April 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Delay. A magistrates delay in rendering a decision or order and failure to comply with this Courts
rules, directives and circulars both constitute less serious offenses under Rule 140, Section 9 of the
Rules of Court. Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. vs. Judge William Simon P. Peralta, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1917,
April 16, 2009.
Delay. Respondent committed undue delay in disposing of the cases assigned to him. Judges have
the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay. A judge who fails to do so has to suffer the
consequences of his omission, as any delay in the disposition of cases undermines the peoples faith
in the Judiciary. Provincial Prosecutor Manuel F. Torrevillas vs. Judge Roberto A. Natividad etc., A.M.
No. RTJ-06-1976/A.M. No. RTJ-06-1977, April 29, 2009.
Delay; burden of proof. In the absence of fraud, bad faith, evil intention or corrupt motive, the
complainant may not be allowed to question the judiciousness of the decisions rendered and orders
issued by the respondent, since the same may only be assailed through the appropriate judicial
remedies under the Rules of Court and not through an administrative complaint. In this case,
complainant did not exhaust available judicial remedies to challenge the decisions and orders.
Moreover, the OCA found that the complainant failed to prove that respondent was guilty of delay in
the resolution of pending incidents. Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings, the burden
of showing that the respondent committed the acts complained of devolves on the complainant. In
fact, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a
satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to
prove his exception or defense. Prosecutor Jorge D. Baculi vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, A.M. No.
RTJ-09-2176, April 20, 2009.
Disbarment. Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. While
the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show
compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. In cases where we have
deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment imposed on the lawyer, we have taken
into account the remorse of the disbarred lawyer and the conduct of his public life during his years
outside of the bar. Re: 2003 Bar Examinations Atty. Danilo De Guzman (Petitioner), B.M. No. 1222,
April 24, 2009.
Dishonesty. There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that
respondent committed dishonesty and abused the confidence reposed in him by the complainant and
her spouse. Records show that two lots had been sold by respondent as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale of 11 March 1990. Respondent, however, taking advantage of the absence of
complainant and her spouse from the Philippines and their complete trust in him, deceitfully informed
them in a letter dated 20 March 1990 that he had sold only one. It can be reasonably deduced from
the exchanges between the parties that the proceeds of the first lot had been transmitted to
complainant and her spouse. Respondents contention, though, that he had been authorized to retain
the proceeds of the second is specious, as complainant and her spouse could not have given the
same, having been left in the dark as regards its sale. And despite repeated demands, to date, there
is no showing that the outstanding amount has been paid. Thus, respondents deceitful conduct
warrants disciplinary sanction and a directive for the remittance of the remaining proceeds is in order.
Nelia Pasumbal De-Chavez-Blanco represented by Atty. Eugenia J. Muos vs. Atty. Jaime Lumasag,
Jr., A.C. No. 5195, April 16, 2009.
Disclosure of confidential information. The information the complainant disclosed does not qualify as
confidential information, as the term is defined under Section I, Canon II of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel: Confidential information means information not yet made a matter of public record
relating to pending cases, as well as information not yet made public concerning the work of any
justice or judge relating to pending cases, including notes, drafts, research papers, internal
discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations, and similar papers. As the
records indicate, the decision adverted to has already become final; in fact, a certificate of finality has
already been issued, and an entry of judgment had already been made. At best, the complainant was
only guilty of releasing information without observance of the internal procedures of the court, and for

undertaking the dissemination of the copies of the documents disclosed without being the staff
member authorized to do so. Dorothy Fe Mah-Arevalo vs. Elmer P. Mpe, A.M. No. P-09-2622, April 7,
2009.
Dishonesty. The respondents conduct clearly shows lack of forthrightness and straightforwardness in
his dealings with his superiors amounting to dishonesty. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no
place in the judiciary. The Court had repeatedly held that everyone in the judiciary, from the presiding
judge to the clerk, must always be beyond reproach; they carry this heavy burden to ensure that the
institution we save the judiciary is always kept above suspicion. Atty. Marlyds L. EstardoTeodoro Vs. Carlos S. Segismundo, A.M. No. P-08-2523, April 7, 2009.
Failure to notify client. The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present
the need for the lawyer to inform timely and adequately the client of important developments
affecting the clients case. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is
defending the clients interests. The Court finds well-taken the recommendation of the IBP to suspend
Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina from the practice of law for one year. Carlito P. Carangdang vs. Atty. Gilbert S.
Obmina, A.C. No. 7813, April 21, 2009.
Grave misconduct. Respondent sheriff was unauthorized to receive money intended for complainants
bailbond. Whether or not respondent was able to file the bailbond for complainant was immaterial.
The mere fact that respondent received money and agreed to facilitate the posting of bail created the
wrong impression that he had the power and authority to secure a court process. Respondent opened
himself to suspicion that he was going to benefit from the transaction. There is no doubt that
respondent is guilty of grave misconduct. He used his position as sheriff for pecuniary gain when, in
fact, he had no business getting involved in the processing of bail. He flagrantly disregarded
established rules of procedure and law when he misrepresented that he could expedite complainants
application for bail. Domingo U. Sabado, Jr. vs. Laniel P. Jornada etc., A.M. No. P-07-2344, April 15,
2009.
Grave misconduct. We sustain the findings of the OCA and hold respondent Manio guilty of dishonesty
and grave misconduct for the second time. The detailed narration of the facts in the unrebutted
affidavit of Mallonga and the letter of Judge Aquino, taken together with the copy of the fake
resolution, substantially supported the administrative charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct
against respondent Manio. She took advantage of her official position and defrauded a potential
litigant. Her acts clearly constitute dishonesty which is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.On the other hand, the
forgery that she committed in furtherance of the deceit constitutes grave misconduct or a flagrantly
or shamefully wrong or improper conduct. Peter B. Mallonga vs. Marites R. Manio / Hon. Lyliha
Abella-Aquino vs. Marites R. Manio, A.M. No. P-07-2298/A.M. No. P-07-2299, April 24, 2009.
Gross ignorance of the law. Judge Pagayatan displayed gross ignorance of the law when he
abandoned his duty to personally and independently evaluate the prosecutions motion to admit the
third amended Information, which excluded several accused therefrom, and relied entirely on the
directive of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo ordering such an amendment. Verily, Judge Pagayatans
actions patently indicate his insufficient grasp of the law. Dolores S. Bago vs. Judge Ernesto P.
Pagayatan etc., A.M. No. RTJ-07-2058. April 7, 2009.
Gross ignorance of the law. The judge showed gross ignorance of the law when he archived Criminal
Case No. 2000-08-00-01 immediately after the warrant of arrest was issued against the accused. He
violated Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92, which allows the archiving of a criminal case if, after the
issuance of the warrant of arrest, the accused remains at large for six (6) months from delivery of the
warrant to the proper peace officer. Everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know the law; when
the law is sufficiently basic or elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. However, for full liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or
actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only found to be erroneous; more
importantly, it must be established that he was motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some
other similar motive. Prosecutor Robert M. Visbal vs. Judge Wenceslao B. Vanilla, A.M. No. MTJ-061651, April 7, 2009.

Gross ignorance of the law. In disregarding the rules and settled jurisprudence, Judge Rosete showed
gross ignorance of the law, amounting to bad faith. Mutya B. Victorio vs. Judge Maxwell S.
Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1706, April 16, 2009.
Gross ignorance of the law. In the discharge of a judges duties, however, when the inefficiency
springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle, the judge is
either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds, or is too vicious that the
oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. If the
rule or law is so elementary, as the above-quoted sections of Rule 114 are, not to know it or to act as
if he does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law, without even the complainant having to
prove malice or bad faith on the part of the judge, as it can be clearly inferred from the error
committed. Provincial Prosecutor Manuel F. Torrevillas vs. Judge Roberto A. Natividad etc ., A.M. No.
RTJ-06-1976/A.M. No. RTJ-06-1977. April 29, 2009
Gross ignorance of the law. Competence is the mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter
lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the publics confidence in the competence of the courts.
Such is gross ignorance of the law. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he owes the
public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign
of incompetence. Basic procedural rules must be at the palm of his hands. A judge must be
acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules. Thus, this Court has been
consistent in ruling that when the law is so elementary, for a judge not to be aware of it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. Verily, failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and the
rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no one is excused, and surely not a judge like
respondent.Prosecutor Jorge D. Baculi vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2176. April
20, 2009
Gross misconduct. This Court agrees with the OCAs recommendation that Tanudra be dismissed from
service because of the following acts: her act of accepting money as facilitation fee which was clearly
not part of her official duties as a Court Stenographer; refusing to return the same despite repeated
demands for its return; and then later on blaming a fellow court officer for such failure. Clearly, such
actuations of Tanudra are tantamount to dishonesty and gross misconduct.
Gross misconduct has been defined as the transgression of some established or definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence. Dishonesty on the other hand is the
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle.
Moreover, as correctly observed by the OCA, it is of no moment that the act of dishonesty of Tanudra
does not relate to the performance of her official duties. The government cannot tolerate in its service
a dishonest official, even if she performs her duties correctly and well, because by reason of her
government position, she is given more ample pportunities to commit acts of dishonesty against her
fellowmen, even against offices and entities of the government other than the office where she is
employed; and by reason of her office, she enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which
render the victim of her great misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to
resist and counteract her evil acts and actuations. Erlina P. Jolito vs. Marlene E. Tanudra/Erlina P. Jolito
vs.George E. Gareza, A.M. No. P-08-2469/A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2857-P, April 24, 2009.
Insubordination. Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a superior officer is
entitled to give and have obeyed. The term imports a willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and
reasonable instructions of the employer.
Clearly, respondents conduct towards complainant constitutes insubordination. Complainant, as the
chief of her office, acted within her authority when she summoned the employees involved in the
reported November 2, 2006 incident into her chambers for a meeting to ascertain what actually
happened during that time and to undertake the appropriate measures to maintain peace in her
office. In that meeting, however, respondent deported in a manner reflecting lack of restraint and
disrespect towards his superior. And if this was not enough, he rudely and unceremoniously walked
out of the meeting. He even had the audacity to ignore complainants requests for him to return to
the meeting. Worse, after hiding in the comfort room of the clerk, he went home without so much as
seeking leave from the judge. Without a doubt, respondents actions amount to gross

insubordination, not to mention gross disobedience and disrespect to the judicial authority and the
position of complainant judge. Judge Pelagia Dalmacio-Joaquin vs. Nicomedes C. Dela Cruz etc., A.M.
No. P-07-2321, April 24, 2009.
Just cause for dismissal. There is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that petitioner was
dismissed for a just cause. Petitioner was at the scene of the attack and actively encouraged her
husbands attack on her supervisor. Rosario A. Gatus vs. Quality Hounse Inc., and Christopher
Chua, G.R. No. 156766, April 16, 2009.
Negligence. The failure to implement a writ of execution maybe classified as simple neglect of duty
which has been defined as the failure of an employee to give ones attention to a task expected of
him, and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. Under Rule IV,
Section 52, B 1 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of
duty is a less grave offense punishable by suspension from office for one (1) month and one (1) day
to six (6) months for the first offense.
Here, not only was there a long delay in the full implementation of the writs of execution issued in
Civil Case Nos. 192-L, 193-L, 194-L and 197-L but there was likewise an utter failure to implement the
writs issued in Civil Case Nos. 195-L and 198-L. Hence, the Court deems it appropriate to impose on
respondent sheriff a penalty of suspension from office for three (3) months. Estelito R. Marabe
vs.Tyrone V. Tan, A.M. No. P-05-1996, April 21, 2009; see also Wilson C. Ong vs. Ariel R. Pascaio, A.M.
No. P-09-2628, April 24, 2009.
Simple misconduct. Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character,
improper or wrong behavior. It is any unlawful behavior by public officers in relation to the duties of
their offices, willful in character. The term embraces acts which the office holder had no right to
perform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act.
Respondent committed misconduct when he verbally abused his co-employees and appeared at his
place of work drunk. Drinking during office hours may constitute misconduct and is prohibited under
the Civil Service Rules. Judge Pelagia Dalmacio-Joaquin vs. Nicomedes C. Dela Cruz etc., A.M. No. P07-2321, April 24, 2009.
Solicitation. Soliciting is prohibited under The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. Section 2, Canon I
thereof provides that [c]ourt personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on
any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official
actions; while Section 2(e), Canon III states that Court personnel shall not x x x solicit or accept any
gift, loan, gratuity, discount, favor, hospitality or service under circumstances from which it could
reasonably be inferred that a major purpose of the donor is to influence the court personnel in
performing official duties. Such acts are strictly prohibited to avoid the perception that in exchange
for certain favors, court personnel can be influenced to act in favor of a certain party or person. In re:
Improper Solicatation of Court Employees / Office of the Court Administrator vs.. Sheela R.
Nobleza, A.M. No. 2008-12-SC/A.M. No. P-08-2510, April 24, 2009.
May 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Misconduct. In preparing and notarizing the illegal lease contracts, respondent violated the Attorneys
Oath and several canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. One of the foremost sworn duties
of an attorney-at-law is to obey the laws of the Philippines. This duty is enshrined in the Attorneys
Oath and in Canon 1, which provides that (a) lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Rule 1.02 under Canon 1 states: A lawyer
shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at decreasing confidence in the
legal systems. Willem Kupers vs. Atty. Johnson B. Hontanosas, A.C. No. 5704, May 8, 2009.

Misconduct. The rule clearly requires that the sheriff executing writs shall provide an estimate of the
expenses to be incurred, and such estimated amount must be approved by the court. Upon approval,

the interested party shall then deposit the amount with the clerk of court and ex-officio sheriff. The
expenses shall be disbursed to the assigned deputy sheriff to execute the writ, subject to liquidation
upon the return of the writ. Any amount unspent shall be returned to the interested party.
In this case, Sheriff Lindo failed to comply with the prescribed rule. His act of receiving an amount for
expenses to be incurred in the execution of the writ, without having made an estimate and without
securing prior approval of the court, is a violation of the prescribed rule. Sheriff Lindo should not have
received from Aprieto any money without having submitted the expenses for approval of the court.
He did not even advise Aprieto that he was not authorized to receive any amount from her and that
the money for expenses should be deposited with the clerk of court. Virginia L. Aprieto vs. Noel C.
Lindo, A.M. No. P-07-2356, May 21, 2009.

July 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attorney-client relationship. Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively
communicating with complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors
of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Respondent cannot
shield herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance
she rendered to complainant was only in the form of friendly accommodations, precisely because at
the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the
opposing parties who had been referred to her by the SEC.
Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by arguing that no written
contract for the engagement of her services was ever forged between her and complainant. This
argument all the more reveals respondents patent ignorance of fundamental laws on contracts and
of basic ethical standards expected from an advocate of justice. The IBP was correct when it said: The
absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship
between the parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an
attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the
advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession.
Rolando B. Pacana, Jr. vs. Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez, A.C. No. 8243, July 24, 2009.
Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Perez claimed that her transactions with
Agustin, Jr. had no relation to her position as court stenographer and that they were private in nature.
The Court is not impressed. The image of the Judiciary is mirrored in the conduct of its personnel
whether inside or outside the court. Thus, court personnel must exhibit a high sense of integrity not
only in the performance of their official duties but also in their personal affairs. While there is nothing
wrong in engaging in private business, caution should be taken to prevent the occurrence of dubious
circumstances that may impair the image of the Judiciary. Every act of impropriety ultimately affects
the dignity of the Judiciary, and the peoples faith in it. As the OCA correctly stated, Perezs activities
dragged the Court into the fake receipts scam at the City Treasurers Office. Perez must be held
accountable. Liberty M. Toledo vs. Liza Perez, Court Stenographer III, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC,
Manila, A.M. No. P-03-1677 & A.M. No. P-07-2317, July 15, 2009.
Conflict of interest. Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent should
have done was either to advise complainant to engage the services of another lawyer since she was
already representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative
of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both
because that would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.
Rolando B. Pacana, Jr. vs. Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez, A.C. No. 8243, July 24, 2009.

Dishonesty. Estonilos act of punching in another employees daily time card falls within the ambit of
falsification. Worse, he did not do it for only one co-employee, but for two others. He made it appear
as though his co-employees personally punched in their daily time cards. Estonilo also made Padillas
daily time card reflect a log-in time different from the latters actual time of arrival, as well as
made Bambillas daily time card falsely show that the latter was at the Supreme Court premises
in BaguioCity when he was not there at all. It is patent dishonesty, which inevitably reflects
on Estonilos fitness as an employee to continue in office and on the level of discipline and morale in
the service.
Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary. We have defined dishonesty
as the (d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray.[14] Falsification of daily time records is an act of dishonesty, for which all
three respondents must be held administratively liable under Rule XVII, Section 4 of the Omnibus Civil
Service Rules and Regulations (Civil Service Rules).
Under Rule XIV, Section 21 of the Civil Service Rules, falsification of official documents (such as daily
time records) and dishonesty are both grave offenses. As such, they carry the penalty of dismissal
from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in government service. Re: Unauthorized disposal of unnecessary
and scrap materials in the Supreme Court Baguio Compound, and the irregularity on the bundy cards
of some personnel therein, A.M. No. 2007-17-SC, July 7, 2009.
Dishonesty. Even assuming that the payment of P10,000.00 was made on behalf of the defendant,
respondent acknowledged having received a total of P12,500.00 as sheriffs expenses. The estimated
expenses which he submitted to and were later approved by the RTC amounted to only P7,500.00,
which reveals that complainant had, in fact, overpaid him by P2,500.00. While respondent was able to
submit a Liquidation of Expenses dated August 30, 2005 in which he claimed to have spent
P13,000.00, he was only able to present two receipts to prove his expenses: (1) P1,500.00 issued on
June 6, 2005 as rent for the jeep hired to haul objects and (2)P2,000.00 issued on July 1, 2005 as
guarding fee for two (2) tricycles. Notably, it does not appear that said liquidation was approved by
the RTC. Respondent has undoubtedly violated Section 4, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel, which provides that court personnel shall not accept any fee or remuneration beyond what
they receive or are entitled to in their official capacity. Respondent failed to substantiate that the
expenses amounting to P9,500.00, without receipts to qualify the same, was actually incurred and
duly accounted for. Geronimo Francisco vs. Sebastian Bolivar, etc., A.M. No. P-06-2212, July 14,
2009.
Dishonesty. Respondent was undeserving of the trust reposed in him. Instead of using the money for
the bond of the complainants son, he pocketed it. He failed to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in
his dealings with his client. He failed to live up to his fiduciary duties. By keeping the money for
himself despite his undertaking that he would facilitate the release of complainants son, respondent
showed lack of moral principles. His transgression showed him to be a swindler, a deceitful person
and a shame to the legal profession. Dolores C. Belleza vs. Atty. Alan S. Macasa, A.C. No. 7815, July
23, 2009.
Dishonesty. Dishonesty is a serious offense which has no place in the judiciary. Each false entry in
the DTR constitutes falsification and dishonesty. The falsification of a DTR constitutes fraud involving
government funds. It bears stressing that the DTR is used to determine the salary and leave
credits accruable for the period covered thereby. Falsifying ones DTR to cover up absences or
tardiness automatically results in financial losses to the government because it enables an employee
to receive salary and earn leave credits for services which were never rendered.

Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty and falsification of
official document are punishable with dismissal even for the first offense. However, the Court, in
certain instances, has not imposed the penalty of dismissal due to the presence of mitigating factors
such as the length of service, acknowledgment of the infractions, and remorse by the
respondent. Judge Jaime L. Dojillo, Jr. vs. Concepcion Z. Ching, etc./Concepcion A. Ching vs. Judge
Jaime L. Dojillo, Jr., etc., A.M. No. P-06-2245/A.M. No. MTJ-09-1741, July 31, 2009.
Execution of judgment. Sheriffs have an important role to play in the administration of justice cannot
be overemphasized. They form an integral part, as they are called upon to serve writs, execute all the
processes, and carry into effect the orders, of the court. When placed in their hands, it is their duty, in
the absence of any instruction to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness,
to execute writs according to their mandate.
As noted by the OCA, no restraining order was issued by the appellate court on October 17, 2003 to
excuse the delay in the execution of the writ. It was only on October 21, 2003 or four days later that
the appellate court issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the motion for
reconsideration. At all events, even if a writ is later ruled to be improvidently or improperly issued,
the sheriff is not in a position to question it, as his duty in executing the same is purely ministerial.
Atty. Nelson T. Antolin, et al. vs. Judge Alex L. Quiroz, et al./Edwin V. Garrobo Vs. Judge Alex
L. Quiroz, RTV, Pasig City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2186/A.M. No. RTJ-09-2187, July 14, 2009.
Exhaustion of judicial remedies. The rule on exhaustion of judicial remedies does not erase the gross
ignorance of the law that he exhibited. It is not a mandatory sine qua non condition for the filing of an
administrative case in the way that it is required in the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
and other similar rules in the Rules of Court. The filing of an administrative case is not an
extraordinary remedy that demands that the lower court or tribunal be given every opportunity to
review its finding. In fact, it is not a remedy at all required in the underlying case that was attended
by gross ignorance to challenge or reverse the ruling in that case. It is a totally separate matter
whose objective is to seek disciplinary action against the erring judge. Prosecutor Robert
M. Visbal vs.Judge Wenceslao B. Vanilla, MTCC, Br. 2, Tacloban City, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1651, July 15,
2009.
Falsification. Although dishonesty through falsification of DTRs is punishable by dismissal, such an
extreme penalty cannot be inflicted on an errant employee such as herein respondent, especially so
in cases where there exist mitigating circumstances which could alleviate her culpability. Respondent
has been Branch Clerk of Court for about ten (10) years and this is her first administrative complaint.
The OCA recommended that respondent be suspended from the service for one (1) year without pay,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Concerned
Employees of the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan Vs. Larizza Paguio-Bacani,
Branch COC II, MTC, Meycauayan, Bulacan, A.M. No. P-06-2217, July 30, 2009.
Grave abuse of authority. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve
order in judicial proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of justice. The courts must
exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a
safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they exercise. Thus, judges have, time and again,
been enjoined to exercise their contempt power judiciously, sparingly, with utmost restraint and with
the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for
retaliation or vindication. Respondent judges act of unceremoniously citing complainant in contempt
is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority vested upon him by
law. Venancio Inonog vs.Judge Francisco B. Ibay, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
135, Makati City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175, July 28, 2009.

Grave misconduct. We thus find petitioner guilty of grave misconduct. By his actuations, he violated
the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Public servants
must bear in mind this constitutional mandate at all times to guide them in their actions during their
entire tenure in the government service.
Under the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules, grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal
from service. Atty. Emmanuel Pontejos vs. Hon. Aniano Desierto and Restituto Aquino, G.R. No.
148600, July 7, 2009.
Grave misconduct. Grave Misconduct is a malevolent transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer or
employee which threatens the very existence of the system of administration of justice. Estonilo,
Padilla, and Bambilla committed grave misconduct in unlawfully bringing scrap materials out of the
court premises and using the court vehicle for the purpose, deviating from the established or definite
rule of action.
Section 52(A)(3) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service classifies grave as a
grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense. Re: Unauthorized disposal of unnecessary
and scrap materials in the Supreme Court Baguio Compound, and the irregularity on the bundy cards
of some personnel therein, A.M. No. 2007-17-SC, July 7, 2009.
Grave misconduct. Under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, it is a serious charge to
borrow money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court. Under the
same provision, an act that violates the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes gross misconduct,[42]
which is also a serious charge. In either instance, a serious charge is punishable by: 1) dismissal from
the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits; 2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not
exceeding six months; or 3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000. Concerned
Lawyers of Bulacan vs. Presiding Judge Pornillos, RTC Br. 10, Malolos City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183, July 7,
2009.
Grave misconduct. We do not find respondents guilty of grave misconduct. Misconduct is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by a public officer. And when the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law or flagrant disregard of established rule are manifest, the public officer shall be liable for grave
misconduct. Respondents rightfully determined the occupation by the SPFMPCI members
unauthorized (albeit on a different basis). The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office
of the Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in her capacity as the Ombudsman
vs. Rufino V. Maijares, Roberto G. Ferrera, Alfredo M. Ruba and Romeo Querubin. G.R. Nos. 17061516. July 9, 2009.
Gross ignorance of the law. Instead of first ruling whether the case fell under the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, Judge Pangilinan immediately issued a warrant of arrest and fixed complainants
bail at P2,000. There being no showing that complainant failed to appear in court when required by
Judge Pangilinan, the warrant of arrest he issued had no legal basis.
Judge Pangilinans faux pas cannot be countenanced. For when a judge shows unfamiliarity with the
fundamental rules and procedures, he contributes to the erosion of public confidence in the judicial
system and is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedures. Lanie Cervantes vs.. Judge

Heriberto M. Pangilinan, and Clerk of Court III Carmencita P. Baloco, etc., A.M. No. MTJ-08-1709, July
31, 2009.
Gross ineffiency. The Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all lower courts shall
be decided or resolved within 90 days from the time they are submitted for decision. Respondent
repeatedly ignored this mandate. She also violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct which requires judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within
the required periods.
Failure to comply within the mandated period constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right
of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. The Court has always considered a judges delay
in deciding cases within the prescribed period of three months as gross inefficiency. Re: Report on
the Judicial Audit in Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Jiminez-Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental/
Judge Pricilla Hernandez, A.M. No. 03-170-MCTC, July 14, 2009.
Gross inefficiency. No less than the Constitution mandates that all cases or matters must be decided
or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission to the Supreme Court, and, unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all
lower courts. In implementing this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct exhorts in the section on Competence and Diligence that judges shall perform all
judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable
reason, constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of an administrative sanction on the
defaulting judge. Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
55, Malabon City, A.M. No. 08-3-73-MeTC, July 31, 2009.
Falure to decide cases. Judge Pantanosas, Jr.s explanation that the undecided cases were never
brought to his attention during his incumbency deserves scant consideration. Proper and efficient
court management is the responsibility of the judge, and he is the one directly responsible for the
proper discharge of his official functions. It should be emphasized that the responsibility of making a
physical inventory of cases primarily rests on the presiding judge. He ought to know the cases
submitted to him for decision or resolution, and he is expected to keep his own record of cases so that
he may act on them without undue delay. It is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording
and filing system in his court so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy
disposition.
A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel since
proper and efficient court management is his responsibility. Court personnel are not the guardians of
a judges responsibilities. The efficient administration of justice cannot accept as an excuse the
shifting of the blame from one court personnel to another. A judge should be the master of his own
domain and take responsibility for the mistakes of his subordinates. Re: Report on the Judicial Audit
Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cagayan De Oro City, A.M. No. 02-8-207MTCC, July 27, 2009.
Negligence. Respondent is guilty of simple neglect of duty, defined as the failure to give attention to
a task or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference,[16] which is classified as a less
grave offense under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and punishable
with suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first offense and dismissal for the
second offense. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Officer-in-charge and Legal
Researcher Nilda Cinco, RTC, Br. 28, Catbalogan, Samar, A.M. No. P-06-2219, July 13, 2009.

Negligence; failure to file memorandum on appeal. The appellant is duty-bound to submit his
memorandum on appeal. Such submission is not a matter of discretion on his part. His failure to
comply with this mandate or to perform this duty will compel the RTC to dismiss his appeal.
Respondents failure to file the required pleadings is per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Natividad Uy vs.. Atty. Braulio RG Tansisin, A.C. No. 8252, July 21, 2009.
Negligence. A lawyers negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship of
counsel and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice the rights of a
litigant, particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of the ethics of the legal profession, a
lawyers lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client is both unprofessional and unethical.
If his clients case is already pending in court, a lawyer must actively represent his client by promptly
filing the necessary pleading or motion and assiduously attending the scheduled hearings. This is
specially significant for a lawyer who represents an accused in a criminal case. Dolores
C. Belleza vs.Atty. Alan S. Macasa, A.C. No. 7815, July 23, 2009.
Negligence. When respondent accepted the amount of P50,000.00 from complainant, it was
understood that he agreed to take up the latters case, and that an attorney-client relationship
between them was established. From then on, it was expected that he would serve his client, herein
complainant, with competence, and attend to her cause with fidelity, care and devotion.
The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling complainants case and
subsequently failing to render such services is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence. Trinidad H. Camara, et al. vs. Atty. Oscar Amondy Reyes, A.C. No. 6121, July 31, 2009.
Simple misconduct. Misbehavior by court employees within and around their vicinity necessarily
diminishes their dignity. Any fighting or misunderstanding becomes a disgraceful sight reflecting
adversely on the good image of the Judiciary.
Indeed, the two are guilty of conduct unbecoming of court employee amounting to simple
misconduct, classified as a less grave offense under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service which merits suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first offense,
and dismissal for the second offense.
Under Section 53 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, in the
determination of the penalties to be imposed, the extenuating, mitigating, aggravating or alternative
circumstances, among other considerations, may be taken into account. As recommended then, the
length of service, the performance ratings, and the number of times an employee has been
administratively charged may be considered. Re: Fighting incident between two(2) SC shuttle bus
drivers, namely, Messrs. Edilbert L. Idulsa and Ross C. Romero, A.M. No. 2008-24-SC, July 14, 2009.
Simple misconduct. Sheriff Jundarinos duty is to implement the Writ of Execution dated 28
November 2007 at No. 2519 Granate St., Sta.Ana, Manila. Given Quilos assertions that his residence
was actually at No. 2518 Granate St., San Andres Bukid, Manila, and that he was not even a party to
Civil Case No. 158273-CV, the more prudent course of action for Sheriff Jundarino was to defer
implementation of the said Writ until a determination by the MeTC of Quilos Motion to Quash the
same. It bears to stress that said Motion was already scheduled for hearing on 28 March 2008, just a
day after Sheriff Jundarinos second visit to Quilos residence on 27 March 2008.
Without even considering whether Quilos residence is the same as the property involved in Civil Case
No. 158273-CV, the Court finds that Sheriff Jundarinos acts herein i.e., his rude and inappropriate

remarks and aggressive behavior during his visits to Quilos residence on 12 February 2008 and 27
March 2008 to implement the Writ of Execution issued in the aforementioned case; as well as his
unreasonable insistence on implementing the said Writ on 27 March 2008 despite the fact
that Quilos Motion to Quash the same was already set to be heard the very next day, 28 March 2008
constitute simple misconduct. Edgardo A. Quilo Vs. Rogelio G. Jundarino, Sheriff III, Metropolitan
Trail Court, Branch 19, Manila, A.M. No. P-09-2644, July 30, 2009.
Simple misconduct. Mom-issuance of official receipt for stenpgraphic fees is simple
misconduct. Gaspar R. Dutosme Vs. Atty. Rey D. Caayona, A.M. No. P-08-2578, July 31, 2009.
Unauthorized practice of law. Additionally, a judge should not permit a law firm, of which he was
formerly an active member, to continue to carry his name in the firm name as that might create the
impression that the firm possesses an improper influence with the judge which consequently is likely
to impel those in need of legal services in connection with matters before him to engage the services
of the firm. A judge cannot do indirectly what the Constitution prohibits directly, in accordance with
the legal maxim,quando aliquid prohibitur ex directo, prohibitur et per obliquum or what is prohibited
directly is prohibited indirectly.
By allowing his name to be included in the firm name Bartolome Lelina Calimag Densing &
Associates Law Offices while holding a judicial office, he held himself to the public as a practicing
lawyer, in violation of the Rules and the norms of judicial ethics.
Under Sections 9 and 11(B), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10 SC,
unauthorized practice of law is classified as a less serious charge punishable by suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months, or a fine of
more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. Atty. Florencio Alay Binalay vs. Judge Elias O. Lelina,
Jr., A.M. No. P-08-2132, July 31, 2009.
Violation of lawyers oath. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia,
taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest to obtain funds for
his BATAS Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his television
program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order
restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the
complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its products. At the
same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
mandates lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes. For he defied said status quo order, despite his (respondents) oath as a
member of the legal profession to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities. Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., A.C. No. 7199, July 22, 2009.

August 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Bias. Equally tenuous is complainants contention that the CAs finding of grave abuse of discretion
of the part of respondent Judge proves the latters bias and partiality. A finding of grave abuse of
discretion does not necessarily prove that respondent Judge displayed a preference for one of the

party-litigants. As aptly observed by the Investigating Justice, the reversal of a judges order by a
superior court in a certiorari case is, in itself, not a ground for an administrative action against the
judge. Respondent Judge, by granting the petition for relief in Civil Case No. B-1016 on the ground
that complainant failed to disclose a verbal agreement between her family and defendants therein,
may have committed an error of judgment. However, in the absence of bad faith, such erroneous
judgment cannot be a ground for disciplinary action. Adelpha E. Malabed vs. Judge Enrique C. Asis,
RTC, Br. 16, Naval Biliran, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2031, August 4, 2009.
Dishonesty. The making of untruthful statements in the PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification
of an official document. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme
penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave
credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service.
Respondent, a judge, knows (or should have known) fully well that the making of a false statement in
his PDS could subject him to dismissal. This Court will not allow him to evade the consequences of his
dishonesty. Being a former public prosecutor and a judge now, it is his duty to ensure that all the laws
and rules of the land are followed to the letter. His being a judge makes it all the more unacceptable.
There was an obvious lack of integrity, the most fundamental qualification of a member of the
judiciary. Olga M. Samson vs. Judge Virgilio G. Caballero, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138, August 5, 2009.
Dishonesty. It was established that the OCC logbook indicated the time as reflected in respondents
DTR but his actual time of arrival at the RTC-San Fernando was actually later than the time as
reflected in the DTR. The discrepancy was explained by the fact that, as respondent himself admitted,
he punched in at the RTC-Guagua which is not his official work station.
OCA Circular No. 7-2003 is clear and states that court personnel should indicate in their bundy cards
the truthful and accurate times of their arrival at, and departure from, the office. That office is the
official work station of the court personnel. In the present case, respondents official work station is
RTC-San Fernando and not RTC-Guagua. Respondents punching in at RTC-Guagua was a clear
violation of OCA Circular No. 7-2003. As we have ruled in Garcia v. Bada andServino v. Adolfo, court
employees must follow the clear mandate of OCA Circular No. 7-2003.
Section 4, Rule XVII (on Government Office Hours) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws also provides that falsification or
irregularities in the keeping of time records will render the guilty officer or employee administratively
liable.[3] Falsification of time records constitutes dishonesty, which is a grave offense punishable by
dismissal from the service. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Lyndon L. Isip, Sheriff IV, RTC, OCC,
City of San Fernando, Pampanga, A.M. No. P-07-2390, August 19, 2009.
Failure to pay debt. Indeed, when Sermonia backtracked on her promise to pay her debt, such act
already constituted a ground for administrative sanction, for any act that would be a bane to the
public trust and confidence reposed in the judiciary shall not be countenanced. Sermonias unethical
conduct has diminished the honor and integrity of her office, stained the image of the judiciary and
caused unnecessary interference, directly or indirectly, in the efficient and effective performance of
her functions. Certainly, to preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with
just contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards. Like all other court
personnel, Sermonia is expected to be a paragon of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in all
her official conduct but also in her personal actuations, including business and commercial
transactions, so as to avoid becoming her courts albatross of infamy.
The gravamen of Sermonias offense is her unwillingness to pay a just obligation. The penalty
imposed by the law is not directed at Sermonias private life, but at her actuation unbecoming a

public official. Teopicio Tan vs. Salvacion D. Sermonia, Clerk IV, MTCC, Iloilo City, A.M. No. P-08-2436,
August 4, 2009. see also Wilson B. Tan vs. Jesus F. Hernando, A.M. No. P-08-2501, August 28, 2009.
Grave abuse of authority. Respondents became administratively liable for grave abuse of authority
when they forcibly levied and took away properties belonging to a third person and, thereafter,
appropriated the levied property for themselves. Respondents grave abuse of authority amounted to
gross misconduct, which under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule IV,
Section 52 A (3) thereof, is a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first offense. Hector
P. Teodosio Vs. Rolando R. Somosa, et al.. A.M. No. P-09-2610, August 13, 2009.
Grave abuse of authority. Sheriff who caused the demolition of petitioners properties without an
order for the purpose in the court of implementing a writ of execution commits grave abuse of
authority. Simeon Guario, et al. vs. Cesar F. Ragsac, et al., A.M. No. P-08-2571, August 27, 2009.
Immorality. The evidence presented is enough to hold respondent guilty of the charge of immorality
or disgraceful and immoral conduct. It is elementary that administrative proceedings are governed by
the substantial evidence rule. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial
evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that the person indicted was
responsible for the alleged wrongdoing or misconduct.
The acts imputed against respondent, a married man, consist of his cohabitation with a woman other
than his legal wife and there is a strong likelihood that respondent fathered a child with the said
woman. It is morally reprehensible for a married man or woman to maintain intimate relations with a
person other than his or her spouse. Moreover, immorality is not based alone on illicit sexual
intercourse. It is not confined to sexual matters, but includes conducts inconsistent with rectitude, or
indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless
conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. Lolita S. Regir vs. Joel Regir, A.M. No. P06-2282, August 7, 2009.

Misbehavior. Courts are looked upon by the people with high respect. Misbehavior by judges and
employees necessarily diminishes their dignity. Any fighting or misunderstanding is a disgraceful
occurrence reflecting adversely on the good image of the Judiciary. By fighting within the court
premises, respondent judges failed to observe the proper decorum expected of members of the
Judiciary. More detestable is the fact that their squabble arose out of a mere allowance coming from
the local government. Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali, RTC, Br. 212, Mandaluyong City vs. Judge Paulita
B. Acosta-Villarante, RTC, Br. 211, Mandaluyong City/Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante, RTC, Br. 211,
Mandaluyong City vs. Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali, RTC, Br. 212, Mandaluyong City, A.M. No. RTJ-082124/A.M. No. FTJ-08-2125, August 27, 2009.
Misconduct. The evidence on record clearly establishes that the first petition filed by Mendoza for
extrajudicial foreclosure against mortgagor David Joson was stamped received and docketed as
Foreclosure No. F0184.[10] The corresponding filing fees and cost of publication were paid. The Notice
to Parties of Sheriffs Public Auction Sale[11] and the Notice of Extrajudicial Foreclosure with Auction
Sale of Real Property under Act No. 3135, as amended, were likewise issued by Tablizo. Thus, when
Tablizo cancelled the auction sale for no reason and without the knowledge and consent of the
Executive Judge, he did so in clear violation of his ministerial duties as Ex-Officio Sheriff in
applications for extrajudicial foreclosure under the Administrative Order.
As to the second petition for extrajudicial foreclosure filed by Mendoza against mortgagor spouses
Ricardo and Adelina Abrasaldo which was allegedly refused outright by Tablizo, the evidence on

record shows that the said petition[12] was marked with the receiving stamp of the Office of the Clerk
of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes. The same petition also bears the mark F0193 at the upper right-hand corner of the first page. The mark appears to denote that the petition,
docketed as Foreclosure No. F0193, is an Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale under Act No. 3135, as
amended. It raises valid suspicion, however, why the receiving stamp was left blank despite the
docket number written on the petition. This unexplained act on the part of Tablizo shows another
violation of his ministerial duties as Ex-Officio Sheriff in applications for extrajudicial foreclosure under
Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1984. We have reminded sheriffs time and again that, as court
employees, they must conduct themselves with propriety and decorum so that their actions must be
above suspicion at all times. Leo Mendoza vs. Prospero V. Tablizo, A.M. No. P-08-2553, August 28,
2009.
Negligence. As gleaned from the cited case and from the Return of Service of Summons of Process
Server Eduardo R. Rabena and his explanation, respondent is liable for simple neglect or dereliction of
duty.
A process servers primary duty is to serve court notices. This requires utmost dedication on his part
to ensure that all notices assigned to him are duly served on the parties.
Considering the grave responsibilities imposed on him, Eduardo R. Rabena, despite his explanation
that he had performed his duty with utmost good faith, proved to be careless and imprudent in
discharging his duties. Neither neglect nor delay should be allowed to stall the expeditious disposition
of cases. As such, he is indeed guilty of simple neglect of duty, which is the failure of an employee to
give proper attention to a required task. Simple neglect of duty signifies disregard of a duty resulting
from carelessness or indifference. Judge Alma Crispina B. Collado-Lacorte vs. Eduardo Rabena, A.M.
No. P-09-2665, August 4, 2009.

September 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Disbarment; prescription. Neither the lapse of time from the occurrence of the cause nor the
motivation for the filing of the complaint diminished the Courts inherent power to discipline a
member of the Bar whenever appropriate. First of all, the ordinary statutes of limitation had no
application to disbarment or suspension proceedings against members of the Bar. Indeed, such
proceedings are sui generis. They are not akin to the trials of actions or suits in which interests and
rights are enforced by the plaintiffs against the defendants, but are rather investigations into the
conduct of the members of the Bar made by the Supreme Court within the context of its plenary
powers expressly granted by the Constitution to regulate the practice of law. The proceedings, which
the Court may even motu proprio initiate, have neither plaintiffs nor prosecutors. The public interest
is their primary objective, the true question for determination being whether or not the respondent
members of the Bar are still fit to be allowed to retain their memberships and to enjoy the privileges
appurtenant to such memberships. Imelda Bides-Ulaso vs. Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana, A.C. No. 7297,
September 29, 2009.
Disbarment; withdrawal by complainant. The agreement between Bides and Ulaso stipulating the
withdrawal of the disbarment case against the respondent did not terminate or abate the jurisdiction
of the IBP and of this Court to continue the present administrative proceeding against the respondent
as a member of the Philippine Bar. Imelda Bides-Ulaso vs. Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana, A.C. No. 7297,
September 29, 2009.

Dishonesty. The Court finds well-taken the evaluation and recommendation of the OCA on the charge

for discourtesy. The Court finds well-taken too the evaluation and recommendation of the OCA on
respondents failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 141, Section 10 of the Rules of Court. It
finds the OCAs characterization of such failure as Inefficiency and Incompetence in the Performance
of Official Duties a grave offense too harsh, however. Leticia Sales vs. Arnel Jose A. Rubio, Sheriff
IV, RTC, OCC, Naga City, A.M. No. P-08-2570, September 4, 2009.
Dishonesty. By misrepresenting her educational attainment to qualify for her present position,
respondent has committed dishonesty. Dishonesty has been defined as intentionally making a false
statement on any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in
securing ones examination, registration, appointment or promotion. It is also understood to imply a
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray. Judge Jenny Lind Aldecia-Delorino vs. Marilyn De Castro Remigio-Versosa, Clerk III,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City, A.M. No. P-08-2433, September 25, 2009.
Dishonesty. Based on the foregoing, the Court is more inclined to believe that when complainant
and defendants-spouses failed to reach an agreement, respondent came forward as a third-party
claimant to prevent the levy and execution of said properties. He, therefore, violated Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility,which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Under this rule, conduct has been construed not to pertain
exclusively to the performance of a lawyers professional duties. In previous cases, the Court has held
that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor; or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. John Christen S. Hegna vs. Atty. Goering
G.C. Paderanga, A.C. No. 5955. September 8, 2009
Grave misconduct. Ganzans failure to remit her collections, amounting to P256,530.25 and to
report/collect fines totaling P50,050.00, constitutes gross neglect of duty, dishonesty, and grave
misconduct. She has transgressed the trust reposed in her as cashier and disbursement officer of the
Court. Therefore, the Court is left with no other recourse but to declare Ganzan guilty of dishonesty
and gross misconduct.
Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292
and other pertinent Civil Service Laws, dishonesty and grave misconduct are considered grave
offenses, for which the penalty of dismissal is prescribed even at the first instance. Section 9 of said
Rules additionally provides: The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility and
retirement benefits, and the disqualification of re-employment in the government service. This
penalty is without prejudice to criminal liability of the respondent. Office of the Court Administrator
vs. Clerk of Court Fe P. Ganzan, MCTC, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental, A.M. No. P-05-2046, September 17,
2009
Grave misconduct. It is undisputed that accused were charged with a non-bailable offense; that they
were released from detention on the basis merely of the Custody Receipt signed by the respondent,
which was a clear violation of Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which explicitly provides that
no person under detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the
court or when he is admitted to bail. As a court employee, respondent is cognizant of this
requirement as in fact he admitted in his Comment that a motion for temporary release should have
been filed in court.
As a court employee, respondent is expected to follow the law and the rules and procedures
prescribed by the Court. The facts in this case clearly indicate that respondent deliberately
circumvented the law to favor his accused-relatives. This is a grave misconduct which merits the

penalty of dismissal. P/Supt. Rene Macaling Orbe vs. Marcos U. Digandang, Process Server, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City, A.M. No. P-09-2685, September 3, 2009.
Gross ignorance of the law. Judge Reyes is discharged from the service for gross ignorance of the law
and conduct unbecoming of a judge. Prosecutor Romana R. Reyes vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes, etc./Armi
M. Flordeliza, et al. Vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes, etc./Andree K. Lagdameo vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes,
etc./timoteo A. Migrio, etc. vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes/Florencio Sebastian, Jr. vs. Hon. Judge Julia A.
Reyes, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 69, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1623/A.M.
No. MTJ-06-1625/A.M. No. 06-1627/A.M. No. P-09-2693/A.M. No. MTJ-06-1638, September 18, 2009.
Gross ignorance of the law. Respondent is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure for
taking cognizance of the petition for indirect contempt, despite the non-payment of docket fees. Rule
71, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that an indirect contempt proceeding, which is not
initiated motu proprio by the court, shall be commenced by a verified petition that fully complies with
the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions, including the payment of docket fees.
That Rule being so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes Gross Ignorance of the Law or
Procedure. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan/Leticia
Lourdes Camara vs. Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2089/A.M. No. RTJ-0921-99,
September 8, 2009.
Gross negligence. Indeed, Romeros gross negligence in driving the shuttle bus is evident. Gross
negligence has been defined as the want or absence of even slight care or diligence as to amount to
a reckless disregard of the safety of persons or property. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.
In A.M. No. 2008-13-SC, the Court ruled that a government employee holding a casual or temporary
employment cannot be terminated within a period of his employment except for cause. We sustain
the recommendation of the OAS that there is a sufficient cause to terminate Romeros employment,
his gross recklessness in driving the shuttle bus having been established by substantial evidence.
Moreover, the presence of mitigating circumstances, such as his length of service or this being his
first offense, should not be taken into account considering that the paramount concern in this case is
the need to safeguard the lives and limbs of the shuttle bus passengers. Complaint of Atty.
Wilhelmina D. Geronga against Mr. Ross C. Romero, driver, shuttle bus no. 5 for reckless driving, A.M.
No. 2009-04-SC, September 4, 2009.
Immorality. Under Sections 8 and 11 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a judge found guilty of
immorality can be dismissed from the service, if still in the active service, or may forfeit all or part of
his retirement benefits, if already retired, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office including government-owned or controlled corporations. We have already ruled that if a
judge is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent and
derived from direct knowledge. This quantum of evidence, complainant failed to satisfy.
The testimonies of Mutia and Zozobrado are specious and insufficient to convincingly prove that
respondent committed disreputable conduct. This considered, complainant should not have refused to
testify during the hearing. More than anyone else, it was complainant who had a direct interest in
making sure that the evidence adduced met the necessary burden of proof, considering that the
allegations in her complaint involved charges that cannot be lightly dealt with. She should have been
more zealous in prosecuting her complaint.
Nevertheless, we agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice that although the charges of
immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service were not satisfactorily proven by
complainant, respondent cannot be completely exonerated. Mutias testimony that he saw Judge
Macias having dinner with Seranillos and entering a bedroom with her may not satisfactorily prove

the charge of immorality, but this act certainly suggested an appearance of impropriety, Judge Macias
being a married man. Such behavior undeniably constituted unbecoming conduct, a light offense
punishable by a fine not less than P1,000.00 but not more thanP10,000.00. In light of the
circumstances affecting not only the reputation of Judge Macias himself but the image and reputation
of the whole judiciary as well, we find it reasonable to impose upon him the maximum fine of
P10,000.00. Margie Corpus Macias Vs. Mariano vs. Mariano Joaquin S. Macias, Presiding
Judge, Branh 28, Regional Trial Court, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1650, September
29, 2009.
Influence peddling. After a careful study of the instant case, we find no sufficient evidence to support
complainants claim. Except for complainants bare allegations, there is no proof that respondents
engaged in influence peddling, extortion, or in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
It is axiomatic that he who alleges the same has the onus of validating it. Gregory U. Chan
vs.NLRC Commissioner Romeo L. Go, et al., A.C. No. 7547, September 4, 2009.
Loan to client. The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when
in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers
fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter
that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to
the client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject
matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. Either of these circumstances may lead the
lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which
may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of
undivided fidelity to the clients cause. Pedro L. Linsangan vs. Atty. Nicodemes Tolentino, A.C. No.
6672, September 4, 2009.
Misappropriation. We find respondent guilty of misappropriating judiciary funds which act
constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct. Respondent did not deny committing the irregularities
imputed against her or submit an explanation thereof despite several opportunities given her. In her
letter dated November 12, 2004, respondent acknowledged sole responsibility over said infractions
and admitted using the missing judiciary funds for her personal gain; she even offered
to restitute the undeposited collections. Respondents offer to restitute the whole amount would not
serve to exonerate her from administrative liability; much more in this case where out of the total
missing amount of P8,694,578.56, respondent only returned the measly sum of P100,601.00. The
infraction had been committed; it could not be erased by mere offer of restitution. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Concepcion G. Espineda, etc., A.M. No. CTA-08-2, September 4, 2009.
Mistajke. It has been held that not all mistakes of members of the Bar justify the imposition of
disciplinary actions. An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. For an honest mistake or
error, an attorney is not liable. Wen Ming W. Chen a.k.a. Domingo Tan vs. Atty. F.D. Nicolas
B. Pichay, A.C. No. 7910, September 18, 2009.
Negligence. It is with respect to respondents receipt of the proceeds of complainants bonus in June
2006 that this Court, as did the OCA, faults respondent for being remiss in his duties in failing to
submit a return of the writ. While respondent belatedly executed a Sheriffs Report dated May 13,
2008, the same fails to comply with the mandate of Section 14 of Rule 39.
In fine, respondent is indeed guilty of simple neglect of duty. Under Rule IV, Section 52 (B) (1) of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the first offense of simple neglect of duty
is penalized with suspension for one month and one day to six months. Dr. Salome U. Jorge vs. Carlos

P. Diaz, Deputy Sheriff, RTC, Branch 20, Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, A.M. No. P-07-2332, September 4,
2009.
Non-compliance with court order. Atty. Venida apologized for the late filing of both his partial and full
comments. But tried to exculpate himself by saying he inadvertently misplaced the complaint and
had a heavy workload (for his partial comment). He even had the temerity to blame a strong typhoon
for the loss of all his files, the complaint included (for his full comment). His excuses tax the
imagination. Nevertheless, his apologies notwithstanding, we find his conduct utterly unacceptable
for a member of the legal profession. He must not be allowed to evade accountability for his
omissions.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the
lawyers oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Rolando Saa vs. Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar
Discipline, Board of Governors, Pasig City and Atty. Freddie A. Venida, G.R. No. 132826, September 3,
2009.
Notarial law. Specifically, the notarial certification contained in the jurat of the amended verification
and affidavit of non-forum shopping SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, on this 18th day of
June 2003, affiant IRENE BIDES, showing to me her CTC Nos. 11833475 issued on November 21, 2002,
in Manila indicated both the necessity for the physical presence of Bides as the affiant and the fact
that the signing was done in the presence of the respondent as the notary. The physical presence of
Bides was required in order to have her as the affiant swear before the respondent that she was that
person and in order to enable the respondent as the notary to ascertain whether Bides had voluntarily
and freely executed the affidavit. Thus, the respondent, by signing as notary even before Bides
herself could appear before her, failed to give due observance and respect to the solemnity.
Being a lawyer commissioned as a notary, the respondent was mandated to discharge with fidelity
the sacred duties appertaining to her notarial office. Such duties being dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest, she could not disregard the requirements and solemnities of the
Notarial Law. It was emphatically her primary duty as a lawyer-notary to obey the laws of the land and
to promote respect for the law and legal processes. She was expected to be in the forefront in the
observance and maintenance of the rule of law. She ought to have remembered that a graver
responsibility was placed upon her shoulders by virtue of her being a lawyer. Imelda BidesUlaso vs.Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana, A.C. No. 7297, September 29, 2009.
Solicitation of clients. With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule
that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise
of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. Again the Court notes that respondent
never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos referrals.
Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his office. Respondent committed an unethical,
predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the
CPR. Pedro L. Linsangan vs. Atty. Nicodemes Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009.

October 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Lawyers

Confidential information. It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does
not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be
confidential. Since the proposed amendments to the by-laws must be approved by at least
a majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with the
SEC, the information could not have been intended to be confidential. Thus, the disclosure
made by respondent during the stockholders meeting could not be considered a violation
of his clients secrets and confidence within the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Rebecca J. Palm vs. Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr., A.C. No. 8242,
October 2, 2009.
Conflict of interest. In Quiambao v. Bamba, the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict
of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against
his former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment. The Court has ruled that what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate
the clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter
in which he previously represented him.
There is no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a case filed by Comtech. The
case where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa case filed by Comtech against its former
officer. There was nothing in the records that would show that respondent used against Comtech any
confidential information acquired while he was still Comtechs retained counsel. Further, respondent
made the representation after the termination of his retainer agreement with Comtech. A lawyers
immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers
employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the
clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters
that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated. Rebecca J. Palm vs. Atty. Felipe Iledan,
Jr., A.C. No. 8242, October 2, 2009.
Indirect contempt. It is reasonable to conclude that the two lawyers crafted the complaint and
incorporated therein all the unfounded accusations against the respondent in order to conceal their
inadequacies in the handling of their clients cases. To say the least, the complaint was most unfair to
the respondent who, as the record shows, was simply keeping faith with her avowed objective of
expediting the proceedings in her court by, among other measures, requiring lawyers to be prepared
at all times and to be fair and candid in their dealings with the court. Juan Pablo P. Bondoc vs. Judge
Divina Luz P. Aquino-Simbulan, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-09-2204, October 26, 2009.
Misconduct. When a lawyer accepts to handle a case, whether for a fee or gratis et amore, he
undertakes to give his utmost attention, skill and competence to it, regardless of its significance.
Thus, his client, whether rich or poor, has the right to expect that he will discharge his duties
diligently and exert his best efforts, learning and ability to prosecute or defend his (clients) cause
with reasonable dispatch. Failure to fulfill his duties will subject him to grave administrative liability as
a member of the Bar. For the overriding need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in
the legal profession demands that an erring lawyer should be sanctioned. Maria Earl Beverly C.
Ceniza vs. Atty. Vivian G. Rubia, A.C. No. 6166, October 2, 2009.
Judges and court personnel
Absence without leave. Ginas applications for leave from March 1, 2007 up to March 31, 2007 and
from May 1, 2007 up to July 31, 2007 inclusive were disapproved and considered unauthorized, as
reflected above. A court employees absence without leave for a prolonged period of time disrupts the
normal functions of the court; constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of public service;
contravenes a public servants duty to serve the public with the utmost degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; and manifests disrespect for ones superiors and colleagues, in

particular, and for the service and the public at large, in general. Gina must thus be dropped from the
rolls. Re: Dropping from the rolls of Ms. Gina P. Fuentes, Court stenographer I, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Mabini, Compostela Valley, A.M. No. 09-3-50-MCTC, October 9, 2009.
Habitual drunkenness. Time and again, this Court has pointed out the heavy burden and responsibility
which court personnel are saddled with, in view of their exalted positions as keepers of the public
faith. They should, therefore, be constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or
negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. Those who work in the judiciary
must adhere to high ethical standards to preserve the courts good name and standing. They should
be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency, and they must discharge their duties with
due care and utmost diligence, since they are officers of the court and agents of the law. Indeed, any
conduct, act or omission on the part of those who would violate the norms of public accountability
and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary shall not be
countenanced.
In the instant case, respondent cannot take refuge behind his alleged ailment to justify his infractions.
In fact, respondent made no categorical denial of the accusations against him. He merely sidestepped
the same by explaining that he had been drinking in order to ease the pains brought about by his leg
injury. He shifted the blame on the medications he took for his failure to perform his duties as court
interpreter. He had been constantly reminded of his unfavorable behavior but he remained
unrepentant. The only time he took an effort to make excuses for himself was when an administrative
complaint was already filed against him. However, the fact remains that, even by his own admission,
respondent had been remiss in the performance of his duties. Judge Rene B. Baculi vs. Clemente U.
Ugale, A.M. No. P-08-2569, October 30, 2009.
Ignorance. The respondent judge ought to have known that the joint decision was already final and
executory and could no longer be disturbed when he made his adjustments. This legal reality, known
as the rule of immutability of judgment, is an elementary principle of law and procedure. Once a
judgment becomes final, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the Highest Court of
the land. The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors, or the making of socalled nunc pro tunc entries, which cause no prejudice to any party, and where the judgment is void.
To be sure, the respondent judges ground for modifying the joint decision is not among these
recognized exceptions.
For modifying a final and executory decision in the course of its execution, we find the respondent
judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Where the law is straightforward and its application to the
facts plainly evident, not to know the law or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. The respondent judge violated Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which mandates professional competence on the part of a judge. A judge owes the public
and the court the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and
prevailing jurisprudence; otherwise, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. Ignorance of
the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice. George P. Mercado (Substituted by his
wife, Rebecca Royo-Mercado, and Children, namely, Rebecca Gay, Kristina Evita, Cris Oliver and
Marian Rica, all surnamed Mercado) vs. Hon. Erasto D. Salcedo, (Ret.) Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Tagum City, Davao Del Norte, Branch 31/State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco vs. Hon.
Erasto D. Salcedo, (Ret.) Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Tagum City, Davao Del Norte, Branch
31, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1781/A.M. No. RTJ-03-1782, October 16, 2009,
Ignorance. Rodrigo C. Calacal (respondent), a Utility Worker I of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Alfonso Lista-Aguinaldo, Ifugao, without obtaining a travel authority required by OCA Circular No. 492003, left the country on May 15, 2008 for Singapore where he stayed up to June 6, 2008.

On the Courts directive to explain why he failed to comply with OCA Circular 49-2003, respondent
proffered unawareness of the circular as there is no copy in his office. Anyway, he stated that the
Clerk of Court approved his leave application.
Unawareness of the circular is not an excuse for non-compliance therewith, violation of which is
penalized with reprimand on the first offense, suspension for 1-30 days on the second offense, and
dismissal on the third offense. Office of the Administrative Services (OAS)- Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) Vs. Rodrigo C. Calacal, Utility Worker 1, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, (MCTC),
Alfonso Lista-Aguinaldo, Ifugao, A.M. No. P-09-2670, October 16, 2009.
Misconduct. Compounding respondents acts of lasciviousness and drunkenness during office hours
were, by his own admission, his smoking within court premises during office hours and leaving his
post during office hours in violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 9-99.
In Merilo-Bedural v. Edroso, the therein respondent court utility worker who committed lascivious acts
against a fellow court employee was found by the Court guilty of gross misconduct and immorality
prejudicial to the best interests of the service and was dismissed from the service.
Respondents gross misconduct and immorality as reflected above, not to mention his violation of a
Supreme Court circular, merit his dismissal. The exacting standards of morality and decency expected
of those in the service of the judiciary must be maintained, failing which the respect and confidence
in the judiciary will be eroded. Angelita I. Dontogan vs. Mario Q. Pagkanlungan, Jr., A.M. No. P-092620, October 9, 2009.
Misconduct. The absenteeism of judges or court employees and/or their irregular attendance at work
is a serious charge that, if proven, may warrant the imposition of the penalty of dismissal or
suspension from service. Unauthorized absence and irregular attendance are detrimental to the
dispensation of justice and, more often than not, result in undue delay in the disposition of cases;
they also translate to waste of public funds when the absent officials and employees are nevertheless
paid despite their absence. As heretofore mentioned, the Supreme Court regulates the conduct of
court officials and employees and it acts through its subordinates, among them in this case, the
respondent judge. His responsibility in this administrative supervision is direct by virtue of the
delegation made by this Court. By conducting a superficial investigation and by his slanted findings
that caused the OCA to recommend the dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge
Agayan and his court personnel, the Courts administrative machinery failed; the respondent judges
intent to shield another judge, resulting in the lack of objectivity of his report, deprived the Court of
the opportunity to act properly on the reported violations of the norms of conduct of judges and court
employees.
Serious misconduct, as defined, refers to weighty and serious transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. It
warrants dismissal from the service when the judicial act is corrupt and inspired by an intention to
violate the law, and when it translates to wrongful intention rather than mere error of judgment.
In this case, by giving premium to personal relations and personal feelings rather than to the faithful
discharge of his duty as investigating judge, the respondent judge acted dishonestly and inefficiently,
coupled with a deliberate and wrongful intent to perform his duties unfaithfully. This is no less a
serious misconduct than a corrupt act undertaken for monetary gains; one as well as the other eroded
public confidence in a judges ability to render justice. George P. Mercado (Substituted by his wife,
Rebecca Royo-Mercado, and Children, namely, Rebecca Gay, Kristina Evita, Cris Oliver and Marian
Rica, all surnamed Mercado) vs. Hon. Erasto D. Salcedo, (Ret.) Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Tagum City, Davao Del Norte, Branch 31/State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco vs. Hon. Erasto D.

Salcedo, (Ret.) Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Tagum City, Davao Del Norte, Branch 31, A.M.
No. RTJ-03-1781/A.M. No. RTJ-03-1782, October 16, 2009,
Misconduct. The act of borrowing a vehicle by a judge or any court employee is not per se a violation
of judicial norms and standards established for court personnel, as borrowing is a legitimate and
neutral act that can happen in everyday life. However, judges and court employees by the nature of
their functions and of the norms and standards peculiar to their positions live their lives under
restrictions not otherwise imposed on others; specifically, they cannot simply borrow in situations
when this act may or can affect the performance of their duties because of the nature of the thing
borrowed or the identity of the borrower, or in situations when borrowing would involve ethical
questions under express rules. In this case, the complaint alleged that what the respondent judge
borrowed was in fact a vehicle that was the subject of a previous litigation before his sala; the
respondent judge borrowed, too, from a lender who still had cases before his sala.
We hold, based on our examination and analysis of the records, that the respondent judge went over
the dividing line that separates permissible from impermissible borrowing. George P. Mercado
(Substituted by his wife, Rebecca Royo-Mercado, and Children, namely, Rebecca Gay, Kristina Evita,
Cris Oliver and Marian Rica, all surnamed Mercado) vs. Hon. Erasto D. Salcedo, (Ret.) Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Tagum City, Davao Del Norte, Branch 31/State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco
vs. Hon. Erasto D. Salcedo, (Ret.) Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Tagum City, Davao Del
Norte, Branch 31, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1781/A.M. No. RTJ-03-1782, October 16, 2009,
Misconduct. The investigation established that De Rivera had deliberately and knowingly conspired
with Key, Luzadas, and other court employees to facilitate the fraudulent release of the retirement
and leave credits benefits of Lantin. She tampered with court records, specifically the date of receipt
of the application for retirement benefits, in violation of Section 3, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel. She accepted the application from Key although the latter was not the
designated agent in the SPA, an act amounting to misconduct. De Rivera accepted PhP 30,000 in
connection with an illegal transaction, which constitutes grave misconduct. She used her official
position to secure unwarranted benefits, privileges, or exemptions for herself and others, contrary to
Canon I of the Code, Fidelity to Duty.
From the investigation, it can be gleaned that Villapando worked closely with De Rivera and, by his
own admission, received money from her. He went beyond his official functions and followed up the
papers of Lantin with unusual zeal and received money from Key after the SC clearance was
completed. He committed grave misconduct for accepting money in exchange for routing the papers
of the judge. He is guilty of the same offenses as De RiveraGrave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service, violation of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, and violation of
Sec. 3(b) of RA 3019 and of RA 6713; and is also guilty of violating Sec. 1 of Canon IV on the
Performance of Duties, Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. He should be dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits.
From the investigation, it can be gleaned that Villapando worked closely with De Rivera and, by his
own admission, received money from her. He went beyond his official functions and followed up the
papers of Lantin with unusual zeal and received money from Key after the SC clearance was
completed. He committed grave misconduct for accepting money in exchange for routing the papers
of the judge. He is guilty of the same offenses as De RiveraGrave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service, violation of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, and violation of
Sec. 3(b) of RA 3019 and of RA 6713; and is also guilty of violating Sec. 1 of Canon IV on the
Performance of Duties, Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. He should be dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits.

De Rivera admitted that she received thirty thousand pesos (PhP 30,000) from Key allegedly to
facilitate the processing of Lantins retirement papers. She, however, denied receiving an additional
forty thousand pesos (PhP 40,000). She claimed that she gave money to Villapando, Butch N. Borres,
and Edison P. Vasquez, although she did not say how much. She said she did not know how the other
offices had cleared Lantin. She gave no explanation why she accepted the retirement papers of
Lantin; why she asked no identification from Key; and why she processed the papers even if
incomplete. She denied taking part in processing the SC clearance of Lantin. Betty Ignacio, to whose
account the two checks issued to Lantin were allegedly deposited, in a Sworn Affidavit, said that
Luzadas sent her a text message that it was De Rivera who facilitated the processing of the judges
retirement claims. De Rivera stopped reporting for work after she was preventively suspended for
ninety (90) days.
The investigation established that De Rivera had deliberately and knowingly conspired with Key,
Luzadas, and other court employees to facilitate the fraudulent release of the retirement and leave
credits benefits of Lantin. She tampered with court records, specifically the date of receipt of the
application for retirement benefits, in violation of Section 3, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel. She accepted the application from Key although the latter was not the designated agent in
the SPA, an act amounting to misconduct. In Re: Fraudulent release of retirement benefits of Judge
Jose C. Lantin, former Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Felipe, Zambales, A.M. No. 2007-08SC, October 9, 2009.
Misconduct. As Judge Farrales noted in her Report, Rimando should have first demanded full payment
of the amounts stated in the dispositive portion of the trial courts decision, which dispositive portion
was, it bears reiteration, incorporated in the writ. But he did not. Without determining with certainty
that the van belonged to the judgment debtor, and despite the information given to him at the time
of seizure that it did not belong to the judgment debtor, he went ahead and seized the van.
On top of this, Rimando falsely made it appear in the Notice of L[i]s Pendens addressed to the
district head of the Olongapo City LTO that the van was the subject matter in the civil case. Not only
did Rimando thus make a false statement. His statement betrayed his ignorance. For under Section
14, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court and Section 76 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, a notice of lis
pendens applies only in actions affecting the title or the right of possession of realproperty. Besides,
the van was not the subject matter of the civil case.
As if Rimandos faux pas were not enough, he even attempted to release the van on a non-working
day and would have succeeded were it not for Judge Gonzales order against it. His claim that his
attempt was made after ascertaining that the van did not belong to the judgment debtor is an
admission of his slip reflected above.
Rimando is, for refusal to comply with Judge Gonzales order for him to explain his actions, also liable
for Gross Insubordination, what Necesario v. Dinglasa describes as the indifference of a respondent to
an administrative complaint and to resolutions requiring comment thereon. Judge Jacinto C. Gonzales
vs. Clerk of Court and City Sheriff Alexander C. Rimando, et al., A.M. No. P-07-2385. October 26,
2009.
Misconduct. Complainants testified, and respondent was unable to rebut, that he had shouted at and
uttered vindictive words against them, and even humiliated them while they were doing their job and
attending to the needs of the public. In his desperate attempt to exonerate himself, respondent could
only impute malicious motive to complainants, averring that they merely had an axe to grind against
him; and that they had defied, disobeyed, and refused to recognize him as head of the OCC-MTCC.
Unfortunately for him, his explanations do not excuse his actions.

Respondents acts are absolutely unbecoming a court employee who is expected to display proper
decorum. In Villaros v. Orpiano, the Court stressed that the behavior of all employees and officials
involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a
heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times in
order to merit and maintain the publics respect for and trust in the judiciary.
High-strung and belligerent behavior has no place in government service, where the personnel are
enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and
insolence. More so is such conduct exacted from court employees, since they have to earn and keep
the publics respect for and confidence in the judicial service. This standard of conduct must apply to
the court employees dealings not only with the public, but also with their co-workers. Joana Gilda L.
Leyrit, et al. Vs. Nicolasito S. Solas, Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Iloilo
City/Ma. Theresa Zerrudo, et al. vs. Nicolasito S. Solas, Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Iloilo City, A.M. No. P-08-2567/A.M. No. P-08-2568, October 30, 2009.
Neglect of duty. Respondents proffered excuse that she had to prioritize the transcription of
stenographic notes taken in other cases which were needed in the next scheduled hearings does
not impress, however. It bears noting that the stenographic notes subject of the request of Angelas
counsel were taken in 2006 yet and had remained untranscribed even despite the lapse of more than
one year when the present complaint was filed, and four months despite the payment of respondents
fees for the purpose. Her having had heavy work is not, as the OCA observed, an adequate
excuse. Elisa C. Ruste vs. Cristina Q. Selma, A.M. No. P-09-2625. October 9, 2009.
Neglect of duty. An order or resolution of the Court is not to be construed as a mere request which
could be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. To do so shows disrespect to the Court.
Without the least delay, every court officer or employee is duty bound to obey the orders and
processes of the Court and to exercise at all times a high degree of professionalism.
Respondent, being a clerk of court, has the duty to immediately deposit the various funds he collects
because he is not authorized to keep them in his custody. He failed in his duty, however.
Delay in depositing funds collected constitutes simple neglect of duty. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Alfredo Manasan, Clerk of Court II, MCTC, Orani-Samal, Bataan, A.M. No. P-07-2415,
October 19, 2009.
Neglect of duty. We find Genabe guilty for simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty has been
defined as the failure of an employee to give attention to a task expected of him and signifies a
disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.
Genabe had been permitted to attend a two-day seminar in Baguio City on the premise that no work
would be left pending. She was assigned to summarize the testimonies of three defense witnesses for
a criminal case set for promulgation. The records reveal that Genabe was only able to summarize the
TSN of one witness consisting of 46 pages and failed to finish the TSN of the other two witnesses
consisting of 67 pages. Before leaving for Baguio, Genabe had three working days to complete the
task. However, the assignment remained unfinished. When such task was assigned to another court
employee, it only took the other employee two and a half hours to complete the TSN of the two
witnesses. Re: Order dated 21 December 2006 issued by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Pias City, suspending Loida M. Genabe, Legal Researcher, same
court/Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Pias City Vs. Loida M.
Genabe, Legal Researcher, Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Pias City, A.M. No. 07-2-93RTC/A.M. No. P-07-2320, October 29, 2009.

Power to discipline. The guidelines clearly provide that the authority of judges to discipline erring
court personnel, under their supervision and charged with light offenses, is limited to conducting an
inquiry only. After such inquiry, the executive judge is required to submit to the OCA the results of the
investigation and give a recommendation as to what action should be taken. An executive judge does
not have the authority to act upon the results of the inquiry and thereafter, if the court employee is
found guilty, unilaterally impose a penalty, as in this case. It is only the Supreme Court which has the
power to find the court personnel guilty or not for the offense charged and then impose a penalty.
In the present case, Judge Maceda suspended Genabe for the offense of neglect of duty. Under
Section 52(B), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense which carries a penalty of one month and one day to six
months suspension for the first offense. Under A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, an executive judge may only
conduct an investigation for all offenses. After the investigation, the executive judge is mandated to
refer the necessary disciplinary action to this Court for appropriate action. Re: Order dated 21
December 2006 issued by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Pias
City, suspending Loida M. Genabe, Legal Researcher, same court/Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Pias City Vs. Loida M. Genabe, Legal Researcher, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 275, Las Pias City, A.M. No. 07-2-93-RTC/A.M. No. P-07-2320, October 29, 2009.

November 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Interest; attorneys fees. The imposition of any interest, as prayed for in this petition, on any amount
payable to petitioners is unwarranted. Contracts for attorneys services are unlike any other contracts
for the payment of compensation for any other services which allow the imposition of interest in case
of delay under the provisions of the Civil Code. The practice of law is a profession, not a
moneymaking venture. Jose Feliciano Loy, et al. vs. San Miguel Corporation Employees UnionPhilippine Transport and General Workers Organization (SMCEU-PTGWO), et al., G.R. No. 164886.
November 24, 2009
Misappropriation. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or
suspension of a lawyer for the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4)
grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the
lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client such that he
must promptly account for whatever money or property his client may have entrusted to him. As a
mere trustee of said money or property, he must hold them separate from that of his own and make
sure that they are used for their intended purpose. If not used, he must return the money or property
immediately to his client upon demand, otherwise the lawyer shall be presumed to have
misappropriated the same in violation of the trust reposed on him. A lawyers conversion of funds
entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional ethics.
Here, respondent Mijares chose not to be heard on his evidence. Technically, the only evidence on
record that the Court can consider is the Universitys evidence that he got P500,000.00 from
complainant for expenses in facilitating and processing its title application; that he undertook to
return the money if he did not succeed in his purpose; that he falsely claimed having obtained the
MMDA approval of the application; and that he nonetheless refused to return the money despite
repeated demands. Unopposed, this evidence supports the finding of guilt of the Investigating
Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors. Arellano University, Inc. vs. Atty. Leovigildo H. Mijares
III, A.C. No. 8380, November 20, 2009.

December 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Legal Ethics
Abuse of court processes and legal procedure; forum shopping The successive filings of a petition for
certiorari, petition for annulment of judgment, two petitions for annulment of the complainants
certificate of title, and a petition for declaratory relief, all containing a prayer for injunctive relief,
reveal the respondents persistence in preventing and avoiding the execution of the final decisions of
the lower courts against his client. Under the circumstances, the respondent lawyers repeated
attempts go beyond the legitimate means allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the
interests of his client. These are already uncalled for measures to avoid the enforcement of the final
judgment of the lower courts. The respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The respondent also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which are directed against the filing
of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Conrado Que v. Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr., A.C. No.
7054, December 4, 2009.
Gross negligence. A lawyer, when he undertakes a clients cause, makes a covenant that he will exert
all efforts for its prosecution until its final conclusion. He should undertake the task with dedication
and care, and he should do no less, otherwise, he is not true to his lawyers oath. Respondent was
woefully remiss in his duty to display utmost diligence and competence in protecting the interests of
his clients. Petitioners lost the civil case in the trial court because they were barred from presenting
their evidence as a result of their being declared in default as a consequence of respondents failure
to submit a pre-trial brief and to attend the pre-trial conference. Petitioners appeal to the Court of
Appeals from the adverse default judgment of the trial court was dismissed on account of
respondents failure to file an appeal brief. Respondent is guilty of gross negligence and misconduct
in violation of Canon 17, and Rules 18.02 and 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Cesar Talento and Modesta Herrera Talento v. Atty. Agustin Paneda, A.C. No. 7433,
December 23, 2009.
Judicial ethics
Bad faith defined; absence of proof. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence;
it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of a
sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive or selfinterest or ill-will for ulterior purposes. Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the
part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage. In issuing, ex parte, an order which was
effectively a Temporary Restraining Order with an indefinite term, the respondent judge was found to
have violated Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. However, the charge of bad faith and manifest
partiality was rejected by the Supreme Court. No evidence was adduced to prove that the issuance of
the assailed order was motivated by bad faith. Further, the Supreme Court found that in issuing the
assailed order, respondent judge was not at all motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred and some
other motive; rather, he took into account the circumstances obtaining between the
parties. Mayor Hadji Amer R. Sampiano, et al. v. Judge Cader P. Indar, A.M. RTJ-05-1953, December
21, 2009.
Grave misconduct and dishonesty; court personnel. A court employee is not prohibited from helping
individuals in the course of performing her official duties, but her actions cannot be left unchecked

when the help extended puts under suspicion the integrity of the Judiciary. Indeed, she is strictly
instructed not to use her official position to secure unwarranted benefits, privileges, or exemptions for
herself or for others. The evident purpose of the instruction is precisely to free the court employees
from suspicion of misconduct.
The respondent did not comply with the instruction. Instead, she used her official position as an
employee of the Judiciary to attempt to influence Judge Guerrero to rule in favor of litigant Garcia, her
landlord. She was thereby guilty of misconduct, defined as a transgression of some established or
definite rule of action; or, more particularly, an unlawful behavior on the part of a public officer or
employee. Her misconduct is grave misconduct warranting dismissal from the service. The
respondent was also liable for dishonesty when she attended the proceedings in the case involving
her landlord but did not file applications for leave and did not reflect her absence in her daily time
records. Judge Juanita V. Guerrero v. Juanita V. Ong, G.R. No. 182336, December 23, 2009.
Gross ignorance of the law; interference with co-equal court. Two Regional Trial Court Judges were
found administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law in issuing a Temporary Restraining Order
against the execution of a demolition order issued by another Regional Trial Court. The Supreme
Court held that when the respondent judges acted on the application for TRO, they were clearly aware
that they were being asked to act on matters already before another RTC a co-equal court, which
was already exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition brought before them. They
nonetheless opted to interfere with the [demolition] order of a co-equal and coordinate court of
concurrent jurisdiction, in blatant disregard of the doctrine of judicial stability, a well-established
axiom in adjective law. Heirs of Simeon Piedad v. Executive Judge Cesar Estrena and
Judge Gaudiso Villarin, A.M. RTJ-09-2170, December 16, 2009.
Gross neglect of duty; clerk of court. A clerk of court who issued a certificate of finality of a
purported decision which, however, turned out to be spurious and non-existent as it cannot be found
in the courts records and solely on the basis of her familiarity with the signature of the presiding
judge as appearing in the purported decision was found administratively liable for gross neglect of
duty.
Citing the high degree of responsibility, integrity, efficiency and ethics required of public officers by
the Constitution, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A.
No. 6713), and the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, the Supreme Court stated that conduct and
behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, is circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
The Court rejected the respondent clerk of courts defense that she acted with diligence and in good
faith when she issued the certification based on her familiarity with the presiding judges signature.
The Court ruled that, in the absence of the record showing the genuineness of the purported decision,
no certification should have been issued and that, at the very least, the respondent should have
informed the presiding judge about the request for certification and the fact that there exist no
records to support the certification. Atty. Eduardo E. Francisco v. Liza O. Galvez, A.M. No. P-09-2636,
December 4, 2009.
Impropriety; judge. Respondent Judge clearly fell short of the exacting standards set by the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. His acts of receiving lawbooks worth fifty thousand
pesos, cellular phones and monthly cellular phone prepaid cards from the property guardians of the
late Rev. Fr. Aspiras, who was then the ward of the court, constitute impropriety which the Supreme
Court cannot allow. Respondent Judges act of issuing Orders directing the manager of the PNB, La
Union Branch to draw checks amounting to thousands of pesos from the account of the late Rev.
Fr. Aspiras creates the impression of impropriety and subjects the court to suspicion of irregularities in

the conduct of the proceedings. Heirs of the Late Rev. Fr. Jose O. Aspiras v. Judge Clifton
U. Ganay, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2055, December 17, 2009.
Sheriffs and process servers expenses for service of writs and processes. In the implementation of
writs or processes of the court for whic expenses are to be incurred, sheriffs are mandated to comply
with Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC to the effect that
the sheriff or process server must first prepare an estimate of the expenses for approval by the court,
and that the interested party may then deposit the amount as indicated in the approved estimate
with the clerk of court or ex oficio sheriff for disbursement to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect the
service of the writ or process, subject to liquidation within the same period for submitting a sheriffs
return. In this case, the respondent served the writ of execution without presenting to the
complainant a court approved estimate of expenses and without the required deposit from the
complainant to the clerk of court. While the record reveal the existence of an approved Itemized
Estimated Amount of Expenses, a copy of that same itemized estimated expenses was only given to
the complainant almost four months after the writ of execution was served on the losing party.
Likewise in contravention of Rule 141, respondent sheriff directly received money from the
complainant. Respondent is found guilty of neglect of duty. Emma B. Ramos v. Apollo R. Ragot, A.M.
No. P-09-2600, December 23, 2009.

January 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Bar discipline case; cases against judge. Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC (Re: Automatic Conversion
of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, Judges
of Regular and Special Courts, and Court Officials Who Are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Them Both as Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar), this administrative case shall
also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the bar. Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Judge Harun B. Ismael, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2045, January 19, 2010.
Delay; rendering an order. A delay of nearly three years of a Court of Appeals Justice in resolving a
Motion for Inhibition directed against her constitutes undue delay in rendering an order.
Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the Constitution directs that All cases or matters filed after the effectivity
of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from the date of
submission for the Supreme Court, and unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all
lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.
Respondents justification for the delay in resolving the motion for inhibition in deference to the
authority of the SC to resolve the issues raised in the petition for certiorari does not impress. Section
7 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for certiorari shall not interrupt the course of
the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been
issued against the public respondent from further proceeding with the case. This rule must be strictly
adhered to by appellate and lower courts notwithstanding the possibility that the proceedings
undertaken by them tend to or would render nugatory the pending petition before the SC.
But even gratuitously crediting respondents justification for the delay, since the Court resolved the
complainants petition for certiorari on April 7, 2007, still given the nature and history of the cases,
respondent unduly delayed the resolution of a mere motion for inhibition only on October 8, 2008,
after the Court referred the present complaint to the appellate court and after complainant filed a
reiterative motion.

Under Section 9(1) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is a
less serious charge. Ramon C. Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals Associate Justice Amelita G.
Tolentino, A.M. No. CA-10-49-J, January 28, 2010.
Delay; resolution of cases. Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the Constitution provides that lower courts
have a period of 90 days only within which to decide or resolve a case from the time it is submitted
for decision. In this case, more than three years beyond the 90-day reglementary period lapsed
before the case was decided by Judge Cruz.
The reasons proffered by the said judge failed to persuade the Court. First, he claims that his illness
primarily caused the delay in the disposition of the case. However, the case was submitted for
decision before he claimed to be indisposed. There was also no showing that respondent judge was
continually ill from the time that the case was submitted for decision until the promulgation of the
judgment. Removal of cataract from both eyes does not entail prolonged confinement. Besides,
granting that his illness hindered the efficient performance of his functions, all respondent judge had
to do was request for an extension of time within which to decide the case. Second, he claims that
the delay was partly due to heavy pressure of work. Precisely, a judge is mandated to resolve cases
with dispatch. Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct categorically exhorts all judges
to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness.
Delay in the disposition of cases not only deprives litigants of their right to speedy disposition of their
cases, but also tarnishes the image of the judiciary. Procrastination among members of the judiciary
in rendering decisions and taking appropriate actions on the cases before them not only causes great
injustice to the parties involved but also invites suspicion of ulterior motives on the part of the judge,
in addition to the fact that it erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards and brings it into disrepute. Luminza Delos Reyes vs. Judge Danilo S. Cruz and Clerk of
Court vs. Godolfo R. Gundran, Both of Reginal Trial Court, Branch 152, Pasig City, A.M. No. RTJ-082152, January 18, 2010.
Delay; resolution of cases. Failure to decide or resolve cases within the reglementary period
constitutes gross inefficiency and is not excusable. It is a less serious charge and is punishable by
either suspension from office without salaries and benefits for not less than one month but not more
than three months, or a fine of more than Php 10,000 but not exceeding Php 20,000.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge shall perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness. Rule 3.05, Canon 3
of the Code admonishes all judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases
within the period specified in Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution. Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Judge Harun B. Ismael, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2045, January 19, 2010.
Delay; transmitting case record to Court of Appeals. As for Clerk of Court Gundran, Section 10, Rule
141 of the Rules of court states that it his duty to verify the correctness and completeness of the
records of the case. However, in this case, he relegated the performance of his job to another court
employee without any justifiable reason. Difficulty in completing the records of the case is also not a
justifiable ground for non-transmittal of the records. Under the rules, when the records cannot be
completed, respondent should indicate in his letter of transmittal the exhibits or transcripts not
included in the records being transmitted to the appellate court, the reasons for their non-transmittal,
and the steps taken or that could be taken to have them available.
Clerks of Court are essential judicial officers who perform delicate administrative functions vital to the
prompt and proper administration of justice. Their duty is, inter alia, to assist in the management of
the calendar of the court and in all matters that do not involve discretion or judgment properly

belonging to the judge. They play a key role in the complement of the court, as their office is the hub
of adjudicative and administrative orders, processes and concerns. As such, they are required to be
persons of competence, honesty, and probity, they cannot be permitted to slacken on their
jobs. Luminza Delos Reyes vs. Judge Danilo S. Cruz and Clerk of Court V Godolfo R. Gundaran, A.M.
No. RTJ-08-2152, January 18, 2010.
Grave misconduct and dishonesty; court personnel. Respondents act of taking off the shock
absorbert of a motorcycle which forms part of the prosecutions evidence in a criminal case without
the knowledge of the evidence custodian or the owner, for personal gain, and thereafter replacing it
with a damaged one to prevent detection constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned in the
administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the
cause. It generally means wrongful, improper, or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate, and intentional purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or
criminal intent. On the other hand, the term gross connotes something out of all measure; beyond
allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful.
Dishonesty has been defined as intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or
practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration,
appointment or promotion. It is also understood to imply a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
A public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees are duty-bound to serve with the
highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and shall remain accountable to the
people. Persons involved in the administration of justice ought to live up to the strictest standard of
honesty and integrity in the public service. The conduct of personnel connected with the courts
should, at all times, be circumspect to preserve the integrity and dignity of our courts of justice. As
forerunners in the administration of justice, they ought to live up to the strictest standards of honesty
and integrity, considering that their positions primarily involve service to the public. Gerardo Q.
Ferreras vs. Rudy P. Eclipse, A.M. No. P-05-2085, January 20, 2010.
Grave misconduct; court personnel. Respondent sheriffs were found guilty of grave misconduct in
demanding and collecting sums for the implementation of a Writ of Demolition without providing
corresponding official receipts therefor, and subsequently not implementing the writ.
Under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the sheriff is required to secure the courts prior
approval of the estimated expenses and fees needed to implement the court process.
Following the abovementioned rule, a sheriff is guilty of violating the Rules if he fails to observe the
following: (1) prepare an estimate of expenses to be incurred in executing the writ, for which he must
seek the courts approval; (2) render an accounting; and (3) issue an official receipt for the total
amount he received from the judgment debtor. The rule requires that the sheriff execute writs and
processes to estimate the expenses to be incurred. Upon approval of the estimated expenses, the
interested party has to deposit the amount with the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff. The
expenses shall then be disbursed to the executing Sheriff, subject to his liquidation, within the same
period for rendering a return on the process or writ. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the
party who made the deposit.
Sheriffs are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the
performance of their duties. To do so would be inimical to the best interests of the service, because
even assuming arguendo that the payments were indeed given and received in good faith, this fact

alone would not dispel any suspicion that such payments were made for less than noble purposes.
Corollary to this point, a sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant
without observing the proper procedural steps; otherwise, such act would amount to dishonesty and
extortion.
A sheriff is an officer of the court. As such, he performs integral part of the administration of justice,
since he is called upon to serve the orders and writs and execute all processes of the court. As such,
he is required to live up to the strict standards of honesty and integrity in public service. His conduct
must at all times be characterized by honesty and openness and must constantly be above
suspicion. Benjamin E. Sanga vs. Sheriffs Florencio SJ. Alcantara and Sales T. Bisnar, A,M. No. P-092657. January 25, 2010.

February 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Court personnel; administrative complaint; effect of resignation. Respondent Nuez has filed his
resignation on September 5, 2008, which was subsequently accepted by the Court, subject to the
usual clearance requirements and without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings in the
instant administrative case. Nonetheless, the fact of his resignation and our approval thereof does
not render moot the complaint against him. Our jurisdiction over him is not lost by the mere fact that
he resigned during the pendency of the case. To deprive the Court of authority to pronounce his
innocence or guilt of the charges is undoubtedly fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful
and dangerous implications. What would prevent a corrupt and unscrupulous government employee
from committing abuses and other condemnable acts knowing fully well that he would soon be
beyond the pale of the law and immune to all administrative penalties? Resignation should be used
neither as an escape nor as an easy way out to evade administrative liability by court personnel
facing administrative sanction. If only for reasons of public policy, the Court must assert and maintain
its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for
acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants
and the general public. If innocent, respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as
he leaves the government which he served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the
corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation. Judge Delia P. NoelBertulfo, Municipal Trial Court, Palompon, Leyte vs. Fyndee P. Nuez, Court Aide, Municipal Trial
Court, Palompon, Leyte, A.M. No. P-10-2758, February 2, 2010.
Court personnel; conduct prejudicial to best interest of service. Sheriffs are officers of the court who
serve and execute writs addressed to them by the court, and who prepare and submit returns on their
proceedings. As officers of the court, they must discharge their duties with great care and diligence.
They have to perform faithfully and accurately what is incumbent upon them and show at all times a
high degree of professionalism in the performance of their duties. Despite being exposed to hazards
that come with the implementation of the judgment, sheriffs must perform their duties by the book.
When the judgment obligee is not present at the time the judgment obligor makes the payment, the
sheriff is authorized to receive it. However, the money received must be remitted to the clerk of
court within the same day or, if not practicable, deposited in a fiduciary account with the nearest
government depository bank. Evidently, sheriffs are not permitted to retain the money in their
possession beyond the day when the payment was made or to deliver the money collected directly to
the judgment obligee.
Good faith on the part of respondent, or lack of it, in proceeding to properly execute his mandate
would be of no moment, for he is chargeable with the knowledge that being an officer of the court
tasked thereto, it behooves him to make due compliance. As implementing officers of the court,

sheriffs should set the example by faithfully observing and not brazenly disregarding the Rules of
Court. Incredibly, respondent even blatantly admitted that he followed the same procedure in some of
the other writs of execution that he enforced. Domingo Pea, Jr. vs. Achilles Andrew V. Ragalado II,
etc.,A.M. No. P-10-2772, February 16, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Respondents are indeed guilty of dishonesty, defined as the disposition
to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray. Dishonesty, which is a grave offense, is punishable by dismissal even for the first offense.
Respondents are guilty too of violation of reasonable office rules and procedures. In Estardo-Teodoro
v. Segismundo where the therein respondent court personnel failed to secure permission for his travel
to Manila to obtain summons in a civil case in a court and visited the residence of the defendants in
that civil case, in violation of an office memorandum issued by the clerk of court and noted by the
executive judge, the Court held that the therein respondent violated reasonable office rules and
procedures. Such violation is classified as a light offense.
While respondents committed two offenses leaving the court premises without any travel order,
which is a light offense, and dishonesty for fraudulently punching in their bundy cards, which is a
grave offense the mitigating circumstances considered by the OCA (affliction of Stage 2 Breast
Cancer and first time offenders) justify the imposition of the recommended penalty of six-month
suspension for each respondent. Re: Irregularity in the use of bundy clock by Sophia M. Castro
and Babylin V. Tayag, Social Welfare Officers II, both the Regional Trial Court, Office of the Clerk of
Court, Angeles City, A.M. No. P-10-2763, February 10, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty Respondent Nuez is charged with Gross Dishonesty for allegedly taking
money from the complainant. Based on the evidence submitted, the Court finds that there is more
than substantial evidence to prove that respondent Nuez is guilty of dishonesty. Ma. Irene
R. Legaspi narrated that respondent admitted his culpability. The NBI agent, Allan Tubi, likewise
testified that respondent admitted stealing the money of Judge Bertulfo.
Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, dishonesty is
considered a grave offense for which the penalty of dismissal is prescribed even at the first instance.
In this case, dismissal can no longer be imposed in view of respondents resignation. Thus, in lieu
thereof, we hereby order the forfeiture of whatever benefits still due him from the government,
except for the accrued leave credits, if any, that he had earned, and his disqualification from further
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Judge Delia P. Noel-Bertulfo, Municipal Trial
Court, Palompon, Leyte vs. Fyndee P. Nuez, Court Aide, Municipal Trial Court, Palompon, Leyte, A.M.
No. P-10-2758, February 2, 2010.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. The attachment to the journal entry voucher of what
to Ilagan was an unfamiliar remittance voucher, as well as his awareness of previous series of
experiences of the Accounting Division regarding misdelivered zero-balance vouchers, should have
put him on guard in processing Judge Tans remittance voucher. He should not have merely
assumed, to use his word, that such unfamiliar voucher was a mere duplicate.
Given Judge Tans contributory negligence, the Court sees it fit to only obligate Ilagan to reimburse
the amount paid by Judge Tan for the interest and surcharges on the unremitted P88,666.00 as
of October 8, 2002, or the date the GSIS actually informed Judge Tan of her outstanding obligation.
Ilagan is thus administratively liable for simple neglect of duty, defined as failure to give proper
attention to a task expected of an employee resulting from either carelessness or indifference. Re:

Complaint of Judge Rowena Nieves A. Tan for late remittance by the Supreme Court of her terminal
leave pay to GSIS to apply for payment of her salary load to said agency, A.M. No. 2007-02-SC,
February 10, 2010.
Judges; delay in rendering decisions. The Constitution provides that all lower courts must decide all
cases filed within three months. Further, the Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge shall
dispose of the courts business promptly and decide the cases within the required periods.
Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, lowers
its standards, and brings it to disrepute. Judges should not abuse the grant of an extension to decide
a case, and strive to decide the case within the extended period granted by the Court.
Under Sec. 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is classified
as a less serious charge punishable with suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than P10,000.00, but not
exceeding P20,000.00.
In this case, Judge Batingana decided Civil Case No. 2063 four years after the first extension granted
to him by the Court, and two years after the Court denied his seventh request for extension and
directed him to submit a copy of his decision through the OCA, but he failed to decide Civil Case No.
1759 despite the numerous extensions granted to him. Request of Judge Nio A. Batingana Regional
Trial Court, Brach 6, Mati, Davao Oriental for extension of time to decide Criminal Cases Nos. 2063
and 1756, A.M. No. 05-8-463RTC, February 17, 2010.
Judges; gross inefficiency. With respect to cases reported by the OCA which remain undecided even
beyond the reglementary period, it appears that in most of these cases, thirty (30) days had elapsed
from the date of submission of the case for decision. Respondent insists that the reckoning period
should be ninety (90) days as provided under the Constitution. However, the cases enumerated by
the OCA appear to fall under the Rules on Summary Procedure, where the required period to decide
the same is thirty (30) days. Otherwise, the OCA would not have reported that the decisions in these
cases are already overdue.
In her desperate attempt to vindicate herself with respect to supposed decisions of cases which were
found to have gone beyond the ninety (90) day reglementary period, respondent tried to mislead the
Court in her Comment and Supplemental Comment by arguing that since she has not yet issued an
Order declaring the cases as submitted for decision, the same are not yet ready for judicial
determination such that the ninety (90) day reglementary period in deciding the said cases does not
yet run. She also contended that in determining the period for the decision in the subject cases to
become due, the OCA failed to show whether other pleadings have yet to be filed by the parties after
the cases were deemed submitted for decision.
Respondents arguments have again exposed her gross ignorance of the law and mires her even more
into a deeper hole from which there was neither reprieve nor escape. Respondent should be aware of
the basic rule that once a case is submitted for decision, no further pleadings are required to be filed.
Moreover, there is no need to issue an order declaring a case to be submitted for decision in order
that the ninety (90) day period in deciding the same shall begin to run.
Failure to promptly decide cases in accordance with the Constitution or the Rules of Court constitutes
gross inefficiency. Judge Dolores L. Espaol, etc. vs. Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas, etc., A.M.
No. MTJ-03-1462, February 11, 2010.
Judges; undue delay in rendering decision. Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that
all lower courts must decide or resolve all cases or matters filed within three months. Moreover, Rule

3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly
and decide the cases within the required periods.
The Court granted Judge Batingana an extension of 90 days, or until February 11, 2008, to decide
Criminal Case No. 4645-05. However, he decided the case only on July 8, 2009, or after one year and
almost five months from the extension granted.
As oft stated, justice delayed is justice denied. The honor and integrity of the judiciary is measured
not only by the fairness and correctness of decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which
the disputes are resolved. Judges are therefore mandated to perform their duties with utmost
diligence in order to preserve the confidence of the public in the judiciary.
Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is
classified as a less serious charge punishable with suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than P10,000.00
but not exceeding P20,000.00. Request of Judge Nio A. Batingana Regional Trial Court, Branch
6, Mati, Davao Oriental, for extension of time to decide Criminal Case No. 4745-05, A.M. No. 08-2107-RTC, February 1, 2010.
Lawyers; disbarment case; unavailability of procedural defenses. Laws dealing with double jeopardy
or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case,
prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in
the determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. First, admission
to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest
because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the
continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of
the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State
may inquire into through the Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct
party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own; effectively, his or her
participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the
Court. Maelotisea S. Garrido vs. Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Romana P. Valencia, A.C. No. 6593,
February 4, 2010.
Lawyers; disbarment; gross immorality. Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members
of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency. We make these distinctions as
the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply
immoral, conduct.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically,
violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyers oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the
Bar. As a lawyer, he violated his lawyers oath, Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, all of which commonly require him to obey the
laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this
second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his
bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which commands that he shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that [a] lawyer shall at all times

uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that, [a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality. To have good
moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that
he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the
estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is known. The requirement of
good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the
public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves. Each purpose is as important as the other. Maelotisea S. Garrido vs. Atty. Angel
E. Garrido and Romana P. Valencia, A.C. No. 6593, February 4, 2010
Lawyers fees. A client has an undoubted right to settle a suit without the intervention of his lawyer,
for he is generally conceded to have the exclusive control over the subject-matter of the litigation and
may, at any time before judgment, if acting in good faith, compromise, settle, and adjust his cause of
action out of court without his attorneys intervention, knowledge, or consent, even though he has
agreed with his attorney not to do so. Hence, a claim for attorneys fees does not void the
compromise agreement and is no obstacle to a court approval.
However, counsel is not without remedy. As the validity of a compromise agreement cannot be
prejudiced, so should not be the payment of a lawyers adequate and reasonable compensation for
his services should the suit end by reason of the settlement. The terms of the compromise
subscribed to by the client should not be such that will amount to an entire deprivation of his lawyers
fees, especially when the contract is on a contingent fee basis. In this sense, the compromise
settlement cannot bind the lawyer as a third party. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection
against injustice or imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the client is against abuse on the
part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not only to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper and
lawful manner, but also to see to it that a lawyer is paid his just fees.
Even if the compensation of a counsel is dependent only upon winning a case he himself secured for
his client, the subsequent withdrawal of the case on the clients own volition should never completely
deprive counsel of any legitimate compensation for his professional services. In all cases, a client is
bound to pay his lawyer for his services. The determination of bad faith only becomes significant and
relevant if the adverse party will likewise be held liable in shouldering the attorneys
fees. Atty. Mangontawar M. Gubat vs. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 167415. February 26,
2010.
Lawyers; negligence. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for the
rule on negligence and states:
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
The Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform
the obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation. The circumstance that the client was
also at fault does not exonerate a lawyer from liability for his negligence in handling a case.
All court rulings drive home the fiduciary nature of a lawyers duty to his client once an engagement
for legal services is accepted. A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of
protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence. The lawyer bears the duty to serve his client
with competence and diligence, and to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law,

the interest of his or her client. Accordingly, competence, not only in the knowledge of law, but also in
the management of the cases by giving these cases appropriate attention and due preparation, is
expected from a lawyer.
In addition to the above finding of negligence, the Court also finds Atty. Macalalad guilty of violating
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to account for all the
money received from the client. In this case, Atty. Macalalad did not immediately account for and
promptly return the money he received from Atty. Solidon even after he failed to render any legal
service within the contracted time of the engagement. Atty. Elmer C. Solidon vs.
Atty. Ramil E. Macalalad,A.C. No. 8158, February 24, 2010.

March 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Court personnel; administrative proceedings; desistance. Complainant Plaza manifested before the
Court his intention to desist from pursuing the case. However, we remind complainant that the
discretion whether to continue with the proceedings rests exclusively with the Court, notwithstanding
the complainants intention to desist. This Court looks with disfavor at affidavits of desistance filed by
complainants, especially if done as an afterthought. Contrary to what the parties might have
believed, withdrawal of the complaint does not have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
any administrative disciplinary sanction. It does not operate to divest this Court of jurisdiction to
determine the truth behind the matter stated in the complaint. The Courts disciplinary authority
cannot be dependent on or frustrated by private arrangements between parties. An administrative
complaint against an official or employee of the judiciary cannot simply be withdrawn by a
complainant who suddenly claims a change of mind. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of
justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined. Ryan S. Plaza, Clerk of
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Argao, Cebu vs. Atty. Marcelina R. Amamio, Clerk of Court, Genoveva R.
Vasquez, Legal Researcher and Floramay Patalinhug, Court Stenographer, all of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 26, Argao, Cebu, A.M. No. P-08-2559, March 19, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Complainant stated that respondent Atty. Cario may not have disclosed
to the Supreme Court, in the course of her application as Clerk of Court, her pending administrative
and criminal cases before the Ombudsman. Respondent Atty. Cario vehemently denied the
allegations against her. She claimed that she was just being truthful when she answered No to item
number 37(a) of her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) which states: Have you ever been formally
charged? She admitted that she was aware of the two (2) complaints filed against her and her
former Regional Election Director before the Ombudsman. She, however, pointed out that these
cases are still in the preliminary investigation and pre-charge stages, since probable cause has yet to
be determined by the investigating officers and as such, should not be considered as formal charges
yet.
If we but look at the attachments to the complaint itself, it is evident that at the time respondent Atty.
Cario was applying for the position of Clerk of Court, she had not yet been formally charged
administratively or criminally. Clearly, there were no final dispositions of the cases yet. In fact, the
complainant even stated in his Complaint that those cases were not yet resolved by the Ombudsman.
Thus, it is only after the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause and filing of the information
in court that she can be considered formally charged. In fact, the reckoning point is the filing of the
information with the written authority or approval of the Ombudsman. To rule otherwise would subject
herein respondent, or any civil servant for that matter, to extreme hardships considering that a
government official or employee formally charged is deprived of some rights/privileges, i.e., obtaining
loans from the Government Service Insurance System or other government-lending institutions, delay
in the release of retirement benefits, disqualification from being nominated or appointed to any

judicial post and, in some instances, prohibition to travel. Crisostomo M. Plopinio vs. Atty. Liza ZabalaCario, etc., A.M. No. P-08-2458, March 22, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Clerks of court, in particular, are the chief administrative officers of their
respective courts. They must show competence, honesty and probity, having been charged with
safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings. Furthermore, they are judicial officers
entrusted with the role of performing delicate functions with regard to the collection of legal fees, and
are expected to correctly and effectively implement regulations. Hence, as custodians of court funds
and revenues, they have always been reminded of their duty to immediately deposit the various
funds received by them to the authorized government depositories for they are not supposed to keep
funds in their custody.
The clerk of court is primarily accountable for all funds that are collected for the court, whether
personally received by him or by a duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision and control.
As the custodian of court funds, revenues, records, properties and premises, he is liable for any loss,
shortage, destruction or impairment of said funds and properties. A clerk of court found short of
money accountabilities may be dismissed from the service.
In this case, the financial audit conducted in the MTC of Bongabon, Nueva Ecija showed that
respondent incurred cash shortages. While he was able to reduce his accountability by producing the
required documents, he could not account for the balance. This indicated two things: (1) respondents
gross negligence and very poor management of the records of collected fees and (2) his failure to
account for the remainder which gave rise to the presumption that he misappropriated the same for
his personal use. He failed to fully account for the funds despite the ample time he was given to do
so. His continued failure to remit court funds and to give a satisfactory explanation for such failure
constitutes grave misconduct, dishonesty and even malversation. These, as well as his gross
negligence, are all grave offenses that merit the supreme penalty of dismissal even for the first
offense. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Macario C. Villanueva, etc., A.M. No. P-04-1819, March
22, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Section 22(a), (b) and (c) of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws, classifies
Gross Neglect of Duty, Dishonesty, and Grave Misconduct as grave offenses. The penalty for each of
these offenses is dismissal even for the first offense.
The long delay in the remittance of the courts funds, as well as the unexplained shortages that
remained unaccounted for, raises grave doubts regarding the trustworthiness and integrity of Atty.
Caballero. Her failure to remit the funds in due time constitutes gross dishonesty and gross
misconduct. It diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a
grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even if committed for the
first time. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Jocelyn G. Caballero, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Kidapawan, North Cotabato, A.M. No. P-05-2064, March 2, 2010.
Court personnel; duty to deposit authorized government depositories immediately. Time and again,
we have reminded court personnel tasked with collections of court funds, such as Clerks of Courts and
cash clerks, to deposit immediately with authorized government depositories the various funds they
have collected, because they are not authorized to keep funds in their custody. In this case,
respondents violated Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 50-95, which commands that all fiduciary
collections shall be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with
an authorized government depositary bank. Section B (4) of SC Circular No. 50-95, on the collection
and deposit of court fiduciary funds, mandates that all collections from bail bonds, rental deposits,
and other fiduciary funds shall be deposited within twenty-four (24) hours by the Clerk of Court
concerned, upon receipt thereof with the Land Bank of the Philippines. Along the same vein, SC

Circular Nos. 13-92 and 5-93 provide the guidelines for the proper administration of court funds. SC
Circular No. 13-92 commands that all fiduciary collections shall be deposited immediately by the
Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with an authorized government depositary
bank. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Atty. Mary Ann Paduganan-Pearanda, Office of the Clerk
of Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental and Ms. Jocelyn
Mediante, A.M. No. P-07-2355, March 19, 2010.
Court personnel; duty to deposit funds; belated compliance cannot erase liability. Atty. Caballeros
belated turnover of cash deposited with her is inexcusable and will not exonerate her from liability.
Clerks of Court are presumed to know their duty to immediately deposit with the authorized
government depositories the various funds they receive, for they are not supposed to keep funds in
their personal possession. Even undue delay in the remittances of the amounts that they collect at
the very least constitutes misfeasance. Although Atty. Caballero subsequently deposited her other
cash accountabilities with respect to the Fiduciary Fund, she was nevertheless liable for failing to
immediately deposit the said collections into the courts funds. Her belated remittance will not free
her from punishment. Even restitution of the whole amount cannot erase her administrative liability.
More so, in the instant case, she failed to fully comply with all the Courts directives. Clearly, her
failure to deposit the said amount upon collection was prejudicial to the court, which did not earn
interest income on the said amount or was not able to otherwise use the said funds. Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Jocelyn G. Caballero, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Kidapawan, North
Cotabato, A.M. No. P-05-2064, March 2, 2010.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. Noel and Amelia are liable for violation of Sec. 1, Canon I of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, which pertinently provides that court personnel shall not use
their official position to secure unwarranted benefits, privileges, or exemption for themselves or for
others. By misrepresenting they could help influence either the outcome of a case or set a case for
agenda by the Court En Banc for which they demanded and received payment, Noel and Amelia
committed grave misconduct. It shows the corruption of Noel and Amelia, who used their station or
character as Court employees in misrepresenting they could set a case for agenda by the Court En
Banc and procuring financial benefits for that vicious act. Re: Complaints of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador
against Spouses Noel and Amelia Serafico, A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, March 15, 2010.
Court personnel; gross neglect of duty. Shortages in the amounts to be remitted and the years of
delay in the actual remittances constitute neglect of duty, for which Atty. Caballero should be
administratively liable more so, since she failed to give a satisfactory explanation for said shortages.
Clerks of court perform a delicate function as designated custodians of the courts funds, revenues,
records, properties, and premises. As such, they are generally regarded as treasurers, accountants,
guards, and physical plant managers thereof. It is the clerks of courts duty to faithfully perform their
duties and responsibilities as such, to the end that there is full compliance with their function: that of
being the custodians of the courts funds and revenues, records, properties, and premises. They are
the chief administrative officers of their respective courts. It is also their duty to ensure that the
proper procedures are followed in the collection of cash bonds. Clerks of court are officers of the law
who perform vital functions in the prompt and sound administration of justice. Their office is the hub
of adjudicative and administrative orders, processes and concerns. They are liable for any loss,
shortage, destruction, or impairment of such funds and property.
It is the duty of the clerks of court to perform their responsibilities faithfully, so that they can fully
comply with the circulars on deposits of collections. They are reminded to deposit immediately, with
authorized government depositaries, the various funds they have collected, because they are not
authorized to keep those funds in their custody. The unwarranted failure to fulfill these responsibilities
deserves administrative sanction, and not even the full payment of the collection shortages will
exempt the accountable officer from liability.

These circulars are mandatory in nature and designed to promote full accountability for government
funds; no protestation of good faith can override such mandatory nature. By failing to properly remit
the cash collections constituting public funds, Atty. Caballero violated the trust reposed in her as
disbursement officer of the judiciary. Her failure to explain the fund shortage satisfactorily and to
restitute the shortage and fully comply with the Courts directives leave us no choice but to hold her
liable for gross neglect of duty and gross dishonesty. Hence, for the delay in the remittance of cash
collections in violation of Supreme Court Circulars No. 5-93 and No. 13-92, and for her failure to keep
proper records of all collections and remittances, Atty. Caballero is found guilty of Gross Neglect of
Duty punishable, even for the first offense, by dismissal. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Jocelyn
G. Caballero, clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Kidapawan, North Cotabato, A.M. No. P-05-2064,
March 2, 2010.
Court personnel; guilty of two or more charges; Lesser offense an aggravating circumstance. Grave
misconduct is punishable with dismissal from the service for the first offense under Sec. 52 (A)(3) of
the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Moreover, under Sec. 55 of
said Rules, if the respondent is guilty of two (2) or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed
should be the penalty for the most serious charge, and the rest considered as aggravating. It is also
worthy to note that the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel provides that all provisions of law, Civil
Service rules, and issuances of the Supreme Court or regulating the conduct of public officers and
employees applicable to the Judiciary are deemed incorporated into this Code. Conformably, in the
instant case, the penalty for grave misconduct, which is the more serious charge, must be applied,
and the charge of disgraceful and immoral conduct considered as merely an aggravating
circumstance. Re: Complaints of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia
Serafico, A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, March 15, 2010.
Court personnel; immorality. The investigation established that both Noel and Amelia had subsisting
marriages when they got married. It is, thus, apparent that both had legal impediments to marrying
when they married each other.
While the trial court is the proper forum to rule their subsequent marriage as bigamous, from a
criminal point of view, Noel and Amelia are nonetheless liable for immorality by the mere fact of living
together and contracting a subsequent marriage before their respective first marriages were judicially
dissolved. In effect, Noel, who was still married to Rosemarie Jimeno, and Amelia, who was still
married to Marc Michael A. Nacianceno, not only contracted an apparently bigamous marriage, but
also cohabited as man and wife in violation of their prior marital status and obligations solemnly
assumed before God and man. Indeed, we find that Noel and Amelia made a mockery of marriage,
which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. Their act of contracting a second
marriage while their respective first marriages were still in place is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency, and morality.
For marrying each other despite their subsisting prior marriages, Noel and Amelia acted reprehensibly
and are guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct. They are, thus, liable to suspension for at least six
months under Section 52(A)(15) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service. Re: Complaints of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia Serafico, A.M.
No. 2008-20-SC, March 15, 2010.
Court personnel; misconduct. The contention of the Clerk of Court that there was no danger to the
building and the records since the raffle draw was merely held at the ground floor lobby and that
those who attended the raffle draw were decent people, majority of whom are women, is untenable.
Time and again, the Court has always stressed in pertinent issuances and decisions that courts are
temples of justice, the honor and dignity of which must be upheld and that their use shall not expose
judicial records to danger of loss or damage. So strict is the Court about this that it has declared that
the prohibition against the use of Halls of Justice for purposes other than that for which they have

been built extends to their immediate vicinity including their grounds. If the building housing the
Argao Hall of Justice is such an important historical landmark, all the more reason why activities, such
as Sara Lee raffle draw, should not be held within. At most, the said Hall of Justice could have been
made part of a regular local tour, to be viewed at designated hours, which viewing shall be confined
to certain areas not intrusive to court operations and records. Ryan S. Plaza, Clerk of Court Municipal
Trial Court, Argao, Cebu vs. Atty. Marcelina R. Amamio, Clerk of Court, Genoveva R. Vasquez, Legal
Researcher and Floramay Patalinhug, Court Stenographer, all of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26,
Argao, Cebu, A.M. No. P-08-2559, March 19, 2010.
Court personnel; neglect of duty. It is the duty of clerks of court to perform their responsibilities
faithfully, so that they can fully comply with the circulars on deposits of collections. Delay in the
remittances of collections constitutes neglect of duty. The failure to remit judiciary collections on
time deprives the court of the interest that may be earned if the amounts are deposited in a bank.
Under the Civil Service Rules and the Omnibus Rules implementing it, simple neglect of duty is a less
grave offense penalized with suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first
offense, and dismissal for the second offense. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Atty. Mary Ann
Paduganan-Pearanda, Office of the Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cagayan de Oro
City, Misamis Oriental and Ms. Jocelyn Mediante, A.M. No. P-07-2355, March 19, 2010.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. Bengsons act of dealing with Hernando, more particularly of
offering her services to facilitate the titling of Hernandos property, whether directly or through
another, certainly fell short of the above yardstick or standard for court employees and personnel.
She definitely had no business indulging, even indirectly, in the processing or the titling of the
property.
Now, in Dela Cruz v. Zapico, this Court reiterated that misconduct generally means wrongful, unlawful
conduct, motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. Thus, any transgression or
deviation from the established norm, whether it be work-related or not, amounts to misconduct.
Undeniably, Bengsons solicitation and misrepresentation amounted to Simple Misconduct. Priscilla L.
Hernando vs. Juliana Y Bengson, etc., A.M. No. P-09-2686, March 10, 2010.
Judges; gross inefficiency. Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates lower courts to
decide or resolve cases or matters for decision or final resolution within three (3) months from date of
submission. Failure to decide cases within the 90-day reglementary period may warrant imposition of
administrative sanctions on the erring judge.
Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business
promptly and to decide cases within the required period. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided
or resolved by all lower courts within a period of three (3) months from submission.
Furthermore, the Court, in Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999, requires all judges
to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases, because failure
to comply therewith violates the constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition of their cases.
Likewise, Administrative Circular No. 28, dated July 3, 1989, expressly provides that:
(3) x x x Lack of transcript of stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend
the period for deciding the case x x x.
Under Section 9(1), Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision constitutes
a less serious charge punishable under Section 11(b) of the same Rule by either suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month but not more than three (3)

months, or a fine of more than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) but not exceeding Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00).
Because Judge Emuslan could not proffer any valid excuse, his failure to decide the 43 cases
translates to gross inefficiency in the performance of his duties. He should be held administratively
liable. Re: Cases Submitted for decision before Hon. Meliton G. Emuslan, former Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 47, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2226, March 22, 2010.
Judges; gross misconduct. This is a case about the improper conduct of an MTC judge who kept
properties owned by the complainant while conducting a preliminary investigation. During the ocular
inspection, Judge Ocampo allegedly took pieces of antique, including a marble bust of Spelmans
mother, a flower pot, a statue, and a copper scale of justice. A week later, Judge Ocampo went back
and further took six Oakwood chairs and its table, four gold champagne glasses, and a deer horn
chandelier. Judge Ocampo denied the charge, pointing out that Spelmans wife, Villan (the
complainant in that theft case), gave him certain household items for safekeeping before she filed the
case of theft against Rencio.
Respondent judge should be made accountable for gross misconduct constituting violations of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Section 6 of Canon 1, Section 1 of Canon 2, and Section 1
of Canon 4. From the circumstances, his acts were motivated by malice. He was not a warehouseman
for personal properties of litigants in his court. He certainly would have kept Spelmans properties
had the latter not filed a complaint against him. He was guilty of covetousness. It affected the
performance of his duties as an officer of the court and tainted the judiciarys integrity. He should be
punished accordingly. Roland Ernest Marie Jose Spelmans vs. Judge Gaydifredo T. Ocampo,
Municipal Trial Court, Polomolok, South Cotabato, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1663, March 26, 2010.
Judges; simple misconduct. There was no showing from Judge Barillo that he exerted any effort at all
to ascertain the correct rule or procedure regarding the lifting of suspension of lawyers, or to
determine if the suspension of Atty. Paras had indeed already been lifted before the said counsel was
allowed to resume his practice of law. Significantly, upon verification by the Court of the status of the
suspension of Atty. Paras, it appeared that, based on the records of the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the suspension imposed on Atty. Paras in A.C. No. 3066 was yet to be lifted. In our opinion, Judge
Barillo was negligent in failing to confirm such fact.
Still, the Court is not convinced that Judge Barillo should be held liable for gross misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law absent any evidence showing outright bad faith. It may truly be said that the
various faux pas committed by Judge Barillo are examples of poor judgment and negligence.
However, equally important to note is the fact that there is no allegation, much less a genuine
showing, that Judge Barillo was impelled by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other corrupt
motive in committing the acts for which he was charged. Neither were allegations of corruption nor
imputations of pecuniary benefit ever asserted against him.
Thus, contrary to the findings of the OCA, the transgressions committed by Judge Barillo in this case
are not flagrant enough or motivated by any ill motive so as to be classified as grave misconduct or
to warrant a finding of gross ignorance of the law. Nevertheless, the Court rules that Judge Barillo is
guilty of simple misconduct in view of the commission of acts which subjected the MTC to distrust and
accusations of partiality. Hon. Hector B. Barillo, Acting Presiding Judge, MTC, Guihulngan, Negros
Oriental vs. Hon. Ralph Lantion, et al./Walter J. Aragones vs. Hon. Hector B. Barillo, Acting Presiding
Judge, MTC, Guihulngan, Negros, G.R. No. 159117/A.M. No. MTJ-10-1752, March 10, 2010 .
Lawyers liability for filing complaint with Ombudsman. In our view, the complainants errors do not
belong to the genre of plain and simple errors that lawyers commit in the practice of their profession.
Their plain disregard, misuse and misrepresentation of constitutional provisions constitute serious

misconduct that reflects on their fitness for continued membership in the Philippine Bar. At the very
least, their transgressions are blatant violations of Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides: Rule 10.02. A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent
the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision
or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
To emphasize the importance of requiring lawyers to act candidly and in good faith, an identical
provision is found in Cannon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Moreover, lawyers are sworn to
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court before they are even admitted to the
Bar. All these the complainants appear to have seriously violated.
In the interest of due process and fair play, the complainants Lozano should be heard, in relation to
their criminal complaint before the Ombudsman against retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and
retired Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, on why they should not be penalized as members
of the Bar and as officers of this Court, for their open disregard of the plain terms of the Constitution
and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, and their misuse and misrepresentation of constitutional
provisions in their criminal complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman. Re: Subpoena Duces
Tecum dated January 11, 2010 of Acting Director Aleu A. Amante, PIAB-C Office of the
Ombudsman, A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC, March 2, 2010.
Lawyers; deceitful conduct. The overt act in arranging the meeting between Judge Dizon and
complainants-litigants in the Coffee Shop of the East Royal Hotel made it clear that Respondent
consented to Judge Dizons desire to ask money from the complainants-litigants for a favorable
decision of their case which was pending before the sala of Judge Dizon. The admission proved that
the respondent had known all along of the illegal transaction between the judge and the
complainants, and belied his feigned lack of knowledge of the delivery of the money to the judge.
The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins an attorney from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, or
deceitful conduct. Corollary to this injunction is the rule that an attorney shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the Legal Profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. The
respondent did not measure up to the exacting standards of the Law Profession, which demanded of
him as an attorney the absolute abdication of any personal advantage that conflicted in any way,
directly or indirectly, with the interest of his clients. For monetary gain, he disregarded the vow to
delay no man for money or malice and to conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients that he made
when he took the Lawyers Oath. He also disobeyed the explicit command to him as an attorney to
accept no compensation in connection with his clients business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval. He conveniently ignored that the relation between him and his clients was
highly fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential character.
Verily, the respondent was guilty of gross misconduct, which is improper or wrong conduct, the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. Any gross
misconduct of an attorney in his professional or private capacity shows him unfit to manage the
affairs of others, and is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment,
because good moral character is an essential qualification for the admission of an attorney and for
the continuance of such privilege. Spouses Manuel C. Rafols, Jr., et al. vs. Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios,
Jr., A.C. No. 4973, March 15, 2010.
Lawyers; lifting order of suspension; guidelines. The following guidelines are to be observed in the
matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law: (1) After a finding that
respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision

imposing the penalty; (2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory
upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration
thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory; (3) Upon the
expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court,
through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practice
of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension; (4) Copies of the
Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the
courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has
appeared as counsel; (5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondents
compliance with the order of suspension; and (6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements
made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or
disbarment, as may be warranted. Ligaya Maniago vs. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March
30, 2010.
Lawyers; misconduct. The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking over the Board of
Directors and the GEMASCO facilities, respondent violated the provisions of the Cooperative Code of
the Philippines and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He also violated the Lawyers Oath, which provides that a
lawyer shall support the Constitution and obey the laws.
When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against complainant, he violated
the Lawyers Oath that a lawyer shall not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same. When, after obtaining an extension of time to
file comment on the complaint, respondent failed to file any and ignored this Courts subsequent
show cause order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that
A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the
period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
The Court notes that respondent had previously been suspended from the practice of law for six
months for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he having been found to have received
an acceptance fee and misled the client into believing that he had filed a case for her when he had
not. It appears, however, that respondent has not reformed his ways. A more severe penalty this
time is thus called for. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa Vs. Atty. Oscar Paguinto, A.C. No. 6273, March 15,
2010.

April 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Court personnel; grave misconduct. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct,
the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule
must be manifest. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or
employee who unlawfully or wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for
himself or for another, contrary to the rights of others.
Medrano knowingly and corruptly submitted spurious or irregular bail bonds for the approval of the
judge. He categorically admitted his offense, giving the simple explanation of having thereby
accommodated ill-intentioned people. His anomalies for a consideration appeared to be not isolated,
but repeated many times. He thereby converted his employment in the court into an incomegenerating activity. His grave misconduct was, therefore, a grave offense that deserved the penalty
of dismissal for the first offense pursuant to Sec. 52-A of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service. Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Hon. Marilou Runes-Tamang, Presiding
Judge, MeTC Pateros, Manila and Presiding Judge, MeTC San Juan, Metro Manila, A.M. No. MTJ-041558, April 7, 2010.

Court personnel; grave misconduct. No less than the Constitution mandates that public office is a
public trust. Service with loyalty, integrity and efficiency is required of all public officers and
employees, who must, at all times, be accountable to the people.
The outright admission of Clerk IV Aranzazu Baltazar to committing malversation of funds shows her
blatant disregard for these principles she had sworn to uphold, thereby eroding public trust. When
asked to explain, Ms. Baltazar readily confessed her shortage and willingly executed an affidavit,
dated April 5, 2004, wherein she admitted that she had committed grave negligence and
malversation of funds when she allowed other court employees to borrow from the court funds in her
custody, causing the shortage as discovered by the audit team.
Ms. Baltazar was grossly inefficient in handling the finances of the court. Her bare admission that she
had indeed allowed other employees to borrow from the court funds shows her extensive
participation in the irregularities reported by the audit team. There is no doubt that these acts
constitute a grave offense. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Atty. Fermin M. Ofilas, et al., A.M.
No. P-05-1935, April 23, 2010.
Court personnel; gross dishonesty. Contrary to the P400,000.00 assessment made by respondent, the
complainant should have been assessed legal fees only amounting to P75,525.00, based on SC
Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, which was issued by the Court to serve as reference
for Clerks of Court in the assessment of the legal fees to avoid any confusion. Respondent also
violated SC Circular No. 26-97 dated May 5, 1997 for failing to issue the original receipts and merely
furnishing complainant with photocopies of receipts.
Respondents case is not simply non-abidance with court circulars and directives. Complainant in
good faith trusted respondents word when the latter made an assessment of the fees he must pay.
Unfortunately, respondent abused this trust and confidence reposed on her and used her position to
extract exorbitant amounts from complainant under the guise of legal fees for her personal gain. A
very obvious indication of respondents dishonest motive is the huge difference in the amounts,
P324,475.00 to be exact, which eliminates any possibility that respondent may have only made the
wrong assessment in good faith. Worse, respondent is nowhere to be found and thus the amounts
collected are still unaccounted for.
Under the circumstances, respondent is clearly guilty of gross dishonesty and grave misconduct
which the Court cannot countenance. The Court will not tolerate any conduct, act or omission by any
court employee violating the norm of public accountability and diminishing or tending to diminish the
faith of the people in the Judiciary. Jonathan A. Rebong vs. Elizabeth R. Tengco, et al., A.M. No. P-072338, April 7, 2010.
Court personnel; gross neglect of duty. The 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court requires that all
applications for bail and judicial bonds shall be coursed, before their approval by the Judge
concerned, through the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized personnel, who shall see to it that the
bonds are in order. As the Branch Clerk of Court of the MeTC in San Juan, Sorio was the
administrative officer of the branch, who had the control and supervision of all court records,
properties and supplies. With her responsibilities as such, Sorio should have ensured that all bail
bonds and their supporting documents were in order before endorsing them to Judge Tamang for
approval. Sorio should have rejected the bail bonds of Covenant due to the latters blacklisting and
its lack of clearance from the Supreme Court to issue such bail bonds. She cannot now simply feign
ignorance and escape liability upon the implausible pretext that some bail bonds did not pass through
her.
Likewise, Sorio did not explain the non-transmittal of some approved bail bonds and their supporting
documents to the courts, before which the criminal cases of the accused concerned had been filed

and pending. Based on the record, Judge Tamang had given instructions to Sorio and Medrano to
immediately release the bail bonds upon her approval of them. However, during the hearing before
the Investigating Judge, Sorio admitted her failure to see to their immediate release, although such
was her primary responsibility as the Branch Clerk of Court. It must be remembered that her
obligation does not end with the initial verification and signing of the documents, but extends until
the bail bonds and their supporting documents are transmitted to the courts concerned for
appropriate action.
Thus, Sorio was remiss in the performance of her duties. She fell short of the task of effective
supervision of the court staff. The recommendation of the OCA that Sorio be administratively
sanctioned for gross negligence of duty was, therefore, proper. Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint
against Hon. Marilou Runes-Tamang, Presiding Judge, MeTC Pateros, Manila and Presiding Judge,
MeTC San Juan, Metro Manila, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1558, April 7, 2010.
Court personnel; incompetence. It is clear that Velasco failed to exercise due diligence in the
performance of his duties. The writ of demolition covered only Lot Nos. 80-A and 81-A. He was
informed beforehand that complainants house was constructed on Lot No. 81-B. He relied on the
representative of the plaintiff in Spl. Civil Case No. 645 who told him that complainants house should
be included in the demolition instead of conducting a relocation survey on the areas involved in the
case.
We reiterate that sheriffs, as public officers, are repositories of public trust and are under obligation to
perform the duties of their office honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their abilities. Sheriffs are
bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in the performance of their official duties, particularly
where the rights of individuals might be jeopardized by their neglect. In this case, Velasco failed to
act with caution in the implementation of the writ of demolition, which resulted to damage to
complainant. Dalamacio Z. Tomboc, et al. vs. Sheriff Liborio M. Velasco, Jr., et al., A.M. No. P-07-2322,
April 23, 2010.
Court personnel; misconduct. As a clerk of court, Sorio is specifically mandated to safeguard the
integrity of the court and its proceedings, and to maintain the authenticity and correctness of court
records. For the substantial alterations made on exhibits 12, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31; and for the
loss of the 17 February 1999 TSN in the records of Criminal Case No. 44739, which significantly
affected the very integrity and authenticity of the court records, Sorio does not deserve to remain
clerk of court one day longer. We have no choice but to dismiss her from the service. Her failure to
obey this mandate constituted grave misconduct and conduct highly prejudicial to the best interest of
the service based on our ruling in Almario v. Resus [318 SCRA 742 (1999)]. Had Sorio performed her
duty to properly supervise the transmittal of all the records of Criminal Case No. 44739 including the
pagination, marking, and indexing of the exhibits the alterations in the exhibits and the loss of the
17 February 1999 TSN in the records of Criminal Case No. 44739 would not have taken place. Rufina
Chua vs. Eleanor A. Sorio, et al., A.M. No. P-07-2409, April 7, 2010.
Court personnel; usurpation of authority. A review of the records shows that no evidence was
presented during the investigation to prove that the acts of respondents amounted to usurpation of
authority. It is apparent that the issuance of the Writ of Execution was within the scope of duties of
Jamora as Branch Clerk of Court. It was also proven that the Writ of Execution was indeed issued on
June 29, 2005. Significantly, Reyes failed to show proof that there was no writ of execution yet at the
time he filed his petition for relief from judgment.
As to the liability of Alejo in the alleged hasty implementation of the writ of execution, we find the
same to be unmeritorious. When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it becomes his ministerial
duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to implement it in accordance with its
mandate. This duty, in the proper execution of a valid writ, is not just directory, but mandatory. He

has no discretion whether to execute the writ or not. He is mandated to uphold the majesty of the law
as embodied in the decision. In the instant case, respondent Sheriff was merely performing his
ministerial duty when he implemented the writ of execution issued by the court. Alejo, however,
should be reminded that it is required of him to pay the required fees before the implementation of
the writ of execution. Atty. Alberto III Borbon Reyes vs. Clerk of Court V Richard C. Jamora, et al., A.M.
No. P-06-2224, April 30, 2010.
Judges; gross ignorance of the law. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the
law for issuing a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in favor of petitioner Albert Chang Tan in SP Case
No. M-6373, since a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife under R.A. No. 9262, the
AntiViolence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Indeed, as a family court judge, Judge
Arcaya-Chua is expected to know the correct implementation of R.A. No. 9262. Francisco P. Ocampo
vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua/Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Evelyn S. ArcayaChua/Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua, et al./Sylvia Santos vs. Judge
Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua,A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ/A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049/A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141/A.M.
No. RTJ-2093, April 23, 2010.

Judges; gross ignorance of the law. When the law or procedure is so elementary, such as the
provisions of the Rules of Court, not to know, or to act as if one does not know the same, constitutes
gross ignorance of the law, even without the complainant having to prove malice or bad faith.
Section 7 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is plain and simple: it limits the imposable penalty for
contempt committed against a lower court to a fine not exceeding P5,000 or imprisonment of one
month, or both. In this case, respondent Judge issued an Order finding complainants guilty of
contempt committed against the Municipal Trial Court and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment
of four months to be served in the Municipal Jail of Himamaylan, and issued on even date warrants for
their arrest. Respondent is thus liable for gross ignorance of the law. Maria Panco, et al. vs. Judge Y
Aguirre, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-09-2196, April 7, 2010.
Judges; gross ignorance of the law. While a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the
law for every erroneous order that he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal principle
involved is sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Indeed, even though a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous
order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and
arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. It does not mean that a judge need not observe
propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his official functions. This is because if
judges wantonly misuse the powers vested on them by the law, there will not only be confusion in the
administration of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process.
The rule is very explicit as to when admission to bail is discretionary on the part of the respondent
Judge. In offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death, the accused has no right to bail when
the evidence of guilt is strong. Thus, as the accused in Criminal Case No. 3620-01 had been
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the bail should have been cancelled, instead of increasing it as
respondent Judge did.
Clearly, in the instant case, the act of Mangotara in increasing the bail bond of the accused instead of
canceling it is not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on the part of respondent
Judge, but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such error
produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. It is a
pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and changes therein, as well as with the
latest decisions of the Supreme Court. One cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory acquaintance with
the statute and procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no

one not even judges. Hadja Sohurah Dipatuan vs. Presiding Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara, A.M.
No. RTJ-09-2190, April 23, 2010.
Judges; simple neglect of duty. Judge Tamang admittedly approved not only the bail bonds issued by
Covenant, a blacklisted bonding company, but also the bail bonds in some instances for accused
persons charged in criminal cases pending outside her territorial jurisdiction. Yet, she insisted that
she did not thereby transgress the Code of Judicial Conduct, because she had relied on the
representation of her duly authorized personnel that the bail bonds were in order.
Judge Tamangs excuse of simply relying on the representation of the court personnel who
unfortunately took advantage of her leniency and kindness betrayed a deficiency in that requisite
degree of circumspection demanded of all those who don the judicial robe. She cannot now thereby
exculpate herself, for, in fact, such reliance was actually her admission of being neglectful and of
lacking the diligent care in paying attention to the judicial matters brought to her for signature. A
carelessness of that kind and degree ran contrary to the competence expected of her as a dispenser
of justice and as a visible representation of the law.
She was thereby guilty of a neglect of duty, for, according to Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of
Confiscated Cash, Surety and Property Bonds at RTC, Tarlac City, Brs. 63, 64 & 65 (A.M. No. 04-7-358RTC, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 21), the judge is still bound to review the supporting documents before
approving the bail bonds, even if it is the Clerk of Court who has the duty to ascertain that the bail
bonds are in order, and that all requisites for approval have been complied with. We thus find her
guilty of simple neglect of duty, a light charge under Section 10, Rule 140, Rules of Court, for we are
all too aware of the pitfalls that a judge like her frequently stumbles into when detailed in another
station. She became an unwitting victim of the continuing illegal activities of Medrano, who took
advantage of her being too busy with her judicial and administrative duties and tasks to have noticed
and prevented his illegal activities. Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Hon. Marilou RunesTamang, Presiding Judge, MeTC Pateros, Manila and Presiding Judge, MeTC San Juan, Metro
Manila, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1558, April 7, 2010.
Judges; simple negligence. Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, which
pertains to the Discipline of Justices and Judges, does not provide any penalty for simple negligence.
The Court, though, deems simple negligence as falling within the ambit of simple misconduct.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior, especially by a government official. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct
should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public
officer.
In this case, there was ostensible legal basis for Judge Paderanga to dismiss an action for failure of
the plaintiff to attend the mediation conference. However, Judge Paderangas Order dated November
9, 2005, dismissing Civil Case No. 2005-160, was improperly and prematurely issued. Judge
Paderanga failed to take into consideration that Bacalzo, the plaintiff, could not have attended the
mediation conference scheduled on November 4, 2005 because the said date had been declared a
regular holiday under Presidential Proclamation No. 933. The declaration of November 4, 2005 as a
holiday was a development totally outside Bacalzos control for which she should not be sanctioned
with the dismissal of the case. Evidently, Judge Paderanga failed to exercise the necessary diligence
before issuing the Order dismissing the case, to the prejudice of Bacalzo. This, however, makes Judge
Paderanga liable for simple negligence, and not gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
authority, as charged by Senarlo. Cecilia Gadrinab Senarlo vs. Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga, et
al., A.M. No. RTJ-06-2025, April 5, 2010.

Judges; violation of Code of Judicial Conduct; penalty. Before this Court is the Motion For
Reconsideration, filed by respondent Judge, of the Decision finding him guilty of violating Rule 2.03 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct and ordering him to pay a fine of P5,000.00. In his Motion, respondent
Judge alleged that the penalty of fine of P5,000.00 was too severe, considering that he is a first-time
offender.
While this Court is duty-bound to sternly wield a corrective hand to discipline its errant employees
and to weed out those who are undesirable, this Court also has the discretion to temper the
harshness of its judgment with mercy. Thus, in the interest of fair play and compassionate justice,
considering that this was respondent Judges first offense, we resolve to grant the instant motion for
reconsideration. In lieu of fine, Judge Cesar O. Untalan of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati
City, is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in his official and personal deportment, with a WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Alfredo
Favor vs. Judge Cesar O. Untalan, et al, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2158, April 13, 2010.
Lawyers; gross misconduct. A lawyer who obtains possession of the funds and properties of his client
in the course of his professional employment shall deliver the same to his client (a) when they
become due, or (b) upon demand. In the instant case, respondent failed to account for and return the
P300,000.00 despite complainants repeated demands.
Atty. Alvero cannot take refuge in his claim that there existed no attorney-client relationship between
him and Barcenas. Even if it were true that no attorney-client relationship existed between them, case
law has it that an attorney may be removed, or otherwise disciplined, not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in the profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties,
making him unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer
upon him.
Atty. Alveros failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and upon demand
violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral soundness, and
warranted the imposition of disciplinary action. It gave rise to the presumption that he converted the
money for his own use, and this act constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal
of public confidence in the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct and gross unethical
behavior for which he may be suspended. Reynaria Barcenas vs. Atty. Anorlito A. Alvero, A.C. No.
8159, April 23, 2010.
Lawyers; misconduct. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides, A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. Conduct, as used in
the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyers professional duties. A lawyer may be
disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether
his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or
whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
In the present case, respondent acted in his private capacity. He misrepresented that he owned the
lot he sold to complainant. He refused to return the amount paid by complainant. His refusal to return
the money paid for the lot is unbecoming a member of the bar and an officer of the court. By his
conduct, respondent failed to live up to the strict standard of professionalism required by the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondents acts violated the trust and respect complainant reposed in
him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. As a final blow, he denied having any
transaction with complainant. It is crystal-clear in the mind of the Court that he fell short of his duty
under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We cannot, and we should not, let
respondents dishonest and deceitful conduct go unpunished. We consider a penalty of two-year
suspension more appropriate considering the circumstances of this case. Alfredo Roa vs. Atty. Juan
Moreno, A.C. No. 8382, April 21, 2010.

May 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attorneys fees; quantum meruit. The principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves) may be
a basis for determining the reasonable amount of attorneys fees. Quantum meruit is a device to
prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain
benefit without paying for it. It is applicable even if there was a formal written contract for attorneys
fees as long as the agreed fee was found by the court to be unconscionable. In fixing a reasonable
compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, factors such as
the time spent, and extent of services rendered; novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
importance of the subject matter; skill demanded; probability of losing other employment as a result
of acceptance of the proffered case; customary charges for similar services; amount involved in the
controversy and the benefits resulting to the client; certainty of compensation; character of
employment; and professional standing of the lawyer, may be considered [Orocio v. Anguluan, G.R.
Nos. 179892-93, January 30, 2009]. Indubitably entwined with a lawyers duty to charge only
reasonable fee is the power of the Court to reduce the amount of attorneys fees if the same is
excessive and unconscionable in relation to Sec. 24, Rule 138 of the Rules. Attorneys fees are
unconscionable if they affront ones sense of justice, decency or unreasonableness.
Verily, the determination of the amount of reasonable attorneys fees requires the presentation of
evidence and a full-blown trial. It would be only after due hearing and evaluation of the evidence
presented by the parties that the trial court can render judgment as to the propriety of the amount to
be awarded. Hicoblino M. Catly (Deceased), Substituted by his wife, Lourdes A. Catly vs. William
Navarro, et al., G.R. No. 167239, May 5, 2010.
Judges; gross inefficiency. Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution mandates lower court
judges to decide a case within the reglementary period of 90 days. The Code of Judicial Conduct
under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 likewise enunciates that judges should administer justice without delay
and directs every judge to dispose of the courts business promptly within the period prescribed by
law. Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent
needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day period is mandatory.
Judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Any delay, no matter how short, in the disposition
of cases undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary. It also deprives the parties of
their right to the speedy disposition of their cases. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary
period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative
sanctions on the defaulting judge.
The inefficiency of Judge Andoy is evident in his failure to decide 139 cases within the mandatory
reglementary period for no apparent reason. Some of these cases have been submitted for resolution
as early as 1997. Judge Andoy, upon finding himself unable to comply with the 90-day period, could
have asked the Court for a reasonable period of extension to dispose of the cases. The Court, mindful
of the heavy caseload of judges, generally grants such requests for extension. Yet, Judge Andoy also
failed to make such a request. Re: Cases submitted for decision before Hon. Teresito A. Andoy,
former Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Cainta, Rizal, A.M. No. 09-9-163-MTC. May 6, 2010.

June 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attoney; grossly immoral act. Respondent acts of converting his secretary into a mistress;
contracting two marriages with Shirley and Leny, are grossly immoral which no civilized society in the

world can countenance. The subsequent detention and torture of the complainant is gross misconduct
which only a beast may be able to do. In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly immoral
and acts which constitute gross misconduct, respondent has ceased to possess the qualifications of a
lawyer.Rosario T. Mecaral vs. Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez, A.C. No. 8392, June 29, 2010.
Attorney; representation within bounds of the law. Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall
represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. For this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code
requires a lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with the law and principles of fairness. A
lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. It is his
duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice and refrain from
doing an intentional wrong to their adversaries. Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. (RBCI), Bohol vs. Atty.
James Benedict Florido, A.C. No. 5736, June 18, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty and falsification of public document. Dishonesty is defined as
intentionally making a false statement on any material fact in securing ones examination,
appointment, or registration. Dishonesty is a serious offense which reflects a persons character and
exposes the moral decay which virtually destroys honor, virtue, and integrity. It is a malevolent act
that has no place in the judiciary, as no other office in the government service exacts a greater
demand for moral righteousness from an employee than a position in the judiciary. A birth certificate,
being a public document, serves as prima facie evidence of filiation. The making of a false statement
therein constitutes dishonesty and falsification of a public document. Anonymous vs. Emma B.
Curamen, A.M. No. 08-2549. June 18, 2010.
Court personnel; gross misconduct. Pagulayan indeed committed the transgression Judge Beltran
charged. What Pagulayan did is the nightmare of every decisionmaker and magistrate who is usually
the last to know that somebody has used his or her name to ask for money para kay Fiscal o para
kay Judge as mulcters reputedly always say. Pagulayans misconduct, it must be stressed, brought
dishonor to the administration of justice in particular and, to the public service in general. Indeed,
Pagulayan failed to live up to the standards of honesty and integrity required in the public service. In
the words of the Constitution, public office is a public trust and Pagulayan betrayed this trust. Under
Civil Service rules, gross misconduct is a grave offense and punishable by dismissal. Judge Orlando D.
Beltran vs. Vilma C. Pagulayan, Interpreter III, RTC, Branch 2, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, A.M. No. P05-2014, June 29, 2010.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. The acts of Rantael in taunting and uttering invectives at Caya
and causing the latter physical harm by pulling her hair within the court premises, and during working
hours, exhibit discourtesy and disrespect not only to her co-workers but also to the court. Such
behavior of letting personal hatred affect public performance falls short of the standard laid down in
A.M. No. 03-16-13-SC or the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which took effect on 1 June 2004.
Without doubt, Rantaels actuations failed to live up to the high standard required of personnel in the
judicial service. Thus, she must be held administratively liable for simple misconduct. Simple
misconduct has been defined as an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established rules of
conduct for public officers. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Cristita L. Caya and Rhodora AtienzaRantael, A.M. No. 09-2632, June 18, 2010.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. In Collado-Lacorte v. Rabena, Labis, Jr. v. Estaol, Reyes v.
Pablico, and several other cases, the Court found process servers liable for simple neglect of duty for
failure to serve court notices properly. Simple neglect of duty is failure to give proper attention to a
required task. It signifies disregard of duty due to carelessness or indifference. Marie Dinah S.
Tolentino-Fuentes vs. Michael Patrick A. Galindez, A.M. No. 07-2410, June 18, 2010.
Court personnel; use of prohibted drugs. As dispensers of justice, all members and employees of the
Judiciary are expected to adhere strictly to the laws of the land, one of which is Republic Act No. 9165

which prohibits the use of dangerous drugs. Likewise, we can no longer countenance his
manifestations of queer behavior, bordering on absurd, irrational and irresponsible, because it has
greatly affected his job performance and efficiency. By using prohibited drugs, and being a front-line
representative of the Judiciary, De Guzman has exposed to risk the very institution which he serves. It
is only by weeding out the likes of De Guzman from the ranks that we would be able to preserve the
integrity of this institution. Office of the Court Administrator Vs. Florecio Reyes, Officer-in-charge, and
Rene De Guzman, Clerk, Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, A.M. No. P-08-2535,
June 23, 2010
Judges; simple misconduct. Judge Carbonell had no authority to render a decision on the subject civil
case. As clearly laid down in Circular No. 19-98, the pairing judge shall take cognizance of all cases
until the assumption to duty of the regular judge. Since Judge Tabora was already present and
performing her functions in court, it was improper for Judge Carbonell to have rendered a decision in
Civil Case No. 6840 without the approval of the regular presiding judge. For violating Section 2, Canon
3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct [on Impartiality], we find Judge Carbonell guilty of simple
misconduct. Simple misconduct has been defined as an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the
established rules of conduct for public officers. Judge Mona Lisa T. Tabora, Regional Trial Court, Br. 26
San Fernando City, La union vs. Judge Antonio Carbonell, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27 San
Fernando City, La Union, A.M. No. 08-2145. June 18, 2010.

July 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attorney; attorneys fees. The issue of the reasonable legal fees due to respondent still needs to be
resolved in a trial on the merits with the following integral sub-issues: (1) the reasonableness of the
10% contingent fee given that the recovery of Tiwis share [in unpaid realty taxes] was not solely
attributable to the legal services rendered by respondent, (2) the nature, extent of legal work, and
significance of the cases allegedly handled by respondent which reasonably contributed, directly or
indirectly, to the recovery of Tiwis share, and (3) the relative benefit derived by Tiwi from the
services rendered by respondent. The amount of reasonable attorneys fees finally determined by the
trial court should be without legal interest in line with well-settled jurisprudence. Municipality of Tiwi,
represented by Hon. Mayor Jaime C. Villanueva and Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi Vs. Antonio B.
Betito, G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010.
Attorney; engagement of private counsel by GOCC. In Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel
Corporation, we listed three (3) indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire a private lawyer: (1)
private counsel can only be hired in exceptional cases; (2) the GOCC must first secure the written
conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the
case may be; and (3) the written concurrence of the COA must also be secured. Failure to comply
with all three conditions would constitute appearance without authority. A lawyer appearing after his
authority as counsel had expired is also appearance without authority. Rey Vargas, et al. vs. Atty.
Michael Ignes, et al., A.C. No. 8096, July 5, 2010.
Attorney; engagement of private counsel by LGU. Pursuant to this provision [Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of
the LGC], the municipal mayor is required to secure the prior authorization of the Sangguniang
Bayanbefore entering into a contract on behalf of the municipality. In the instant case,
the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi unanimously passed Resolution No. 15-92 authorizing Mayor Corral to
hire a lawyer of her choice to represent the interest of Tiwi in the execution of this Courts Decision
in National Power Corporation v. Province of Albay. The above-quoted authority necessarily carried
with it the power to negotiate, execute and sign on behalf of Tiwi the Contract of Legal
Services. Municipality of Tiwi, represented by Hon. Mayor Jaime C. Villanueva and Sangguniang Bayan
of Tiwi Vs. Antonio B. Betito, G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010.

Attorney; gross misconduct. In Lao v. Medel, we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and
the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct for which a lawyer may be sanctioned
with one-year suspension from the practice of law. However, in this case, we deem it reasonable to
affirm the sanction imposed by the IBP-CBD, i.e., Atty. Valerio was ordered suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years, because, aside from issuing worthless checks and failing to pay her
debts, she has also shown wanton disregard of the IBPs and Court Orders in the course of the
proceedings. A-1 Financial Services, Inc. vs. Atty. Laarni N. Valerio, A.C. No. 8390, July 2, 2010.
Attorney; violation of attorney-client relationship. We find no merit in petitioners assertion that Atty.
Binamira gravely breached and abused the rule on privileged communication under the Rules of Court
and the Code of Professional Responsibility of Lawyers when he represented [respondent] Helen in
the present case. Notably, this issue was never raised before the labor tribunals and was raised for
the first time only on appeal. Moreover, records show that although petitioners previously employed
Atty. Binamira to manage several businesses, there is no showing that they likewise engaged his
professional services as a lawyer. Likewise, at the time the instant complaint was filed, Atty. Binamira
was no longer under the employ of petitioners. Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corporation and
Lambert Lim vs. Helen Binamira, G.R. No. 170464. July 12, 2010.
Court personnel; immoral conduct. Employees of the judiciary are subject to a higher standard than
most other civil servants. Immorality has been defined to include not only sexual matters but also
conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of
respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public
welfare. There is no doubt that engaging in sexual relations with a married man is not only a
violation of the moral standards expected of employees of the judiciary but is also a desecration of
the sanctity of the institution of marriage which this Court abhors and is, thus, punishable. Julie Ann
C. Dela Cruz vs. Selima B. Omaga, A.M. No. P-08-2590, July 5, 2010.
Judge; abuse of authority. In issuing the Direct Contempt Order without legal basis, Judge Francisco is
more appropriately guilty of the administrative offense of grave abuse of authority, rather than gross
ignorance of the law and incompetence. Olivia Laurel Vs. Judge Pablo B. Francisco/Judge Pablo B.
Francisco Vs. Olivia Laurel/Judge Pablo B. Francisco Vs. Olivia Laurel/Judge Pablo B. Francisco Vs.
Gerardo P. Hernandez, et al./Judge Pablo B. Francisco Vs. Nicanor B. Alfonso, et al./Judge Pablo B.
Francisco Vs. Caridad D. Cuevillas/Judge Pablo B. Francisco Vs. Hermina S. Javier, et al./Judge Pablo B.
Francisco Vs. Atty. Rowena A. Malabanan-Galeon, et al./Judge Pablo B. Francisco Vs. Atty. Rowena A.
Malabanan-Galeon//Judge Pablo B. Francisco Vs. Atty. Rowena A. Malabanan-Galeon, et al./Joel O.
Arellano and Arnel M. Magat Vs. Judge Pablo B. Francisco, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1992/A.M. No. P-102745/A.M. No. RTJ-00-1992/A.M. No. P-10-2746/A.M. No. P-102747/A.M. No. P-10-2748/A.M. No. P-102749/A.M. No. P-10-2750/A.M. No. P-10-2751/A.M. No. P-03-1706/A.M. No. RTJ-10-2214, July 6, 2010.
Judge; bias and partiality. Established is the norm that judges should not only be impartial but should
also appear impartial. Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do
so in a manner free from any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity. This reminder
applies even more to lower court judges like herein respondent because they are judicial front-liners
who have direct contact with litigants. Atty. Jose A. Bernas vs. Judge Julia A. Reyes, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 69, Pasig City, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1728, July 21, 2010.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. To be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be
shown to have committed an error that was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious. Also
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law is a judge who shown to have been motivated
by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption ignored, contradicted or failed to apply settled law and
jurisprudence. As a matter of public policy though, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice,

corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with
ignorance of the law can find refuge. Rolando E. Marcos vs. Judge Ofelia T. Pinto, A.M. No. RTJ-092180, July 26, 2010.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We find that the respondent judges error does not rise to the
level of gross ignorance of the law that is defined by jurisprudence. We take judicial notice of the fact
that at the time he issued the Writ of Amparo on January 23, 2008, the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo has been effective for barely three months. At that time, the respondent judge cannot be
said to have been fully educated and informed on the novel aspects of the Writ of Amparo. More
importantly, for full liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or
actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous; it
must be established that he was motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar
motive. Ruben Salcedo vs. Judge Gil Bollozos, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2236, July 5, 2010.
Judge; simple misconduct. The Judges act of solemnizing the marriage of accuseds son in the
residence of the accused speaks for itself. It is improper and highly unethical for a judge to actively
participate in such social affairs, considering that the accused is a party in a case pending before her
own sala. In pending or prospective litigations before them, judges should be scrupulously careful to
avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations
could influence their objectivity. Considering the above findings, it is apparent that respondent
judges actuations constitute simple misconduct. Rolando E. Marcos vs. Judge Ofelia T. Pinto, A.M. No.
RTJ-09-2180, July 26, 2010.

August 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attorney; gross discourtesy. When Milagros finally met respondent on September 30, 2008 [in order
to collect on his debt to her], respondent, in the presence of several others, told her Eh kung sabihin
ko na sugar mommy kita, adding that Nagpapakantot ka naman sa akin. The Court finds that
respondent is indeed guilty of gross discourtesy amounting to conduct unbecoming of a court
employee. By such violation, respondent failed to live up to his oath of office as member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and violated Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Court has consistently been reminding officials and employees of the Judiciary that their conduct or
behavior is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility which, at all times, should be
characterized by, among other things, strict propriety and decorum. As such, they should not use
abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing and improper language. Their every act or word should be
marked by prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity. Aside from violating Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respondent appears to have also violated Rule 8.01 of the same
Code. Complaints of Mrs. Milagros Lee & Samantha Lee against Atty. Gil Luisito R. Capito, A.M. No.
2008-19-SC. August 18, 2010
Attorney; mistake binding on client. A client is generally bound by the mistakes of his lawyer;
otherwise, there would never be an end to a litigation as long as a new counsel could be employed,
and who could then allege and show that the preceding counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or
experienced or learned. The legal profession demands of a lawyer that degree of vigilance and
attention expected of a good father of a family; such lawyer should adopt the norm of practice
expected of men of good intentions. Moreover, a lawyer owes it to himself and to his clients to adopt
an efficient and orderly system of keeping track of the developments in his cases, and should be
knowledgeable of the remedies appropriate to his cases. National Tobacco Administration vs. Daniel
Castillo, G.R. No. 154124,August 13, 2010.

Attorney; mistake of counsel. Granting that their counsel made a mistake in entering into such
stipulations, such procedural error unfortunately bound them. The Court has consistently held that
the mistake or negligence of a counsel in the area of procedural technique binds the client unless
such mistake or negligence of counsel is so gross or palpable that would require the courts to step in
and accord relief to the client who suffered thereby. Without this doctrinal rule, there would never be
an end to a suit so long as a new counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior
counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned. Gilbert Urma, et al. vs. Hon.
Orlando Beltran, et al., G.R. No. 180836, August 8, 2010.
Attorney; notarization of falsified deed, We cannot overemphasize the important role a notary public
performs. In Gonzales v. Ramos, we stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary
act but one invested with substantive public interest. The notarization by a notary public converts a
private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for
this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of his duties; otherwise, the publics confidence in the integrity of a notarized document
would be undermined. The records undeniably show the gross negligence exhibited by the
respondent in discharging his duties as a notary public. He failed to ascertain the identities of the
affiants before him and failed to comply with the most basic function that a notary public must
do, i.e., to require the parties presentation of their residence certificates or any other document to
prove their identities. Given the respondents admission in his pleading that the donors were already
dead when he notarized the Deed of Donation, we have no doubt that he failed in his duty to
ascertain the identities of the persons who appeared before him as donors in the Deed of Donation.
Under the circumstances, we find that the respondent should be made liable not only as a notary
public but also as a lawyer. He not only violated the Notarial Law (Public Act No. 2103), but also
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Luzviminda R. Lustestica vs. Atty.
Sergio E. Bernabe, A.C. No. 6258. August 24, 2010.
Attorney; reinstatement.
The Court, in the recent case of Ligaya Maniago v. Atty. Lourdes I. De
Dios,issued the guidelines on the lifting of orders of suspension, and has advised strict observance
thereof. However, the Court will not hesitate to withhold the privilege of the practice of law if it is
shown that respondent, as an officer of the Court, is still not worthy of the trust and confidence of his
clients and of the public. Thus, applying the guidelines in Maniago, the Court Resolved
to GRANT Respondents Petition for Reinstatement, effective upon his submission to the Court of a
Sworn Statement attesting to the fact: 1) that he has completely served the four (4) suspensions
imposed on him successively;2) that he had desisted from the practice of law, and has not appeared
as counsel in any court during the periods of suspension; and 3) that he has returned the sums of
money to the complainants as ordered by the Court, attaching proofs thereof. Carlos Reyes vs. Atty.
Jeremias R. Vitan/Celia Arroyo-Posidio vs. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan/Violeta Tahaw vs. Atty. Jeremias R.
Vitan/Mark Yuson vs. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan, A.C. No. 5835/A.C. No. 6051/A.C. No. 6441/A.C. No.
6955, August 18, 2010.
Attorney; violation of rules on forum shopping and abuse of judicial processes. A lawyer owes fidelity
to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. The filing
of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the courts processes and improper conduct that tends to
impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court.
Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays
the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act
with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and
are consistent with truth and honor. The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter,
in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the

speedy and efficient administration of justice. By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02
and Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a lawyers mandate to delay no man for money or
malice. Atty. Josabeth V. Alonso, et al. vs. Atty. Ibaro B. Relaminda, Jr., A.C. No. 8481, August 3,
2010.
Court personnel; grave misconduct and dishonesty. Respondent was found wanting, and her
admission to tampering the duplicate and triplicate copies of the courts official receipts shows
her blatant disregard for her responsibilities as an officer of the court. The fact that respondent is
willing to pay her shortages does not free her from the consequences of her wrongdoing. As Clerk of
Court, respondent is entrusted with delicate functions in the collection of legal fees. She acts as
cashier and disbursement officer of the court; and is tasked to collect and receive all monies paid as
legal fees, deposits, fines and dues, and controls the disbursement of the same. She is designated as
custodian of the courts funds and revenues, records, properties and premises, and shall be liable for
any loss or shortage thereof. Hence, even when there is restitution of funds, unwarranted failure to
fulfill these responsibilities deserves administrative sanction, and not even the full payment of the
collection shortages will exempt the accountable officer from liability. Her failure to account for the
shortage in the funds she was handling, to turn over money deposited with her, and to explain and
present evidence thereon constitute gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct. Office
of the Court Administrator vs. Marina Garcia Pacheco, COC, MCTC, Paete, Laguna, A.M. No. P-021625, August 4, 2010.
Court personnel; misconduct; lack of evidence. We find Judge Manalastas recommendation to be in
order. Indeed, PO2 Gabriel failed to prove his complaint against Sheriff Ramos. WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Complaint for Grave Misconduct filed by PO2 Patrick Mejia Gabriel against
Sheriff IV William Jose R. Ramos, RTC, Branch 166, Pasig City, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
evidence.PO2 Patrick Mejia Gabriel vs. William Jose R. Ramos, A.M. No.P-10-2837, August 25, 2010.
Judge; conduct unbecoming. Verily, we hold that respondent Judge Belen should be more circumspect
in his language in the discharge of his duties. A judge is the visible representation of the law. Thus,
he must behave, at all times, in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand
the most searching public scrutiny. The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are
essential to the preservation of the peoples faith in the judicial system. A judge must consistently be
temperate in words and in actions. Respondent Judge Belens insulting statements, tending to project
complainants ignorance of the laws and procedure, coming from his inconsiderate belief that the
latter mishandled the cause of his client is obviously and clearly insensitive, distasteful, and
inexcusable. Such abuse of power and authority could only invite disrespect from counsels and from
the public. Patience is one virtue that members of the bench should practice at all times, and
courtesy to everyone is always called for. Atty. Raul L. Correa vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 Calamba City, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2242, August 6, 2010.
Judge; delay in rendering decision. To ensure the strict observance of the constitutional mandate for
all lower courts to decide or resolve cases or matters within the reglementary period, the Court issued
Administrative Circular No. 13-87. And the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary which took effect on June 1, 2004 expressly requires judges to perform all judicial duties,
including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. Rule
3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct also echoes the mandate to decide or resolve cases or matters
within the reglementary period by requiring judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and
decide or resolve cases or matters within the required periods. Heavy workload per se is not an
excuse in not observing the reglementary period of deciding cases. An appointment to the Judiciary
is an honor burdened with a heavy responsibility. When respondent accepted the appointment, he
also accepted the heavy workload that comes with it. Re: Request of Judge Salvador Ibarreta, Jr., RTC,
Br. 8, Davao City, for extension of time to decide, A.M. No. 07-1-05-RTC, August 23, 2010.

Judges; inhibition. The rule on compulsory disqualification and voluntary inhibition of judges is
provided under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. While the second paragraph does not
expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition and leaves it to the sound discretion of the
judge, such should be based on just or valid reasons. The import of the rule on the voluntary
inhibition of judges is that the decision on whether to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and
conscience of the judge based on his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing
in the case brought before him. It makes clear to the occupants of the Bench that outside of
pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication,
there might be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for
inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preferences and
predilections are many and varied. The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of
conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. It is a subjective test, the result of
which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any manifest finding of arbitrariness
and whimsicality. The discretion given to trial judges is an acknowledgment of the fact that they are
in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with
the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a schoolmate
or classmate appears before the judge as counsel for one of the parties, however. In one case, the
Court ruled that organizational affiliation per se is not a ground for inhibition. Kilosbayan Foundation,
et al. vs. Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr., etc., et al., G.R. No. 180543, August 18, 2010.
Judge; simple misconduct, etc. Respondent Justices cannot lightly regard the legal requirement for all
of them to sit together as members of the Fourth Division in the trial and determination of a case or
cases assigned thereto. It is simply not enough that the three members of the Fourth Division were
within hearing and communicating distance of one another at the hearings in question, as they
explained in hindsight, because even in those circumstances not all of them sat together in session. It
is of no consequence, then, that no malice or corrupt motive impelled respondent Justices into
adopting the flawed procedure. As responsible judicial officers, they ought to have been well aware of
the indispensability of collegiality to the valid conduct of their trial proceedings. For this reason alone,
respondent Justices adoption of the irregular procedure cannot be dismissed as a mere deficiency in
prudence or as a lapse in judgment on their part, but should be treated as simple misconduct, which
is to be distinguished from either gross misconduct or gross ignorance of the law. Justice Ong and
Justice Hernandez admitted randomly asking the counsels appearing before them from which law
schools they had graduated, and their engaging during the hearings in casual conversation about
their respective law schools. They thereby publicized their professional qualifications and manifested
a lack of the requisite humility demanded of public magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of selfconceit. We point out that publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of having studied in and
graduated from certain law schools, no matter how prestigious, might have even revealed, on the
part of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, their bias for or against some lawyers. Their conduct was
impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid situations that may reasonably give rise to the
suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with individual members
of the legal profession who practice regularly in their courts. In this regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of
theNew Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, mandates judges to carry out judicial
duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court
staff, and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the
proper performance of such duties. Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez vs.
Justice Gregory S. Ong, et al., A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, August 24, 2010.
Judge; undue delay in rendering decision. It bears stressing that ejectment cases must be resolved
with great dispatch. Their nature calls for it. That explains why Section 10 of the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure which applies to an ejectment complaint, among others, directs that within 30
days after the receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for
filing the same, the trial court should render judgment on the case. Without any order of extension

granted by this Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required period constitutes
gross inefficiency. Rule 3.08 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge should be diligent in
discharging administrative responsibilities and should maintain professional competence in court
management, hence, it is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system so
that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition. Josephine Sarmiento,
et al. vs. Hon. Aznar D. Lindayag, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-09-1743, August 3, 2010.
Judge; violation of Code of Judicial Conduct. In Ladignon v. Garong, respondent judges act of using
the official letterhead of his court and signing the same using the word judge in his letter-complaint
to the First United Methodist Church in Michigan, USA, was held to be violative of Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Ethics and Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. In view of the foregoing, we find
respondent judge guilty of violation of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary [for committing a similar act]. Michael B. Belen
vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 Calamba City, A.M. No. RTJ-082139, August 6, 2010.

September 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attorney; mistake binding on client. Petitioner cannot simply harp on the mistakes and negligence of
his lawyer allegedly beset with personal problems and emotional depression. The negligence and
mistakes of counsel are binding on the client. There are exceptions to this rule, such as when the
reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the
application of the general rule results in the outright deprivation of ones property or liberty through a
technicality. However, in this case, we find no reason to exempt petitioner from the general rule. The
admitted inability of his counsel to attend fully and ably to the prosecution of his appeal and other
sorts of excuses should have prompted petitioner to be more vigilant in protecting his rights and
replace said counsel with a more competent lawyer. Instead, petitioner continued to allow his counsel
to represent him on appeal and even up to this Court, apparently in the hope of moving this Court
with a fervent plea for relaxation of the rules for reason of petitioners age and medical condition.
Verily, diligence is required not only from lawyers but also from their clients. Gregorio Dimarucot y
Garcia vs.. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 183975,September 20, 2010.
Attorney; mistake binding on client. Considering the initial 15-day extension granted by the CA and
the injunction under Sec. 4, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure against further extensions
except for the most compelling reason, it was clearly inexcusable for petitioner to expediently plead
its counsels heavy workload as ground for seeking an additional extension of 10 days within which to
file its petition for review. To our mind, petitioner would do well to remember that, rather than the low
gate to which parties are unreasonably required to stoop, procedural rules are designed for the
orderly conduct of proceedings and expeditious settlement of cases in the courts of law. Like all rules,
they are required to be followed and utter disregard of the same cannot be expediently rationalized
by harping on the policy of liberal construction which was never intended as an unfettered license to
disregard the letter of the law or, for that matter, a convenient excuse to substitute substantial
compliance for regular adherence thereto. When it comes to compliance with time rules, the Court
cannot afford inexcusable delay. J. Tiosejo Investment Corporation vs.. Sps. Benjamin and Eleanor
Ang, G.R. No. 174149, September 8, 2010.
Attorneys fees. It is settled that a claim for attorneys fees may be asserted either in the very action
in which a lawyer rendered his services or in a separate action. But enforcing it in the main case
bodes well as it forestalls multiplicity of suits. The intestate court in this case, therefore, correctly
allowed Atty. Siapian to interject his claim for attorneys fees in the estate proceedings against some
of the heirs and, after hearing, adjudicate the same on April 3, 1997 with an order for Arturo, et al to

pay Atty. Siapian the fees of P3 million due him. Since the award of P3 million in attorneys fees in
favor of Atty. Siapian had already become final and executory, the intestate court was within its
powers to order the Register of Deeds to annotate his lien on the Estates titles to its properties. The
Estate has no cause for complaint since the lien was neither a claim nor a burden against the Estate
itself. It was not enforceable against the Estate but only against Arturo,et al, who constituted the
majority of the heirs. Heirs and/or Estate of Atty. Rolando P. Siapian, represented by Susan S.
Mendoza vs. Intestate Estate of the Late Eufrocina G. Mackay as represented by Dr. Roderick Mackay,
et al., G.R. No. 184799, September 1, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement in any
material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception of fraud in securing his
examination, registration, appointment or promotion. Chulyao employed her sister, Pangowon, to
take the July 31, 1988 CSPE conducted in Baguio City for her and in her behalf and claimed the result
thereof as her own in her personal data sheet accomplished on April 23, 2007. Dishonesty and
falsification are malevolent acts that have no place in the Judiciary. Re: Complaint of the Civil Service
Commission vs. Rita S. Chulyao, A.M. No. P-07-2292, September 28, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Azurins act of deliberately not registering in the CTRM to hide his
habitual tardiness for the third time, which is punishable by dismissal, constitutes dishonesty.
Dishonesty refers to a persons disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack
of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. By repeatedly making it appear that he has consistently
rendered a full days service, when he had actually been tardy, Azurin defrauded the public and
betrayed the trust reposed in him as an employee of the highest Court. Azurins dishonesty definitely
falls short of the strict standards required of every court employee, that is, to be an example of
integrity, uprightness and honesty. Re: failure of various employees to register their time of arrival
and/or departure from office in the chronolog machine, A.M. No. 2005-21-SC, September 28, 2010.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. There is no doubt that Padillo received from Escalona P20,000
purportedly for fiscal & judge and for warrant officer and this amount was intended to facilitate
the case against Dalit. Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct of Court Personnel provides that
(C)ourt personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit
understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions. Lourdes S.
Escalona vs. Consolacion S. Padilla, A.M. No. P-10-2785, September 21, 2010.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. This Court cannot tolerate misconduct on the part of its
employees. The reported exchanges between Bunao and Wee in the court premises, and in the
presence of Judge Mendrado V. Corpuz and Assistant Prosecutor Alfredo A. Balajo, Jr., is disgraceful
behavior. Shouting at each other within the court premises exhibits discourtesy and disrespect not
only towards co-workers but to the court as well. The conduct and behavior of every official and
employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most
junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at
all times be characterized by strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the publics respect
for the judiciary. This standard is applied with respect to a court employees dealings not only with
the public but also with his or her co-workers in the service. Tanching L. Wee, etc., et al. vs. Virgilio T.
Bunao, Jr., etc / Virgilio T. Bunao, Jr., etc. vs. Tanching L. Wee, etc., A.M. No. P-08-2487/A.M. No. P-082493, September 29, 2010.
Court personnel; violation of office rules and regulations. Considering the various justifications
proffered by respondent employees for failure to register their time of arrival and departure in the
CTRM (for example, [1] domestic and office concerns, [2] long travel time, [3] forgetfulness, and [4]
malfunctioning CTRM), the Court finds no error in the recommendation of the OAS finding them guilty
of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations, more specifically Administrative Circular No.

36-2001. As stated by the OAS, rules and regulations are [issued] to attain harmony, smooth
operation, maximize efficiency and productivity, with the ultimate objective of realizing the functions
of particular offices and agencies of the government. Thus, any breach of such rules and regulations
cannot be countenanced. Re: failure of various employees to register their time of arrival and/or
departure from office in the chronolog machine, A.M. No. 2005-21-SC, September 28, 2010.
Judge; grave misconduct. [N]o judge has a right to solicit sexual favors from a party litigant even from
a woman of loose morals. In Tan v. Pacuribot, this Court further stressed: We have repeatedly
reminded members of the Judiciary to so conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and
suspicion, and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in
the discharge of their official duties but also in their everyday lives. For no position exacts a greater
demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary.
Judges are mandated to maintain good moral character and are at all times expected to observe
irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency. Susan O. Reyes vs. Judge Manuel N.
Duque, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2136,September 21, 2010.
Judges; inhibition. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition,
especially when the charge is without basis. Extrinsic evidence must further be presented to
establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be
inferred from the decision or order itself. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge
clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being
biased or partial. BGen. (Ret.) Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Hon. Jose R. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 173057-74,
September 20, 2010.

Judge; undue delay in rendering decision. Respondent indeed gave the defense ten (10) days to
submit its reply to the prosecutions comment on the motion for reconsideration and, thereafter, she
would resolve all pending incidents in said consolidated cases. The reglementary period to resolve
the motion in question began to run from February 8, 2009 or after the lapse of ten days from January
29, 2009. Respondent, however, did not act on the matter and allowed a hiatus in the consolidated
criminal cases. A judge cannot choose to prolong the period for resolving pending incidents and
deciding cases beyond the period authorized by law. Let it be underscored that it is the sworn duty of
judges to administer justice without undue delay under the time-honored precept that justice delayed
is justice denied. Judges should act with dispatch in resolving pending incidents, so as not to frustrate
and delay the satisfaction of a judgment. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles vs. Judge Maria Elisa Sempio
Diy, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2248, September 29, 2010.
Motion for reconsideration; second motion for reconsideration. While as a general rule the Court does
not give due course to second motions for reconsideration, this is not without exceptions, as when
there is an extraordinarily persuasive reason and after an express leave has been obtained, both of
which are present in this case. In denying respondents first motion for partial reconsideration, the
Court applied the ruling in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Delia H. Panganiban where it was
held that a Judges unblemished record will not justify her lapses. However, as correctly pointed out
by respondent in her second motion for partial reconsideration, said case should not have been
applied, as it presupposes that respondent indeed committed lapses which her long service and
unblemished reputation would not justify while she has always maintained that she had not
committed the act complained of, that is, the non-filing of the leaves of absence for May 3 and August
3, 2005 because she did not have to. Indeed, if respondent committed no lapse or violation, then the
Courts denial of her first motion for partial reconsideration on the basis of the Panganiban decision
deserves to be reviewed. Sr. State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco vs. Hon. Adoracion G. Angeles, A.M.
OCA IPI No. 05-2353-RTJ, September 6, 2010.

October 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attorney; misconduct. Respondent (lawyer) was ordered to reimburse his client Php16,300.00. Nine
years after the directive was made, he effected payment. Respondents belated compliance with
the order glaringly speaks of his lack of candor, of his dishonesty, if not defiance of Court orders,
qualities that do not endear him to the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. The lack of any sufficient
justification or explanation for the nine-year delay in complying with the Resolutions betrays a clear
and contumacious disregard for the lawful orders of this Court. Such disrespect constitutes a clear
violation of the lawyers Code of Professional Responsibility. Leonard W. Richards vs. Patricio A.
Asoy, A.C. No. 2655, October 12, 2010.

Court personnel; conduct prejudicial to best interest of the service. This case filed by Argoso against
Regalado involves money received by Regalado from an interested party to implement a writ of
execution. Regalado should not have received money from Argoso for his transportation to Daet,
without previously submitting his expenses for the courts approval. Regalados admission that he
received money without complying with the proper procedure in enforcing writs of execution, made
him guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Levi M. Agroso vs. Achilles Andrew
Regalado II, etc., A.M. No. P-09-2735, October 12, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Respondent (clerk of court) failed to regularly submit monthly reports of
collections and deposits, as required by SC Circular No. 32-93, and official receipts and other
documents, despite the Courts repeated orders. The failure to remit the funds in due time amounts
to dishonesty and grave misconduct, which the Court cannot tolerate for they diminish the peoples
faith in the judiciary. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Marcela V. Santos, Clerk of Court II
etc., A.M. No. P-06-2287, October 12, 2010.

Court personnel; dishonesty etc. Fernandez deserves to be sanctioned. Her habitual tardiness and
absenteeism, coupled with her submission of a falsified document to cover up some of her absences,
do not speak well of her fitness for employment in the public service, especially in the judiciary. We
cannot ignore the gross dishonesty involved in her submission of a falsified document to cover up
several unauthorized absences. Isabel D. Marquez vs. Jocelyn C. Fernandez, A.M. No. P-07-2358,
October 19, 2010.
Court personnel; gross misconduct. On several instances, Abellanosa demanded and received various
sums of money from party-litigants in cases pending before the RTC of Makati, Branch 137. Also, the
Order of the Makati RTC Branch 137 was published in the Taliba newspaper, but it did not go through
the mandated procedure for distribution of judicial notices or orders by raffle to qualified newspapers
or periodicals under P.D. No. 1079. Abellanosas acts of soliciting money from litigants to facilitate
the publication of their petitions or orders of the court clearly manifested her desire to achieve
personal gain and constitutes gross misconduct which is deplorable. Judge Jenny Lind R. AldecoaDelorino vs. Jessica B. Abellanosa, etc./Jessica B. Abellanosa, etc. vs. Judge Jenny Lind R. AldecoaDelorino/Jessica B. Abellanosa etc. vs. Rowena L. Ramos, etc., A.M. No. P-08-2472/A.M. No. RTJ-082106/A.M. No. P-08-2420, October 19, 2010.
Court personnel; misconduct. Marcelo deserves to be sanctioned for the grave transgressions he
committed while in office. As clerk of court, he was in charge of the courts funds and was responsible
for their collection and safekeeping. Marcelo made collections for the courts several funds and never
bothered to deposit these collections in the official court depository bank a violation of the rule that
all clerks of court are required to deposit all collections with the LBP within twenty-four (24) hours
upon receipt of the collections. Marcelo also held on to his collections, thus committing another

violation. Clerks of court may not keep funds in their custody. His acts and omissions constitute a
betrayal of the trust and confidence the Court reposes on a senior officer. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Rodelio E. Marcelo and Ma. Corazon D. Espanola, MTCC, San Jose Del Monte City,
Bulacan,A.M. No. P-06-2221. October 5, 2010.
Court personnel; misconduct. Under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 1991, an officer or
employee of the civil service is considered habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the
number of minutes, ten (10) times a month for at least two (2) months in a semester, or for at least
two (2) consecutive months. We consistently ruled that non-office obligations, household chores, and
domestic concerns are not sufficient reasons to excuse or justify habitual tardiness. Hence, Ms.
Esellers reasons for her tardiness her need to attend to her children and her problems in the
workplace cannot exculpate her. By being habitually tardy, Ms. Eseller fell short of the stringent
standard of conduct demanded from everyone connected with the administration of justice. Leave
Division-OAS, Office of the Court Administrator vs. Bethel I. Eseller, Interpreter II, MTCC, Branch 3,
Bacolod City, A.M. No. P-10-2807, October 6, 2010.

Court personnel; simple misconduct. The rule requires that the sheriff executing the writs shall
provide an estimate of the expenses to be incurred that shall be approved by the court. Upon the
courts approval, the interested party shall then deposit the amount with the clerk of court and exofficiosheriff. Thereafter, the expenses shall then be disbursed to the assigned deputy sheriff who
shall execute the writ subject to the latters liquidation upon the return of the writ. Any amount
unspent shall be returned to the interested party. Clearly, the rule does not allow direct payment of
sheriff expenses from the interested party to the sheriff. The respondent failed to comply with the
rules and is therefore, liable for simple misconduct. Renato Miguel D. Garcia vs. Ricky Montejar etc.,
A.M. No. P-10-2860, October 20,2010.
Judge; ignorance of the law. Respondent Judge should have granted the plaintiffs motion for
immediate execution considering that the defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas bond
despite having appealed. Respondent Judges excuse, that he had lost jurisdiction over the case by
virtue of the defendants appeal, was unacceptable in light of the clear and explicit text of Section 19
of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. He could not credibly justify his omission to act according to the
provision by claiming good faith or honest belief, or by asserting lack of malice or bad faith. These
justify non-compliance only when there is an as-yet unsettled doubt on the meaning or applicability of
a rule or legal provision. Lourdes B. Ferrer and Prosperidad M. Arandez vs. Judge Romeo A. Rabaca,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 25, Manila, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1580, October 6, 2010.
Judge; release of retirement benefits. Judge Luczon averred that Trinidad Irorita filed a disbarment
case against his father, Atty. Jimmy Luczon. He maintained that he is not the Atty. Jimmy
Luczonreferred to as respondent in the instant case. He retired from the service as Presiding Judge of
RTC Tuguegarao Branch 1. His retirement benefits, however, have yet to be released since the
necessary clearances cannot be issued due to the pendency of the instant case. The Court orders the
Office of the Bar Confidant to make the necessary correction in the records of both Atty. Jimmy C.
Luczon and Judge Jimmy Henry F. Luczon, Jr., in order to facilitate the release of the retirement
benefits of Judge Luczon. Trinidad Irorita vs. Atty. Jimmy Lucson, A.C. No. 3872, October 4, 2010.

Judge; undue delay. Section 15(1), Article VIII, of the Constitution requires a trial judge to dispose of
all cases or matters within three months from the time of their submission for decision. Rule 3.05,
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to dispose of their courts business
promptly and to decide cases within the required period. Judge Herrera was guilty of undue delay in
the disposition of the cases pending him his court. His failure to decide his cases with dispatch
constituted gross inefficiency. His plea of heavy workload, lack of sufficient time, poor health, and

physical impossibility could not excuse him. Without an order of extension granted by the Court, a
failure to decide even a single case within the required period rightly constitutes gross inefficiency
that merits administrative sanction. Re: Cases submitted for decision before Judge Damaso A.
Herrera, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna A.M. No. RTJ-08-1924, October 13, 2010.
Judge; undue delay. Any delay in the determination or resolution of a case, no matter how
insignificant the case may seem to a judge, is delay in the administration of justice in general.
Respondent Judge Montojos delay in acting on pending cases clearly demonstrated his inefficiency.
He failed to control the proceedings or course of the cases; to impose deadlines in the submission of
documents or performance of acts incident to the disposition of cases; and to resolve pending
incidents on time, and take appropriate action on incidents arising in the course of proceedings. A
judge should at all times remain in full control of the proceedings in his sala. Narciso Bernando, Jr. vs.
Judge Peter M. Montojo, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1754, October 20, 2010.
Judge; undue delay in rendering decision. The subject criminal cases violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC. Section 17 of this Rule
requires the court to promulgate a judgment not later than thirty (30) days after termination of trial.
Judge Andoy should have rendered a decision within 30 days from the termination of trial. Even
assuming that the subsequent resettings of the cases for trial were valid, he should have rendered a
decision within 30 days from the date the cases were finally considered submitted for decision. His
failure to meet this deadline is a patent indication that he did not take into account and had
disregarded the Rule on Summary Procedure. Cirila S. Raymund vs. Judge Teresito A. Andoy, A.M. No.
MTJ-09-1738, October 6, 2010.
Judge; undue delay in rendering decision. Respondent Judge failed in his duty to promptly and
expeditiously dispose of the subject civil case. In so failing, he ran afoul of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 28 dated July 3, 1989, whose paragraph three provides: The ninety (90)
day period for deciding the case shall commence to run from submission of the case for decision
without memoranda; in case the court requires or allows its filing, the case shall be considered
submitted for decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or upon the expiration. The
respondent should have issued the order directing the stenographers to submit the TSNs after the
complainant had manifested that the defendants had not filed their memorandum. Eduardo B.
Olaguer vs. Judge Alfredo D. Ampuan,A.M. No. MTJ-10-1769, October 6, 2010.
Judge; various offenses. Five administrative cases were filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) against Judge Alberto L. Lerma (respondent judge) for violating Supreme Court rules, directives,
and circulars, for making untruthful statements in his certificates of service, for gross ignorance of the
law and/or gross negligence, for delay in rendering an order, for abusing judicial authority and
discretion, and for serious irregularity. He was found guilty of all of the charges. The totality of all
these findings underscore the fact that respondent judges actions served to erode the peoples faith
and confidence in the judiciary. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Alberto L. Lerma/Atty.
Lourdes A. Ona vs. Judge Alberto L. Lerma/Jose Mari L. Duarte vs. Judge Alberto L. Lerma/ Ret.
General Meliton D. Goyena vs. Judge Alberto L. Lerma/Office of the Court Administrator Vs. Judge
Alberto L. Lerma, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2076/A.M. No. RTJ-07-2077/A.M. No. RTJ-2078/A.M. No. RTJ-072079/A.M. No. RTJ-07-2080, October 12, 2010.
Judges; violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. That the assailed Resolutions issued by
respondents favored Northern Islands Co., Inc. and the Guy family does not necessarily render
respondents guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, absent proven particular acts of
manifest, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, good faith and regularity being generally
presumed in the performance of official duties by public officers. In order for this administrative
offense to prosper, the subject order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties
must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, more importantly, must be attended

by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. 3-D Industries, Inc. and Smartel Phil., Inc. vs. Justices
Vicente Q. Roxas and Juan Q. Enriquez, A.M. No. CA-10-50-J, October 5, 2010.
Plagiarism. The passing off of the work of another as ones own is an indispensable element of
plagiarism. Whether or not the footnote is sufficiently detailed, so as to satisfy the footnoting
standards of counsel for petitioners is not an ethical matter but one concerning clarity of writing. The
statement See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005) in
the Vinuyadecision is an attribution no matter if Tams thought that it gave him somewhat less credit
than he deserved. Such attribution altogether negates the idea that Justice Del Castillo passed off the
challenged passages as his own.
The Vinuya decision lifted passages from Criddle-Descents article. Criddle-Descents footnotes were
carried into the Vinuya decisions own footnotes but no attributions were made to the two authors.
One of Justice Del Castillos researchers, a court-employed attorney, explained how she accidentally
deleted the attributions, originally planted in the beginning drafts of her report to him. She said that
she did her research electronically. In the course of editing and cleaning up her draft, the researcher
accidentally deleted the attributions. Given the operational properties of the Microsoft program in use
by the Court, the accidental decapitation of attributions to sources of research materials is not
remote.The Microsoft Word program does not have a function that raises an alarm when original
materials are cut up or pruned.
Petitioners theory that intent is not material in committing plagiarism since all that a writer has to do,
to avoid the charge, is to enclose lifted portions with quotation marks and acknowledge the sources
from which these were taken, ignores the fact that plagiarism is essentially a form of fraud where
intent to deceive is inherent. Plagiarism presupposes intent and a deliberate, conscious effort to steal
anothers work and pass it off as ones own.
The subject passages were reproduced in the Vinuya decision without placing them in quotation
marks. But such passages consisted of common definitions and terms, abridged history of certain
principles of law, and similar frequently repeated phrases that, in the world of legal literature, already
belong to the public realm. The judge is not expected to produce original scholarship in every respect.
Since the attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis were accidentally deleted, it is impossible for any
person reading the decision to connect the same to the works of those authors as to conclude that in
writing the decision Justice Del Castillo twisted their intended messages. And the lifted passages
provided mere background facts that established the state of international law at various stages of its
development. These are neutral data that could support conflicting theories regarding whether or not
the judiciary has the power today to order the Executive Department to sue another country or
whether the duty to prosecute violators of international crimes has attained the status of jus cogens.
On occasions judges and justices have mistakenly cited the wrong sources, failed to use quotation
marks, inadvertently omitted necessary information from footnotes or endnotes. But these do not, in
every case, amount to misconduct. Only errors that are tainted with fraud, corruption, or malice are
subject of disciplinary action.
The Justices researcher was competent in the field of assignment given her. She finished law from a
leading law school, graduated third in her class, served as Editor-in Chief of her schools Law Journal,
and placed fourth in the bar examinations when she took it. She earned a masters degree in
International Law and Human Rights from a prestigious university in the United States under the
Global-Hauser program. Justice Del Castillo did not exercise bad judgment in assigning the research
work in the Vinuya case to her. In the matter of the charge of plagiarism, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC,
October 12, 2010.

Statement of UP Professors. While the statement was meant to reflect the educators opinion on the
allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an
established fact, but a truth. They expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillos explanation on
how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to
those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized. The statement bore certain remarks
which raise concern for the Court. The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision
in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the
Highest Court of the land. The authors also not only assumed that Justice Del Castillo committed
plagiarism, they went further by directly accusing the Court of perpetrating extraordinary injustice by
dismissing the petition of the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. They further attempt
to educate this Court on how to go about the review of the case. The insult to the members of the
Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its
dismissal on the basis of polluted sources, the Courts alleged indifference to the cause of
petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even
the most basic values of decency and respect.
The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law regarding the allegations of
plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a
rash act of misplaced vigilance. Of public knowledge is the ongoing investigation precisely to
determine the truth of such allegations. More importantly, the motion for reconsideration of the
decision alleged to contain plagiarized materials is still pending before the Court. We made it clear in
the case of In re Kelly that any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the
parties, the officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the
decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable.
The UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not
reverse the Vinuya decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of
the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity
according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration
of justice. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of
the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation
in the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC. October 19, 2010.

November 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attorney; gross misconduct. Deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross misconduct, for
which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments
for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They must, at all times, faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt
payment of financial obligations. Manuel C. Yuhico vs. Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez, A.C. No. 8391,
November 23, 2010.
Attorney; gross misconduct. There is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in
different fora, as long as he does so in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and without any illmotive or purpose other than to achieve justice and fairness. In the present case, however, we find
that the barrage of cases filed by the respondent against his former client and others close to her was
meant to overwhelm said client and to show her that the respondent does not fold easily after he was
meted a penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law. Atty. Carmen Leonor M. Alcantara,
et al. vs. Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera, A.C. No. 5859, November 23, 2010.

Court personnel; gross dishonesty. Saddis failure to turn over up to this time the full amount of his
collections and to adequately explain and present evidence thereon constitute gross dishonesty,
grave misconduct, and even malversation of public funds. The delayed remittance of his cash
collections and failure to submit monthly reports of court funds he received constitute gross neglect
of duty. Dishonesty alone, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Gregorio B. Saddi, A.M. No. P-10-2818, November 15, 2010.
Court personnel; immorality. Immoral conduct is conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community. Abandonment of ones wife and children, and cohabitation with a woman not his wife,
constitutes immoral conduct that is subject to disciplinary action. Thelma T. Babante-Caples vs.
Philbert B. Caples etc., A.M. No. HOJ-10-03, November 15, 2010
Court personnel; loafing. The Civil Service Commission Rules define loafing as frequent
unauthorized absences from duty during regular office hours. The word frequent connotes that the
employees absent themselves from duty more than once. First, respondents claimed activities
(smoking, reading newspapers and discussing legal matters with the police), even if true, would not
consume as much as 2 to 3 hours of his time. Second, any discussions of legal matters with the
police should be upon the instructions of his judge. Finally, the respondent should only read
newspapers and smoke during breaktime; these activities should never be done during working
hours. Exec. Judge Aurora Maqueda Roman vs. Virgilio M. Fortaleza, A.M. No. P-10-2865, November
22, 2010.
Court personnel; misconduct. The Court finds respondent guilty of violating Section 9 (b), Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, considered a less grave offense, when, instead of faithfully implementing the alias
writ upon the properties subject of the writ therein defendant Powroll and its stockholders, he
arrogated upon himself the authority to levy the three motorcycles belonging to RUSI Marketing,
which was not even a party to the case. It may seem that the list of stockholders of both companies
are the same, but such fact did not give respondent the blanket authority to undertake the levy on
the properties of RUSI Marketing as the said company was not named as a defendant in the civil case
and there was no judgment rendered against it. Moreover, RUSI Marketing is a separate entity from
that of its stockholders and, therefore, its properties do not necessarily include the properties of its
stockholders. Antonio T. Ramas-Uypitching vs. Vincent Horace U. Magalona, A.M. No. P-07-2379,
November 17, 2010.
Court personnel; misconduct. Fixing may range from the patently corrupt act of serving as middleman
between a litigant and the decision maker, to rendering illegal and out-of-the-way assistance such as
providing referral service to lawyers and other participants in court cases, or providing information
such as the identity of the ponente, all for a fee, or, likewise for a fee, intervening to facilitate court
processes such as the release of court papers or providing advance and illegitimate copies of drafts or
final but unpromulgated decisions. Pastor C. Pinlac vs. Oscar T. Llamas, etc., A.M. No. P-10-2781,
November 24, 2010.
Judges; gross ignorance of the law. With the numerous cases already decided on the matter of bail,
we feel justified to expect judges to diligently discharge their duties on the grant or denial of
applications for bail. Judge Buaya granted the ex-parte motion to grant bail on the same day that it
was filed by the accused. He did this without the required notice and hearing. He justified his action
on the ex-partemotion by arguing that the offense charged against the accused was a bailable
offense; a hearing was no longer required since bail was a matter of right. Under the present Rules of
Court, however, notice and hearing are required whether bail is a matter of right or discretion. Lorna
M. Villanueva vs. Judge Apolinario M. Buaya, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2131, November 22, 2010.

December 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Administrative proceeding; settlement does not render case moot. The fact that the complainant
manifested that he is no longer interested to pursue the administrative case against the respondent
since he and the latter have already agreed to settle their dispute amicably would not render the case
moot. The withdrawal of complaints cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor strip it of its power
to determine the veracity of the charges made and to discipline, such as the results of its
investigation may warrant, an erring respondent. Administrative actions cannot depend on the will or
pleasure of the complainant who may, for reasons of his own, condone what may be destestable.
Neither can the Court be bound by the unilateral act of the complainant in a matter relating to its
disciplinary power. The Courts interest in the affairs of the judiciary is of paramount concern. For
sure, public interest is at stake in the conduct and actuations of officials and employees of the
judiciary, inasmuch as the various programs and efforts of this Court in improving the delivery of
justice to the people should not be frustrated and put to naught by private arrangements between
the parties. Fernando P. Chan vs. Joven T. Olegario, Process Server, Regional Trial Court, Branch 6,
Iligan City, A.M. No. P-09-2714, December 6, 2010.
Attorney; negligence. Respondent Atty. Elayda failed to inform his clients, petitioners herein, of the
dates of hearing and the adverse decision against them, which eventually became final and
executory as no appeal was filed therefrom, to the prejudice of his clients. A lawyer is duty bound to
uphold and safeguard the interests of his clients. He should be conscientious, competent and diligent
in handling his clients cases. Atty. Elayda should give adequate attention, care, and time to all the
cases he is handling. As the petitioners counsel, Atty. Elayda is expected to monitor the progress of
said spouses case and is obligated to exert all efforts to present every remedy or defense authorized
by law to protect the cause espoused by the petitioners. Respondent is guilty of gross
negligence. Spouses Virgilio and Angelina Aranda vs. Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda, A.C. No. 7907.
December 15, 2010
Court personnel; conduct unbecoming of court employee. Respondent Olegario, a court process
server, evaded the payment of his debt for seven (7) years. Respondent Olegario is guilty of conduct
unbecoming of court employee. The Court stressed the need for circumspect and proper behavior on
the part of court employees. While it may be just for an individual to incur indebtedness unrestrained
by the fact that he is a public officer or employee, caution should be taken to prevent the occurrence
of dubious circumstances that might inevitably impair the image of the public office. Employees of
the court should always keep in mind that the court is regarded by the public with respect. Certainly,
to preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just contractual
obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards. Like all other court personnel, Olegario is
expected to be a paragon of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in all his official conduct but
also in his personal actuations, including business and commercial transactions, so as to avoid
becoming his courts albatross of infamy. The penalty imposed by the law is not directed at Olegarios
private life, but at his actuation unbecoming a public official. Fernando P. Chan vs. Joven T. Olegario,
Process Server, Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Iligan City, A.M. No. P-09-2714, December 6, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Respondent Genabe, a court staff, continued to render service despite
her 30-day suspension and has quarrelsome deportment. Respondent is guilty of conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service and conduct unbecoming of a court employee. The conduct and
behavior of everyone connected with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk must be characterized with propriety and decorum. Also, every official and employee of
an agency involved in the administration of justice, like the Court of Appeals, from the Presiding
Justice to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Atty.

Jonna M. Escabarte, et al. vs. Ms. Loida Marcelina J. Genabe / Ms. Loida Marcelina J. Genabe vs. Judge
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, et al., A.M. No. P-09-2602, December 1, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Respondent Manubag falsified her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) in
connection with her application for the position of clerk of court by stating therein that she was a
Bachelor of Science in Commerce graduate when in fact she was not. Dishonesty means a disposition
to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray. The significance of accomplishing PDS with utmost honesty cannot be overemphasized. It is a
requirement under Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection with ones employment in the
government. Thus, the making of false statements in completing the PDS is intimately connected
with such employment. Making erroneous entries to accomplish the PDS amounts to dishonesty and
falsification of an official document. Dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses for
which the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service of employees found guilty of such offenses is
prescribed even for the first offense. Retired employee, MTC, Sibonga, Cebu vs. Merlyn G. Manubag,
Clerk of Court II, MTC, A.M. No. P-10-2833. December 14, 2010.
Court personnel; dishonesty and gross misconduct. Respondents, clerks of court, failed to deposit
collections and tampered deposit slips. Respondents are guilty of dishonesty and gross misconduct,
which are grave offenses punishable by dismissal. The Clerk of Court performs a very delicate
function. He or she is the custodian of the courts funds and revenues, records, property and
premises. Being the custodian thereof, the Clerk of Court is liable for any loss, shortage, destruction
or impairment of said funds and property. Hence, Clerks of Court have always been reminded of their
duty to immediately deposit the various funds received by them to the authorized government
depositories, for they are not supposed to keep the funds in their custody. The same should be
deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where the
court is located. Delayed remittance of cash collections by Clerks of Court and cash clerks constitutes
gross neglect of duty. The failure of a public officer to remit funds upon demand by an authorized
officer shall be prima facie evidence that the public officer has put such missing funds or property to
personal use. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Juliet C. Banag, Clerk of Court and Ms. Evelyn R.
Galvez, Interpreter etc., A.M. No. P-09-2638, December 7, 2010.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. Respondent sheriff levied upon a personal property not
belonging to the judgment debtor. He was found guilty of simple misconduct. The sheriff cannot and
should not be the one to determine which property to levy if the judgment obligor cannot
immediately pay because it is the judgment obligor who is given the option to choose which property
or part thereof may be levied upon to satisfy the judgment. It was improper for respondent to have
enforced the writ of execution on a property that did not belong to the judgment debtor/obligor.
Respondent evidently failed to perform his duty with utmost diligence. Misconduct is defined as any
unlawful conduct, on the part of a person concerned in the administration of justice, prejudicial to the
rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause. It generally means wrongful, improper,
unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. Crispin Sarmiento
vs. Luisito P. Mendiola, Sheriff III, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila, A.M. No. P-07-2383.
December 15, 2010
Court personnel; simple neglect. A sheriffs duty in the execution of a writ issued by a court is purely
ministerial. When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of
instructions, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its
mandate. Sheriffs must exert every effort to see to it that the final stage in the litigation process
the execution of a judgment is carried out in order to ensure a speedy and efficient administration of
justice. A decision left unexecuted or indefinitely delayed due to their inefficiency renders it useless.
Worse, parties prejudiced by the inaction tend to condemn the entire judicial system for the lapse.

Respondent Deputy Sheriff Velasco failed to implement the writ of execution and submit period report
as required by Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. His acts show his lack of diligence and zeal in
the performance of his duties. By his actuations, he displayed conduct short of the stringent
standards required of Court employees. The Court found him liable for simple neglect of duty, which
has been defined as the failure of an employee to give ones attention to a task expected of him,
signifying a disregard of duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. German Agunday vs.
Lemuel B. Velasco,A.M. No. P-05-2003, December 6, 2010.
Government lawyers; prohibition against private practice. As a rule, government lawyers are not
allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession during their incumbency. By way of
exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the
following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law;
and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official functions. The last
paragraph of Section 7 of RA 6713 provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers
separated from the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of
R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before
the office he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after
leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter
in which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the term intervene which we previously interpreted to include an act
of a person who has the power to influence the proceedings. Otherwise stated, to fall within the
ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted
engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously
exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the
sales application covering Manuels land when the former was still a member of the Committee on
Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the
practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the
preparation of a single document and private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts of the
same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. Jovito S. Olazo vs.
Justice Dante O. Tinga (Ret.), A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC. December 7, 2010.
Government lawyers; promoting private interests. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibits a lawyer in the government service from using his or her public position to: (1) promote
private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her
public duties. The restriction extends to all government lawyers who use their public offices to
promote their private interests. Promotion of private interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be affected by
the functions of his or her office. Private interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to
advancing the interest of relatives. We also ruled that private interest interferes with public duty
when the respondent uses the office and his or her knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit
relatives.
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof that
the respondent (retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga) abused his position as a
Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Jovito S. Olazo vs. Justice Dante O. Tinga (Ret.), A.M. No.
10-5-7-SC. December 7, 2010.

Judge; making untruthful statements. Respondent Judge failed to indicate in his Certificates of Service
for May and June 2005 his absences. Canon 3 generally mandates that a judge should perform official
duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence. Rule 3.01 requires that a judge be faithful to the
law and maintain professional competence, while Rule 3.09 commands a judge to observe high
standards of public service and fidelity at all times. A judges submission of false certificates of
service seriously undermines and reflects on the honesty and integrity expected of an officer of the
court. This is so because a certificate of service is not merely a means to ones paycheck but is an
instrument by which the Court can fulfill the constitutional mandate of the people s right to a speedy
disposition of cases. Respondent Judge is guilty of making untruthful statements in his Certificates of
Service. Atty. Norlinda R. Amante-Descallar vs. Judge Reinerio [Abraham] B. Ramas, A.M. No. RTJ-062015. December 15, 2010.
Judge; misconduct. Judge Maceda was accused of mishandling the courts training fund obtained from
the local government because of lack of liquidation report. Judge cannot be held liable. Nevertheless,
in view of the nature of the fund, which required no liquidation and is not an accountable judicial
fund), the Court believed that the Judge should have taken stepssuch as informing the court staff or
filing of a report with the Office of Court Administratoron how the fund was handled. This
precautionary move would have placed the Judge above any suspicion of impropriety. Judges shall
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities. Atty. Jonna M. Escabarte,
et al. vs. Ms. Loida Marcelina J. Genabe / Ms. Loida Marcelina J. Genabe vs. Judge Bonifacio Sanz
Maceda, et al.,A.M. No. P-09-2602, December 1, 2010.
Judge; undue delay in rendering decision. Respondent Judge Asdala violated the 90-day reglementary
period for rendering decisions. Respondent judge is guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision.
Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution requires judges to decide all cases within three (3) months
from the date of submission. This Constitutional policy is reiterated in Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct which states that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay;
and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the same Code provides that a judge shall dispose of the courts business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods. The 90-day period is mandatory. Failure to
decide cases within the reglementary period constitutes a ground for administrative liability except
when there are valid reasons for the delay. The raison detre behind the rule on mandatory
compliance with the constitutionally prescribed periods is that the honor and integrity of the judiciary
is measured not only by the fairness and correctness of the decisions rendered, but also by the
efficiency with which disputes are resolved. Thus, judges must perform their official duties with
utmost diligence if public confidence in the judiciary is to be preserved. There is no excuse for
mediocrity in the performance of judicial functions. The position of judge exacts nothing less than
faithful observance of the law and the Constitution in the discharge of official duties. Carmen Edao
vs. G. Asdala, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2007. December 6, 2010.

January 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attorney; dishonesty. Respondent was accused of filing various pleadings on behalf of parties who
were already deceased. To all attorneys, truthfulness and honesty have the highest value, for, as the
Court has said in Young v. Batuegas: A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his
admission to the Bar that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court and he
shall conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his
high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in
doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect
only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the
solemn duty to defend his clients rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his

clients cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth. Respondent lawyer was found not
liable as he had disclosed in a pleading the death of the deceased parties and the fact that he was
representing the successors in interest of the deceased parties. Jessie R. De Leon vs. Atty. Eduardo
G. Castelo, A.C. No. 8620, January 12, 2011.
Court personnel; conduct prejudicial to service. The respondents were accused of failing to serve a
court order and delaying the issuance and implementation of the writ of execution. Due to this
negligence, the writs implementation was delayed for almost two years, thereby gave the
defendants sufficient time to conceal and/or dissipate their assets to thwart plaintiffs efforts to
recover in full the judgment awarded to them. Court employees bear the burden of observing
exacting standards of ethics and morality. This is the price one pays for the honor of working in the
judiciary. Those who are part of the machinery dispensing justice, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, must conduct themselves with utmost decorum and propriety to maintain the publics
faith and respect for the judiciary. Respondents were held guilty of conduct prejudicial to the interest
of the service. Judge Philbert I. Iturralde, et al. vs. OIC Branch Clerk of Court Babe SJ. Ramirez, et
al., A.M. No. P-03-1730, January 18, 2011.
Court personnel; dereliction of duty. Respondent received sheriffs fees without court approval,
accepted monthly allowance in the course of the performance of his duties and engaged in
moonlighting activities by assisting in the collection of rents for one of the parties. Respondent is
guilty of dereliction of duty. A sheriff may collect fees for his expenses from the party requesting the
execution of a writ but only in accordance with the procedure laid down Section 9, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, i.e., subject to the approval of the court. Moreover, sheriffs are not allowed to receive
any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties. To do so would
be inimical to the best interest of the service because even assuming arguendo such payments were
indeed given and received in good faith, this fact alone would not dispel the suspicion that such
payments were made for less than noble purposes. Sheriffs cannot receive gratuities or voluntary
payments from parties they are ordered to assist. Court personnel shall not accept any fee or
remuneration beyond what they receive or are entitled to in their official capacity. Furthermore,
respondent received money for extra work he rendered. Respondents defense that he is not using
government time in doing his duties is not tenable considering that there is a prohibition for all
officials and employees of the judiciary to engage directly in any private business, vocation or
profession even outside office hours. Respondents acts can be considered as moonlighting, which,
though not normally considered as a serious misconduct, amounts to malfeasance in office. Reina
Edenlyne Garcia vs. Robert V. Alejo, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 142, Makati City, A.M. No. P-09-2627, January
26, 2011.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Respondent failed to (1) immediately account for and return the excess
in the cash bond she received; (2) issue appropriate receipts; (3) safekeep monies received; and, (4)
remit/deposit cash bonds in the government depository upon receipt. The Court ruled that these
constituted dishonesty and grave misconduct for which she deserves to be dismissed from the
service. Dishonesty is any act which shows lack of integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive
or betray. It consists of an intent to violate the truth, in a matter of fact relevant to ones office or
connected with the performance of his duties. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Marissa U.
Angeles, etc./ Judge Analie C. Aldea-Arocena vs. Marissa U. Angeles, etc., A.M. No. P-11-2887/A.M. No.
P-10-2880, January 18, 2011.
Court personnel; dishonesty. The OCA audit team found that there were shortages in the Judiciary
Development Fund and Fiduciary Fund. Respondents admitted making false entries in the receipts but
justify their actions by saying that they were just following the orders of their superior. The Court
found them guilty of dishonesty. A cash clerk is an accountable officer entrusted with the great
responsibility of collecting money belonging to the funds of the court and, thus, considered as public
funds. It was incumbent upon them to be more circumspect and discerning in performing their

assigned tasks, even in the seemingly inconsequential details such as making sure that there was a
carbon paper to make duplicate and triplicate copies when issuing receipts. Moreover, restitution of
the missing amount does not erase their liability. A public servant is expected to exhibit, at all times,
the highest degree of honesty and integrity, and should be made accountable to all those whom he
serves. There is no place in the judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial
conduct and integrity. Report of the Financial Audit Conducted on the Books of Account of Sonia L. Dy
and Atty. Graciano D. Cuanico, Jr., RTC, Catarman Northern Samar/Virgilio O. Gallano vs. Atty.
Graciano D. Cuanico, Jr., Clerk of Court and Sonia L. Dy, Social Welfare Officer II etc., A.M. No. P-072364/A.M. No. P-11-2902. January 25, 2011.
Court personnel; dishonesty. The OCA audit team discovered unreported and unremitted collections
that respondent made in connection with his duties. The Court found him guilty for dishonesty and
grave misconduct. He violated OCA Circular 50-95, which states that all collections from bail bonds,
rental deposits, and other fiduciary collections shall be deposited within 24 hours by the Clerk of
Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the Land Bank of the Philippines. Likewise, he violated
OCA Circular 26-97, which directed judges and clerks of court to compel collecting officials to strictly
comply with the provisions of the Auditing and Accounting Manual citing Article VI, Sections 61 and
113 which required collecting officers to promptly issue official receipts for all money received by
them. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Victorio A. Dion, Former Clerk of Court, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan, A.M. No. P-10-2799, January 18, 2011.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. An Information was filed against respondent for possession of
dangerous drugs. Consequently, an administrative complaint was filed against him. The Court defines
misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of
the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established
rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct,
the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule,
must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct,
consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of
others. An act need not be tantamount to a crime for it to be considered as grave misconduct as in
fact, crimes involving moral turpitude are treated as a separate ground for dismissal under the
Administrative Code. Respondent committed grave misconduct which, under Section 52 (A)(3), Rule
IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, is a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for
the first offense. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Claudio M. Lopez, Process Server, MTC,
Sudipen. La Union,A.M. No. P-10-2788, January 18, 2011.
Court personnel; gross misconduct. Respondent sheriff refused to take any sincere effort to
implement the Writ of Execution in order to compel the complainant to agree to his demand for a 35%
share in whatever may be collected. The Court found the respondent guilty of gross misconduct. Time
and again, the Court has pointed out the heavy burden and responsibility which court personnel are
saddled with in view of their exalted positions as keepers of the public faith. They should, therefore,
be constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the
performance of official functions must be avoided. Those who work in the judiciary must adhere to
high ethical standards to preserve the courts good name and standing. They should be examples of
responsibility, competence and efficiency, and they must discharge their duties with due care and
utmost diligence, since they are officers of the court and agents of the law. Indeed, any conduct, act
or omission on the part of those who would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or
even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary shall not be countenanced. Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Jose M. Ramano, Deputy Sheriff, Regional Trial Court, Branch 140, Makati
City, A.M. No. P-90-488. January 25, 2011.

Court personnel; gross neglect of duty. The settled rule is that a clerk of court is grossly negligent for
his or her failure to promptly remit or deposit cash collections with the local or nearest Land Bank of
the Philippines Branch, in accordance with Court administrative circulars and issuances. No
protestation of good faith can override the mandatory observance of court circulars which are
designed to promote full accountability of government funds. Restitution of the amount of the
shortages does not erase administrative liability. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Merlinda T.
Cuachon and Fe P. Alejano, Court Stenographer, MCTC, Ilog-Candoni, Negros Occidental, A.M. No. P06-2179, January 12, 2011.
Court personnel; misconduct. Respondent sheriff levied on the trucks of the complainant even if the
notice of levy was addressed to another person. The complainant claimed ownership of the trucks but
the respondent sheriff went ahead with the levy without taking steps to first ascertain the trucks
ownership. Well-settled is the rule that [t]he duty of a sheriff in enforcing writs of execution is
ministerial and not discretionary. However, errors in the levy of properties do not necessarily give
rise to liability if circumstances exist showing that the erroneous levy was done in good faith. In the
instant case however, the conduct of respondent is inexcusable. The facts clearly show that the two
(2) trucks seized by her did not belong to the addressee of the notice but to herein complainant. What
is more, she could have acted in good faith and checked from the LTO the identity of the registered
owners of the said vehicles before proceeding with their seizure. Respondent is guilty of misconduct
in the discharge of her functions. Misconduct is a transgression of an established rule of action. More
particularly, misconduct is the unlawful behavior of a public officer. It means the intentional
wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a
government official. In order for misconduct to constitute an administrative offense, it should be
related to or connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public
officer. Corazon Tenorio, represented by Imelda Tenorio-Ortiz vs. Alyn C. Perlas, Sheriff III, A.M. No. P10-2817, January 26, 2011.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. Respondent failed to reflect in the minutes of the hearing the
correct documentary evidence marked. A court interpreter is duty-bound to prepare and sign the
minutes of court sessions which is an important document, for it gives a brief summary of the events
that take place thereat including a statement of the date and time of the session; the name of the
judge, clerk of court, court stenographer, and court interpreter who are present; the names of the
counsel for the parties who appear; the parties presenting evidence; the names of the witnesses who
testified; the documentary evidence marked; and the date of the next hearing. Failure to reflect in the
minutes the correct documentary evidence marked constitutes simple neglect of duty, defined as the
failure to give attention to a task expected of him and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference. Freddy Reyes vs. Vivian Pabilane, Court Interpreter, MTC, Tagkawayan,
Quezon, A.M. No. P-09-2696, January 12, 2011.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. Respondent clerk of court failed to detect the irregularities
committed by the court employees in handling the court funds. The Clerk of Court is primarily
accountable for all funds that are collected for the court, whether personally received by him or by a
duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision and control. Being the custodian of the courts
funds, revenues, and records, the Clerk of Court is likewise liable for any loss, shortage, destruction,
or impairment of said funds and property. The Court held that his failure to properly supervise and
manage the financial transactions in his court constituted simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of
duty is the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or
indifference. As the Court has pronounced in the past, even simple neglect of duty lessens the
peoples confidence in the judiciary and, ultimately, in the administration of justice. Thus, the Court
cannot allow those who commit this offense to escape liability. Report of the Financial Audit
Conducted on the Books of Account of Sonia L. Dy and Atty. Graciano D. Cuanico, Jr., RTC, Catarman
Northern Samar/Virgilio O. Gallano vs. Atty. Graciano D. Cuanico, Jr., Clerk of Court and Sonia L. Dy,
Social Welfare Officer II etc., A.M. No. P-07-2364/A.M. No. P-11-2902. January 25, 2011.

Judges; administrative Proceedings against judges; how instituted. Section 1, Rule 140 provides three
ways by which administrative proceedings against judges may be instituted: (1) motu proprio by the
Supreme Court; (2) upon verified complaint with affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of
the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an
anonymous complaint supported by public records of indubitable integrity. An unverified complaint
against a judge, where the facts alleged are disputed or are not easily verifiable from public records,
will generally be dismissible for being unsubstantiated. Re: Letter-complaint of Atty. Ariel Samson C.
Cayetuna, et al., all employees of Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias against Associate Justice
Michael P. Elbinias, CA Mindanao Station, A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-127-CA-J. January 11, 2011.
Administrative proceedings; substantial evidence required. As correctly pointed out by the
Investigating Judge, to sustain a finding of administrative culpability, only substantial evidence is
required. The present case is an administrative case, not a criminal case, against respondent.
Therefore, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Evidence to
support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, and the dismissal of the criminal case against
the respondent in an administrative case is not a ground for the dismissalof the administrative
case. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Claudio M. Lopez, Process Server, MTC, Sudipen. La
Union, A.M. No. P-10-2788, January 18, 2011.
Judge; burden of proof. It is well-settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that
respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant. Re: Letter-complaint of Atty.
Ariel Samson C. Cayetuna, et al., all employees of Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias against
Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias, CA Mindanao Station, A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-127-CA-J. January 11,
2011.
Judge; burden of proof. The respondent Justice and court employee were charged of corruption. Where
one seeks the imposition of a penalty upon a judicial officer or magistrate on the ground of
corruption, it behooves him/her to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt, for the general
rules with regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal cases apply. The Court ruled that the
corruption charges were not proved by sufficient evidence. It emphasized that while the Court will
never tolerate or condone any act, conduct or omission that would violate the norms of public
accountability or diminish the peoples faith in the judiciary, neither will it hesitate to reject suits that
only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice. Re: Anonymous Letter
Relative to the Alleged Corruption in the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, A.M. No. 07-6-14-CA,
January 18, 2011.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Respondent was charged with gross ignorance of the law for
reversing motu proprio a final and executory order rendered by another court ten years earlier. The
Court ruled that the respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He failed to conform to the
high standards of competence required of judges under the Code of Judicial Conduct. Competence is a
mark of a good judge. When a judge exhibits an utter lack of know-how with the rules or with settled
jurisprudence, he erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. It is highly crucial
that judges be acquainted with the law and basic legal principles. Ignorance of the law, which
everyone is bound to know, excuses no one not even judges. Imelda R. Marcos vs. Judge Fernando
Vil Pamintuan,A.M. No. RTJ-07-2062. January 18, 2011.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Respondent judge failed to cause the raffle of an injunction case
and failed to follow the procedural requirements in issuing a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction
as he issued them without prior notice to the defendant and without a hearing. The Court found
respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law and procedure. Though not every judicial error
bespeaks ignorance of the law or of the rules, and that, when committed in good faith, does not
warrant administrative sanction, the rule applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable

misjudgment. When the law or the rule is so elementary, not to be aware of it or to act as if one does
not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. A judge is expected to keep abreast of the
developments and amendments thereto, as well as of prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law
by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. However,
the assailed judicial acts must not be in gross violation of clearly established law or procedure, which
every judge must be familiar with. Spouses Democrito and Olivia Lago vs. Judge Godofredo B. Abul,
Jr., RTC, Br. 43. Gingoog City, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255, January 17, 2011.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Respondent judges, without authority, took cognizance of cases
pending before another court in the absence of a presiding judge for that court. The Court held that
they were guilty of gross ignorance of the law. While they might have been motivated by noble
intentions in taking cognizance of the pending cases because they wanted to uphold the accuseds
right to liberty, they still cannot escape liability. However well-intentioned they might have been, they
still did not have the authority to act on the cases as these were not pending before their respective
salas. Their lack of authority was so patent and so self-evident; to disregard it would itself be
ignorance of the law. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Benjamin P. Estrada, RTC, Br. 9,
Malaybalay, Bukidnon and Judge Josefina Gentiles-Bacal, RTC, Br 10, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, A.M. No.
RTJ-09-2173, January 18, 2011.
Judge; gross incompetence and inefficiency. Respondent judge failed to decide 102 criminal cases and
43 civil cases within the reglementary period. As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within
which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory. In the same vein,
Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is emphatic in enjoining judges to administer
justice without delay by disposing of the courts business promptly and deciding cases within the
period prescribed by law. Corollary to this, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999,
requires all judges to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding
cases, because failure to comply therewith violates the constitutional right of the parties to speedy
disposition of the cases. Only in certain meritorious cases, that is, those involving difficult questions
of law or complex issues, may a longer period to decide the case be allowed but only upon proper
application for extension of the period has been made by the concerned judge. Respondent judge is
guilty of gross incompetence and gross inefficiency. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Former
Judge Leonardo L. Leonida of the RTC, Br. 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2198. January 18,
2011.
Judge; impropriety. Respondent judge sent a letter, in his official letterhead, to one of the parties in a
case pending before his own court, inviting the latter to a conference to discuss the case. The Court
found the respondent guilty of impropriety. Employees of the court have no business meeting with
litigants or their representatives under any circumstance. This prohibition is more compelling when it
involves a judge who, because of his position, must strictly adhere to the highest tenets of judicial
conduct; a judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Mansueta
Rubin vs. Judge Jose Aguirre, Jr., RTC, Br. 55, Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2267,
January 19, 2011.
Judge; gross misconduct. Respondent judge obtained commodity and cash loans from the
complainant for the construction of his home. Respondent judge pleaded innocence reasoning that
the loans were obtained when there was no case pending in his sala where the complainant is a party.
The above disclaimer notwithstanding, the Court held that respondent judge is guilty of gross
misconduct. Respondent judge violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Although at the time he
and his family had business dealings with complainant there was no pending case involving the
businessman, he should have been more circumspect in securing the construction materials. The

sphere of complainants business operations was within his territorial jurisdiction. As the OCA aptly
noted, it is neither impossible nor remote that a case might be filed in his court with complainant as
a party. In such a case, his (respondent) business and financial dealings with complainant would
create a doubt about his fairness and impartiality in deciding the case and would tend to corrode the
respect and dignity of the court. In addition, the Court found that Judge respondent committed
impropriety in talking with litigants outside court proceedings. His improper conduct was further
aggravated by the fact that these conversations took place in the absence of the opposing litigants
and/or the opposing counsel. Time and again, the Court have emphasized that judges are expected to
conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance respect and confidence of the people in the
judicial system. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges
must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid any
appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in the Judiciary. These
standards apply not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is
made. Victoriano Sy vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-09-2189, January 18, 2011.
Judge; gross misconduct. Respondent committed acts unbecoming of a judge, in particular, talking to
a prospective litigant in his court, recommending a lawyer to the litigant, and preparing a motion for
the litigant, which pleading was filed in his court and was acted upon by him. The conduct of a judge
should be beyond reproach and reflective of the integrity of his office. Indeed, as stated by the OCA,
the said acts of respondent violate Section 1 of Canon 2 (Integrity), Section 2 of Canon 3
(Impartiality), and Section 1 of Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary. The aforementioned acts of respondent constitute gross misconduct.
Misconduct means a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, wilful in
character, improper or wrong behavior. Gross has been defined as out of all measure, beyond
allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused. Florenda V. Tobias vs. Judge
Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., MCTC, Valladolid, Negros Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1734, January 19, 2011.
Judge; gross misconduct; penalty. Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross misconduct
constituting a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct as a serious charge. Under Section 11 of the
same Rule, the respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be meted any of the following
sanctions: (1) Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or reappointment to any public office; (2)
Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not
exceeding six months; or (3) A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00. Victoriano Sy vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Br. 24, Koronadal City, A.M. No.
RTJ-09-2189, January 18, 2011.
Judge; insubordination; simple misconduct. Some court personnels bundy cards were punched-in
even though they were in fact absent. Respondent judge failed to investigate the bundy cards
incident from the time the leader of the judicial audit team had reported it to him in his capacity as
the Acting Executive Judge and despite an order from the OCA for him to do so. Section 3, Canon 2 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary directs a judge to take or initiate
appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of
which the judge may have become aware. This imperative duty becomes the more urgent when the
act or omission the court personnel has supposedly committed is in the nature of a grave offense, like
the bundy-cards incident involved herein. For disobeying or ignoring the directive to investigate the
bundy-cards incident, respondent judge is guilty of insubordination, an omission that constitutes
simple misconduct. In re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Br. 45,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and Report on the Incident at Br. 49, Same Court, A.M. No. 08-4-253-RTC,
January 12, 2011.
Judge; misconduct. Office of the Court Administrator uncovered the mismanagement of the records of
Urdaneta RTC Branch 45 presided by respondent judge. An orderly and efficient case management

system is no doubt essential in the expeditious disposition of judicial caseloads, because only thereby
can the judges, branch clerks of courts, and the clerks-in-charge of the civil and criminal dockets
ensure that the court records, which will be the bases for rendering the judgments and dispositions,
and the review of the judgments and dispositions on appeal, if any, are intact, complete, updated,
and current. Such a system necessarily includes the regular and continuing physical inventory of
cases to enable the judge to keep abreast of the status of the pending cases and to be informed that
everything in the court is in proper order. In contrast, mismanaged or incomplete records, and the
lack of periodic inventory definitely cause unwanted delays in litigations and inflict unnecessary
expenses on the parties and the State. Although the presiding judge and his or her staff share the
duty of taking a continuing and regular inventory of cases, the responsibility primarily resides in the
presiding judge. The judge should not forget that he or she is duty-bound to perform efficiently, fairly,
and with reasonable promptness all his or her judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions. Respondent judge is of simple misconduct. In re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in
the Regional Trial Court, Br. 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and Report on the Incident at Br. 49, Same
Court, A.M. No. 08-4-253-RTC, January 12, 2011.
Judge; undue delay in the disposition of cases. The respondent judge failed to resolve the case within
the 90-day reglementary period. No less than the Constitution sets the limits on this all-important
aspect in the administration of justice. It mandates that lower courts have three (3) months or ninety
(90) days within which to decide cases or matters submitted to them for resolution. Also, the Code of
Judicial Conduct requires judges to dispose of the Courts business promptly and decide cases within
the prescribed period. It cannot be over emphasized that judges need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously. Delay in the disposition of cases is a major cause in the erosion of public faith and
confidence in the justice system. For this fundamental and compelling reason, judges are required to
decide cases and resolve motions with dispatch within the reglementary period. Failure to comply
constitutes gross inefficiency, a lapse that warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions against
the erring magistrate. Prosecutor Hilario Ronson H. Tilan vs. Judge Ester Piscoso-Flor, RTC, Br. 34,
Banaue, Ifugao, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2188, January 10, 2011.

February 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Administrative proceedings; compromise agreements. The compromise agreement between

complainant and respondent, or the fact that complainant already forgave respondent, does not
necessarily warrant the dismissal of the administrative case. Three reasons justify the continuation of
the administrative matter despite the compromise agreement or the forgiveness. One, the Courts
disciplinary authority is not dependent on or cannot be frustrated by the private arrangements
entered into by the parties; otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the
discipline of court personnel, will be undermined. Two, public interest is at stake in the conduct and
actuations of the officials and employees of the Judiciary. Accordingly, the efforts of the Court in
improving the delivery of justice to the people should not be frustrated and put to naught by any
private arrangements between the parties. And, three, the Courts interest in the affairs of the
Judiciary is a paramount concern that bows to no limits. Benigno B. Reas v. Carlos M. Relacion, A.M.
No. P-05-2095. February 9, 2011.
Administrative Proceedings; substantial evidence. Bayani was charged with dishonesty for failure to
disclose in her Personal Data Sheet that she was previously admonished in an administrative case.
Bayani invoked good faith as her defense. The Court ruled that while her defense of good faith may
be difficult to prove as clearly it is a question of intention, a state of mind, erroneous judgment on the
part of Bayani does not, however, necessarily connote the existence of bad faith, malice, or an
intention to defraud. In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required to warrant
disciplinary sanctions. Substantial evidence is defined as relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, after much consideration of the facts and
circumstances, while the Court has not shied away in imposing the strictest penalty to erring
employees, neither can it think and rule unreasonably in determining whether an employee deserves
disciplinary sanction. Bayani was admonished and warned that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will warrant the imposition of a mere severe penalty. Re: Anonymous Complaint against Ms.
Hermogena F. Bayani for Dishonesty, A.M. No. 2007-22-SC. February 1, 2011.
Attorney; gross misconduct. While respondents five-year suspension from the practice of law on
account of an earlier administrative case was still in effect, she appeared and actively participated in
at least three cases where she misrepresented herself as Atty. Leizl Tanglao when in fact her name
is Luna B. Avance. She then refused to heed two orders from the SC for her to answer the new charge
against her for which she was found guilty of indirect contempt and fined in the amount of P30,000.
However, the respondent failed to pay the fine imposed. In view of the foregoing, the Court found the
respondent unfit to continue as a member of the bar. As an officer of the court, it is a lawyers duty to
uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is
shown by a lawyers obedience to court orders and processes. Here, respondents conduct evidently
fell short of what is expected of her as an officer of the court as she obviously possesses a habit of
defying the Courts orders. Failure to comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct,
insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyers suspension or even disbarment. Teresita D.
Santeco v. Atty. Luna B. Avance, A.C. No. 5834. February 22, 2011.
Attorneys; plagiarism. The rule exonerating judges from charges of plagiarism applies also to lawyers.
Although as a rule they receive compensation for every pleading or paper they file in court or for
every opinion they render to clients, lawyers also need to strive for technical accuracy in their
writings. They should not be exposed to charges of plagiarism in what they write so long as they do
not depart, as officers of the court, from the objective of assisting the Court in the administration of
justice. In matter of the charges of plagiarism, etc. against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC. February 8, 2011.
Attorney; willful disobedience of lawful orders of court. Respondent willfully disobeyed the Court when
she continued her law practice despite the five-year suspension order against her and even
misrepresented herself to be another person in order to evade said penalty. Thereafter, when she was
twice ordered to comment on her continued law practice while still suspended, nothing was heard
from her despite receipt of two Resolutions from this Court. Neither did she pay the P30,000.00 fine
imposed in the September 29, 2009 Resolution. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court a
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from office as an attorney for gross misconduct
and/or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court. In repeatedly disobeying the
Courts orders, respondent proved herself unworthy of membership in the Philippine Bar. Worse, she
remains indifferent to the need to reform herself. Clearly, she is unfit to discharge the duties of an
officer of the court and deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment. Teresita D. Santeco v. Atty. Luna
B. Avance, A.C. No. 5834. February 22, 2011.
Court personnel; dishonesty. In her Personal Data Sheet, Bayani stated that she was never convicted
of any administrative offense, when in fact in 1995, she was admonished, in a Memorandum issued
by the Office of Administrative Services Office of the Court Administrator (OAS-OCA) but signed by
then Chief Justice Narvasa, for being remiss in the performance of her duties. Bayani explained that it
was due to her understanding that there was no conviction on the administrative case against her,
because she was merely admonished and warned therein. The Court ruled that Bayani is not guilty of
dishonesty. Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or
practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration,
appointment or promotion. Thus, dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence.
Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty,
consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act

committed by the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was committed,
the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his
act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. While Bayani made an
erroneous judgment in choosing not to disclose her previous infraction, she cannot be blamed for
believing that such was irrelevant to: (1) question no. 25 for this incident had long been resolved
and is no longer pending; and (2) question no. 27 for clearly being admonished and warned for
being remiss in the performance of her duties do not necessarily equate to conviction as question no.
27 seeks to determine. Re: Anonymous Complaint against Ms. Hermogena F. Bayani for
Dishonesty, A.M. No. 2007-22-SC. February 1, 2011.
Court personnel; falsification. Respondent court personnel, in apparent collusion with the presiding
judge of their court (who passed away before the case was decided), falsified court records and
made it appear that a public prosecutor appeared during the supposed hearings of a number of cases
for annulment of marriage, when, in truth, the prosecutors who supposedly appeared were either on
leave or had already been re-assigned to another station. Falsification of an official document such as
court records is considered a grave offense. It also amounts to dishonesty. Under Section 23, Rule XIV
of the Administrative Code of 1987, dishonesty (par. a) and falsification (par. f) are considered grave
offenses warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon commission of the first offense.
Furthermore, falsification of an official document is punishable as a criminal offense under Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code and dishonesty is an impious act that has no place in the judiciary.
Respondents were found guilty of falsification of official documents and dishonesty and were
dismissed from service. Vivian T. Dabu, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor v. Eduardo Roden E. Kapunan,
Presiding Judge, Branch 51 and Acting Judge, Branch 52, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1600. February 1,
2011.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. The salary check of the complainant was inadvertently
surrendered to respondent. However, respondent failed to immediately return the check to
complainant. Respondents failure to immediately return complaints salary check was improper and
constituted misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established rule of action, an unlawful
behavior, or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the
additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or disregard of long-standing rules,
which must be established by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. That
respondent did not maliciously or deliberately take complainants salary check rendered him liable
only for simple misconduct. Under Section 52 (B) (2), Rule IV, of the Revised Uniform Rules On
Administrative Cases In the Civil Service, simple misconduct is a less grave offense with a penalty
ranging from suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first offense, and dismissal
for the second offense. Benigno B. Reas v. Carlos M. Relacion, A.M. No. P-05-2095. February 9, 2011.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. . Respondent sheriff enforced the writ of execution and
evicted the complainant without the required prior notice to vacate. The requirement of a notice to
vacate is based on the rudiments of justice and fair play. A notice be served on the person against
whom the judgment for the delivery or restitution of real property is rendered and all persons
claiming rights under him. It is only when such persons resist after service of notice and demand to
vacate that the sheriff can forcibly enforce the writ by bodily removing them from the premises.
Failure to observe the requirements of Section 10(c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court constitutes simple
neglect of duty, which is a less grave offense punishable by one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months suspension. Manuel P. Calaunan v. Reynaldo B. Madolaria, Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 217,
Quezon City, A.M. No. P-10-2810. February 8, 2011.
Judge; delay in disposition of cases. Complainant is the private complainant in a BP 22 case before
the sala of respondent judge. Even as the case was covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure,
Respondent judge constantly postponed hearings without valid cause. Respondent judge is liable for
delay in the disposition of cases tantamount to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of

his official duties. Although the postponement of a hearing in a civil or criminal case may at times be
unavoidable, the Court disallows undue or unnecessary postponements of court hearings, simply
because they cause unreasonable delays in the administration of justice and, thus, undermine the
peoples faith in the Judiciary, aside from aggravating the financial and emotional burdens of the
litigants. For this reason, the Court has enjoined that postponements and resettings should be
allowed only upon meritorious grounds, and has consistently reminded all trial judges to adopt a firm
policy against improvident postponements. Yet, respondent judge postponed five hearings for lack of
material time without bothering to state the specific causes why his court lacked material time. He
also reset four hearings supposedly upon the agreement of the parties, which the complainant
credibly denied because that was prejudicial to his interest. Respondent judge cited the absence of
the public prosecutor in one hearing and of the PAO lawyer in two hearings as justifications for the
cancellation of the hearings. Such excuses for delay were not credible, however, for he could have
summoned a relief prosecutor and a relief PAO attorney, or made arrangements for their attendance
pursuant to the Courts Circular 1-89 (dated January 19, 1989) to avoid unnecessary
postponements. Daniel G. Sevilla v. Judge Francisco S. Lindo, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55,
Malabon City, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1714. February 9, 2011.
Judge; delay in disposition of cases. Respondent judge failed to resolve a motion within the prescribed
period. Respondent judge insisted that the delay was not intentional but simply brought about by
sheer volume of work in his sala. Respondent judge is guilty of undue delay in resolving a motion. The
Court has consistently held that failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary
period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against
the erring magistrate. Delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a judge within the
reglementary period of ninety (90) days fixed by the Constitution and the law is not excusable and
constitutes gross inefficiency. The Court finds no merit in Respondent judges explanation that the
reason for the delay in resolving the motion was the pressure from equally urgent matters in
connection with the 800 pending cases before his sala. Firstly, he is duty-bound to comply with the
above-cited rules under the Canons in the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the administrative guidelines
laid down by this Court. Secondly, the Court is not unmindful of the circumstances that may delay the
speedy disposition of cases assigned to judges, Respondent judge should have seasonably filed a
request for an extension to resolve the subject motion. For failing to do so, he cannot evade
administrative liability. Pio Angelia v. Judge Jesus L. Grageda, RTC, Branch 4, Panabo City, A.M. No.
RTJ-10-2220. February 7, 2011.
Judge; failure to comply with SC directives and circulars. Respondent judge failed to file the required
comment as required by the Supreme Courts show cause resolution in a pending administrative case
against him despite several opportunities given to him. Compliance with the rules, directives and
circulars issued by the Court is one of the foremost duties that a judge accepts upon assumption to
office. The obligation to uphold the dignity of his office and the institution which he belongs to is also
found in Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 2.01 which mandates a judge to behave
at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Under the
circumstances, the conduct exhibited by respondent judge constitutes no less than clear acts of
defiance against the Courts authority. His conduct also reveals his deliberate disrespect and
indifference to the authority of the Court, shown by his failure to heed our warnings and directives.
Respondent judges actions further disclose his inability to accept the Courts instructions. Moreover,
his conduct failed to provide a good example for other court personnel, and the public as well, in
placing significance to the Courts directives and the importance of complying with them. Respondent
judge was held administratively liable. Judge Napoleon E. Inoturan, RTC, Branch 133, Makati City v.
Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., MCTC, Valladolid, San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental/Sancho
E. Guinanao v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., MCTC, Valladolid, San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362/A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785. February 22, 2011.

Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Respondent, a MTC judge, conducted a preliminary investigation
and found probable cause to hold the complainant for trial for the crime of direct assault. The conduct
of preliminary investigation by respondent judge was in direct contravention of A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC,
which took effect on 3 October 2005, amending Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure by removing the authority to conduct preliminary investigations from judges of the first
level courts. Thus, under Section 2 of Rule 112, only the following officers are authorized to conduct
preliminary investigations: (a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants; (b) National and
Regional State Prosecutors; and (c) Other officers as may be authorized by law. Clearly, MTC judges
are no longer authorized to conduct preliminary investigation. The complainant is charged with direct
assault with an imposable penalty of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years. It was therefore
incumbent upon respondent judge to forward the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor for preliminary investigation, instead of conducting the preliminary investigation himself.
When a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law. Anything less is
gross ignorance of the law. Judges should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the
statutes and procedural rules, and should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law
and jurisprudence. Respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Lydelle L. Conquilla v.
Judge Lauro G. Bernardo, MTC, Bocaue, Bulacan, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1737. February 9, 2011.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Complainant filed a Motion for Inhibition against respondent judge.
Complainant alleged that during the hearing of the Motion for Inhibition, respondent became very
emotional, coerced her to testify without the assistance of counsel and demanded a public apology
from her; and that while she requested to refer the motion to the Executive Judge, respondent
interrogated her relentlessly following which he issued an Order finding her guilty of Direct Contempt
and was detained for 19 days. Respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. The penalty
for direct contempt if imprisonment is imposed should not, as Section 1 of Rule 71 provides, exceed
10 days. In this case, Complainant was detained for 19 days or 9 days more than the limit imposed
by the Rules. Moreover, Respondent judge did not fix the bond, in violation of the same Section 2 of
Rule 71, which complainant could have posted had she desired to challenge the order. And on the
same day the Order was issued, respondent ordered the confinement of complainant to the provincial
jail.Josephine Jazmines Tan v. Judge Sibanah E. Usman, RTC, Branch 29, Catbalogan, Samar, A.M. No.
RTJ-11-2666. February 15, 2011.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Respondent judge, acting as an investigating judge, issued orders
archiving several criminal cases instead of forwarding them to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
for review and appropriate action (this rule is prior to the amendments introduced by A.M. No. 05-826-SC removing from judges of first level courts the authority to conduct preliminary investigations).
The Court found the respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. A judge owes it to himself
and his office to know basic legal principles by heart and to harness that knowledge correctly and
justly, failing which publics confidence in the courts is eroded. In issuing the orders archiving the
criminal cases, respondent judge failed to consider that he was acting not as a trial judge but an
investigating judge of an MTC whose actions were thus governed by Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure on preliminary investigations. He ought to have known that after conducting
preliminary investigation on the criminal cases, it was his duty to transmit his resolution thereon to
the provincial or city prosecutor for appropriate action. His failure to do so betrays an utter lack of
familiarity with the Rules. The complaint against respondent is for gross ignorance of the law in which
the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence; it must have
been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption the presence of which in the present
case is not clear. Be that as it may, such leeway afforded a judge does not mean that he should not
evince due care in the performance of his adjudicatory functions. Sanctions are still in order as such
lapses in judgment cannot be countenanced. As the Court has repeatedly stressed, a judge, having
applied for the position and appointed as such, is presumed to know the law. Thus, when the law is so
elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Rene C. Ricablanca v. Judge
Hector B. Barillo, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1710. February 15, 2011.

Judge; gross inefficiency. It took respondent judge more than two years to decide an ejectment case
after it was declared submitted for resolution. The delay in deciding a case within the reglementary
period constitutes a violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which
mandates judges to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently,
fairly and with promptness. In line with jurisprudence, respondent judge is liable for gross
inefficiency for his failure to decide a case within the reglementary period. Judge Napoleon E.
Inoturan, RTC, Branch 133, Makati City v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., MCTC, Valladolid, San
Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental/Sancho E. Guinanao v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., MCTC,
Valladolid, San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362/A.M. No. MTJ-111785. February 22, 2011.
Judge; gross misconduct. Respondent judge made or allowed many unreasonable postponements that
inevitably delayed the proceedings and prevented the prompt disposition of the case out of manifest
bias in favor of the accused. Thus, he flagrantly violated the letter and spirit both of Rule 1.02 of
theCode of Judicial Conduct, which enjoined all judges to administer justice impartially and without
delay; and of Canon 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which required him as a trial judge to be
prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is often justice
denied. That his conduct proceeded from his bias towards the accused rendered his acts and
omissions as gross misconduct. It is settled that the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the
additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or disregard of long-standing rules,
which must be established by substantial evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Daniel
G. Sevilla v. Judge Francisco S. Lindo, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, Malabon City, A.M. No. MTJ08-1714. February 9, 2011.
Judges; plagiarism. SC Associate Justice Castillo was accused of plagiarism in connection with the
decision he wrote for the Court in the case entitled Vinuya v. Romulo (G.R. No. 162230). The Court
dismissed the charges against Justice Castillo. Plagiarism, a term not defined by statute, has a
popular or common definition. To plagiarize, says Webster, is to steal and pass off as ones own the
ideas or words of another. Stealing implies malicious taking. Blacks Law Dictionary, the worlds
leading English law dictionary quoted by the Court in its decision, defines plagiarism as the
deliberate and knowing presentation of another persons original ideas or creative expressions as
ones own. The presentation of another persons ideas as ones own must be deliberate or
premeditateda taking with ill intent. While the academic publishing model is based on the
originality of the writers thesis, the judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis, which
encourages courts to cite historical legal data, precedents, and related studies in their decisions. The
judge is not expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. Citing published articles or
work of a number of legal writers, the Court ruled that a judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether
trial or appellate, is exempted from a charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law
review article, novel thoughts published in a legal periodical or language from a partys brief are used
without giving attribution. Judges are free to use whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve
the matter before them, without fear of reprisal. This exemption applies to judicial writings intended
to decide cases for two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary work and, more importantly, the
purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject to
a claim of legal plagiarism. In matter of the charges of plagiarism, etc. against Associate Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC. February 8, 2011.
Judge; propriety. Respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest of the complainant for direct assault.
Upon learning about the warrant, complainant alleged that she called respondent judges wife, who
said she would help in having the bail reduced to P6,000.00 and would have the case for direct
assault against herein complainant dismissed provided herein complainant cancel the wifes debt
ofP35,000.00 and provided that complainant loan the wife an additional amount of P50,000.00.
Respondent judge denied any knowledge of the loan. Though the Court ruled that the complainant
failed to substantiate her claim, nevertheless, the Court notes that although respondent judge denies

knowledge of such transaction between his wife and complainant, respondent judge did not
categorically deny his wifes debt to complainant. Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
stresses the importance of propriety and the appearance of propriety to the performance of all the
activities of a judge. Respondent judge should bear in mind that judges should avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. Furthermore, judges and members of their
families are prohibited from asking for or accepting any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to
anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him in connection with the performance of
judicial duties.Lydelle L. Conquilla v. Judge Lauro G. Bernardo, MTC, Bocaue, Bulacan, A.M. No. MTJ09-1737. February 9, 2011.
Judge; violation of SC rules, directives, and circulars. Respondent judge granted bail even in the
absence of any written application. Respondent judge invokes the constitutional right of the accused
to bail and Section 17(c), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which does not require
that a person be charged in court before he or she may apply for bail. To his mind, there was already
a constructive bail given that only the papers were needed to formalize it. The Court held that
respondent judge is guilty of a less serious charge of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and
circulars under Sec. 9, Rule 140. Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure allows
that any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any court in the
province, city or municipality where he is held. However, in the case at bar, despite the absence of
any written application, respondent judge verbally granted bail to the accused. Moreover, in clear
departure from Sec. 14 of Rule 114, respondent judge verbally ordered the clerk of court to accept
the cash deposit as bail, to earmark an official receipt for the cash deposit, and to date it the
following day. The bail should be deposited in the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial,
city or municipal treasurer. Worse, respondent judge did not require the accused to sign a written
undertaking containing the conditions of the bail under Sec. 2, Rule 114 to be complied with by the
accused. Immediately upon receipt by the clerk of court of the cash deposit of PhP 30,000 from the
accused, respondent judge ordered the police escorts to release the accused without any written
order of release. In sum, there was no written application for bail, no certificate of deposit from the
BIR collector or provincial, city or municipal treasurer, no written undertaking signed by the accused,
and no written release order. As regards the insistence of respondent judge that such may be
considered as constructive bail, there is no such species of bail under the Rules. Despite the noblest
of reasons, the Rules of Court may not be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the rights
of another. Procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of
justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice,
or whimsicality. In this case, the reason of respondent judge is hardly persuasive enough to disregard
the Rules. Gaudencio B. Pantilo III v. Judge Victor A. Canoy, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2262. February 9, 2011.
Judge; undue delay. Complainant filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal before the sala of the
respondent judge. From the filing of the Motion, a period of more than five (5) months had to pass
before the respondent judge finally directed a writ of execution be issued. However, the Court ruled
that respondent judge is not administratively liable due to the defective notice of hearing in
complainants motion. First. Rather than being addressed to the adverse party, the notice of hearing
in complainants motion was directed to the Branch Clerk of Court. Such gaffe actually contradicts a
basic purpose of the notice requirementi.e., to inform an adverse party of the date and time of the
proposed hearing. Second. The notice of hearing did not specify a date and time of hearing. The
notice is merely an instruction for the clerk of court to submit the motion for the consideration and
approval of the trial court immediately upon receipt or at any time convenient with the said
court. Jurisprudence had been categorical in treating a litigious motion without a valid notice of
hearing as a mere scrap of paper. An important aspect of the above judicial pronouncement is the
absence of any duty on the part of the court to take action on a motion wanting a valid notice of
hearing. Accordingly, a judge may not be held administratively accountable for not acting upon a
mere scrap of paper. To impose upon judges a positive duty to recognize and resolve motions with
defective notices of hearing would encourage litigants to an unbridled disregard of a simple but

necessary rule of a fair judicial proceeding. Marciano Alcaraz v. Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Quezon City, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2272. February 16, 2011.
Judge; undue delay. During a judicial audit, it was discovered that there were many pending cases
before the sala of the respondent judge which were awaiting resolution but were already beyond the
reglementary period. The Supreme Court is aware of the heavy caseloads heaped on the shoulders of
every trial judge. But such cannot excuse him from doing his mandated duty to resolve cases with
diligence and dispatch. Judges burdened with heavy caseloads should request the Court for an
extension of the reglementary period within which to decide their cases if they think they cannot
comply with their judicial duty. Corollarily, a heavy caseload may excuse a judges failure to decide
cases within the reglementary period but not their failure to request an extension of time within which
to decide the case on time. Hence, all that respondent judge needs to do is request for an extension
of time over which the Court has, almost customarily, been considerate. Moreover, it is not enough
that he pens his decision; it is imperative to promulgate the same within the mandated period. The
lack of staff that will prepare and type the decision is equally inexcusable to justify the delay in the
promulgation of the cases. Failure to render decisions and orders within the mandated period
constitutes a violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3, of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which then makes
respondent judge liable administratively. Section 9, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court classifies
undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge punishable under Section 11 (B)
of the same Rule. Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56,
Mandaue City, Cebu, A.M. No. 09-7-284-RTC. February 16, 2011.

March 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Administrative Cases Initiated by Supreme Court; procedure. Respondent law professors asked for
alternative reliefs should the Court find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause
Resolution be set for hearing and for that purpose, they be allowed to require the production or
presentation of witnesses and evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the
Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17SC) and to have access to the records of, and evidence that were presented or may be presented in
the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. It should be clarified that this is not an indirect contempt
proceeding and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As explicitly
ordered in the Show Cause Resolution this case was docketed as an administrative matter. The rule
that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary proceedings initiated
motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court
or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the
case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a
lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6
to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the
Supreme Court.
From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation, through a referral to the
specified officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is only if the
Court deems such an investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A will
be followed. As respondent professors are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not
require a trial type hearing. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A
statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the allegations of
plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.

Administrative Proceedings; burden of proof. A complaint charging Judge Kapili with Conduct
Unbecoming of a Member of the Judiciary, and Gross Misconduct amounting to Violation of the Code
of Judicial Conduct was dismissed because of the failure of the complainant to meet the burden of
proof required in administrative proceedings. Administrative charges against judges have been
viewed by this Court with utmost care, as the respondent stands to face the penalty of dismissal or
disbarment. Thus, proceedings of this character are in their nature highly penal in character and are
to be governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases. The charges in such case must,
therefore, be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Jocelyn Datoon v. Judge Bethany G. Kapili, Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Maasin City, Southern Leyte, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2247, March 2,
2011.
Attorney; breach of fiduciary duties. Atty. Ricaforts act of obtaining money from his clients under the
respective pretexts that the amount would be deposited in court and that he would prepare and file
the memorandum for them erected a responsibility to account for and to use the amounts in
accordance with the particular purposes intended. For him to deposit the amount in his personal
account without the consent of the clients and to fail to file the memorandum and not return the
money upon demand, constituted a serious breach of his fiduciary duties as their attorney. He
reneged on his duty to render an accounting to his clients showing that he had spent the amounts for
the particular purposes intended. He was thereby presumed to have misappropriated the moneys for
his own use to the prejudice of his clients and in violation of the clients trust reposed in him. He could
not escape liability, for upon failing to use the moneys for the purposes intended, he should have
immediately returned the moneys to his clients. Atty. Ricaforts plain abuse of the confidence
reposed in him by his clients rendered him liable for violation of Canon 16, particularly Rule 16.01,
supra, and Canon 17, all of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His acts and actuations constituted
a gross violation of general morality and of professional ethics that impairs public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves punishment. Erlinda R. Tarog v. Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort, A.C. No.
8253, March 15, 2011.
Clerk of Court; gross inefficiency. Atty. Lometillo utterly failed to perform her duties with the degree
of diligence and competence expected of a clerk of court. The performance of ones duties in a
perfunctory manner is never justified especially when reliance on employees of lower rank projects
nothing else but gross inefficiency and incompetence. Next to the judge, the clerk of court is the chief
administrative officer charged with preserving the integrity of court proceedings. A number of nonjudicial concerns connected with trial and adjudication of cases is handled by the clerk of court,
demanding a dynamic performance of duties, with the prompt and proper administration of justice as
the constant objective. The nature of the work and of the office mandates that the clerk of court be
an individual of competence, honesty and integrity. The Clerks of Court perform a very delicate
function as custodian of the courts funds, revenues, records, property and premises. They wear
many hats those of treasurer, accountant, guard and physical plant manager of the court, hence,
they are entrusted with the primary responsibility of correctly and effectively implementing
regulations regarding fiduciary funds and are thus, liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or
impairment of such funds and property. Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Magdalena L.
Lometillo, Former Clerk of Court VII, Victoria S. Patopaten, Cashier II, Linda C. Guides, Administrative
Officer I, Lenny Gemma P. Castillo, Clerk III, and Brenda M. Linacero, Clerk III, All of Regional Trial
Court, Iloilo City, A.M. No. P-09-2637. March 29, 2011.
Clerk of Court; gross neglect of duty. Atty. Lometillos 42-year stint in office provides the Court a
reasonable expectation that she was aware of the consequences that delay in the remittances of
collections constitutes neglect of duty. Surely, her long service to the judiciary must have made her
realize the effect of delayed deposit of collections: that the court is deprived of the interest that may
be earned if the amounts are deposited in a bank. Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty.
Magdalena L. Lometillo, Former Clerk of Court VII, Victoria S. Patopaten, Cashier II, Linda C. Guides,

Administrative Officer I, Lenny Gemma P. Castillo, Clerk III, and Brenda M. Linacero, Clerk III, All of
Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City,A.M. No. P-09-2637. March 29, 2011.
Court Personnel; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Bengson should be liable for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in view of her act of offering her services for
facilitation of the land transfer papers at the BIR and representing that her half-sister and niece had
the power, influence and capacity to facilitate the titling of subject property. Bengsons act begrimed
both the image and integrity of her office. At this point, the Court would like to once again
underscore that the conduct of every court personnel must be beyond reproach and free from
suspicion that may cause to sully the image of the judiciary. They must totally avoid any impression
of impropriety, misdeed or misdemeanor not only in the performance of their official duties but also in
conducting themselves outside or beyond the duties and functions of their office. Every court
personnel are enjoined to conduct themselves toward maintaining the prestige and integrity of the
judiciary for the very image of the latter is necessarily mirrored in their conduct, both official and
otherwise. They must not forget that they are an integral part of that organ of the government
sacredly tasked in dispensing justice. Their conduct and behavior, therefore, should not only be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility but at all times be defined by propriety and
decorum, and above all else beyond any suspicion. Priscilla L. Hernando v. Juliana Y. Bengson, Legal
Researcher, RTC, Branch 104, Quezon City, A.M. No. P-09-2686. March 28, 2011.
Court Personnel; grave misconduct. Respondent Sheriffs unilateral and repeated demands for sums
of money from a party-litigant, purportedly to defray the expenses of execution, without obtaining the
approval of the trial court for such purported expense and without rendering to that court an
accounting thereof, in effect, constituted dishonesty and extortion. That conduct, therefore, fell far
too short of the required standards of public service. Such conduct is threatening to the very
existence of the system of the administration of justice. For grave misconduct, dishonesty and
neglect of duty, Archibald C. Verga, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Butuan City, was
suspended from office without pay for six months. In Sanga v. Alcantara, the Court had another
occasion to remind sheriffs on the performance of their duty: Under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court, the sheriff is required to secure the courts prior approval of the estimated expenses and
fees needed to implement the court process. A sheriff is guilty of violating the Rules if he fails to
observe the following: (1) prepare an estimate of expenses to be incurred in executing the writ, for
which he must seek the courts approval; (2) render an accounting; and (3) issue an official receipt for
the total amount he received from the judgment debtor. The rule requires that the sheriff execute
writs or processes to estimate the expenses to be incurred. Upon the approval of the estimated
expenses, the interested party has to deposit the amount with the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio
Sheriff. The expenses shall then be disbursed to the executing Sheriff, subject to his liquidation,
within the same period for rendering a return on the process or writ. Any unspent amount shall be
refunded to the party who made the deposit. A sheriff is an officer of the court. As such, he forms an
integral part of the administration of justice, since he is called upon to serve the orders and writs and
execute all processes of the court. As such, he is required to live up to the strict standards of honesty
and integrity in public service. His conduct must at all times be characterized by honesty and
openness and must constantly be above suspicion. Dy Teban Trading Co., Inc. v. Archibald C. Verga,
Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 33 Butuan City, A.M. No. P-11-2914, March 16, 2011.
Court Personnel; grave misconduct. Respondent Tagubas act of collecting or receiving money from a
litigant constitutes grave misconduct in office. Grave misconduct is a grave offense that carries the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even on a first offense. Court personnel, from the
lowliest employee, are involved in the dispensation of justice; parties seeking redress from the courts
for grievances look upon court personnel, irrespective of rank or position, as part of the Judiciary. In
performing their duties and responsibilities, these court personnel serve as sentinels of justice and
any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and
the peoples trust and confidence in this institution. Therefore, they are expected to act and behave

in a manner that should uphold the honor and dignity of the Judiciary, if only to maintain the peoples
confidence in the Judiciary. This expectation is enforced, among others, by Section 2, Canon I of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which mandates that [c]ourt personnel shall not solicit or
accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit
shall influence their official actions. Section 2(e), Canon III, on the other hand, mandates that
[c]ourt personnel shall not x x x [s]olicit or accept any gift, loan, gratuity, discount, favor,
hospitality or service under circumstances from which it could reasonably be inferred that a major
purpose of the donor is to influence the court personnel in performing official duties. The acts
addressed are strictly prohibited to avoid the perception that court personnel can be influenced to act
for or against a party or person in exchange for favors. Milagros Villaceran and Omar T. Miranda v.
Judge Maxwel S. Rosete and Process Server Eugenio Taguba, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2,
Santiago City, Isabela, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1727, March 22, 2011.
Court Personnel; immoral conduct. The sole issue in this case is whether respondents Halasan and
Largo, who admitted to having an illicit relationship with each other, are guilty of disgraceful and
immoral conduct. The Court once again reminds its employees that the image of a court of justice is
mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the women and men who work in the judiciary, from
the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court employees are enjoined to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the
good name and integrity of the court of justice. In this case, we found respondents Halasan and
Largo guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct for which they may be held administratively
liable. Presiding Judge Jeoffre W. Acebido, Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City v.
Ludycissa A. Halasan, Court Stenographer III, and Joel A. Largo, Utility Worker I, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City, A.M. No. P-10-2803. March 30, 2011.
Court Personnel; immorality. This is an administrative complaint for immorality filed against
respondent Gibas and respondent Lintao who were accused of having an illicit relationship. Court
employees should maintain moral righteousness and uprightness in their professional and private
conduct to preserve the integrity and dignity of the courts of justice. Court personnel should avoid
any act of impropriety which tarnishes the honor and dignity of the Judiciary, thus: Every employee
of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant,
he must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of his official
duties but in his personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the courts good name
and standing. It cannot be overstressed that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct,
official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its
personnel. Court employees have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and
decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of
courts of justice. Emmanuel M. Gibas, Jr. v. Ma. Jesusa E. Gibas, Court Stenographer I, Municipal Trial
Court, Guiguinto, Bulacan, and Franconello S. Lintao, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 83,
Malolos City, Bulacan, A.M. No. P-09-2651, March 23, 2011.
Court Personnel; misconduct. Aromin actually interfered with the execution of a valid certificate of
sheriffs sale in behalf of her friend without regard to the impropriety of her acts considering that she
is a court employee. As a public servant, she should have known that she is enjoined to uphold public
interest over and above personal interest at all times. Employees of the judiciary should be living
examples of uprightness not only in the performance of official duties but also in their personal and
private dealings with other people so as to preserve at all times the good name and standing of the
courts in the community. The image of the court, as being a true temple of justice, is aptly mirrored in
the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the
least and lowliest of its personnel. Angelina C. Lim and Vivian M. Gaduang v. Maribeth G. Aromin,
Records Officer I, OCC, MTC, Meycauayan, Bulacan, A.M. No. P-09-2677, March 9, 2011.

Court Personnel; professionalism. An administrative complaint was filed against a court employee for
using her position to assist a friend in stopping the implementation of a courts judgment. In addition,
the court employee was absent from work to attend to this and did not even file a leave. Time and
again, the Supreme Court has emphasized that court personnel must devote every moment of official
time to public service. The conduct and behavior of court personnel should be characterized by a high
degree of professionalism and responsibility, as they mirror the image of the court. Specifically, court
personnel must strictly observe official time to inspire public respect for the justice system. Section
1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel mandates that court personnel shall commit
themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their office during working
hours. Angelina C. Lim and Vivian M. Gaduang v. Maribeth G. Aromin, Records Officer I, OCC, MTC,
Meycauayan, Bulacan, A.M. No. P-09-2677, March 9, 2011.
Court Personnel; punctuality. Administrative employees of the Court are being sanctioned herein for
their habitual tardiness. It is a canon under the Constitution that a public office is a public trust. This
canon includes the mandate for the observance of prescribed office hours and the efficient use of
every moment of such hours for the public service, because only thereby may the public servants
recompense the Government and the people for shouldering the costs of maintaining the Judiciary.
Accordingly, court officials and employees must at all times strictly observe official hours to inspire
the publics respect for the justice system. Absenteeism and tardiness are, therefore,
impermissible. Re: Employees Incurring Habitual Tardiness in the Second Semester of 2009, A.M.
No. 2010-11-SC, March 15, 2011.
Court Personnel; reassignment by executive judge. Section 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel expressly states that court personnel shall not be required to perform any work
outside the scope of their job description. While the executive judge may not require court personnel
to perform work outside the scope of their job description, except duties that are identical with or are
subsumed under their present functions, the executive judge may reassign court personnel of
multiple-branch courts to another branch within the same area of administrative supervision when
there is a vacancy or when the interest of the service requires, after consultation with the presiding
judges of the branches concerned. The reassignment of court personnel in multiple-branch courts to
another branch within the same area of the executive judges administrative supervision must involve
(1) work within the scope of the court personnels job description or (2) duties that are identical with
or are subsumed under the court personnels present functions. Executive Judge Leonilo B. Apita,
RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City v. Marissa M. Estanislao, Court Legal Researcher II, RTC, Br. 34, Tacloban
City, A.M. No. P-06-2206, March 9, 2011.
Court Personnel; temporary designation. This is an administrative complaint of first impression
involving the designation of court personnel, specifically a legal researcher as court interpreter, by an
executive judge. While the Manual for Clerks of Court provides that court personnel may perform
other duties the presiding judge may assign from time to time, said additional duties must be directly
related to, and must not significantly vary from, the court personnels job description. However, in
case of a sudden vacancy in a court position, the judge may temporarily designate a court personnel
with the competence and skills for the position even if the duties for such position are different from
the prescribed duties of the court personnel. The temporary designation shall last only for such period
as is necessary to designate temporarily a court personnel with the appropriate prescribed duties.
Such temporary designation cannot go on for an indefinite period, or until the vacancy is filled
up. Executive Judge Leonilo B. Apita, RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City v. Marissa M. Estanislao, Court Legal
Researcher II, RTC, Br. 34, Tacloban City, A.M. No. P-06-2206, March 9, 2011.
Court Personnel; temporary designation. Requiring a Legal Researcher to perform the work of a Court
Interpreter is counter-productive and does not serve the ends of justice. Not only will respondent
jeopardize her present position as Legal Researcher by constantly shifting from one job to another,
her qualification as Court Interpreter will also be put in question. This arrangement does nothing but

compromise court personnels professional responsibility and optimum efficiency in the performance
of their respective roles in the dispensation of justice. Executive Judge Leonilo B. Apita, RTC, Br. 7,
Tacloban City v. Marissa M. Estanislao, Court Legal Researcher II, RTC, Br. 34, Tacloban City, A.M. No.
P-06-2206, March 9, 2011.
Judges; administrative complaint not a substitute for judicial remedy. An administrative complaint for
gross ignorance of the law was filed against Judge De Vera for denying admission of a position paper
due to her mistaken belief that the same was filed out of time. Upon a showing of the judges good
faith and efforts to rectify her mistake, the complaint was dismissed. An administrative complaint is
not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where
a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for
certiorari. Disciplinary proceedings against a judge are not complementary or suppletory to, nor a
substitute for these judicial remedies whether ordinary or extraordinary. For, obviously, if subsequent
developments prove the judges challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed
against her at all. Besides, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or
decision rendered, assuming she has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make
her position doubly unbearable. Atty. Rafael T. Martinez and Spouses Dan and Edna Reyes v. Judge
Grace Gliceria F. De Vera, Presiding Judge, MTCC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1718,
March 9, 2011.
Judges; administrative complaint not a substitute for judicial remedy. As to the allegation of grave
misconduct against Judge Pao in holding a hearing notwithstanding the fact that defendants counsel
already rested his case, the same has no leg to stand on. Time and again, the Supreme Court has
ruled that the acts of a judge, pertaining to his judicial functions, are not subject to disciplinary
action, unless they are tainted with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. If the complainant felt
aggrieved, his recourse is through judicial remedies, i.e., to elevate the assailed decision or order to
the higher court for review and correction. Indeed, disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions
against magistrates do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary
or extraordinary. An inquiry into their civil, criminal and/or administrative liability may be made only
after the available remedies have been exhausted and decided with finality. Ferdinand C. Bacolot v.
Hon. Francisco D. Pao, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 93, San Pedro, Laguna, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2241, March
9, 2011.
Judges; conduct unbecoming of a judge. In his Comment on an administrative complaint filed against
him, respondent judge used derogatory and irreverent language in relation to the complainant.
Verily, we hold that Judge Amila should be more circumspect in his language. It is reprehensible for
a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and
restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words,
written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his
discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness. Accordingly, respondent Judge Venancio
J. Amila is hereby found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. Lydia A. Benancillo v. Judge
Venancio J. Amila, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149, March 9, 2011.
Judges; gross ignorance of law. An administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law was filed
against Judge De Vera for denying admission of a position paper due to her mistaken belief that the
same was filed out of time. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject
decision, order or actuation of respondent judge in the performance of her official duties is contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, she must be moved by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find
refuge. The complaint is dismissed. Atty. Rafael T. Matinez and Spouses Dan and Edna Reyes v.
Judge Grace Gliceria F. De Vera, Presiding Judge, MTCC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, A.M. No. MTJ-081718, March 9, 2011.

Judges; gross misconduct. When Judge Limbona was appointed as a judge, he took an oath to
uphold the law, yet in filing a certificate of candidacy as a party-list representative without giving
up his judicial post, he violated not only the law, but the constitutional mandate that no officer or
employee in the civil service shall engage directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan
political campaign. The NBI investigation on the authenticity of Judge Limbonas signatures on the
certificate of candidacy unqualifiedly established that the judge signed the certificate of candidacy,
thus negating his claim that his signatures were forged. The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a
partisan political activity as the candidate thereby offers himself to the electorate for an elective
post. For his continued performance of his judicial duties despite his candidacy for a political post,
Judge Limbona is guilty of grave misconduct in office. While we cannot interfere with Judge Limbonas
political aspirations, we cannot allow him to pursue his political goals while still on the bench. We
cannot likewise allow him to deceive the Judiciary. In light of the gravity of Judge Limbonas
infractions, we find OCAs recommended penalty of dismissal to be appropriate. Under the Rules of
Court, dishonesty and gross misconduct are punishable by dismissal. Ashary M. Alauya, Clerk of
Court, Sharia District Court, Marawi City v. Judge Casan Ali M. Limbona, Sharia Circuit Court, Lanao
del Sur, A.M. No. SCC-98-4, March 22, 2011.
Judges; impropriety. Respondent judge acted inappropriately in calling the complainant and the
intervenors to a meeting inside his chamber and using derogatory and irreverent language in relation
to a complainant. Accordingly, he was found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. The New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of the judiciary, in the discharge of
their duties, to be models of propriety at all times. Sections 1 and 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of impropriety but even acts
which have the appearance of impropriety. The Code recognizes that even acts that are not per se
improper can nevertheless be perceived by the larger community as such. Be it stressed that judges
are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys and other persons not
[vested] with public trust. Lydia A. Benancillo v. Judge Venancio J. Amila, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149,
March 9, 2011.
Judges; undue delay in rendering a decision or order. It took respondent judge six (6) years to
resolve, on technicality, a case governed by the rule on summary procedure. When confronted with
administrative charges of delay, the Court shall be guided by the period allowed by law.
Reglementary periods fixed by law and the various issuances of the Court are designed not only to
protect the rights of all the parties to due process but also to achieve efficiency and order in the
conduct of official business. The Court has time and again admonished judges to be prompt in the
performance of their solemn duty as dispenser of justice, since undue delays erode the peoples faith
in the judicial system. Delay not only reinforces the belief of the people that the wheels of justice
grind ever so slowly, but invites suspicion, however unfair, of ulterior motives on the part of the
judge. The raison dtre of courts lies not only in properly dispensing justice but also in being able to
do so seasonably. Josefina Naguiat v. Judge Mario B. Capellan, Presiding Judge, MTCC, Br. 1, Malolos
City, Bulacan, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1782, March 23, 2011.
Law Professors; academic freedom; limitation. A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for
it has not been passed upon in any previous case before this Court, is the question of whether
lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic freedom as a defense in an administrative
proceeding for intemperate statements tending to pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a
case or degrade the courts. Applying by analogy the Courts past treatment of the free speech
defense in other bar discipline cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by
respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in jurisprudence is that the constitutional right to
freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers
to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the publics faith in the legal profession and the
justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case
of lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law professors. It is not contested

that respondent professors are, by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed academic freedom and
undisputably, they are free to determine what they will teach their students and how they will teach.
We must point out that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents
the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not
inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to
disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in favor of
a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their
capacity as teachers. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A statement by
the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.
Law Professors; engaged in practice of law. It would do well for the Court to remind respondent law
professors that, in view of the broad definition in Cayetano v. Monsod, lawyers when they teach law
are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than
lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of
the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against the same
canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their
being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers. Re: Letter of the UP
Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme
Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.
Law Professors; freedom of expression and speech; limitation. Respondent law professors claim that
the Court, upon its issuance of the Show Cause Resolution, has interfered with their constitutionally
mandated right to free speech and expression. In a long line of cases, this Court has held that the
right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial
concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In
cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly
affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and
fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and
common decency. Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement
exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech. Re: Letter of
the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme
Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.
Law Professors; respect for courts. For the disposition of the Court are the submissions of 37
respondent law professors in response to the Resolution directing them to show cause why they
should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for issuing a statement which alleged acts of
plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously
propound their points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This
Court is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the
same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established ethical standards. All
lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of
the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the
Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this
sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school
to which they belong. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A statement by
the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011.

April 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attorney; negligence. A complaint for disciplinary action was filed against Atty. Macario Ga due to his
failure to reconstitute or turn over to his client the records of the case in his possession. The Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to serve their clients with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 state: Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable; Rule 18.04. A lawyer shall
keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
clients request for information. Respondent Atty. Ga breached these duties when he failed to
reconstitute or turn over the records of the case to his client, herein complainant Gone. His
negligence manifests lack of competence and diligence required of every lawyer. His failure to
comply with the request of his client was a gross betrayal of his fiduciary duty and a breach of the
trust reposed upon him by his client. Respondents sentiments against complainant Gone is not a
valid reason for him to renege on his obligation as a lawyer. The moment he agreed to handle the
case, he was bound to give it his utmost attention, skill and competence. Public interest requires that
he exert his best efforts and all his learning and ability in defense of his clients cause. Those who
perform that duty with diligence and candor not only safeguard the interests of the client, but also
serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the communitys respect for
the legal profession. Patricio Gone v. Atty. Macario Ga, A.C. No. 7771, April 6, 2011.
Court personnel; conduct unbecoming. Sheriff Villarosas failure to comply with Section 9 of Rule 39
by delaying the deposit of the final amount he received (from a judgment debtor pursuant to a writ of
execution) and not delivering the other amounts to the Clerk of Court; and to faithfully account for the
amounts he received thru his failure to deliver the exact amounts, are clear manifestation of conduct
unbecoming of a government employee, tantamount to grave abuse of authority and dishonesty. The
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees enunciates the state policy
to promote a high standard of ethics in public service, and enjoins public officials and employees to
discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity and competence. Section 4 of the Code
lays down the norms of conduct which every public official and employee shall observe in the
discharge and execution of their official duties, specifically providing that they shall at all times
respect the rights of others, and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, and public interest. Thus, any conduct contrary to these standards would
qualify as conduct unbecoming of a government employee. Ma. Chedna Romero v. Pacifico B.
Villarosa, Jr., Sheriff IV, RTC, Br 17 Palompon, Leyte, A.M. No. P-11-2913, April 12, 2011.
Court personnel; falsification of public records. Respondent misrepresented in his Personal Data Sheet
his educational attainment and civil service eligibility for appointment as Clerk of Court III of the RTC
of Cebu City. Section 52, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292 (Administrative Code of 1987) and other pertinent Civil Service Laws classify dishonesty and
falsification of a public document as grave offenses such that even the first offense of this nature is
already punishable by dismissal from the service. Apropos is this Courts counsel in Aldecoa-Delorino
v. Remigio-Versoza on how it views, and intends to deal with such acts of dishonesty, thus: Let this
case serve as a warning to all court personnel that the Court, in the exercise of its administrative
supervision over all lower courts and their personnel, will not hesitate to enforce the full extent of the
law in disciplining and purging from the Judiciary all those who are not befitting the integrity and
dignity of the institution, even if it would mean their dismissal from the service despite their length of
service. Any act of dishonesty, misrepresentation, or falsification done by a court employee that may
lead to moral decadence shall be dealt with severely. Respondent Clerk of Court is found guilty of
gross dishonesty and falsification of public records, and is dismissed from the service. Antonio
Exequiel A. Momongan v. Primitivo A. Sumayo, Clerk III and Ariel A. Momongan, Process Server, A.M.
No. P-10-2767, April 12, 2011.

Court personnel; gross dishonesty. Respondent misrepresented in his Personal Data Sheet his
educational attainment and civil service eligibility for appointment as Clerk of Court III of the RTC of
Cebu City. This misrepresentation amounts to plain and simple dishonesty which, in this case, refers
to the act of intentionally making a false statement on any material fact in securing ones
appointment. It is a serious offense reflective of a persons character and the moral decay he suffers
from, virtually destroying all honor, virtue and integrity. It is a malevolent act that has no place in the
judiciary. No other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness
from an employee than a position in the judiciary. Respondents insistence that any deficiency arising
from the lack of a college diploma was cured by his satisfactory performance ratings arising from his
many years in public service deserves scant consideration. But even assuming arguendo that
respondents ratings mirror his performance, the core issue here is his fitness to continue serving in a
sensitive post. Antonio Exequiel A. Momongan v. Primitivo A. Sumayo, Clerk III and Ariel A.
Momongan, Process Server, A.M. No. P-10-2767, April 12, 2011.
Court personnel; gross negligence. We agree with the OCA finding that Atty. Fabro was guilty of gross
negligence of duty as branch clerk of court for being remiss in his duty to transmit to the CA the
records of civil cases within the required period (the records were elevated to the Court of Appeals
after six years from issuance of the RTC Order requiring him to do so). Judge Renato A. Fuentes v.
Atty. Rogelio F. Fabro, A.M. No. P-10-2791. April 6, 2011.
Court personnel; immoral conduct. This case involves an administrative complaint filed against a
court stenographer for Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct. The Court defined immoral conduct as
conduct that is willful, flagrant or shameless, and that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community. To justify suspension or disbarment, the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried and consenting adults
is not enough to warrant administrative sanction for illicit behavior. The Court has repeatedly held
that voluntary intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, where both are not under
any impediment to marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled act
that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action. While the Court has the power to regulate
official conduct and, to a certain extent, private conduct, it is not within our authority to decide on
matters touching on employees personal lives, especially those that will affect their and their
familys future. We cannot intrude into the question of whether they should or should not marry.
However, we take this occasion to remind judiciary employees to be more circumspect in their
adherence to their obligations under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The conduct of court
personnel must be free from any taint of impropriety or scandal, not only with respect to their official
duties but also in their behavior outside the Court as private individuals. This is the best way to
preserve and protect the integrity and the good name of our courts. In this case, the acts complained
of cannot be considered as disgraceful or grossly immoral conduct. Mary Jane Abanag v. Nicolas B.
Mabute, A.M. No. P-11-2922, April 4, 2011.
Judge; disciplinary action. Assuming for the sake of argument that respondent judge erred in issuing
the questioned order, he cannot be held liable for his official acts, no matter how erroneous, for as
long as he acted in good faith. A judge is not required to be faultless because to demand otherwise
would make the judicial office untenable for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in
the administration of justice can be infallible. As a matter of policy, a judge cannot be subject to
disciplinary action for his erroneous actions, unless it can be shown that they were accompanied by
bad faith, malice, corrupt motives, or improper considerations. In the absence of such proof, the
decision or order in question is presumed to have been issued in good faith by respondent judge.
This was emphasized in the case of Balsamo v. Judge Suan, where the Court explained: The Court
has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the
latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus, not every error or mistake that a

judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted
in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt
motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of
the law can find refuge. Antonio Monticalbo v. Judge Cresente F. Maraya, Jr., RTC, Br. 11, Calubian,
Leyte, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197, April 13, 2011.
Judge; gross ignorance of law. Complainant insists that respondent judge erred in ruling that his
counterclaim for attorneys fees and litigation expenses was covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure and points out that his claim exceeds the P10,000.00 limit set in the Rule on Summary
Procedure. Complainant is mistaken. The rule now has placed the ceiling at P100,000.00. A judge
can be held liable for gross ignorance of the law if it can be shown that he committed an error so
gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith. In addition to this, the acts complained of
must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but should also be motivated by bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. Antonio Monticalbo v. Judge Cresente F. Maraya, Jr., RTC, Br.
11, Calubian, Leyte, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197, April 13, 2011.
Judge; misconduct. We pass upon the unsigned letter complaint for administrative action and
disbarment against Justice Inting for gross neglect of judicial duties in deciding a case. In
administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in the
complaint with substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. We set the applicable standard in deciding cases
involving accusations of misconduct leveled at judges in Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan v. VillalonPornillos, where we said: The burden of substantiating the charges in an administrative proceeding
against court officials and employees falls on the complainant, who must be able to prove the
allegations in the complaint with substantial evidence. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
presumption that respondent regularly performed her duties will prevail. Moreover, in the absence of
cogent proof, bare allegations of misconduct cannot prevail over the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions. In fact, an administrative complaint leveled against a judge must
always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are, by their nature,
highly penal, such that the respondent stands to face the sanction of dismissal and/or disbarment.
The Court does not thus give credence to charges based on mere suspicion and speculation. Given
the lack of any evidence to prove that Justice Inting acted with any bad faith or ill-motive, we dismiss
the complaint against her. Re: Complaint of Concerned Members of Chinese Grocers Association
Against Justice Socorro B. Inting of the Court of Appeals, A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-177-CA-J, April 12, 2011.
Judge; presumption of good faith. In cases where a judge is charged with bribery or grave
misconduct, bias or partiality cannot be presumed. Neither can bad faith or malice be inferred just
because the judgment or order rendered by respondent is adverse to complainant. In order to merit
disciplinary action, it must be established that respondents actions were motivated by bad faith,
dishonesty or hatred or were attended by fraud, dishonesty or corruption. In the absence of such
proof, the decision or order in question is presumed to have been issued in good faith by respondent
judge. This was emphasized in the case of Balsamo v. Judge Suan, where the Court explained: The
Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice
before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus, not every error or
mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown
to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and absence of
malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged
with ignorance of the law can find refuge. Antonio Monticalbo v. Judge Cresente F. Maraya, Jr., RTC,
Br. 11, Calubian, Leyte, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197, April 13, 2011.
Justice; conduct unbecoming. We point out that publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of
having studied in and graduated from certain law schools, no matter how prestigious, might have
even revealed, on the part of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, their bias for or against some

lawyers. Their conduct was impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, demands that judges avoid situations that may
reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal
relations with individual members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their courts.
Judges should be dignified in demeanor, and refined in speech. In performing their judicial duties,
they should not manifest bias or prejudice by word or conduct towards any person or group on
irrelevant grounds. Their language must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be
misconstrued. In this regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, mandates judges to carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons,
such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on
any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties. In view of the foregoing,
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez were guilty of unbecoming conduct, which is defined as improper
performance. Unbecoming conduct applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of
social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method. Assistant Special
Prosecutor III Rohermina J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, et al., A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J,
April 12, 2011.
Justice; simple misconduct. The procedure adopted by respondent Justices for their provincial
hearings was in blatant disregard of PD 1606, as amended, the Rules of Court, and the Revised
Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Even worse, their adoption of the procedure arbitrarily denied
the benefit of a hearing before a duly constituted Division of the Sandiganbayan to all the affected
litigants, including the State, thereby rendering the integrity and efficacy of their proceedings open to
serious challenge. Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors men forgive and time
forgets. They are expected to have more than just a modicum acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules. For this reason alone, respondent Justices adoption of the irregular procedure
cannot be dismissed as a mere deficiency in prudence or as a lapse in judgment on their part, but
should be treated as simple misconduct, which is to be distinguished from either gross misconduct or
gross ignorance of the law. The respondent Justices were not liable for gross misconduct defined as
the transgression of some established or definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior
or gross negligence, or the corrupt or persistent violation of the law or disregard of well-known legal
rules considering that the explanations they have offered herein, which the complainant did not
refute, revealed that they strove to maintain their collegiality by holding their separate hearings
within sight and hearing distance of one another. Neither were they liable for gross ignorance of the
law, which must be based on reliable evidence to show that the act complained of was ill-motivated,
corrupt, or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or in persistent disregard of well-known legal
rules; on the contrary, none of these circumstances was attendant herein, for the respondent Justices
have convincingly shown that they had not been ill-motivated or inspired by an intention to violate
any law or legal rule in adopting the erroneous procedure, but had been seeking, instead, to thereby
expedite their disposition of cases in the provinces. Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermina J.
Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, et al., A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, April 12, 2011.

May 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Court personnel; gross dishonesty and gross misconduct. It is the clerks of courts duty to faithfully
perform their duties and responsibilities as such to the end that there was full compliance with
function, that of being custodians of the courts funds and revenues, records, properties and
premises. They are the chief administrative officers of their respective courts. It is also their duty to
ensure that the proper procedures are followed in the collection of cash bonds. Clerks of court are
officers of the law who perform vital functions in the prompt and sound administration of justice. Their
office is the hub of adjudicative and administrative orders, processes and concerns. Thus, the
unwarranted failure to fulfill these responsibilities deserves administrative sanction and not even the

full payment of the collection shortages will exempt the accountable officer from liability. By failing to
properly remit the cash collections constituting public funds, Recio violated the trust reposed in her as
disbursement officer of the Judiciary. Her failure to explain satisfactorily the fund shortage, and to
restitute the shortage and fully comply with the Courts directives leave us no choice but to hold her
liable for gross neglect of duty and gross dishonesty. Office of the Court Administrator v. Recio, A.M.
No. P-11-2932. May 30, 2011
Court personnel; duty of sheriff. A court sheriffs act of distorting the facts in his Officers Return
during the implementation of a writ issued by a trial court is a matter that remains within the
supervisory control of the court. The alleged errors committed by the courts ministerial officers, like
the respondent sheriff, should be correctible by the court. The alleged irregularities should have been
brought first to the RTC for its resolution. The same is true with the writ of possession itself. It was the
judges responsibility as the writ was issued by the court. The respondent sheriffs duty, it must be
stressed, is only to implement the writ and this duty is ministerial. Maylas v. Esmeria, A.M. No. P-112932. May 30, 2011
Court personnel; misconduct. A complaint for Grave Misconduct was filed by Judge Tan against
Quitorio, then an RTC Legal Researcher, for allegedly drafting a resolution of a motion to dismiss in a
case which was not assigned to him and for thereafter informing one of the parties in that case that
he had already submitted the draft to Judge Tan and that the said party should follow it up with the
judge. Misconduct has been defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct
is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or
to disregard established rules, all of which must be established by substantial evidence, and must
necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave
misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses
his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty
and the rights of others. The Court finds itself hardly convinced that Quitorio prepared the draft
resolution of the motion knowing that the case was not assigned to him in the absence of clear
evidence of that fact. However, Quitorios admission that he informed a party about the submission
of his draft resolution to Judge Tan, and advised said party to follow it up with Judge Tan in her sala, is
violative of the confidentiality required of court personnel and constitutes simple misconduct. A court
personnel is prohibited from disclosing confidential information to any unauthorized person. Tan v.
Quitorio, A.M. No. P-11-2919. May 30, 2011.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. A security guard employed by the Supreme Court was charged
administratively for the theft of used galvinized iron sheets in the SC Compound in Baguio City. There
is reasonable ground to believe that Tugas is indeed responsible for the taking of the GI sheets. It is
hard to believe that Tugas, being the back post guard at the time, did not hear the rattling and
clanging sound of GI sheets being moved and dropped below the perimeter fence. Tugas attire at the
night of the incident matched that of the culprit as described by the boarder. Misconduct has been
defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any
of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established
rules, all of which must be established by substantial evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a
charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an
official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure
some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. Furthermore,
misconduct warranting removal from office of an officer must have direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to misadministration or willful,
intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office. Security guards, by the very
nature of their work, are mandated to secure the court premises and protect its property from
pilferage. Tugas is bound to safeguard the court premises and its properties. Tugas very clearly

violated his duty by taking the GI sheets with the intention to use it for personal house repairs. He
unlawfully used his position to procure benefit for himself, blatantly contrary to his duty. With the
element of corruption accompanying his unlawful behaviour, Tugas is guilty of grave misconduct. Re:
Theft of the Used Galvinized Iron Sheets in the SC Compound, Baguio, A.M. No. 2008-15-SC. May 31,
2011.

June 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Administrative proceedings; quantum of evidence. It is a settled rule that in administrative

proceedings that the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in his or her complaint
with substantial evidence. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the
respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail. Illupa vs. Abdullah, A.M. No. SCC-11-16-P.
June 1, 2011
Administrative proceedings; mitigating circumstances. In several jurisprudential precedents, the
Court has refrained from imposing the actual administrative penalties prescribed by law or regulation
in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondents length of service, the
respondents acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances,
humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondents advanced age, among other things, have
had varying significance in the determination by the Court of the imposable penalty. Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Aguilar, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2087, June 7, 2011
Court personnel; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Respondent was found to
have knowingly delayed the release of a warrant of arrest against an accused in a criminal case until
the accused had left the country. For knowingly delaying the release of the warrant of arrest,
respondent had placed the court in a very negative light. It prejudiced the Courts standing in the
community as it projected an image of a Court that is unable to enforce its processes on time. For
this reason, we find her liable not only for simple neglect of duty, but for the more serious offense of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Respondent clerk of courts very much delayed
action on the complainants request for a copy of the warrant of arrest in the criminal case and in the
delivery of the warrant to the police authorities cast doubts on the capability of the court to
administer justice fairly and expeditiously. Such act is likely to reflect adversely on the administration
of justice. Thus, the respondent should be made to answer for her infraction in a way that will serve
as a lesson to everyone in the judiciary to be forthright in his dealings with the public, and to act
speedily on matters within his area of responsibility, regardless of who is involved. The prejudice she
caused and her liability for her conduct can in no way be extinguished or mitigated by the issuance of
a second warrant of arrest, or by the complainants subsequent voluntary desistance from pursuing
the case. The harm had already been done on the aggrieved party and on the judiciary when these
developments transpired. Sonido vs. Ilocso, A.M. No. P-10-2794. June 1, 2011
Court personnel; conduct unbecoming. The respondent MTCC court interpreter harassed and
threatened her neighbors and even used the police to perpetrate these acts. By her actions, she
directly implied that she was using her court position to unilaterally enforce what she wanted.
Employees of the judiciary should be living examples of uprightness, not only in the performance of
official duties, but also in their personal and private dealings with other people, so as to preserve at
all times the good name and standing of the courts in the community. Any scandalous behavior or any
act that may erode the peoples esteem for the judiciary is unbecoming of an employee. The Code of
Judicial Ethics mandates that court personnel must not only be, but also be perceived to be, free from
any impropriety with respect to both their official duties and their behavior anywhere else. The
respondents ugly display of an oppressive and overbearing character failed to meet the exacting
standards required of employees of the judiciary and deserves administrative sanctions from the

Court. The respondents continued harassment of complainants to force them to leave the premises
so she could occupy the whole place cannot and should not be countenanced. Clearly, respondent is
guilty of oppression and of conduct unbecoming a court employee acts that amount to simple
misconduct. Mendez vs. Balbuena, A.M. No. P-11-2931. June 1, 2011
Court personnel; grave misconduct. Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice and
high standards are expected of them. Their conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by
propriety and decorum but must, at all times, be above suspicion. Part of this stringent requirement
is that agents of the law should refrain from the use of abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing or
otherwise improper language. Judicial employees are expected to accord due respect, not only to
their superiors, but also to others and their rights at all times. Their every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity. The respondents arrogant behavior was a
violation of these rules of conduct for judicial employees. Flores vs. Pascasio, A.M. No. P-06-2130,
June 13, 2011
Court personnel; grave misconduct. Respondent sheriff was found guilty of two offenses: (1) failure to
make a return of a writ of execution within the period provided by the Rules of Court; and (2) failure to
turn over the checks he received by virtue of the implementation of the writ to the court issuing it
within the same day he received them. The duty of a sheriff to make a return of the writ is ministerial
and it is not his duty to wait for the plaintiff to decide whether or not to accept the checks as
payment. When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any
instructions to the contrary, to proceed with celerity and promptness to execute it according to its
mandate. A sheriff has no discretion whatsoever with respect to the disposition of the amounts he
receives. If he finds that there is a need to clarify what to do with the checks, prudence and
reasonableness dictate that clarification be sought immediately from the clerk or judge issuing it. A
sheriff is expected to know the rules of procedure pertaining to his functions as an officer of the
court, relative to the implementation of writs of execution, and should, at all times, show a high
degree of professionalism in the performance of his duties. Any act deviating from the procedure laid
down by the Rules is misconduct that warrants disciplinary action. Office of the Court Administrator
vs. Tolosa,A.M. No. P-09-2715. June 13, 2011
Court personnel; gross neglect of duty. [Respondent] should be reminded that it is the duty of the
court stenographer who has attended a session of a court to immediately deliver to the clerk of court
all the notes he has taken, the same to be attached to the record of the case. The failure to submit
the TSNs within the period prescribed constitutes gross neglect of duty. Gross neglect of duty is
classified as a grave offense and punishable by dismissal even if for the first offense. The
performance of a stenographers duty is essential to the prompt and proper administration of justice,
and his inaction hampers the administration of justice and erodes public faith in the judiciary. No less
than the Constitution mandates that public officers must serve the people with utmost respect and
responsibility. Public office is a public trust. Absin vs. Montalla, A.M. No. P-10-2829. June 21, 2011
Court personnel; misconduct. Clerk of Court Joaquino was found guilty of grave misconduct, abuse of
authority, and gross ignorance of the law. He filed a second motion for reconsideration contending
that the penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay is too harsh and severe for the offense he
was found guilty of. The Court, in the spirit of compassion, lowered the penalty imposed but warned
him that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future shall merit his dismissal from the
service. Clerks of court occupy a sensitive position in the judicial system, they are required to
safeguard the integrity of the court and its proceedings, to earn and preserve respect therefor, to
maintain loyalty thereto and to the judge as superior officer, to maintain the authenticity and
correctness of court records, and to uphold the confidence of the public in the administration of
justice. Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Joaquinto, A.M. No. P-10-283, June 8, 2011

Judge; dishonesty. The accomplishment of the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) is a requirement under the
Civil Service Rules and Regulations for employment in the government. Judge Aguilar was guilty of
dishonesty in filling out her PDS when she answered that she had no pending administrative case
against her and that she had not been formally charged nor found guilty of any administrative
charge. Her failure to disclose such facts in her PDS filed upon her assumption of office when she
already had notice of the adverse decision therein constitutes dishonesty, considered a grave offense
under the Administrative Code of 1987, as well as the Civil Service Rules, with the corresponding
penalty of dismissal from service even for the first offense. Office of the Court Administrator vs.
Aguilar,A.M. No. RTJ-07-2087, June 7, 2011
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Considering that complainant had already manifested in court,
albeit belatedly, the presence of what it considered to be a valid Certification to File Action in court
due to unsuccessful conciliation, respondent judges act of referring the case to barangay conciliation
rendered its purpose moot and academic. The rules of procedure are clear and unambiguous, leaving
no room for interpretation. The failure to apply elementary rules of procedure constitutes gross
ignorance of the law and procedure. Neither good faith nor lack of malice will exonerate respondent
because the rules violated were basic procedural rules. All that was needed for respondent to do was
to apply them. Diaz vs. Gestopa, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1786. June 22, 2011
Judge; gross inefficiency. Respondent judge is liable for gross inefficiency for failing to adopt a system
of record management in her court. Furthermore, respondent judge resolved a motion for
reconsideration which was filed way beyond the required period. There was also a delay in sending
the records of the appealed case to the CA. Respondent judge violated Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly
and decide cases within the required periods. Bareng vs. Daguna, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2246. June 1,
2011
Lawyers; administrative proceedings vis--vis contempt proceedings. When the Court initiates
contempt proceedings and/or disciplinary proceedings against lawyers for intemperate and
discourteous language and behavior directed at the courts, the evil sought to be prevented is the
same the degradation of the courts and the loss of trust in the administration of justice. For this
reason, it is not unusual for the Court to cite authorities on bar discipline (involving the duty to give
due respect to the courts) in contempt cases against lawyers and vice versa. When the Court chooses
to institute an administrative case against a respondent lawyer, the mere citation or discussion in the
orders or decision in the administrative case of jurisprudence involving contempt proceedings does
not transform the action from a disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt. Re: Letter of UP Law
Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law etc.,A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, June 7, 2011
Sharia Court personnel; abuse of authority. Respondent, a clerk of court of a Sharia court, was found
not to have abused his authority in issuing a certificate of divorce upon the request of the
complainants wife. The issuance of a certificate of divorce is within the respondent clerk of courts
duties as defined by law in the Muslim Code of the Philippines. The respondent merely performed his
ministerial duty. The alleged erroneous entries on the Certificate of Divorce cannot be attributed to
respondent considering that it is only his duty to receive, file and register the certificate of divorce
presented to him for registration. Further, even if there were indeed erroneous entries on the
certificate of divorce, such errors cannot be corrected nor cancelled through an administrative
complaint. Illupa vs. Abdullah, A.M. No. SCC-11-16-P. June 1, 2011

July 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Court personnel; dishonesty and conduct prejudicial. A complaint was filed against the respondent
alleging that he accepted employment as Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Supreme Court, and thus
received salaries and other benefits as such, while still remaining an active member and officer of the
Philippine National Police (PNP). The Court found that respondent was liable for gross dishonesty and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. His non-disclosure of the material fact that he
was still employed as an active member of the PNP and receiving his monthly salaries during the
period that he was already a Court employee is considered substantial proof that he tried to
cheat/defraud both the PNP and the Court. Respondent transgressed the Constitution and the Civil
Service law on the prohibition on dual employment and double compensation in the government
service. Re: Gross violation of Civil Service Law on the prohibition against dual employment and
double compensation in the government service committed by Mr. Eduardo V. Escala, etc. A.M. No.
2011-04-SC, July 5, 2011
Court personnel; effect of absences without approved leave. An administrative case was filed against
Cabrera, a Utility Worker in the MTCC of Lipa City, who has failed to file his Daily Time
Records (DTRs) and to seek leave for any of his absences. The Court held that pursuant to the
Omnibus Rules on Leave, an employees absence without official leave for at least 30 working days
warrants his separation from the service. A public office is a public trust. Public officers must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency. By going on AWOL, Cabrera grossly disregarded and neglected the duties of
his office. He failed to adhere to the high standards of public accountability imposed on all those in
government service. Re: Dropping from the Rolls of Cornelio Reniette Cabrera, etc. A.M. No. P-112946. July 13, 2011
Court personnel; habitual tardiness. Respondent, a clerk of court of the RTC in Lucena City, was found
to have been tardy in reporting for work more than ten times each month from July to October 2010.
Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 23, Series of 1998 provides that any employee shall be
considered habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, ten (10) times
a month for at least two (2) months in a semester or at least two (2) consecutive months during the
year. Habitual tardiness is an administrative offense that seriously compromises work efficiency and
hampers public service. By being habitually tardy, respondent has fallen short of the stringent
standard of conduct demanded from everyone connected with the administration of justice. The Clerk
of Court plays a vital role in ensuring the prompt and sound administration of justice. Moral
obligations, performance of household chores, traffic problems and health, domestic and financial
concerns are not sufficient reasons to excuse habitual tardiness. Re: Leave Division, Office of
Administrative Services, OCA v. Francisco A. Pua, Jr. Clerk of Court V, RTC, Br. 55, Lucena City. A.M.
No. P-11-2945. July 13, 2011
Court personnel; habitual tardiness. The Leave Division of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
reported on the tardiness incurred by respondent court stenographer. The OCA recommended that
the case be redocketed as a regular administrative matter and that she be reprimanded for habitual
tardiness with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense would warrant the imposition
of a more severe penalty. Moral obligations, performance of household chores, traffic problems, health
conditions, domestic and financial concerns are not sufficient reasons to excuse habitual
tardiness. Respondent submitted an answer to the complaint acknowledging her infraction and
begging the indulgence of the Court. The Court found the penalty of severe reprimand to be proper
for her infraction. Office of the Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator vs. Leda O.
Uri, etc.A.M. No. P-10-2852. July 27, 2011
Court personnel; misconduct. Respondent sheriff was charged with negligence and grave
misconduct as he was allegedly negligent in levying upon a motor vehicle and proceeding with its
auction sale without looking into the cars Certificate of Registration to determine whether it was
encumbered or not. The Court held that it was irrelevant for the complainant to argue that the

respondent failed to check the cars certificate of registration to determine if it was encumbered
because the encumbrance, until foreclosed, will not in any way affect the judgment debtors rights
over the property or exempt the property from the levy in any event. A sheriffs duty to execute a
writ is simply ministerial and he is bound to perform only those tasks stated under the Rules of Court
and no more. Any interest a third party may have on the property levied upon by the sheriff to
enforce a judgment is the third partys responsibility to protect through the remedies provided under
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Golden Sun Finance Corporation, rep by Rachelle L. Marmito vs. Ricardo
R. Albano, etc, A.M. No. P-11-2888. July 27, 2011
Court personnel; sheriffs duty to give notice prior to demolition. With respect to Sheriff Calsenia, the
Court finds that he failed to strictly comply with the requirement of prior notice to vacate before
demolition as required by the rules. It is the duty of the sheriff to give notice of such writ and
demand from the defendant to vacate the property within three days. Only after such period can the
sheriff enforce the writ by the bodily removal of defendant and his personal belongings. The law
discourages any form of arbitrary and oppressive conduct in the execution of an otherwise legitimate
act. Any act deviating from the procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court is tantamount to
misconduct and necessitates disciplinary action. Spouses Sur and Rita Villa, et al. v. Presiding Judge
Roberto L. Ayco, et al.A.M. No. RTJ-11-2284. July 13, 2011
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Respondent Judge failed to conduct a pre-trial conference contrary
to elementary rules of procedure which he should have known all too well considering his long years
of service in the bench. Such ignorance of a basic rule in court procedure, as failing to conduct pretrial, sadly amounts to gross ignorance and warrants a corresponding penalty. As to the allegations of
poor judgment and gross ignorance of basic legal principles in granting the motions for execution
pending appeal for flimsy and unsupported reasons, the particular reasons relied upon by respondent
judge for issuing the writ of execution pending appeal are so unreliably weak and feeble that it
highlights the lack of knowledge of respondent judge with regard to the proper appreciation of
arguments. Dire financial conditions of the plaintiffs supported by mere self-serving statements as
good reason for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal does not stand on solid
footing. It does not even stand on its own. National Power Corporation, represented its President
Cyril Del Callar vs. Judge Santos B. Adiong, Regional Trial Court, BR. 8, Marawi City, A.M. No. RTJ-072060. July 27, 2011
Judge; gross misconduct. Judge Rabang, a judge of the MTCC in Cotabato City, left the Philippines in
May 2007 without an approved leave and has remained abroad and absent from his court for more
than four years. Such attitude betrays his lack of concern for his office. He has abandoned his office
and committed gross misconduct. The Code of Judicial Conduct decrees that a judge should
administer justice impartially and without delay. A judge should likewise be imbued with a high sense
of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly administer justice. The trial
court judges being the paradigms of justice in the first instance have been exhorted to dispose of the
courts business promptly and to decide cases within the required period because delay results in
undermining the peoples faith in the judiciary from whom the prompt hearing of their supplications is
anticipated and expected, and reinforces in the minds of the litigants the impression that the wheels
of justice grind ever so slowly. Re: Application for indefinite leave and travel abroad of Pres. Judge
Francisco P. Rabang III, MTCC, Cotabato City. A.M. No. 07-9-214-MTCC. July 26, 2011
Judge; undue delay in rendering a decision. With respect to Judge Ayco, the Court stresses that the
propriety or impropriety of the motion for reconsideration is judicial in nature and therefore, beyond
the scope of this administrative proceedings. He however, cannot be excused for the delay in
resolving complainants motion for reconsideration. Failure to decide a case or resolve a motion within
the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanction against the erring judge. Spouses Sur and Rita Villa, et al. v. Presiding Judge Roberto L.
Ayco, et al.A.M. No. RTJ-11-2284. July 13, 2011

August 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Court personnel; dishonesty and gross neglect of duty. It must be stressed that sheriffs are not
allowed to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their
duties. Corollary, a sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant
without observing the procedural steps under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court: (1) prepare an
estimate of expenses to be incurred in executing the writ, for which he must seek the courts
approval; (2) render an accounting; and (3) issue an official receipt for the total amount he received
from the judgment debtor. Failure to observe these steps would amount to dishonesty or extortion.
Moreover, Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that it is mandatory for sheriffs to
execute and make a return on the writ of execution within 30 days from receipt of the writ and every
30 days thereafter until it is satisfied in full or its effectivity expires. Even if the writs are unsatisfied
or only partially satisfied, sheriffs must still file the reports so that the court, as well as the litigants,
may be informed of the proceedings undertaken to implement the writ. Here, the long delay in the
execution of the judgments and the failure to accomplish the required periodic reports demonstrate
respondent sheriffs gross neglect and gross inefficiency in the performance of his official duties.
Likewise, respondent sheriffs receipt of money in his official capacity and his failure to turn over the
amount to the clerk of court is an act of misappropriation of funds amounting to
dishonesty. Proserpina V. Anico v. Emerson B. Pilipia, Sheriff IV, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Manila. A.M. No. P-11-2896. August 2, 2011.
Court personnel; inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties. The Court found
Officer-in-Charge (OIC) Ester Asilo administratively liable for her inaccurate preparation of monthly
case reports, inept monitoring of case records, and incompetent supervision of court personnel. A
Clerk of Court is an essential officer in any judicial system, her office being the center of activities,
both adjudicative and administrative. Thus, OIC Asilo must recognize that her administrative
functions are just as vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice. She cannot proffer as an
excuse that she merely inherited and continued the procedure followed prior to her designation.
Upon acceptance of her designation, her first concern was to know her assumed duties and
responsibilities especially when administrative circulars, issuances and manual of clerks of court are
at hand. Nilda Verginesa-Suarez v. Judge Renato J. Dilag and Court Stenographer III Concepcion A.
Pascua and Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Renato J. Dilag. Ester A. Asilo, Officer-inCharge, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo City, Zambales and Atty.
Ronald D. Gavino, Deputy Clerk of Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional trial Court, Olongapo
City. A.M. No. RTJ-06-2014 and A.M. No. RTJ-11-2293. August 16, 2011
Court personnel; simple misconduct. Giganto and Valenzuela, co-workers in the Personnel Division of
OAS-OCA, got involved in a fistfight for which they were found guilty of simple misconduct by the
Court. In computing their penalties, the Court considered their length of service, satisfactory
performance ratings, and number of previous administrative charges as mitigating, aggravating and
alternative circumstances, as the case may be. Time and again, the Court has stressed the need for
the conduct and behavior of every person connected with the dispensation of justice to be
characterized by propriety and decorum. This standard is applied, not only with respect to a court
employees dealings with the public, but also with his or her co-workers in the service. Conduct
violative of this standard quickly and surely erodes respect for the courts. Misbehavior within and
around the courts vicinity diminishes the courts sanctity and dignity. Any fighting or
misunderstanding becomes a disgraceful sight reflecting adversely on the good image of the
Judiciary. Re: Letter-Complaint of Mr. Recarredo S. Valenzuela, Clerk IV, Personnel Division, OAS-OCA
against Mr. Ricardo R. Giganto, Utility Worker II, Personnel Division, OAS-OCA. A.M. No. 2011-01-SC.
August 23, 2011.

September 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attorney; filing of baseless complaint. Respondents cannot be held liable for judiciously performing
their sworn duty to observe and follow court proceedings as provided by the Rules. Complainant
apparently filed this complaint primarily to divert the attention of his client from his shortcomings as
its counsel, if not to simply harass the respondents. A lawyer who files an unfounded complaint must
be sanctioned because, as an officer of the court, he does not discharge his duty by filing
frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary.
Such filing of baseless complaints is contemptuous of the courts. Complainant was ordered to show
cause why he should not be subjected to disciplinary action for filing a frivolous and baseless
complaint. Atty. Emmanuel R. Andamo v. Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr., Clerk of Court Stanlee D. Calma
and Legal Researcher Diana G. Ruiz, all of Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 Tagytay City. A.M. No. RTJ11-2265. September 21, 2011.
Court personnel; dishonesty. The practice of respondent in offsetting her collection is not allowed
under accounting and auditing rules and regulations. By failing to properly remit the cash collections
constituting public funds, she violated the trust reposed in her as disbursement officer of the
Judiciary. Likewise, her claim that she did not know that she is the accountable officer for the court
collections does not convince the Court. Clerks of Court are presumed to know their duty to
immediately deposit with the authorized government depositories the various funds they receive, for
they are not supposed to keep funds in their personal possession. Her failure to deposit the said
amount upon collection was prejudicial to the court, which did not earn interest income on the said
amount or was not able to otherwise use the said funds. The Court found respondent guilty of
dishonesty and dismissed her from the service. Office of the Court Administrator v. Evelyn
Elumbaring, Clerk of Court II, 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Carmen-Sto. Tomas-Braulio E. Dujali,
Davao del Norte. A.M. No. P-10-2765. September 13, 2011.
Court personnel; failure to perform duty. Respondent admitted that he failed to serve the Notice of
Pre-Trial Conference and Pre-Trial to complainant, upon instruction of the judge, since the complainant
was already informed of the scheduled hearing. Respondent, as process server, is reminded to
perform his duty diligently for the orderly administration of justice. There is a need to serve the
notice on the complainant not only to make the act official but also to enable him to make the proper
return to reflect what transpired. The possibility that the complainant might deny that he had been
so informed by the Judge is not remote. Col. Mauricio A. Santiago, Jr. v. Arthur M. Camangyan,
Process Server, Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Toledo City. A.M. No. P-11-2977. September 14,
2011.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. Upon receipt of the process server fee, respondent issued an
acknowledgment receipt instead of an official receipt. This is in violation of the Supreme Court
Circular No. 26-97 which mandates the issuance of official receipts for payments received. Her
explanation that the acknowledgment receipt was sufficient since the process server fee she collected
was not part of the Judiciary Development Fund, Special Allowance for the Judiciary or subjected to
any fund allocation was not a valid justification for her non-compliance with the court circular. She
violated the trust and confidence reposed in her as cashier and disbursement officer of the court. The
Court will not tolerate any conduct, act or omission by any court employee violating the norm of
public accountability and diminishing or tending to diminish the faith of the people in the
Judiciary. Dolores C. Seliger v. Alma P. Licay, Clerk of Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Juan, La
Union. A.M. No. P-11-2970. September 14, 2011.

October 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attorney; dishonesty. It is clear from the records that respondent Atty. Ediza deceived the Spouses
Floran when he asked them to unknowingly sign a deed of sale transferring a portion of their land to
him. Respondent also made it appear that the original owner of the land conveyed her rights therto
to respondent and not to the Spouses Floran. When the sale of the Spouses Florans land pushed
through, respondent received half of the proceeds given by the buyer and falsely misled the Spouses
Floran into thinking that he will register the remaining portion of the land. Lamentably, Atty. Ediza
played on the navet of the Spouses Floran to deprive them of their valued property. This is an
unsavory behavior from a member of the legal profession. Aside from giving adequate attention, care
and time to his clients case, a lawyer is also expected to be truthful, fair and honest in protecting his
clients rights. Once a lawyer fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer. Respondent
lawyer violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for which he is suspended from the practice of law for six
months. Nemesio Floran and Caridad Floran v. Atty. Roy Prule Ediza. A.C. No. 5325. October 19,
2011.
Attorney; grave misconduct. Respondent attorney was found to have violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondents actions clearly show that she deceived
complainant into lending money to her through the use of documents and false representations and
by taking advantage of her education and complainants ignorance in legal matters. As manifested
by complainant, he would have never granted the loan to respondent were it not for respondents
misrepresentation that she was authorized to sell the property and that complainant could register
the open deed of sale if respondent fails to pay the loan. By her misdeed, respondent has eroded
not only complainants perception of the legal profession but the publics perception as well. Her
actions constitute gross misconduct for which she may be disciplined. Tomas P. Tan, Jr. v. Atty. Haide
V. Gumba. A.C. No. 9000. October 5, 2011.
Attorney; misconduct. With his admission that he drafted and notarized another instrument that did
not state the true consideration of the sale so as to reduce the capital gains and other taxes due on
the transaction, respondent cannot escape liability for making an untruthful statement in a public
document for an unlawful purpose. As the second deed indicated an amount much lower than the
actual price paid for the property sold, respondent abetted in depriving the Government of the right
to collect the correct taxes due. Not only did respondent assist the contracting parties in an activity
aimed at defiance of the law, he likewise displayed lack of respect for and made a mockery of the
solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment. By notarizing such illegal and fraudulent document, he
is entitling it full faith and credit upon its face, which it obviously does not deserve considering its
nature and purpose. Respondents actions violated not only Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of
Responsibility, but pertinent sections of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice as well. Thus, respondent
is meted the penalty of revocation of notarial commission and suspension from the practice of law for
a period of two years. Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla v. Atty. Victoriano G. Pascua. A.C. No. 6655. October
11, 2011.
Attorney; notarization. The fact that the affiant previously appeared in person and signed the Deed of
Donation before the respondent notary public does not justify the respondents act of notarizing the
Deed of Donation, considering the affiants absence on the very day the document was actually
notarized. In the notarial acknowledgment of the Deed of Donation, respondent attested that Atty.
Linco personally came and appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet obviously, Atty. Linco could not
have appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because the latter died on July 29, 2003 a day before
the Deed of Donation was notarized, and respondent was aware of that fact. Clearly, respondent
made a false statement and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his
oath as a lawyer. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an

acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Respondent should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. Atty. Florita S. Linco v.
Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal. A.C. No. 7241. October 17, 2011.
Attorney; notarization of illegal document. A notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a
marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving
the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what respondent did in this case. In preparing and
notarizing an agreement for extrajudicial dissolution of marriage a void document respondent
violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent knew fully well
that the Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay has no legal effect and is against public policy. Therefore,
respondent may be suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rodolfo A. Espinosa and Maximo
A. Glindo v. Atty. Julieta A. Omaa. A.C. No. 9081. October 12, 2011.
Court personnel; dishonesty. The Court deems Benedictoss falsification of her bundy cards
tantamount to dishonesty. This Court has defined dishonesty as the (d)isposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the
service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in government service. However, considering the presence of a
mitigating factor this being Benedictos first administrative case in her nineteen years in
government service suspension for six months is already a sufficient penalty. Falsification of daily
time records of Ma. Emcisa A. Benedictos, Administrative Officer I, Regional Trial Court, Malolos City,
Bulacan. A.M. No. P-10-2784. October 19, 2011.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. The act of the respondents in causing the removal of several
pages in a copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda of the Supreme Courts Second Division is a malevolent
transgression of their duties as court personnelparticularly, as employees detailed at the Office of
Clerk of Court Second Division (OCC-SD). Such act is unauthorized and a blatant disregard of the
standard operating procedures observed by the office in handling confidential documents, such as
theAgenda. It compromised the ability of the OCC-SD to efficiently perform its functions and also
imperiled the environment of confidentiality the office is supposed to be clothed with. Respondents
clearly committed a willful breach of the trust reposed upon them by the Court. Supreme Court v.
Eddie V. Delgado, Utility Worker II, Joseph Lawrence M. Madeja, Clerk IV, and Wilfredo A. Florendo,
Utility Worker II, all of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Second Division. A.M. No. 2011-07-SC.
October 4, 2011.
Judge; failure to file statement of assets and liabilities. Respondent clearly violated the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees when he failed to file his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for the
years 2004-2008. He gave no explanation why he failed to file his SALN for five consecutive years.
While every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand
on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Hence, judges
are strictly mandated to abide with the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with existing
administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of our people in the administration of
justice. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Uyag P. Usman, Presiding Judge, Sharia Circuit
Court, Pagadian City. A.M. No. SCC-08-12. October 19, 2011.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. The failure of Judge Infante to conduct a hearing prior to the grant
of bail in a criminal case involving a crime punishable by a capital offense, and his mere reliance on

the recommendation for bail by the public prosecutor, was inexcusable and reflected gross ignorance
of the law and the rules as well as a cavalier disregard of its requirement. He well knew that the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong was a matter of judicial discretion, and
that the discretion lay not in the determination of whether or not a hearing should be held, but in the
appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the Prosecutions evidence of guilt against the accused.
His fault was made worse by his granting bail despite the absence of a petition for bail from the
accused. Consequently, any order he issued in the absence of the requisite evidence was not a
product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness. Atty. Franklin
G. Gacal v. Judge Jaime I. Infante, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in Alabel, Sarangani. A.M. No. RTJ04-1845. October 5, 2011.
Judge; undue delay. As early as February 27, 2002, the case had been submitted for decision, but
respondent judge had yet to render a decision by the time the administrative complaint against him
was filed on November 6, 2009. Judges should meticulously observe the periods prescribed by the
Constitution for deciding cases because failure to comply with the said period transgresses the
parties constitutional right to speedy disposition of their cases. Thus, failure to decide cases within
the ninety (90)-day reglementary period may warrant imposition of administrative sanctions on the
erring judge. However, the Court is not unmindful of circumstances that justify the delay in the
disposition of the cases assigned to judges. When a judge sees such circumstances before the
reglementary period ends, all that is needed is to simply ask the Court, with the appropriate
justification, for an extension of time within which to decide the case. Evidently, respondent Judge
failed to do any of these options. Antonio Y. Cabasares v. Judge Filemon A. Tandinco, Jr. Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, 8th Judicial Region, Calbayog City, Western Samar. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1793.
October 19, 2011.
Sheriff; gross neglect of duty. Respondent Sheriff was remiss in performing his mandated
duties: first,to give notice of the writ and demand that the judgment obligor and all persons claiming
under him vacate the property within three (3) days; second, to enforce the writ by removing the
judgment obligor and all persons claiming under the latter; third, to remove the latters personal
belongings in the property as well as destroy, demolish or remove the improvements constructed
thereon upon special court order; and fourth, to execute and make a return on the writ within 30 days
from receipt of the writ and every 30 days thereafter until it is satisfied in full or until its effectivity
expires. The lapse of time almost two years it took for the respondent to unsuccessfully execute
the writ demonstrates his utter lack of diligence in performing his duties. Teresita Guerrero-Boylon v.
Aniceto Boyles, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cebu City. A.M. No. P-09-2716.
October 11, 2011.

November 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attorney; aiding illegal practice of law. It has been established that Dela Rosa who is not a member of
the Bar misrepresented herself as respondents collaborating counsel. There was also sufficient
evidence to prove that respondent allowed Dela Rosa to illegally practice law, appear in court, and
give legal assistance to respondents client. This is in violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states that [a] lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized
practice of law. The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to
the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services.
Holding ones self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as
identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself
as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law. Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando
F. Busmente. A.C. No. 7269. November 23, 2011.

Attorney; competence and diligence required. Respondent attorneys were engaged to represent
complainant and his son in in a civil case for forcible entry and damages. However, respondents
failed to file an answer within the 10-day period required by the summons and the Rules of Court.
Respondents claimed that, to their mind, the civil case was actually for possession, notwithstanding
that its title is for forcible entry, and that they mistakenly assumed that the court would first issue an
order stating that the case falls under the rules on summary procedure before requiring their clients
to answer. They further claimed that when no such order was issued by the court, they again
incorrectly assumed that the regular rules of procedure will apply and that they have fifteen days to
answer. All these, without seeking a clarification from the court or ascertaining exactly when the
answer should be filed and despite the summons issued and served stating a ten day period to file an
answer. The Supreme Court did not find respondents defenses acceptable as it betrayed a lack of
necessary competence and diligence. The respondents had in fact been negligent, or worse, had
failed to exercise the required competence and diligence in filing the answer to the complaint.
Pursuant to Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is expected to be
acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has the
right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a wholehearted fealty to the clients cause. Rogelio F. Estavillo v. Attys. Gemmo G. Guillermo and Erme S.
Labayog. A.C. No. 6899. November 16, 2011.
Attorney; conflict of interest. Respondent attorney drafted a demand letter on behalf of complainant
in connection with the dishonored checks issued by Ms. Koa. In the ensuing criminal cases,
respondent filed a Motion for Consolidation on behalf of Ms. Koa and appeared at the preliminary
investigation hearing as Ms. Koas counsel. Respondent argued that no lawyer-client relationship
existed between him and complainant because there was no professional fee paid for the services he
rendered. Moreover, he argued that he drafted the demand letter only as a personal favor to
complainant who is a close friend. A lawyer-client relationship can exist notwithstanding the close
friendship between complainant and respondent. The relationship was established the moment
complainant sought legal advice from respondent regarding the dishonored checks. By drafting the
demand letter respondent further affirmed such relationship. The fact that the demand letter was not
utilized in the criminal complaint filed and that respondent was not eventually engaged by
complainant to represent her in the criminal cases is of no moment. Likewise, the non-payment of
professional fee will not exculpate respondent from liability. Absence of monetary consideration does
not exempt lawyers from complying with the prohibition against pursuing cases with conflicting
interests. The prohibition attaches from the moment the attorney-client relationship is established
and extends beyond the duration of the professional relationship. Lydia Castro-Justo v. Atty. Rodolfo
Galing. A.C. No. 6174. November 16, 2011.
Attorney; gross misconduct. Complainant engaged the legal services of respondent to assist her and
her child in pursuing and protecting their rights as heirs of her deceased husband who was a British
national, including claiming insurance proceeds due to the complainant and her child, as well as
processing visa applications for travel to England. Respondent solicited various sums from the
complainant, allegedly for purposes do defraying expenses in connection with the engagement.
Respondent admitted having received money from complainant but failed to render an accounting or,
at least, apprised the complainant of the actual expenses incurred. Worse, respondent even
inculcated in the mind of the complainant that she had to adhere to the nefarious culture of giving
grease money or lagay to the British Embassy personnel, as if it was an ordinary occurrence in the
normal course of conducting official business transactions as a means to expedite the visa
applications. This runs afoul the dictum in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Respondents repeated reprehensible acts of employing chicanery and
unbecoming conduct to conceal her web of lies, to the extent of milking complainants finances dry,
and deceitfully arrogating upon herself the insurance proceeds that should rightfully belong to
complainant, in the guise of rendering legitimate legal services, clearly transgressed the norms of

honesty and integrity required in the practice of law. This being so, respondent should be purged
from the privilege of exercising the noble legal profession. Marites Freeman v. Atty. Zenaida P.
Reyes. A.C. No. 6246. November 15, 2011.
Court personnel; grave misconduct and dishonesty. Respondent admitted receiving pay-offs from
Taguinod every time the City Star, the paper published by Taguinod, is awarded a judicial notice from
Branch 21 of the RTC of Santiago City for publication. Respondents defense that he never
demanded any money or any rebate from Taguinod does not spare him from liability. Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 1079 not only prohibits local court personnel from demanding pay-offs, it
also bars receipt of such pay-offs. By accepting pay-offs, respondent also violated Section 2(e), Canon
III of the Code of Conduct, mandating that court personnel shall not [s]olicit or accept any gift, loan,
gratuity,discount, favor, hospitality or service under circumstances from which it could reasonably be
inferred that a major purpose of the donor is to influence the court personnel in performing official
duties. These violations of respondent constitute grave misconduct or corrupt conduct in flagrant
disregard of well-known legal rules. Furthermore, by keeping the discounts or rebates for himself and
thereby profiting from them, he had committed a clear case of dishonesty. Francisco Taguinod v.
Deputy Sheriff Rolando Tomas, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Santiago City. A. M. No. P-09-2660.
November 29, 2011.
Court personnel; habitual tardiness. Under Memorandum Circular No. 23, Series of 1998, [a]n
employee shall be considered habitually tardy if he incurs tardiness, regardless of the number of
minutes, ten (10) times a month for at least two (2) months in a semester or at least two (2)
consecutive months during the year. It is clear from the facts that Calingasan has been habitually
tardy. Consequently, as an employee of the judiciary, she failed to live up to the stringent standard of
conduct demanded from everyone connected with the administration of justice. The excuses offered
by respondent moral obligations, the performance of household chores, traffic problems, health
conditions, and domestic and financial concerns are not sufficient causes to excuse habitual
tardiness. Leave Division-OAS, Office of the Court Administrator v. Laraine I. Calingasan
Stenographer II, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Sta Rosa, Laguna. A.M. No. P-11-3010. November 23,
2011.
Court personnel; inefficiency; time for completion and submission of TSN. Respondent failed to
strictly follow Administrative Circular No. 24-90 that prescribes a 20-day period from the time the
notes are taken for the completion and submission of the transcript of stenographic notes. Although
the Court is solicitous of the plight of court stenographers, being saddled with heavy workload is not
compelling reason enough to justify respondents failure to faithfully comply with the prescribed
period provided in Administrative Circular No. 24-90 and, thus, she must be faulted. Otherwise, every
government employee charged with inefficiency would resort to the same convenient excuse to
evade punishment, to the great prejudice of public service. Concerned Citizen v. Maria Concepcion
Divina, Court Stenographer, Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Balanga City, Bataan. A.M. No. P-072369. November 16, 2011.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. Simple misconduct has been defined as an unacceptable
behavior that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public officers. Respondents actions
transgressed the norms of civility expected of judicial officers, even in their private lives, and
constitute simple misconduct that must be squarely penalized. Although beso-beso or air kissing may
be considered a standard greeting between family members, what respondent did was he not merely
greeted his sister-in-law, but encroached into the territory of unwarranted advances that offended
acceptable standards of decency. Regardless of whether it reached the level of criminal malice or
lewdness, his conduct was unbecoming a court personnel, upon whom is placed the heavy burden of
moral uprightness. Beatriz B. Onate v. Severino G. Imatong, Junior Process Server, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Piat, Cagayan. A.M. No. P-11-3009. November 16, 2011.

Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. Respondent, a security guard at the Court of Appeals
compound in Manila, accidentally fired his service pistol while in the process of unloading it for
turnover to the guard on duty for the next shift. Respondent failed to show that his service pistol was
not mechanically sound at that time. In ruling out mechanical causes, it can only be concluded that
the undesired discharge of respondents service pistol was the result of his own negligence; in the
usual course of things, a firearm that is being unloaded should not discharge if gun safety procedures
had been strictly followed. However, we cannot consider the respondents negligence as gross in
nature because there is nothing in the records to show that the respondent willfully and intentionally
fired his service pistol. Also, at the time of the incident, the respondent did observe most of the safety
measures required in unloading his firearm. Court of Appeals by: COC Teresita Marigomen v. Enrique
Manabat Jr., Security Guard I, Court of Appeals, Manila. A.M. No. CA-11-24-P. November 16, 2011.

December 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Affidavit of Desistance; no effect on disciplinary proceeding. It bears to stress that a case of

suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant in a civil case
but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession or its undesirable members in order to
protect the public and the courts. It is not an investigation into the acts of respondent as a husband
but on his conduct as an officer of the Court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.
Hence, the Affidavit dated March 15, 1995, which is akin to an affidavit of desistance, cannot have
the effect of abating the instant proceedings. Elpidio P. Tiong vs. Atty. George M. Florendo. A.C. No.
4428. December 12, 2011
Attorney; gross immorality. Possession of good moral character is not only a condition for admission
to the Bar but is a continuing requirement to maintain ones good standing in the legal profession. It
is the bounden duty of law practitioners to observe the highest degree of morality in order to
safeguard the integrity of the Bar. Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in
his public or private activities, which tends to show him deficient in moral character, honesty, probity
or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant his suspension or disbarment. Respondents act of having
an affair with his clients wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and
his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for his profession.
He also violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by the complainant, which in itself is
prohibited under Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Elpidio P. Tiong vs. Atty. George
M. Florendo.A.C. No. 4428. December 12, 2011

Attorney; gross misconduct; inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedures. The

respondent, while an MTC judge, accepted a petition for declaratory relief filed by the Municipal
Council of San Fernando, Pampanga, assigned it to himself, and acted on it, all on the same day and
without issuing summons or giving notice to the complainant who was the part adversely affected by
the resolution subject of the Municipal Councils petition. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and
impartiality but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode
the peoples faith in the judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are
deemed essential not just in the proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor
of judges. This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the
decision is made. As a member of the bar and former judge, respondent is expected to be well-versed
in the Rules of Procedure. This is expected upon members of the legal profession because
membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate for public service of the highest order. Lawyers
are oath-bound servants of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law

and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which
they have sworn to be fearless crusaders. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Atty. Daniel B.
LiangcoA.C. No. 5355. December 13, 2011
Court personnel; grave misconduct. Under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the sheriff is
required to secure the courts prior approval of the estimated expenses and fees needed to
implement the court process. It is imperative that a sheriff shall observe the following: (1) the sheriff
must make an estimate of the expenses to be incurred by him; (2) he must obtain court approval for
such estimated expenses; (3) the approved estimated expenses shall be deposited by the interested
party with the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Sheriff; (4) the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount to
the executing sheriff; and (5) the executing sheriff shall disburse/liquidate his expenses within the
same period for rendering a return on the writ. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party
who made the deposit. Sheriffs are not authorized to receive any voluntary payments from parties in
the course of the performance of their duties. A sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of
money from a party-litigant without observing the proper procedural steps; otherwise, it would
amount to dishonesty or extortion.
The duty of sheriffs to promptly execute a writ is mandatory and ministerial. Sheriffs have no
discretion on whether or not to implement a writ. There is no need for the litigants to follow-up its
implementation. Unless restrained by a court order, they should see to it that the execution of
judgments is not unduly delayed. When respondent took it upon himself to mediate between litigants
and even provided an extension of the implementation of the writ, he appeared to be lacking in the
amount of diligence required of him in the performance of his duties. Atty. Rutillo B. Pasok vs. Carlos
P. Diaz, Sheriff IV, RTC Br 20, Tacurong City. A.M. No. P-07-2300. December 12, 2011
Court personnel; grave misconduct. All officials and employees involved in the administration of
justice, from judges to the lowest rank and file employees, bear the heavy responsibility of acting with
strict propriety and decorum at all times in order to merit and maintain the publics respect for, and
trust in, the Judiciary. Respondents use of the letterhead of the court and of her official designation in
the demand letters she prepared hardly meets the foregoing standard. Despite her good intentions,
she gave private individuals an unwarranted privilege at the expense of the name of the court. Clerks
of Court are notaries public ex officio. They may notarize documents or administer oaths only when
the matter is related to the exercise of their official functions. Thus, in their ex-officio capacity, clerks
of court should not take part in the execution of private documents bearing no relation at all to their
official functions. Arthur M. Gabon vs. Rebecca P. Merka, Clerk of Court II, Municipal Trial Court, Liloan,
Southern Leyte. A.M. No. P-11-3000. December 14, 2011
Court personnel; gross negligence in the performance of duty. Respondent clerk of court assigned to
a cash clerk the collections, remittances, financial reports and accountable forms. He later found out
that some are already missing. The clerk of court is the courts accountable officer, not the cash clerk.
He is the courts chief administrative officer. No amount of good faith can relieve him of his duty to
properly administer and safeguard the courts funds. Clerks of court are officers of the law who
perform vital functions in the prompt and sound administration of justice. They are designated
custodians of the courts funds, revenues, records, properties and premises. They are liable for any
loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and property.Respondent is liable for gross
neglect of duty. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Clerk of Court Hermenegildo I. Marasigan, RTC
Kabacan, North Cotabato A.M. No. P-05-2082. December 12, 2011
Court personnel; immoral conduct. Respondents act of maintaining an illicit relationship with a
married man comes within the purview of disgraceful and immoral conduct, which is classified as a
grave offense. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct of the official and personnel
who work thereat. Court employees have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of
morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name

and integrity of courts of justice. This Court has thus consistently penalized court personnel who had
been found wanting of such standards, even if they have precipitately resigned from their positions.
Resignation should not be used either as an escape or as an easy way out to evade an administrative
liability or an administrative sanction. Evelina C. Banaag vs. Olivia C. Espeleta, Interpreter III, Branch
82, RTC. Quezon City. A.M. No. P-11-3011. December 16, 2011
Court personnel; leave for foreign travel without authority. The exercise of ones right to travel or the
freedom to move from one place to another is not absolute. Section 5 (6), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts
and the personnel thereof. This provision empowers the Court to oversee all matters relating to the
effective supervision and management of all courts and personnel under it. Pursuant to this, the Court
issued OCA Circular No. 49-2003 to regulate their foreign travel in an unofficial capacity. Such
regulation is necessary for the orderly administration of justice. If judges and court personnel can go
on leave and travel abroad at will and without restrictions or regulations, there could be a disruption
in the administration of justice. A situation where the employees go on mass leave and travel
together, despite the fact that their invaluable services are urgently needed, could possibly arise.
Thus, judges and personnel who shall leave the country without travel authority issued by the Office
of the Court Administrator shall be subject to disciplinary action. A judge or a member of the
Judiciary, who is not being restricted by a criminal court or any other agency pursuant to any
statutory limitation, can leave for abroad without permission but he or she must be prepared to face
the consequences for his or her violation of the Courts rules and regulations. OCA-OAS vs. Wilma
Salvacion P. Heusdens, etc. A.M. No. P-11-2927. December 13, 2011
Court personnel; unreasonable delay in remitting cash receipts. As custodian of court funds and
revenues, it is the duty of a clerk of court to immediately deposit the various funds received by them
to the authorized government depositories for they are not supposed to keep funds in their custody.
Atty. Cruz belated turnover of cash deposited with him is inexcusable and will not exonerate him from
liability. His failure to remit his cash collections on time is violative of Administrative Circular No. 32000 which mandates that all fiduciary collections shall be deposited immediately by the Clerk of
Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the Land Bank of the Philippines, the authorized
government depository bank. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Atty. Teotimo D. Cruz A.M. No. P11-2988. December 12, 2011
Presumption of innocence in disbarment proceedings; burden of proof; quantum of proof. The Court
has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer
enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove
the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is
preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise
doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent. Siao Aba, et al. vs. Attys. Salvador De
Guzman, Jr., et al. A.C. No. 7649. December 14, 2011

January 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attorney; accounting of funds. When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a
particular purpose, he should promptly account to the client how the money was spent. If he does not
use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His failure either
to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not
materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his clients funds or properties as they fall due or upon
demand. His failure to return the clients money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he
has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him

by the client. The issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a
closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows lack
of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and
constitutes a ground for disciplinary action. Hector Trenas vs. People of the Philippines. G.R. No.
195002. January 25, 2012.
Attorney; mistake of counsel. The general rule is that the mistake of a counsel binds the client, and it
is only in instances wherein the negligence is so gross or palpable that courts must step in to grant
relief to the aggrieved client. It can be gleaned from the circumstances that petitioner was given
opportunities to defend his case and was granted concomitant reliefs by the court. Thus, it cannot be
said that the mistake and negligence of his former counsel were so gross and palpable to have
deprived him of due process. Cresencio C. Milla vs. People of the Philippines and Carlo V. Lopez. G.R.
No. 188726. January 25, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity,
uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and
integrity not only in the performance of her official duties but in her personal and private dealings
with other people, to preserve the courts good name and standing. The image of a court of justice is
mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to
the lowest of its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards
of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name
and integrity of the courts of justice. Under Section 52(A)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first
offense. Under Section 58 of the same rules, dismissal carries with it cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government
service. Thus, the respondent is dismissed for dishonesty when she made someone take the Civil
Service Sub-professional Examination on her behalf. Concerned Citizen vs. Domingo Nawen Abad,
etc.A.M. No. P-11-2907. January 31, 2012.
Court personnel; grave abuse of authority. By the very nature of his duties, a sheriff performs a very
sensitive function in the dispensation of justice. He is duty-bound to know the basic rules relative to
the implementation of writs of execution, and should, at all times show a high degree of
professionalism in the performance of his duties. Administrative Circular No. 12 was promulgated in
order to streamline the service and execution of court writs and processes in courts and to better
serve the public good and facilitate the administration of justice. Paragraph 2 of Administrative
Circular No. 12 provides that All Clerks of Court of the Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, and/or their deputy sheriffs shall serve all court processes and execute all writs of
their respective courts within their territorial jurisdiction. Furthermore, paragraph 5 of the same
circular provides that No sheriff or deputy sheriff shall execute a court writ outside his territorial
jurisdiction without first notifying in writing, and seeking the assistance of, the sheriff of the place
where the execution shall take place. It is clear that respondents act of implementing the subject
writs in San Fernando City, when his territorial jurisdiction is confined only to Angeles City, is a
violation of the Circular and tantamount to abuse of authority. While respondent claimed that he
personally informed the OCC of San Fernando City, he, however, failed to prove that he made written
notice as required by Administrative Circular No. 12. A mere submission of the copies of the court
processes to the OCC will not suffice as to the written notice requirement. The requirement of notice
is based on the rudiments of justice and fair play. It frowns upon arbitrariness and oppressive
conduct in the execution of an otherwise legitimate act. Luis P. Pineda vs. Neil T. torres, sheriff II,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Angeles City. A.M. No. P-12-3027. January 30, 2012
Court personnel; gross neglect of duty. A clerk of court performs a very delicate function as the
custodian of the funds and revenues, records, property, and premises of the court. He is liable for any
loss, shortage, destruction, or impairment of said funds and property. Even the undue delay in the

remittance of amounts collected by them at the very least constitutes misfeasance. The safekeeping
of funds and collections is essential to the goal of an orderly administration of justice and no
protestation of good faith can override the mandatory nature of the Circulars designed to promote full
accountability for government funds. Supreme Court Circular No. 13-92 mandates that all fiduciary
collections shall be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with
an authorized government depository bank which is the Land Bank of the Philippines. The
respondents failure to remit their collection constitutes gross neglect of duty, dishonesty, and grave
misconduct. Moreover, the failure of a public officer to remit funds upon demand by an authorized
officer shall be prima facie evidence that the public officer has put such missing funds or property to
personal use. Re: Report on Financial Audit Conducted at MCTC, Santiago-San Esteban, Ilocos
Sur. A.M. No. P-11-2950. January 17, 2012
Judges; administrative liability. Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought against any
judge in relation to the performance of his official functions are neither complementary to nor
suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies. Any party who may
feel aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of resorting to disciplinary
proceedings and criminal actions. A judges failure to correctly interpret the law or to properly
appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily incur administrative liability, for to hold him
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he has
erred, will be nothing short of harassment and will make his position doubly unbearable. His judicial
office will then be rendered untenable, because no one called upon to try the facts or to interpret the
law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. Administrative sanction
and criminal liability should be imposed only when the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious, or is
committed with evident bad faith, or only in clear cases of violations by him of the standards and
norms of propriety and good behavior prescribed by law and the rules of procedure, or fixed and
defined by pertinent jurisprudence. Re: Verified complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the
Board/CEO etc. against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., et al. A.M. No. 11-184-CA-J. January 31, 2012.
Judges; court personnel; gross misconduct; neglect of duty. Respondent Judge failed to exert due
diligence required of him to ascertain the facts of the case before he came out with the Order. He
should be reminded of his personal responsibility in the making of his decisions and orders. He
should not rely on anybody else for the examination and study of the records to properly ascertain
the facts of each case that he handles. He cannot simply pass the blame on his staff and hide behind
the incompetence of his subordinates. Moreover, respondent Judge should have been more cautious
since the case involved was an old inherited case with voluminous records and what was sought to be
executed was an order issued almost twenty (20) years ago. It is incumbent upon him to devise an
efficient court management system since he is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge
of his functions. Although judges cannot be held to account for erroneous judgments rendered in good
faith, good faith in situations of infallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable
judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle
evident and basic as to be beyond permissible margins of error.
The records and pleadings filed have established the administrative liability of the clerk of court.
First, respondent Clerk of Court failed to inform respondent Judge of the existence of the Court of
Appeals and Supreme Court decisions. Second, he failed to inform and send the parties their
respective notices and court orders. Third, he issued the Certificate of Finality without verifying if
indeed a motion for reconsideration was filed in connection with the case. As custodian of judicial
records, it is incumbent upon the clerk of court to ensure an orderly and efficient court management
system, and to supervise the personnel under his office to function effectively. They must be
assiduous in performing official duty and in supervising and managing court dockets and records. It is
also incumbent upon him to see to it that court orders were sent with dispatch to the parties
concerned. Thus, respondent Clerk of Court should ensure an orderly and efficient record
management system to assist all personnel, including respondent Judge, in the performance of their

respective duties. Espina and Madarang Company, et al. vs. Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj and Abie M.
Amilil, Officer-in-charge, branch Clerk of Court, both of theRegional Trial Court, Br. 14, Cotabato
City. A.M. No. RTJ-07-2069. December 14, 2011.

February 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Administrative cases against lawyers; prescriptive period. The two-year prescriptive period for
initiating a complaint against a lawyer for disbarment or suspension provided under Section 1, Rule
VIII of the Rules of Procedure of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline should be construed to mean
two years from the date of discovery of the professional misconduct. Nesa Isenhardt vs. Atty.
Leonardo M. Real, A.C. No. 8254, February 15, 2012.
Attorney; disqualification as notary public. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the
person who signs it is the same person who executed it, personally appearing before him to attest to
the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. This is to enable the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the
partys free act. The duties of a notary public is dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest. It is not a meaningless ministerial act of acknowledging documents executed by parties who
are willing to pay the fees for notarization. It is of no moment that the subject SPA was not utilized by
the grantee for the purpose it was intended because the property was allegedly transferred from
complainant to her brother by virtue of a deed of sale consummated between them. What is being
penalized is respondents act of notarizing a document despite the absence of one of the parties. A
notarized document is by law entitled to full credit upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries
public must observe the basic requirements in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the confidence of
the public in notarized documents will be undermined. Nesa Isenhardt vs. Atty. Leonardo M.
Real, A.C. No. 8254, February 15, 2012.
Attorney; government service; applicability of Code of Professional Responsibility. The Code of
Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the
government service. Where a lawyers misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to
affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a
member of the bar on such grounds. Martin Lahn III and James P. Concepcion vs. Labor Arbiter
Jovencio Li. Mayor, Jr., A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012.
Attorney; gross ignorance of the law. The respondent labor arbiter, being part of the quasi-judicial
system of our government, performs official functions that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly,
the present controversy may be approximated to administrative cases of judges whose decisions,
including the manner of rendering the same, were made subject of administrative cases. While a
judge may not always be held liable for ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that he
renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic, lack of
conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. The unfounded insistence of the
respondent on his supposed authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, taken together with the delay in the resolution of the said motion for
reconsideration, would clearly show that the respondent deliberately intended to cause prejudice to
the complainants. Martin Lahn III and James P. Concepcion vs. Labor Arbiter Jovencio Li. Mayor, Jr., A.C.
No. 7430, February 15, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Dishonesty has been defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. Dishonesty, being in the
nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of

retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in
government service. Given the total absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that
respondent clerk of court punched his DTR to make it appear he was at the office on February 26,
2010 when he was in fact absent still prevails. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the
judiciary. Public service requires utmost integrity and discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all
times the highest sense of honesty and integrity, for no less than the Constitution declares that a
public office is a public trust, and all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, and serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. Leave
Division, Office of the Adrministrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator vs. Leoncio K.
Gutierrez III, Clerk III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City. A.M. No. P-11-2951, February 15,
2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty, misrepresentation. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 provides that court
personnel who wish to travel abroad must secure a travel authority from the Office of the Court
Administrator. Section 67 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave provides that any violation of the leave laws,
rules or regulations, or any misrepresentation or deception in connection with an application for leave
shall be a ground for disciplinary action. The respondent court stenographer traveled without securing
a travel authority and did not state her foreign travel in her leave application. She is guilty of violating
at least two office rules and regulations. This shows deception amounting to dishonesty.
Dishonesty means the concealment of truth in a matter of fact relevant to ones office or connected
with the performance of his duties. It is an absence of integrity, a disposition to betray, cheat, deceive
or defraud, bad faith. The discrepancy in the respondents date of birth in her records does not
amount to dishonesty, as she made no false statement. No deliberate intent to mislead, deceive or
defraud appears from the cited circumstances of this case. The respondents date of birth is not a fact
directly relevant to her functions or qualification to office or connected with the performance of her
duties. Sheila G. Del Rosario, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Br. 36, Santiago City, Isabela vs. Mary Anne
C. Pascua, Court Stenographer III, same court. A.M. No. P-11-2999. February 27, 2012.
Court personnel; habitual absenteeism. Administrative Circular No. 14-2002 provides that an
employee is considered habitually absent if the employee incurred unauthorized absences exceeding
the 2.5 days allowed per month for three months in a semester or at least three consecutive months
during the year. In imposing penalty of habitual absenteeism in administrative cases, however, the
court may take into consideration mitigating circumstances. The presence of factors such as length of
service in the judiciary, acknowledgment of infractions and feeling of remorse, and family
circumstances, among other things, play an important role in the imposition of penalties. Judge
Lucina Alpez Dayaon, etc. vs. Jesusa V. De Leon. A.M. No. P-11-2926, February 1, 2012
Judge; gross ignorance of law and undue delay. Well- settled is the rule that an injunction cannot be
issued to transfer possession or control of a property to another when the legal title is in dispute
between the parties and the legal title has not been clearly established. In this case, respondent
judge evidently disregarded this established doctrine when he granted the preliminary injunction in
favor of Pagels whose legal title is disputed. When the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of
conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Gross ignorance of the law is the
disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. When the inefficiency springs from a failure to
consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is
either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the
oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. A
judge may also be administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and
jurisprudence. Atty. Rene Medina, et al. vs. Judge Victor Canoy, et al. A.M. RTJ-11-2298, February 22,
2012.

Judges; delay in conducting summary hearing to extend the 72-hr TRO; gross ignorance of law;
requirement of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption. Judges are not administratively responsible
for what they may do in the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers
and jurisdiction. Not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties
renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an
injustice. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try
the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision, order or actuation
of the respondent judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
Complainants failed to adduce proof to show that respondent judge was motivated by bad faith, ill will
or malicious motive when he granted the TRO and preliminary injunction. In addition, respondent
judge should not be penalized for failing to conduct the required summary hearing within 72 hours
from the issuance of the original TRO. Though the Rules require the presiding judge to conduct a
summary hearing before the expiration of the 72 hours, it could not be complied with because of the
remoteness and inaccessibility of the trial court from the parties addresses. Sps. Democrito and
Olivia Lago vs. Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. RTC, Br. 43, Gingoog City. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255, February
8, 2012.
Judges; immorality vs. simple misconduct. The New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
provides that, as a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. In particular, judges must conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office. Occupying as he does an
exalted position in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed
upon him. Thus, the judge must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct,
official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the
epitome of integrity and justice. There was no evidence that respondent judge engaged in scandalous
conduct that would warrant the imposition of disciplinary action against him. His admission of
homosexuality does not make him automatically immoral. However, respondent judge is guilty of
simple misconduct in causing the registration of title in his sons name with the intention of
defrauding a possible judgment-obligee. Simple misconduct is a transgression of some established
rule of action, an unlawful behavior, or negligence committed by a public officer. Aida R. Campos, et
al. vs. Judge Eliseo M. Campos, MTC, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, February 8,
2012.
Judges; undue delay in rendering a decision. Judges must resolve matters pending before them
promptly and expeditiously within the constitutionally mandated three-month period. If they cannot
comply with the same, they should ask for an extension from the Supreme Court upon meritorious
grounds. The rule is that the reglementary period for deciding cases should be observed by all judges,
unless they have been granted additional time. Judges must dispose of the courts business promptly.
Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers
its standards, and brings it to disrepute. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch.
Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanctions on them.
Although there are no promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial audit, the absence of such rules
should not serve as license to recommend the imposition of penalties to retired judges who, during
their incumbency, were never given a chance to explain the circumstances behind the results of the
judicial audit. Judicial audit reports and the memoranda which follow them should state not only
recommended penalties and plans of action for the violations of audited courts, but also give
commendations when they are due. To avoid similar scenarios, manual judicial audits may be
conducted at least six months before a judges compulsory retirement. Office of the Court

Administrator vs. Judge Celso L. Mantua, Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte. A.M. No.
RTJ-11-2291. February 8, 2012.

March 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attorney; lifting of indefinite suspension. Professional misconduct involving the misuse of

constitutional provisions for the purpose of insulting Members of the Supreme Court is a serious
breach of the rigid standards that a member of good standing of the legal profession must faithfully
comply with. Thus, the penalty of indefinite suspension was imposed. However, in the past two years
during which Atty. Lozano has been suspended, he has repeatedly expressed his willingness to admit
his error, to observe the rules and standards in the practice of law, and to serve the ends of justice if
he should be reinstated. And in these two years, this Court has not been informed of any act that
would indicate that Atty. Lozano had acted in any unscrupulous practices unsuitable to a member of
the bar. While the Court will not hesitate to discipline its erring officers, it will not prolong a penalty
after it has been shown that the purpose for imposing it had already been served. Re: subpoena
Duces Tecum dated January 11, 2010 of Acting Director Aleu A. Amante, PIAB-C, Office of the
Ombudsman/Re: Order of the Office of the Ombudsman referring the complaint of Attys. Oliver O.
Lozano & Evangeline J. Lozano-Endriano against Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno(ret.). A.M. No. 10-1-13SC & A.M. NO. 10-9-9-SC, March 20, 2012.
Court personnel; administrative case; quantum of evidence. The Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service govern the conduct of disciplinary and non-disciplinary proceedings in
administrative cases. In Section 3, it provides that, Administrative investigations shall be conducted
without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to
judicial proceedings.
The weight of evidence required in administrative investigations is substantial evidence. For these
reasons, only substantial evidence is required to find Malunao guilty of the administrative offense
charged against her. In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable man might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, is the
lowest standard of proof provided under the Rules of Court. In assessing whether there is substantial
evidence in administrative investigations such as this case, the Court is not bound by technical rules
of procedure and evidence. Dela Cruzs Sinumpaang Salaysay, the joint affidavit of arrest executed by
the NBI agents, the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, photocopy of the marked money, the Complaint
Sheet, and the photographs of Malunao entering Dela Cruzs house, and the contents of Malunaos
bag after receipt of the money, all prove by subsantial evidence the guilt of Malunao for the offense of
grave misconduct. Sheryll C. Dela Cruz vs. Pamela P. Malunao, Clerk III, RTC, Branch 28, Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya. A.M. No. P-11-2019, March 20, 2012.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. The
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate
the law or to disregard established rules. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in
the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his position or office to
procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of
others. Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel states: Court personnel shall
not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit understanding that such gift,
favor or benefit shall influence their official actions. Respondents use of her position as Clerk III in
Branch 28 to solicit money from Dela Cruz with the promise of a favorable decision violates Section 2,
Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and constitutes the offense of grave misconduct

meriting the penalty of dismissal. Sheryll C. Dela Cruz vs. Pamela P. Malunao, Clerk III, RTC, Branch
28, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. A.M. No. P-11-2019, March 20, 2012.
Judges; judicial clemency. In A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency), the Court laid down the following
guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, thus:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and
probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will
give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of
him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds merit in petitioners request. A review
of the records reveals that petitioner has exhibited remorse for her past misdeeds, which occurred
more than ten (10) years ago. While she was found to have belatedly filed her motions for additional
time to resolve the cases then pending in her sala, the Court noted that she had disposed of the same
within the extended period sought, except in A.M. No. 99-2-79-RTC where she submitted her
compliance beyond the approved 45-day extended period. Nevertheless, petitioner has subsequently
shown diligence in the performance of her duties and has not committed any similar act or
omission. In the Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator, her prompt compliance with
the judicial audit requirements of pending cases was acknowledged and she was even commended
for her good performance in the effective management of her court and in the handling of court
records.
Moreover, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Bohol Chapter has shown its high regard for
petitioner per the letter of support signed by a number of its members addressed to the IBP dated
October 15, 1999 during the pendency of her administrative cases and the IBP Resolution No. 11,
Series of 2009 endorsing her application for lateral transfer to the RTC of Tagbilaran City. Re: Petition
for judicial clemency of Judge Irma Zita V. Masamayor. A.M. No. 12-2-6-SC, March 6, 2012.

April 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attorney; falsification. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or
suspended on the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4)
grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the
lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or
willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case without authority so to do.

The crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and,
therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in
the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted
and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral
turpitude. Re: SC Decision date May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 under Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court vs. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin. A.C. No. 7940, April 24, 2012.
Attorney; groundless imputation of bribery. As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers. They are to abstain from offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the court and must refrain from attributing to a judge motives
that are not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
Atty. Pea cannot be excused for uttering snide and accusatory remarks at the expense of the
reputation and integrity of members of this Court, and for using those unsubstantiated claims as basis
for the subject Motion for Inhibition.
Not only has respondent Pea failed to show sincere remorse for his malicious insinuations of bribery
and wrongdoing against Justice Carpio, he in fact continually availed of such unethical tactics in
moving for the inhibition of eleven Justices of the Court. Indeed, his pattern of behavior can no longer
be seen as isolated incidents that the Court can pardon given certain mitigating circumstances.
Respondent Pea has blatantly and consistently cast unfounded aspersions against judicial officers in
utter disregard of his duties and responsibilities to the Court.
Respondent Peas actions betray a similar disrespectful attitude towards the Court that cannot be
countenanced especially for those privileged enough to practice law in the country. In re: Supreme
Court Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817 and 145822. A.C. No. 6332, April 17, 2012.
Attorney; lack of diligence. When a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise
due diligence in protecting the latters rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention
expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his
client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and
society. His workload does not justify neglect in handling ones case because it is settled that a lawyer
must only accept cases as much as he can efficiently handle. Suzette Del Mundo vs. Atty. Arnel C.
Capistrano. A.C. No. 6903, April 16, 2012.
Attorney; obligation to hold in trust money of his client. A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of
his client that may come to his possession. As trustee of such funds, he is bound to keep them
separate and apart from his own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the
filing and processing of a case if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand. Failure to
return gives rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on
him. And the conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of professional ethics
and betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Suzette Del Mundo vs. Atty. Arnel C.
Capistrano.A.C. No. 6903, April 16, 2012.
Attorney; representation of conflicting interests. The proscription against representation of
conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same
action or in an unrelated action. The prohibition also applies even if the lawyer would not be called
upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there
would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of

the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. To be held accountable under this rule, it is
enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients
and the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of them would affect the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients. Anion vs. Sabistsana. A.C. No. 5098,
April 11, 2012.
Attorney; submission of falsified internal court documents. The falsification, subject of the instant
administrative case, lies in the fact that respondent Pea submitted to the Court a document he was
absolutely certain, at the time of such submission, was a copy of the Agenda of the then ponente.
Candor and truthfulness are some of the qualities exacted and expected from members of the legal
profession. Thus, lawyers shall commit no falsehood, nor shall they mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice. As disciples of truth, their lofty vocation is to correctly inform the court of the
law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. Courts
are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. In
the instant case, the submission of a document purporting to be a copy of the Agenda of a member of
this Court is an act of dishonesty that puts into doubt the ability of respondent to uphold his duty as a
disciple of truth.
Respondent led the Court to believe that what he submitted was a faithful reproduction of
theponentes Agenda, just to support the subject Motion to Inhibit. The original of the purported copy
was later found to have been inexistent in the courts records.
The Court noted that respondent Pea has not explained, to the Courts satisfaction, how he
managed to obtain internal and confidential documents.
Respondent Pea is sanctioned for knowingly using confidential and internal court records and
documents, which he suspiciously obtained in bolstering his case. His unbridled access to internal
court documents has not been properly explained. The cavalier explanation of respondent Pea that
this Courts confidential documents would simply find themselves conveniently falling into
respondents lap through registered mail and that the envelopes containing them could no longer be
traced is unworthy of belief. This gives the Court reason to infer that laws and its own internal rules
have been violated over and over again by some court personnel, whom respondent Pea now aids
and abets by feigning ignorance of how the internal documents could have reached him. It is not
unreasonable to even conclude that criminal liabilities have been incurred in relation to the Revised
Penal Code and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, with Atty. Pea benefitting from the same.
Respondents actions clearly merit no other penalty than disbarment. In re: Supreme Court Resolution
dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817 and 145822. A.C. No. 6332, April 17, 2012.
Court personnel; conduct unbecoming of a court personnel. Respondent is liable for conduct
unbecoming a court employee for his continued refusal to coordinate with complainants in the
implementation of the writ of possession, despite numerous attempts on their part to get in touch
with him. It may be recalled that complainants endeavored, no less than four (4) times, to
communicate with respondent for the proper and expeditious execution of the writ, but each time,
respondent rebuffed their efforts. Finally, on25 April 2011, the day respondent finally implemented
the writ, respondent refused to allow Ms. De Jesus to inform complainants of the intended
implementation and opted to be accompanied by an ordinary bank employee to witness the
enforcement of the writ.
The persistent refusal of respondent to cooperate with complainants in the implementation of the writ
runs afoul of the exacting standards required of those in the judiciary. Time and again, the Court has
emphasized the heavy burden of responsibility which court officials and employees are mandated to
perform. They are constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in

the performance of official functions must be avoided. This is so because the image of the court of
justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work
there. The conduct of even minor employees mirrors the image of the courts they serve; thus, they
are required to preserve the judiciarys good name and standing as a true temple of justice. Attys.
Gonzalez, et al. vs. Calo. A.M. No. P-12-3028, April 11, 2012.
Court personnel; disgraceful and immoral conduct. Immorality has been defined to include not only
sexual matters but also conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency,
depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral indifference
to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good
order and public welfare. There is no doubt that engaging in sexual relations with a married man is
not only a violation of the moral standards expected of employees of the judiciary, but is also a
desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage which this Court abhors and is, thus,
punishable. Evelyn J. Jailorina vs. Richelle Taneo-Regner, Demo II, RTC, OCC, San Mateo, Rizal. A.M.
No. P-11-2948, April 23, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Falsification of daily time record constitutes dishonesty. Dishonesty is
defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack
of honesty probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray. Section 52(A), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service (MC No. 19, dated September 14, 1999) classifies dishonesty as a grave offense
punishable by dismissal even for first time offenses. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Araya. A.M.
No. P-12-3053, April 11, 2012.
Court personnel; grave misconduct. The behavior of all employees and officials involved in the
administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy
responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times in order to
merit and maintain the publics respect for and trust in the judiciary. Needless to say, all court
personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty and uprightness.
Respondents shouting at complainant within the court premises, reporting complainant to the police
after she was reprimanded for her solicitation, and refusing to talk with complainant judge are not
only acts of discourtesy and disrespect but likewise an unethical conduct sanctioned by Republic Act
No. 6713, otherwise known as The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.
High-strung and belligerent behavior has no place in government service where the personnel are
enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and
insolence. Such conduct is exacted from them so that they will earn and keep the publics respect for
and confidence in the judicial service. This standard is applied with respect to a court employees
dealings not only with the public but also with his or her co-workers in the service. Conduct violative
of this standard quickly and surely erodes respect for the courts
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; and the misconduct is grave if it involves
any of the additional elements of corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules. Thus, considering respondents transgressions, i.e., disrespectful conduct,
solicitation, and influence peddling of bail bonds, there is no question that respondent is guilty of
grave misconduct. Judge Salvador R. Santos, Jr. vs. Editha R. Mangahas. A.M. No. P-09-2720, April 17,
2012.
Court personnel; habitual tardiness. Under Sec. 52 (C) (4), Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular No.
19, Series of 1999, habitual tardiness is penalized as follows: First offense Reprimand; Second offense

Suspension for 1-30 days; Third offense Dismissal from the service. Since it was proven that the
present case is the second offense of Gareza for being habitually tardy, the OCA correctly
recommended for the penalty of suspension for 30 days with warning that a similar offense in the
future would be meted a more severe penalty. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sheriff
Gareza. A.M. No. P-12-3058, April 25, 2012.
Court personnel; official and personal conduct. Respondent took more than six years to pay their
obligation to the complainant. Also, one of the land titles that respondents gave as collateral turned
out to have been encumbered. While they have already paid their obligation, such payment was
conditioned upon the complainants execution of an Affidavit of Desistance.
All these facts constitute conduct that reflects badly on the judiciary, diminishing the honor and
integrity of the offices they hold. This is especially true because respondents were admittedly given
the loans because they were considered prominent persons in the community; and that they were
considered as such, presumably because they worked in the judiciary.
In Villaseor v. De Leon, the Court emphasized that to preserve decency within the judiciary, court
personnel must comply with just contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical
standards. In that case, the Court said that respondent was expected to be a paragon of
uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in all her official conduct but also in her personal
actuations, including business and commercial transactions, so as to avoid becoming her courts
albatross of infamy. Re: Complaint filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro against Edna Magallanes and
Bonifacio Magallanes. A.M. No. P-11-3003, April 25, 2012.
Court personnel; neglect of duty. Settled is the role of clerks of court as judicial officers entrusted with
the delicate function with regard to collection of legal fees. They are expected to correctly and
effectively implement regulations relating to proper administration of court funds. Delay in the
remittance of collection constitutes neglect of duty. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Nini. A.M.
No. P-11-3002, April 11, 2012.
Court personnel; neglect of duty. The following are the duties of a sheriff: first, to give notice of the
writ and demand that the judgment obligor and all persons claiming under him vacate the property
within three (3) days; second, to enforce the writ by removing the judgment obligor and all persons
claiming under the latter; third, to remove the latters personal belongings in the property as well as
destroy, demolish or remove the improvements constructed thereon upon special court order;
andfourth, to execute and make a return on the writ within 30 days from receipt of the writ and
every thirty (30) days thereafter until it is satisfied in full or until its effectivity expires.
Respondent was clearly remiss in the performance of his mandated duties: he unilaterally gave the
occupants 3 months, instead of the three (3) days provided by the Rules, to vacate the property;
when he did evict the occupants from the premises, a room containing their personal effects was
padlocked, therefore delaying the demolition of the improvements introduced on the property; finally,
respondent failed to make a return on the writ of possession after he implemented the same. Attys.
Gonzalez, et al. vs. Calo. A.M. No. P-12-3028, April 11, 2012.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is the failure to give attention to a
task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. Office of the Court Administrator
vs. Sarmiento, et al. A.M. No. P-11-2912, April 10, 2012.
Court personnel; unauthorized absences. Under the Civil Service rules, an employee should submit in
advance, whenever possible, an application for a vacation leave of absence for action by the proper
chief of agency prior to the effective date of the leave. It is clear from the facts that Dacsig had failed
to acquire the necessary leave permits. He offers no excuse or explanation for failing to obtain the

necessary authorization for his leaves. Thus, he is guilty of taking unauthorized absences. Rule IV,
Section 52 (A) (17) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, provides that the
penalty for frequent unauthorized absences of a first offender is suspension for six months and one
day to one year. Judge Andrew P. Dulnuan vs. Esteban D. Dacsig, Clerk of Court II, MCTC, MagddelaNagtipunan, Quirinio. A.M. No. P-11-3004, April 18, 2012.
Judge; gross ignorance. Civil Case No. 632, a case for ejectment, is covered by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. It is equally undisputed that in summary procedure, a preliminary conference
should be held not later than 30 days after the last answer has been filed. Considering that no
preliminary conference at all was held in Civil Case No. 632, Judge Literato evidently failed to comply
with a basic rule of procedure for which he should accordingly be held accountable. Judge Literatos
inaction in Civil Case No. 632 for 322 days constitutes utter disregard for the summary nature of an
ejectment case.
Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the
rules, he erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. It is highly imperative that
judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. Basic legal procedures must be at the
palm of a judges hands. In sum, Judge Literato is administratively guilty of gross ignorance of the
Rule on Summary Procedure and undue delay in rendering a decision. Dr. Ramie G. Hipe vs. Judge
Rolando T. Literato, Municipal Trial Court, Mainit, Surigao Del Norte. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1781, April 25,
2012.
Judge; gross misconduct. In Guerrero vs. Judge Deray, the Court held that a judge who deliberately
and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the resolution of [the Supreme] Court is guilty of
gross misconduct and insubordination.
In the present case, the Court found that Judge Go failed to heed the Courts pronouncements. He did
not file the required comment to the Courts show-cause resolutions despite several opportunities
granted him. His willful disobedience and disregard to the show-cause resolutions constitutes grave
and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to his
office. It is noteworthy that Judge Go was afforded several opportunities to explain his failure to
decide the subject cases long pending before his court and to comply with the directives of this Court,
but he has failed, and continuously refuses to heed the same. This continued refusal to abide by
lawful directives issued by this Court is glaring proof that he has become disinterested to remain with
the judicial system to which he purports to belong. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Go, et
al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1667, April 10, 2012.
Judge; gross misconduct and dishonesty. In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous
annulment of marriage cases which do not exist in the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that (1)
proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2) docket fees had been paid; (3) the parties were
notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4) hearings had been conducted; or (5) the cases
were submitted for decision. Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions
on the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that such cases underwent trial
and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential requisites for voiding marriages. Such act
undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct.
Among the questioned annulment decrees is Judge Indars Decision dated 23 May 2007, in Spec. Proc.
No. 06-581, entitled Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling. Despite the fact that no proceedings
were conducted in the case, Judge Indar declared categorically, in response to the Australian Embassy
letter, that the Decision annulling the marriage is valid and that petitioner is free to marry. In effect,
Judge Indar confirms the truthfulness of the contents of the annulment decree, highlighting Judge

Indars appalling dishonesty. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Indar. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232,
April 10, 2012.
Judge; performing or agreeing to perform functions or services outside of their official functions. Judge
Molato is to be reprimanded for agreeing to serve as one of Lucky Corporations alternate bank
signatories even if he may not have performed such service for the corporation. He has no business
agreeing to the performance of such service. His offense constitutes a violation of Administrative
Circular 5 which in essence prohibits public officials from performing or agreeing to perform functions
or services outside of their official functions for the reason that the entire time of the officials and
employees of the judiciary shall be devoted to their official work to ensure the efficient and speedy
administration of justice. Ramoncito and Juliana Luarca vs. Judge Ireneo B. Molato, MTC, Bongabong,
Oriental Mindoro/ Jeny Agbay vs. Judge Ireneo B. Molato, MTC, Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. A.M. No.
MTJ-08-1711/A.M. No. MTJ-08-1716, April 23, 2012.
Notary public; duty to ascertain the identities of the parties executing the document. A notary public
is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the acknowledgement
and affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of these notarial acts, the notary
public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The notarial seal
converts a document from a private to a public instrument, after which it may be presented as
evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due execution. Thus, notarization should not
be treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary act.
A notary publics function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers and
duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. A notary public exercises
duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they
certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal
transactions.
The Court cautioned all notaries public to be very careful and diligent in ascertaining the true
identities of the parties executing the document before them, especially when it involves disposition
of a property, as this Court will deal with such cases more severely in the future. Maria vs.
Cortez. A.C. No. 7880, April 11, 2012.

June 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Administrative Complaint; moot and academic. The Court dismissed the complaint filed by Inter-Petal
Recreational Corporation against Chief Justice Renato Corona for being moot and academic after
considering the judgment of the Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court, which found the Chief
Justice guilty of the charge under Article II of the Articles of Impeachment, with the penalty of removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines as provided in
Section 3(7), Article XI of the Constitution. Re: Complaint Against the Honorable Chief Justice Renato
C. Corona dated September 14, 2011 filed by Inter-Petal Recreational Corporation, A.M. No. 12-6-10SC. June 13, 2012
Attorneys; disbarment cases imprescriptible. The defense of prescription is untenable. The Court has
held that administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of considerable time from
the commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase
the administrative culpability of a lawyer. Otherwise, members of the bar would only be emboldened
to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private
complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated

from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco
vs. Atty. Pablo Bernardo, A.C. No. 6368, June 13, 2012.
Attorney; False and untruthful statements in pleadings. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on
those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are
expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the
courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied
in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Magats act clearly falls short of the standards set by the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Rule 10.01, which provides:
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
The Court ruled that there was a deliberate intent on the part of Atty. Magat to mislead the court
when he filed the motion to dismiss the criminal charges on the basis of double jeopardy. Atty. Magat
should not make any false and untruthful statements in his pleadings. If it were true that there was a
similar case for slight physical injuries that was really filed in court, all he had to do was to secure a
certification from that court that, indeed, a case was filed. Rodrigo Molina vs. Atty. Ceferino
Magat A.C. No. 1900. June 13, 2012.
Attorney; Neglect etc.Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship
and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is
that lawyers duty to serve the client with competence and diligence. Respondent has failed to fulfill
this duty. When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of Appeal.
Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on
Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellants brief be filed after the records of the case have
been elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know this procedure. Canon 5 of
the Code reads:
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal
education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the
practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and
jurisprudence.
The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of the case does not
excuse his negligence. Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal
matter without adequate preparation. While it is true that respondent was not complainants lawyer
from the trial to the appellate court stage, this fact did not excuse him from his duty to diligently
study a case he had agreed to handle. If he felt he did not have enough time to study the pertinent
matters involved, as he was approached by complainants husband only two days before the
expiration of the period for filing the Appellants Brief, respondent should have filed a motion for
extension of time to file the proper pleading instead of whatever pleading he could come up with, just
to beat the deadline set by the Court of Appeals.
Also, as counsel, he had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their case. His failure to do so
amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which reads:
18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the clients request for information.

If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent could have
done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He could have
thus explained why he was no longer the counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and
informed the court that he could no longer contact them. His failure to take this measure proves his
negligence.
The failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigans Motion to Dismiss is
negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the
clients case, viz:
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence in fulfilling
their duty would render them liable for disciplinary action. Respondent has failed to live up to his
duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates his duties to his client, he engages in unethical and
unprofessional conduct for which he should be held accountable. Emilia R. Hernandez vs. Atty.
Venancio B. Padilla, A.C. No. 9387, June 20, 2012.
Contempt; unauthorized practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court ruled that practice of law
means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are
usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind
of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. The OCA was able to establish the
pattern in Karaans unauthorized practice of law. He would require the parties to execute a special
power of attorney in his favor to allow him to join them as one of the plaintiffs as their attorney-infact. Then, he would file the necessary complaint and other pleadings acting for and in his own
behalf and as attorney-in-fact, agent or representative of the parties. The fact that Karaan did not
indicate in the pleadings that he was a member of the Bar, or any PTR, Attorneys Roll, or MCLE
Compliance Number does not detract from the fact that, by his actions, he was actually engaged in
the practice of law.
Under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person assuming to be an attorney
or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority, is liable for indirect contempt of court.
Under Section 7 of the same rules, a respondent adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed
against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank may be punished by a fine not
exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If a
respondent is adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a lower court, he may be punished by a
fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both. Juvy P.
Ciocon-Reer, et al., vs. Judge Antonio C. Lubao, RTC Br. 22, General Santos City, A.M. OCA IPI No. 093210-RTJ, June 20, 2012.
Court personnel; discourtesy. Unless specifically provided by the rules, clerks of court have no
authority to pass upon the substantive or formal correctness of pleadings and motions that parties file
with the court. Compliance with the rules is the responsibility of the parties and their counsels. And
whether these conform to the rules concerning substance and form is an issue that only the judge of
the court has authority to determine. The duty of clerks of courts to receive pleadings, motions, and
other court-bound papers is purely ministerial. Although they may on inspection advise the parties or
their counsels of possible defects in the documents they want to file, which may be regarded as part
of public service, they cannot upon insistence of the filing party refuse to receive the same.
Canon IV, Section 2 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel provides that court personnel shall
carry out their responsibilities as public servants in as courteous a manner as possible. Atty. Ramos

was counsel in a case before Teves branch. He was an officer of the court who expressed a desire to
have the presiding judge, to whom he addressed his motion, see and consider the same. Teves
arrogated onto himself the power to decide with finality that the presiding judge was not to be
bothered with that motion. He denied Atty. Ramos the courtesy of letting the presiding judge decide
the issue between him and the lawyer. As held in Macalua v. Tiu, Jr., an employee of the judiciary is
expected to accord respect for the person and right of others at all times, and his every act and word
should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity. These are absent in this case.
Civil Service Resolution 99-1936 classifies discourtesy in the course of official duties as a light
offense, the penalty for which is reprimand for the first offense, suspension of 1-30 days for the
second offense, and dismissal for the third offense. In two consolidated administrative cases, one for
grave misconduct and immorality and the other for insubordination, the Court meted out on Teves the
penalty of suspension for six months in its resolution of October 5, 2011. The Court of course decided
these cases and warned Teves to change his ways more than a year after the September 8, 2008
incident with Atty. Ramos. Consequently, it could not be said that he ignored with respect to that
incident the warnings given him in the subsequently decided cases. Still those cases show Teves
propensity for misbehavior. Thus, the Court imposed on Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court of
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, the penalty of 30 days suspension with warning that a
repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Atty. Edward Anthony B.
Ramos vs. Reynaldo S. Teves, Clerk of Court III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu
City. A.M. No. P-12-3061, June 27, 2012.
Court personnel; disgraceful and immoral conduct. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the
conduct, official or otherwise, of the women and men who work in the judiciary, from the judge to the
lowest of its personnel. Like the rest of the personnel of the Court, the shuttle bus drivers are
expected to observe the norms and ethics of conduct of public officials and employees. Judiciary
employees should be circumspect in how they conduct themselves inside and outside the office. Any
scandalous behavior or any act that may erode the peoples esteem for the judiciary is unbecoming
of an employee. Court employees are supposed to be well-mannered, civil and considerate in their
actuations.
Laribo Jr.s utterances, are by themselves, malicious and cast aspersion upon Diomampos character.
The Court cannot countenance such behavior. The Court sanctioned Laribo Jr. for his disgraceful and
immoral conduct. Since such conduct is classified as a grave offense, the penalty for the first offense
is suspension from 6 months and 1 day to one year. But the Court tempered OCAs recommended
penalty and imposed a penalty of one month suspension, with a warning that a repetition of the same
or similar act shall be dealt with more severely, taking into account that this is Laribos Jr. first
infraction. Shirley D. Diomampo, Records Officer II, Sandiganbayan vs. Felipe C. Laribo Jr., Shuttle Bus
Driver, Sandiganbayan. A.M. No. SB-12-18-P. June 13, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees enunciates the States policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. And no other office in the government service exacts a greater
demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than the judiciary. Persons
involved in the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowest clerk, must live up to the
strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness and diligence in the public service. As the
assumption of public office is impressed with paramount public interest, which requires the highest
standards of ethics, persons aspiring for public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful
compliance with the law.
Respondent committed dishonesty by causing the unauthorized insertion of an additional sentence in
the trial courts order. Dishonesty has been defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud.
It implies untrustworthiness, lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle on the

part of the individual who failed to exercise fairness and straightforwardness in his or her dealings. By
her act, she has compromised and undermined the publics faith in the records of the court below
and, ultimately, the integrity of the Judiciary. To tolerate such act would open the floodgates to fraud
by court personnel.
The insertion of an additional sentence in an order of the trial court, regardless of the reason is not
among respondents duties. A legal researchers duty focuses mainly on verifying legal authorities,
drafting memoranda on evidence, outlining facts and issues in cases set for pre-trial, and keeping
track of the status of cases. In Salvador v. Serrano, the Court held that courts have the inherent
power to amend and control their process and orders to make them conformable to law and justice.
But such power rests upon the judge and not to clerks of court who only perform adjudicative support
functions and non-adjudicative functions. In the same vein, the power to amend court orders cannot
be performed by a legal researcher. It is well to remind that court personnel are obliged to accord the
integrity of court records of paramount importance, as these are vital instruments in the dispensation
of justice. Judge Amado Caguioa (ret.) vs. Elizabeth Aucena, Court Legal Researcher II, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 4, Baguio City. A.M. No. P-09-2646, June 18, 2012.
Under Section 52 (A) (1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
promulgated by the Civil Service Commission through Resolution No. 99-1936 dated August 31, 1999
and implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999, dishonesty is a grave offense
punishable by dismissal from the service for the first offense. However, the Court, in certain
instances, has not imposed the penalty of dismissal due to the presence of mitigating factors such as
the length of service, being a first-time offender, acknowledgment of the infractions, and remorse by
the respondent. The Court has also ruled that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever
missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. It is not
only for the laws concern for the workingman; there is, in addition, his family to consider.
Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on wage earners.
Considering that this is respondents first offense in her twenty-two (22) years of service in the
Judiciary, the admission of her act and her sincere apology for her mistake, her firm resolve not to
commit the same mistake in the future, and taking into account that she is a widow and the only one
supporting her five children, the recommended penalty of suspension for a period of six (6) months is
in order. Judge Amado Caguioa (ret.) vs. Elizabeth Aucena, Court Legal Researcher II, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 4, Baguio City. A.M. No. P-09-2646, June 18, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty.For Aguam to assert that she herself took and passed the examination
when in fact somebody else took it for her constitutes dishonesty. Every employee of the Judiciary
should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, she must exhibit
the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of her official duties but also in
her personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the courts good name and
standing. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the
personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court personnel have
been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and
private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. Here,
Aguam failed to meet these stringent standards set for a judicial employee and does not therefore
deserve to remain with the Judiciary.
In Cruz v. Civil Service Commission, Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, and Concerned Citizen v.
Dominga Nawen Abad, the Court dismissed the employees found guilty of similar offenses. In Cruz,
Zenaida Paitim masqueraded as Gilda Cruz and took the Civil Service examination in behalf of Cruz.
The Court said that both Paitim and Cruz merited the penalty of dismissal. In Sta. Ana, somebody else
took the Civil Service examination for Sta. Ana. The Court dismissed Sta. Ana for dishonesty. In Abad,
the evidence disproved Abads claim that she personally took the examination. The Court held that

for Abad to assert that she herself took the examination when in fact somebody else took it for her
constitutes dishonesty. Thus, Abad was for her offense. The Court found no reason to deviate from
these consistent rulings. Under Section 52(A)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense. Under
Section 58(a) of the same rules, the penalty of dismissal carries with it cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government
service. The OCA properly excluded forfeiture of accrued leave credits, pursuant to the Courts ruling
in Sta. Anaand Abad. The Court also consistently held that the proper penalty to be imposed on
employees found guilty of an offense of this nature is dismissal from the service. Lourdes CelaviteVidal vs. Noraida A. Aguam, A.M. No. SCC-10-13-P, June 26, 2012.
Court personnel; Disrespectful behavior. Section 2, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel, requires that court personnel shall carry out their responsibilities as public servants in as
courteous a manner as possible. The image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct,
official or otherwise, of the men and women who work there. Court personnel must at all times act
with strict propriety and proper decorum so as to earn and rebuild the publics trust in the judiciary as
an institution. The Court would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all
those involved in the administration of justice, which would violate the norm of public accountability
and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary.
Under Rule XIV, Section 23 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292,
discourtesy in the course of official dutiesis classified as a light offense. A first-time violation of this
rule warrants the penalty of reprimand. Considering a) respondents apology and admission of his
mistakes; b) his retirement from service on 1 July 2011 after long years of employment in the
Judiciary; and c) this case being the first complaint against him, he should be held liable for
discourtesy and be meted out the penalty of reprimand.
Respondent committed other lapses in the performance of his duties as Clerk of Court. Instead of
strictly observing the required number of working hours in the civil service, he left his post in the
middle of the day to attend a social event. Worse, he chose to return to the office and enter the
judges chambers while under the influence of alcohol. His behavior constitutes a direct violation of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, particularly Section 1, Canon IV on the Performance of
Duties, which states: Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with
diligence. They shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their
office during working hours. Judge Ethelwolda Jaravata vs. Precioso Orencia, Clerk of Court, MTC,
Agoo, La Union A.M. No. P-12-3035, June 13, 2012.
Court personnel; falsification. Falsification of a DTR by a court personnel is a grave offense. The act of
falsifying an official document is in itself grave because of its possible deleterious effects on
government service. At the same time, it is also an act of dishonesty, which violates fundamental
principles of public accountability and integrity. Under Civil Service regulations, falsification of an
official document and dishonesty are distinct offenses, but both may be committed in one act.
The constitutionalization of public accountabilityshows the kind of standards of public officers that are
woven into the fabric of our legal system. Public office is a public trust, which embodies a set of
standards such as responsibility, integrity and efficiency. Reality may depart from these standards,
but our society has consciously embedded them in our laws, so that they may be demanded and
enforced as legal principles. This Court, in the exercise of its administrative jurisdiction, should
articulate and apply these principles to its own personnel, as a way of bridging actual reality to the
norms we envision for our public service.
The Supreme Court exercised its administrative jurisdiction despite respondent Kasilags resignation,
more than two years after he was directed to file his Comment. The resignation of a public servant

does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be
answerable. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions that of separation from service
may no longer be imposed, there are other penalties which may be imposed namely, the
disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits. There are no mitigating
circumstances for respondent Kasilag. Dishonesty and the act of falsifying detract from the notion of
public accountability, as implemented by our laws. We apply the law as it is written. Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Jaime Kasilag, Sheriff IV, Regionatl Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila. A.M. No. P08-2573, June 19, 2012.
Court Personnel; gross insubordination. Respondent failed to explain why, despite her receipt of the
Notices, she did not comply with the directives of this Court to submit her comment. The records
show that the OCA had sent notices to her at RTCBranch 93 of San Pedro, Laguna, where she is the
branch sheriff. While she apologized to this Court for her failure to submit her comment, she did not
explain the reasons for her non-submission thereof and only averred that it was the first time she
learned of the Complaint against her. The OCA did not find her explanation satisfactory, because she
did submit her Comment, but only after a Show-Cause Order had been issued to her and almost a
year after the first directive requiring her to file the Comment. Respondents prolonged and repeated
refusal to comply with the directives of the Supreme Court constituted willful disrespect of its lawful
orders, as well as those of the OCA. Respondent committed the infraction twice, yet failed to fully
explain the circumstances that led to the repeated omissions. Hence, there no reason to overturn or
mitigate the penalty recommended by the OCA. Ricardo Dela Cruz et al., vs. Ma.
Gross insubordination is the indifference of a respondent to an administrative complaint and to
resolutions requiring a comment thereon. The offense is deemed punishable, because every
employee in the judiciary should not only be an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty; more
than anyone else, they are bound to manifest utmost respect and obedience to their superiors orders
and instructions.Ricardo Dela Cruz et al., vs. Ma. Consuelo Jole A. Fajardo, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 93, San
Pedro, Laguna. A.M. No. P-12-3064, June 18, 2012.
Court personnel; gross misconduct and dishonesty. The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel stresses
that employees of the judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part
immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the peoples confidence in it. No
other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and
uprightness from an employee than in the Judiciary. Thus, the failure of judicial employees to live up
to their avowed duty constitutes a transgression of the trust reposed in them as court officers and
inevitably leads to the exercise of disciplinary authority. By these standards, respondent was found
wanting, as she never denied the allegations that she had stolen and encashed the 30,000 check
payable to Judge Rojas. She did not even refute the allegations of Dauz and Corpuz that she
misrepresented to both of them that she had authority to encash the check. Worse, neither did she
ever deny the allegations pertaining to her previous acts of stealing from and paying off her
obligations to other trial court judges. She has virtually admitted her wrongdoing.
Whether or not respondent has fully settled her obligation to Judge Rojas, and to the other trial court
judges for that matter, will not exonerate her from any administrative wrongdoing. This Court
inVillaseor v. De Leon has emphasized that full payment of an obligation does not discharge the
administrative liability, because disciplinary actions involve not purely private matters, but acts
unbecoming of a public employee. The Court ruled that respondents admitted acts of pocketing
checks and later encashing them for her benefit constitute grave misconduct. The Court has defined
grave misconduct as follows:
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; and the misconduct is grave if it involves

any of the additional elements of corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.
Furthermore, stealing the checks and encashing them are considered acts of gross
dishonesty.Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness;
lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the personnel who
work therein. Court employees are enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and
decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of
the court of justice. Both gross misconduct and dishonesty are grave offenses that are punishable by
dismissal even for the first offense. Penalties include forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service.
The mere expedient of resigning from the service will not extricate a court employee from the
consequences of his or her acts. The Court has often ruled that resignation should not be used either
as an escape or as an easy way out to evade an administrative liability or an administrative sanction.
Thus, respondent was still held administratively liable for gross misconduct
and dishonesty.Herresignation, however, would affect the penalties the Court may impose. The
penalty of dismissal arising from the offense was rendered moot by virtue of her resignation. Thus,
the recommendation of the OCA is appropriate under the circumstances. The Court imposed upon
respondent the penalty of a fine in the amount of 40,000 with forfeiture of all benefits due her,
except accrued leave credits, if any. The 40,000 fine shall be deducted from any such accrued leave
credits, with respondent to be personally held liable for any deficiency that is directly payable to the
Court. She was further declared disqualified from any future government service. The Court
emphasized that all court employees, being public servants in an office dispensing justice, must
always act with a high degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be in accordance with the law and court
regulations. To maintain the peoples respect and faith in the judiciary, court employees should be
models of uprightness, fairness and honesty. They should avoid any act or conduct that would
diminish public trust and confidence in the courts. Executive Judge Melanio C. Rojas, Jr. RTC Branch
25, Tagudin, Ilocos Sur vs. Ana Marivic L. Mina, Clerk III, RTC, Bracnh 25, Tagudin Ilocos Sur. A.M. No.
P-10-2867, June 19, 2012
Court personnel; misconduct defined. In Arcenio v. Pagorogon, the Court defined misconduct as a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by the public officer. As differentiated from simple misconduct, in grave misconduct
the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule,
must be manifest. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption,
willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence. In this case, respondent was a mere Utility Worker who had no authority to take
custody of the office attendance logbook, the DTRs of his office mates, let alone case records. Yet,
respondent, taking advantage of his position as a Utility Worker and the access to the court records
and documents which such position afforded him, repeatedly wrought havoc on the proper
administration of justice by taking case records outside of the courts premises and preoccupying his
office mates with the time-consuming task of locating documents. Without doubt his actions
constitute grave misconduct which merits the penalty of dismissal. However, in view of his
resignation, the Court found it proper to instead impose on respondent the penalty of fine in the
amount of P10,000 with forfeiture of benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice
to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. This of course is without prejudice to any criminal liability he may have
already incurred.

As regards the 68 missing court records to date have not yet been found, the Court deemed it proper
to order complainant to explain why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with in view of the apparent
failure on her part to exercise due care in the custody of the said case records. Our courts of justice,
regarded by the public as their haven for truth and justice, cannot afford and does not have the
luxury of offering excuses to litigants for negligence in its role of safekeeping and preserving the
records of cases pending before it. The consequences of such failure or negligence, if there be any,
are simply too damaging not just for the parties involved but worse, for our court system as a
whole. Clerk of Court Arlyn A. Hermano vs. Edwin D. Cardeno, Utility worker I, Municipal Trial Court,
Cabuyao, Laguna. A.M. No. P-12-3036, June 20, 2012.
Court Personnel; Procedure in the service and execution of court writs and processes. There was a
valid substituted service of summons in this case. As a rule, personal service of summons is preferred
as against substituted service and substituted service can only be resorted to by the process server if
personal service cannot be made promptly. Most importantly, the proof of substituted service of
summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b)
specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon
a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the
office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts
proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officers return.
Based on the records, Sheriff Villar exhausted efforts to personally serve the summons to Spouses Tiu
as indicated in his Sheriffs Return of Summons. When it was apparent that the summons could not be
served personally on the spouses, Sheriff Villar served the summons through Bauco, their employee,
at the office address of the couples business. It was evident that Bauco was competent and of
sufficient age to receive the summons on their behalf as she represented herself to be their General
Manager and Caretaker.
The Sheriff also complied with the requirement of prior coordination as mandated in Administrative
Circular No. 12 which lays down the guidelines and procedure in the service and execution of court
writs and processes in the reorganized courts. Documentary evidence indeed discloses that Sheriff
Villar of Pasay City coordinated with the Sheriff of Pasig City before he implemented the writ of
preliminary attachment. In the Certification, the Clerk of Court of Pasig City attested to the fact that
Sheriff Villar formally coordinated with their office in connection with the implementation of the writ of
attachment. Attached to said certification is a certified true copy of Sheriff Villars request for
coordination on which the word received was stamped by the Office of the Clerk of Court and Exofficio Sheriff, RTC Pasig City.
By law, sheriffs are obligated to maintain possession of the seized properties absent any instruction to
the contrary. In this case, the writ of preliminary attachment authorizing the trial court to legally hold
the attached items was set aside by the RTC Order dated July 8, 2010 specifically ordering Sheriff
Villar to immediately release the seized items to Spouses Tiu. The instruction of the trial court was
clear and simple. Sheriff Villar was to return the seized properties to Spouses Tiu. He should have
followed the courts order immediately. He had no discretion to wait for the finality of the courts order
of dismissal before discharging the order of attachment. Nevertheless, Sheriff Villar showed no
deliberate defiance of, or disobedience to, the courts order of release. Records show that he took the
proper step under the circumstances and filed with the trial court his Sheriffs Report with Urgent
Prayer for the Issuance of a Clarificatory Order. There was nothing amiss in consulting the judge
before taking action on a matter of which he is not an expert. Spouses Rainier Tiu and Jennifer Tiu vs.
Virgilio Villar, Sheriff IV, RTC, OCC Pasay City. A.M. No. P-11-2986, June 13, 2012
Judge; delay in rendering decisions. Judges are continuously reminded to resolve cases with dispatch
to avoid any delay in the administration of justice. Thus, under Section 9 (1), Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is considered a less serious charge.

The Supreme Court ruled that the prudent course of action would have been for Judge Asis to request
an extension for acting on Civil Case No. 05-35013 instead of disposing the case only after being
prompted to file a comment on the present Complaint. The Court nevertheless deemed it proper to
reduce the fine, considering the existence of factors that mitigated the commission of the offense,
namely: (a) this is his first infraction, and (b) his delay in the disposition of the case resulted from his
serious medical conditions. Leticia Jacinto vs. Judge Josephus Joannes H. Asis, MeTC, Br. 40, Quezon
CityA.M. No. MTJ-12-1811, June 13, 2012
Judge; delay in rendering decision. Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, mandates that cases
or matters filed with the lower courts must be decided or resolved withinthree months from the date
they are submitted for decision or resolution. With respect to cases falling under the Rule on
Summary Procedure, first level courts are only allowed 30 days following the receipt of the last
affidavit and position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to render
judgment. As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done,
or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless
delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules
are regarded as mandatory.
Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to promptly act upon cases and matters pending before their
courts. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, directs judges to dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics further exhort judges to be prompt and punctual in the disposition and resolution of
cases and matters pending before their courts.
In addition, Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 once more reminds all magistrates
to observe scrupulously the periods prescribed in Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution, and to
act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts. Prompt disposition
of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If they do not
possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of litigants.
Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of
their obligation to promptly administer justice.
Unfortunately, respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty and responsibility that
her position requires. The case was submitted for resolution on July 19, 2006, yet it was still pending
when complainant filed the present administrative complaint on June 4, 2010, and remained
unresolved per complainants manifestation filed on September 8, 2010. More than four years after
being submitted for resolution, the case was still awaiting decision by respondent. Respondent
irrefragably failed to decide the case within the 30-day period prescribed by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. This action is contrary to the rationale behind the Rule on Summary Procedure,
which was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases,
and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases. Indeed,
respondent even failed to decide the case within the three-month period mandated in general by the
Constitution for lower courts to decide or resolve cases. Records do not show that respondent made
any previous attempt to report and request for extension of time to resolve the case.
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies undue delay
in rendering a decision as a less serious charge for which the penalty is suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for one month to three months, or a fine of P10,000.00
to P20,000.00. Given that respondent had been previously dismissed from the service, the penalty of
suspension is already inapplicable. Instead, the Court imposed upon respondent, for her undue delay
in resolving the case, a fine in the maximum amount of P20,000.00, to be deducted from her accrued
leave credits Fe Valdez vs. Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 60,
Mandaluyong City. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1796, June 13, 2012.

Judge; gross abuse of authority and gross ignorance. In this case, the contempt charge was
commenced not through a verified petition, but by Judge Belen motu proprio through the issuance of
an order requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect
contempt. As such, the requirements of the rules that the verified petition for contempt be docketed,
heard and decided separately or consolidated with the principal action find no application.
Consequently, Judge Belen was justified in not directing the contempt charge against State Prosecutor
Comilang to be docketed separately or consolidated with the principal action. However, Judge Belen
blatantly violated the injunctive writ issued by the CA enjoining the implementation of his May 30,
2005 Order and December 12, 2005 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 94069.
As pointed out by the OCA, the CAs disquisition is clear and categorical. In complete disobedience to
the said Resolution, however, Judge Belen proceeded to issue (1) the Order requiring State Prosecutor
Comilang to explain his refusal to file the supersedeas bond and to require his presence in court on
September 26, 2007, as well as to explain why he should not be cited for indirect contempt; (2) the
September 26, 2007 Order seeking State Prosecutor Comilangs explanation for his defiance of
thesubpoena requiring his presence at the hearing of even date, and directing, once again, his
attendance at the next hearing on October 1, 2007 and to explain once more why he should not be
cited for indirect contempt; and (3) the October 1, 2007 Order finding State Prosecutor Comilang
guilty of indirect contempt and sentencing him to pay a fine of P30,000.00 and to suffer two days
imprisonment. In requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his non-filing of a supersedeas bond,
in issuing subpoenas to compel his attendance before court hearings relative to the contempt
proceedings, and finally, in finding him guilty of indirect contempt for his non-compliance with the
issued subpoenas, Judge Belen effectively defeated the status quo which the writ of preliminary
injunction aimed to preserve. State Prosecutors II Josef Albert T.
Judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith as judicial competence
requires no less. Moreover, refusal to honor an injunctive order of a higher court constitutes
contempt, as in this case, where Judge Belen, in contumaciously defying the injunctive order issued
by the CA, was found guilty of indirect contempt. Judge Belens actuations cannot be considered as
mere errors of judgment that can be easily brushed aside. Obstinate disregard of basic and
established rule of law or procedure amounts to inexcusable abuse of authority and gross ignorance
of the law. Likewise, citing State Prosecutor Comilang for indirect contempt notwithstanding the
effectivity of the CA-issued writ of injunction demonstrated his vexatious attitude and bad faith
towards the former, for which he must be held accountable and subjected to disciplinary action. Our
conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who
discharge their duties in accordance with law. Hence considering the foregoing disquisitions and
Judge Belens previous infractions, which are all of serious nature and for which he had been severely
warned, the Court adopted the recommendation of the OCA to mete the ultimate penalty of dismissal
against Judge Belen for grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law. The Court can no
longer afford to be lenient in this case, lest it give the public the impression that incompetence and
repeated offenders are tolerated in the judiciary. State Prosecutors II Josef Albert T. Comilang and Ms.
Victoria Sunega-Lagman vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, RTC, Branch 36, Calamba City. A.M. No.
RTJ-10-2216, June 26, 2012.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Not all administrative complaints against judges merit a
corresponding penalty. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. The remedy of the complainants in this case is
judicial in nature. Hence, the denial of their motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Courts
Resolution dismissing the administrative case against Judge Lubao is in order.
The records would show that Judge Lubao had been very careful in his actions on the case, as his
branch clerk of court even wrote the Post Office of General Santos City asking for certification as to

when the Order, sent under Registry Receipt, was received by the defendants. There was no evidence
that Judge Lubao acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. Further, Judge Lubao could not be faulted for trying
to give all the parties an opportunity to be heard considering that the records of the case would show
that the court a quo summarily dismissed the case without issuing summons to the defendants. Juvy
P. Ciocon-Reer, et al., vs. Judge Antonio C. Lubao, RTC Br. 22, General Santos City, A.M. OCA IPI No.
09-3210-RTJ, June 20, 2012.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. The respondent deserves to be sanctioned for gross ignorance of
the law. With her inaction on the petition for contempt, she betrayed her unbecoming lack of
familiarity with basic procedural rules such as what was involved in the contempt proceedings before
her court. She should have known that while the petitioners have the responsibility to move ex
parteto have the case scheduled for preliminary conference, the court (through the branch clerk of
court) has the duty to schedule the case for pre-trial in the event that the petitioners fail to file the
motion. The respondent cannot pass the blame for the lack of movement in the case to her staff who,
she claims, were monitoring the case. As presiding judge, she should account for the anomaly that
since the respondents filed their answer, the petition for contempt had been gathering dust or had
not moved in the respondents court. Clearly, the respondent fell short of the standards of
competence and legal proficiency expected of magistrates of the law in her handling of the petition
for contempt. As in Magpali v. Pardo, she should be fined P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. It
bears stressing that when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Eladio D.Perfecto vs. Judge Alma Consuelo DesalesEsideria, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2258, June 20, 2012.
Judges; inhibition. Judicial remedies were available to complainant in the main cases. The allegations
in the instant complaint are a mere rehash of the allegations in complainants Urgent Omnibus Motion
to Expunge Motion for Clarification and Recall the Resolution dated November 13, 2002 and the
Urgent Motion to Inhibit and the Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion filed in the main
cases. These were in fact decided already on October 19, 2011. The Complainant charges Justice
Sereno of unfairly refusing to inhibit herself from taking part in the deliberation in the main cases
notwithstanding that Justice Carpios former law office supposedly worked for her appointment in the
Supreme Court. The charge is purely conjectural and the Court, in its April 17, 2012 per
curiam decision in A.C. No. 6332 has already ruled that the charge has no extrinsic factual evidence
to support it. Re: Letter-Complaint Against Hon. Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Loudes P.A
Sereno dated September 16, 2011 filed by Atty. Magdaleno M. Pena, A.M. No. 12-6-11-SC. June 13,
2012.
Judges; undue delay in rendering a decision or order. Delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the
erosion of public faith and confidence in the judiciary and the lowering of its standards. Failure to
decide cases within the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reasons, constitutes gross
inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanction on the defaulting judge.
In this case, the decision was purportedly issued on 7 April 2011, or more than four months since the
last submission of the parties position paper. The pretrial Order was purportedly issued on 26 January
2010, or more than three months since the pretrial. Section 8 of the Rules on Summary Procedure
provides that within five days after the termination of the preliminary conference, the court shall
issue an order stating the matters taken up therein.
Further, paragraph 8, Title I(A) of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, entitled Guidelines to be Observed by Trial
Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery
Measures, mandates that a judge must issue a pretrial order within 10 days after the termination of
the pretrial. Since the ejectment case fell under the Rules on Summary Procedure, respondent judge
should have handled it with promptness and haste. The reason for the adoption of those Rules is
precisely to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases, an offense for which respondent judge

may be held administratively liable. Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies undue delay in
rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge, which under Section 1(b) of the same Rule is
punishable with suspension from office, without salary and other benefits, for not less than one (1)
nor more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than 10,000, but not exceeding 20,000.
Considering that the instant administrative charge is only the third against respondent judge (the first
has been dismissed, while the second is still pending), and considering his relatively long tenure in
the judiciary starting in 1997, he may be reasonably meted out a penalty of 5,000 for being
administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision. Pilar S. Tanoco vs. Judge Inocencio B.
Saguin, Jr. MTCC Br. 3, Cabanatuan City. A.M. No. MTJ-12-1812. June 20, 2012.
Judge; unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases. Judges have the sworn duty to administer
justice without undue delay, for justice delayed is justice denied. They have always been exhorted to
observe strict adherence to the rule on speedy disposition of cases, as delay in case disposition is a
major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judicial system. Under the 1987
Constitution, trial judges are mandated to decide and resolve cases within 90 days from submission.
Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly, and with
reasonable promptness. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, the Court held that a judge
cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension granted by
the Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross
inefficiency that merits administrative sanction. If a judge is unable to comply with the period for
deciding cases or matters, he can, for good reasons, ask for an extension.
An inexcusable failure to decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross
inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions such as suspension from office
without pay or fine on the defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending chiefly
on the number of cases not decided within the reglementary period and other factors, such as the
presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the damage suffered by the parties as a result
of the delay, the health and age of the judge, and other analogous circumstances.
In this case, records are bereft of showing that Judge Buenavista sought for an extension of time to
decide and resolve most of the cases pending before him, save only for one instance. Having
therefore failed to decide cases and resolve incidents within the required period constituted gross
inefficiency, warranting the imposition of a fine of P10,000.00 which the Court finds reasonable under
the circumstances. Re: Report of the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional trial Court, Branches 72
and 22, Narvacan Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. 06-9-525-RTC, June 13, 2012.
Public Officials; SALNs. While no prohibition could stand against access to official records, such as the
SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation. Section 8 (c) and (d) of R.A. No. 6713 provides
for the limitation and prohibition on the regulated access to SALNs of government officials and
employees as well as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6713. The power to regulate
the access by the public to these documents stems from the inherent power of the Court, as
custodian of these personal documents, to control its very office to the end that damage to, or loss of,
the records may be avoided; that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the books
and documents and other employees may be prevented; and that the right of other persons entitled
to make inspection may be insured. In this connection, Section 11 of the R.A 6173 provides for the
penalties in case there should be a misuse of the SALN and the information contained therein. The
Court found no reason to deny the public access to the SALN, PDS and CV of the Justices of the Court
and other magistrates of the Judiciary subject, of course, to the limitations and prohibitions provided
in R.A. No. 6713, its implementing rules and regulations, and in the guidelines set forth in the decretal
portion.

The Court noted the valid concerns of the other magistrates regarding the possible illicit motives of
some individuals in their requests for access to such personal information and their publication.
However, custodians of public documents must not concern themselves with the motives, reasons
and objects of the persons seeking access to the records. The moral or material injury which their
misuse might inflict on others is the requestors responsibility and lookout. Any publication is made
subject to the consequences of the law. While public officers in the custody or control of public
records have the discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be inspected, examined or
copied by interested persons, such discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit access,
inspection, examination, or copying of the records. After all, public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
The Supreme Court also provided the following guidelines:
1.
All requests shall be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals; for the lower courts, with the Office of the
Court Administrator; and for attached agencies, with their respective heads of offices.
2.
Requests shall cover only copies of the latest SALN, PDS and CV of the members, officials and
employees of the Judiciary, and may cover only previous records if so specifically requested and
considered as justified, as determined by the officials mentioned in par. 1 above, under the terms of
these guidelines and the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6713.
3.
In the case of requests for copies of SALN of the Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, the authority to disclose shall be made by
the Court En Banc.
4.
Every request shall explain the requesting partys specific purpose and their individual interests
sought to be served; shall state the commitment that the request shall only be for the stated
purpose; and shall be submitted in a duly accomplished request form secured from the SC website.
The use of the information secured shall only be for the stated purpose.
5.
In the case of requesting individuals other than members of the media, their interests should go
beyond pure or mere curiosity.
6.
In the case of the members of the media, the request shall additionally be supported by proof
under oath of their media affiliation and by a similar certification of the accreditation of their
respective organizations as legitimate media practitioners.
7. The requesting party, whether as individuals or as members of the media, must have no
derogatory record of having misused any requested information previously furnished to them. Re:
Request for copy of 2008 Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth [SALN] and Personal Data
Sheet or Curriculum Vitae of the Justices of the Supreme Court and Officers and Employees of the
Judiciary/ Re; Request of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism [PCIJ] for the 2008
Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth [SALN] and Personal Data Sheets of the Court of
Appeals Justices, A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC/A.M. No. 09-8-07-CA. June 13, 2012.
Retirement under R.A 910; Retirement vs. Resignation. Resignation and retirement are two distinct
concepts carrying different meanings and legal consequences in our jurisdiction. While an employee
can resign at any time, retirement entails the compliance with certain age and service requirements
specified by law and jurisprudence. Resignation stems from the employees own intent and volition
to resign and relinquish his/her post. Retirement takes effect by operation of law. In terms of
severance to ones employment, resignation absolutely cuts-off the employment relationship in

general; in retirement, the employment relationship endures for the purpose of the grant of
retirement benefits. RA No. 910, as amended allows the grant of retirement benefits to a justice or
judge who has either retired from judicial service or resigned from judicial office. In case of
retirement, a justice or judge must show compliance with the age and service requirements as
provided in RA No. 910, as amended. The second sentence of Section 1 imposes the following
minimum requirements for optional retirement:
(a) must have attained the age of sixty (60) years old; and
(b) must have rendered at least fifteen (15) years service in the Government, the last three (3) of
which shall have been continuously rendered in the Judiciary.
Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is the rule and the grant of
exception remains to be on a case to case basis. The Court allows seeming exceptions to these fixed
rules for certain judges and justices only and whenever there are ample reasons to grant such
exception.
On the other hand, resignation under RA No. 910, as amended must be by reason of incapacity to
discharge the duties of the office. In Britanico, it was held that the resignation contemplated under RA
No. 910, as amended must have the element of involuntariness on the part of the justice or judge.
More than physical or mental disability to discharge the judicial office, the involuntariness must spring
from the intent of the justice or judge who would not have parted with his/her judicial employment
were it not for the presence of circumstances and/or factors beyond his/her control.
In either of the two instances above-mentioned, Judge Macarambons case does not render him
eligible to retire under RA No. 910,as amended. First, Judge Macarambon failed to satisfy the age
requirement since he was less than 60 years of age when he resigned from his judicial office before
transferring to the COMELEC. Likewise, he failed to satisfy the service requirement not having been in
continuous service with the Judiciary for three (3) years prior to his retirement. Second, Judge
Macarambons resignation was not by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. His
separation from judicial employment was of his own accord and volition. Thus, the ruling
in Britanicocannot be properly applied to his case since his resignation was voluntary. Third, there are
no exceptional reasons to justify Judge Macarambons request. Judge Macarambon failed to present
similar circumstances, i.e., the presence of available and sufficient accumulated leave credits which
we may tack in to comply with the age requirement. A verification from the Leave Division, OCA
shows that at the time he left the Court Judge Macarambon only had 514 vacation leaves and 79 sick
leaves which are insufficient to cover the gap in the age of retirement. Moreover, these accumulated
leave credits were all forwarded to the COMELEC upon his transfer. Finally, unlike in Britanico, the
nature of his separation from his judicial office was voluntary.
However, although Judge Macarambon is not qualified to retire under RA No. 910, as amended, he
may retire under RA No. 1616 based on the documents he had presented before the Court which
meets the age and service requirements under the said law. Re: Application for Retirement of Judge
Moslemen Macarambon under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No.
14061-RET, June 19, 2012.

July 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attorney; bigamy; gross immorality. A disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification
and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in
filing the case.Respondents regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates either his

wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what course of
action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions. Respondent entered into
marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity.His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly
immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Manuel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012.
Attorney; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.Section 27, Rule 138
provides that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In a disbarment case, the Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction. The crime of
direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. The lawyers final conviction of the crime of direct
bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138.
Disbarment follows as a consequence of the lawyers conviction of the crime. Atty. Policarpio I.
Catalan, Jr. vs. Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa. A.C. No. 7360, July 24, 2012.
Attorney; inexcusable negligence. The failure of counsel to file the requisite appellants brief
amounted to inexcusable negligence in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In Perla
Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon, it was held that an attorney is bound to protect his clients
interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. On account of respondents failure to
protect the interest of complainant, respondent indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually,
academically and morally. This Court has been exacting in its expectations for the members of the
Bar to always uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence of the public. Isaac C. Basilio, Perlita Pedrozo
and Jun Basilio vs. Atty. Virgil R. Castro A.C. No. 6910. July 11, 2012
Attorney; representation of conflicting interest. Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. Rule 15.03 also
provides that A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of facts. in Hilado v. David, the Court held that an attorney
is employed that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor
when he is listening to his clients preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice
thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his clients pleadings, or advocating his clients pleadings,
or advocating his clients cause in open court. Hence the necessity of setting down the existence
of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of
interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent
conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. The question is not necessarily
one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional
standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesars wife, not only to keep
inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing.

Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice. The prohibition against representation of conflicting
interests applies although the attorneys intentions were honest and he acted in good faith. Atty.
Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. vs. Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa. A.C. No. 7360, July 24, 2012.
Attorney; sharing of fees. A lawyer is proscribed by Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not
licensed to practice law. In Tan Tek Beng v. David , it was rule that an agreement between a lawyer
and a layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and
that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Manuel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede
S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012.
Attorney; solicitation of clients. Based on the facts of the case, respondent violated Rule 2.03 of the
Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit. A lawyer is not prohibited
from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the business
is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyers duties as
a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to
the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for
indirect solicitation on the lawyers behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be
regarded as the practice of law
Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former
is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the
practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations governing the attorney-client
relationship may be operative in one and not in the other. Manuel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S.
Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012.
Court Personnel; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service refers to acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish or tend to diminish the peoples faith in the Judiciary. If an employees questioned
conduct tarnished the image and integrity of his public office, he is liable for conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. The basis for his liability is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. The Code, particularly its Section
4(c), commands that public officials and employees shall at all times respect the rights of others, and
shall refrain from doing acts contrary to public safety and public interest.
The strictest standards have always been valued in judicial service. Everyone involved in the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, is expected to live up to the
strictest norm of competence, honesty and integrity in the public service. The conduct of every court
personnel must be beyond reproach and free from suspicion that may cause to sully the image of the
Judiciary. They must totally avoid any impression of impropriety, misdeed or misdemeanor not only in
the performance of their official duties but also in conducting themselves outside or beyond the
duties and functions of their office. Court personnel are enjoined to conduct themselves toward
maintaining the prestige and integrity of the Judiciary for the very image of the latter is necessarily
mirrored in their conduct, both official and otherwise. They must not forget that they are an integral
part of that organ of the government sacredly tasked in dispensing justice. Their conduct and
behavior, therefore, should not only be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility but at
all times be defined by propriety and decorum, and above all else beyond any suspicion. The Court
does not hesitate to condemn and sanction such improper conduct, act or omission of those involved
in the administration of justice that violates the norm of public accountability and diminishes or tends
to diminish the faith of the public in the Judiciary. Filomena B. Consolacion vs. Lydia S. Gambito, Court
Stenographer, MCTC, Binalonan, Pangasinan/Judge Emma S. Ines-Parajas vs. Lydia S. Gambito, Court
Stenographer, MCTC, Binalonan, Pangasinan A.M. No. P-06-2186 & A.M. No. P-12-3026. July 3, 2012

Court personnel; dishonesty and grave misconduct. In Alenio v. Cunting, the Court defined
dishonesty and grave misconduct as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of
fairness and straightforwardness. Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by
the public officer. To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious,
important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and
not a mere error of judgment. The misconduct must also have a direct relation to and be connected
with the performance of the public officers official duties amounting either to maladministration or
willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office.
Taking monetary evidence without proper authority constitutes theft. In Judge San Jose, Jr. v.
Camurongan, the Court held that, The act of taking monetary exhibits without authority from their
custodian constitutes theft. Thievery, no matter how petty, has no place in the judiciary. Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Ma. Irissa G. Musni, Court Legal Researcher II RTC, Judicial Region III,
Branch 36, Gapan City, Nueva Ecija A.M. No. P-11-3024, July 17, 2012.
Court personnel; dishonesty, gross neglect, grave misconduct. Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution
declares that a public office is a public trust, and all public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. The demand for moral uprightness is more
pronounced for the members and personnel of the judiciary who are involved in the dispensation of
justice. The conduct of court members and personnel must not only be characterized with propriety
and decorum but must also be above suspicion, for any act of impropriety ca seriously erode or
diminish the peoples confidence in the judiciary. As frontliners in the administration of justice, they
should live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service.
Clerks of Court act as custodians of the courts funds, revenues, records, property and premises and
are thus, liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and property. In Re:
Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit of RTC-Br. 4, Panabo, Davao Del Norte, it was held that the
failure of the Clerk of Court to remit the court funds constitutes gross neglect of duty, dishonesty, and
grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. In this case, Peradilla is guilty of
dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, and grave misconduct for her: (1) non-remittance of collections of
judiciary funds; (2) non-issuance of official receipts and non reporting in the Monthly Reports and
Collections and Deposits of some of the collections; and (3) erroneous reporting in the
Monthly Reports and Collections and Deposits of some of the collections. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Lunalinda M. Peradilla, Clerk of Court II, MCTC, E1 Nido-Linapacan, Palawan A.M. No.
P-09-2647, July 17, 2012.
Court personnel; simple misconduct. The Sheriff disregarded the procedure for the execution of
judgments as mandated by Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. A sheriff is mandated to make
an estimate of the expenses which shall be approved by the court. It is only after the approval of the
court that an interested party shall deposit the amount with the clerk of court. Upon the return of the
writ, the sheriff must submit a liquidation and return to the interested party any unspent amount. The
Sheriffs act of receiving money from the party for the expenses to be incurred in the execution of the
writs, without first making an estimate and securing prior approval from the MTCC, as well as his
failure to render accounting after its execution, are clear violations of the rule. Even if conceding that
the sum demanded by Sheriff is reasonable, this does not justify his deviation from the procedure laid
down by the rule. Neither the acquiescence nor consent of the complainant, before or after the
implementation of the writ will absolve him from liability. The mere act of receiving the money
without the prior approval of the court and without him issuing a receipt therefor is considered as a
misconduct in office.

Sheriffs are reminded that they are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the
course of the performance of their duties. Corollarily, a sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums
of money from a party-litigant without observing the proper procedural steps. Even assuming that
such payments were indeed given and received in good faith, such fact alone would not dispel the
suspicion that such payments were made for less than noble purposes. Sheriffs and their deputies are
the front-line representatives of the justice system, and if, through their lack of care and diligence in
the implementation of judicial writs, they lose the trust reposed on them, they inevitably diminish the
faith of the people in the Judiciary. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official
and otherwise, of the personnel who work there, from the judge to the lowest employee. As such, the
Court will not tolerate or condone any conduct of judicial agents or employees which would tend to or
actually diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Lambayong Teachers and Employees
Cooperative, represented in this act by its Manager, Gudelio S. Valeroso vs. Carlos P. Diaz, in his
capacity as Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 20, Tacurong City A.M. No. P-06-2246, July 11, 2012.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. The manner in which a writ of execution is to be returned to
the court, as well as the requisite reports to be made by the sheriff or officer, is explicitly outlined in
Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In accordance with this rule, periodic reporting must be
done by the sheriff regularly and consistently every thirty (30) days until the judgment is fully
satisfied. It is mandatory for the sheriff to make a return of the writ of execution, so that the court and
the litigants may be apprised of the proceedings undertaken in the enforcement of the writ. The
return will enable the courts to take the necessary steps to ensure the speedy execution of
decisions. The failure of a sheriff to make periodic reports on the status of a writ of execution
warrants administrative liability.
The Court faults respondent for not submitting his periodic reports on the progress of his
implementation of the writ. He is guilty of simple neglect of duty, defined as the failure of an
employee to give ones attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty
resulting from carelessness or indifference.As officers of the court, sheriffs are charged with the
knowledge of what proper action to take in case there are questions on the writ needing to be
clarified; they are charged as well with the knowledge of what they are bound to comply with.Sheriffs
are expected to know the rules of procedure pertaining to their functions as officers of the
court,relative to the implementation of writs of execution, and should at all times show a high degree
of professionalism in the performance of their duties. Any act deviating from the procedure laid down
by the Rules of Court is misconduct that warrants disciplinary action.
Rhea Airene P. Katague, et al. vs. Jerry A. Ledesma, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 48, Bacolod City A.M. No. P-123067. July 4, 2012.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. The duty of a process server is vital to the administration of
justice. A process servers primary duty is to serve court notices which precisely requires utmost care
on his part by ensuring that all notices assigned to him are duly served on the parties. Unjustified
delay in performing this task constitutes neglect of duty and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanctions. All employees in the judiciary should be examples of responsibility, competence and
efficiency. It is through the process server that defendants learn of the action brought against them
by the complainant. It is also through the service of summons by the process server that the trial
court acquires jurisdiction over the defendant. It is therefore important that summonses, other writs
and court processes be served expeditiously.
Heavy workload is not an adequate excuse to be remiss in the diligent performance of ones public
duties as a public servant. Otherwise, every government employee charged with negligence and
dereliction of duty will always use this as a convenient excuse to escape punishment to the great
prejudice of public service

The Court has defined dishonesty as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness
and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. Dishonesty is not simply bad
judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a
person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances
which gave rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the
offense was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on
the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. It was
never alleged, much less established, that Dela Cruz was impelled by some evil design or corrupt
motives to commit said errors or to favor any party or litigant. Hence, he was found guilty only of
negligence in the performance of his tasks, and not of dishonesty. Simple neglect of duty is defined
as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due
to carelessness or indifference. Judge Pelagia Dalmacio-Joaquin vs. Nicomedes Dela Cruz, Process
Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. A.M. No. P-06-2241. July 10, 2012
Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Judge Clapis is also liable for gross ignorance of the law for
conducting bail hearings without a petition for bail being filed by the accused and without
affording the prosecution an opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. His Order
granting bail indicates that he merely used as basis the affidavit of one prosecution witness that was
submitted earlier. Clearly, he failed to observe the proper procedure in granting bail. His act is not a
mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment but a patent disregard of well-known rules.
When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge
liable for gross ignorance of the law.
If judges are allowed to wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by the law, there will not only be
confusion in the administration of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of
due process. Judges are reminded that having accepted the exalted position of a judge, they owe it to
the public to uphold the exacting standard of conduct demanded from them. Criselda C. Gacad vs.
Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC, Br. 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley A.M. No. RJ-10-2257. July 17,
2012
Judge; gross misconduct. In Kaw v. Osorio, the Court held that while the respondent judge, in that
case, may not be held liable for extortion and corruption as it was not substantially proven, he should
be made accountable for gross misconduct. The acts of the Judge in meeting a litigant in a case
pending before his sala, and telling her, Sige, kay ako na bahala gamuson nato ni sila (Okay, leave
it all to me, we shall crush them) constitute gross misconduct. Misconduct means intentional
wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior in connection with ones
performance of official functions and duties. For grave or gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act
complained of should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a persistent
disregard of well-known rules. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment. The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken together, give doubt as to his impartiality,
integrity and propriety. His acts amount to gross misconduct constituting violations of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct, particularly Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 2 and Sections 2 and 4 of Canon 3 and
Section 1 of Canon 4
It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial
at all times. Being in constant scrutiny by the public, his language, both written and spoken, must be
guarded and measured lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. Needless to state, any gross
misconduct seriously undermines the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary. Criselda
C. Gacad vs. Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC, Br. 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley A.M. No. RJ-102257. July 17, 2012

Judge; undue delay. The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure was promulgated to achieve an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases that it covers. The respondent failed to abide
by this purpose in the way that he handled and acted on the subject unlawful detainer case. Under
Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, a preliminary conference should be held
not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed. The respondent set the case for
preliminary conference at a time way beyond the required thirty (30)-day period. Another of the
respondents procedural lapses relates to the frequent resetting of the date of the preliminary
conference. Clearly, the respondent failed to exert his authority in expediting the proceedings of the
unlawful detainer case. Sound practice requires a judge to remain, at all times, in full control of the
proceedings in his court and to adopt a firm policy against unnecessary postponements.
In numerous occasions, the Court admonished judges to be prompt in the performance of their
solemn duty as dispensers of justice because undue delay in the administration of justice erodes the
peoples faith in the judicial system. Delay not only reinforces the belief of the people that the wheels
of justice in this country grind slowly, it also invites suspicion, however unfair, of ulterior motives on
the part of the Judge. Judges should always be mindful of their duty to render justice within the
periods prescribed by law. Murphy Chu, et al. vs. Hon. Mario B. Capellan, Assisting Judge, MeTC, Br.
40, Quezon City. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1779, July 16, 2012.

August 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

Attorney; failure to account for money. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Canon 16-A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.
Rule 16.01-A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
Rule 16.02-A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him.
Rule 16.03-A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose, should be
immediately returned. A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of
his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation
of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.Emilia O. Dhaliwal vs. Atty. Abelardo B. Dumaguing. A.C. No. 9390, August 1, 2012.
Attorney; grave misconduct and dishonesty. The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and
the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the administration of justice
by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and
trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. The Court cited the case of In
Re: Sotto and ruled that One of the qualifications required of a candidate for admission to the bar is
the possession of good moral character, and, when one who has already been admitted to the bar
clearly shows, by a series of acts, that he does not follow such moral principles as should govern the
conduct of an upright person, and that, in his dealings with his clients and with the courts, he
disregards the rule of professional ethics required to be observed by every attorney, it is the duty of
the court, as guardian of the interests of society, as well as of the preservation of the ideal standard

of professional conduct, to make use of its powers to deprive him of his professional attributes which
he so unworthily abused.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for
law, legal processes but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with
clients and the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship.
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, respondent may either be disbarred or
suspended for committing deceitful and dishonest acts. This rule provides that in any of the following
circumstances, to wit: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct; (4) grossly immoral conduct;
(5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; or (8) corruptly or wilfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so; the Court is vested with the authority and
discretion to impose either the extreme penalty of disbarment or mere suspension. Grace M. Anacta
vs. Atty. Eduardo D. Resurrecction.A.C. No. 9074, August 14, 2012.
Attorney; immorality. The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As
such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the
Code. Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards
whether in their professional or in their private capacity.
The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is
considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage
and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Respondent violated the
Lawyers Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Engr.Gilbert Tumbokon vs. Atty. Mariano R.
Pefianco.A.C. No. 6116, August 1, 2012
Attorney; representing conflicting interest. Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer cannot represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of their
relationship, sound public policy dictates that he be prohibited from representing conflicting interests
or discharging inconsistent duties. An attorney may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former
client. This rule is so absolute that good faith and honest intention on the erring lawyers part does
not make it inoperative. The reason for this is that a lawyer acquires knowledge of his former clients
doings, whether documented or not, that he would ordinarily not have acquired were it not for the
trust and confidence that his client placed on him in the light of their relationship. It would simply be
impossible for the lawyer to identify and erase such entrusted knowledge with faultless precision or
lock the same into an iron box when suing the former client on behalf of a new one. Santos Ventura
Hocorma Foundation, Inc., represented by Gabriel H. Abad vs. Atty. Richard V. Funk. A.C. No. 9094,
August 15, 2012
Attorney; sharing of fees with non- lawyers. Respondents defense that forgery had attended the
execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have
undertaken the payment of complainants commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap.
Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from

dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law,
except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar. Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon vs. Atty.
Mariano R. Pefianco.A.C. No. 6116, August 1, 2012.
Court personnel; disgraceful and immoral conduct. Immorality has been defined to include not only
sexual matters but also conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency,
depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral indifference
to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good
order and public welfare. Respondent engaged in sexual relations with a married man which not only
violate the moral standards expected of employees of the Judiciary but is also a desecration of the
sanctity of the institution of marriage.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of court personnel must be free from any whiff
of impropriety, not only with respect to his duties in the judicial branch but also to his behavior
outside the court as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a court employee is also
judged by his private morals. The exacting standards of morality and decency have been strictly
adhered to and laid down by the Court to those in the service of the Judiciary. Respondent, as a court
stenographer, did not live up to her commitment to lead a moral life.
Public office is a public trust. The good of the service and the degree of morality, which every
official and employee in the public service must observe, if respect and confidence are to be
maintained by the Government in the enforcement of the law, demand that no untoward
conduct affecting morality, integrity, and efficiency while holding office should be left without proper
and commensurate sanction, all attendant circumstances taken into account. Judge Armando S.
Adlawan, Presiding Judge, 6th MCTC, Bonifacio-Don Mariano Marcos, Misamis Occidental vs. Estrella P.
Capilitan, 6th MCTC, Bonifacio-Don Mariano Marcos, Misamis Occidental. A.M. No. P-12-3080. August
29, 2012
Court personnel; dishonesty and falsification of public document. Willful concealment of facts in the
Personal Data Sheet (PDS) constitutes mental dishonesty amounting to misconduct. Likewise, making
a false statement in ones PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document.
Dishonesty has been defined as intentionally making a false statement on any material fact.
Dishonesty evinces a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity,
lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition
to defraud, deceive or betray.
Civil service rules mandate the accomplishment of the PDS as a requirement for employment in the
government. Hence, making false statements in ones PDS is ultimately connected with ones
employment in the government. The employee making false statements in his or her PDS becomes
liable for falsification. Moreover, for respondent to be meted the penalty of dismissal, her dishonesty
need not be committed in the performance of official duty.
As the Court has previously ruled: The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or
employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character
are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The Government cannot
tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by
reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of
dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the
office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence
and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less
disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations.
When official documents are falsified, intent to injure a third person is irrelevant because the principal
thing punished is the violation of public faith and the destruction of the truth as claimed in

thatdocument.The act undermines the integrity of government records and therein lies the prejudice
to public service. The act need not result in disruption of service or loss to the government. It is the
act of dishonesty itself that taints the integrity of government service. A government officers
dishonesty affects the morale of the service, even when it stems from the employees personal
dealings. Such conduct should not be tolerated from government officials, even when official duties
are performed well.
Employment in the judiciary demands the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency from its personnel. All judiciary employees are expected to conduct themselves with
propriety and decorum at all times. An act that falls short of the exacting standards set for public
officers, especially those in the judiciary, shall not be countenanced. Manolito C. Villordon vs. Marilyn
C. Avila, Court Interpreter I, Municipal Trial Court in Cities. Branch 3, Cebu City. A.M. No. P-10-2809,
August 10, 2012
Court personnel; neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give attention to a
task or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. The Court ruled in Pilipina v. Roxas:
The Court cannot countenance neglect of duty for even simple neglect of duty lessens the peoples
confidence in the judiciary and ultimately in the administration of justice. By the very nature of their
duties and responsibilities, public servants must faithfully adhere to, hold sacred and render inviolate
the constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust; that all public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency. Memoranda of Judge Eliza B. Yu issued to Legal Researcher Marie Joy P. Lagman
and to Court Stenographer Soledad J. Bassig, all of Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 47, Pasay
City. A.M. No. P-12-3033, August 15, 2012.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. Rule 39, Section 14 of the Rules of Court clearly mandates
the sheriff or other proper officer to file a return and when necessary, periodic reports, with the court
which issued the writ of execution. The writ of execution shall be returned to the court immediately
after the judgment had been partially or fully satisfied. In case the writ is still unsatisfied or only
partially satisfied 30 days after the officers receipt of the same, said officer shall file a report with the
court stating the reasons therefor. Subsequently, the officer shall periodically file with the court a
report on the proceedings taken to enforce the writ every 30 days until said writ is fully satisfied or its
effectivity expires. The officer is further required to furnish the parties with copies of the return and
periodic reports.
Difficulties or obstacles in the satisfaction of a final judgment and execution of a writ do not excuse
respondents total inaction. Neither the Rules nor jurisprudence recognizes any exception from the
periodic filing of reports by sheriffs It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the
suit and is the life of law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for
the prevailing party. Therefore, sheriffs ought to know that they have a sworn responsibility to serve
writs of execution with utmost dispatch. When writs are placed in their hands, it is their ministerial
duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute them in accordance with their
mandate. Unless restrained by a court order, they should see to it that the execution of judgments is
not unduly delayed. Accordingly, they must comply with their mandated ministerial duty as speedily
as possible. As agents of the law, high standards are expected of sheriffs
Canon IV, Section 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel that reads, Court personnel shall at
all times perform official duties properly and with diligence. Astorga and Repol Law Offices,
represented by Atty. Arnold B. Lugares vs. Leodel N. Roxas, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 66,
Makati City. A.M. No. P-12-3029, August 15, 2012.
Attorney; representation of non-client. Atty. Espejos claim that he drafted and signed the pleading
just to extend assistance to Rodica deserves scant consideration. It is true that under Rules 2.01and

2.02, Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not reject, except for valid
reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed, and in such cases, even if he does not accept
a case, shall not refuse to render legal advise to the person concerned if only to the extent necessary
to safeguard the latters right. However, in this case, Rodica cannot be considered as defenseless or
oppressed considering that she is properly represented by counsel in the RTC case. Needless to state,
her rights are amply safeguarded. It would have been different had Rodica not been represented by
any lawyer, which, however, is not the case.
The Court wonders why Atty. Espejo, knowing fully well that Rodica is not their law firms client and
without the knowledge and consent of his
superiors, gave in to Rodicas request for him to indicate in the said motion the names of his law firm,
Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle for the purpose of giving more weight and credit to the pleading. As
a member of the bar, Atty. Espejo ought to know that motions and pleadings filed in courts are acted
upon in accordance with their merit or lack of it, and not on the reputation of the law firm or the
lawyer filing the same. More importantly, he should have thought that in so doing, he was actually
assisting Rodica in misrepresenting before the RTC that she was being represented by the said law
firm and lawyers, when in truth she was not.
It is well to remind Atty. Espejo that before being a friend to Rodica, he is first and foremost an officer
of the court. Hence, he is expected to maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealings and must
conduct himself beyond reproach at all times. He must likewise ensure that he acts within the bounds
of reason and common sense, always aware that he is an instrument of truth and justice. Jasper
Junno F. Rodica vs. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al. A.C. No. 9259, August 23, 2012

January 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; forum shopping as contempt of court. A disbarment complaint against Atty. Gonzales was
filed for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility for the forum shopping he allegedly
committed. The court held that the respondent was guilty of forum shopping. Lawyers should be
reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct
that tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes this obligation. The
Court has repeatedly warned lawyers against resorting to forum shopping since the practice clogs the
Court dockets and can lead to conflicting rulings. Willful and deliberate forum shopping has been
made punishable either as direct or indirect contempt of court. In engaging in forum shopping, Atty.
Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which directs lawyers to obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. He also disregarded his
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and the prohibition against unduly
delaying a case by misusing court processes. Thus, the court subjected Atty. Gonzales to
censure. Anastacio N. Teodoro III vs. Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales. A.C. No. 6760. January 30, 2013
Attorney; neglect. Complainant filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Gacott who allegedly
deceived the complainant and her husband into signing a preparatory Deed of Sale that respondent
converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his relatives.
The respondent is reminded that his duty under Canon 16 is to hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession. Allowing a party to take the original TCTs
of properties owned by another an act that could result in damage should merit a finding of legal
malpractice. While it was his legal staff who allowed the complainant to borrow the TCTs and it does
not appear that the respondent was aware or present when the complainant borrowed the TCTs, the
court still held the respondent liable, as the TCTs were entrusted to his care and custody; he failed to
exercise due diligence in caring for his clients properties that were in his custody.

Moreover, Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. What amounts to
carelessness or negligence in a lawyers discharge of his duty to his client is incapable of an exact
formulation, but the Court has consistently held that the mere failure of a lawyer to perform the
obligations due his client is per se a violation. In Canoy v. Ortiz, the court held that a lawyers failure
to file a position paper was per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Similar to Canoy, the respondent clearly failed in his duty to his client when, without any explanation,
he failed to file the Motion for Leave to Intervene on behalf of the spouses Ylaya. Fe A. Ylaya vs. Atty.
Glenn Carlos Gacott.A.C. No. 6475. January 30, 2013
Attorney; lack of diligence. Complainant filed a case for disbarment against Atty. Cefra for violating
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rules 138 and139 of the Rules of Court. The
court held that Atty. Cefra was guilty of negligence in handling the complainants case. His acts in the
present administrative case also reveal his lack of diligence in performing his duties as an officer of
the Court. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence. It further states that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. In addition, a lawyer has
the duty to keep the client informed of the status of his case. Atty. Cefra failed to live up to these
standards as shown by the following: (1) Atty. Cefra failed to submit a formal offer of documentary
evidence within the period given by the RTC; (2) He failed to comply with the two orders of the RTC
directing him to submit a formal offer of documentary evidence; (3) Atty. Cefra failed to file an
appropriate motion or appeal, or avail of any remedial measure to contest the RTCs decision; (4) He
failed to file an appropriate motion or appeal, or avail of any remedial measure to contest the RTCs
decision which was adverse to complainants.
Thus, the above acts showing Atty. Cefras lack of diligence and inattention to his duties as a lawyer
warrant disciplinary sanction. The court has repeatedly held that [t]he practice of law is a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers
are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Sps. Arcing and Cresing Bautista,
et al. vs. Atty. Arturo CefraA.C. No. 5530. January 28, 2013.
Attorney; reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys; guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency;
good moral character requirement. In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency, the Court laid down the following guidelines in
resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
(a) There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and
probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will
give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
(b) Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.
(c) The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of
him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
(d) There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
(e) There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other candidate for
admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character.
In a previous Decision, the Court disbarred respondent from the practice of law for having contracted
a bigamous marriage with complainant Teves and a third marriage with one Constantino while his first

marriage to Esparza was still subsisting. These acts, according to the court, constituted gross immoral
conduct.
In this case, the court held that Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his
indiscretion in the legal profession and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children
by complainant Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the herein
attached pictures. After his disbarment, respondent returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and
devoted his time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death in 2008. In
2009, he was appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter, assumed
the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/Office-In-Charge in the Assessors Office, which
office he continues to serve to date. Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the University of
Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the School Year 2011-2012. Respondent likewise took
an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire need.
Certain documents also attest to Respondents reformed ways such as: (1) Affidavit of Candida P.
Mabborang; (2) Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez; (3) Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud; (4) Certification from
the Municipal Local Government Office.
Furthermore, respondents plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the IBP- Cagayan Chapter and
by his former and present colleagues. His parish priest certified that he is faithful to and puts to
actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church. He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer.
Respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no opposition to the instant
suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends regular support to his children in compliance with
the Decision dated February 27, 2004.
The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent was disbarred
and recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product of Lemu National High School, and his
fourteen (14) years of dedicated government service from 1986 to July 2000 as Legal Officer of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the Civil Service
Commission; Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer; and State Prosecutor of the Department of
Justice. From the attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that respondent has
sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 58 years of age, he still has productive years ahead of
him that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of
society. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers,
concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their ways as in this
case.
Thus, the court reinstated respondent to the practice of law. He was, however, reminded that such
privilege is burdened with conditions whereby adherence to the rigid standards of intellect, moral
uprightness, and strict compliance with the rules and the law are continuing requirements. Florence
Teves Macarubbo vs. Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo; Re: Petition (for Extraordinary Mercy) of Edmundo
L. Macarubbo. A.C. No. 6148. January 22, 2013
Court personnel; refusal to perform duty. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel enjoins court personnel to perform their official duties properly and with diligence at all
times. Clerks of Court are primarily responsible for the speedy and efficient service of all court
processes and writs. Hence, they cannot be allowed to slacken on their work since they are charged
with the duty of keeping the records and the seal of the court, issuing processes, entering judgments
and orders, and giving certified copies of records upon request. As such, they are expected to possess
a high degree of discipline and efficiency in the performance of their functions to help ensure that the
cause of justice is done without delay.
As an officer of the court, respondent Clerk of Court was duty-bound to use reasonable skill and
diligence in the performance of her officially-designated duties as clerk of court, failing which,
warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions. In this case, respondent unjustifiably failed to
issue the alias writs of execution to implement the judgment in a Civil Case, despite orders from the
RTC. Moreover, she failed to file the required comment in disregard of the duty of every employee in
the judiciary to obey the orders and processes of the Court without delay. Such act evinces lack of

interest in clearing her name, constituting an implied admission of the charges. Mariano T. Ong vs.
Eva G. Basiya-Saratan, Clerk of Court, RTC, Br. 32, Iloilo City. A.M. No. P-12-3090. January 7, 2013
Judge; disciplinary proceedings against judges; presumption of regularity. Jurisprudence is replete
with cases holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative
functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed
through available judicial remedies. Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement,
supplement or substitute judicial remedies and, thus, cannot be pursued simultaneously with the
judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by their erroneous orders or judgments.
Even if the CA decision or portions thereof turn out to be erroneous, administrative liability will only
attach upon proof that the actions of the respondent CA Justices were motivated by bad faith,
dishonesty or hatred, or attended by fraud or corruption, which were not sufficiently shown to exist in
this case. Neither was bias as well as partiality established. Acts or conduct of the judge clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly shown before he can be branded the stigma of
being biased and partial. In the same vein, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the
judgment or order is adverse to a party. Here, other than AMALIs bare and self-serving claim, no act
clearly indicative of bias and partiality was alleged except for the claim that respondent CA Justices
misapplied the law and jurisprudence. Thus, the presumption that the respondent judge has regularly
performed his duties shall prevail. Re: Verified complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against Hon. Danton Q.
Bueser, et al. A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 12-202-CA-J. January 15, 2013
Judge; gross ignorance of law. Judge Sarmiento, Jr. was charged with gross ignorance of the law,
manifest partiality and dereliction and neglect of duty. The court held that the judge did not commit
gross ignorance of the law. Gross ignorance of the law on the part of a judge presupposes an
appalling lack of familiarity with simple rules of law or procedures and well-established jurisprudence
which tends to erode the public trust in the competence and fairness of the court which he
personifies. The complaint states that respondent judge, in arbitrary defiance of his own September
25, 2006 Decision which constitutes res judicata or a bar to him to pass upon the issue of Geoffrey,
Jrs. custody, granted, via his March 15, 2011 Order, provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. to Eltesa.
The Decision adverted to refers to the judgment on compromise agreement.
Respondent judge cannot be held guilty of the charges hurled by the complainant against him since
there is no finding of strong reasons to rule otherwise. The preference of a child over 7 years of age
as to whom he desired to live with shall be respected. Moreover, custody, even if previously granted
by a competent court in favor of a parent, is not permanent. Geoffrey Beckett vs. Judge Olegario R.
Sarmiento, Jr., RTC, Branch 24, Cebu City. A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326. January 30, 2013
Judge; misconduct. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law
or a standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be
connected with the performance of the official functions of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of an established rule must be established.
In this case, the actions of the Sandiganbayan Justices respecting the execution of the final judgment
against accused Velasco were shown to be in respectful deference to the Courts action on the various
petitions filed by the former. Records are bereft of evidence showing any trace of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of the rules as to hold the Sandiganbayan Justices
administratively liable for grave misconduct. Re: Complaint of Leonardo A. Velasco against Associate
Justices Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr., et al. A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-25-SB-J. January 15, 2013
Judge; no abuse of authority when judge did not renew a temporary appointment. Complainant, a
former Court Stenographer III at the RTC, failed to show any proof that she was entitled to a
permanent position. Other than her allegation that she was given two very satisfactory and one
satisfactory rating, there was no evidence presented that she has met the prescribed qualification
standard for the position. Such standard is a mix of the formal education, experience, training, civil
service eligibility, physical health and attitude that the job requires. Respondent judge, who is the

immediate supervisor of complainant, is in the best position to observe the fitness, propriety and
efficiency of the employee for the position. It should be impressed upon complainant that her
appointment in the Judiciary is not a vested right. It is not an entitlement that she can claim simply
for the reason that she had been in the service for almost two years.
The subsequent filing of complaint against Atty. Borja (officer-in-charge of the PAO-Virac) manifests
complainants propensity to file complaints whenever she does not get what she wants. Such attitude
should not be tolerated. Otherwise, judges will be placed in hostage situations by employees who will
threaten to file complaints whenever they do not get their way with their judges.
Since there is no proof that respondent judge abused her position, the case against her should be
dismissed. Respondent judge should, however, be reminded to be circumspect in her actuations so as
not to give the impression that she is guilty of favoritism. Kareen P. Magtagob vs. Judge Genie G.
Gapas-Agbada. OCA IPI No. 11-3631-RTJ. January 16, 2013
February 2013 Philippines Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; confidentiality of proceedings against attorneys; exception. Atty. Fortun filed a petition for
contempt against respondents for publicizing the disbarment case against him in media.
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that proceedings against attorneys shall be
private and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its
decisions in other cases. The purpose of the rule is not only to enable the Court to make its
investigations free from any extraneous influence or interference, but also to protect the personal and
professional reputation of attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive,
and irresponsible clients and litigants; it is also to deter the press from publishing administrative
cases or portions thereto without authority. Malicious and unauthorized publication or verbatim
reproduction of administrative complaints against lawyers in newspapers by editors and/or reporters
may be actionable. Such premature publication constitutes a contempt of court, punishable by either
a fine or imprisonment or both at the discretion of the Court. However, Section 18, Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court is not a restriction on the freedom of the press. If there is a legitimate public interest,
media is not prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate news report of a disbarment complaint.
In the absence of a legitimate public interest in a disbarment complaint, members of the media must
preserve the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during its pendency.
In this case, the filing of a disbarment complaint against Atty. Fortun is itself a matter of public
concern considering that it arose from the Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of the public is
not on Atty. Fortun himself but primarily on his involvement and participation as defense counsel in
the Maguindanao Massacre case. Thus, since the disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest,
media had a right to publish such fact under freedom of the press. Philip Sigrid A. Fortun vs. Prima
Jesusa B. Quinsayas, et al., G.R. No. 194578. February 13, 2013.
Attorney; full discharge of duties to client; limitations. Atty. Villarin is expected to champion the cause
of his client with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. This simply means that his client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense including the institution of an
ejectment case that is recognized by our property laws. In Legarda v. Court of Appeals, the court
held that in the full discharge of their duties to the client, lawyers shall not be afraid of the possibility
that they may displease the general public.
Nevertheless, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the limitation that lawyers shall
perform their duty to the client within the bounds of law. They should only make such defense when
they believe it to be honestly debatable under the law. In this case, Atty. Villarins act of issuing
demand letters, moved by the understanding of a void HLURB Decision, is legally sanctioned. If his
theory holds water, the notice to vacate becomes necessary in order to file an action for ejectment.
Hence, he did not resort to any fraud or chicanery prohibited by the Code just to maintain his clients
disputed ownership over the subdivision lots.
However, the facts show that Atty. Villarin brazenly typified one of the complainants as an illegal
occupant when the final and executory HLURB Decision had already recognized her as a subdivision

lot buyer. Given that he knew such falsity, he thus advances the interest of his client through means
that are not in keeping with fairness and honesty. This is proscribed by Rule 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to
attain lawful objectives. Lawyers must not present and offer in evidence any document that they
know is false. Verleen Trinidad, Florentina Lander, Wally Casubuan, Minerva Mendoza, Celedonio
Alojado, et al. vs. Atty. Angelito Villarin, A.C. No. 9310. February 27, 2013.
Attorney; notarial practice; necessity of affiants personal appearance; nature of notarization;
penalties when a notary public fails to discharge his duties. A notary public should not notarize a
document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein.
Without the personal appearance of the person who actually executed the document, the notary
public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the partys free act or deed.
The notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarized document is, by law,
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the publics
confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined
Respondents failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those directly
affected by the notarized document but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in
degrading the function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as
a notary public but also as a lawyer. The responsibility to faithfully observe and respect the legal
solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is more pronounced when the notary public is a
lawyer because of his solemn oath under the Code of Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and
to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are
mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public
policy and impressed with public interest.
Based on existing jurisprudence, when a lawyer commissioned as a notary public fails to discharge his
duties as such, he is meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years, and suspension from the
practice of law for one year. Patrocinio V. Agbulos vs. Atty. Roseller A. Viray, A.C. No. 7350. February
18, 2013.
Court personnel; discourteous acts. Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution states that a public
office is a public trust. It enjoins public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and to, at all times, remain accountable to the people.
As front liners of the justice system, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs must always strive to maintain public
trust in the performance of their duties. As agents of the law, they are called upon to discharge their
duties with due care and utmost diligence because in serving the courts writs and processes and
implementing the orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without affecting the integrity of their
office and the efficient administration of justice.
Sheriff Gelbolingos failure to properly respond to the letters is tantamount to discourtesy. A simple
note as to where their personal effects were temporarily stored could have assured Sasing that their
belongings were not confiscated but merely stored for safekeeping. The Court is fully aware that a
sheriffs schedule can be hectic, but she could have easily relayed the information to the other court
staff to address Sasings concerns.
The administrative offense committed by Sheriff Gelbolingo is discourtesy in the course of official
duties which, under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule IV, Section
52(C)(1), is a light offense. The penalty imposable for such an offense is either a reprimand for the
first offense, a suspension from 1 day to 30 days for the second offense, and dismissal from public
service for the third offense. In this case, the court admonished Sheriff Gelbolingo considering there
was an effort on her part to meet with Sasing twice, but the latter did not appear on the second

scheduled meeting. Ray Antonio C. Sasing vs. Celestial Venus G. Gelbolingo, Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch
20, Cagayan de Oro City, A.M. No. P-12-3032. February 20, 2013.
Court personnel; public office is a public trust; simple neglect of duty. No less than the Constitution
itself mandates that all public officers and employees should serve with responsibility, integrity and
efficiency, for public office is a public trust. The Court has repeatedly reminded those who work in the
Judiciary to be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency; they must discharge their
duties with due care and utmost diligence, since they are officers of the Court and agents of the law.
Indeed, any conduct, act or omission on the part of those who would violate the norm[s] of public
accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary shall
not be countenanced.
In this case, Mendoza charged Esguerra, a process server in the RTC, with Negligence and Dereliction
of Duty. The court held that Esguerra was guilty of simple neglect of duty. Esguerra cannot blame the
Civil Docket Clerk for the delay in the service of the July 7, 2008 Order. If indeed a copy of the July 7,
2008 Order had been handed to Esguerra only on August 8, 2008, a Friday, he should not have
proceeded to mail the same; but instead, should have served the Order personally to the parties,
particularly to the herein complainant. Even the Notice of Dismissal dated August 21, 2008 was
mailed only on September 19, 2008, three (3) weeks after it was endorsed to him sometime on
August 22 or 25, 2008. These acts clearly demonstrate lack of sufficient or reasonable diligence on
the part of the respondent. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel mandates
that Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with diligence. Clearly,
Esguerra had been remiss in the performance of his duties and has shown lack of dedication to the
functions of his office. Esguerras acts displayed a conduct falling short of the stringent standards
required of court employees. Erlinda C. Mendoza vs. Pedro S. Esguerra, Process Server, RTC, Br. 89,
Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija,A.M. No. P-11-2967. February 13, 2013.
Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA); preliminary injunction; requirement of a hearing. Section 4 of Rule VI
of the 2009 IRCA provides that [T]he requirement of a hearing for preliminary injunction is satisfied
with the issuance of a resolution served upon the party sought to be enjoined requiring him to
comment on the said application within the period of not more than ten (10) days from notice.
In this case, the CA was justified in dispensing with the requisite hearing on the application for
injunctive writ, since the so-called new and substantial matters raised in the third urgent motion in
CA-G.R. SP No. 122784 and in the supplement thereto were in fact not previously unknown to
respondents Ricafort, and they had already been previously ordered to comment on the said
application, at the time when the said subsequent matters were already obtaining. Ethelwoldo E.
Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S. Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr.,
Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013.
Judge; anonymous complaints against judges must be supported by public records of indubitable
integrity; unbecoming conduct. Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous
complaints may be filed against judges, but they must be supported by public records of indubitable
integrity. Courts have acted in such instances needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered by
the complainant.
Thus, for anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in administrative proceedings which usually
rests with the complainant, must be buttressed by indubitable public records and by what is
sufficiently proven during the investigation. If the burden of proof is not overcome, the respondent is
under no obligation to prove his defense.
In this case, no evidence was attached to the letter-complaint. The complainant never appeared, and
no public records were brought forth during the investigation. Judge Achas denied all the charges
made against him, only admitting that he was separated de facto from his wife and that he reared
fighting cocks.
For going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas has clearly failed to abide by Canons
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary. Regarding his involvement in cockfighting,

however, there is no clear evidence. Although Judge Achas denied engaging in cockfighting and
betting, he admitted rearing fighting cocks for leisure. While rearing fighting cocks is not illegal, Judge
Achas should avoid mingling with a crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors as it undoubtedly
impairs the respect due him. As a judge, he must impose upon himself personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the
judicial office. Judges in particular must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged
as they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings. He should behave at all
times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. His personal behavior outside the
court, and not only while in the performance of his official duties, must be beyond reproach, for he is
perceived to be the personification of law and justice. Thus, any demeaning act of a judge degrades
the institution he represents. Anonymous vs. Judge Rio C. Achas, MTCC Branch 2, Ozamiz City,
Misamis Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801. February 27, 2013.
Judge; definition of ponencia; ponente if present can act upon an urgent motion alone or with another
member present. There is nothing in the Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA) which would have required
the Division Clerk of Court to transmit the urgent motion for action only to the two present regular
members of the 14th Division, as the complainants seem to believe. The complainants would have
been correct if the absent member of the Division was not the ponente herself but either of the other
members. This implies that the ponente if present can act upon the urgent motion alone or with
another member present, provided that the action or resolution is submitted on the next working
day to the absent member or members of the Division for ratification, modification or recall.
A preliminary injunction is not a ponencia but an order granted at any stage of an action prior to final
judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. It is settled that as an ancillary or
preventive remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may be resorted to by a party to protect or
preserve his rights and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. Its object is
to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are passed upon. It is not a cause of action in
itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. On the other hand, ponencia refers
to the rendition of a decision in a case on the merits, which disposes of the main controversy. The writ
of preliminary injunction issued by the 14th Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 122784 did not settle the
controversy therein, but is a mere interlocutory order to restore the status quo ante, that is, the state
of things prior to the RTCs Order of December 21, 2011. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson
& Angel S. Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI
No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013.
Judge; government employee vis--vis government officer; liberal treatment upon retirement claims
of judges and justices. In a letter, former Chief Justice Panganiban requested that the government
service which he rendered from January 1962 to December 1965 in the Department of Education, its
Secretary, and the Board of National Education, be creditable so that he can meet the present service
requirement of fifteen (15) years for entitlement to retirement benefits.
Under the old Administrative Code (Act No. 2657), a government employee includes any person in
the service of the Government or any branch thereof of whatever grade or class. A government
officer, on the other hand, refers to officials whose duties involve the exercise of discretion in the
performance of the functions of government, whether such duties are precisely defined or not.
Clearly, the law, then and now, did not require a specific job description and job specification. Thus,
the absence of a specific position in a governmental structure is not a hindrance for the Court to give
weight to CJ Panganibans government service as legal counsel and consultant.
The Supreme Court has unquestionably followed the practice of liberal treatment in passing upon
retirement claims of judges and justices, thus: (1) waiving the lack of required length of service in
cases of disability or death while in actual service19 or distinctive service; (2) adding accumulated
leave credits to the actual length of government service in order to qualify one for retirement; (3)
tacking post-retirement service in order to complete the years of government service required; (4)

extending the full benefits of retirement upon compassionate and humanitarian considerations; and
(5) considering legal counseling work for a government body or institution as creditable government
service. Re: Request of (Ret.) Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban for Re-Computation of his
Creditable Service for the Purpose of Re-Computing his Retirement Benefits, A.M. No. 10-9-15-SC.
February 12, 2013.
Judge; gross ignorance of the law; mandatory inhibition; no liability for damages in the exercise of
judicial functions. The court held that Judge Dinopol is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. To be held
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but must have also been motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty, and corruption. Gross ignorance of the law is considered as a serious offense under Rule
140, Section 8, and is punishable under Section 11.
Moreover, one of the plaintiffs in the Civil Case assigned to the judge, is a relative by affinity within
the sixth degree, Judge Dinopol should have inhibited himself from taking cognizance of the case as
mandated by Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.
However, Judge Dinopol is not liable for damages. In Alzua v. Johnson, the court explained that in civil
actions for damages, judges of superior and general jurisdiction are not liable to answer for what they
do in the exercise of their judicial functions, provided they are acting within their legal powers and
jurisdiction. Eduardo Panes, Jr. et al. vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Joewe
Palad vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Roque C. Facura, et al. vs. Judge
Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Eden V. Castro vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC,
Branch 24, Koronadal City/Rosalinda G. Farofaldane vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24,
Koronadal City/Engr. Roque C. Facura, et al. vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal
City, A.M. OCA-IPI No. 07-2618-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2619-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2652RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2720-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2721-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 08-2808RTJ. February 12, 2013.
Judge; instituting administrative proceedings against justices. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
there are three ways by which administrative proceedings may be instituted against justices of the CA
and the Sandiganbayan and judges of regular and special courts: (1) motu proprio by the Supreme
Court; (2) upon verified complaint (as in this complaint) with affidavits of persons having personal
knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or
(3) upon an anonymous complaint supported by public records of indubitable integrity.
In this case, complainants have no personality to assail the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the CAs former Special 14th Division since they were not parties in the lower court. Thus, they are
not permitted to harass the CA Justices who issued the same. For even granting that the issuance of
the writ was erroneous, as a matter of public policy a magistrate cannot be held administratively
liable for every discretionary but erroneous order he issues. The settled rule is that a Judge cannot
be held to account civilly, criminally or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered by him in
good faith. The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in the consolidated CA petitions was
discretionary, interlocutory and preservative in nature, and equally importantly, it was a collective
and deliberated action of the former Special 14th Division. Moreover, as an established rule, an
administrative, civil or criminal action against a judge cannot be a substitute for an
appeal. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S. Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso.
Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013.
Judge; judicial conduct; definition of just debts; willful failure to pay a just debt is a ground for
disciplinary action against judges. Manlapaz charged Judge Sabillo with serious and gross misconduct
for failure to return an amount arising from a transaction.
The Court has repeatedly stressed that it is not a collection agency for the unpaid debts of its officials
and employees, but has nevertheless provided for Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court that holds
its officials and employees administratively liable in unpaid debt situations. This Section provides that
willful failure to pay a just debt is a ground for disciplinary action against judges and justices. Just

debts, as defined in Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292,
refer to (1) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (2) claims, the existence and justness of which are
admitted by the debtor. Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies willful failure to pay a just
debt as a serious charge.
While reference to a debt necessarily implies a transaction that is private and outside of official
transactions, the rules do not thereby intrude into public officials private lives; they simply look at
their actions from the prism of public service and consider these acts unbecoming of a public official.
These rules take into account that these are actions of officials who are entrusted with public duties
and who, even in their private capacities, should continually act to reflect their status as public
servants. Employees of the judiciary should be living examples of uprightness not only in the
performance of official duties but also in their personal and private dealings with others so as to
preserve at all times the good name and standing of the courts in the community. Here, the
complainants claim is a just debt. The willfulness of Judge Sabillo in not paying is shown by his
continuous failure to settle despite demand letters sent to him. Thus, the court imposed the penalty
of fine. Victoriano G. Manlapaz vs. Judge Manuel T. Sabillo, MCTC, Lamitan, Basilan, A.M. No. MTJ-101771. February 13, 2013.
Judge; judicial audit; courts jurisdiction over an administrative case; presumption of regularity. The
OCA submitted its memorandum to then Acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio on 10 July 2012
more than two years and seven months after Judge Grageda compulsorily retired. During his
incumbency, Judge Grageda was never given the chance to explain the alleged violation of Supreme
Court rules, directives and circulars. Up to the present, the OCA has not commenced any formal
investigation or asked Judge Grageda to comment on the matter. Thus, the complaint against Judge
Grageda must be dismissed.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Mantua, the court held that this Court concedes that there are
no promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial audit. However, the absence of such rules should not
serve as license to recommend the imposition of penalties to retired judges who, during their
incumbency, were never given a chance to explain the circumstances behind the results of the
judicial audit. Judicial audit reports and the memoranda which follow them should state not only
recommended penalties and plans of action for the violations of audited courts, but also give
commendations when they are due. To avoid similar scenarios, manual judicial audits may be
conducted at least six months before a judges compulsory retirement. We recognize that effective
monitoring of a judges observance of the time limits required in the disposition of cases is hampered
by limited resources.
These limitations, however, should not be used to violate Judge Mantuas right to due process.
For the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint must be filed during
the incumbency of the respondent. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by reason of
respondents cessation from office. In this case, Judge Gragedas compulsory retirement divested the
OCA of its right to institute a new administrative case against him after his compulsory retirement.
The Court can no longer acquire administrative jurisdiction over him by filing a new administrative
case against him after he has ceased to be a public official. The remedy is to file the appropriate civil
or criminal case against him for the alleged transgression.
Moreover, to hold Judge Grageda liable, there must be substantial evidence that he committed an
offense. Otherwise, the presumption is that he regularly performed his duties. In Go v. Judge Achas,
the Court held that, In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the respondent
has regularly performed his duties will prevail. Even in administrative cases, if a court employee or
magistrate is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be
competent.Missing Exhibits and Court Properties in Regional Trial Court, Br. 4, Panabo City, Davao
del Norte, A.M. No. 10-2-41-RTC. February 27, 2013.
Judge; undue delay. The court held that Judge Amdengan committed undue delay in rendering a
Decision in the ejectment case. An action for ejectment is governed by the Rules of Summary
Procedure, Section 10 which provides that within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits

and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render
judgment. This provision is mandatory, considering the nature of an ejectment case.
Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or an order is
classified as a less serious charge, punishable by either suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than
P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. The court considered his candid admission and acceptance of his
infraction as factors in imposing only a fine. Atty. Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. vs. Presiding Judge Michael M.
Amdengan, Municipal Trail Court, Angono Rizal, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. February 13, 2013.
March 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; a lawyer shall not assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the
Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by
a secretary of his law office. He likewise categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the
communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit
with his tolerance. Clearly, he violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR), which provides:
CANON 9 A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which
by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate
the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under
the Rules of Court, a counsels signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading;
(2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is
not interposed for delay. Thus, by affixing ones signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has
the responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document. For violating rule
9.01 of the CPR, Atty. Bacolo was meted with the penalty the suspension from the practice of law for
one year.Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia v. Attys. Charlie Bancolo and Janus Jarder; A.C. No.
9604. March 20, 2013.
Attorney; disbarment complaint; outright dismissal is warranted if the complaint, on its face, lacks
merit. For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the complainant upon the dismissal of
the Complaint for disbarment he instituted against the respondent lawyers. Complainant claims he
was denied due process because (1) she was not allowed to file a Reply and (2) the Court deviated
from usual procedure when it resolved the disbarment Complaint without first declaring the case to
have been submitted for resolution.
The Supreme Court has the power to outrightly dismiss a Complaint for disbarment when on its face,
it is clearly wanting in merit. Thus, in International Militia of People against Corruption & Terrorism v.
Chief Justice Davide, Jr. (Ret.), the Court, after finding the Complaint insufficient in form and
substance, dismissed the same outright for utter lack of merit. In the instant case, the Court did not
dismiss outright the disbarment Complaint. In fact, it even required the respondents to file their
respective Answers. Then, after a judicious study of the records, it proceeded to resolve the same
although not in complainants favor. Based on the Complaint and the supporting affidavits attached
thereto, and the respective Comments of the respondents, the Court found that the presumption of
innocence accorded to respondents was not overcome. Moreover, the Court no longer required
complainant to file a Reply since it has the discretion not to require the filing of the same when it can
already judiciously resolve the case based on the pleadings thus far submitted. And contrary to
complainants mistaken notion, not all petitions or complaints reach the reply or memorandum stage.
Depending on the merits of the case, the Court has the discretion either to proceed with the case by
first requiring the parties to file their respective responsive pleadings or to dismiss the same outright.
Likewise, the Court can proceed to resolve the case without need of informing the parties that the

case is already submitted for resolution. Jasper Junno F. Rodica v. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al.; A.C.
No. 9259. March 12, 2013.
Attorney; duty to exercise due diligence. The Court reiterated its ruling in Del Mundo v.
Capistrano that when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due
diligence in protecting the latters rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention
expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his
client and makes him answerable not just to client but also to the legal profession, the court and
society.
Respondents infractions were aggravated by his failure to comply with CBDs directives for him to file
his pleadings on time and to religiously attend hearings, demonstrating not only his irresponsibility
but also his disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such conduct was unbecoming of a
lawyer who is called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in
complying with court directives as an officer of the court. As a member of the bar, he ought to have
known that the orders of the CBD as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases
against lawyers were not mere requests but directives which should have been complied with
promptly and completely. Gloria P. Jinon v. Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz; A.C. No. 9615. March 5, 2013.
Attorney; duty to hold in trust money received from client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific
purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of land title, but not used for the purpose, should be
returned to the client immediately. The Court held in Dhaliwal v. Dumaguing that a lawyers failure to
return the funds he holds on behalf of a client, despite latters demand, gives rise to the presumption
that he has appropriated the same for his own use and constitutes a gross violation of general
morality and professional ethics. Gloria P. Jinon v. Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz; A.C. No. 9615. March 5, 2013.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; failure of branch clerk of court to keep and maintain a
general docket. Branch clerk of court Mr. Teves admitted that he failed to keep and maintain a
general docket of cases assigned to their branch. As such, he failed to comply with his duty under
Section 8, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, thus:
Sec. 8. General docket. The clerk shall keep a general docket, each page of which shall be
numbered and prepared for receiving all the entries in a single case, and shall enter therein all cases,
numbered consecutively in the order in which they were received, and under the heading of each
case, a complete title thereof, the date of each paper filed or issued, of each order or judgment
entered, and of each other step taken in the case so that by reference a single page the history of the
case may be seen.
With this infraction, Mr. Teves was held liable for simple neglect of duty. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-121818. March 12, 2013.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; failure of branch clerk of court to schedule the promulgation
of cases. In the Datan case, Mr. Teves, instead of scheduling the case for promulgation, just gave the
accused a copy of the unpromulgated decision at the time when the presiding judge was serving her
suspension. Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states that:
Sec. 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the
accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light
offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the
judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of
court x x x.
Clearly, as found by the OCA, Mr. Teves is guilty of simple neglect of duty. It is his duty to calendar the
case for promulgation in accordance with the Rules of Court. He did not only fail to do so. Rather, he,
in fact, served copies of the decision to the accused without the judgment having been promulgated
first. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial

Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same
court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; imposable penalty. Simple neglect of duty is defined as the
failure of an employee to give ones attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of
a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense penalized with
suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first offense, and dismissal for the
second.
In the determination of the proper penalty, the Court looked into Mr. Teves past administrative cases.
Considering his past infractions and having been warned that a repetition of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely, Mr. Teves still has not reformed. He has remained undeterred in
disregarding the law and he appears to be unfazed by the previous penalties and warnings he
received. Mr. Teves repeated infractions seriously compromise efficiency and hamper public service
which the Court can no longer tolerate. As such, he was meted with the penalty of dismissal from
service with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with
prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M.
Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo
S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; duty to adopt an efficient system to monitor the status of cases. The OCA found that the
court failed to maintain a general docket book to keep track of the cases under it. Although the duty
is vested with Mr. Teves as the Branch Clerk of Court, it is the duty of Judge Tormis to make sure that
the members of her staff perform their duties. The OCA also found that Mr. Teves repeatedly
submitted inaccurate reports as to the actual number of cases pending with their court. This is
brought about by their failure to adopt an efficient system of monitoring their cases. Again, this is the
primary responsibility of Judge Tormis. Finally, the OCA noted that Judge Tormis failed to conduct an
actual physical inventory of cases to keep abreast of the status of the pending cases and to be
informed that every case is in proper order.
Judge Tormis is guilty of violating Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars for her failure to
comply with her duty to provide an efficient court management system in her court which includes
the preparation and use of docket inventory and monthly report of cases as tools thereof. Office of
the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No.
MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; gross ignorance of the law; when the law is sufficiently basic, not to be aware of it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. Judge Tormis issued the warrant of arrest in violation of the Rule on
Summary Procedure that the accused should first be notified of the charges against him and given
the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and other countervailing evidence. The Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure has been in effect since November 15, 1991. It finds application in a substantial
number of civil and criminal cases. Judge Tormis cannot claim to be unfamiliar with the same. Every
judge is required to observe the law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to
simply apply it; and anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In
short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law.Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same
court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; gross inefficiency; gross ignorance of the law; imposable penalties. Under Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated September 11, 2001, violation of Supreme
Court rules, directives and circulars, and gross inefficiency are categorized as less serious charges

with the following sanctions: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less
than one nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00.
Moreover, gross ignorance of the law is classified as serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the
Revised Rules of Court, and penalized under Section 11 (a), Rule 140 of the same Rules by: (1)
Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned
or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall, in no case, include
accrued leave credits; (2) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three (3), but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding
P40,000.00.
In determining the proper imposable penalty, we also consider Judge Tormis work history which
reflects how she performed her judicial functions. We find that there are several administrative cases
already filed against her, with most of these cases being decided against her. These cases show her
inability to properly discharge her judicial duties. Considering her past infractions and taking into
account the number of irregularities she committed in this present case, Judge Tormis was meted with
the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued
leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-121818. March 12, 2013.
Judges; motion to inhibit; grounds. As held in Sps. Hizon v. Sps. dela Fuente, an inhibition must be
for just and valid reason. Complainants mere imputation that the case was decided by the
magistrates of the Court with extreme bias and prejudice is baseless and clearly unfounded. Jasper
Junno F. Rodica v. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al.; A.C. No. 9259. March 12, 2013.
Judges; undue delay in deciding cases. The honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured not
only by the fairness and correctness of decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which
disputes are resolved. Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated to decide and resolve
cases within 90 days from submission for decision or resolution. Corollary to this constitutional
mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires
judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness. The mandate
to promptly dispose of cases or matters also applies to motions or interlocutory matters or incidents
pending before the magistrate. Unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a
violation of the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes gross inefficiency that warrants the
imposition of an administrative sanction against the defaulting magistrate. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-121818. March 12, 2013; Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49,
Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No.
RTJ-13-2342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013.
Judge Fuentes III concedes that there is no valid justification for the delay in resolving the cases
pending in his court. Indeed, his frequent travels to his residence in Ozamis City, which led to travel
fatigue and poor health, will not absolve him from liability. If a judge is unable to comply with the
period for deciding cases or matters, he can, for good reasons, ask for an extension. Without an
extension granted by the Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required period
constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction. Office of the Court Administrator v.
Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge Fernando G.
Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013.

Judges; undue delay in deciding cases; administrative sanctions. An inexcusable failure to decide a
case within the prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of
administrative sanctions such as suspension from office without pay or fine on the defaulting judge.
The fines imposed vary in each case, depending on the following factors: (1) the number of cases not
decided within the reglamentary period; (2) the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances;
(3) the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay; (4) the health and age of the judge;
and (5) other analogous circumstances.
In this case, the fine was reduced considering that this was the first infraction of Judge Fuentes III in
his more than 15 years in the service. The Court likewise took into consideration the fact that the
respondent judge exerted earnest efforts to fully comply with the Courts directives as contained in
the resolution. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran
City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-132342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013.
Judges; undue delay in deciding cases; suspension from office is not a justification for the delay.
Respondent judge claimed that the delay was the consequence of the three suspension orders issued
against her as she was suspended for an aggregate period of almost one year and six months.
Records reveal, however, that Judge Tormis was repeatedly suspended in cases wherein she
committed a breach of her duty as a member of the Bench. She cannot, therefore, be allowed to use
the same to justify another violation of her solemn oath to dispense justice. Even if she was allowed
to avail of this excuse, as aptly observed by the OCA, several of the cases that she failed to dispose of
had been overdue for decision or resolution even prior to said suspensions. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-121818. March 12, 2013.
Jurisdiction of the Court over administrative proceedings. An administrative matter was instituted
against Judge Grageda, based on the result of a judicial audit conducted after his retirement.
According to the Supreme Court, for it to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative proceeding, the
complaint must be filed during the incumbency of the respondent public official or employee. This is
because the filing of an administrative case is predicated on the holding of a position or office in the
government service. However, once jurisdiction has attached, the same is not lost by the mere fact
that the public official or employee was no longer in office during the pendency of the case.
In present case, Judge Gragedas retirement effectively barred the Court from pursuing the instant
administrative proceeding that was instituted after his tenure in office, and divested the Court, much
less the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), of any jurisdiction to still subject him to the rules and
regulations of the judiciary and/or to penalize him for the infractions committed while he was still in
the service. Accordingly, the complaint against retired Judge Grageda was dismissed. Office of the
Court Administrator v. Jesus L. Grageda; A.M. No. RTJ-10-2235. March 11, 2013.
April 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Cases on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; practice of law; notary. The practice of law is imbued with public interest and a lawyer
owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the
administration of justice as an officer of the court. Accordingly, lawyers are bound to maintain not
only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
Similarly, the duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest. Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private
document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of
preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.
In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-litigants, courts, other
lawyers and the general public to the perils of ordinary documents posing as public instruments.

Respondent committed acts of deceit and falsehood in open violation of the explicit pronouncements
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Evidently, respondents conduct falls miserably short of the
high standards of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from lawyers. Thus, he should
be sanctioned. Efigenia M. Tenoso vs. Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez. A.C. No. 8384. April 11, 2013
Court personnel; dishonesty. In Civil Service Commission v. Perocho, Jr., the Court defined dishonesty
as intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice
any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion. Thus,
dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of
intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be
taken not only of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the
respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might
have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree
of reasoning he could have had at that moment. Evidence showed that respondent was not the one
who took the Civil Service Sub-Professional Examinations. The Court, citing the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel, stressed that its employees should hold the highest standard of integrity for they are
a reflection of the esteemed institution which they serve. It certainly cannot countenance any form of
dishonesty perpetrated by its employees. Civil Service Commission vs. Merle Ramoneda-Pita. A.M. No.
P-08-2531. April 11, 2013
Court Personnel; simple neglect of duty. In this case, the personnel in charge of the court records
failed to elevate the case records to the Court of Appeals within the prescribed period due to the
alleged heavy workload. The Court held that he was guilty of simple neglect of duty. Section 1,
Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel commands court personnel to perform their
duties properly and with diligence at all times. The administration of justice is an inviolable task and it
demands the highest degree of efficiency, dedication and professionalism.
The Court is not unaware of the heavy workload of court personnel, given the number of cases filed
and pending before it. However, unless proven to exist in an insurmountable degree, this
circumstance cannot serve as an excuse to evade administrative liability; otherwise, every
government employee faced with negligence and dereliction of duty would resort to that excuse to
evade punishment, to the detriment of the public service.
Clearly, Salazar is guilty of simple neglect of duty, which is defined as the failure to give proper
attention to a task expected of an employee, thus signifying a disregard of a duty resulting from
carelessness or indifference.
In the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and alternative
circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime shall be considered. The Court has mitigated
imposable penalties for various special reasons. It has considered length of service in the judiciary,
acknowledgement of infractions, remorse and family circumstances, among others, in determining
the applicable penalty. In this case, while Salazar is a second time offender for simple neglect of duty,
her long years of service in the judiciary and the admission of her negligence are circumstances to
mitigate her culpability. Judge Renato A. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 17, Davao City vs. Atty. Rogelio F. Fabro,
etc., et al. A.M. No. P-10-2791. April 17, 2013
Judge; Court Personnel; Grave misconduct; Gross neglect of duty; Gross inefficiency. In Obaana, Jr. v.
Ricafort, the court held that: Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the
performance of official functions must be avoided. This Court shall not countenance any conduct, act
or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the
norm of public accountability and diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
First, the judges involved solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by the couples
were incomplete and questionable. Their actions constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala, the
Court held that inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness.
Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization
fees. The Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, defined neglect of duty as the failure to give ones

attention to a task expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the
frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten public
welfare. The marriage documents show that official receipts for the solemnization fee were missing or
payment by batches was made for marriages performed on different dates.
Third, the judges also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a foreigner who did not
submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. This irregularity displayed the
gross neglect of duty of the judges.
Fourth, the judges are also guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the Family Code
with respect to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during cohabitation
such as the minority status of one party.
On the other hand, the court interpreter is guilty of grave misconduct when she said she can facilitate
the marriage and the requirements on the same day. She proposed an open-dated marriage in
exchange for a fee of P3,000. Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel prohibits
court personnel from soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit
understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as a grave offense that carries
the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even on a first offense. Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013
Judge; Gross ignorance of the law. The respondent judges violated Canons 21 and 6 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics which exact competence, integrity and probity in the performance of their duties.
Ignorance of the law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance
thereof is considered as an indication of lack of integrity. In connection with this, the administration of
justice is considered a sacred task and upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary
mortal. He or she becomes the visible representation of the law and more importantly of
justice. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691.
April 2, 2013
Public officer; Presumption of regularity. In People v. Jansen, the Court held that the solemnizing
officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly
issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has
been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that
said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the
requirements of law. However, in Sevilla v. Cardenas, the presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The visible
superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have alerted the solemnizing judges to the
irregularity of the issuance. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et
al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013
Judge; Prohibition against private practice of law. Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon from engaging in the private practice of law or
giving professional advice to clients. Section 11 Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct and Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging in the
private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. The prohibition is based on sound
reasons of public policy, considering that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an
attorney are inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and
privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to
their judicial duties, prevent them from extending favors to their own private interests, and assure the
public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a
sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest.
Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right to practice law
as a member of the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for
the entire period of his incumbency as a judge. The term practice of law is not limited to the conduct

of cases in court or to participation in court proceedings, but extends to the preparation of pleadings
or papers in anticipation of a litigation, the giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the
same, the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, and the
preparation of papers incident to actions and special proceedings.
In this case, Judge Malanyaon engaged in the private practice of law by assisting his daughter at his
wifes administrative case, coaching his daughter in making manifestations or posing motions to the
hearing officer, and preparing the questions that he prompted to his daughter. Sonia C. Decena and
Rey C. Decena vs. Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon, RTC, Br. 32, Pili, Camarines Sur. A.M. RTJ-10-2217. April 8,
2013
Public Officers; public office is a public trust; public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. In this case, Gesultura, a Cashier II in the Office of
the Clerk of Court in the RTC, was dismissed for an anomaly involving the Judiciary Development Fund
and the General Fund. The Court held that public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Those charged with the
dispensation of justice, from justices and judges to the lowliest clerks, should be circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility. Not only must their conduct at all times be characterized by
propriety and decorum but, above all else, it must be beyond suspicion.
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from the occupant than does the
judicial office. The safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to the goal of an orderly
administration of justice. The act of misappropriating judiciary funds constitutes dishonesty and grave
misconduct which are grave offenses punishable by dismissal upon the commission of even the first
offense. Time and again, we have reminded court personnel tasked with collections of court funds,
such as Clerks of Courts and cash clerks, to deposit immediately with authorized government
depositories the various funds they have collected, because they are not authorized to keep funds in
their custody. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Develyn Gesultura. A.M. No. P-04-1785. April 2,
2013
June 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; the failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable
negligence. In Dalisay Capili v. Atty. Alfredo L. Bentulan, the Court held that the failure to file a brief
resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence. In this case, the Court
cannot accept as an excuse the alleged lapse committed by his client in failing to provide him a copy
of the case records.
In the first place, securing a copy of the case records was within Atty. San Juans control and is a task
that the lawyer undertakes.
Second, Atty. San Juan, unlike his client, knows or should have known, that filing an appellants brief
within the reglementary period is critical in the perfection of an appeal. The preparation and the filing
of the appellants brief are matters of procedure that fully fell within the exclusive control and
responsibility of Atty. San Juan. It was incumbent upon him to execute all acts and procedures
necessary and incidental to the perfection of his clients appeal.
Third, Atty. San Juan lacked candor in dealing with his client. He omitted to inform Tomas of the
progress of his appeal with the Court of Appeals. Worse, he did not disclose to Tomas the real reason
for the Court of Appeals dismissal of the appeal. Neither did Atty. San Juan file a motion for
reconsideration, or otherwise resort to available legal remedies that might have protected his clients
interest.
Atty. San Juans negligence undoubtedly violates the Lawyers Oath that requires him to conduct
[himself] as a lawyer according to the best of (his) knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to (his) clients[.] He also violated Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility. Rex Polinar Dagohoy v. Atty. Artemio V. San Juan. A.C. No. 7944,
June 3, 2013.
Attorney; IBP findings and recommended penalties in administrative cases against lawyers are only
recommendatory. IBPs recommended penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of
law is not commensurate to the gravity of the infractions committed. These infractions warrant the
imposition of a stiffer sanction. The following acts and omissions of Atty. San Juan were considered:
first, the negligence in handling his clients appeal; second, his failure to act candidly and effectively
in communicating information to his client; and more importantly, third, the serious and irreparable
consequence of his admitted negligence which deprived his client of legal remedies in addressing his
conviction.
In Pineda v. Atty. Macapagal, the Court imposed a one (1) year suspension from the practice of law on
a lawyer who, like Atty. San Juan, had been found guilty of gross negligence in handling his clients
case. With this case as the norm, Atty. San Juan should be meted a suspension of one (1) year from
the practice of law for his negligence and inadequacies in handling his clients case.
Moreover, IBPs findings and stated penalty are merely recommendatory; only the Supreme Court has
the power to discipline erring lawyers and to impose against them penalties for unethical conduct.
Until finally acted upon by the Supreme Court, the IBP findings and the recommended penalty
imposed cannot attain finality until adopted by the Court as its own. Thus, the IBP findings, by
themselves, cannot be a proper subject of implementation or compliance. Rex Polinar Dagohoy v.
Atty. Artemio V. San Juan. A.C. No. 7944, June 3, 2013.
Court personnel; dishonesty. Ismael Hadji Ali, a court stenographer I at the Sharia Circuit Court,
represented that he took and passed the Civil Service Professional Examination but evidence showed
that another person took the exam for him. Per CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, Series of 1991, the
use of spurious Civil Service eligibility constitutes dishonesty, among others. Dishonesty is a
malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary. Hadji Ali failed to observe the strict standards and
behavior required of an employee in the judiciary. He has shown unfitness for public office. Pursuant
to the Civil Service Rules, Hadji Ali was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and
other benefits. Civil Service Commission v. Ismael A. Hadji Ali, et al., A.M. No. SCC-08-11-P, June 18,
2013.
Court personnel; dishonesty and grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior as well as gross negligence by a
public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important,
weighty, momentous and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere
error of judgment. The misconduct must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of the public officers official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office.
Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and
straightforwardness.
In this case, respondent deceived complainants family who were led to believe that he is the legal
representative of the Hodges Estate. Boasting of his position as a court officer, a City Sheriff at that,
complainants family completely relied on his repeated assurance that they will not be ejected from
the premises.
In Re: Complaint Filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro Against Edna Magallanes, Court Stenographer III, RTC
Br. 28 and Bonifacio G. Magallanes, Process Server, RTC Br. 30, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, the Court
stressed that to preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just
contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards. In that case, the court held
that court employees are expected to be paragons of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in
their official conduct but also in their personal dealings, including business and commercial
transactions to avoid becoming the courts albatross of infamy.

More importantly, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 671350 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees mandates that public officials and employees shall
remain true to the people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not
discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times
respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. Rodolfo C. Sabidong v.
Nicolasito S. Solas. A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25, 2013.
Court personnel; Prohibition in acquiring property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction of their
courts. Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers such as clerks of court from
acquiring property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of their courts. The rationale
is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the
relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons. In so providing,
the Code tends to prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends not to give occasion for fraud, which is what
can and must be done.
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the
pendency of the litigation involving the property. Where the property is acquired after the termination
of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
In this case, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case
No. 14706 which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it
cannot be said that the property is no longer in litigation at that time considering that it was part of
the Hodges Estate then under settlement proceedings.
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also
from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. A property forming part
of the estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the probate court
issues an order declaring the estate proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as long as
the order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings
cannot be deemed closed and terminated. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs
entitled to receive the same. Rodolfo C. Sabidong v. Nicolasito S. Solas. A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25,
2013.
July 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; Attorney-client relationship. Respondent Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr. was charged for gross
negligence in violation of Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Supreme Court held him guilty of gross negligence. The relationship
between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this light,
clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise
the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all
times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to
the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyers duty
of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsels care
or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before any court or
tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings,
prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting
for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. While such negligence or carelessness is
incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyers mere failure to
perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation. Thus, the court suspended respondent for
six (6) months. Josefina Caranza Vda de Saldivar v. Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr., A.C. No. 7749, July 8,
2013

Attorney; Conflict of interest. The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent
situations wherein a lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of
his present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client
involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client
only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary
obligation of loyalty. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the
facts connected with the clients case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge
and information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded
with care. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice. The nature of that
relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.
Contrary to Atty. Eras ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson and his group, the
termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest
adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the clients
confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment.
Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect
his former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously represented the client. Nor should the
lawyer disclose or use any of the clients confidences acquired in the previous relation. Thus, Atty. Era
was found guilty of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and was suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty. Edgardo
O. Era, A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013.
Attorney; Disbarment and suspension of lawyers; Burden of proof. The burden of proof in disbarment
and suspension proceedings always rests on the shoulders of the complainant. The Court exercises its
disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant
evidencethat warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal
presumption that he is innocent of the charges made against him until the contrary is proved. An
attorney is further presumed as an officer of the Court to have performed his duties in accordance
with his oath. In this case, complainants failed to discharge their burden of proving that respondents
ordered their secretary to stamp a much later date instead of the actual date of receipt for the
purpose of extending the ten-day period within which to file a Motion for Reconsideration under the
NLRC Rules of Procedure. Such claim is merely anchored on speculation and conjecture and not
backed by any clear preponderant evidence necessary to justify the imposition of administrative
penalty on a member of the Bar. Jaime Joven and Reynaldo C. Rasing v. Atty. Pablo R. Cruz and
Frankie O. Magsalin III, A.C. No. 7686, July 31, 2013.
Attorney; Honesty; Practice of law is not a right but a privilege. Lawyers are officers of the court,
called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system,
protecting and upholding truth and the rule of law. They are expected to act with honesty in all their
dealings, especially with the court. Verily, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers from
committing or consenting to any falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any
artifice. Moreover, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice. Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed
upon by the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of those requirements is the observance of
honesty and candor. Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioners honorable
membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients,
the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the
truth and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with
fidelity to the courts and their clients. Sonic Steel Industries, Inc. v. Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua, A.C. No.
6942, July 17, 2013.

Court personnel; Gross dishonesty; Misrepresentation of eligibility; Penalty. Respondent, a court

stenographer III, was charged with gross dishonesty in connection with her Civil Service eligibility
where she was accused of causing another person to take the Civil Service Eligibility Examination in
her stead. Before the Decision was imposed, however, respondent already resigned. The Supreme
Court held that the respondents resignation from the service did not cause the Court to lose its
jurisdiction to proceed against her in this administrative case. Her cessation from office by virtue of
her intervening resignation did not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint against her,
for the act complained of had been committed when she was still in the service. Nor did such
cessation from office render the administrative case moot and academic. Otherwise, exacting
responsibility for administrative liabilities incurred would be easily avoided or evaded.
Respondents dismissal from the service is the appropriate penalty, with her eligibility to be cancelled,
her retirement benefits to be forfeited, and her disqualification from re-employment in the
government service to be perpetual. Her intervening resignation necessarily means that the penalty
of dismissal could no longer be implemented against her. Instead, fine is imposed, the determination
of the amount of which is subject to the sound discretion of the Court. Concerned Citizen V. Nonita v.
Catena, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Br. 50, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1321-P,
July 16, 2013.
Court personnel; Misconduct; Penalty under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service; Effect of death in an administrative case. Misconduct is a transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, wilful in
character, improper or wrong behavior. A misconduct is grave or gross if it is out of all measure;
beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful or such conduct as is not to be excused. Respondent Ongs
and Buencaminos acts of using the levied car for personal errands and losing it while under their
safekeeping constitute grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty. These are flagrant and shameful
acts and should not be countenanced. Respondents acts warrant the penalty of dismissal as provided
in Rule 10, Section 46 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As for
respondent Buencamino, his death is not a ground for the dismissal of the Complaint against him.
Respondent Buencaminos acts take away the publics faith in the judiciary, and these acts should be
sanctioned despite his death.
Sheriffs are reminded that they are repositories of public trust and are under obligation to perform
the duties of their office honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their abilities. Being frontline officials
of the justice system, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs must always strive to maintain public trust in the
performance of their duties. Office of the Court Administrator v. Noel R. Ong, Deputy Sheriff, Br. 49,
et al., A.M. No. P-09-2690, July 9, 2013.
Court personnel; Simple neglect of duty; Penalty under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases;
Mitigating circumstances. The Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) charged respondent Sheriff
lV Famero with Gross Neglect of Duty amounting to Gross Misconduct for refusing to implement the
Writ of Execution issued in a civil case involving DBP. The Supreme Court held that the respondent
cannot fully be excused for his failure to make periodic reports in the proceedings taken on the writ,
as mandated by Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
For the respondents lapses in the procedures in the implementation of the writ of execution, he was
found guilty of simple neglect of duty, defined as the failure of an employee to give attention to the
task expected of him. Under Section 52(B)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense punishable by suspension from office for one
(1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense.
In the imposition of the appropriate penalty, Section 53 of the same Rules allows the disciplining
authority to consider mitigating circumstances in favor of the respondent. The court considered his
length of service in the Judiciary, acknowledgment of infractions, remorse and other family
circumstances, among others, in determining the proper penalty. He was also found to be entitled to
the following mitigating circumstances: (1) his more than 24 years of service in the Judiciary; (2) a

clear record other than for the present infraction which is his first offense, (3) the resistance of the
informal settlers to leave the property; (4) fear for his life; and (5) his well-grounded recognition that
he could not undertake any demolition without the appropriate court order. After considering the
attendant facts and the mitigating circumstances, the court also considered that the efficiency of
court operations may ensue if the respondents work were to be left unattended by reason of his
suspension. Thus, he was imposed the penalty of fine instead of suspension from
service. Development Bank of the Philippines, etc. Vs. Damvin V. Famero, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 43,
Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, A.M. No. P-0-2789, July 31, 2013.
Judge; Gross Inefficiency; Duties include prompt disposition or resolution of cases. As a frontline
official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should always act with efficiency and probity. He is duty-bound
not only to be faithful to the law, but also to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of
excellence ought always to be his guiding principle. Such dedication is the least that he can do to
sustain the trust and confidence that the public have reposed in him and the institution he
represents.
The Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases. Nonetheless, the
Court has been mindful of the plight of our judges and understanding of circumstances that may
hinder them from promptly disposing of their businesses. Hence, the Court has allowed extensions of
time to decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge needs to do is to request and justify
an extension of time to decide the cases, and the Court has almost invariably granted such request.
Judge Carbonells failure to decide several cases within the reglementary period, without justifiable
and credible reasons, constituted gross inefficiency. Considering that Judge Carbonell has retired due
to disability, his poor health condition may have greatly contributed to his inability to efficiently
perform his duties as a trial judge. That mitigated his administrative liability, for which reason the
Court reduced the recommended penalty of fine from P50,000 to P20,000. Re: Failure of Former
Judge Antonio A. Carbonell to Decide Cases Submitted for Decision and Resolve Pending Motions in
the RTC, Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union, A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC, July 9, 2013.
September 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; Attorneys Fees. The case initially concerned the execution of a final decision with the Court
of Appeals in a labor litigation. Petitioner Malvar, however, entered into a compromise agreement
with the respondents pending appeal without informing her counsel. Malvars counsel filed a Motion
to Intervene to Protect Attorneys Rights.
The Supreme Court, on considerations of equity and fairness, disapproved of the tendencies of clients
compromising their cases behind the backs of their attorneys for the purpose of unreasonably
reducing or completely setting to naught the stipulated contingent fees. Thus, the Court granted the
Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorneys Rights as a measure of protecting the Intervenors right
to his stipulated professional fees. The Court did so in the interest of protecting the rights of the
practicing Bar rendering professional services on contingent fee basis.
Although the compromise agreement was still approved by the Court, the payment of the counsels
adequate and reasonable compensation could not be annulled by the settlement of the litigation
without the counsels participation and conformity. He remains entitled to the compensation, and his
rights are safeguarded by the Court because its members are officers of the Court who are as entitled
to judicial protection against injustice or imposition of fraud committed by the client as much as the
client is against their abuses as her counsel. In other words, the duty of the Court is not only to
ensure that the attorney acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see to it that the attorney is
paid his just fees. Even if the compensation of the attorney is dependent only on winning the
litigation, the subsequent withdrawal of the case upon the clients initiative would not deprive the
attorney of the legitimate compensation for professional services rendered. Czarina T. Malvar v. Kraft
Foods Phils., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 183952, September 9, 2013.

Attorney; Attorney-Client Relationship. A disbarment complaint was filed against respondent Atty.
Ramos for representing conflicting interests in the same case. The Supreme Court held that Atty.
Ramos violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Under the aforecited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests
oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or
on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good
taste. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount interest in the administration of justice. Atty. Ramos
justification that no confidential information was relayed to him is not an excuse since the rule on
conflict of interests provides an absolute prohibition from representation with respect to opposing
parties in the same case. Thus, a lawyer cannot change his representation from one party to the
latters opponent in the same case. Joseph L. Orola, et al. v. Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos, A.C. No. 9860,
September 11, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Misconduct. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated Canon 18 and Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated his oath under
Canon 18 to serve his client with competence and diligence when he filed a criminal case for estafa
when the facts of the case would have warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of contract. To be
sure, after the complaint for estafa was dismissed, Atty. Alcid, Jr. committed another similar blunder
by filing a civil case for specific performance and damages before the RTC, when he should have filed
it with the MTC due to the amount involved. Atty. Alcid, Jr. did not also apprise complainant of the
status of the cases. Atty. Alcid, Jr. is not only guilty of incompetence in handling the cases. His lack of
professionalism in dealing with complainant is gross and inexcusable. The legal profession dictates
that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal
and fervor in the protection of the clients interest. The most thorough groundwork and study must be
undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. Atty. Alcid, Jr. has defied and failed to
perform such duty and his omission is tantamount to a desecration of the Lawyers Oath. Julian
Penilla v. Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr., A.C. No. 9149, September 4, 2013.
Attorney; Practice of Law. Petitioner Medado passed the bar examinations in 1979. He took the
Attorneys Oath thereafter, and was scheduled to sign the Roll of Attorneys, but failed to do so
because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, he found such
Notice and realized he never signed the Roll of Attorneys. Medado filed this Petition to allow him to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys. The Supreme Court held that while an honest mistake of fact could be
used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a
mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the
law and its consequences. Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law transgresses Canon 9
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such Canon also applies to law students and Bar
candidates. Medado was imposed a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign one (1) year
after receipt of the Courts Resolution. In Re: Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys, B.M. No. 2540,
September 24, 2013.
Court Personnel; Gross Dishonesty; Gross Misconduct. The audit team discovered cash shortages in
the books of accounts of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Lipa City. As clerk of court, Atty. Apusen
is primarily accountable for all funds collected for the court, whether personally received by him or by
a duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision and control. As custodian of court funds,
revenues, records, properties and premises, he is liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or
impairment of said funds and properties. Being a cash clerk, Savadera is an accountable officer
entrusted with the great responsibility of collecting money belonging to the funds of the court.
Clearly, she miserably failed in such responsibility upon the occurrence of the shortages. The
Supreme Court held that no position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its
holder than a judicial office. Those connected with the dispensation of justice, from the highest official

to the lowliest clerk, carry a heavy burden of responsibility. As frontliners in the administration of
justice, they should live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity. They must bear in mind
that the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the
men and women who work there. Office of the Court Administrator v. Donabel M. Savadera, et
al., A.M. No. P-04-1903, September 10, 2013.
Judge; Delay in deciding cases. Judge Lazaro was accused of undue delay in the resolution of the
Motion to Dismiss a civil case considering that she had resolved the Motion to Dismiss beyond the 90day period prescribed for the purpose without filing any request for the extension of the period. The
Supreme Court held that the 90-day period within which a sitting trial Judge should decide a case or
resolve a pending matter is mandatory. If the Judge cannot decide or resolve within the period, she
can be allowed additional time to do so, provided she files a written request for the extension of her
time to decide the case or resolve the pending matter. The rule, albeit mandatory, is to be
implemented with an awareness of the limitations that may prevent a Judge from being efficient.
Under the circumstances specific to this case, it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the
Court to disregard Judge Lazaros limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance with the rule.
With her undeniably heavy inherited docket and the large volume of her official workload, she most
probably failed to note the need for her to apply for the extension of the 90-day period to resolve the
Motion to Dismiss. Danilo E. Lubaton v. Judge Mary Josephine P. Lazaro, Regional Trial Court, Br. 74,
Antipolo, Rizal,A.M. RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013.
Judge; Delay in deciding cases. Judge Baluma was asked to explain his failure to act on the twentythree (23) cases submitted for decision/resolution. The Supreme Court held that it has consistently
impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored
precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and
should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the
disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not
excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on
the defaulting judge. Judge Balumas gross inefficiency, evident in his undue delay in deciding 23
cases within the reglementary period, merits the imposition of administrative sanctions. Re: Cases
Submitted for Decision before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma, Former Judge, Branch 1, Regional Trial Court,
Tagbilaran City, Bohol, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2355, September 2, 2013.
Judge; Gross Inefficiency. Judge Soriano failed to decide thirty-six (36) cases submitted for decision in
MTC and MTCC, which were all due for decision at the time he compulsorily retired. The Supreme
Court held that Judge Soriano has been remiss in the performance of his judicial duties. Judge
Sorianos unreasonable delay in deciding cases and resolving incidents and motions, and his failure to
decide the remaining cases before his compulsory retirement constitutes gross inefficiency which
cannot be tolerated. Inexcusable failure to decide cases within the reglementary period constitutes
gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of an administrative sanction on the defaulting judge.
Judge Sorianos inefficiency in managing his caseload was compounded by gross negligence as
evinced by the loss of the records of at least four (4) cases which could no longer be located or
reconstituted despite diligent efforts by his successor. Judge Soriano was responsible for managing his
court efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery of court services, especially the speedy disposition of
cases. Thus, Judge Soriano was found guilty of gross inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law, and
fined P40,000 to be taken from the amount withheld from his retirement benefits. Office of the Court
Administrator v. Hon. Santiago E. Soriano, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1683, September 11, 2013.
October 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; Gross Immoral Conduct. Respondent Pedrea, a Public Attorney, was charged for sexual
harassment. The Supreme Court held that the records show that the respondent rubbed the

complainants right leg with his hand; tried to insert his finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed
her hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed his finger against her private part.
Given the circumstances in which he committed them, his acts were not merely offensive and
undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral. They constituted misconduct on the part
of any lawyer. In this regard, immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency. Atty. Pedreas
misconduct was aggravated by the fact that he was then a Public Attorney mandated to provide free
legal service to indigent litigants, and by the fact that complainant was then such a client. He also
disregarded his oath as a public officer to serve others and to be accountable at all times, because he
thereby took advantage of her vulnerability as a client then in desperate need of his legal assistance.
Thus, respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2)
years. Jocelyn De Leon v. Atty. Tyrone Pedrena, A.C. No. 9401, October 22, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Misconduct. A complaint for disbarment was filed against Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr. for falsifying an inexistent decision of the RTC. The Supreme Court
held that the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of the
decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession.
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Lawyers are further required
by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and
immoral or deceitful conduct. Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyers disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that
reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the
administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a
foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. Thus, the Court disbarred the respondent. Atty.
Oscar L. Embido, etc. v. Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr., etc., A.M. No. 6732, October 22, 2013.
Attorney; Gross Negligence. Respondent Villaseca was charged for gross and inexcusable negligence
in handling a criminal case, as a consequence of which the complainants were convicted. The
Supreme Court held that Atty. Villasecas failure to submit a demurrer to evidence constitutes
inexcusable negligence; it showed his lack of devotion and zeal in preserving his clients cause.
Furthermore, Atty. Villasecas failure to present any testimonial, object or documentary evidence for
the defense reveals his lack of diligence in performing his duties as an officer of the Court; it showed
his indifference towards the cause of his clients. Considering that the liberty and livelihood of his
clients were at stake, Atty. Villaseca should have exerted efforts to rebut the presented prosecution
evidence. The Court emphasized that while a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy
to employ in a case entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or defense within the authority
of the law to support his clients cause. Mary Ann T. Mattus v. Albert T. Villaseca, A.C. No. 7922,
October 1, 2013.
Attorney; Lawyer-Client Relationship. Respondent Gagate was accused of gross ignorance of the law
and unethical practice of law. The Supreme Court emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer
and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect
that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of
diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. To this end, he is enjoined
to employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. These principles are embodied in
Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code. Thus, the Court found

that the respondent failed to exercise the required diligence in handling complainants cause since
he: (1) failed to represent her competently and diligently by acting and proffering professional advice
beyond the proper bounds of law; and, (2) abandoned his clients cause while the grave coercion case
against them was pending. Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher v. Atty. Rustico B. Gagate, A.C. No.
9532, October 8, 2013.
Attorney; Lawyer-Client Relationship. Respondent Obias was charged for grave misconduct and/or
gross malpractice. The Supreme Court held that since respondent publicly held herself out as lawyer,
the mere fact that she also acted as a real estate broker did not divest her of the responsibilities
attendant to the legal profession. In this regard, the legal advice and/or legal documentation that she
offered and/or rendered regarding the real estate transaction subject of this case should not be
deemed removed from the category of legal services. Case law instructs that if a person, in respect to
business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice
or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the
professional employment is established.
Moreover, according to the Court, respondent grossly violated the trust and confidence reposed in her
by her clients, in contravention of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code. Records disclose that instead of
delivering the deed of sale covering the subject property to her clients, she wilfully notarized a deed
of sale over the same property in favor of another person. It is a core ethical principle that lawyers
owe fidelity to their clients cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
them. Thus, respondent was disbarred by the Court. Ma. Jennifer Tria-Samonte v. Epifania Fanny
Obias, A.C. No. 4945, October 8, 2013.
Judiciary; Accountability. Respondent Arnejo, a stenographer of the RTC, was accused of receiving
payment for the TSN on 22 July 2010 and remitting the money to the cashier of the Clerk of Court
only on 19 and 23 December 2010. The Supreme Court held that the respondent violated the Code of
Conduct of Court Personnel and Code of Ethics for Government Officials and Employees. The Court
will not tolerate the practice of asking for advance payment from litigants, much less the
unauthorized acceptance of judicial fees. Section 11, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, specifically
provides that payment for requests of copies of the TSN shall be made to the Clerk of Court. Clearly,
therefore, payment cannot be made to respondent, as it is an official transaction, and, as such, must
be made to the Clerk of Court. Respondent, being a stenographer, is not authorized to accept
payment for judicial fees, even if two-thirds of those fees would be paid to her. Moreover, the
issuance of an acknowledgment receipt cannot be construed as having been done in good faith,
considering the fact that respondent only remitted the payment for the TSN five (5) months after her
receipt of the supposed judicial fee, or only after the instant Complaint had been filed against her.
Her belated remittance was tainted with bad faith. Joefil Baguio v. Maria Fe Arnejo, Stenographer III,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Cebu City, A.M. No. P-13-3155, October 21, 2013.
Judiciary; Applicability of Sec. 7, Rule III, IRR of R.A. No. 10154. The issue presented in this case is
whether or not Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA)
10154 applies to the employees of the Judiciary. The Supreme Court ruled that the subject provision
which requires retiring government employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency
of administrative case/s from, among others, the CSC should not be made to apply to employees of
the Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would disregard the Courts constitutionally-enshrined power of
administrative supervision over its personnel. Besides, retiring court personnel are already required to
secure a prior clearance of the pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Court which
makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious requirement contrary to the declared
state policy of RA 10154. The Court, however, noted that since the Constitution only accords the
Judiciary administrative supervision over its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance
requirement obtains with respect to criminal cases. As such, a clearance requirement which pertains
to criminal cases may be imposed by the appropriate government agency, i.e., the Office of the
Ombudsman, on retiring court personnel as it is a matter beyond the ambit of the Judiciarys power of

administrative supervision. Re: Request for guidance/clarification on Section 7, Rule III of Republic Act
No. 10154 Requiring Retiring Government Employees to Secure a Clearance of Pendency/NonPendency of Case/s from the Civil Service Commission, A.M. No. 13-09-08-SC, October 1, 2013.
Judiciary; Duty of Sheriff to Promptly Serve Summons. Sherriff Nery was accused of failing to serve
summons to the defendant in a case where he asked for transportation expense, and despite being
given an amount. The Supreme Court found the respondent guilty. Summons to the defendant in a
case shall forthwith be issued by the clerk of court upon the filing of the complaint and the payment
of the requisite legal fees. Once issued by the clerk of court, it is the duty of the sheriff, process
server or any other person serving court processes to serve the summons to the defendant efficiently
and expeditiously. Failure to do so constitutes simple neglect of duty, which is the failure of an
employee to give ones attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty
resulting from carelessness or indifference. Moreover, sheriffs are not allowed to receive any
payments from the parties in the course of the performance of their duties. They cannot just
unilaterally demand sums of money from the parties without observing the proper procedural steps
under Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Atty. Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao v.
Naeptali Angelo V. Nery, Sheriff III, Branch 30, Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, A.M. No. P13-3153,
October 14, 2013.
Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. Judge Clemens was charged for gross ignorance of the law and
violation of the Child Witness Examination Rule. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for lack
of merit since the acts of Judge Clemens were far from being ill-motivated and in bad faith as to
justify any administrative liability on his part. A complete reading of the TSN reveals that he was
vigilant in his conduct of the proceedings. In the instances mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit, he
had been attentive to the manifestations made by Atty. Tacorda and had acted accordingly and with
dispatch. Further, contrary to the allegations of Atty. Tacorda, the TSN showed that the respondent
Judge was very much concerned with following the proper conduct of trial and ensuring that the OneDay Examination of Witness Rule was followed; but at the same time, he was sensitive to the fact that
the witness was already exhausted, having testified for almost three (3) hours. Atty. Jerome Norman
L. Tacorda for: Odel L. Gedraga v. Judge Reynaldo B. Clemens, presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Br. 31, Calbayog City, Western Samar, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2359, October 23, 2013.
Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. Complainant filed a case against Judge Patricio accusing him of
gross ignorance of the law, manifest bias and partiality for refusing to execute a judgment which was
already final and executory. The rule is that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. Thus, the Supreme Court held that Judge Patricio demonstrated
ignorance of such rule by repeatedly refusing to execute the final and executory judgment of
conviction against the accused. The rules on execution are comprehensive enough for a judge not to
know how to apply them or to be confused by any auxiliary incidents. The issuance of a writ of
execution for a final and executory judgment is ministerial. In other words, a judge is not given the
discretion whether or not to implement the judgment. He is to effect execution without delay and
supervise implementation strictly in accordance with the judgment. Judge Patricios acts unmistakably
exhibit gross ignorance of the law.Jesus D. Carbajosa v. Judge Hannibal R. Patricio, Presiding Judge,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, President Roxas, Capiz, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834, October 2, 2013.
Judge; Gross Misconduct. Judge Pardo was accused of corruption. Judge Pardo did not deny that
Rosendo, a litigant who had a pending application for probation in his sala, went to his house, had a
drinking spree with him and stayed there for more than two hours. The Supreme Court held Judge
Pardo liable for gross misconduct. Citing jurisprudence, the Court held that a judges acts of meeting
with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours and sending a member of his staff to
talk with complainant constitute gross misconduct. Moreover, a judge was held liable for misconduct
when he entertained a litigant in his home and received benefits given by the litigant. Atty. Jessie
Tuldague and Atty. Alfredo Baldajo, Jr. v. Judge Moises Pardo and Jaime Calpatura, etc. / Atty. Jessie

Tuldague and Atty. Alfredo Baldajo, Jr. v. Jaime Calpatura, etc. / Re: Report on the Judicial Audit and
Investigation Conducted in the RTC, Cabarroguis, Quirino, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1962/ A.M. OCA IPI No. 052243-P/ A.M. No. 05-10-661-RTC, October 25, 2013.
Judge; Grave Misconduct; Gross Neglect of Duty; Gross Dishonesty; Penalty. Grave misconduct, gross
neglect of duty and gross dishonesty of which Judge Salubre, Edig, Palero and Aventurado are found
guilty, even if committed for the first time, are punishable by dismissal and carries with it the
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for
reemployment in the government service. As to Judge Salubre and Edig, however, in view of their
deaths, the supreme penalty of dismissal cannot be imposed on them anymore. It is only the penalty
of dismissal that is rendered futile by their passing since they are not in the service anymore, but it is
still within the Courts power to forfeit their retirement benefits. Report on the financial audit
conducted in the MTCC, Tagum City, Davao del Norte / Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Ismael L. Salubre, et al.,A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3138-P/A.M. No. MTJ-05-1618, October 22, 2013.
Judge; Remedy for Correcting Actions of Judge. A complaint for gross ignorance of the law, grave
misconduct, oppression, bias and partiality was filed against Judge Omelio. The Supreme Court
reiterated the rule that the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for
correcting the actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a
sufficient remedy exists. The actions against judges should not be considered as complementary or
suppletory to, or substitute for, the judicial remedies which can be availed of by a party in a case.
Moreover, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the sound
discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of
evidence towards that end involves findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive
determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be
interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of discretion. Ma. Regina S. Peralta v. Judge George
E. Omelio / Romualdo G. Mendoza v. Judge George E. Omelio / Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra v. Judge
George E. Omelio, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2259/A.M. No. RTJ-11-2264/A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273, October 22,
2013.
November 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; Accountability for Money Received from Client. Atty. Lawsin undertook to process the
registration and eventually deliver, within a period of 6 months, the certificate of title over a certain
parcel of land (subject land) in favor of complainant acting as the representative of the Heirs of the
late Isabel Segovia. Atty. Lawsin received from complainant the amounts of P15,000 and P39,000 to
cover for the litigation and land registration expenses, respectively. Atty. Lawsin, however, failed to
fulfil his undertaking and failed to return the money to complainant. The Supreme Court held that
Atty. Lawsins failure to properly account for and duly return his clients money despite due demand is
tantamount to a violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code. Complainants purported
act of maligning him does not justify the latters failure to properly account for and return his
clients money upon due demand. Verily, a lawyers duty to his client is one essentially imbued with
trust so much so that it is incumbent upon the former to exhaust all reasonable efforts towards its
faithful compliance. Azucena Segovia-Ribaya v. Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin, A.C. No. 7965, November
13, 2013.
Attorney; Administrative Proceedings; Sole Issue. Complainants filed a complaint for dishonesty
against respondent, a retired judge, for knowingly making untruthful statements in the complaint he
filed against them. The Supreme Court held that in administrative cases, the only issue within the
ambit of the Courts disciplinary authority is whether a lawyer is fit to remain a member of the Bar.
Other issues are proper subjects of judicial action. On its face, the 12 September 2006 complaint filed
by the Spouses Williams against Atty. Enriquez does not merit an administrative case. In order for the
Court to determine whether Atty. Enriquez is guilty of dishonesty, the issue of ownership must first be

settled. The issue of ownership of real property must be settled in a judicial, not administrative,
case.Sps. David Williams and Marissa Williams v. Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez, A.C. No. 7329, November 27,
2013.
Attorney; Gross Neglect of Duty. A complaint was filed against Atty. Venida for serious misconduct and
gross neglect of duty. Complainant alleged that she engaged the services of respondent to handle her
case before the CA but the respondent had been remiss. Thus, her case was dismissed. The Supreme
Court held that this is a clear violation of Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to keep their clients informed of the status of their case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. Respondents refusal to obey
the orders of the IBP is not only irresponsible, but also constitutes utter disrespect for the judiciary
and his fellow lawyers. His conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon
to obey court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court
directives being themselves officers of the court. Aurora H. Cabauatan v. Atty. Freddie A. Venida, A.C.
No. 10043, November 20, 2013.
Attorney; Mishandling of Clients Case. Complainant-Spouses filed an administrative case against Atty.
Dublin for gross negligence and dereliction of duty for mishandling their case. The Supreme Court
held Atty. Dublin guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95. Records show that the 10-day period
given to him to submit his formal offer of documentary evidence pursuant to the RTC Order lapsed
without any compliance from him. Atty. Dublin violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
particularly Canon 18 and Rule 18.03. Respondent admitted that he deliberately failed to timely file
the formal offer of exhibits because he believed that the exhibits were fabricated and the same would
be refused admission by the RTC. However, if respondent truly believed that the exhibits to be
presented in evidence by his clients were fabricated, then he had the option to withdraw from the
case. Canon 22 allows a lawyer to withdraw his services for good cause such as [w]hen the client
pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct with the matter he is handling or [w]hen the client
insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules. Thus, Atty. Dublin was
imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for 6 months. Sps. George A. Warriner
and Aurora R. Warriner v. Atty. Reni M. Dublin, A.C. No. 5239, November 18, 2013.
Attorney; Notary Public; Notarial Register. Complainants filed a complaint against Atty. Kilaan for
falsification of documents, dishonesty and deceit. Complainants alleged that Atty. Kilaan intercalated
certain entries in the application for issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate a
public utility jeepney filed before the LTFRB. Complainants also alleged that the Verification in
Batingweds application for CPC was notarized by Atty. Kilaan as Doc. No: 253, Page No. 51, Book No.
VIII, Series of 2003. However, upon verification of Atty. Kilaans Notarial Registry submitted to the
RTC, the said notarial entry actually refers to a Deed of Sale and not the Verification of Batingweds
application. It is settled that it is the notary public who is personally accountable for the accuracy of
the entries in his Notarial Register. The Court is not persuaded by respondents explanation that he is
burdened with cases thus he was constrained to delegate the recording of his notarial acts in his
Notarial Register to his secretary. Rule VI, Sections I and 2 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice
require a notary public to keep and maintain a Notarial Register wherein he will record his every
notarial act. His failure to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register concerning his
notarial acts is a ground for revocation of his notarial commission. Since Atty. Kilaan failed to make
the proper entries in his Notarial Register, his notarial commission may be properly revoked. Mariano
Agadan, et al. v. Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan, A.C. No. 9385, November 11, 2013.
Attorney; Respect to Courts. Complainant alleged that Atty. Flores failed to give due respect to the
court by failing to obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language in his pleadings.
The Supreme Court held that Atty. Flores failed to obey the courts order to submit proof of his MCLE
compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. Court orders are to be respected not

because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely
essential if our Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not
because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them.
Moreover, Atty. Flores employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court,
Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behaviour before the Courts. Hon. Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan, Presiding Judge,
Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal v. Atty. Rodolfo Flores, A.C. No. 8954, November 13, 2013.
Court Personnel; Dishonesty. Complainants accused respondent sheriff of grave misconduct,
dishonesty and conduct unbecoming an officer of the court for unlawfully and forcibly acquiring part
of their lot. The Supreme Court held that respondent is guilty of simple dishonesty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but not of grave misconduct. Dishonesty is
intentionally making a false statement on any material fact and a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive
or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack
of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. Respondent did not
have a hand in the re-survey conducted by the DAR in 2003 which resulted in the increased land area
of his lot. Nonetheless, respondents acts thereafter displayed his lack of honesty, fairness, and
straightforwardness, not only with his neighbors, but also with the concerned government
agencies/officials. Respondents deportment under the circumstances likewise constitute conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Respondent appears to have illegally forced his way into
the disputed area. As a Sheriff, he is expected to be familiar with court procedure and processes,
especially those concerning the execution of orders and decisions of the courts. Heirs of Celestino
Teves, represented by Paul John Teves Abad, Elsa C. Aquino and Filimon E. Fernan v. Augusto
Felicidario, A.M. No. P-12-3089, November 13, 2013.
Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty. Complainant alleged that the respondent failed to
execute the decision in a land registration case despite receiving an amount for the implementation
of the Alias Writ. The Supreme Court held that the deposit and payment of expenses incurred in
enforcing writs are governed by Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as revised by A.M. No. 042-04-SC. The rule clearly requires that the sheriff executing a writ shall provide an estimate of the
expenses to be incurred, and such estimated amount must be approved by the court. Upon approval,
the interested party shall then deposit the amount with the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff. The
expenses shall be disbursed to the assigned deputy sheriff to execute the writ, subject to liquidation
upon the return of the writ. In this case, the money which respondent had demanded and received
from complainant was not among those prescribed and authorized by the Rules of Court as it was not
even accounted for earlier in his Manifestation. He merely reported his receipt of the P20,000 in his
liquidation of expenses only after complainant demanded an accounting and in compliance to Judges
directive. The Court has ruled that any amount received by the sheriff in excess of the lawful fees
allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction and renders him liable for grave misconduct and
gross dishonesty. Eleanor P. Olivan v. Arnel A. Rubio, etc., A.M. No. P-13-3063, November 26, 2013.
Court Personnel; Gross Dishonesty. An administrative complaint was filed against Ibay, Clerk II of
MTCC, for stealing a check. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of substantial defense to
refute the charges against her, Ibay is liable for the loss of the check and the forgery of De Ocampos
signature, leading to the checks encashment. The case against Ibay is bolstered by the fact that
Judge Eduarte found striking similarities between her handwriting in the inventory of cases and the
forged endorsement in the check. Thus, there is substantial evidence to dismiss Ibay on the ground of
dishonesty. Section 52(A) (1) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
provides that dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal from the service even when
committed for the first time. Persons involved in the dispensation of justice, from the highest official
to the lowest clerk, must live up to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness, honesty

and diligence in the public service. The Supreme Court will not tolerate dishonesty, for the judiciary
deserves the best from all its employees. Executive Judge Henedino P. Eduarte, RTC, Br. 20, Cauayan,
Isabela v. Elizabeth T. Ibay, Clerk II, MTCC, Cauayan, Isabela, A.C. No. P-12-3100, November 12, 2013.
Judges; Absence Without Approved Leave. Judge Villacorta III was granted authority to travel until
February 3, 2011. However, he only returned to work on February 16, without securing an extension
of his authority to travel abroad. This happened again for a second time. The Supreme Court held that
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (Guidelines on Requests for Travel Abroad and Extensions for Travel/Stay
Abroad) requires that a request must be made for an extension of the period to travel/stay abroad,
and that the request be received by the OCA ten (10) working days before the expiration of the
original travel authority. Failure to do so would make the absences beyond the original period
unauthorized. In this case, Judge Villacorta was in a position to file an application for leave to cover
his extended stay abroad. Section 50 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 41,
series of 1998, states that an official or an employee who is absent without approved leave shall not
be entitled to receive the salary corresponding to the period of the unauthorized leave of
absence. Re: Unauthorized Travel Abroad of Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III, Regional Trial Court, Branch
6, Baguio City, A.M. No. 11-9-167-RTC, November 11, 2013.
Judges; Judicial Clemency in Administrative Cases. Judge Pacalna was held administratively liable for
dishonesty, serious misconduct and gross ignorance of the law or procedure, and for violation the
Code of Judicial Conduct. He then filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency. The Supreme Court laid down
the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency: (1) There must be proof of
remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or
testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges
associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A
subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise
to a strong presumption of non-reformation; (2) Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition
of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation; (3) The age of the person asking for clemency must
show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a
chance to redeem himself; (4) There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude,
learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system
or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service; (5) There must be
other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. In this case, Judge Pacalnas
petition is not supported by any single proof of his professed repentance and therefore, must be
denied. Mamasaw Sultan Ali v. Judge Baguinda-Ali Pacalna, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-03-1505, November
27, 2013.
Judges; Retirement Benefits. The surviving spouse of Judge Gruba applied for retirement/gratuity
benefits under Republic Act No. 910. The 5-year lump sum gratuity due to Judge Gruba was paid to
his heirs. On January 13, 2010, Congress amended Republic Act No. 910 and passed Republic Act No.
9946 which provided for more benefits, including survivorship pension benefits, among others. On
January 11, 2012, Mrs. Gruba applied for survivorship pension benefits under Republic Act No. 9946.
In a Resolution dated January 17, 2012, this Court approved the application of Mrs. Gruba. She
received 1,026,748.00 for survivorship pension benefits from January 1, 2011 to April 2012. Later,
however, the Supreme Court revoked the resolution dated January 17, 2012. The Supreme Court held
that the law accommodates the heirs of Judge Gruba by entitling them to receive the improved
gratuity benefits under Republic Act No. 9946, but it is clear that Mrs. Gruba is not entitled to the
survivorship pension benefits. However, despite the fact that Mrs. Gruba is not entitled to receive
survivorship pension, she no longer needs to return the survivorship pension benefits she received
from January 2011 to April 2012 amounting to 1,026,748.00. The Supreme Court, in the past, has
decided pro hac vice that a surviving spouse who received survivorship pension benefits in good faith
no longer needs to refund such pensions. Re: Application for Survivorship Pension Benefits Under

Republic Act 9946 of Mrs. Pacita A. Gruba, Surviving Spouse of the Late Manuel K. Gruba, Former CTA
Associate Judge, A.M. No. 14155-Ret. November 19, 2013.
December 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; Applicability of the Code of Professional Responsibility to lawyers in government service in
the discharge of their official tasks. Private respondents were charged before the Court of Tax Appeals
for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended. However, the CTA
dismissed the case since the prosecution failed to present certified true copies of the documentary
evidence submitted contrary to Section 7, Rule 130 and Section 127, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG), as counsel
for the BOC, filed a petition for certiorari but the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period.
The Supreme Court held that the display of patent violations of even the elementary rules shows that
the case against respondents was doomed by design from the start. This stance taken by the lawyers
in government service rouses the Courts vigilance against inefficiency in the administration of
justice. Verily, the lawyers representing the offices under the executive branch should be reminded
that they still remain as officers of the court from whom a high sense of competence and fervor is
expected. The Court will not close its eyes to this sense of apathy in RATS lawyers, lest the
governments goal of revenue enhancement continues to suffer the blows of smuggling and similar
activities. The Court reminded the lawyers in the BOC that the canons embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility equally apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official tasks. Thus, RATS lawyers should exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice. People of the Philippines v. The Hon. Juanito C.
Castaneda, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 208290, December 11, 2013.
Attorney; Champertous contract. Complainants engaged the legal services of Atty. Baez, Jr. in
connection with the recovery of their properties from Fevidal. Complainants signed a contract of legal
services, where they would not pay acceptance and appearance fees to Atty. Baez Jr., but that the
docket fees would instead be shared by the parties. Under the contract, complainants would pay him
50% of whatever would be recovered of the properties. Later, however, complainants terminated his
services and entered into an amicable settlement with Fevidal. Atty. Baez, Jr. opposed the withdrawal
of their complaint in court. Thus, complainants filed a case against him alleging that the motion of
Atty. Baez, Jr. for the recording of his attorneys charging lien was the legal problem preventing
them from enjoying the fruits of their property.
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in a case to protect his
rights concerning the payment of his compensation. According to the discretion of the court, the
attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money rendered in a case in which
his services have been retained by the client. In this case, however, the contract for legal services is
in the nature of a champertous contract an agreement whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the
expenses of the proceedings to enforce the clients rights in exchange for some bargain to have a
part of the thing in dispute. Such contracts are contrary to public policy and are thus void or
inexistent. They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
states that lawyers shall not lend money to a client, except when in the interest of justice, they have
to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling for the client. Thus, the Court held
that Atty. Baez, Jr. violated Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Conchita
Baltazar,et al. v. Atty. Juan B. Baez, Jr., A.C. No. 9091, December 11, 2013.
Attorney; Disbarment proceedings. A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Macapagal. He was
charged with dishonesty (1) when he stated in the defendants Answer in Civil Case No. A-95-22906
that the parties therein are strangers to each other; (2) when he introduced a falsified Certificate of
Marriage as part of his evidence in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and (3) when he knowingly filed a
totally baseless pleading captioned as Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in the same case. The Supreme Court held that these issues are proper

subjects of and must be threshed out in a judicial action. However, since Atty. Macapagal failed to file
a comment and his position paper despite his receipt of Notice, he was reprimanded for failing to give
due respect to the Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Nestor V. Felipe, et al. v. Atty.
Ciriaco A. Macapagal, A.C. No. 4549, December 2, 2013.
Attorney; Disobedience to court directives. Complainant Sy charged Respondent Esponilla, Legal
Researcher and then Officer-In-Charge of Br. 54 of RTC Manila, and Atty. Buendia, clerk of court and
ex-officio sheriff of RTC Manila with Gross Misconduct, Negligence and Dishonesty. The complaint was
in connection with the irregular withdrawal of deposits for monthly rentals in a civil case based on a
purported Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Rental Deposits filed by Atty. Bayhon in the civil case. The
Supreme Court held that Atty. Bayhon violated the Lawyers Oath and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for failing to explain, in good faith the circumstances surrounding
the filing of the Ex-Parte Motion which he himself filed, for proffering misleading claims in the course
of the subject administrative investigation, and for not having shown and proved that he exerted his
best efforts to secure and submit a copy of the Ex-Parte Motion all in violation of the resolutions
issued by the Court. Atty. Bayhon was suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law. Elpidio
Sy, President, Systems Realty Development Corporation v. Edgar Esponilla, Legal Researcher and
Officer-in-Charge, et al., A.M. No. P-06-2261, December 11, 2013.
Attorney; Due diligence in handling clients case. Respondents were charged for gross negligence in
handling the labor complaints of complainant. The Supreme Court held that the relationship between
a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led
to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required
degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is required to maintain at all
times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to
the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He is likewise
expected to act with honesty in all his dealings, especially with the courts. These principles are
embodied in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. In this case, Atty. Quesadas failure to attend the scheduled
conference hearings, despite due notice and without any proper justification, exhibits his inexcusable
lack of care and diligence in managing his clients cause in violation of Canon 17 and Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code. Felipe C. Dagala v. Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. and Atty. Amado T. Adquilen, A.C.
No. 5044, December 2, 2013.
Attorney; Duty to represent a client must be within the bounds of law. The Supreme Court issued a
Resolution dismissing the administrative complaint of Tomas Merdegia against Court of Appeals
Justice Veloso. The Resolution directed Atty. Adaza II, Merdegias counsel, to show cause why he
should not be cited for contempt. The Supreme Court held Atty. Adaza II guilty of indirect contempt.
Atty. Adaza prepared the administrative complaint after Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself from
a case he was handling. The complaint and the motion for inhibition were both based on the same
main cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso during the oral arguments of Merdegias case. The
resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition should have disposed of the issue of Justice Velosos
bias. If they doubted the legality of the Resolution, they could have filed a petition for certiorari.
Administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other
judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling. While a lawyer has a duty to represent his
client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided by law. He is also duty-bound to impress
upon his client the propriety of the legal action the latter wants to undertake, and to encourage
compliance with the law and legal processes. Atty. Adaza failed to impress upon his client the features
of the Philippine adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial
system, and his own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the Court
demand of him in acting for his client before the courts. Re: Verified Complaint of Tomas S. Merdegia
against Hon. Vicente S.E. Veloso, etc./Re: Resolution dated October 8, 2013 in OCA IPI No. 12-205-CAJ against Atty. Homobono Adaza II, IPI No. 12-205-CA-J/A.C. No. 10300, December 10, 2013.

Attorney; Gross misconduct. Heenan filed a complaint against Atty. Espejo for violation of the
Lawyers Oath due to the latters failure to pay a loan. The Supreme Court found Atty. Espejo guilty of
gross misconduct. The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned. Verily, lawyers must at all times
faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. The prompt
payment of financial obligations is one of the duties of a lawyer. The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained
the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private capacity and not as an attorney of Heenan is
of no moment. A lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession
but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity. While the Court may not ordinarily
discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in his non-professional or private capacity, the Court
may be justified in suspending or removing him as an attorney where his misconduct outside of the
lawyer professional dealings is so gross in character as to show him morally unfit and unworthy of
the privilege which his licenses and the law confer. Thus, Atty. Espejo was suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years. Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo, A.C. No. 10050, December
3, 2013.
Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. Complainant claimed that since Judge Cajigals appointment as
presiding judge of RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City, the latter has displayed gross inefficiency by failing
to resolve within the prescribed period a number of incidents. Moreover, complainant questions the
propriety of the Judges decision in a case he is involved in. The Supreme Court held that the charges
of ignorance of the law are bereft of merit. Judge Cajigals order was issued in the proper exercise of
his judicial functions, and as such, is not subject to administrative disciplinary action; especially
considering that the complainant failed to establish bad faith on the part of the judge. Well
entrenched is the rule that a judge may not be administratively sanctioned for mere errors of
judgment in the absence of showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance, corrupt purpose,
or a deliberate intent to do an injustice on his or her part. Moreover, as a matter of public policy, a
judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as
he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment.Narciso G. Dulalia v. Judge Afable E. Cajigal, RTC, Br. 96, Quezon City, A.M. No. OCA IPI No.
10-3492-RTJ, December 4, 2013.
Judge; Voluntary inhibition. Rallos charges Justice Hernando with bias because he voluntarily inhibited
himself in CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676 only after the promulgation of the March 28, 2012 and April 13,
2012 resolutions. The Supreme Court held that the fact that Justice Hernando voluntarily inhibited
himself after writing the assailed resolutions did not establish his bias against Rallos and her co-heirs
considering that the inhibition was for the precise objective of eliminating suspicions of undue
influence. The justification of Justice Hernando was commendable, and should be viewed as a truly
just and valid ground for his self-disqualification as a judicial officer in a specific case. Further, Rallos
insists that she was entitled to be informed about the inhibitions of the Justices and about their
reasons for the inhibitions. The Court held that there is nothing in Rule V or in any other part of the
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that specifically requires that the party-litigants be informed of
the mandatory or voluntary inhibition of a Justice. Nevertheless, a party-litigant who desires to be
informed of the inhibition of a Justice and of the reason for the inhibition must file a motion for
inhibition in the manner provided under Section 3, Rule V of the Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals.
However, the Court held that henceforth all the parties in any action or proceedings should be
immediately notified of any mandatory disqualification or voluntary inhibition of the Justice who has
participated in any action of the court, stating the reason for the mandatory disqualification or
voluntary inhibition. The requirement of notice is a measure to ensure that the disqualification or
inhibition has not been resorted to in order to cause injustice to or to prejudice any party or
cause. Re: Letters of Lucena B. Rallos, for alleged acts/incidents/occurences relative to the

resolutions(s) issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 06676 by Court of Appeals Executive Justice Pampio Abarintos
and Associate Justices Ramol Paul Hernando and Victoria Isabel Paredes/Re: Complaint filed by
Lucena B. Rallos against Justices Gabriel T. Ingles, Pamela Ann Maxino, and Carmelita S. Manahan, IPI
No. 12-203-CA-J/A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA, December 10, 2013.

January 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; Contingent Fee. Spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency basis. The Supreme
Court held that spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of 2,000.00 and not,
as asserted by the latter, one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation contained in the amended
complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired the former on a
contingency basis; the Spouses Cadavedo undertook to pay their lawyer 2,000.00 as attorneys fees
should the case be decided in their favor. Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty.
Lacaya indeed entered into an oral contingent fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of the
subject lot, the agreement is void. The agreement is champertous and is contrary to public policy. Any
agreement by a lawyer to conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or
to save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment is
obnoxious to the law. The rule of the profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client
for part of the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting the case at the lawyers expense is
designed to prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and his client. The Conjugal
Partnership of the Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (both deceased),
substituted by their Heirs, namely: Herminia, Pastora, Heirs of Fructiosa, Heirs of Raquel, Evangeline,
Vicente, Jr., and Armand, all surnamed Cadavedo, G.R. No. 173188. January 15, 2014.
Attorney; Disbarment; Deceitful and Dishonest Conduct. A Complaint for Disbarment was filed against
Atty. Solidum, Jr. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Solidum, Jr. violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a
lawyers professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court. The Supreme Court found Atty. Solidum, Jr. guilty of engaging in dishonest and
deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his
private capacity with respect to complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed Atty.
Solidum, Jr. to draft the terms of the loan agreements. Atty. Solidum, Jr. drafted the MOAs knowing
that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity
of the same MOAs he prepared. He issued checks that were drawn from his sons account whose
name was similar to his without informing complainants. Further, there is nothing in the records that
will show that he paid or undertook to pay the loans he obtained from complainants. The fiduciary
nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Atty. Solidum, Jr. failed
to fulfill this duty. Natividad P. Navarro and Hilda S. Presbitero v. Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr., A.C. No.
9872, January 28, 2014.
Attorney; Disbarment; Gross Immoral Conduct. A Petition for Disbarment was filed against Atty. Celera
for contracting a second marriage when his first marriage with Complainant was still subsisting. The
Supreme Court held that for purposes of the disbarment proceeding, the Marriage Certificates bearing
the name of Atty. Celera are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy,
which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar. Atty. Celera exhibited a deplorable lack
of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a

sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his
first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio Juan A.
Celera,A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014.
Attorney; Disbarment; Willful Disobedience. A Petition for Disbarment was filed against Atty. Celera for
contracting a second marriage when his first marriage with Complainant was still subsisting. Atty.
Celara failed to file a Comment despite numerous Notices from the Court, stating that he never
received such Notices. When said excuse seemed no longer feasible, Atty. Celera just disappeared.
The Supreme Court held that Atty. Celeras acts were deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the
Court in order to delay the disposition of the case and to evade the consequences of his actions.
Ultimately, what is apparent is respondents deplorable disregard of the judicial process which this
Court cannot countenance. Atty. Celeras acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of
this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause
for suspension or disbarment. Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the
Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Atty. Celeras conduct indicates
a high degree of irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is not to be construed as a mere request, nor
should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty.
Rogelio Juan A. Celera,A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014.
Attorney; Malpractice. A Complaint was filed against Atty. Mendoza of the Public Attorneys Office
(PAO) for violation of the attorneys oath, deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. One of the charges against Atty. Mendoza which she admitted is telling her clients
Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon. The
Supreme Court held that Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule
1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that a
lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system. Rule 15.07 states that a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the
laws and the principles of fairness. However, while her remark was inappropriate and unbecoming,
her comment was not disparaging and reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to the
Judiciary. Thus, she was only reprimanded and sternly warned. Edgardo Areola v. Atty. Maria Vilma
Mendoza, A.C. No. 10135, January 15, 2014.
Court Personnel; Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. A complaint for grave misconduct was filed
against Mylene H. Dela Cruz, Clerk III of the Regional Trial Court. The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Republic Act 6713, enunciates the States policy of
promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. And no other
office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness
from an employee than in the judiciary. The Supreme Court held that in this case, Dela Cruz failed to
live up to these exacting standards. The inculpatory acts committed by Dela Cruz are so grave as to
call for the most severe administrative penalty. Dishonesty and grave misconduct, both being in the
nature of a grave offense, carry the extreme penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in
the government service. This penalty is in accordance with Sections 52 and 58 of the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Atty. Rhea R. Alcantara-Aquino v. Mylene H. Dela
Cruz, etc., A.M. No. P-13-3141. January 21, 2014.
Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct. A Complaint for Grave Misconduct and Making Untruthful
Statements was filed against Alfredo Pallanan, Sheriff IV, assigned at the Regional Trial Court.
Complainant alleged that Pallanan should not have implemented the writ of execution in the unlawful
detainer case since there was a pending motion for reconsideration with the court. Misconduct has
been defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,

unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any
of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established
rules, all of which must be established by substantial evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a
charge of grave misconduct. The Supreme Court ruled that Pallanan did not commit grave
misconduct. In ejectment cases, the rulings of the courts are immediately executory and can only be
stayed via compliance with Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Such provision was not complied
here.
The sheriffs duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to execute the order of the
court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion whether to execute the judgment or not. When the
writ is placed in his hands, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed
with reasonable celerity and promptness to implement it in accordance with its mandate. It is only by
doing so could he ensure that the order is executed without undue delay. This holds especially true
herein where the nature of the case requires immediate execution. Absent a TRO, an order of quashal,
or compliance with Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, respondent sheriff has no alternative but to
enforce the writ. Atty. Virgillo P. Alconera v. Alfredo T. Pallanan, A.M. No. P-12-3069, January 20, 2014.
Court personnel; Simple neglect of duty. The audit of the financial transactions of Maniquis, former
Officer-in-Charge, Clerk of Court III, and that of his successor Atty. Buencamino (Atty. Buencamino),
Clerk of Court IV uncovered shortages in the books of accounts of the Metropolitan Trial Court. Mapue,
Clerk III, admitted her fault.
The Supreme Court held that the admission of Mapue of her liability does not exculpate Atty.
Buencamino from her own negligence. A clerk of court has general administrative supervision over all
the personnel of the court. The administrative functions of a clerk of court are as vital to the prompt
and proper administration of justice as his judicial duties. As custodian of court funds and revenues,
the clerk of court is primarily accountable for all funds that are collected for the court, whether
personally received by him or by a duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision and control.
Atty. Buencamino was remiss in the performance of her duties as clerk of court. Atty. Buencamino
failed to supervise Mapue and to properly manage the court funds entrusted to her, enabling Mapue
to misappropriate part of the funds. Atty. Buencaminos failure to properly supervise and manage the
financial transactions in her court constitutes simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is the
failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. It is a
less grave offense punishable by suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first
offense. Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino, etc., et al./Re: Report on
the financial audit conducted in the Metropolitan Trial Court etc., A.M. No. P-05-2051/A.M. No. 05-4118-MeTC. January 21, 2014.
February 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; Notarization; Importance. An administrative case was filed against Atty. Rinen for
falsification of an Extra Judicial Partition with Sale which allowed the transfer to Spouses Durante of a
parcel of land. In Bautista v. Atty. Bernabe, the Court held that [a] notary public should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The
presence of the parties to the deed will enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the affiant. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. It converts a private document into a public one, making it admissible in court without further
proof of its authenticity. Thus, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements
in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public
instruments would be undermined.
In this case, Atty. Rinen did not deny his failure to personally verify the identity of all parties who
purportedly signed the subject document and whom, as he claimed, appeared before him on April 7,
1994. Such failure was further shown by the fact that the pertinent details of the community tax

certificates of Wilberto and his sister, as proof of their identity, remained unspecified in the deeds
acknowledgment portion. Clearly, there was a failure on the part of Atty. Rinen to exercise the due
diligence that was required of him as a notary public exofficio. Thus, Atty. Rinens notarial
commission as revoked and he was disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for one
year. Wilberto C. Talisic v. Atty. Primo R. Rinen, A.C. No. 8761, February 12, 2014.
Attorney; Notarization not an empty act. Complainant charged Atty. Gupana of forgeries and
falsifications in the notarization of certain documents. The Supreme Court found Atty. Gupana
administratively liable under Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law,
for violation of his notarial duties when he failed to require the personal presence of Candelaria
Magpayo when he notarized the Affidavit of Loss which Candelaria allegedly executed on April 29,
1994.
Under the law, the party acknowledging must appear before the notary public or any other person
authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents. In this case, the jurat of the
Affidavit of Loss stated that Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit before Atty. Gupana on April 29,
1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was already dead since March 26, 1991. Hence, it is
clear that the jurat was made in violation of the notarial law. The notarization of a document is not an
empty act or routine. A notary publics function should not be trivialized and a notary public must
discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity.
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, Atty. Gupana is mandated to subscribe to the sacred
duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public
interest. Thus, the Supreme Court held that Atty. Gupanas revocation of his notarial commission,
disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension
from the practice of law for one year are in order. Carlito Ang v. Atty. James Joseph Gupana, A.C. No.
4545. February 5, 2014.
Court Personnel; Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service. An administrative
complaint was filed against Salamanca, Clerk III of a Metropolitan Trial Court for
unauthorized/unexplained absences and other infractions: (1) failure to account for and turn over the
partial settlement amount of a civil obligation; and (2) failure to account for and turn over the
payment for legal fees she received in a case. The Supreme Court held that the acts of Salamanca
constitute dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud. It implies untrustworthiness,
lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle on the part of the individual who
failed to exercise fairness and straightforwardness in his or her dealings. Conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of service, on the other hand, pertains to any conduct that is detrimental or derogatory
or naturally or probably bringing about a wrong result; it refers to acts or omissions that violate the
norm of public accountability and diminish or tend to diminish the peoples faith in the Judiciary.
However, Salamancas dishonesty does not consist of her failure to remit court funds because the
money she received from the litigants did not acquire the status of court funds as no official receipt
therefor was issued by her. While Salamancas complained acts involved technically private money,
the deceit she pulled off disrupted the publics faith in the integrity of the judiciary and its personnel.
Her conduct tarnished the image and integrity of her public office and violated the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Section 4(c) which commands that public
officials and employees shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts
contrary to public safety and public interest. Executive Judge Ma. Ofelia S. Contreras-Soriano v. Clerk
III Liza D. Salamanca, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, Malabon City, A.M. No. P-13-3119. February
10, 2014.
Court Personnel; Duty to Submit Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN). Sheriff
Collado was charged with failing to disclose in her SALN for the years 2004 and 2005 certain time
deposits, among others. The Supreme Court cited Section 8 of RA 6713 which requires all public
officials and employees to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of their assets and

liabilities. The requirement of SALN submission is aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities
for official corruption, as well as at maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. With such
disclosure, the public would, to a reasonable extent, be able to monitor the affluence of public
officials, and, in such manner, provides a check and balance mechanism to verify their undisclosed
properties and/or sources of income.
The Supreme Court held that based on Section 8 of RA 6713, all other assets such as investments,
cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like, should be declared by the public official in his
or her SALN. In this case, however, it was established that she only declared the original amount of
her time deposits in her SALN for the years 2004 and 2005, and did not disclose the interests which
had eventually accrued on the same. Accordingly, Collado fell short of the legal requirement stated
under Section 8 of RA 6713 and thus should be held administratively liable for said
infraction. Angelito R. Marquez, et al. v. Judge Venancio M. Ovejera, etc., et al., A.M. No. P-11-2903,
February 5, 2014.
Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct. A complaint was filed against Susbilla-De Vera for soliciting
money to supposedly facilitate a legal proceeding in court. The court held Susbilla-De Vera guilty of
the most serious administrative offense of grave misconduct. To deserve the trust and confidence of
the people, Susbilla-De Vera was expected to have her dealings with the public to be always sincere
and above board. She should not lead others to believe that despite her status as a minor court
employee she had the capacity to influence the outcomes of judicial matters. Her acts did not live up
to the expectation, for the records unquestionably showed how she had deliberately and fraudulently
misrepresented her ability to assist the complainant in the adoption of her niece and nephew. Section
2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel has enjoined all court personnel from soliciting
or accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit understanding that such gift, favor or
benefit shall influence their official actions. The Court thus warranted her dismissal from
service.Veronica F. Galindez v. Zosima Susbilla-De Vera, A.M. No. P-13-3126, February 4, 2014.
Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct. An administrative case was filed against respondents who are
employees of the Court of Appeals for transacting with partylitigants with a pending case before
the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the court personnels act of soliciting or receiving
money from litigants constitutes grave misconduct. The sole act of receiving money from litigants,
whatever the reason may be, is antithesis to being a court employee. The Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel requires that court personnel avoid conflicts of interest in performing official duties. It
mandates that court personnel should not receive tips or other remunerations for assisting or
attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the judiciary.
Further, court personnel cannot take advantage of the vulnerability of partylitigants. In this case,
respondents were found guilty of grave misconduct and thus, dismissed from service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from holding public office in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations. Anacleto
O. Villahermosa, Sr., et al. v. Victor Sacia, Executive Assistant IV and Efren R. Rivamonte, etc., A.M.
No. CA-14-28-P, February 11, 2014.
Judge; Notarization; Prohibition. An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Rojo for
notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized, in violation of Circular
No. 190 dated February 26, 1990. Circular No. 190 allows municipal trial court judges to act as
notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with their official functions and
duties.
The Supreme Court held Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Circular
No. 190, and of gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which
were documents not connected with the exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing
officer. He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public
were lacking in his courts territorial jurisdiction. As a solemnizing officer, the judges only duty
involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived together

for at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge
can notarize the parties affidavit of cohabitation. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent
with the duty to examine the parties requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized
the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavits statements
before performing the marriage ceremony. Thus, Judge Rojo was suspended for six months from
office.Rex M. Tupal v. Judge Remegio V. Rojo, etc., A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842. February 24, 2014.
March 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; Disbarment cases; Initiation. Complainants who are members of the Congressional Village
Homeowners Association, Inc. filed a Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Jimenez for violating
Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for his negligence in handling an appeal in a case involving the Association and willful violation of his
duties as an officer of the court.
The Supreme Court held that the complainants have personality to file the disbarment case. In Heck
v. Judge Santos, the Court held that [a]ny interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate
disciplinary proceedings. The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor
is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. The
procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest
must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. Disbarment proceedings are matters of
public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges.
Further, the Supreme Court held that a lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the
responsibility of protecting the latters interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellants
brief on behalf of his client, Atty. Jimenez had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in
Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the
Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice. However, the Supreme Court only suspended Atty.
Jimenez from the practice of law for one month. Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr. v. Atty.
Diosdado B. Jimenez,A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014.
Attorney; Fidelity to Client. Atty. Guaren was charged with violating the Canon of Professional
Responsibility when he accepted the titling of complainants lot and despite the acceptance of
P7,000, failed to perform his obligation and allowing 5 years to elapse without any progress in the
titling of complainants lot. The Supreme Court reiterated that the practice of law is not a business. It
is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is
not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily
yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. In this case, Atty. Guaren
admitted that he accepted the amount of P7,000 as partial payment of his acceptance fee. He,
however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the titling of complainants lot despite the
lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence
when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. Thus, Atty. Guaren violated Canons 17 and 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and was suspended from the practice of law for six
months.Stephan Brunet and Virginia Romanillo Brunet v. Atty. Ronald L. Guaren,A.C. No. 10164,
March 10, 2014.
Attorney; Neglect of Duty. Atty. Agleron was charged with violating Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. The Supreme Court
held that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with
competence, and to attend to his clients cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed on him.

In this case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint despite the fact that it was already
prepared and signed. He attributed his non-filing of the appropriate charges on the failure of
complainant to remit the full payment of the filing fee and pay the 30% of the attorneys fee. Such
justification, however, is not a valid excuse that would exonerate him from liability. As stated, every
case that is entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full attention whether he accepts this for a fee or free.
Even assuming that complainant had not remitted the full payment of the filing fee, he should have
found a way to speak to his client and inform him about the insufficiency of the filing fee so he could
file the complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked professionalism in dealing with complainant and
showed incompetence when he failed to file the appropriate charges. A lawyer should never neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence renders him liable for disciplinary action such
as suspension ranging from three months to two years. In this case, Atty. Agleron was suspended
from the practice of law three months. Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez, represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact, Vicente A. Pichon v. Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron Sr.,A.C. No. 5359, March 10, 2014.
Attorney; Notarization; Personal Appearance. A petition for disbarment was filed against Atty.
Cabucana, Jr. for falsification of public document. The requirement of personal appearance of the
affiant is required under the Notarial Law and Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice
of 2004. The Supreme Court held that as a notary public, Atty. Cabucana, Jr. should not notarize a
document unless the person who signs it is the same person executing it and personally appearing
before him to attest to the truth of its contents. This is to enable him to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the partys free and
voluntary act and deed. Thus, Atty. Cabucana, Jr. was found violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and suspended from the practice of law for three months. His notarial
commission was revoked and he was prohibited from being commissioned as a notary public for two
years. Licerio Dizon v. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.,A.C. No. 10185, March 12, 2014.
Judge; Violation of Administrative Rules; Unprofessional Conduct. Judge Larida, Jr. was charged for
committing various anomalies and irregularities. The Supreme Court held that Judge Larida, Jr.
committed several lapses, specifically the non-submission to the Court of the required inventory of
locally-funded employees, and his allowing Marticio to draft court orders. Such lapses manifested a
wrong attitude towards administrative rules and regulations issued for the governance and
administration of the lower courts, to the extent of disregarding them, as well as a laxity in the control
of his Branch and in the supervision of its functioning staff. The omission to submit the inventory
should not be blamed on Atty. Calma as the Branch Clerk of Court. Although it was very likely that
Judge Larida, Jr. had tasked Atty. Calma to do and submit the inventory in his behalf, Judge Larida, Jr.
as the Presiding Judge himself remained to be the officer directly burdened with the responsibility for
doing so. Further, for knowingly allowing detailed employees to solicit commissions from bonding
companies, Judge Larida, Jr. contravened the Code of Judicial Conduct, which imposed on him the duty
to take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against court personnel for unprofessional
conduct of which he would have become aware. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Edwin C.
Larida, Jr., RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City,A.M. No. RTJ-08-2151, March 11, 2014.
Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Bitas for
fixing the accuseds bail and reducing the same motu proprio. In this case, Miralles was charged with
Qualified Trafficking, which under Section 10 (C) of R.A. No. 9208 is punishable by life imprisonment
and a fine of not less than P2,000,000 but not more than P5,000,000. Thus, by reason of the penalty
prescribed by law, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion which can be exercised only by Judge
Bitas after the evidence is submitted in a hearing. The hearing of the application for bail in capital
offenses is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecutions
evidence is weak or strong. The Supreme Court held that not only did Judge Bitas deviate from the
requirement of a hearing where there is an application for bail, he also granted bail to Miralles without
neither conducting a hearing nor a motion for application for bail. Judge Bitas acts are not mere
deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on his part, but a patent disregard of well-known

rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making
the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. Ma. Liza M. Jorda, City Prosecutors Office, Tacloban
City v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City; Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao v. Judge
Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City,A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376/A.M. No. RTJ-14-2377. March 5,
2014.
April 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Court personnel; simple misconduct. An administrative case was filed against Melchor Tiongson, a
Court of Appeals (CA) employee who was assigned to be the head watcher during the 2011 bar
examinations. The complaint alleged that she brought a digital camera inside the bar examination
rooms, in violation of the Instructions to Head Watchers. The Court held that in administrative
proceedings, substantial evidence is the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt, and this
requirement is satisfied if there is reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for
the misconduct. Misconduct means transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by an employee. Any transgression or
deviation from the established norm of conduct, work related or not, amounts to a misconduct. In this
case, there was substantial evidence to prove that Tiongson committed a misconduct. Tiongson was
held liable for simple misconduct only, because the elements of grave misconduct were not proven
with substantial evidence, and Tiongson admitted his infraction before the Office of the Bar Confidant.
As a CA employee, Tiongson disregarded his duty to uphold the strict standards required of every
court employee, that is, to be an example of integrity, uprightness and obedience to the judiciary. Re:
Melchor Tiongson, Head Watcher, During the 2011 Bar Examinations, B.M. No. 2482, April 1, 2014.
Judges; bias and partiality must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Court held that the
truth about Judge Austrias alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply relying on the verified
complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a judges sacred obligation
under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to the person, and to give equal
right to the poor and rich. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere
suspicion of partiality is not enough. In this case, aside from being speculative and judicial in
character, the circumstances cited by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises.
The complainant also failed to adduce proof indicating the judges predisposition to decide the case in
favor of one party. Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M.
No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014.
Judges; decision-making; 90-day requirement. An administrative case was filed against Judge
Bustamante when it was found out upon judicial audit that he had a number of cases pending for
decision, some of which the reglementary period have already lapsed. The Court held that decisionmaking, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a member of the bench.
The speedy disposition of cases in the courts is a primary aim of the judiciary so the ends of justice
may not be compromised and the judiciary will be true to its commitment to provide litigants their
constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of their cases. The Constitution, Code of
Judicial Conduct, and jurisprudence consistently mandate that a judge must decide cases within 90
days from submission. A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-day
requirement; he/she should instead persevere in its implementation. Heavy caseload and demanding
workload are not valid reasons to fall behind the mandatory period for disposition of cases. Having
failed to decide a case within the required period, without any order of extension granted by the
Court, Judge Bustamante was held liable for undue delay that merits administrative sanction. Office
of the Court Administrator v. Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Alaminos
City, Pangasinan,A.M. No. MTJ-12-1806, April 7, 2014.
Judges; impropriety. An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Austria for impropriety for
posting her details as judge in Friendster and posting a picture with an indecent attire for the publics

consumption. The Court held that she was guilty of impropriety. While judges are not prohibited from
becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities, they do not shed off
their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and
duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. Judge Austria was guilty
of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public. Joining
Friendster per sedoes not violate the New Code of Judicial Conduct. However, Judge Austria
disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster
photos of herself wearing an off-shouldered suggestive dress and made this available for public
viewing. Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ09-2200, April 2, 2014.
Judges; irregular or erroneous order or decision; appropriate remedy. The Court held that in
administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of his complaint by
substantial evidence. In this case, the allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the
performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit
because the complainant failed to establish Judge Austrias bad faith, malice or ill will. The
complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by
themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations. Even granting that the judge erred
in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action,
but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the complainant. An administrative complaint is
not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where
a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal. Antonio M.
Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2,
2014.
April 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Court personnel; simple misconduct. An administrative case was filed against Melchor Tiongson, a
Court of Appeals (CA) employee who was assigned to be the head watcher during the 2011 bar
examinations. The complaint alleged that she brought a digital camera inside the bar examination
rooms, in violation of the Instructions to Head Watchers. The Court held that in administrative
proceedings, substantial evidence is the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt, and this
requirement is satisfied if there is reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for
the misconduct. Misconduct means transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by an employee. Any transgression or
deviation from the established norm of conduct, work related or not, amounts to a misconduct. In this
case, there was substantial evidence to prove that Tiongson committed a misconduct. Tiongson was
held liable for simple misconduct only, because the elements of grave misconduct were not proven
with substantial evidence, and Tiongson admitted his infraction before the Office of the Bar Confidant.
As a CA employee, Tiongson disregarded his duty to uphold the strict standards required of every
court employee, that is, to be an example of integrity, uprightness and obedience to the judiciary. Re:
Melchor Tiongson, Head Watcher, During the 2011 Bar Examinations, B.M. No. 2482, April 1, 2014.
Judges; bias and partiality must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Court held that the
truth about Judge Austrias alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply relying on the verified
complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a judges sacred obligation
under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to the person, and to give equal
right to the poor and rich. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere
suspicion of partiality is not enough. In this case, aside from being speculative and judicial in
character, the circumstances cited by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises.
The complainant also failed to adduce proof indicating the judges predisposition to decide the case in
favor of one party. Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M.
No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014.

Judges; decision-making; 90-day requirement. An administrative case was filed against Judge
Bustamante when it was found out upon judicial audit that he had a number of cases pending for
decision, some of which the reglementary period have already lapsed. The Court held that decisionmaking, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a member of the bench.
The speedy disposition of cases in the courts is a primary aim of the judiciary so the ends of justice
may not be compromised and the judiciary will be true to its commitment to provide litigants their
constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of their cases. The Constitution, Code of
Judicial Conduct, and jurisprudence consistently mandate that a judge must decide cases within 90
days from submission. A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-day
requirement; he/she should instead persevere in its implementation. Heavy caseload and demanding
workload are not valid reasons to fall behind the mandatory period for disposition of cases. Having
failed to decide a case within the required period, without any order of extension granted by the
Court, Judge Bustamante was held liable for undue delay that merits administrative sanction. Office
of the Court Administrator v. Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Alaminos
City, Pangasinan,A.M. No. MTJ-12-1806, April 7, 2014.
Judges; impropriety. An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Austria for impropriety for
posting her details as judge in Friendster and posting a picture with an indecent attire for the publics
consumption. The Court held that she was guilty of impropriety. While judges are not prohibited from
becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities, they do not shed off
their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and
duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. Judge Austria was guilty
of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public. Joining
Friendster per sedoes not violate the New Code of Judicial Conduct. However, Judge Austria
disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster
photos of herself wearing an off-shouldered suggestive dress and made this available for public
viewing. Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ09-2200, April 2, 2014.
Judges; irregular or erroneous order or decision; appropriate remedy. The Court held that in
administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of his complaint by
substantial evidence. In this case, the allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the
performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit
because the complainant failed to establish Judge Austrias bad faith, malice or ill will. The
complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by
themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations. Even granting that the judge erred
in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action,
but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the complainant. An administrative complaint is
not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where
a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal. Antonio M.
Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2,
2014.
June 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics
Attorney; Disbarment; Effect of withdrawal. A disbarment case was filed by Quiachon against her
lawyer Atty. Ramos who represented her in a labor case before NLRC and a special proceeding case
before the RTC. During the pendency of the proceedings, complainant withdrew the disbarment case.
The Supreme Court held that the withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not
terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative
proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar. The complainant in a
disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the

attention of the Court. In this case, Atty. Ramos violated Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Thus, the appropriate penalty should be imposed despite the desistance of
complainant or the withdrawal of the charges. Adelia V. Quiachon v. Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos, A.C.
No. 9317, June 4, 2014.
Attorney; Quantum of proof in administrative cases. An administrative complaint for dishonesty was
filed against Atty. Molina for having advised his clients to enforce a contract on complainants client
who was never a party to the agreement. The Supreme Court in dismissing the complaint held that
when it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered: quantum of
proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is on the
complainant. Here, the complaint was without factual basis. The allegation of giving legal advice was
not substantiated in this case, either in the complaint or in the corresponding hearings. Bare
allegations are not proof. Even if Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still cannot be
held administratively liable without any showing that his act was attended with bad faith or malice.
The default rule is presumption of good faith. Atty. Alan F. Paguia v. Atty. Manuel T. Molina, A.C. No.
9881, June 4, 2014.
Court personnel; Dishonesty. Ampong was dismissed from the Civil Service Commission for
dishonesty, however, remained employed in the RTC. The Supreme Court has already held in its
August 26, 2008 Decision that Ampong was administratively liable for dishonesty in impersonating
and taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of one
Decir. Under section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS),
the penalty of dismissal carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil
service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and
controlled corporation or government financial institution. Ampong should be made to similarly suffer
the same. Every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness, and
honesty. Court personnel are enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in
their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts
of justice. Here, Ampong failed to meet these stringent standards set for a judicial employee and does
not, therefore, deserve to remain with the Judiciary. Office of the Court Administrator v. Sarah P.
Ampong, etc., A.M. No. P-13-3132, June 4, 2014.
Court personnel; Simple neglect of duty. Sheriff Macusi was charged with misfeasance, nonfeasance
or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for failing to act on a writ of execution. The
Supreme Court held that the 30-day period imposed for the execution of the writ after the judgment
has been received by the sheriff, as well as the periodic report every 30 days, is mandatory. Contrary
to such rule, Sheriff Macusi submitted only one return of writ of execution in his Partial Report and did
not file any other report to the court. Sheriffs play an important part in the administration of justice
because they are tasked to execute the final judgment of courts. Thus, Sheriff Macusi was held to be
remiss in his duties and thus liable for simple neglect of duty which is the failure to give attention to a
task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. Alberto Valdez v. Desiderio W.
Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 25, Tabuk, Kalinga, A.M. No. P-13-3123, June 10, 2014.
Judge; Time within which certain acts must be done; Exception. An administrative complaint was filed
against MCTC Judge Regencia. The Supreme Court held that pursuant to Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and
dedication to duty of judges. If judges do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is
inevitable to the prejudice of the litigants. In this case, the civil case was already submitted for
resolution. Being an ejectment case, it is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly
sets a period of 30 days from the submission of the last affidavit or position paper within which a
decision must be issued. Despite this, Judge Regencia rendered judgment only more than 2 years
later. While rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to

prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases and, thus, should be regarded
as mandatory, the Court has nevertheless been mindful of the plight of judges and has been
understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing of their businesses
and, as such, has allowed extensions of time due to justifiable reasons. However, Judge Regencia
failed to proffer any acceptable reason in delaying the disposition of the ejectment case, thus, making
her administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision. Gershon N. Dulang v. Judge Mary
Jocylen G. Regencia, MCTC, Asturias-Balamban, Cebu, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841, June 2, 2014.