1

Noah Westfall
Philosophy of Mind Term Paper

Against the Zombie Argument for Dualism

Property Dualism theory of mind entails that human beings experience physical
properties (body) and mental properties (mind). The Zombie Argument attempts to prove this
concept of property dualism by using a philosophical Zombie, or a person that has no
consciousness (mental properties). I will attempt to disprove the Zombie Argument using an
Anti-Zombie Argument of consciousness.
The Zombie Argument was originally presented by Robert Kirk in a philosophy paper
named Zombies vs Materialists, which was published in 1974. The Zombie Argument was
elaborated on by David Chalmers in the book The Conscious Mind: in Search of a
Fundamental Theory, which was published in 1996. For the sake of this paper, we will use
the more accepted version of the Zombie Argument found in Chalmers book. The main
argument found in Chalmers book is cited in the philosophy paper titled The Anti-Zombie
Argument, by Keith Frankish, published in 2007.
The Zombie Argument (as described by Chalmers) is as follows:
1.)
2.)
3.)
4.)

Zombies are conceivable

If zombies are conceivable, then zombies are metaphysically possible
If zombies are metaphysically possible, then consciousness is non-physical
So consciousness is non-physical.1

The conceivability of philosophical zombies is most likely not to be challenged. The

concept of a zombie is essentially that if x = myself and y = the zombie version of
myself, then x is only different from y in that y has no consciousness, or that y is just
dark inside. That being said, the physical functioning of the body continues in a zombie
but the mental part is essentially non-existent. This means that the zombie is not
experiencing nor exhibiting any mental phenomena, which seems quite possible with the
assumption that all mental properties are epiphenomena of physical substance. I therefore
accept premise 1 as true. Premise 2 can be accepted if one applies the CP (Conceivability
Possibility) thesis. The CP thesis essentially states that if something is conceivable then it
is metaphysically possible. For the time being, I will accept premise 2 as true, but will
further discuss this upon presenting my opposing argument. Premise 3 is based on
property dualism, because it seems that a zombie would be able to fully function without
experiencing mental phenomena. If it seems that a zombie could fully function in this
way, then it must be the case that mental phenomena is not necessary for the human body
to function, but instead it exists to provide for consciousness. If mental phenomena
provides consciousness while not being necessary for physical function of the body, then
it must not be a physical part of the body, but just a non-physical epiphenomena. The
conclusion (P4) is true if P1-3 are all true. At this time, the zombie argument for dualism
can be considered valid and sound for the purpose of presenting my counter-argument
efficiently.
1

K. Frankish, Philosophical Quarterly: The Anti-Zombie Argument (2007: p.652)

Now we move to the Anti-Zombie Argument against dualism as seen here:

1.) Anti-zombies are conceivable
2.) If anti-zombies are conceivable, then anti-zombies are possible
3.) If anti-zombies are possible, then consciousness is physical
4.) So consciousness is physical.2
An anti-zombie is a bare physical duplicate of a human being, being that it has no
further properties of the non-physical kind. The notion of an anti-zombie works the same
as that of a zombie, being that it is purely physical while still experiencing consciousness.
This is conceivable in part because the world as we know it is purely physical, according
to physicalism and property dualism, and we still experience consciousness. When
compared to the zombie argument for property dualism, there are a few differences we
can point out. Wherever it said zombie in the original argument, it now says antizombie in this argument. In premise 3 and conclusion 4, instead of saying nonphysical like in the original argument, it now says physical in this argument. These
differences have no effect on the validation or soundness of this argument. This argument
is also defended by the CP thesis in relation to Premise 2 or the argument. This argument
seems to be equally as descriptive, and equally as powerful as the original argument. The
one difference that stands out in this argument is that it completely counters the claims of
the zombie argument, and disproves property dualism in doing so.
2

K. Frankish, Philosophical Quarterly: The Anti-Zombie Argument (2007: p.654)

The soundness of the two arguments now must be contested as it seems the point
where the argument falls through has been found, so there must be some inconsistency of
some kind. Looking at the zombie argument again, it must be valid. The CP thesis being
used in premise 2 seems to be the only real hole in this argument, that being because it
can be equally and oppositely applied to disprove the argument. Since this argument is
equal to the counter argument, the zombie argument fails to explain whether or not
dualism is true as it is not better than its counter argument.
The Anti-Zombie Argument has one thing that the Zombie Argument doesnt have,
and thats more premises:
5.) If anti-zombies are possible, then the microphysical features of our world
are metaphysically sufficient for the existence of consciousness. 3
6.) The microphysical features of this world are sufficient for the existence of
consciousness.
The microphysical features discussed in premise 5 are all the features of the world we
live in essentially, from the C-fibers in the brain to the atoms of everything in existence.
Since the anti-zombie world shows consciousness is physical, the microphysical features
of that world must be metaphysically sufficient for there to be consciousness. This also
would entail that any world with the same microphysical features would be equally
3

K. Frankish, Philosophical Quarterly: The Anti-Zombie Argument (2007: p.655)

sufficient in supporting consciousness without non-physical features. If our world has the
same microphysical features as the anti-zombie world, the microphysical features of our
world are also sufficient for sustaining consciousness without mental (non-physical)
features.
There is only one objection to this argument that a zombie argument theorist of
dualism can use against it. Zombists cannot say that premise 2 is false, as it is based on
the CP thesis in the same way as the zombie argument, so rejecting premise 2 of the antizombie argument is effectively rejecting premise 2 of the zombie argument. If premise 2
is true, then P3 and C4 are also true. This leave Zombists with one thing left to reject, and
that is premise 1 of the anti-zombie argument. Zombists must claim that anti-zombies are
not conceivable. To do this, we assume the existence of a bare physical world where
everything is based on microphysical features. In this world, there are either zombies or
anti-zombies, for dualists would argue if it is a bare physical
world there cannot be consciousness, and materialists would argue the opposite. In this
world, only one can exist, so Zombists would claim that this bare physical world would
have no consciousness. This leaves the burden of proof on the Zombists, as their
argument based on the CP thesis is not enough to support this claim, as I have already
shown with an equal argument from materialism.
It is impossible for Zombists to meet the burden of proof in this situation. Whether
consciousness is physical or non-physical cannot be known a priori, as we experience

consciousness. This means that consciousness is a posteriori, therefore being experience

dependent. We have no way of knowing if we are experiencing physical epiphenomena,
or non-physical functioning without some sort of proof. There is no proof provided in the
zombie argument to show that consciousness is non-physical, nor have Zombists
provided proof that anti-zombies are inconceivable; other than stating that if zombies
exist, anti-zombies cannot. Zombists must use this objection, but this objection is reliant
completely on their main argument which is not based on proof of any kind. The only
concrete thing the zombie argument uses is CP thesis, which is used in the anti-zombie
argument. Therefore, by rejecting the conceivability of anti-zombies, Zombists are
effectively rejecting the conceivability of zombies.
Zombists would have to accept the conceivability of anti-zombies at this point.
Zombists now have to attack the coherence of my main argument for anti-zombies, using
a similar method to how I proved that anti-zombies are conceivable. To do this, Zombists
simply have to say that even if anti-zombies are conceivable, the anti-zombie argument
still doesnt prove that consciousness is physical. This brings us to the initial argument
against the zombie argument, being that it attacks the truth of the CP thesis in coming to
an answer that is fully proven. As this is the only route a Zombist has left to take, they are
effectively arguing against the validity of their own main argument, potentially without
even realizing it.
The Anti-Zombie argument is an argument for the sufficient possibility of a
physical world. This means that the conditions of the physical world are sufficient for
consciousness. The Zombist objection against this is not correct, even though it seems to

be. The difference is seen in the word sufficient, because anti-zombie theorists dont
claim that it is necessary for consciousness to be physical, but that the physical world is
sufficient to provide for consciousness. One may ask then if the physical world is proven
to not be sufficient for consciousness when applying the zombie argument. This is where
the burden of proof comes in, because the anti-zombie world is identical to the actual
world, while the zombie world is not identical to the actual world. Anti-zombie theory
shows that the physical world is sufficient because we are all essentially anti-zombies,
and this world is sufficient for us to be conscious. The same cannot be said for Zombists,
as we are not without consciousness in the actual world.
It has now been shown that a world based on microphysical features is sufficient for
consciousness. Zombists attempted to claim that a bare physical world could not sustain
consciousness, but failed to meet the burden of proof to hold this argument. It has been
proven that anti-zombies are the same as people in the actual world, and this is sufficient
proof to show that a physical world can sustain consciousness, although it is not proven
to be necessary that consciousness is physical. This concept is shown in addition of a 5 th
part to the anti-zombie argument. The CP thesis has been shown to be insufficient proof
to claim that non-physical or physical features are necessary for consciousness. The CP
thesis has been shown to be ineffective in these arguments, but has been used in the antizombie argument to make the use of it in the zombie argument ineffective.
In conclusion, we cannot use the CP thesis to prove whether or not
consciousness is physical. If dualists want to prove that consciousness is non-physical,
they must abandon the zombie argument entirely, or possibly revise it. Any revision to the

zombie argument will most likely need to be rather extreme, as the core of the argument
has been disproven, making the argument essentially useless.