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1. G.R. NO.

116801, APRIL 06, 1995


GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, FIRST ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF CEBU,
PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONRADO VASQUEZ,HONORABLE
ARTURO C. MOJICA, DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS, AND HONORABLE
FRANKLIN DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AND UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE
RAMON J. LIWAG, RESPONDENTS.
[MENDOZA]

Facts:
On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for
immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio
Ilustrisimo. The graft investigation officer assigned to the case found, after investigation, no prima facie
evidence and accordingly recommended for the dismissal of the case. However, upon review of the
matter, Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and instead directed that
Mayor Illustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the Regional Trial Court. The case was then
referred by the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, Arturo Mojica, to the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor
Oliveros E. Kintanar for the filing of appropriate information with the RTC of Danao City. The same was
eventually assigned to herein petition, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa.

On preliminary investigation, petitioner found that only acts of lasciviousness had been committed. With
the approval of the Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar, an information for act of lasciviousness against Mayor
Ilustrisimo on July 4, 1994 with the MTC of Santa Fe.

Deputy Ombudsman Mojica wrote two letters to the Provincial Prosecutor inquiring on any action taken
on the referred case. And since no case for attempted rape had been filed, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica
ordered the Provincial Prosecutor and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be
punished for contempt for refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives of the Office of the
Ombudsman. For this purpose, hearings were duly conducted. As a result, Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar
and petitioner Gloria Lastimosa were placed under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months.

Issue/s:
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the
prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo.
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case against the mayor because the crime
was not committed in relation to a public office and whether it has authority to place petitioner and
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension.

Ruling:
The court ruled that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute on its own
or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency,
when such act of omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. This power has been held
to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of
whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from the
performance of his official duty. It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official.
Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power
of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.

In the exercise of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance as
provided in Section 31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Even if the preliminary investigation had been
given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of the offense to be
charged would still be subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is because under
Section 31 of the Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the "supervision and
control" of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct,
review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor's) decision.

Section 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for
contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same
penalties provided therein." There is no merit in the argument that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar cannot be held liable for contempt because their refusal arose out of an administrative, rather
than judicial, proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. Neither is there any doubt as to the power
of the Ombudsman to discipline petitioner should it be found that she is guilty of grave misconduct,
insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of the Ombudsman's power to place her in the meantime under
preventive suspension. Sections 21 & 24 of the same Act provides for this power.

Under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act, preventive suspension is warranted if evidence against the
public official is strong. As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to
the determination of the Ombudsman. The administrative complaint against petitioner and Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar was filed in connection with their designation as deputies of the ombudsman in the
prosecution of a criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Given the attitude displayed by
petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor toward the criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, their
preventive suspension is justified to the end that the proper prosecution of that case may not be hampered.
In addition, because the charges against the two prosecutors involve grave misconduct, insubordination
and neglect of duty and these charges, if proven, can lead to a dismissal from public office, the
Ombudsman was justified in ordering their preventive suspension. Under the same provision of the law, it
provides that the preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the
Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay. Their preventive suspension for six (6) months
without pay is thus according to law.

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension is
DENIED.
2. Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936
DECISION
(En Banc)
LAUREL, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the
National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly
passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior
to the adoption of the said resolution.
On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against
the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9,
1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any election
protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.
Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the
dismissal of respondents protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.
II.

THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition.]
NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the
time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the
Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative
in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one
or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision
relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

3. Case Digest: Philippine Lawyers Association vs Agrava,


105 Phil 173 (1959)
FACTS:
This is a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyers Association for prohibition and injunction
against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity s Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 23,
1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957
an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys
before the said office. Petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinations, and is in
good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the
respondent Director's holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is
in violation of the law. The respondent, in reply, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases
"does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but include the application of scientific
and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual purpose so as to include engineers and
other individuals who passed the examination can practice before the Patent Office. Furthermore,
respondent contends that he has previously conducted such examinations and that this is the first
time that he is questioned formally.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not members of the bar should first take and pass an examination conducted by the
Patent Office before he would be allowed to practice law in said office;
2. Whether or not appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation of applications or
patents, etc. constitutes practice of law or is included in the practice of law; and,
3. Whether or not the Director of the Patent Office is authorized to conduct examinations for
patent attorneys.

RULING:
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines and any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may

practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative,
in the Philippines. Moreover, "The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation m court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation sendees, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held
to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. As such, , the practice of law includes such appear ance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their
applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases.
Thus, under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to
practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the
reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of
the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation
of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent Director are
judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the
law, taken to the Supreme Court. In sum, the practice of law covers any activity in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedures, principles or practice and calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience. And, only the Supreme Court has the exclusive and
constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law

Agusmin Promotional Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA


117 SCRA 369
FACTS: Agusmin Promotional Enterprises, Inc. organized by Guiang, Liceralde and six (6) others, which
was then issued a consolidated timber license. Guiang and Liceralde, due to some differences with the
majority group in the corporation, requested the Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources that they
be allowed to withdraw their respective forest areas under their original timber licenses from the
consolidated timber license of Agusmin and consolidated them with he timber license of Pedreo B. De
Jesus and Sulpicio Lagnoda. The request was referred to the Director of Forestry who declared that the
request is beyond his jurisdiction. Guiang, Liceralde and De Jesus formed a corporation known as the
P.B. De Jesus & Co., Inc. Agusmin interposed and appealed from the decision of the Secretary stating
that it was appealing said decision to the Office of the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right for procedural due process has been violated by the Executive
Secretary?
HELD: No, in deciding administrative questions, technical rules of procedure are not strictly enforced
and due process of law in the strict judicial sense is not indispensable, little, if any, useful purpose could
be gained in further discussing these issues because Letter of Instruction No. 172, which ordered the
cancelation of the timber issued to Agusmin, in effect, reversed and set aside the said decision of the
Executive Secretary before the same become final and enforceable. In the words of the CA, the said

decisions did not acquire and finality. Administrative rules of procedure would be construed liberally in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their respective claims and defenses. There is no denial of due process if the decision
was rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected.
Pascual vs. Board of Examiners
28 SCRA 344

FACTS: In the initial hearing of the Board of Medical Examiners on the charge against Arsenio Pascual,
Jr., counsel for complainants announced that he would present Pascual as his first witness. Pascual
objected relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. The Board
took note, but stated that he will still testify as such witness in the next hearing. Pascual filed an action for
prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board with the CFI of Manila. The
complainants in the administrative case, Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, filed a motion for
intervention. Lower court ruled in favor of Pascual.

ISSUE: Whether in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, the
Board can compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.
HELD: No. The lower court's decision follows the principle in Cabal v. Kapunan, about an adminstrative
case, that the accused in a criminal case may refuse not only to answer incriminatory questions but also to
take the witness stand. While the matter there referred to an administrative case, there is clearly the
imposition of a penalty. The present case is not dissimilar. The self-incrimination clause is applicable to a
proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession.The
Board is mistaken that the clause is limited to allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to
which could lead to a penal liability. That is just one aspect of the right. The constitutional guarantee
protects as well the right to silence. In Chavex v. CA, defendant has a right to forego testimony, to remain
silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand.

Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations


G.R. No. L-49496

FACTS: This case involved a motion for new trial of the National Labor Union, Inc. The respondent
National Labor Union, Inc., prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of the Court
and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers, among
others, that (1) Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in

ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor
Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather; (2) the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio
Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army; (3) the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a
company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are
illegal; and (4) the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the
exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the
Court of Industrial Relations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations is granted.

HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is
given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other
evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. Thus, the failure to grasp the fundamental issue
involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion
for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be
remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such
evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.

There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof;

2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;

3. That of having something to support its decision;

4. The evidence must be substantial;

5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected;

6. Judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and

7. Should render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved and the reason for the decision rendered.

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