Cases Sec. 8 - 9 - CNL2

EDMUND B.
PAGHARION
Rm. A338, 1730H 2030H
Atty. Maria Luz Raneses-Raval

Professor, Constitutional Law 2
CASES: ARTICLE 3, SEC. 8 9
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS v. SECRETARY OF LABOR
27 SCRA 41 (1916
FACTS
Petitioners pray for writs of certiorari and prohibition to restrain respondents,
the Secretary of Labor, the Director of Labor Relations and the Registrar of
Labor Organizations, from enforcing an order of cancellation of the
registration certificate of the Social Security System Employees Association
hereinafter referred to as the SSSEA which is affiliated to the Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions hereinafter referred to as PAFLU as
well as to annul all proceedings in connection with said cancellation and to
prohibit respondents from enforcing Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875.
Petitioners, likewise, pray for a writ of preliminary injunction pending the final
determination of this case. In their answer, respondents traversed some
allegations of fact and the legal conclusions made in the petition.
Pending such resolution, or on December 16, the PAFLU, the SSSEA, Alfredo
Fajardo "and all the officers and members" of the SSSEA commenced the
present action, for the purpose stated at the beginning of this decision,
upon the ground that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 violates their
freedom of assembly and association, and is inconsistent with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; that it unduly delegates judicial power to an
administrative agency; that said Section 23 should be deemed repealed by
ILO-Convention No. 87; that respondents have acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating, on
November 19, 1963, its decision dated October 22, 1963, beyond the 30-day
period provided in Section 23(c) of Republic Act No. 875; that "there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law"; that the decision complained of had not been approved by
the Secretary of Labor; and that the cancellation of the SSSEA's certificate of
registration would cause irreparable injury.
To be registered, pursuant to Section 23(b) of Republic Act No. 875, a labor
organization, association or union of workers must file with the Department
of Labor the following documents:
(1) A copy of the constitution and by-laws of the organization
together with a list of all officers of the association, their addresses
and the address of the principal office of the organization;
(2) A sworn statement of all the officers of the said organization,
association or union to the effect that they are not members of
the Communist Party and that they are not members of any
organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by
force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method; and
(3) If the applicant organization has been in existence for one or
more years, a copy of its last annual financial report.
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DOCTRINE
The Constitution does not guarantee these rights and privileges, much less said
personality, which are mere statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of
which registration is required to protect both labor and the public against abuses,
fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly accredited agents of
the union they purport to represent. Such requirement is a valid exercise of the police
power, because the activities in which labor organizations, associations and union of
workers are engaged affect public interest, which should be protected. Furthermore,
the obligation to submit financial statements, as a condition for the non-cancellation
of a certificate of registration, is a reasonable regulation for the benefit of the
members of the organization, considering that the same generally solicits funds or
membership, as well as oftentimes collects, on behalf of its members, huge amounts
of money due to them or to the organization.
prescribing the period within which a decision should be rendered are directory, not
mandatory in nature in the sense that, a judgment promulgated after the
expiration of said period is not null and void, although the officer who failed to comply
with law may be dealt with administratively, in consequence of his delay unless the
intention to the contrary is manifest.
Justice Black: When a statute specifies the time at or within which an act is to be
done by a public officer or body, it is generally held to be directory only as to the
time, and not mandatory, unless time is of the essence of the thing to be done, or the
language of the statute contains negative words, or shows that the designation of the
time was intended as a limitation of power, authority or right.
The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 unduly curtails the
freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of
factual basis. The registration prescribed in paragraph (b) of said section 1 is not a
limitation to the right of assembly or association, which may be exercised with
or withoutsaid registration. 2 The latter is merely a condition sine qua non for
the acquisition of legal personality by labor organizations, associations or unions and
the possession of the "rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations".
The determination of the question whether the requirements of paragraph (b) have
been met, or whether or not the requisite financial report or non-subversive affidavits
have been filed within the period above stated, is not judicial power. Indeed, all
officers of the government, including those in the executive department, are
supposed, to act on the basis of facts, as they see the same. This is specially true as
regards administrative agencies given by law the power to investigate and render
decisions concerning details related to the execution of laws the enforcement of
which is entrusted thereto.
OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

B.S.P. v. Araos, we held that there is no
incompatibility between Republic Act No.
875 and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Upon the other hand, the
cancellation of the SSSEA's registration
certificate would not entail a dissolution of
said association or its suspension. The
existence of the SSSEA would not be
affected by said cancellation, although its
juridical personality and its statutory rights
and privileges as distinguished from
those conferred by the Constitution
would be suspended thereby.
Footnotes:
"Any labor organization, association or union
of workers duly organized for the material,
intellectual and moral well being of its
members shall acquire legal personality and
be entitled to all the rights and privileges
granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations within thirty days of filing with the
office of the Secretary of Labor notice of its
due organization and existence and the
following documents, together with the
amount of five pesos as registration fee.
EDMUND B. PAGHARION
Rm. A338, 1730H 2030H

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMADO V. HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-6025
May 30, 1964
FACTS
I. That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and continuously
thereafter, until the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and the place which they had
chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirtyone (31) defendants charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 19071, 14082, 14270, 14315 and 14344 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and also with others whose whereabouts and
identities are still unknown, the said accused and their other co-conspirators, being then high ranking
officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.),
which is now actively engaged in an armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines thru
act theretofore committed and planned to be further committed in Manila and other places in the
Philippines, and of which party the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"(H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly
known as the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks), unlawfully and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command the "Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) or the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks) to rise publicly and take arms against
the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed public uprising, for the purpose
of removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws thereof as
in fact the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" or "Hukbalahaps" have risen publicly and taken
arms to attain the said purpose by then and there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks
against police, constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary
means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have
then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of
private and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate
the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as. follows, to wit: (Enumeration of thirteen attacks on
government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946, August 6, 1946, April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947,
August 19, 1947, June, 1946, April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950, August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950,
September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29, 1950.)
II. That during the period of time and under the same circumstances herein-above indicated the said
accused in the above-entitled case, conspiring among themselves and with several others as
aforesaid, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously organized, established, led and/or maintained the
Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the Committee on Labor Organizations
(CLO), with central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or associated labor unions and other
"mass organizations" in different places in the Philippines, as an active agency, organ, and
instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) and as such agency, organ, and
instrumentality, to fully cooperate in, and synchronize its activities as the CLO thus organized,
established, led and/or maintained by the herein accused and their co-conspirators, has in fact fully
cooperated in and synchronized its activities with the activities of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan" (H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (P.K.P.), to thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the complete and permanent success of
the above-mentioned armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.
After trial the Court of First Instance found, as against appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the following:
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DOCTRINE /OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be
considered as a criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an
advocacy of action. In the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is
insufficient unless the communist advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual
agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an agreement forged to use force and
violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow constituted authority and seize
the reins of Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or intended or
contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist, merely holding belief in the supremacy
of the proletariat a Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of
Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet actually considered as engaging
in the criminal field subject to punishment. Only when the Communist advocates action
and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of conspiracy to commit
rebellion.
In this respect, the mere fact of his giving and rendering speeches favoring Communism
would not make him guilty of conspiracy, because there was no evidence that the
hearers of his speeches of propaganda then and there agreed to rise up in arms for the
purpose of obtaining the overthrow of the democratic government as envisaged by the
principles of Communism.
The appellant was a politician and a labor leader and it is not unreasonable to suspect
that his labor activities especially in connection with the CLO and other trade unions, were
impelled and fostered by the desire to secure the labor vote to support his political
ambitions. It is doubtful whether his desire to foster the labor union of which he was the
head was impelled by an actual desire to advance the cause of Communism, not merely
to advance his political aspirations.
Supreme Court of the United States:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a
status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that
status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of
violent overthrow), that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the
EDMUND B. PAGHARION
Rm. A338, 1730H 2030H
(1) that he is a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and as such had aliases, namely,
Victor or Soliman;
(2) that he was furnished copies of "Titis", a Communist publication, as well as other publications of the
Party;
(3) that he held the position of President of the Congress of Labor Organizations;
(4) that he had close connections with the Secretariat of the Communist Party and held continuous
communications with its leaders and its members;
(5) that he furnished a mimeographing machine used by the Communist Party, as well as clothes and
supplies for the military operations of the Huks;
(6) that he had contacted well-known Communists coming to the Philippines and had gone abroad to
the WFTU conference Brussels, Belgium as a delegate of the CLO, etc. Evidence was also received by
the court that Hernandez made various speeches encouraging the people to join in the Huk movement
in the provinces.
The court also found that there was a close tie-up between the Communist Party and the Congress of
Labor Organizations, of which Hernandez was the President, and that this Congress was organized by
Hernandez in conjunction with other Huks, namely: Alfredo Saulo, Mariano Balgos, Guillermo
Capadocia, etc.
(1) The ultimate goal of the Communist Party is to overthrow the president government by force of aims
and violence; thru armed revolution and replace it with the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat the
Communist Party carries its program of armed overthrow of the present government by organizing the
HMB and other forms of organization's such as the CLO, PKM, union organizations, and the professional
and intellectual group; the CLO was organized by the Trade Union Division TUD of the Communist Party.
(2) A good majority of the members of the Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the
CLO were also top ranking officials of the Communist Party; activities undertaken by the TUD - the vital
undertaking of the TUD is to see that the directives coming from the organizational bureau of the
Communist Party can be discussed within the CLO especially the Executive Committee. And it is a fact
that since a good majority of the members of the Executive Committee are party members, there is no
time, there is no single time that those directives and decisions of the organizational department, thru
the TUD are being objected to by the Executive Committee of the CLO. These directives refer to how
the CLO will conduct its functions. The executive committee is under the chairmanship of accused
Amado V. Hernandez.
(3) The CLO played its role in the overall Communist program of armed overthrow of the present
government and its replacement by the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of propaganda - by
propagating the principles of Communism, by giving monetary aid, clothing, medicine and other forms
of material help to the HMB. This role is manifested in the very constitution of the CLO itself which
expounded the theory of classless society and the eradication of social classes (par. 5, Sec. 1, Art. 2,
page 18 of the CLO Constitution contained in the Fourth Annual Convention Souvenir Program of the CLO.
Page | 3

concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Membership, without more, in an organization
engaged in illegal advocacy, it is now said, has not heretofore been recognized
by this Court to be such a relationship. ... .
What must be met, then, is the argument that membership, even when
accompanied by the elements of knowledge and specific intent, affords an
insufficient quantum of participation in the organization's alleged criminal
activity, that is, an insufficiently significant form of aid and encouragement to
permit the imposition of criminal sanctions on that basis. It must indeed be
recognized that a person who merely becomes a member of an illegal
organization, by that "act" alone need be doing nothing more than signifying his
assent to its purposes and activities on one hand, and providing, on the other,
only the sort of moral encouragement which comes from the knowledge that
others believe in what the organization is doing. It may indeed be argued that
such assent and encouragement do fall short of the concrete, practical impetus
given to a criminal enterprise which is lent for instance by a commitment on the
part of the conspirator to act in furtherance of that enterprise. A member, as
distinguished from a conspirator, may indicate his approval of a criminal
enterprise by the very fact of his membership without thereby necessarily
committing himself to further it by any act or course of conduct whatever.
(Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 6 L. ed. 782)
EDMUND B. PAGHARION
Rm. A338, 1730H 2030H

PEOPLE v. SIMEON FERRER
48 SCRA 382 (G.R. Nos. Li32613-14, 27 December 1972)
FACTS
DOCTRINE
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the

Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared
RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus,
dismissing the information of subversion against thefollowing: 1.)
Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and
insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men
to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being
members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and
overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating
Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is
of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.)
Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP
without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a
presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP
regardless of voluntariness.
benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act

to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership
therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being
although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also
by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP
is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section
4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the
CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a
designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to
filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for
furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open
court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows
the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under
oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its
valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.
Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be
Issues: (1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto

law. (2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.
mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been
Page | 4
legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured
Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S.

Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Charter of
the City of Los Angeles which provided:
as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The

statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied
retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively
is also an ex post facto law.)
the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy
for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of
SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also
to other organizations having the same purpose and their
successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not person.
shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the
goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of
MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required
proof of a members direct participation. Why is membership
punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the
organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4
prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of
the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given
an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in
accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of
... [N]o person shall hold or retain

or be eligible for any public office
or employment in the service of
the City of Los Angeles, in any
office or department thereof,
either elective or appointive, who
has within five (5) years prior to the
effective date of this section
advised, advocated, or taught, or
who may, after this section
becomes effective, become a
member of or affiliated with any
group, society, association,
organization or party which
advises, advocates or teaches or
has within said period of five (5)
years advised, advocated, or
taught the overthrow by force or
violence of the Government of
the United States of America or of
the State of California.
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the
prospective application of the Act to the petitioner
therein, thus:
... Immaterial here is any opinion
we might have as to the charter
provision insofar as it purported to
apply restrospectively for a five-
EDMUND B. PAGHARION
Rm. A338, 1730H 2030H
R.A. No. 1700 "AN ACT TO OUTLAW THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND SIMILAR ASSOCIATIONS PENALIZING MEMBERSHIP
THEREIN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

made.
year period to its effective date.
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to
We assume that under the Federal

Constitution the Charter
Amendment is valid to the extent
that it bars from the city's public
service persons who, subsequently
to its adoption in 1941, advise,
advocate, or reach the violent
overthrow of the Government or
who are or become affiliated with
any group doing so. The provisions
operating thus prospectively were
a reasonable regulation to
protect the municipal service by
establishing an employment
qualification of loyalty to the State
and the United States.
overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of

guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The
EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise
of Freedom of Expression and Association in this matter. Before
the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble,
careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further
stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and
association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP
are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of
DEMOCRACY.
The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution
under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences
of subversion, the following elements must also be established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that
the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of
the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER.
Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive
purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
Page | 5
... Unlike the provisions of the

charter and ordinance under
which petitioners were removed,
the statute in the Lovett case did
not declare general and
prospectively operative standards
of qualification and eligibility for
public employment. Rather, by its
terms it prohibited any further
payment of compensationto
named individuals or employees.
Under these circumstances,
viewed against the legislative
background, the statutewas held
to have imposed penalties without
judicial trial.
EDMUND B. PAGHARION
Rm. A338, 1730H 2030H

RIVER BRIDGE v. WARREN BRIDGE,
11 Pet. 420, 641 (U.S. 1837)
FACTS
DOCTRINE
In 1650, the Legislature of Massachusetts granted to Harvard College

the liberty and power to dispose of a ferry by lease or otherwise from
Charlestown to Boston, passing over Charles River. The right to set up a
ferry between these places had been given by the governor under
the authority of the Court of Assistance, by an order dated November
9, 1636, to a particular individual, and was afterwards leased
successively to others, they having the privilege of taking tolls
regulated in the grant; and when, in 1650, the franchise of this ferry
was granted to the college, the rights of the lessees in the same had
expired. Under the grant, the college continued to hold the ferry by its
lessees and receive the profits therefrom until 1785, when the
Legislature of Massachusetts incorporated a company to build a
bridge over Charles River where the ferry stood, granting them tolls,
the company to pay to Harvard College two hundred pounds a year
during the charter, for forty years, which was afterwards extended to
seventy years, after which the bridge was to become the property of
the Commonwealth. The bridge was built under this charter, and the
corporation received the tolls allowed by the law, always keeping the
bridge in order and performing all that was enjoined on them to do. In
1828, the Legislature of Massachusetts incorporated another company
for the erection of another bridge, the Warren Bridge, over Charles
River from Charlestown to Boston, allowing the company to take tolls,
commencing in Charlestown, near where the Charles River Bridge
commenced, and terminating in Boston about eight hundred feet
from the termination of the Charles River Bridge. The bridge was to
become free after a few years, and has actually become free.
Travelers who formerly passed over the Charles River Bridge from
Charlestown square now pass over the Warren Bridge, and thus the
Charles River Bridge Company are deprived of the tolls they would
have otherwise received. The value of the franchise granted by the
Act of 1783 is now entirely destroyed. The proprietors of the Charles
River Bridge filed a bill in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
against the proprietors of the Warren Bridge, first for an injunction to
prevent the erection of the bridge and afterwards for general relief,
stating that the act of the Legislature of Massachusetts authorizing the
building of the Warren Bridge was an act impairing the obligations of
The object and the end of all Government is to promote the

happiness and prosperity of the community by which it is
established, and it can never be assumed that the Government
intended to diminish its power of accomplishing the end for which it
was created; and in a country like ours, free, active, and
enterprising, continually advancing in numbers and wealth, new
channels of communication are daily found necessary both for
travel and trade, and are essential to the comfort, convenience,
and prosperity of the people. A State ought never to be presumed
to surrender this power because, like the taxing power, the whole
community have an interest in preserving it undiminished, and,
when a corporation alleges that a State has surrendered, for
seventy years, its power of improvement and public
accommodation in a great and important line of travel, along
which a vast number of its citizens must daily pass, the community
have a right to insist, in the language of this Court,"that its
abandonment ought not to be presumed in a case in which the
deliberate purpose of the State to abandon it does not appear."
Lord Stowell, whose eminent qualifications as a

judge entitle him to great reverence, on that
occasion said:
Page | 6
The continued existence of a Government would be of no great

value if, by implications and presumptions, it was disarmed of the
powers necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation, and the
functions it was designed to perform transferred to the hands of
privileged corporations. The rule of construction announced by the
Court was not confined to the taxing power, nor is it so limited in the
opinion delivered. On the contrary, it was distinctly placed on the
ground that the interests of the community were concerned in
preserving, undiminished, the power then in question; and
whenever any power of the State is said to be surrendered or
diminished, whether it be the taxing power or any other affecting
the public interest, the same principle applies, and the rule of
construction must be the same. No one will question that the
interests of the great body of the people of the State would, in this
instance, be affected by the surrender of this great line of travel to
a single corporation, with the right to exact toll and exclude
competition for seventy years. While the rights of private property
"A general presumption arising from these

considerations is that government does not mean to
divest itself of this universal attribute of sovereignty
conferred for such purposes (to be used for peace,
as well as war) unless it is so clearly and
unequivocally expressed. In conjunction with this
universal presumption must be taken also the wise
policy of our own peculiar law, which interprets the
grants of the Crown in this respect by other rules than
those which are applicable in the construction of the
grants of individuals. Against an individual, it is
presumed that he meant to convey a benefit with
the utmost liberality that his words will bear. It is
indifferent to the public in which person an interest
remains, whether in the grantor or the taker. With
regard to the grant of the sovereign, it is far
otherwise. It is not held by the sovereign himself, as
private property, and no alienation shall be
presumed except what is clearly and indisputably
expressed."
EDMUND B. PAGHARION
Rm. A338, 1730H 2030H
a contract, and therefore repugnant to the Constitution of the United
States. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts dismissed the bill of the
complainants, and the case was brought by writ of error to the
Supreme Court of the United States under the provisions of the 25th
Section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The judgment of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts dismissing the bill of the plaintiffs in
error was affirmed.
The plaintiffs in error insisted on two grounds for the reversal of the
judgment or decree of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. 1. That,
by the grant of 1650, Harvard College was entitled, in perpetuity, to
the right to keep a ferry between Charlestown and Boston; that the
right was exclusive, and the legislature had no right to establish
another ferry on the same line of travel, because it would infringe the
rights of the college and those of the plaintiffs under the charter of
1785.
2. That the true construction of the acts of the Legislature of

Massachusetts granting the privilege to build a bridge necessarily
imported that the Legislature would not authorize another bridge, and
especially a free one, by the side of the Charles River Bridge, so that
the franchise which they held would be of no value, and that this
grant of the franchise of the ferry to the college, and the grant of the
right of pontage to the proprietors of the Charles River Bridge, is a
contract which is impaired by the law authorizing the erection of the
Warren Bridge. By the Court. It is very clear that, in the form in which
this case comes before us, being a writ of error to a State court, the
plaintiffs, in claiming under either of these rights, must place
themselves on the ground of contract, and cannot support
themselves upon the principles that the law divests vested rights. It is
well settled by the decisions of this Court that a State law may be
retrospective in its character, and may divest vested rights, and yet
not violate the Constitution of the United States unless it also impairs
the obligation of contract.
Page | 7

are sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the community also
have rights, and that the happiness and wellbeing of every citizen
depends on their faithful preservation.
When land is granted, the State can exercise no acts of ownership
over it unless it be taken for public use, and the same rule applies to
a grant for a bridge, a turnpike-road, or any other public
improvement. It would assume a bold position to say that a
subsequent Legislature may resume the ownership of a tract of land
which had been granted at a preceding session, and yet the
principle is the same in regard to vested rights under an act of
incorporation. By granting a franchise, the State does not divest
itself of any portion of its sovereignty, but to advance the public
interests, one or more individuals are vested with a capacity to
exercise the powers necessary to attain the desired object. In the
case under consideration, the necessary powers to construct and
keep up the Charles River Bridge were given to Thomas Russell and
his associates. This did not withdraw the bridge from the action of
the State sovereignty any more than it is withdrawn from land which
it has granted. In both cases, the extent of the grant may become
a question for judicial investigation and decision, but the rights
granted are protected by the law.
"Where the mind labors to discover the design of the Legislature, it
seizes everything from which aid can be derived, and, in such a
case, the title claims a degree of notice, and will have its due share
of consideration. "
The grant remains in full force that the thing granted shall not be
resumed or impaired by the grantor.
the State impliedly contracts not to resume its grant or to do any
act to the prejudice or destruction of its grant.
EDMUND B. PAGHARION
Rm. A338, 1730H 2030H

CITY OF MANILA V. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA
40 Phil 349, (G.R. No. L-14355 October 31, 1919)
FACTS
The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese

Community of Manila], answering the petition of the plaintiff, alleged
that it was a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue
of the laws of the Philippine Islands, having for its purpose the benefit
and general welfare of the Chinese Community of the City of Manila;
that it was the owner of parcels one and two of the land described in
paragraph 2 of the complaint; that it denied that it was either
necessary or expedientthat the said parcels be expropriated for street
purposes; that existing street and roads furnished ample means of
communication for the public in the district covered by such
proposed expropriation; that if the construction of the street or road
should be considered a public necessity, other routes were available,
which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense
and without disturbing the resting places of the dead; that it had a
Torrens title for the lands in question; that the lands in question had
been used by the defendant for cemetery purposes; that a great
number of Chinese were buried in said cemetery; that if said
expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the resting places
of the dead, would require the expenditure of a large sum of money
in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site and
in the purchase of such new sites, would involve the destruction of
existing monuments and the erection of new monuments in their
stead, and would create irreparable loss and injury to the defendant
and to all those persons owning and interested in the graves and
monuments which would have to be destroyed; that the plaintiff was
without right or authority to expropriate said cemetery or any part or
portion thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact,
was not necessary as a public improvement.
The theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has established the fact,
under the law, that it has authority to expropriate land, it may
expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court
in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question;
that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the
advisible purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions
concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere
appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and,
when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the
law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.
Page | 8
DOCTRINE
"the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of

eminent domain are questions essentially political and
not judicial,"
It is well settled that although the legislature must
necessarily determine in the first instance whether the
use for which they (municipalities, etc.) attempt to
exercise the power is a public one or not, their
(municipalities, etc.) determination is not final, but is
subject to correction by the courts, who may
undoubtedly declare the statute unconstitutional, if it
shall clearly appear that the use for which it is proposed
to authorize the taking of private property is in reality not
public but private."
what is a public use is a legislative question
But, as long as there is a constitutional or statutory
provision denying the right to take land for any use other
than a public use, it occurs to us that the question
whether any particular use is a public one or not is
ultimately, at least, a judicial question.
It was then held that land already devoted to a public

use cannot be taken by the public for another use which
is inconsistent with the first, without special authority from
the Legislature, or authority granted by necessary and
reasonable implication.
The court said that it is unquestionable that the
Legislature has the power to authorize the taking of land
already applied to one public use and devote it to
another. When the power is granted to municipal or
private corporations in express words, no question can
arise.
But when the statute does not designate the

property to be taken nor how may be taken,
then the necessity of takingparticular
property is a question for the courts. Where
the application to condemn or appropriate
is made directly to the court, the question
(of necessity) should be raised and
decided in limene. (Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs.
Toledo, Ry, etc., Co. (72 Ohio St., 368 [106 Am. St.
rep., 622, 628)
The taking of private property for any use

which is not required by the necessities or
convenience of the inhabitants of the state,
is an unreasonable exercise of the right of
eminent domain, and beyond the power of
the
legislature
to
delegate.
(Bennett vs. Marion, 106 Iowa, 628, 633;
Wilson vs. Pittsburg, etc. Co., 222 Pa. St., 541, 545;
Greasy, etc. Co. vs. Ely, etc. Co., 132 Ky., 692,
697.)
The very foundation of the right to exercise

eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and
that necessity must be of a public
character. The ascertainment of the
necessity must precede or accompany, and
not
follow,
the
taking
of
the
land.(Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co.,
166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281;
Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72
Ohio St., 368.)
EDMUND B. PAGHARION
Rm. A338, 1730H 2030H

LEONCIO SEA Y MEDINA vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY and THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT
G.R. No. 15915 September 7, 1921
FACTS
This is an application for the registration of a parcel of land situated in
the barrio of Palsabagon, municipality of Pagbilao, Province of
Tayabas, containing three lots of which lot No. 2 is the only one in
question. Said lot No. 2 is composed of 35, 327 square meters, and is
occupied by the Manila Railroad Company, the same being within
civil reservation No. 3 of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas (G. L. R.
O. reservation Case No. 242). The lower court denied the registration
of said lot upon the ground that the application for registration had
not been presented within the time required by law in said civil
reservation proceedings.It appears that by Executive Order No. 112,
dated December 3, 1914, the Governor-General, pursuant to the
provisions of Act No. 648, reserved "for railroad purposes" a strip of land
30 meters wide and more than 80 kilometers long, from the
municipality of Lucena to the municipality of Caluag, Province of
Tayabas. Lot No. 2 in question is included within said reservation.
Upon being duly notified by the Governor-General of said Executive
Order, the Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Tayabas, pursuant to the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 648, on the
21st day of December, 1914, issued the following notice to all the
parties concerned:
Whereas under the provisions of Act No. 648 of the Philippine
Commission, by executive order there have been reserved from
settlement or public sale and for railroad purposes the following
described lands the public domain the use of which has not otherwise
been directed by law.
Notice is hereby given that claims for all private lands, buildings, and
interests therein, within the limits aforesaid, must be presented in said
court for registration under 'The Land Registration Act' within six
calendar months from the date of this notice, and that all, lands,
buildings and interests therein, within the limits aforesaid not so
presented within the time herein limited will be conclusively adjudged
to be public lands, and all claims on the part of private individuals for
such lands, buildings, or an interest therein not so presented will be
forever barred. The lower court denied said petition upon the ground
that, the same not having been presented within the six months'
period provided by Act No. 627, the land in question was conclusively
presumed to be public land.
The appellant makes two principal assignments of error: That the lower
court erred (1) in not finding that Executive Order No. 112 was void
and of no effect; and (2) in finding that the right of the petitioner had
prescribed.
Page | 9
DOCTRINE
A historical research discloses the meaning of the term 'public use'
to be one of constant growth. As society advances, it demands
upon the individual increase and each demand is a new use to
which the resources of the individual may be devoted."
It cannot be denied that a railroad is a public necessity in this
country a factor indispensable to its economic development and
material welfare. It is in recognition of this fact that railroad
corporations are empowered by law to exercise the right of
eminent domain. therefore of the opinion that a railroad is a
public use, for "whatever is beneficially employed for the
community is a public use."
EDMUND B. PAGHARION
Rm. A338, 1730H 2030H

J. M. TUASON & CO., INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-18128
December 26, 1961
FACTS
DOCTRINE
The Court of First Instance, after the appellate court's decision

became final and upon return of the records in due course, issued writ
of execution of the judgment against Rosete and Dizon, as prayed for
by the landowner Tuason & Company.
The Bill of Rights, in requiring that "private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation," and Article XIII, section 4
in prescribing that "Congress may authorize, upon payment of just
compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals," prohibit any
disturbance of proprietary rights without coetaneous payment of
just indemnity. Hence, the mere filing of the condemnation
proceedings for the benefit of tenants cannot, by itself alone,
lawfully suspend the condemnee's dominical rights, whether of
possession, enjoyment, or disposition. And this is especially the case
where final and executory judgments of ejectment have been
obtained against the occupants of the property.
the Company claiming mainly that the Republic Act was

unconstitutional, null and void, as legislation aimed at depriving it of its
property for the benefit of squatters and occupants, even if the
property had been actually subdivided, and its lots were being sold to
the public; and that respondent officers threatened to enforce said
law by initiating expropriation proceedings. At petitioner's request,
Judge Hermogenes Caluag of the Quezon City Court of First Instance
(to whom the prohibition case was assigned) issued an ex parte writ of
preliminary injunction on November 18, 1960, upon the filing of a bond
of P20,000.
The Court of Appeals (Second Division) refused to lift the preliminary
injunction; on the contrary, on February 26, upon motion of one of the
respondents, the Land Tenure Administration, it clarified the previous
writ of preliminary injunction.
The Land Tenure Administration avers that the issuance of the
injunction in the prohibition case (Q-5527), the denial of the motion to
dismiss the case, the refusal to dissolve the injunction, and the refusal
to have the complaint for expropriation docketed were all in abuse of
discretion and excess of jurisdiction; that furthermore, venue was
improperly laid, because an action for prohibition is personal in
character, and neither petitioner nor any of the respondents in said
prohibition case were domiciled in Quezon City. Petitioner Land
Tenure Administration, therefore, prayed that Judge Caluag be
ordered by this Court to refrain from proceeding with the prohibition
case, from enforcing the writ of preliminary injunction issued therein,
from issuing orders of demolition of the tenant's houses, and to allow
the expropriation case to be docketed and regularly proceeded with.
the issue of constitutionality would be like a prejudicial question

to the expropriation, as it would be a waste of time and effort to
appoint evaluation commissioners and debate the market value of
the property sought to be condemned if it turned out that the
condemnation was illegal.
It needs no argument to show that by restraining the land owner
from enforcing even final judgments in his favor to recover
possession of his property, as well as from disposing of it to persons
of his choice, he is deprived of the substance of ownership, and his
title is left as an empty shell. The land owner would then be deprived
of those attributes of ownership that give it value, and his property is
virtually taken from him without compensation and in violation of
the Constitution, particularly in view of the fact that R.A. 2616 (unlike
previous Acts of similar character) does not even provide for a
deposit of the current rentals by the tenants during the pendency
of the proceedings (Cf. R.A. No. 1126, section 5). The Bill of Rights, in
requiring that "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation," and Article XIII, section 4 in prescribing
that "Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation,
the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and
conveyed at cost to individuals," prohibit any disturbance of
proprietary rights without coetaneous payment of just indemnity.
Hence, the mere filing of the condemnation proceedings for the
benefit of tenants cannot, by itself alone, lawfully suspend the
condemnee's dominical rights, whether of possession, enjoyment,
or disposition.
Page | 10

Cochiong vs. Dinglasan, 79 Phil. 125, this Court
quoted with approval from 28 Am. Jur. 369-371 the
rule that
It is recognized, however, that an injunction
will lie to restrain the threatened
enforcement of an invalid law where the
lawful use and enjoyment of private
property will be injuriously affected by its
enforcement ...,
EDMUND B. PAGHARION
Rm. A338, 1730H 2030H

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE v. DULAY
149 SCRA 305, 311 312 (1987)
FACTS
The question raised in this petition is whether or not Presidential
Decrees Numbered 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed and
superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court,
such that in determining the just compensation of property in an
expropriation case, the only basis should be its market value as
declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever is
lower. On February 17, 1981, the respondent judge issued the order of
condemnation declaring the petitioner as having the lawful right to
take the properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of
just compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint.
The respondent judge also issued a second order, subject of this
petition, appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and
report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to
be expropriated.
The only issue raised in this petition is whether or not Sections 5 to 8,
Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court had been repealed or deemed
amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the appointment of
commissioners to determine the just compensation is concerned.
Stated in another way, is the exclusive and mandatory mode of
determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533 valid and
constitutional?
The petitioner maintains that the respondent judge acted in excess of
his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and in setting the
commissioner's report for hearing because under P.D. No. 1533, which
is the applicable law herein, the basis of just compensation shall be
the fair and current market value declared by the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated or such market value as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Therefore, there is no
more need to appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of the
Revised Rules of Court and for said commissioners to consider other
highly variable factors in order to determine just compensation. The
petitioner further maintains that P.D. No. 1533 has vested on the
assessors and the property owners themselves the power or duty to fix
the market value of the properties and that said property owners are
given the full opportunity to be heard before the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Thus, the vesting on the assessor or the property owner of the right to
determine the just compensation in expropriation proceedings, with
appropriate procedure for appeal to higher administrative boards, is
Page | 11
DOCTRINE
in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still
have the power to determine the just compensation for the
property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be
relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as
declared either by the owner or the assessor.
. However, the strict application of the decrees during the
proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade
as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner
and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower
of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence
in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could
substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional
just compensation is concerned.
[Court ruled that under the conceded facts,] there should be a
recognition that the law as it stands must be applied; that the
decree having spoken so clearly and unequivocally calls for
obedience; and that on a matter where the applicable law speaks
in no uncertain language, the Court has no choice except to yield
to its command. We further stated that "the courts should recognize
that the rule introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent
decrees does not upset the established concepts of justice or the
constitutional provision on just compensation for, precisely, the
owner is allowed to make his own valuation of his property."
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of
the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained.
All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings,
its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases
is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature
may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property
may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no
statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can
the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the
decreed compensation.

.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,
31 SCRA 413, the Court, speaking thru now Chief
Justice Fernando, reiterated the 'well-settled (rule)
that just compensation means the equivalent for the
value of the property at the time of its taking.
Anything beyond that is more and anything short of
that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair
and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the
measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would
accrue to the expropriating entity."
EDMUND B. PAGHARION
Rm. A338, 1730H 2030H

valid and constitutional.
GUIDO v. RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION

84 Phil. 847, 47 Off. Gaz. 1848 G.R. No. L-2089,
FACTS
This a petition for prohibition to prevent the Rural Progress
Administration and Judge Oscar Castelo of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal from proceeding with the expropriation of the
petitioner Justa G. Guido's land, two adjoining lots, part
commercial, with a combined area of 22,655 square meters,
situated in Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, just outside the north Manila
boundary, on the main street running from this city to the north. Four
grounds are adduced in support of the petition, to wit:
(1) That the respondent RPA (Rural Progress Administration) acted
without jurisdiction or corporate power in filling the expropriation
complaint and has no authority to negotiate with the RFC a loan of
P100,000 to be used as part payment of the value of the land.
(2) That the land sought to be expropriated is commercial and
therefore excluded within the purview of the provisions of Act 539.
(3) That majority of the tenants have entered with the petitioner
valid contracts for lease, or option to buy at an agreed price, and
expropriation would impair those existing obligation of contract.
(4) That respondent Judge erred in fixing the provisional value of the
land at P118,780 only and in ordering its delivery to the respondent
RPA.
Page | 12
DOCTRINE
Hand in hand with the announced principle, herein invoked, that "the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people should be the concern of the state," is a
declaration, with which the former should be reconciled, that "the
Philippines is a Republican state" created to secure to the Filipino
people "the blessings of independence under a regime of justice,
liberty and democracy." Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the
Constitution, embraces as its necessary components freedom of
conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom in the pursuit of
happiness. Along with these freedoms are included economic
freedom and freedom of enterprise within reasonable bounds and
under proper control. In paving the way for the breaking up of existing
large estates, trust in perpetuity, feudalism, and their concomitant
evils, the Constitution did not propose to destroy or undermine the
property right or to advocate equal distribution of wealth or to
authorize of what is in excess of one's personal needs and the giving
of it to another. Evincing much concern for the protection of property,
the Constitution distinctly recognize the preferred position which real
estate has occupied in law for ages. Property is bound up with every
aspects of social life in a democracy as democracy is conceived in
the Constitution. The Constitution owned in reasonable quantities and
used legitimately, plays in the stimulation to economic effort and the
formation and growth of a social middle class that is said to be the
bulwark of democracy and the backbone of every progressive and
happy country. In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates, trusts
in perpetuity, and land that embraces a whole town, or a large
section of a town or city, bears direct relation to the public welfare.
The size of the land expropriated, the large number of people
benefited, and the extent of social and economic reform secured by
the condemnation, clothes the expropriation with public interest and
public use. The expropriation in such cases tends to abolish economic
slavery, feudalistic practices, and other evils inimical to community
prosperity and contentment and public peace and order. No fixed
line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what is
not can be made; each case has to be judge according to its
peculiar circumstances. It suffices to say for the purpose of this
decision that the case under consideration is far wanting in those
elements which make for public convenience or public use. It is
patterned upon an ideology far removed from that consecrated in
our system of government and embraced by the majority of the
The expropriation proceedings at bar have been instituted

for the economic relief of a few families devoid of any
consideration of public health, public peace and order, or
other public advantage. What is proposed to be done is to
take plaintiff's property, which for all we know she
acquired by sweat and sacrifice for her and her family's
security, and sell it at cost to a few lessees who refuse to
pay the stipulated rent or leave the premises.
To make the analogy closer, we find no reason why the
Rural Progress Administration could not take by
condemnation an urban lot containing an area of 1,000 or
2,000 square meters for subdivision into tiny lots for
resale to its occupants or those who want to build
thereon.
EDMUND B. PAGHARION
Rm. A338, 1730H 2030H

citizens of this country.
NARRA v. FRANCISCO
109 Phil 764, 768 (1960)
FACTS
Appeal on points of law from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija (Civil Case No. 2006) dismissing condemnation
proceedings instituted by the National Resettlement and Rehabilition
Administration (NARRA).
It appears from the record that on June 11, 1955, Republic Act No.
1266 became operative. This law provided as follows:
SECTION 1. The National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) is hereby
authorized to expropriate within six months from the approval of this Act, the Hacienda del
Rosario situated at Valdefuente, Cabanatuan City, and pay the price of the land and cost
of such expropriation out of its funds. The said hacienda shall be subdivided into lots not
bigger than one hectare each and resold to bona-fide occupants thereof at such price is
may be determined by the Board of Directors of the NARRA which shall include the price
of the land and the cost of such expropriation, administration, subdivision, resale and
interests. The purchase price of the resale to bona-fide tenants and lessees shall be
payable in installments within the period of not more than ten years.
DOCTRINE
The power to expropriate, under both Republic Act 1266 and

Commonwealth Act No. 539, is predicated upon the provisions of
Article XIII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution providing:
Sec. 4. The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just
compensation, the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to
individuals";
hence, the rulings of this Court as to the limits of the condemning
power in expropriation proceedings instituted persuant to
Commonwealth Act No. 539 are applicable to the case at bar.
Guido and Baylosis cases, has already ruled that,

under the quoted constitutional provision, the
government may only expropriate landed estate
with extensive areas, and that once a landed estate
has been broken up and divided into parcels of
reasonable extent, the resulting portions are no
longer subject to further expropriation, the existence
of tenancy troubles therein notwithstanding.
SEC. 2. This shall take effect upon its approval.
In accordance with the statute, the NARRA instituted these eminent

domain proceedings in the Court below against the heirs of the
original owner of the Hacienda (the late Judge Simplicio del Rosario,
who died in 1947) and their subsequent vendees. The lands involved
totalled 669 hectares, more or less; but during the pendency of the
proceedings, the heirs Dolores R. Concepcion Teresa R. de Francisco
and Paz R. de Tubangui agreed to the expropriation of their
respective holding; while defendant spouses Carmen R. de Ciocon
and Jaime Ciocon also agreed to the expropriation of their
corresponding share, except a portion of 85.0414 hectares, which said
spouses were occupying and wished to reserve for their seven (7)
children and sixteen (16) grandchildren. As a result, all the defendants
mentioned voluntarily ceded to the NARRA about 3891.7583 hectares.
The NARRA appealed from the decision, contending that the
authorities cited by the Court below were not applicable because
they involved condemnation proceedings under Commonwealth Act
No. 539; that in view of the terms of the Republic Act 1266, "the Court
can not inquire into nor review the action of the Legislature in
designating the paricular property it has authorizes the NARRA to
Page | 13
(same rulings viz Guido and Baylosis cases)
City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil., 350,

wherein it was stated that where the legislature has
directly determined the necessity of appropriating
private property for a particular public improvement
at a specified location, the utility, necessity and
expediency of the improvement and the suitable of
the location are questions for the legislature to
determine and the courts have no power to interfere
and substitute their own discretion. The doctrine thus
invoked is entirely inappropriate, for the question
now before the Court is not the necessity of the
expropriation but the power or authority to
expropriate under Article XIII, Sec. 4, of the
Constitution. The validity of the statute directing the
expropriation is certainly a judicial question.
EDMUND B. PAGHARION
Rm. A338, 1730H 2030H

expropriate."
PEOPLE v. JUAN F. FAJARDO, Et al,

G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958
FACTS
It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of
defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of
Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in
question providing as follows:
SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before
constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor.
SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and
P1.00 for each repair permit issued.
SEC. 3. PENALTY Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall
make the violation liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or
imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion
of the court. If said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any
public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or
house.
SEC. 4. EFFECTIVITY This ordinance shall take effect on its approval. (Orig. Recs., P. 3)
Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had
expired, he and his son in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a written
request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct
a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land
registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and
separated from the public plaza by a creek (Exh. D). On January 16,
1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that the
proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public
plaza (Exh. E). On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their
request for a building permit (Exh. 3), but again the request was turned
down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the
construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a
place of residence very badly, their former house having been
destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased
property.On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and
convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur,
for violation of the ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to the
Court of First Instance, which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced
appellants to pay a fine of P35 each and the costs, as well as to
demolish the building in question because it destroys the view of the
public plaza of Baao, in that "it hinders the view of travelers from the
National Highway to the said public plaza." From this decision, the
accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter forwarded
the records to us because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of
the ordinance in question.
Page | 14
DOCTRINE
the power of the municipal council to require the issuance of

building permits rests upon its first establishing fire limits in populous
parts of the town and prescribing the kinds of buildings that may be
constructed or repaired within them.
(Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State

may not, under the guise of police power,
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of
their property and practically confiscate them solely
to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of
the community. As the case now stands, every
structure that may be erected on appellants' land,
regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned
under the ordinance in question, because it would
interfere with the view of the public plaza from the
highway.
..the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates

to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own
property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and
amounts to a taking of appellants property without just
compensation.
Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use

which can not reasonably be made of it cannot be
said to set aside such property to a use but
constitutes the taking of such property without just
compensation. Use of property is an element of
ownership therein. Regardless of the opinion of
zealots that property may properly, by zoning, be
utterly destroyed without compensation, such
principle finds no support in the genius of our
government nor in the principles of justice as we
known them. Such a doctrine shocks the sense of
justice. If it be of public benefit that property remain
open and unused, then certainly the public, and not
the private individuals, should bear the cost of
reasonable compensation for such property under
the rules of law governing the condemnation of
private property for public use. (Tews vs. Woolhiser
(1933) 352 I11. 212, 185 N.E. 827)
We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the

beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and
happiness of residents. But while property may be regulated in the
interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may
prohibit structures offensive to the sight.
Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of

Baao, Camarines Sur, was beyond the authority of said municipality
to enact, and is therefore null and void.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use

of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the
property. The only substantial difference, in such
case, between restriction and actual taking, is that
the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden
of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation
EDMUND B. PAGHARION
Rm. A338, 1730H 2030H

would relieve him of that burden. (Arverne Bay Constr.
Co.vs. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116).
FELIPE R. HIPOLITO v. THE CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. L-3887
August 21, 1950
FACTS
This is an action to compel the respondents to issue a building permit

in favor of Felipe R. Hipolito.
The petitioner and his wife are the registered owners of a parcel of
land situated at the corner of Invernes and Renaissance Streets, Santa
Ana, Manila. On March 22, 1950, petitioner applied to the respondent
Alejo Aquino, as City Engineer, for permission to erect a strong
material residential building on his above-mentioned lot. For more
than forty days, the respondent took no action. Wherefore, petitioner
wrote him a letter manifesting his readiness to pay the fee and to
comply with existing ordinances governing the issuance of building
permits.
The petitioner, who is a lawyer, replied that the said Commission and
its plans could not legally affect the construction of residential
buildings, like his own, that are not subsidized in whole or in part with
public funds, citing section 6 of Executive Order No. 98, s. 1946, which
partly reads:
SEC. 6. Legal status of general plans. Whenever the Commission shall have adopted a
General Plan, amendment, extension or addition thereto of any urban area or any part
thereof, then and thenceforth no street, park or other public way, ground place, or
space; no public building or structure, including residential buildings subsidized in whole
or part by public funds or assistance; . . . shall be constructed or authorized in such urban
area until and unless the location and extent thereof conform to said general plan or
have been submitted and approved by the Commission, . . . .
The defense to this petition is planted on the opinion that unless

Hipolito's building conforms to the new street line fixed by the National
Urban Planning Commission, the building permit will not be issued.
It is not claimed that the City of Manila has expropriated, or desires to
expropriate, that portion of petitioner's lot between the existing street
line and the new street line adopted by the National Urban Planning
Commission. No law or ordinance is cited requiring private landowners
in Manila to conform to the new street line marked by the National
Urban Planning Commission, except the section above quoted. And
Page | 15
DOCTRINE
adopted a General Plan, applies only to "residential buildings
subsidized in whole or in part by public funds or assistance." The
residential building which petitioner intends to construct may not be
so classified, because he asserts, without contradiction, that his
proposed construction will be financed wholly by himself, not with
public funds or assistance. Therefore, the excuse given by
respondent is not valid.
The City has not expropriated the strip of petitioner's land affected
by the proposed widening of Invernes Street, and inasmuch as there
is no legislative authority to establish a building line, the denial of
this permit would amount to the taking of private property for public
use under the power of eminent domain without following the
procedure prescribed for the exercise of such power. (
EDMUND B. PAGHARION
Rm. A338, 1730H 2030H

the question relates only to its interpretation.
REPUBLIC v. VDA. DE CASTILLVI

58 SCRA 336, 352 (August 15, 1974)
FACTS
DOCTRINE
Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, filed, on June 26,

1959, a complaint for eminent domain against defendant-appellee,
Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the estate of the
late Alfonso de Castellvi (hereinafter referred to as Castellvi), over a
parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca,
Pampanga. In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other
things, that the fair market value of the above-mentioned lands,
according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of
Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market
value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the
lands be fixed at P259.669.10, that the court authorizes plaintiff to take
immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with
the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints three
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be expropriated, and that
the court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation.
1. In support of the assigned error that the lower court erred in holding
that the "taking" of the properties under expropriation commenced
with the filing of the complaint in this case, the Republic argues that
the "taking" should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of
a special lease agreement between the Republic and appellee
Castellvi, the former was granted the "right and privilege" to buy the
property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease, and that in the
event of such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market value should
be as of the time of occupancy; and that the permanent
improvements amounting to more that half a million pesos
constructed during a period of twelve years on the land, subject of
expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of permanency
and stability of occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the interest of
national Security. 7
Appellee Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that the "taking" of
property under the power of eminent domain requires two essential
elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by condemn or upon
the private property for more than a momentary or limited period, and
(2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. This appellee
argues that in the instant case the first element is wanting, for the
contract of lease relied upon provides for a lease from year to year;
that the second element is also wanting, because the Republic was
paying the lessor Castellvi a monthly rental of P445.58; and that the
The first (time) occupied the same pursuant to the contract of lease, and
that the just compensation to be paid for the property should not be
determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.
So many and varied are the circumstances to be taken

into account in determining the value of property
condemned for public purposes, that it is practically
impossible to formulate a rule to govern its appraisement
in all cases. Exceptional circumstances will modify the
most carefully guarded rule, but, as a general thing, we
should say that the compensation of the owner is to be
estimated by reference to the use for which the property is
suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants
of the community, or such as may be reasonably
expected in the immediate future. (Miss. and Rum River
Boom Co. vs. Patterson, 98 U.S., 403).
Page | 16
the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the

commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just
compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint.
It must be considered, however, that the amount fixed as the provisional
value of the lands that are being expropriated does not necessarily
represent the true and correct value of the land. The value is only
"provisional" or "tentative", to serve as the basis for the immediate
occupancy of the property being expropriated by the condemnor.
The important factor in expropriation proceeding is that the owner is
awarded the just compensation for his property.
In eminent domain proceedings, in order that evidence as to the sale price
of other lands may be admitted in evidence to prove the fair market value
of the land sought to be expropriated, the lands must, among other things,
be shown to be similar.
Any lawyer with a modicum of ability

handling this expropriation case would have
right away though [sic] of digging up
documents diligently showing conveyances
of lands near or around the parcels of land
sought to be expropriated in this case in the
offices that would have naturally come to his
mind such as the offices mentioned above,
and had counsel for the movant really
exercised the reasonable diligence required
by the Rule' undoubtedly they would have
been able to find these documents and/or
caused the issuance of subpoena duces
tecum. ...
EDMUND B. PAGHARION
Rm. A338, 1730H 2030H

contract of lease does not grant the Republic the "right and privilege"
to buy the premises "at the value at the time of occupancy."
PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE v. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA

22 SCRA 1334, 1341 (1968)G.R. No. L-24440 March 28, 1968
FACTS
DOCTRINE
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of

Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga
Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved
converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec.
50 of the Act also provided that Buildings and properties which the
province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another
place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a
price to be fixed by the Auditor General.
The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and
some buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of
Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in
the name of Zamboanga Province.
Pursuant thereto, the Auditor General, on January 11, 1955,
apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct Province of
Zamboanga as follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61%
for Zamboanga del Sur. Zamboanga del Norte therefore became
entitled to 54.39% of P1,294,244.00, the total value of the lots and
buildings in question, or P704,220.05 payable by Zamboanga City.
On March 17, 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order of the
President, issued a ruling 4 holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a
vested right as owner (should be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the
properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39, and is
entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This ruling
For, the matter involved here is the extent of legislative control over
the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a province is
one. The principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by the
municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and
governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress
has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private
or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no
absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without
due process and payment of just compensation. 6
Municipality of Catbalogan v. Director of

Lands, 8 and in Municipality of Tacloban v. Director of
Lands, 9 it was held that the capitol site and the
school sites in municipalities constitute their
patrimonial properties. This result is understandable
because, unlike in the classification regarding State
properties, properties for public service in the
municipalities are not classified as public.
revoked the previous Cabinet Resolution of July 13, 1951 conveying all the said
50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945,
when the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province was transferred to
Dipolog.
The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of

Internal Revenue to deduct an amount equal to 25% of the regular
internal revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga for the quarter
ending March 31, 1960, then for the quarter ending June 30, 1960, and
again for the first quarter of the fiscal year 1960-1961.
all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High
School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of
the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospital
and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered
patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under the
phrase "public works for public service" for it has been held that under
theejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and
indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated
Page | 17
Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the
school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public
use. They would fall under the phrase "public works for public
service" for it has been held that under theejusdem generis rule,
such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by
anyone to be considered public, it is enough that the property
be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local
administration, public education, public health, etc.
that provincial funds were used, still the buildings constitute mere
accessories to the lands, which are public in nature, and so, they
follow the nature of said lands, i.e., public. buildings, though
located in the city, will not be for the exclusive use and benefit of
city residents for they could be availed of also by the provincial
residents. The province then and its successors-in-interest are
not really deprived of the benefits thereof.
this Court is not inclined to hold that municipal property held and
devoted to public service is in the same category as ordinary
private property. The consequences are dire. As ordinary private
properties, they can be levied upon and attached. They can even
be acquired thru adverse possession all these to the detriment of
the local community. Lastly, the classification of properties other
than those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under
Art. 424 of the Civil Code is "... without prejudice to the provisions
of special laws." For purpose of this article, the principles, obtaining
under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as
"special laws". Hence, the classification of municipal property
(1) HINUNANGAN V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 11where it

was stated that "... where the municipality has
occupied lands distinctly for public purposes, such as
for the municipal court house, the public school, the
public market, or other necessary municipal building,
we will, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
presume a grant from the States in favor of the
municipality; but, as indicated by the wording, that
rule may be invoked only as to property which is
used distinctly for public purposes...."
(2) VIUDA DE TANTOCO V. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF
ILOILO 12 held that municipal properties necessary for
governmental purposes are public in nature. Thus,
the auto trucks used by the municipality for street
sprinkling, the police patrol automobile, police
stations
and concrete structures
with the
corresponding lots used as markets were declared
exempt from execution and attachment since they
were not patrimonial properties.
(3) MUNICIPALITY OF BATANGAS VS. CANTOS 13 held
squarely that a municipal lot which had always been
devoted to school purposes is one dedicated to
public use and is not patrimonial property of a
municipality.
EDMUND B. PAGHARION
Rm. A338, 1730H 2030H
properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. 7 The playgrounds, however,
would fit into this category

devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as public should
prevail over the Civil Code classification in this particular case.
VICENTE NOBLE v. CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. 44142 December 24, 1938
FACTS
Under a contract entered into between Jose Syquia and the City of
Manila on October 18, 1926, the former constructed on a piece of
land of the latter on Tayuman Street, Tondo, Manila, a school building,
containing twenty compartments, pursuant to the instructions,
specifications and conditions imposed by the city.
On April 25, 1935, the court rendered its decision declaring that the
City of Manila has no right to expropriate the building and that it
should comply with the terms of the contract of October 18, 1926, and
to pay to the plaintiff, for the price of the building, the sum of P46,000,
plus the rentals thereof, corresponding to the month of February, 1934
and following, until the final and absolute conveyance of the building
is made, with legal interest on the rentals due an unpaid.After the filing
of the complaint and the answer, the court, upon petition of the
defendant and by virtue of the cross-complaint, ordered, on June 11,
1934, that, upon the deposit of the amount of P46,000 by the
defendant, the latter take immediate possession of the building for the
purpose of the expropriation thereof, convoking and hearing the
parties on the appointment of the commissioners to appraise the
building. On March 21, 1933, the then mayor of the city, Tomas
Earnshaw, proposed to Vicente Noble that, in order to comply with
the rules of accounting then existing, the contract be amended in the
sense that, the lease be made renewable every year, instead of every
three years (Exhibit 1), and for this purpose it was agreed, by the
document Exhibit J, that it be renewable from year to year until the
leased building is purchased in accordance with the original contract
of July 22, 1927.The City of Manila failed to pay the stipulated rent
corresponding to the month of February, 1934, and following,
whereupon Vicente Noble, on April 10, 1934, filed the complaint which
gave rise to this case, wherein he asks that the city be ordered to
purchase the building for the price of P46,600, with legal interest
thereon from the filing of the complaint, and to pay the rentals at the
rate of P600 a month, corresponding to the month of February, 1934
and following, until the purchase of the building is effected and the
price thereof paid.Under the terms of these transfers, all the rights of
Syquia flowing from his contract with the city, were fully transferred,
first, to Sandoval, and, thereafter, to Noble.
Page | 18
DOCTRINE
The contract, therefore, in so far as it refers to the purchase of the
building, as we have interpreted it, is in force, not having been
revoked by the parties or by judicial decision.
Expropriation lies only when it is made necessary by the opposition
of the owner to the sale or by the lack of any agreement as to the
price. There being in the present case a valid and subsisting
contract, between the owner of the building and the city, for the
purchase thereof at an agreed price, there is no reason for the
expropriation.
Expropriation, as a manifestation of the right of eminent domain of
the state and as a limitation upon private ownership, is based upon
the consideration that it should not be an obstacle to human
progress and to the development of the general welfare of the
community. In the circumstances of the present case, however, the
expropriation would depart from its own purposes and turn out to
be an instrument to repudiate compliance with obligations legally
and validly contracted.
It is said that the contract should be rescinded as unfair and against
morals, not because it was so when it was entered into, but
because after what has already been paid by way of rentals for the
lease, if the sale is now made, the same would be excessively
favorable to the plaintiff and prejudicial to the defendant. But if this
state of things is the result of too much delay in effecting the
purchase, this is attributable to the defendant itself, for it was up to
it entirely to make the purchase at any time since the contract was
entered into.

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EDMUND B.

Atty. Maria Luz Raneses-Raval

OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

Atty. Maria Luz Raneses-Raval

DOCTRINE /OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

Atty. Maria Luz Raneses-Raval

Atty. Maria Luz Raneses-Raval

OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the

benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be

Issues: (1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto

mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been

legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured

Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S.

as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The

... [N]o person shall hold or retain

Atty. Maria Luz Raneses-Raval

year period to its effective date.

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to

We assume that under the Federal

overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of

... Unlike the provisions of the

Atty. Maria Luz Raneses-Raval

OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

In 1650, the Legislature of Massachusetts granted to Harvard College

The object and the end of all Government is to promote the

Lord Stowell, whose eminent qualifications as a

The continued existence of a Government would be of no great

"A general presumption arising from these

2. That the true construction of the acts of the Legislature of

Atty. Maria Luz Raneses-Raval

Atty. Maria Luz Raneses-Raval

The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese

"the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of

It was then held that land already devoted to a public

OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

But when the statute does not designate the

The taking of private property for any use

The very foundation of the right to exercise

Atty. Maria Luz Raneses-Raval

OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

Atty. Maria Luz Raneses-Raval

The Court of First Instance, after the appellate court's decision

the Company claiming mainly that the Republic Act was

the issue of constitutionality would be like a prejudicial question

OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

Atty. Maria Luz Raneses-Raval

OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

Atty. Maria Luz Raneses-Raval

valid and constitutional.

GUIDO v. RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION

OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

The expropriation proceedings at bar have been instituted

Atty. Maria Luz Raneses-Raval

OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

The power to expropriate, under both Republic Act 1266 and

Guido and Baylosis cases, has already ruled that,

SEC. 2. This shall take effect upon its approval.

In accordance with the statute, the NARRA instituted these eminent

(same rulings viz Guido and Baylosis cases)

City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil., 350,

Atty. Maria Luz Raneses-Raval