13. RAPID CITY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS.

ORLANDO VILLA
and LOURDES PAEZ-VILLA,[1]
In

2004,

(petitioner) filed a

complaint

for

declaration of

nullity of

subdivision

plans . . . mandamus and damages against several defendants including Spouses Orlando and Lourdes
Villa (respondents). The complaint/case was filed in the RTC- Antipolo City.
After one failed attempt at personal service of summons, (Zapanta), court process server,
resorted to substituted service by serving summons upon respondents househelp who did not
acknowledge receipt thereof and refused to divulge their names. This was supported by return of
summons.
Despite substituted service, respondents failed to file their Answer, prompting petitioner to file
a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default which the trial court granted by Order of May 3, 2005.
8 months after, respondents filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default,claiming that on January
27, 2006 they officially received all pertinent papers such as Complaint and Annexes. Motion to
Dismiss of the Solicitor General and the ORDER dated May 3, 2005 granting the Motion to Declare
[them] in Default. And they denied the existence of two women helpers who allegedly refused to sign
and acknowledge receipt of the summons. In any event, they contended that assuming that the
allegation were true, the helpers had no authority to receive the documents
By Order of July 17, 2006, the trial court set aside the Order of Default and gave herein
respondents five days to file their Answer. Respondents just the same did not file an Answer, drawing
petitioner to again file a Motion to declare them in default, which the trial court again granted by Order
of February 21, 2007.
On April 18, 2007, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the second
order declaring them in default and to vacate proceedings, this time claiming that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons due to invalid service of summons. The trial court denied
respondents Omnibus Motion by Order of May 22, 2007 and proceeded to receive ex-parte evidence
for petitioner.
Respondents, via certiorari, challenged the trial courts February 21, 2007 and April 18, 2007 Orders
before the Court of Appeals. CA ruled in favor of the defendants/respondents. CA ruled on the ground
that A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based
on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Petitioner here filed a motion of reconsideration on the ground that first Motion to Lift the Order of
Default, voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. But still denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents upon filing of the motion constitute a special appearance.
Held: No. SC held that respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their filing thereof was a special
appearance for the purpose only to question the jurisdiction over their persons. Clearly, they had
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
Court discussed that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary
appearance:
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court,
especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed
and submitted to the court for resolution,
14. G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013
BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G.
TOLEDO,Respondents.
Facts:
In 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against the spouses Toledo. Herein respondent filed an Answer dated 19 March
1998 but on 7 May 1998, she filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer in which she alleged
that her husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead. The death certificate of
Manuel states "13 July 1995" as the date of death.
As a result, petitioner filed a motion, dated 5 August 1999, to require respondent to disclose the heirs of
Manuel.10 In compliance with the verbal order of the court during the 11 October 1999 hearing of the
case, respondent submitted the required names and addresses of the heirs. Petitioner then filed a
Motion for Substitution,12 dated 18 January 2000, praying that Manuel be substituted by his children as
party-defendants. It appears that this motion was granted by the trial court .
On 26 May 2004, the reception of evidence for herein respondent was cancelled upon agreement of the
parties. On 24 September 2004, counsel for herein respondent was given a period of fifteen days within
which to file a demurrer to evidence.However, on 7 October 2004, respondent instead filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint, citing the following as grounds:
(1) that the complaint failed to implead an indispensable party or a real party in interest; hence, the
case must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action;
(2) that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court; (
3) that the trial court erred in ordering the substitution of the deceased Manuel by his heirs; and
(4) that the court must also dismiss the case against Lolita Toledo in accordance with Section 6, Rule
86 of the Rules of Court.16

5
Trial Court denied the motion on the following grounds: (1) It was filed not within the period required
by law. (2) "defendants attack on the jurisdiction of this Court is now barred by estoppel by laches
since respondent failed to raise the issue despite several chances to do so.
Upon appeal, CA ruled in favor of the respondents. CA reasoned out that RTC should have considered
the motion for reconsidered on the following reasons: (1) When the case filed, it is clear that Manuel is
already dead. The complaint should have impleaded the estate of Manuel S. Toledo as defendant, not
only the wife, considering that the estate of Manuel S. Toledo is an indispensable party, which stands
to be benefited or be injured in the outcome of the case. (2) As a consequence, the court did not
acquired the jurisdiction of defendant. Hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
1

Whether or not the Court has never acquired the jurisdiction over the defendant Manuel.

Held:
1.

No. The Court has never acquired the jurisdiction over the person of Manuel.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel since
there was no valid service of summons upon him, precisely because he was already dead even
before the complaint against him and his wife was filed in the trial court. As a consequence,
Here, since Manuel was already dead at the time of the filing of the complaint, the court never
acquired jurisdiction over his person and, in effect, there was no party to be substituted.

Petition granted. Case was directed to TC and proceeded against the wife.

15. G G.R. No. 178193

DANILO B. URSUA, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

16. CITY OF DUMAGUETE, herein

Represented by City Mayor, Agustin R.
Perdices,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 168973

Present:

- versus -

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY,

Respondent.

CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
August 24, 2011

On October 14, 1998, petitioner City of Dumaguete, through Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo
(Remollo), filed before the RTC an Application for Original Registration of Title over a parcel of
land with improvements, located at Barangay Looc, City of Dumaguete (subject property), under the
Property Registration Decree. Stating that he has in open, continuous, apparent and notorious
possession of the land for more than 30 years (2) Tax has been paid. On the order of RTC, it noted that
some of the important records are lacking in the petition:
In an Order[4] dated October 23, 1998, the RTC noted that:

A perusal of the records of the case shows that the annexes lack the
following copies:

a) two blue print copies of the approved plan;

b) two copies of the technical description of the lot sought to be registered;

c) two copies of the Surveyors certificate;

d) a certificate in quadruplicate of the City Assessor of the assessed value of

the land;

e) all original muniments of title in the possession of the applicant which

prove ownership of the land;

f) two copies of the petition/application.

Further, the application did not state the number of the lot sought to be
registered, the number of parcels applied for, the improvements found thereon, and
indicate whether it claims a portion of the road which serves as a boundary line.

All these must be alleged in the petition so that the Court will know the
nature of the property.

TheRTCexplainedthattheextracopiessubmittedbypetitionershallbeforwardedbythe
RTC Clerk of Court to the Land Registration Commission (LRC) inManilafor comment.Only
thereafterwouldtheRTCsettheapplicationforhearing.
Petitioner filed its Compliance[5]with the abovementioned Order, submitting additional
copiesoftherequireddocumentsandclarifyingthus:

1.Theapprovedplandoesnotstatethenumberoflotsoughttoberegistered
becauseitisapublicland,thus,onlyPSU07006805appearsontheplan
whichisbeingappliedforregistration;
2.Onlyone(1)parceloflandisappliedforbypetitionerswhichconsistof
fivethousandfourhundredten(5,410)squaremeters,moreorless;
3.TheCityEngineersBuildingwithintheCityEngineerscompoundarethe
onlyimprovementfoundthereon;and
4.Petitionersdonotclaimanyportionoftheroadwhichservesasaboundary
line.

TheRTCaccordinglysettheinitialhearingofLRCCaseNo.N201onApril12,1999,and
sentnoticestotheparties.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, and respondent,
representedbytheOfficeoftheGovernmentCorporateCounsel,fileditsoppositioncontendingthat
themayorwasnotinpossessionofthelandinaconceptofanownerfor30years.Howeverbeforethe
startofhearing,therespondentsseektofileamotiontodismisstheLRCcaseonthegroundthatthe
RTC lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Respondent argued that Section 14(1) of
PresidentialDecreeNo.1529,otherwiseknownasthePropertyRegistrationDecree,refersonlyto
alienableanddisposablelandsofthepublicdomainunderabonafideclamofownership.Thesubject
propertyinLRCCaseNo.N201isnotalienableanddisposable,sinceitisaforeshoreland,as
explicitlytestifiedtobypetitionersownwitness,Engr.Dorado.Aforeshorelandisnotregisterable.

RTCdeniedtheapplication.ForIthavingbeenshownby[petitioners]ownevidencethatthe
lotsubjectoftheapplicationfororiginalregistrationisaforeshoreland,andthereforenot
registerable.

Uponappeal,CAreiteratedthedecisionofRTC.Hence,petition.

Issue:WhethertheRTCiscorrectindenyingtheapplicationonthegroundthatthesubject
matterisnotaregistrableland.Hence,notwithinthepowerofRTCtoadjudicate.

Held:Yes,theRTCerredinitsdecisionindenyingthepetitiononthatground.
Jurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterofacaseisconferredbylawanddeterminedbythe
allegationsinthecomplaintwhichcompriseaconcisestatementoftheultimatefactsconstitutingthe
plaintiff'scauseofaction.
Thejurisdictionofthecourt cannotbemadetodepend uponthedefensesset upinthe
answeroruponthemotiontodismiss;forotherwise,thequestionofjurisdictionwouldalmostentirely
dependuponthedefendant.Whatdeterminesthejurisdictionofthecourtisthenatureoftheaction
pleadedasappearingfromtheallegationsinthecomplaint.
Inthiscaseatbar,theissuewhetherthesubjectisregistrablelandisfactualissueandmustbe
disputedanddecideduponthecommencementofproceeding.
Hence,petitiongranted.TheCasewasdirectedtoCFI/RTCforthecommencementofLRCcase.

17. G.R. Nos. 197592 & 202623, November 27, 2013

THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN, Petitioners, v. JODY KING CONSTRUCTION AND

DEVELOPMENT CORP., Respondent.

On January 12, 1998, the Province of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction and Development
Corp. (respondent) entered into a contract for the design and construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port
and Terminal (Phase I) in Malay, Aklan. The total project cost is P38,900,000:

On January 5, 2001, petitioner entered into a negotiated contract with respondent for the construction
of Passenger Terminal Building (Phase II) also at Caticlan Jetty Port in Malay, Aklan. The contract
price for Phase II is P2,475,345.54.7
On October 22, 2001, respondent made a demand for the total amount of P22,419,112.96 covering the
following items which petitioner allegedly failed to settle.
Petitioner denied any unpaid balance and interest due to respondent. It asserted that the sums being
claimed by respondent were not indicated in Change Order No. 3 as approved by the Office of
Provincial Governor. Also cited was respondents June 10, 2003 letter absolving petitioner from
liability for any cost in connection with the Caticlan Passenger Terminal Project.
RTC favoured Jodi King. On November 24, 2009, the trial court issued a writ of execution ordering
Sheriff IV Antonio E. Gamboa, Jr. to demand from petitioner the immediate payment of
P67,027,378.34 and tender the same to the respondent. Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for
certiorari with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction assailing
the Writ of Execution dated November 24, 2009 on the ground that the case should have been settled in
COA. CA affirmed the decision of RTC. CA held that petitioner is estopped from invoking the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction as it only raised the issue of COAs primary jurisdiction after its notice of
appeal was denied and a writ of execution was issued against it.