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The Islamic State versus the European Union

T.S. Allen in an officer in the United States Army. The views expressed in his work are his own and do not
reflect the position of the Department of Defense, the United States Army, or any other part of the United
States Government. Follow him on Twitter @TS_Allen.

!On November 14

th

of last year, terrorists affiliated with the Islamic State wounded or killed over five
hundred French citizens with bullets and bombs in Paris. French President Franois Hollande responded
the next day with rhetoric similar to what he had first deployed the previous January after Al Qaeda struck
the City of Light, reiterating that France was at war with Islamic terror. The January speech had
emphasized Frances unique role in combatting terror in Francophone Africa. In his November address,
Hollande added a surprising new approach: in response to the global threat posed by the Islamic State,
France would now invoke the until-then-untested collective defense clause of the European Unions
charter. In effect, he was obligating the peace-loving superstate to start its first war.

Several months into the European war on the Islamic State, however, there is good reason to question
whether the EU is fighting a war against IS at alland if its even capable of doing so. The European
response to Frances call for help has been confused and anemic. On the security frontthat is, when it
comes to defending Europe with domestic counterterrorism effortsEU leaders have aggressively pushed
a new unified security agenda, setting a June deadline for establishing a new combined border force, and
promising enhanced intelligence sharing and cooperation in domestic counterterrorism.

Where Europe has stumbled is on the defense frontthat is, in actually going out and striking back at the
Islamic State itself in Iraq and Syria, where the attack on Paris was planned. Most European powers have
made symbolic moves to intensify military operations against IS, but only the United Kingdom has
made a new, sustainable commitment of combat troops to the campaign. That reveals European
counterterrorism's Achilles heel. Security cannot exist without defense: armies and fleets, not police, are
the ultimate guarantors of borders and the security of what is behind them. Yet even since the Paris
attacks, the United States has provided the real defense muscle that ensures European security, and since
November, only the US has claimed credit for killing IS leaders involved in plotting terrorist attacks on
the West.

European neglect of defense is not new, even if it is increasingly anachronistic. The European Union has
no collective defense policy, no army, and an underfunded and little-loved military staff of only two
hundred. Its only articulated military aspiration is to be able to play a significant role in peacekeeping and

conflict prevention activities. The collective defense clause buried in Article 42 of the EU charter is so
obscure that several of the foreign ministers who France called upon to affirm their invocation of it had
never heard of the thing. They had little reason to, as the clause very sensibly states that the North
Atlantic Treaty Organizationthe largest military alliance in historyis the foundation of [the]
collective defence [of members of both the EU and NATO] and the forum for its implementation. No one
predicted Frances EU move, but many informed commentators, including former Supreme Allied
Commander Admiral James Stavridis and former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen,
assumed that France would also invoke the collective defense clause in Article 5 of the NATO charter,
obliging not just Europe, but the rest of the Free World to come to Frances aid.

France demurred, instead confusingly invoking the EU charter which calls upon NATO to act, without
then calling upon NATO. After an emergency consultation, NATO only declared that a number of Allies
are already working with France on their ongoing operations and investigations in the wake of the
attacks. Hollande surely had sound reasons for avoiding the organizations involvement. It struggled to
lead operations in Afghanistan when it took over from America there. It also inspires Russian antipathy,
which Hollande cannot afford while he seeks to build an accord with Russia that addresses Syria and
hopefully also excuses an end to the pesky US-EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine that hurt
Hollande politically (a move which Germany may well support). Most importantly, as Hollandes
government has stated in the past, even being a member of NATO results in the trivialization of
[Frances] foreign policy and a deterioration of [Frances] ability to make decisions and act.

To prove that Frances foreign policy was far from trivial, in the days after the Paris attacks, French
politicians, diplomats, soldiers, sailors and airmen went into action. While Hollande tried to build a EuroAmero-Russian consensus about how to deal with the Islamic State, Frances own Charles de Gaullethe
only fully operational, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier flying a European flagsteamed to Syria and
doubled the number of French planes flying against IS. They bombed Raqqah, IS capital.

Americans enthusiastically applauded the French president for allegedly not imposing politically toxic
rules of engagement on French forces, and the French military for its ability to fight light while avoiding
dreaded mission creep. However, France is constrained by the limited capabilities of its armed forces.
In 2012, the French Chief of the Defense, Admiral douard Guillaud even expressed doubts about its
ability to deploy 30,000 soldiers for a yearits stated goal. That number is significantly fewer fighters
that even the Islamic State has.

Frances escalation against IS did not include any new deployments of forces to the Middle East. The
De Gaulle had been preparing for its cruise, which was publicly announced weeks before the attacks,
since returning from its last Middle Eastern mission months before, and will have to withdraw in March
for logistical reasons. Even with the De Gaulles 20 planes in action, the French still only have 32 flying
over the Middle East as part of what they call Operation Chammal. Eight of them are outdated Super
tendard Modernises, which have been flying since 1978 and which the French publicly admit are
overdue for retirement. Simply put, Frances current contribution to the fight against IS is both modest
and unsustainable.

Other European responses also fizzled. European defense budgets have been eviscerated since the end of
the Cold War, and the downward trend has only increased since the global financial crisis of 2008. The
European defense forces lining up behind France are small, outdated, and with one exception,
unsustainable.

The United Kingdom, the only European state with worldwide military reach, was the first power to
answer Frances call. After prodding by Hollande and a noisy debate in Parliament, British Prime Minister

David Cameron deployed a handful of additional planes and gained authorization to expand the UKs
anti-IS bombing campaign in Iraq into Syria. As air power analyst Justin Bronk notes, however, this will
not make a significant difference as the UKs niche is intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR) aircraft, which have long been able to fly over Syria. Like France, Britain is flying outdated planes
whose retirement has been delayed to do so. Importantly, though, the UK has deployed a sustainable,
enduring force, whereas the French force flying off the De Gaulle will have to withdraw in a matter of
months.

Germany, the EUs economic giant, promised a modest contribution of six Tornado jets which will be
limited to conducting ISR missions (a smaller air wing than Denmark has sent against IS), a frigate to
escort the De Gaulle, and 150 more trainers for Iraqi Kurdish militias. Germany only has 38 fully
operational combat aircraft, however. While the Germans should be given due credit for bringing their
planes into action rapidlyflying their first mission on December 16ththeir contribution has still been
modest. Germany has also promised to deploy about 650 additional military trainers to Mali asa part of
the broader fight against terrorism, but they will be 5,000 kilometers from the Islamic State.

The rest of Europe has done basically nothing. Italy, which just took delivery of Europes first nextgeneration F-35 fighter planes, typifies the European approach to defense: it spends two-thirds of its
defense budget on personnel costs, has minimal force projection capabilities despite its forces
technological advancement and size, and most importantly no political will to take to the offensive against
IS. Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi insists that Italy wants to wipe out terrorists, but he has refused
to commit any Italian forces to doing so. Instead, when Hollande came to Rome in the aftermath of the
attacks, Renzi promised that Italy would match a 1 billion expenditure on domestic security spending
with 1 billion spent on culture, a curious effort to prevent the radicalization of would-be jihadi youths
with free museum trips and concerts.

There is no sign that the decline of Europes military might will be reversed. In response to the attacks,
Hollande has promised to increase military spending, even if it meant transgressing EU budget guidelines,
but little of that money will go towards forces that could eradicate IS. The coming months may actually
see a de-prioritization of defense abroad as France focuses on expensive domestic security operations.
Operation Sentinel, the militarys long-standing domestic security mission, cost $1 million a day earlier
this year, an amount the French government called unsustainable even before France entered a state of
economic emergency declared in January 2016. Similarly, the United Kingdom, which released a longawaited Strategic Defence and Security Review in the aftermath of the attacks, has at best staunched the
decline of its military forces, which have seen about 30% of their capabilities axed since 2010.

Every European country has a different excuse for this lack of military might. Most European politicians
would note that the EU has demonstrated significant diplomatic, intellectual, and economic power since
the attacks on Paris. European leaders own actions, however, demonstrate that this disinterested and
haphazard approach to defense is already outdated. The Paris attacks showed that the Islamic State is now
a global, hybrid threat, which endangers Europe directly with terrorism and the Middle East (and thus
Europe indirectly) with pseudo-conventional forces. Any effective response must address both security
and defense. which is why France is increasing cooperation between its own security and defense
establishments. The EUs first, faltering war has proven that Europe cannot pursue such a strategy with
the military means now available to it.

For more than half a century, the states that today compose the EU have relied on NATO for security.
France has suggested this is no longer enough, especially as Russia looks more and more like a necessary
partner for Europe. The EU has demonstrated that it offers no alternative, however. Many, especially in
Germany, fantasize that the solution is the formation of an EU Army, but this would require the creation

of a collective defense policy of the sort European leaders dont want to admit is necessary, a level of
defense spending they cannot afford, and alienate the United Kingdom, Europes most capable military
power. There are no easy answers here.
Nonetheless, the European response to the Islamic State suggests that change is on the horizon. As
European publics become increasingly concerned with preventing terrorism, and battles in the Middle
East continue to have direct ramifications on the streets of European cities, Europe will have to give more
consideration to, and likely spend more on, both security and defense. It is a commonplace to predict that
the European Union is doomed so long as it pursues a common monetary policy without a common fiscal
policy. A new critique is in order (a re-purposing of a longstanding argument against NATO, which has an
exclusively wartime, defense role): in an age of hybrid threats, it seems increasingly illogical to pursue a
common security policy without a defense policy or policies that can be tied to it. Only time will tell
whether this calls the ideal of an ever-closer EU, or the ideal of a peace-loving Europe, into question.

Project for Study of the 21st Century is a non-national, non-ideological, non-partisan organization. All
views expressed are the authors own.