INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS ON ELECTRICAL ENERGY SYSTEMS

Int. Trans. Electr. Energ. Syst. 2013; 23:109121

Published online 28 February 2012 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). DOI: 10.1002/etep.1619

Assessing the risk of blackout in the power system including HVDC

and FACTS devices
M. J. Sanjari*,, O. Alizadeh Mousavi{ and G. B. Gharehpetian
No. 424, Hafez Ave, Electrical Engineering Department, Amirkabi University of Technology, 15914, Tehran, Iran

SUMMARY
This article proposes a method to assess the risk of blackouts in the power system, including modern devices
such as HVDC and FACTS devices. In this respect, the Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) was used to analyze
the risk of blackouts. The linearized load ow with the model of HVDC links and FACTS devices was used.
The model of cascading events and hidden failure of the protection system were also considered. The
obtained results of the MCS were studied by using the complementary cumulative distribution function
(CCDF) and the probability distribution function (PDF) of the lost load data. The CCDF of the lost load data
was directly calculated from the lost load data, and the Gaussian mixture method (GMM) was applied to estimate the PDF of the lost load data. The effect of different controlling strategies of HVDC links and FACTS
devices on the risk of blackout was studied more in-depth. Copyright 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
key words:

risk assessment; Monte Carlo simulation; Gaussian mixture method; HVDC; FACTS

1. INTRODUCTION
The growing demand and need for grid expansion under uncertainty conditions result in the increase of
power systems complexity. These problems magnify the probability of partial and total blackouts in power
systems [1]. In the case of large blackouts, there are sometimes large indirect expenditures, such as those
resulting from social breakdown and impacts on vital infrastructures [2]. As a result, the risk assessment of
the power system is of great importance to prevent partial and total blackouts. Many methods have been
developed for the risk evaluation of power systems due to individual or a combination of component failures. The conventional risk evaluation methods are the probability convolution, series and parallel networks, Markov equations, and frequency duration methods [1]. These methods can be directly applied
to simple cases. For large-scale and complex power systems, the risk assessment has two main steps:
Step 1: the selection of system states and the calculation of state probabilities and
Step 2: the problem analysis of selected states and the remedial action taken for problems
The state enumeration method and the Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) are two main methods for
system state selection [3]. The state enumeration involves enumeration of contingencies, including
both circuit and generation unit outages [4]. When the number of events is relatively high and/or
complex operation conditions are involved, the enumeration method cannot be easily used.
Many different methods have been presented for the risk analysis of power systems. In [5], the
probability distribution of the load curtailment for different power demands has been calculated,
considering the transmission line ow and generator capability limits as critical points for blackouts.
MCS has been used to calculate Expected Energy Not Supplied [6] and the value of the security [2].
*Correspondence to: M. J. Sanjari, No. 424, Hafez Ave, Electrical Engineering Department, Amirkabi University of
Technology, 15914, Tehran, Iran.

E-mail: m_j_sanjari@aut.ac.ir
{
Current address: O. Alizadeh Mousavi, ELL 139, Power Systems Group, cole Polytechnique Fdrale de Lausanne
(EPFL), CH1015 Lausanne, Switzerland.
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M. J. SANJARI ET AL.

In [7] and [8], the statistical estimation has been used to model the blackout propagation in power
systems. In these models, the branching process and an estimator have been used to predict the load
shed probability distribution. It must be said that these methods can only present estimations of the
probability density function (PDF).
Increasing applications of power-based apparatuses like HVDC links and FACTS devices are
inevitable because the power system behaves more exibly and stably in the presence of these devices.
Furthermore, due to regulations in the electric power industry, there are new requirements to transmit
power through transmission corridors. HVDC and FACTS controllers can be used to control the power
ow and to schedule for best use of transmission lines capability [9]. A well-chosen FACTS controller
and HVDC link can overcome the limitations of the transmission line and/or corridor.
Analyzing the risk of the system including the HVDC and FACTS devices requires developing a new
tool for risk assessment of a power system in the presence of these devices under different conditions. In
this article, the MCS, direct current (DC) load ow, and linear programming (LP) are used for risk
assessment of power systems including the HVDC and FACTS devices. To improve the power system
risk assessment method, the Gaussian mixture method (GMM) has been used to estimate the PDF of
blackout size [10]. To assess a correct estimation of the risk of power systems including HVDC and
FACTS devices, the model of these devices were considered [11]. It is shown that different controlling
strategies of FACTS devices and HVDC links have a signicant effect on risk assessment results.

2. PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT METHOD

In this article, each component of the system is represented by a double-state Markov model, that is,
the component is either working (up) or has failed (down). Based on this model, a Markov state of
the power system is dened by a particular condition, where each component is in its given operating
state. All possible states of the system present the state space [5,12].
The transition rates from up state to down state and from down state to up state are l and m,
respectively. As given in Equations (1) and (2), P0i and P1i are the probability of the ith component
in the down and up states or the unavailability and availability of each component, respectively [4,12].
li
li mi
mi
P1i
li mi

P0i

i 1; . . . ; n

(1)

i 1; . . . ; n

(2)

After the component states have been determined by MCS, the system with the up state components
would be analyzed. As the unavailability of power system components has a small value, the
probability of multiple outages in component states is small. However, the MCS could study the rare
states with multiple outages that they could lead to the large blackouts. It should be noted that the MCS
is a uctuating process. Therefore, the estimated risk indices always come with a condence band.
This condence interval decreases as the number of samples increases [4,7].
A random variation in the loading pattern is modeled while the total load is kept constant, because
the distribution of loads changes both during the day and between days and cascading blackouts could
start at different random loading patterns. Thus, the random loading
pattern
 is modeled with a normal
distribution, whereas the mean is equal to the amounts of the loads PD0i , and 5% of the variance is



^ i , to obtain the same amount of
also considered. After getting the random distribution of the loads PD
the loading, the amount of the load at each bus (PDi) is calculated according to Equation (3). The
random state of the loads (PDi) is obtained at each iteration of the MCS.
P
0
^ i  Pi PDi
(3)
PD PD
^
i PD i
The analysis of selected system states (including the elements and loads states) requires solving the
nonlinear load ow equations. To avoid iterative and time-consuming alternating current load ow
solutions, the linearized load ow (DC load ow) has been used for the risk assessment [13].
Copyright 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Int. Trans. Electr. Energ. Syst. 2013; 23:109121

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RISK OF BLACKOUT IN POWER SYSTEM INCLUDING HVDC AND FACTS

111

Malfunction or misfunction of the protection system contributes to the cascading nature of events.
The relay has an undetected defect that remains dormant until abnormal operating conditions are
reached, which is often referred to as hidden failure. A hidden failure is undetectable during normal
operation but will be exposed as a direct consequence of other system disturbances, which might cause
a relay system to incorrectly and inappropriately disconnect circuit elements. When line L trips, any
lines sharing a bus with line L can be exposed to incorrect tripping because of hidden failure. These
cascading misoperations are what lead to major system disturbances. The probability of such
occurrences is small but not negligible [13].
In this article, line protection hidden failures were incorporated in the simulation to model the
operation of protective relays. Each line has a different load-dependent probability of incorrect trip that
is modeled as an increasing function of the line load seen by the line protective relay. As shown in
Figure 1, this probability is low and constant (Pr), if the line ow is equal or less than the line limit.
The value of Pr is assumed to be equal to 0.01. This probability increases in proportion to the line ow
between the line limit and 1.4 times of the line limit [13]. The line ow more than 1.4 times of the line
limit is considered as the overloading, and the overloaded lines will be tripped.
In each contingency, rst of all, the lines with line ow more than 1.4 times of the line limit are
tripped due to overloading. If there were not such a line ow violation, all lines connected to the last
tripped lines are exposed to the hidden failure of the protection system according to the obtained
probability from Figure 1.
In each step, if the system breaks into multiple islands, the simulation forks for each island. When
the network turns into some islands, it is assumed that each island can continue its operation under this
condition and can minimize the load curtailment, considering constraints in the island. This
assumption results in the minimization of total load curtailments in the network.
Typical major blackouts involve overloaded line outages and hidden failure trips. The remedial
action taken for problems is the minimization of the value of the load curtailment. The optimization
is a simple model of how operators might redispatch power in response to an overload or an outage.
In the model, the adjustable parameter is the responding speed of LP redispatched to cascading
overloads. The LP redispatching is performed for every three line trips. The optimization is accomplished
by using a simplex algorithm of LP. LP redispatching is dened by the following equations:
min

PCi

(4)

i2ND

subject to

PGi

PCi

PDi

(5)

PGimin PGi PGimax i 2 NG

(6)

0PCi PDi i 2 ND

(7)

i2ND

i2NG

i2ND

Probability

Pr
Line Flow
Line Limit

1.4 Line Limit

Figure 1. Probability of an exposed line tripping incorrectly [13].

Copyright 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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M. J. SANJARI ET AL.

jTk jTkmax k 2 L

(8)

where PCi is the load curtailment, PGi and PDi are the generation and load at bus i, and Tk is the limit of
the line ow in line k.
In this study, the index of the Expected Load Not Served (ELNS) is expressed by the following
equation:
N
P

PCi
ELNS i1
NMCS

(9)

where PCi is the value of the load curtailment in the ith MCS.
The literature demonstrates that distributions of various measures of blackout size have a power law
distribution [14]. To demonstrate the power law region of the lost load data, the complementary
cumulative density function (CCDF) of the lost load can be calculated simply by ranking the lost load
data and then scaling the ranked data.
The presented model for the power system blackout risk could be used to determine the PDF of the
load curtailment by GMM. The PDF of the load curtailment is unknown, and its estimation is a
fundamental step, because it provides a natural way to investigate the properties of a given data set,
that is, a realization to the random variable, and to carry out efcient data mining [15]. Different
methods have been used to estimate the PDF of the load curtailment from the obtained data.
The literature estimates the PDF of the lost load data, and then different functions on the estimated
PDFs were t, like piecewise linear interpolation in [1618], linear interpolation in [13], both of linear
and piecewise linear interpolation in [6], and exponential interpolation in [18] and [19]. Here, GMM is
proposed as a suitable method for the estimation of the blackout PDF, which does not need additional
tting.
Gaussian mixture methods are commonly used to serve as estimations for the PDF [10]. Here, the
Parzen window estimator has been used as one of the most representative nonparametric PDF
estimators. The Parzen window estimator does not assume any function or form of unknown PDF,
as it allows its shape to be entirely determined by the data without choosing a location of the centers.
The PDF is estimated by placing a dened kernel function on each data point and then determining a
common width s, also denoted as the smoothing parameters [15]. The Gaussian kernel is dened by
kernel center or mean (m) and kernel width variance (s2), as follows [15,20,21]:
"
#



1
x  m2
2
N x; m; s
(10)
1 exp 
2s2
2ps2 2
The GMM is a mixture of several Gaussian distributions and can, therefore, represent different subclasses inside one single class. The PDF is dened as a weighted sum of Gaussians expressed by the
following equation:
px;

C
X


ac N x; mc ; s2c

(11)

c1

P
where ac is the weight of each component and 0 < ac < 1 for all components, and Cc1 ac is equal to 1.
Here, ac is 1/N, where N is the number of MCS and mc is the result obtained from MCS. s can be
assumed to be between 0.1 and 1.0 to obtain a smooth PDF. The higher value of s results in
smoother PDF.
The set of parameters, given in Equation (12), denes a particular Gaussian PDF mixture [20].
fa1 ; m1 ; 1 ; . . . ; aC ; mC ; C g

(12)

In addition, the smoothed CCDF of the lost load could also be calculated from the estimated PDF by
the following equation:
Copyright 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Int. Trans. Electr. Energ. Syst. 2013; 23:109121

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RISK OF BLACKOUT IN POWER SYSTEM INCLUDING HVDC AND FACTS

113

Zx
CCDF 1  F x 1 

f t dt

(13)

1

where F(x) and f(t) are the cumulative distribution function and the PDF, respectively.
To calculate the risk of the load curtailment, the generators maximum real power, the active load
powers, the transmission lines, and transformers rated power and reactance (in pu), and the failure
and repair rates of generators, transmission lines, and transformers should be identied.

3. DC LOAD FLOW INCLUDING HVDC LINKS AND FACTS DEVICES

The risk assessment requires performing several load ow calculations. Even fast load ow methods
(such as fast decoupled Newton Raphson) have iterative and, in turn, time-consuming procedures.
Thus, the risk analysis is extremely time-consuming. Similar to [13], in this article, the linearized
power ow method is used as a simple and fast method for load ow calculations. Therefore, to study
the effect of HVDC and FACTS devices on the risk analysis, their simple and modied model in the
DC load ow problem should be used.
The linearized load ow basic assumptions are [2226] as follows:
All bus voltage magnitudes are 1.0 per unit (pu).
Transmission line resistance is negligible.
Let i be the voltage angle at bus i, then it is assumed that cos(i j) is equal to 1 and sin(i j)
can be replaced by i j.
The linearized load ow focuses on bus angles and active power ows in lines. The real power is
expressed by the following equation:
P B:

(14)

where P is the real power injection vector, B is the n  n susceptance matrix of the nbus power
system, and is the bus voltage angle vector.
The bus voltage angles can be calculated, as follows:
B1 :P

(15)

The power ow of each line (Pij) can be easily calculated by the following equation:



Pij Bij : i  j

(16)

As mentioned before, for evaluating the risk of the power system in the presence of the HVDC links
and FACTS devices, these devices should be modeled. In our previous work, [11], a generalized model
for the FACTS devices and HVDC links has been introduced. Although the presented model is very
simple, it is accurate enough for risk assessment studies.
In [11], the effect of the HVDC links or FACTS devices on Equation (14) is generally presented as
Equation (16). P and B are the effect of considering one of these devices on the power vector and on
the susceptance matrix, respectively:
P P B B:

(17)

If the HVDC links or FACTS devices are connected between buses i and j, then P and B are dened as Equations (18) and (19).
^
Pi Pj P

(18)

^
Pdemonstrates
the real power, which should model the effect of the HVDC link or FACTS devices
on the power ow of line ij.
B is a matrix with only four non-zero elements. These non-zero elements can be calculated by the
following equations:
Copyright 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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M. J. SANJARI ET AL.

Bii
Bjj

1
 Bii
Xijnew
1
Xijnew

 Bjj

Bji Bij 

(19)

1
Xijnew

where Xijnew is the reactance between buses i and j after installation of the FACTS device on line ij.
^
This reactance should model the effect of the reactance changes in this line. In [11], Pand
Xijnew have
been presented for the HVDC links and different FACTS devices.

4. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

According to the presented model of [11], the risk of the blackout in the presence of the HVDC links
and FACTS devices can be studied. To demonstrate the effects of the HVDC and FACTS controller
parameters on the blackout risk, several simulations have been carried out on the Western System
Co-coordinating Council (WSCC) 9-bus test system shown in Figure 2 [27]. The data of the system
under study are gathered in Tables I and II.
It is assumed that the FACTS device is installed on line between buses 78, and in the case of the
HVDC link, line 78 is replaced with an HVDC link. The HVDC link and FACTS devices are not
ideal and have an unavailability probability.
Different control modes result in different operating points for the HVDC system (or inverter and rectier active powers). As a result, the active power ow of the HVDC link (and the power ow of the network) can be changed. Based on simulation results, ELNS for different HVDC link power ows (from 2
to 2 pu) is determined and shown in Figure 3. It should be noted again that the main purpose of this article
was the risk assessment of several devices with different controlling modes, not nding set points for controllers, because the control strategies of the HVDC links and FACTS devices are not usually the same.
In this simulation, the rectier and inverter converters are assumed to control the DC and the DC
voltage, respectively. As it can be seen in Figure 3, the value of the risk index of the system including
HVDC links is strongly dependent on the transmitted active power.
This HVDC link could be managed for different purposes. As shown in Figure 3, the ELNS has its
lowest value, if the HVDC link power ow is in the range of 0.241.4 pu.
So, the minimum value of the risk can be attained if the constraint of 0.24 pu < Ptrasmitted < 1.4 pu
could be satised in operating conditions. This constraint (criterion) may not be satised in some

Figure 2. WSCC 9-bus system.

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RISK OF BLACKOUT IN POWER SYSTEM INCLUDING HVDC AND FACTS

Table I. Line data of the system under study.

Line

Resistance (pu)

Reactance (pu)

Susceptance (pu)

Unavailability

14
46
69
39
89
78
72
57
54

0.0000
0.0170
0.0390
0.0000
0.0119
0.0085
0.0000
0.0320
0.0100

0.0576
0.0920
0.1700
0.0586
0.1008
0.0720
0.0625
0.1610
0.0850

0.0000
0.1580
0.3580
0.0000
0.2090
0.1490
0.0000
0.3060
0.1760

0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01

Table II. Load and generation data of the system under study.
Bus number

Load

Generation

Maximum of generation

Unavailability

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

0
0
0
0
1.25
0.90
0
1
0

0.67
1.63
0.85
0
0
0
0
0
0

2.457
1.632
1.088
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.01
0.01
0.01
0
0
0
0
0
0

ELNS

0
-2

-1.5

-1

-0.5

0.5

1.5

P (p.u.)

Figure 3. ELNS of different HVDC link power ows.

cases. For example, if the DC link has a private owner, the Transmission System Operator cannot
manage the power ow of the DC link.
In the next study, it is assumed that the reactance of line 78 has been compensated by the Thyristor
controlled series compensator (TCSC), of which the schematic diagram is shown in Figure 4. The
range of the compensation is chosen between 0% and 50%. Based on the simulation results, the ELNS
has been calculated and shown in Figure 5. It is obvious that the effect of TCSC compensation on the
risk index is negligible. Therefore, the TCSC could not affect the risk index of the system.
To show the effect of controlling parameters on the risk value, the phase shift (z) of the phase angle
regulator (PAR-type phase shifting transformer) that was installed in line 78 has been changed from
15 to 15 degrees. The schematic diagram is shown in Figure 6, and the power system ELNS has been
Copyright 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Figure 4. TCSC schematic diagram.

0.12

ELNS

0.1

0.08

0.06

0.04
10

20

30

40

50

Percentage of Compensation

Figure 5. ELNS of different values of TCSC compensation.

Figure 6. PAR schematic diagram.

calculated and shown in Figure 7. As it can be seen in Figure 7, the value of the risk index of the
system, including the PAR-type phase shifter transformer, is strongly dependent on the phase shift
angle. This PAR-type phase shifter transformer can be managed for different purposes. As shown in
Figure 7, the ELNS has the lowest value, if the phase shift angle is in the range of 2 to 7.3 degrees.
So, the minimum value of the risk can be attained if the criterion 2 < z < 7.3 could be satised in
the operating condition. This criterion may not be applicable because it may lead to an infeasible
solution.
A quadrature boosting transformer (QBT-type phase shifting transformer), of which the schematic
diagram is shown in Figure 8, has been simulated in the same line (line 78). The |UT|, that is, the
boosted voltage magnitude of QBT, is the control variable, which has been changed from 0.75 to
0.75 pu. The ELNS in this case has been calculated and demonstrated in Figure 9. As it can be seen
in Figure 9, the value of the risk index of the system including the QBT-type phase shifter transformer
is strongly dependent on the boosted voltage amplitude. This device can also be managed for different
purposes. As shown in Figure 9, the ELNS has the lowest value, if the boosted voltage magnitude is in
the range of 0.05 to 0.13 pu.
Copyright 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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7
6

ELNS

5
4
3
2
1
0
-15

-10

-5

10

15

Figure 7. ELNS versus phase shift of PAR.

|UT| < 90

Figure 8. QBT schematic diagram.

12

ELNS

10
8
6
4
2
-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0.2

0.4

0.6

|UT|

Figure 9. ELNS versus the controlling parameter of QBT.

So, the minimum value of the risk can be attained if the criterion 0.05 < |UT| < 0.13 could be
achieved in the operating conditions. Similar to PAR-type phase shifter transformer, this criterion
may lead to an infeasible solution.
In this section, the simulation results of the unied power ow controller (UPFC), which has been
installed on line 78, have been presented. As shown in Figure 10, the boosted voltage amplitude and
its phase (i.e., |Upq| and r, respectively) are the control variables of UPFC. To investigate the dependency of the risk to the UPFC setting parameters, |Upq| and r have been changed from 0 to 1 pu and
from 50 to 50 degrees, respectively. The ELNS versus these control variables has been calculated and
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demonstrated in Figure 11. As it can be seen, the result is a surface with a valley presenting the lowest
values of ELNS.
Based on the results shown in Figures 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11, it can be said that the HVDC links and
FACTS devices affect the value of the risk. As a result, risk-based criteria may be added to the
well-known operational constraints of the HVDC links and FACTS devices.
If it is possible to consider the risk-based criterion in the HVDC link and FACTS device, then their
controller can improve the risk index of the system.
Note that ELNS is an index which demonstrates the mean of lost load, whereas the CCDF of lost
load can show the large amount of lost load. In other words, for a given lost load data, a lower value
of ELNS inherently does not mean lower power law region in the CCDF. This point is seen in the given
results in Figure 12, as explained more in depth in [28].
Figure 12 shows the calculated lost load CCDF and the estimated ones by using GMM with
different values of s for the system without controller. It is demonstrated that the higher values of s
lead to the smoother CCDF, which necessarily does not mean more precision.
Figures 13 and 14 depict the calculated and the smoothed CCDF of the lost load for the system
without and with different controllers. The CCDF of the system in the presence of TCSC is so similar
to the CCDF of the system in its absence. That is why TCSC does not have any effect on the risk of the
lost load. For the other controllers, HVDC, UPFC, PAR, and QBT, in this order, have the most effect
on the risk of large blackouts. In addition, in some studies, the PDF of the lost load may be required.
For this purpose, Figure 15 presents the estimated PDF of the lost load data using GMM.
It must be noted that the risk of large blackouts in the presence of controllers (except TCSC) is
increased because the proposed method for risk assessment in the presence of HVDC links and FACTS
devices does not consider the dynamic response of controllers to each disturbance and cascading

|Upq| <

Figure 10. UPFC schematic diagram.

Figure 11. ELNS versus UPFC control variables.

Copyright 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Calculated CCDF
GMM with sigma = 1
GMM with sigma = 0.1
GMM with sigma = 0.01
GMM with sigma = 0.001

CCDF

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.5

1.5

2.5

3.5

Lost Load (pu)

Figure 12. Calculated and different smoothed CCDF of the lost load for the prepared data (linearlinear).

Without Controller
TCSC
HVDC
UPFC
PAR
QBT

CCDF

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

Lost Load (pu)

Figure 13. Calculated CCDF of the lost load without and with different controllers.

100

CCDF

10-1

10-2

10-3

10-40

Without Controller
TCSC
HVDC
UPFC
PAR
QBT
1
2

Lost Load (pu)

Figure 14. Smoothed lost load CCDF without and with different controllers with GMM and s = 1.

outages. This kind of modeling, accompanied by nonoptimum location and rating of the controllers,
and also the small scale of the selected 9-bus system resulted into higher amount of lost load in the
cases with power electronic controllers. However, this article aimed at proposing a methodology for
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PDF

100

10-1

10-2 0

Without Controller
TCSC
HVDC
UPFC
PAR
QBT
1
2

Lost Load (pu)

Figure 15. Estimated PDF of the lost load without and with different controllers with GMM and s =1.

the risk assessment in the presence of DC components. The presented method could be improved by
developing additional optimization for each controller to consider their responses in each step of
cascading outages.

5. CONCLUSION
In this article, the MCS, the DC load ow, the LP, and the GMM have been used to assess and estimate
the risk of blackouts in power systems including the HVDC and FACTS devices. A simple and unied
model for the HVDC links and FACTS devices in the DC load ow has been used for the risk
evaluation. The effects of HVDC and FACTS devices on the blackout risk have been investigated
based on the simulations. Considering the simulation results, it can be said that a minimum risk range
can be determined for each control variable. The proposed method is a straightforward approach and as
a result can also be used for the large-scale power systems. Moreover, the suggested method can be
used for the FACTS and HVDC system allocation. It should be noted that based on the proposed
method, it is possible to compare the FACTS devices and the HVDC links applications to prevent
cascading blackouts, instead of upgrading the power system apparatus.

6. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
PDF
MCS
CCDF
GMM
LP
ELNS
TCSC
QBT
UPFC
HVDC
PAR

probability density function

Monte Carlo simulation
complementary cumulative density function
Gaussian mixture method
linear programming
Expected Load Not Served
Thyristor controlled series compensator
quadrature boosting transformer
unied power ow controller
High Voltage Direct Current
phase angle regulator
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