Memorized!

(PD 1529)
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing
laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or
accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for the
original registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption expire during the
pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a
retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by him,
unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

HEIRS
GR
April
en banc

OF

MARIO

MALABANAN

vs.
No.
29,

REPUBLIC

OF

THE

PHILIPPINES
179987
2009

FACTS: On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC
of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square
meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally
belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four
sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos
death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their
father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering

the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this
property
that
was
sold
by
Eduardo
Velazco
to
Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued
by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A
and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved
the
application
for
registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove
that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of
time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals
reversed
the
RTC
ruling
and
dismissed
the
appliocation
of
Malabanan.

ISSUES: 1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is
established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as
alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription
in
accordance
with
the
Civil
Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its
slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
in
relation
to
the
provisions
of
the
Civil
Code
on
acquisitive
prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or
Section
14(2)
of
the
Property
Registration
Decree
or
both?
HELD:

The

Petition

is

denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of
their
possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section
14(1)
of
the
Property
Registration
Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil
Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable
or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article
422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for
the
acquisition
of
property
of
the
public
dominion
begin
to
run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section
14(2)
of
the
Property
Registration
Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and
other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial
property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial
property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive
evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the
year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration
Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property
was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer
intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article
422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the
Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. ACME PLYWOOD AND VENNER CORP & IAC
NATURE OF THE CASE:The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari froma judgment of
the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision ofthe Court of First Instance of Isabela, which
ordered registration in favorof Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring481,
390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat
tribe.
FACTS: The Director of Lands appealed the judgement of the Intermediate Appellate Court
which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela ordering the registration in favor of
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390sqm., acquired from Mariano
and Acer Infiel, members of the indigenous Dumagat Tribe and owners of the lots-in-question from

timeimmemorial, on October 29, 1962. This was accordingly only registered on July 17, 1982 long after
the aegis of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUES:1.
Whether or not the ruling in the case, Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome (114 SRC 799) should be overturned
in light of jurisprudence.
2. Whether or not the conversion of the land in question is recognized.
3. Whether or not the provision barring private companies andassociations from purchasing public
alienable lands in 1973Constitution is applicable retroactively.
RULING:1.HELD. In light of the jurisprudence traced from Carino v. Insular Govt, to Susi v. Razon, to
Herico v. Dar, the court overturned the decision on Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, stating that a possession
is said to be prescriptively acquired by the operation of the Public Lands Act, upon conclusively presumed
fulfillment of all the necessary conditions for a Government Grant. Thus,the land in question effectively
ceased to be of the public domain and was therefore classified as private property at themoment of the
sale through the continuous and unchallenged possession of the bona fide right to ownership from
Meralcos predecessors-interest. There being no law prohibiting the sale ofprivate lands to privately held
corporations, the court thus overturned the decision
.2. HELD. Referring to the ruling in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, theland held by the Infiels since time
immemorial was effectively deemed as private land, by the operation of the law, ipso jure.Thus, at the
moment of the sale, ACME Plywood & Veneer Co.,Inc., Etc. therefore, purchased private property. There
being no ruling in the 1935 Constitution prohibiting this sale, this was heldto be valid.
3.NO. Acme had already obtained vested rights under the 1935Constitution when it purchased the land
from the Infiels. The provision in the 1973 Constitution prohibiting the purchase ofalienable public lands
by private corporations or associations cannot be retroactively applied.
Republic vs. Sese
FACTS: Respondents filed with the MTC an application for original registration of land over a parcel of
land with an area of 10, 792 square meters, situated in Barangay Sto. Cristo, Municipality of Pulilan,
Province of Bulacan, and more particularly described as Lot 11247, Cad. 345, Pulilan Cadastre, under
Plan
No.
AP-03-004226.
Respondents alleged that on July 22, 1972, they acquired, through a donation inter vivos from their
mother, Resurreccion L. Castro (Resurreccion), the subject agricultural land; that they, through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession of the subject property; and that the property was not
within
a
reservation.
In support of their application, respondents submitted among others a survey plan approved by the
Regional Technical Director of the Land Management Service, Region III of the DENR stating that the
land subject of the survey was alienable and disposable land, and as certified to by the Bureau of
Forestry on March 1, 1927, was outside of any civil or military reservation. On the lower portion of the
plan, there was a note stating that a deed of absolute sale over the subject property was executed by a
certain Luis Santos and Fermina Santos (the Santoses) in favor of Resurreccion on October 4, 1950.
On the lower portion of the survey plan, a note stated, that: "This survey is inside the alienable and

disposable area as per Project No. 20 LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1,
1927. It is outside any civil or military reservation." Finding the application sufficient in form and
substance, the MTC issued the Order, dated October 10, 2002, setting the case for hearing with the
corresponding publication. After compliance with all the requirements of the law regarding publication,
mailing
and
posting,
hearing
on
the
merits
of
the
application
followed.
During the trial, respondent Corazon C. Sese (Corazon) testified on their claim over the subject lot.
Thereafter, respondents submitted their formal offer of evidence, after which the evidence offered were
admitted by the MTC in the Order, without objection from the public prosecutor.
The

OSG

did

not

present

any

evidence

to

oppose

the

application.

The MTC ordered the registration of the subject property in the name of respondents.
Later, the OSG interposed an appeal with the CA. In its brief, the OSG presented the following
assignment of errors: a) only alienable lands of the public domain occupied and possessed in concept of
owner for a period of at least thirty (30) years is entitled to confirmation of title; and b) respondents failed
to
prove
specific
acts
of
possession.
The OSG argued that there was no proof that the subject property was already segregated from
inalienable lands of the public domain. Verily, it was only from the date of declaration of such lands as
alienable and disposable that the period for counting the statutory requirement of possession would start.
Also, there was absolutely no proof of respondents supposed possession of the subject property. Save for
the testimony of Corazon that "at present, the worker of (her) mother is occupying the subject property,"
there was no evidence that respondents were actually occupying the subject tract of land or that they had
introduced
improvement
thereon.
The CA however, affirming the judgment of the MTC ordering the registration of the subject property in the
name of respondents. The CA was of the view that the doctrine of constructive possession was
applicable. Respondents acquired the subject property through a donation inter vivos executed on July
22, 1972 from their mother. The latter acquired the said property from the Santoses on October 4, 1950
by virtue of a deed of absolute sale. Further, respondent Corazon testified that a small hut was built on
the said land, which was occupied by the worker of her mother. Moreover, neither the public prosecutor
nor any private individual appeared to oppose the application for registration of the subject property.
The CA also stated that respondents claim of possession over the subject property was buttressed by the
Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 "in the name of Corazon Sese and Fe Sese, minor, representing
their mother Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural Guardian"; the official receipt of payment of real
property tax over the subject property; and the certificate from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of
Pulilan, stating that the registered owner of a property under Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 were
respondents.
The CA added that although tax declaration or realty tax payments of property were not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they were good indicia of possession in the concept of owner.
Hence,
the
OSG
filed
this
petition.
ISSUES: Whether the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in ruling that the approved survey plan
identified by one of the respondents is proof that the subject land is alienable and disposable.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law in granting the application for registration.
HELD:
CIVIL

The

decision
LAW:

of
proof

the

Court
for

of
claim

Appeals

is
of

overruled.
ownership

In Republic v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 171514, July 18, 2012 citing Republic v. Sarmiento 547 Phil. 157,
166167 (2007) and Menguito v. Republic, 401 Phil. 274, 287-288 (2000), the Court reiterated the rule that
that a notation made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property surveyed was alienable and
disposable was not the positive government act that would remove the property from the inalienable
domain and neither was it the evidence accepted as sufficient to controvert the presumption that the
property
was
inalienable.
Thus:
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print Copy of the conversion and subdivision plan
approved by the DENR Center which bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this
survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on
January
3,
1968
by
the
Bureau
of
Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such annotation to prove that the lot is alienable
is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that it
remains
part
of
the
inalienable
public
domain.
"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
petitioners relied on the printed words which read: This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable
Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3,
1968,
appearing
on
Exhibit
"E"
(Survey
Plan
No.
Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State..."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption
that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have
been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must
be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that
the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive
government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no
authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors assertion,
petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable."
Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to commence and operate against
the State, the classification of land as alienable and disposable alone is not sufficient. The applicant must
be able to show that the State, in addition to the said classification, expressly declared through either a
law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by the President that the subject land is no longer

retained for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express declaration by the State, the land remains to
be a property of public dominion and, hence, not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of prescription. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. It is still
insusceptible
to
acquisition
by
prescription.
For the above reasons, the respondents cannot avail of either Section 14 (1) or 14 (2) of P.O. No. 1529.
Under Section 14 (1), respondents failed to prove (a) that the property is alienable and disposable; and
(b) that their possession of the property dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier. Failing to prove the
alienable and disposable nature of the subject land, respondents all the more cannot apply for registration
by way of prescription pursuant to Section 14 (2) which requires possession for 30 years to acquire or
take. Not only did respondents need to prove the classification of the subject land as alienable and
disposable, but also to show that it has been converted into patrimonial. As to whether respondents were
able to prove that their possession and occupation were of the character prescribed by law, the resolution
of this issue has been rendered unnecessary by the foregoing considerations.

REPUBLIC vs. ZURBARAN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. No. 164408, March
24, 2014
Facts:
Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation filed with RTC an application for original registration of
land. Director of Lands opposed it arguing that applicant and its predecessor in interest had not been in
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of land since June 12, 1945.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Zurbaran.
On appeal to SC, the Republic appealed arguing that Zurbaran failed to establish the time when the land
became alienable and disposable, which is crucial in determining whether Zuburan acquired the land by
prescription.
ISSUE: What are the substantive elements in filing an application for original registration of land?
RULING:
The requirements depend on what basis the application was filed..
The following are the bases for application:
1. On the basis of possession, wherein you need to show the following:
a. The land is alienable and disposable property of the public domain (Example of non-alienable lands are
forests, lakeshores, etc)
b. the applicant and its predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership; and
c. the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the land since June 12,
1945, or earlier

Note: Land need not be declared alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or earlier. It is sufficient
that property is alienable and disposable at the time of application (Malaban vs. Republic)
2. On the basis of prescription, wherein you need to prove the following:
a. Land is alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property
b. continuous possession of land for at least 10 years in good faith and with just title OR 30 years
regardless of good faith or bad faith.
c. Land is converted or declared as patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of 10-year or 30year period of possession.
Only patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription (Article 1113 of Civil Code).
Property of public dominion, if not longer intended for public use or service, shall form part of patrimonial
property of State. (Article 422 of Civil Code)
Here, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public use, service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable
or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law.
In the case at bar, the application did not state when their possession and occupation commenced (no
allegation that they have been in possession since June 12, 1945) and the duration. So the application is
based on prescription. Here, there is no evidence showing that the land in question was within an area
expressly declared by law either to be the patrimonial property of the State, or to be no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth.