturnino Cortez. The automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age, and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr.
and Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez. At the time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but the mother, together will several other members of the Gutierrez
family, seven in all, were accommodated therein. A passenger in the autobus, by the name of Narciso Gutierrez, was en route from San Pablo, Laguna, to
Manila. The collision between the bus and the automobile resulted in Narciso Gutierrez suffering a fracture right leg which required medical attendance for
a considerable period of time, and which even at the date of the trial appears not to have healed properly.
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It is conceded that the collision was caused by negligence pure and simple. The difference between the parties is that, while the plaintiff blames both sets
of defendants, the owner of the passenger truck blames the automobile, and the owner of the automobile, in turn, blames the truck. We have given close
attention to these highly debatable points, and having done so, a majority of the court are of the opinion that the findings of the trial judge on all
controversial questions of fact find sufficient support in the record, and so should be maintained. With this general statement set down, we turn to
consider the respective legal obligations of the defendants.
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In amplification of so much of the above pronouncement as concerns the Gutierrez family, it may be explained that the youth Bonifacio was in
incompetent chauffeur, that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed, and that, on approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his head and so
contributed by his negligence to the accident. The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made
the father responsible for the acts of his son. Based on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and not
the minor or the mother, would be liable for the damages caused by the minor.
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We are dealing with the civil law liability of parties for obligations which arise from fault or negligence. At the same time, we believe that, as has been
done in other cases, we can take cognizance of the common law rule on the same subject. In the United States, it is uniformly held that the head of a
house, the owner of an automobile, who maintains it for the general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children, whom he
designates or permits to run it, where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owner's family
than the child driving it. The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of the
owner's business, so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant. (Huddy On Automobiles, 6th ed.,
sec. 660; Missell vs. Hayes [1914], 91 Atl., 322.) The liability of Saturnino Cortez, the owner of the truck, and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on
a different basis, namely, that of contract which, we think, has been sufficiently demonstrated by the allegations of the complaint, not controverted, and
the evidence. The reason for this conclusion reaches to the findings of the trial court concerning the position of the truck on the bridge, the speed in
operating the machine, and the lack of care employed by the chauffeur. While these facts are not as clearly evidenced as are those which convict the
other defendant, we nevertheless hesitate to disregard the points emphasized by the trial judge. In its broader aspects, the case is one of two drivers
approaching a narrow bridge from opposite directions, with neither being willing to slow up and give the right of way to the other, with the inevitable
result of a collision and an accident.
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The defendants Velasco and Cortez further contend that there existed contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, consisting principally of his
keeping his foot outside the truck, which occasioned his injury. In this connection, it is sufficient to state that, aside from the fact that the defense of
contributory negligence was not pleaded, the evidence bearing out this theory of the case is contradictory in the extreme and leads us far afield into
speculative matters.
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The last subject for consideration relates to the amount of the award. The appellee suggests that the amount could justly be raised to P16,517, but
naturally is not serious in asking for this sum, since no appeal was taken by him from the judgment. The other parties unite in challenging the award of
P10,000, as excessive. All facts considered, including actual expenditures and damages for the injury to the leg of the plaintiff, which may cause him
permanent lameness, in connection with other adjudications of this court, lead us to conclude that a total sum for the plaintiff of P5,000 would be fair and
reasonable. The difficulty in approximating the damages by monetary compensation is well elucidated by the divergence of opinion among the members
of the court, three of whom have inclined to the view that P3,000 would be amply sufficient, while a fourth member has argued that P7,500 would be
none too much.
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In consonance with the foregoing rulings, the judgment appealed from will be modified, and the plaintiff will have judgment in his favor against the
defendants Manuel Gutierrez, Abelardo Velasco, and Saturnino Cortez, jointly and severally, for the sum of P5,000, and the costs of both instances.
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Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

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I vote for an indemnity of P7,500.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:
(Summary: Reginald Hill was acquitted in a Criminal Case filed against him because the trial court found that his actions does not have the
intent to kill, coupled with a mistake. But the plaintiffs instituted a civil action against the defendants, sought to recover damages. The
defendants argued that since Reginald was acquitted, his civil liability is also extinguished and his father cant be sued as well because his
liability as a father was already emancipated through Reginalds marriage. The Supreme Court said that the civil liability that was
extinguished was only that of relating to the crime, however, the liability arising from Quasi-delicts remain. ART. 2177, provides the authority
for this ruling which reads: Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. Arts. 2176 and 2177 are not limited to acts not punishable by law but includes acts which are criminal in nature, whether
intentional or not. The law should be given an interpretation where it gives and not kills. On the matter if his father is liable, the answer of the
Court is in the affirmative. The reason behind is that Reginald is still living under the house of the father, therefore, the father still has the
responsibility to guide his children not do commit acts that are punishable by law. The Court cited Article 2180 to justify its decision which
reads, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.")
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs.
Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant
Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting
subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said
accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised
Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of the
other defendant through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above grounds
that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining
the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the
above entitled case.

SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE
111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS
APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN
THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS
RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4,
Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in
Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the
decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so,
when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the
appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not
reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the
time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally
married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of
fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case,
this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa
criminal or delito and mereculpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians,
and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil
Code. Thus, the opinion holds:

The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under
both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth
unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action.
And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was
being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.).
1

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a
criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by

the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a
proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising
from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of
a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly
recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.)
2

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902
of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly
liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in
an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p.
618, 73 Phil.)
3

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But
inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to
indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to
hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the
literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through any degree of negligence - even
the slightest - would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state
of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any
intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to
uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to
smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a
civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases
of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of
evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified
remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject,
which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of
the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages
only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless
rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or
culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is
high time we pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasidelict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a
crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it
realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on
the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is
more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence
of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper
reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This
can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a
case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided
textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the
subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by
law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the
spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of
such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana orquasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles
1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original
text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not
punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of

the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162,
simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasidelicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary
when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa
aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court
of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article
2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action,
not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a
double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about
construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in
applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the
separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility
arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern
progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made
in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and
not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, thatculpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal
is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it
is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397,
emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by
marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money
or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the
instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of
the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not
unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child
under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to
third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not,
nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into
transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone
else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child,
while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be
done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However,
inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of
his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs
against appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.
Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea
thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any
society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that
"the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812
cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).

Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea
thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any
society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that
"the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812
cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).
Footnotes
1 Referring to Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919.
2 Referring to Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil. 821.
3 Referring to Bernal et al, vs. House et al., 54 Phil. 327.
4 Parenthetically, Manresa seemingly holds. the contrary view thus:
"Sin embargo, para no ineurrir en error hay que tener en cuenta que los lineage. del precepts contenido en el presente
articulo son bastante mas reducidos, pues no se hallan comprendidos en el todos los datios que pues tener por causa
la culpa o la negligencia.
"En efecto, examinando detenidamente la terminos general de la culpa y de la negligencia. se observe que, tanto en
una como en otra de dichas causas, hay tres generoso o tres especies distintas, a saber:
1. La que represents una accion u omision voluntaria por la que results incumplida una obligacion anteriormente
constituida.

2. La que sin existencia de una obligacion anterior produce un dano o perjuicio que, teniendo su origen en un hecho
ilicito, no reviste los caracteres de delito o falta; y
3. La que teniendo por origen un hecho que constituya delito o falta produce una responsabilidad civil como accesoria
de la responsabilidad criminal.
"La primera de estas tres especies de culpa o negligencia es siempre accesoria de una obligacion principal, cuyo
incumplimiento da origen a la terminos especial de la culpa en materia de contratos, y el eatudio de esta debe harms
al examinar cada contrato, en especial, como lo hicimos asi, analizando entoces los peculiares efectos de dicha culpa
en cada uno de ellos.
"La tercera de las especies citadas es accesoria tambien, pues no puede concebirse su existencia sin la de un delicto
o falts que la produzca. Es decir, que solo al lado de la responsabilidad criminal puede supuesto esa responsabilidad
civil y la obligacion proveniente de la culpa, ineurrir como una consecuencia de la responsabilidad criminal, y, por
consiguente, su examen y regulacion perusal. al Derecho penal.
"Como consecuencia de ello, results que la unica especie de culpa y omisiones o negligencia que puede ser y es
meanwhile.' del presente capitulo, es la separability, o sea la que sin la existencia de una obligacion anterior, y sin
ningun antecedents contractual, produce un dano o perjuico que tiene su origen en una accion u omision culpable solo
civilmente; as decir, que siendo ilicita, no reviste sin embargo, los caracteres de un delito o falta por no estar penada
por la ley. Y aun dentro de estos lineage hay que restringir aun mas los terminos o la materia propria de este articulo,
el cual se refiere unicamente a la culpa o negligencia personates del obligado, pero no a las que prudencia de actos o
de omisiones de persons., distintas de este." (pp. 642-643, Vol. XII, Manresa, Codigo Civil Espanol.)
5 "Nuestro Codigo no ha seguido la escuela italiana, sino que mas bien se ha instantaneous, en el criterio de la
doctrina full-grown puesto que impone la obligacion de reparar, el dano causado en virtud de una presuncion juris
tecum de culpa por parte del que tiene bajo su autoridad o dependecia al causante del daho, derivada del hicimos de
no haber puesto el cuidado y la vinculos debida en los actos de sus subordinados para evitar dicho resultado. Asi es
que, segun el parrafo ultimo del art. 1,903, cesa dicha responsabilidad cuando se prueba que los obligados por los
actos ajenos emplearon toda la diligencia de un buen padre de familia. Luego no es la causa de la obligacion impuesta
la representacion, ni el interes, ni la necesidad de que haya quienes responda del dano causado por el que no tiene
personalidad in garantias de specialist. para responsabilidad por siendo sino el incumplimiento implicito o supuesto de
los deberes de precaucion y de prudencia que impuesta los vinculos civiles que unicamente al obligado con las
persons., por quienes debe representacion, el mal causado, Por ese motivo coloca dicha obligacion entre las que
prudencia de la culpa of negligentj (pp. 670671, Manresa, Codigo Civil Espanol, Vol. XII.)