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HO WAI PANG VS.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening, United Arab Emirates Airlines
Flight No. 068 from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA).
Among the passengers were 13 Hongkong nationals who came to the Philippines as tourists. At
the arrival area, Customs Examiner Gilda L. Cinco examined the baggages of each of the 13
passengers and found, all in all, 18 chocolate boxes with white crystalline substance contained in
a white transparent plastic from the baggages of the petitioner and his five co-accused. Six
separate Informations all dated September 19, 1991 were filed against petitioner and his coaccused for violation of R.A. No. 6425. After pleading not guilty to the crime charged, all the
accused testified almost identically, invoking denial as their defense. They claimed that they
have no knowledge about the transportation of illegal substance (shabu) taken from their
traveling bags which were provided by the travel agency.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: (Ho Wai Pang)

Petitioner contended that he was deprived of his constitutional and statutory rights under
custodial investigation both by the Customs officials and by the NBI investigators, so that
the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not excluding evidence taken during the
custodial investigation.

Moreover, he argues that the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not


considering that petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against him.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:

The Court of Appeals held that there were other evidence sufficient to
warrant his conviction. The CA also rebuked petitioners claim that he
was deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to confront the
witnesses against him. The CA gave credence to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses and quoted with favor the trial courts
ratiocination regarding the existence of conspiracy among the
accused.

The OSG countered that petitioner was given the opportunity to


confront his accusers and/or the witnesses of the prosecution when his
counsel cross-examined them.
It is petitioners call to hire an
interpreter to understand the proceedings before him and if he could
not do so, he should have manifested it before the court. At any rate,
the OSG contends that petitioner was nevertheless able to crossexamine the prosecution witnesses and that such examination suffices
as compliance with petitioners right to confront the witnesses against
him.

COURT

The petition lacks merit. Section 12, Article III of the Constitution prohibits as
evidence only confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself.
The Court ruled that the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible
only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation. The
admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and [are] not
otherwise excluded by law or rules, [are] not affected even if obtained or taken in the
course of custodial investigation.
As to the second assignment of error, the Court ruled that petitioners constitutional
right to confront the witnesses against him was not impaired. As borne out by the records,
petitioner did not register any objection to the presentation of the prosecutions evidence
particularly on the testimony of Cinco despite the absence of an interpreter. Moreover, it
has not been shown that the lack of an interpreter greatly prejudiced him. Still and all, the
important thing is that petitioner, through counsel, was able to fully cross-examine Cinco
and the other witnesses and test their credibility. The right to confrontation is essentially a
guarantee that a defendant may cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed June 16,
2006 Decision and January 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 01459 are AFFIRMED.

People vs Lauga
the Constitution.

Extra-judicial Confession; Article III, Section 12 of

Facts:
Appellant Lauga was charged of qualified rape by his daughter. Testimonies
revealed that the victim was left alone at home while his father was having drinking
spree at the neighbors place. Her mother decided to leave because appellant has
the habit of mauling her mother every time he gets drunk. Her only brother also
went out with some neighbors.
At around 10pm, appellant woke up the victim, removed his pants and slid inside
the blanket covering the victim and removed her pants and underwear. Appellant
had warned the victim not to shout for help. He proceeded to have carnal
knowledge of her daughter by threatening her with his fist and a knife. Soon after,
the victims brother arrived and saw her crying. Appellant claimed he scolded the
victim for staying out late. The two decided to leave the house.
While on their way to their maternal grandmothers house, victim recounted to her
brother what happened to her. They later told the incident to their grandmother and
uncle who sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting. Banting found appellant in
his house wearing only his underwear. He was invited to the police station to which
he obliged. Appellant admitted to Banting that he indeed raped her daughter
because he was unable to control himself.
The trial court convicted the accused for qualified rape. Upon appeal, the CA
affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court. Hence this petition.

Accused

That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, province of Bukidnon,
Philippines, the father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have carnal
knowledge with his own daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor against her will.
In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at home.9 AAAs father, the
appellant, was having a drinking spree at the neighbors place. Her mother decided
to leave because when appellant gets drunk, he has the habit of mauling AAAs
mother. Her only brother BBB also went out in the company of some neighbors.
At around 10:00 oclock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up; removed his pants,
slid inside the blanket covering AAA and removed her pants and underwear;
warned her not to shout for help while threatening her with his fist; and told her that
he had a knife placed above her head. He proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her
repeatedly, and "inserted his penis inside her vagina."

Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying. While on their way to their maternal
grandmothers house, AAA recounted her harrowing experience with their father.
Upon reaching their grandmothers house, they told their grandmother and uncle of
the incident, after which, they sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting.

Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear. He
invited appellant to the police station, to which appellant obliged. At the police
outpost, he admitted to him that he raped AAA because he was unable to control
himself.
Appellant
He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food prepared for him at lunchtime.
Shortly after, AAA arrived. She answered back when confronted. This infuriated him
that he kicked her hard on her buttocks.
Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3 oclock in the
afternoon.35 Finding nobody at home,he prepared his dinner and went to sleep.
Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of the "Bantay Bayan"
headed by Moises Boy Banting. They asked him to go with them to discuss some
matters. He later learned that he was under detention because AAA charged him of
rape.
Furthermore, he contended that:
trial court gravely erred in finding him guilty as charged despite the failure of the
prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because:

(1) there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB;
(2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was without the
assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutional right; and
(3) AAAs accusation was ill-motivated.
Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a
"bantay bayan," the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not
assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.

Court
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in
the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by
the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace
and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions
taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities
delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial
investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and
objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided
for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda
Rights, is concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken
without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.

Roquero vs. Chancellor of UPManila


Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
FACTS
Petitioner Wildredo G. Roquero is an employee of UP-Manila assigned at the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH) Security Division as Special Police Captain. Private respondent Imelda O. Abutal is a
Lady Guard of Ex-Bataan Security Agency who was applying for a position in the security force assigned
at UP-PGH. That Capt. Wilfredo Roquero of UP Manila Police force, sometime in Arpil 1996, while
conducting an interview on Ms. Imelda Abutal, an applicant for position of Lady Guard of Ex-Bataan
Security Agency to be assigned at UP-PGH, proposed to her that if she agreed to be his mistress,
Roquero would facilitate her application and giver her permanent position, that despite Ms. Abutals
rejection of the proposal. He still insisted on demanding sexual favor from her. Hence, he is liable for
GRAVE MISCONDUCT. Petitioner was then placed under preventive suspension for 90 days,

simultaneous with appearing to the Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT). Thereafter, the
prosecution presented its only witness the respondent. The prosecution however failed to submit its
formal offer of evidence within the period agreed upon. it was only after five years that the prosecution
submitted the required document, hence the delay in the disposition of the case.

ISSUE
Whether the failure of the ADT to resolve Roqueros Motion violated the constitutional right of
Roquero to a speedy disposition of cases.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION Roquero
Motion to dismiss on the ground that:
a. The prosecution had not formally offered its evidence
b. That the unfounded charges in the administrative complaint were filed just to harass him
c. That he is entitled to a just and speedy disposition of the case
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION
a. Alleged that a formal offer of documentary exhibits had been filed on 24 January 2004, of which a
copy thereof was received by Atty. Lee, petitioners counsel, However petitioner has not filed his
comment to said formal Offer
b. The formal offer could not be prepared by another counsel until all the TSN have been furnished
to the counsel that replaced Atty. Flor.
c. That Stenographer, Jaimie Limbaga, had been on and out of the hospital due to a serious illness,
thus the delay in the filing of the prosecutors Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits.
COURT
While it is true that administrative investigations should not be bound by strict adherence to the technical
rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings the same however should not violate
the constitutional right of respondents to a speedy disposition of cases.
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 16. All person shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all
proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a
case may demand expeditious action by all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a
long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is
the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a
speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The
concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

RULING

Doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that
may be considered and balanced are as follows:
(1) the length of delay;
(2) the reasons for the delay;
(3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
Applying the doctrinal ruling vis-a-vis the factual milieu of this case, the violation of the right to a
speedy disposition of the case against petitioner is clear for the following reasons:
(1) the delay of almost five (5) years on the part of ADT in resolving the motion of petitioner, which
resolution petitioner reasonably found necessary before he could present his defense;
(2) the unreasonableness of the delay; and
(3) the timely assertions by petitioner of the right to an early disposition which he did through a
motion to dismiss. Over and above this, the delay was prejudicial to petitioners cause as he was under
preventive suspension for ninety (90) days, and during the interregnum of almost five years, the trial of
the accusation against him remained stagnant at the prosecution stage.
The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was
intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice by our
judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner
that is in accord with the established rules of procedure but must also be promptly decided to better serve
the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people
guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 22 March 2007
and Resolution dated 1 February 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87776 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) of the University of the
Philippines-Manila, Atty. Zaldy B. Docena, Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara, in their capacities as
Chairman and Members of the ADT respectively, are hereby ORDERED to DISMISS the administrative
case against Capt. Wilfredo G. Roquero for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of
cases so ordered.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Atienza


The mayor has no right to change venue sought by the requesting party
FACTS
The main thrust of the case is the application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola
Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 -5:30 p.m. to be participated in by the IBP officers, and
members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations filed with the Office of the City Mayor
of Manila by then IBP National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz. In response to the application, the
Atienza, then city mayor of Manila issued a permit allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given

date. However, indicated therein is the change of venue of the instead of Mendiola Bridge which
was indicated in the application, the venue was changed to Plaza Miranda
ISSUE
Whether or not appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the venue in
IBPs rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion
PETITIONER IBP
a. Asserts that the partial grant of the application runs contrary to the Public Assembly
Act and violates their constitutional right to freedom of expression and public
assembly.
RESPONDENT Atienza
a. There is no grave abuse of discretion on our part because the Public Assembly Act does
not categorically require respondent to specify in writing the imminent and grave danger
of substantive evil which warrants the denial or modification of the permit.
b. Respondent is authorized to regulate the exercise of freedom of expression and of public
assembly which are not absolute, and that the challenged permit is consistent with Plaza
Mirandas designation as freedom park where protest rallies are allowed without permit.
COURT
a. In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he
did not immediately inform the IBP who should have ben heard first on the matter of
his perceived imminent and grave danger of substantive evil that may warrant the
changing of the venue
b. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil, which blank denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the
appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Copurt of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 94949 are REVERSED.

Senate vs Ermita

FACTS:

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance
of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the
Philippine National Police (PNP).
Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for
them to appear as resource speakers in public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The
public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to
investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail
Project.
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations to the following officials
of the AFP: the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon; Inspector
General of the AFP Vice Admiral Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the AFP Rear
Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief of the Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and Assistant
Commandant, Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to attend as resource persons
in a public hearing on the following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., entitled "Bunye
has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive Electoral Fraud in the
Presidential Election of May 2005"; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator Jinggoy E. Estrada entitled "The
Philippines as the Wire-Tapping Capital of the World"; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo Biazon entitled
"Clear and Present Danger"; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo Madrigal Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of
Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the Role of the Military in the So-called "Gloriagate Scandal";
and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by Senator Biazon - Resolution Directing the Committee on National
Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Wire-Tapping of the President of the
Philippines.
the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to
the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," 7 which, pursuant to Section 6
thereof, took effect immediately.

Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by
E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials,
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either house of Congress, valid and constitutional.

CONTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INVITED IN THE HEARING:

Such issues asked by the senate committee are covered by the executive privilege of
which they are not to be disclosed without the permission of the President of the Philippines.
That they are cannot be compelled by the senate committee to be present in the hearing because
of the E.O. 404 requires them to be able to obtain the consent of the President first before
appearing in such hearing. That they cannot be held liable by the Senate Committee because
they are covered by the Executive Privilege and E.O. 404.

CONTENTION OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE:


Legislators allege that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and duties as members of Congress to
conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws and
such E.O 404 is Unconstitutional

RULING:
power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the
same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to legislate. 60 The
matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of
investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation,
is a proper subject for investigation.
Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction involved in Arnault was a
proper exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being related to the expenditure of public funds of which
Congress is the guardian, the transaction, the Court held, "also involved government agencies created by
Congress and officers whose positions it is within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish."
Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous
to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and
informed on executive operations.

Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only
in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional
concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in
which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to
disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the
exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of
disclosure.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which
it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief
Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such
instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their

appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of
legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power - the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is
based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal
branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation
must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the
President, has determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the President has not
reversed such determination. Such declaration, however, even without mentioning the term "executive
privilege," amounts to an implied claim that the information is being withheld by the executive branch, by
authority of the President, on the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege.

Right to Information
E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive officials in the
hearings conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for information pursuant to their right to
information on matters of public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in claiming, however, that what is
involved in the present controversy is not merely the legislative power of inquiry, but the right of the people
to information.
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies
the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the
demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the
same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information
grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to
Congress and not to an individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a
highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to
information.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any
executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily
deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a
matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in
formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress - opinions which they can then communicate
to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their
freedom of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte:
It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that
the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective
only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when
the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can
such bear fruit.107 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
rllbrr

The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the
sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislature's power of inquiry.
Conclusion
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the
mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated. That is impermissible

DISPOSITORY PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of
2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however,
VALID.
SO ORDERED.

Bayan et.al. vs. Ermita


Facts:
Petitioners come in three groups.
Bayan,et al, Jess del Prado,et al,,Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al, KMU, et al
FACTS:
The rally was scheduled to proceed along Espaa Avenue in front of the University of Santo
Tomas and going towards Mendiola Bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street
and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries
on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested in the case of Bayan, et al allege that they are
citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals
were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by
policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa
No. 880, some of them in toto and others onlySections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the
policy of CPR, "Calibrated Preemptive Response". They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies
under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR policy recently announced. Bayan et al
argued that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of
the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is
thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly

form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not contentneutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words "lawful
cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused
by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to
assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based
legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
Issue: Whether or not the implementation of B.P. No. 880 volated their rights as organizations
and individuals when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005

Petitioners standing:
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights
treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.5
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless
of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and
is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly
form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not contentneutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words "lawful
cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused
by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to
assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based
legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a
curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it
puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies
without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are
not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.
Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. The two
standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are
inconsistent.
Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of
maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack
of publication.

Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to
assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And
even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are
unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a
clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a
permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the
issue would possibly wane.
As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even
before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports
the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and
violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to
peaceably assemble
Respondents argue that:
1. Petitioners have no standing because they have not presented evidence that they had
been "injured, arrested or detained because of the CPR," and that "those arrested stand to
be charged with violating Batas Pambansa [No.] 880 and other offenses."
2. Neither B.P. No. 880 nor CPR is void on its face. Petitioners cannot honestly claim that
the time, place and manner regulation embodied in B.P. No. 880 violates the threepronged test for such a measure, to wit: (a) B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral, i.e., it has no
reference to content of regulated speech; (b) B.P. No. 880 is narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, i.e., the interest cannot be equally well served by a
means that is less intrusive of free speech interests; and (c) B.P. No. 880 leaves open
alternative channels for communication of the information.6
3. B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral as seen from the text of the law. Section 5 requires the
statement of the public assemblys time, place and manner of conduct. It entails traffic rerouting to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the
free flow of commerce and trade. Furthermore, nothing in B.P. No. 880 authorizes the
denial of a permit on the basis of a rallys program content or the statements of the
speakers therein, except under the constitutional precept of the "clear and present danger
test." The status of B.P. No. 880 as a content-neutral regulation has been recognized
in Osmea v. Comelec.7

Held:
Petitioners standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as

Citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the
Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would
publicly assemble in the nations streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in
public assemblies without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be
validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, on the other hand,
have challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without
the permit.
Sec. 4 Art. III Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress
of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that
enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis
of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and
unprotected Rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances
and,for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as
to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the
Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and
Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and
promoting the peoples exercise of these rights. It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not
an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place
and manner of the assemblies, it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner
of holding public assemblies A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that
it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful
cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words
"opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based,
since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of
grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally,
maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the
content of the expressions in the rally. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground
of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or
public health the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal
firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses
our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No.880
cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrictfreedoms; it merely
regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being
insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists,

GONZALES VS KALAW KATIGBAK

Facts:
Antonio Gonzales, president of Malaya Films, claimed that his film Kapit sa Patalim, was rated for
adults only by a subcommittee of the movie review board together with the required cuts and scene
deletions. He justified that these requirements were without basis and were restrains on artistic
expression. He adduced that the film is an integral whole and all its portions, including those to
which the Board now offers belated objection, are essential for the integrity of the film. Viewed as a
whole, there is no basis even for the vague speculations advanced by the Board as basis for its
classification.
He appealed to the movie review board but the same affirmed the decion of the sub committee.
When Gonzales appealed to the supreme court, the board claimed that the deletions were removed
and the requirement to submit the master negative was taken out but the film was still rated for
adults only. The petition was amended to contest the rating only.
Issue: Was the rating made with grave avuse of discretion (Note I put in those regarding obscenity
for future purposes)
Held: No. Petition dismissed. There was no grave abuse of discretion DUE TO LACK OF VOTES
Ratio:
Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and the expression
of the artistic impulse
Burstyn-importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that they
are designed to entertain as well as to inform
(No clear dividing line between what affords knowledge and that of pleasure or else there will be a
diminution to a right to self-expression)
Bagatsing- Press freedom may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any
matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. This is not to say that such freedom, as
is the freedom of speech, absolute. It can be limited if "there be a 'clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent.
Censorship doesnt full cover free speech or there might bean emasculation of basic rights.
However, there must be in exceptional circumstances a sine qua non for the meaningful exercise of
such right without denying the freedom from liability.
Freedom from censorship is a settled principle in our jurisdiction. Mutuc- board of review is limited to
classification of films to safeguard other constitutional objections, hence the GP, PG, or R-18 ratings.
That is to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exemption.
The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its
validity
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear and
present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to prevent. Such
danger must not only be clear but also present. There should be no doubt that what is feared may be
traced to the expression complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. Nor does it
suffice if such danger be only probable.

Where movies are concerned, censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned, is


allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public
public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest.
Roth- "All Ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance unorthodox Ideas,
controversial Ideas, even Ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion have the full protection
of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of the First
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.
Given obscenity as the nemesis of censorship, there is difficulty in determining what is obsecene.
Roth- The early leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be judged merely by the effect of
an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons
The test was whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. Some material can
legitimately deal with sex and its effects on susceptible persons. Such a censorship can be
considered violative of the constitution. On the other hand, the substituted standard provides
safeguards adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity.
Roth- Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals with sex in
a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific
works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of
speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life has indisputably been a
subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of human
interest and public concern.
In the Philippine context, E.O. 876 applied contemporary Filipino cultural values as a standard.
Moreover, as far as the question of sex and obscenity are concerned, it cannot be stressed strongly
that the arts and letters "shall be under the patronage of the State.
Given this constitutional mandate, It will be less than true to its function if any government officeor
agency would invade the sphere of autonomy that an artist enjoys. There is no orthodoxy in what
passes for beauty or for reality. It is for the artist to determine what for him is a true representation. It
is not to be forgotten that art and belleslettres deal primarily with imagination, not so much
with ideas in a strict sense. What is seen or perceived by an artist is entitled to respect, unless there
is a showing that the product of his talent rightfully may be considered obscene.
On the question of obscenity, therefore, such standard set forth in Executive Order No. 878 is to be
construed in such a fashion to avoid any taint of unconstitutionality. To repeat, what was stated in a
recent decision in Trinidad- an elementary, a fundamental, and a universal role of construction,
applied when considering constitutional questions, that when a law is susceptible of two
constructions' one of which will maintain and the other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the
former.
There can be no valid objection to the controlling standard.
There was really a grave abuse of discretion when the Board and its perception of what obscenity is
is very restrictive.
But, sadly, THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH VOTES TO MAINTAIN THAT THERE WAS GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The supporting evidence was in the fact that some scenes were not for
young people. They might misunderstand the scenes. The respondents offered to make it GP if the
petitioners would remove the lesbian and sex scenes. But they refused.

The ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the
consensus of this Court that where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for
observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way,
television reaches every home where there is a set.
It is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It cannot
be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for
the welfare of the young.

489 SCRA 160 Political Law The Executive Branch Presidential Proclamation 1017
Take Care Clause Take Over Power Calling Out Power
Bill of Rights Freedom of Speech Overbreadth
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a
plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by
General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the
connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time
revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding
the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David
proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the
CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another
known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran
of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest
issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in
jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased
to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional
for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power
is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law.
Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those
of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an
overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen
argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by
virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the
presidents calling out power, take care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly
unconstitutional.
II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
Doctrines of Several Political Theorists
on the Power of the President in Times of Emergency
This case brings to fore a contentious subject the power of the President in times of
emergency. A glimpse at the various political theories relating to this subject provides an
adequate backdrop for our ensuing discussion.
John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government, called upon the English
doctrine of prerogative to cope with the problem of emergency. In times of danger to the
nation, positive law enacted by the legislature might be inadequate or even a fatal obstacle
to the promptness of action necessary to avert catastrophe. In these situations, the Crown
retained a prerogative power to act according to discretion for the public good,
without the proscription of the law and sometimes even against it.84 But Locke
recognized that this moral restraint might not suffice to avoid abuse of prerogative
powers. Who shall judge the need for resorting to the prerogative and how may its
abuse be avoided? Here, Locke readily admitted defeat, suggesting that the people
have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth,
but to appeal to Heaven.85
Jean-Jacques Rousseau also assumed the need for temporary suspension of democratic
processes of government in time of emergency. According to him:
The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adopting themselves to
circumstances, may, in certain cases, render them disastrous and make them bring about,
at a time of crisis, the ruin of the State
It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions as strong as to render it impossible
to suspend their operation. Even Sparta allowed its law to lapse
If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their
preservation, the method is to nominate a supreme lawyer, who shall silence all the laws
and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority. In such a case, there is no doubt about
the general will, and it clear that the peoples first intention is that the State shall not perish. 86
Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship or supreme magistracy as
he termed it. For him, it would more likely be cheapened by indiscreet use. He was
unwilling to rely upon an appeal to heaven. Instead, he relied upon a tenure of office of
prescribed duration to avoid perpetuation of the dictatorship. 87

John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of representative government: I am far from
condemning, in cases of extreme necessity, the assumption of absolute power in the
form of a temporary dictatorship.88
Nicollo Machiavellis view of emergency powers, as one element in the whole scheme of
limited government, furnished an ironic contrast to the Lockean theory of prerogative. He
recognized and attempted to bridge this chasm in democratic political theory, thus:
Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be necessary to resort to extra
constitutional measures; for although they may for a time be beneficial, yet the precedent is
pernicious, for if the practice is once established for good objects, they will in a little while be
disregarded under that pretext but for evil purposes. Thus, no republic will ever be perfect if
she has not by law provided for everything, having a remedy for every emergency and fixed
rules for applying it.89
Machiavelli in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill sought to incorporate into the
constitution a regularized system of standby emergency powers to be invoked with suitable
checks and controls in time of national danger. He attempted forthrightly to meet the
problem of combining a capacious reserve of power and speed and vigor in its application in
time of emergency, with effective constitutional restraints. 90
Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the problem of response to
emergency by constitutional democracies, have employed the doctrine of constitutional
dictatorship.91 Frederick M. Watkins saw no reason why absolutism should not be used
as a means for the defense of liberal institutions, provided it serves to protect
established institutions from the danger of permanent injury in a period of temporary
emergency and is followed by a prompt return to the previous forms of political
life.92 He recognized the two (2) key elements of the problem of emergency governance, as
well as all constitutional governance: increasing administrative powers of the executive,
while at the same time imposing limitation upon that power.93 Watkins placed his real
faith in a scheme of constitutional dictatorship. These are the conditions of success of such
a dictatorship: The period of dictatorship must be relatively shortDictatorship
should always be strictly legitimate in characterFinal authority to determine the
need for dictatorship in any given case must never rest with the dictator
himself94 and the objective of such an emergency dictatorship should be strict political
conservatism.
Carl J. Friedrich cast his analysis in terms similar to those of Watkins. 95 It is a problem of
concentrating power in a government where power has consciously been divided to
cope with situations of unprecedented magnitude and gravity. There must be a broad
grant of powers, subject to equally strong limitations as to who shall exercise such powers,
when, for how long, and to what end. 96 Friedrich, too, offered criteria for judging the

adequacy of any of scheme of emergency powers, to wit: The emergency executive


must be appointed by constitutional means i.e., he must be legitimate; he should
not enjoy power to determine the existence of an emergency; emergency powers
should be exercised under a strict time limitation; and last, the objective of
emergency action must be the defense of the constitutional order.97
Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the history of the employment of emergency powers in
Great Britain, France, Weimar, Germany and the United States, reverted to a description of
a scheme of constitutional dictatorship as solution to the vexing problems presented by
emergency.98 Like Watkins and Friedrich, he stated a priori the conditions of success of the
constitutional dictatorship, thus:
1) No general regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship should be initiated
unless it is necessary or even indispensable to the preservation of the State and its
constitutional order
2) the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in the hands of the
man or men who will constitute the dictator
3) No government should initiate a constitutional dictatorship without making specific
provisions for its termination
4) all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization of the
government should be effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal requirements
5) no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no regular procedure
altered any more than is absolutely necessary for the conquest of the particular crisis . . .
6) The measures adopted in the prosecution of the a constitutional dictatorship should
never be permanent in character or effect
7) The dictatorship should be carried on by persons representative of every part of the
citizenry interested in the defense of the existing constitutional order. . .
8) Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every action taken under a constitutional
dictatorship. . .
9) The decision to terminate a constitutional dictatorship, like the decision to institute one
should never be in the hands of the man or men who constitute the dictator. . .
10) No constitutional dictatorship should extend beyond the termination of the crisis for
which it was instituted
11) the termination of the crisis must be followed by a complete return as possible to the
political and governmental conditions existing prior to the initiation of the constitutional
dictatorship99

Rossiter accorded to legislature a far greater role in the oversight exercise of emergency
powers than did Watkins. He would secure to Congress final responsibility for declaring the
existence or termination of an emergency, and he places great faith in the effectiveness of
congressional investigating committees.100
Scott and Cotter, in analyzing the above contemporary theories in light of recent
experience, were one in saying that, the suggestion that democracies surrender the
control of government to an authoritarian ruler in time of grave danger to the nation
is not based upon sound constitutional theory. To appraise emergency power in terms
of constitutional dictatorship serves merely to distort the problem and hinder realistic
analysis. It matters not whether the term dictator is used in its normal sense (as applied to
authoritarian rulers) or is employed to embrace all chief executives administering
emergency powers. However used, constitutional dictatorship cannot be divorced from the
implication of suspension of the processes of constitutionalism. Thus, they favored instead
the concept of constitutionalism articulated by Charles H. McIlwain:
A concept of constitutionalism which is less misleading in the analysis of problems of
emergency powers, and which is consistent with the findings of this study, is that formulated
by Charles H. McIlwain. While it does not by any means necessarily exclude some
indeterminate limitations upon the substantive powers of government, full emphasis is
placed upon procedural limitations, and political responsibility. McIlwain clearly
recognized the need to repose adequate power in government. And in discussing the
meaning of constitutionalism, he insisted that the historical and proper test of
constitutionalism was the existence of adequate processes for keeping government
responsible. He refused to equate constitutionalism with the enfeebling of government by
an exaggerated emphasis upon separation of powers and substantive limitations on
governmental power. He found that the really effective checks on despotism have consisted
not in the weakening of government but, but rather in the limiting of it; between which
there is a great and very significant difference. In associating constitutionalism with
limited as distinguished from weak government, McIlwain meant government
limited to the orderly procedure of law as opposed to the processes of force. The two
fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty
must yet fight are the legal limits to arbitrary power and a complete political
responsibility of government to the governed.101
In the final analysis, the various approaches to emergency of the above political theorists from Locks theory of prerogative, to Watkins doctrine of constitutional dictatorship and,
eventually, to McIlwains principle of constitutionalism ultimately aim to solve one real
problem in emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of
discretionary power to the Chief Executive, while insuring that such powers will be

exercised with a sense of political responsibility and under effective limitations and
checks.
Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from the fetters of a repressive
regime, the 1986 Constitutional Commission, in drafting the 1987 Constitution, endeavored
to create a government in the concept of Justice Jacksons balanced power
structure.102 Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the
Congress, and the Supreme Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own
sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in times of emergency. Each branch is
given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the other. This system does
not weaken the President, it just limits his power, using the language of McIlwain. In other
words, in times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a
certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the
same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.
a. Facial Challenge
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its overbreadth. They claim
that its enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4,
Article III of the Constitution and sent a chilling effect to the citizens.
A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on
their faces statutes infree speech cases, also known under the American Law as First
Amendment cases.103
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speechrelated conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms
of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,104the US Supreme Court held that we
have not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment (freedom of speech).
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that
reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and
rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. In Broadrick v.
Oklahoma,105 it was held:
It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be held void
on its face and when such summary action is inappropriate. But the plain import of our
cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our
traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset,
attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction

moves from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct even if expressive
falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state
interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by
their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.106 Here, the incontrovertible fact
remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is
manifestly subject to state regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as manifestly strong medicine, to be
used sparingly and only as a last resort, and is generally disfavored;107 The reason
for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is
the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a
law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in
other situations not before the Court. 108 A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law
explains further:
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an
exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if
the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers
to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their
own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute
on its face, not merely as applied for so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable
until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts
to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the chilling; deterrent
effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The
Court assumes that an overbroad laws very existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. An overbreadth ruling
is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to
examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation
to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others
not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.
In Younger v. Harris,109 it was held that:

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above
all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of
detailed statutes,ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance
when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show
whether this situation exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too,
is unwarranted.
Related to the overbreadth doctrine is the void for vagueness doctrine which holds that
a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.110 It is subject to the same principles governing
overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing on their
faces statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may
challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again,
petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its
application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot
understand the meaning and application of PP 1017.
SUMMATION
In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 a supervening event
would have normally rendered this case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was
still operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is
no guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there
have been media reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed if
the May 1 rallies become unruly and violent. Consequently, the transcendental issues
raised by the parties should not be evaded; they must now be resolved to prevent future
constitutional aberration.
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by
the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is
sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence
discussed earlier. However, PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving the President express
or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all

lawseven those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the
President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press,
are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII
of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privatelyowned public utility and private business affected with public interest.
In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President
acting as Commander-in-Chief addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the
provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard that the military and
the police should take only the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.But the words acts of terrorism found
in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should
thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While terrorism has been denounced
generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts,
to determine the limits of the AFPs authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.
On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear
that (1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the
dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members; (3)
the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the
warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for
publication and other materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and
jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil, criminal or
administrative sanctions on the individual police officers concerned. They have not been
individually identified and given their day in court. The civil complaints or causes of action
and/or relevant criminal Informations have not been presented before this Court.
Elementary due process bars this Court from making any specific pronouncement of civil,
criminal or administrative liabilities.
It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil
rights are ends in themselves. How to give the military the power it needs to protect
the Republic without unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the eternal
balancing tasks of a democratic state. During emergency, governmental action may vary
in breadth and intensity from normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly
restrain our peoples liberty.
Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied the various
competing political philosophies is that, it is possible to grant government the authority to
cope with crises without surrendering the two vital principles of constitutionalism: the

maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the


government to the governed.158
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017
is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017
commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees
promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the
provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to
take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior
legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the
PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. Considering that acts of
terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion
of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and
warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the
absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form
of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and
whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

.M. No. MTJ-10-1770. July 18, 2012


(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-2255-MTJ)
Office
of
Administrative
Services-Office
of
the
Court
Administrator, complainant, vs. Judge Ignacio B. Macarine, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Gen. Luna, Surigao Del Norte, respondent.
Facts:
On August 13, 2009, the respondent wrote then Court Administrator, now Associate
Justice Jose Portugal Perez, requesting for authority to travel to Hongkong with his
family for the period of September 10 - 14, 2009 where he would celebrate his 65th
birthday. The respondent stated that his travel abroad shall be charged to his annual
forced leave. However, he did not submit the corresponding application for leave. For

his failure to submit the complete requirements, his request for authority to travel
remained unacted upon. The respondent proceeded with his travel abroad without the
required travel authority from the OCA. On January 28, 2010, the respondent was
informed by the OCA that his leave of absence for the period of September 9-15, 2009
had been disapproved and his travel considered unauthorized by the Court. His
absences shall not be deducted from his leave credits but from his salary corresponding
to the seven days that he was absent, pursuant to Section 50 of the Omnibus Rules on
Leave. The respondent was also required to submit his explanation on his failure to
comply with OCA Circular No. 49-2003.
Issue:
Whether or not there exists a violation to the right to travel.
Ruling:
There is no violation on the right to travel. True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the
Constitution. However, the exercise of such right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on ones right to travel provided that such
restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be
provided by law. This, however, should by no means be construed as limiting the Courts
inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts. OCA Circular No. 492003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by
judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To "restrict" is
to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or direct
according to rule.
GUDANI VS. SENGA

Facts:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004
election fraud and the surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining
officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any
legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum,
prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without
Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a
directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for
allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the Chain of
Command. Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial
proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

Petitioners contention:
The petitioners are high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Both petitioners,
Brigadier General Francisco Gudani (Gen. Gudani) and Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Balutan (Col.
Balutan), belonged to the Philippine Marines. At the time of the subject incidents, both Gen. Gudani and
Col. Balutan were assigned to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City, the former as the
PMA Assistant Superintendent, and the latter as the Assistant Commandant of Cadets.

Petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo


enjoining them and other military officers from testifying before Congress without the
Presidents consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief against a pending
preliminary investigation against them, in preparation for possible court-martial
proceedings, initiated within the military justice system in connection with petitioners
violation of the aforementioned directive.
Petitioners characterize the directive from President Arroyo requiring her prior approval
before any AFP personnel appear before Congress as a gag order, which violates the
principle of separation of powers in government as it interferes with the investigation of
the Senate Committee conducted in aid of legislation. They also equate the gag order
with culpable violation of the Constitution, particularly in relation to the publics
constitutional right to information and transparency in matters of public concern.
Plaintively, petitioners claim that the Filipino people have every right to hear the
[petitioners] testimonies, and even if the gag order were unconstitutional, it still was
tantamount to the crime of obstruction of justice. Petitioners further argue that there
was no law prohibiting them from testifying before the Senate, and in fact, they were
appearing in obeisance to the authority of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.
Finally, it is stressed in the petition that Gen. Gudani was no longer subject to military
jurisdiction on account of his compulsory retirement on 4 October 2005. It is pointed out
that Article 2, Title I of the Articles of War defines persons subject to military law as all
officers and soldiers in the active service of the AFP.
Respondents contention:
On the very day of the hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive
Order No. 464 (E.O. 464). The OSG, representing the respondents before this Court,
notes that the E.O. enjoined officials of the executive department including the military
establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval.
In an Investigation Report, the OPMG recommended that petitioners be charged with
violation of Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer, in relation to
Article of War 97, on conduct prejudicial to the good order and military discipline. As
recommended, the case was referred to a Pre-Trial Investigation Officer (PTIO)
preparatory to trial by the General Court Martial (GCM). Consequently, petitioners were
separately served with Orders respectively addressed to them and signed by respondent
Col. Gilbert Jose C. Roa, the Pre-Trial Investigating Officer of the PTIO. The Orders
directed petitioners to appear in person before Col. Roa at the Pre-Trial Investigation of

the Charges for violation of Articles 65and 97of Commonwealth Act No. 408, and to
submit their counter-affidavits and affidavits of witnesses at the Office of the Judge
Advocate General.The Orders were accompanied by respective charge sheets against
petitioners, accusing them of violating Articles of War 65 and 97.

Issue:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the
AFP preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

Ruling:
YES. The SC hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of
her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who
defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber
of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the
consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance.
Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled
to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final
judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty
to faithfully execute.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear
before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of
the legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is
ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct
legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners
testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its
pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members
of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the
appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier
disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief
Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Fr. Roberto P. Reyes vs. Secretary Gonzales


Freedom of Abode, Freedom to Change Abode and Right to Travel Limitation

FACTS

Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege
on November 30, 2007. In the morning of November 30, 2007, petitioner
together with fifty (50) others, were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest
proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz
and Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not
there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of
Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.
On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold
Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of
Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the
aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety.
On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and
36 others for the crime of Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code,
the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information docketed as I.S. No. 2007-1045
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City.
On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination
of Probable Cause and Release of the Accused Fr. Reyes Upon Recognizance
asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his specific
participation in the crime charged; and that under the Constitution, the
determination of probable cause must be made personally by a judge.
On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge
for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. The trial
court ratiocinated that the evidence submitted by the DOJ Panel of Investigating
Prosecutors failed to show that petitioner and the other accused-civilians
conspired and confederated with the accused-soldiers in taking arms against the
government; that petitioner and other accused-civilians were arrested because
they ignored the call of the police despite the deadline given to them to come out
from the 2ndFloor of the Hotel and submit themselves to the police authorities; that
mere presence at the scene of the crime and expressing ones sentiments on
electoral and political reforms did not make them conspirators absent concrete
evidence that the accused-civilians knew beforehand the intent of the accusedsoldiers to commit rebellion; and that the cooperation which the law penalizes
must be one that is knowingly and intentionally rendered.
On December 18, 2007, petitioners counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez
wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 07-3126.

On even date, Secretary Gonzales replied to petitioners letter stating that


the DOJ could not act on petitioners request until Atty. Chavezs right to
represent petitioner is settled in view of the fact that a certain Atty. J. V. Bautista
representing himself as counsel of petitioner had also written a letter to the DOJ.
On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that
despite the dismissal of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still
subsists; that on December 19, 2007, petitioner was held by BID officials at the
NAIA as his name is included in the Hold Departure List; that had it not been for
the timely intervention of petitioners counsel, petitioner would not have been
able to take his scheduled flight to Hong Kong; that on December 26, 2007,
petitioner was able to fly back to the Philippines from Hong Kong but every time
petitioner would present himself at the NAIA for his flights abroad, he stands to
be detained and interrogated by BID officers because of the continued inclusion
of his name in the Hold Departure List; and that the Secretary of Justice has not
acted on his request for the lifting of HDO No. 45. Petitioner further maintained
that immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the availment of the writ is
exigent as the continued restraint on petitioners right to travel is illegal.
On January 24, 2008, respondents represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed the Return of the Writ raising the following
affirmative defenses: 1) that the Secretary of Justice is authorized to issue Hold
Departure Orders under the DOJ Circulars No. 17, Series of 1998 [2] and No. 18
Series of 2007[3] pursuant to his mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987
as ahead of the principal law agency of the government; 2) that HDO No. 45
dated December 1, 2007 was issued by the Sec. Gonzales in the course of the
preliminary investigation of the case against herein petitioner upon the request of
the DILG; 3) that the lifting of HDO No. 45 is premature in view of public
respondents pending Motion for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2008 filed by
the respondents of the Order dated December 13, 2007 of the RTC dismissing
Criminal Case No. 07-3126 for Rebellion for lack of probable cause; 4) that
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies by filing a motion to lift HDO
No. 45 before the DOJ; and 5) that the constitutionality of Circulars No. 17 and
18 can not be attacked collaterally in an amparoproceeding.
During the hearing on January 25, 2008 at 10:00 a.m. at the Paras Hall of
the Court of Appeals, counsels for both parties appeared. Petitioners counsel
Atty. Francisco Chavez manifested that petitioner is currently in Hong Kong; that
every time petitioner would leave and return to the country, the immigration
officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him for several minutes because of the
existing HDO; that the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO has no legal
basis; and that petitioner did not file a motion to lift the HDO before the RTC nor
the DOJ because to do so would be tantamount to recognizing the power of the
DOJ Secretary to issue HDO.

For respondents part, the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG)


maintained that the Secretary of the DOJs power to issue HDO springs from its
mandate under the Administrative Code to investigate and prosecute offenders as
the principal law agency of the government; that in its ten-year existence, the
constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17 has not been challenged except now; and
that on January 3, 2008, the DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors had filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of Dismissal of the trial court.
On February 1, 2008, petitioner filed a Manifestation attaching thereto a
copy of the Order dated January 31, 2008 of the trial court denying respondent
DOJs Motion for Reconsideration for utter lack of merit. The trial court also
observed that the said Motion should be dismissed outright for being filed out of
time. [4]
ISSUE

Whether or not petitioners right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation
by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ
of amparo.
RULING

He has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition
for a writ of amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on
this occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998
(Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders); and
Circular No. 18, Series of 2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and
Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for Other Purposes).
PETITIONERS CONTENTION

a. Argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power to issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and
the subject HDO No. 45 has no legal basis since Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already
been dismissed.
b. Maintains that the writ of amparo does not only exclusively apply to situations of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances but encompasses the whole gamut of
liberties protected by the Constitution
c. Argues that [liberty] includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
personal restraint or servitude and includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his
faculties in all lawful ways. Part of the right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution is
the right of a person to travel.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION

a.

HDO No. 45 was validly issued by the Secretary of Justice in accordance with
Department of Justice Circular No. 17, Series of 1998, [9] and Circular No. 18, Series of
2007,[10] which were issued pursuant to said Secretarys mandate under the Administrative

Code of 1987, as head of the principal law agency of the government, to investigate the
commission of crimes, prosecute offenders, and provide immigration regulatory services;
b. he issue of the constitutionality of the DOJ Secretarys authority to issue hold departure
orders under DOJ Circulars Nos. 17 and 18 is not within the ambit of a writ of amparo.
COURT

a. The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of
the Rules thereon are the following:
(1) right to life;
(2) right to liberty; and
(3) right to security.
Here, the restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of
the
criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish
that
his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a
serious
violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily
available
legal recourse or remedy.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the CA dated
February 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. No. 00011 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

DOCTRINE
Right to Travel

The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. As we have stated
in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, xxx a persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints
imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the
accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the
courts sound discretion.

DISINI VS SANDIGANBAYAN
This case is about the elementary rule of fair play and the dire effect on the
Republics credibility when it reneges on its undertaking to protect witnesses to
whom it had given immunity from prosecution.
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and Jesus P. Disini (Disini)
entered into an Immunity Agreement under which Disini undertook to testify for the
Republic and provide its lawyers with the information, affidavits, and documents
they needed in its case against Westinghouse Electric Corporation before the United
States District Court of New Jersey and in the arbitration case that Westinghouse
Company and others filed against the Republic before the International Court of
Arbitration. Disini worked for his second cousin, Herminio T. Disini (Herminio), as an
executive in the latters companies. The Republic believed that the Westinghouse
contract for the construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, brokered by one of
Herminios companies, had been attended by anomalies.
In the Immunity Agreement, the Republic guaranteed that, it would not
compel Disini to testify in any other domestic or foreign proceeding brought by the
Republic against Herminio.
Disini complied with his undertaking but 18 years later, upon Republics
application, the Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena against Disini, commanding him
to testify and produce documents before that court in an action that the Republic
filed against Herminio. Disini moved to quash the subpoena, invoking the Immunity
Agreement. The Sandiganbayan ignored it and issued a new subpoena directing him
to testify before it.
Petitioners Argument:

Disini argued that the Republic, through the PCGG, was estopped from
revoking the questioned immunity as it had made him believe that it had the
authority to provide such guarantee.

Respondents Argument:

Republic countered by invoking Section 15, Article XI of the 1987


Constitution which provides that the right of the State to recover
properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees from them or
from their nominees, or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription,
laches or estoppel.
Republic maintained that the PCGGs power to grant immunity under Section
5 of Executive Order 14 covered only immunity from civil or criminal
prosecution and did not cover immunity from providing evidence in court.
The Republic of course points out that the immunity from criminal or civil
prosecution that Section 5 of E.O. 14 authorizes does not cover immunity
from giving evidence in a case before a court of law.

Republic argued that Disinis immunity from testifying against Herminio


contravened the states policy to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired under the
regime of former President Marcos.
Republic further argued that under the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the
Immunity Agreement which reads: Nothing herein shall affect Jesus P.
Disinis obligation to provide truthful information or testimony, Disini,
despite the immunity given him against being compelled to testify in other
cases, was to provide truthful information or testimony in such other cases.

Supreme Court:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and ANNULS Resolution 2007-031
dated July 19, 2007 of the Presidential Commission on Good Government and the
Resolution dated August 16, 2007 of respondent Sandiganbayan in Civil Case 0013,
Republic of the Philippines v. Herminio T. Disini, et al.

1.) The estoppel Disini invoked did not have the effect, of denying the state its right to recover
whatever ill-gotten wealth Herminio may have acquired under the Marcos regime. The action against
Herminio could continue, hampered only by the exclusion of Disinis testimony. And there are other
ways of proving the existence of ill-gotten wealth. 2.) Although the government cannot be barred
by estoppel based on unauthorized acts of public officers, such principle cannot apply to this case
since PCGG acted within its authority when it provided Disini with a guarantee against having to
testify in other cases

The language of Section 5, Executive Order 14 affords latitude to the


PCGG in determining the extent of the criminal immunity it may grant. It has
discretion to grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending on the
situation of the witness and his relative importance to the prosecution of illgotten wealth cases. It can even agree, as in this case, to conditions
expressed by the witness as sufficient to induce cooperation. Trusting in the
Governments honesty and fidelity, Disini agreed and fulfilled his part of the
bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the essence of due process,
should hold the Republic on to its promise.

If Disini refuses to testify in cases as ordered by Sandiganbayan, it was


certain to result in prosecution for criminal contempt (a conduct
directed against the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting
judicially; an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring
the court into disrepute or disrespect. The grant, therefore, of immunity to
Disini against being compelled to testify was ultimately a grant of immunity
from criminal prosecution, something that fell within the express coverage of
the immunity given him.

The questioned immunity did not contravene the states public policy
respecting the recovery of illegally acquired wealth under the regime
of former President Marcos. The authority that adopted such policy, was the
same authority that gave the PCGG the power to grant immunity to witnesses
whom it might use to recover illegally acquired wealth during that regime. In

the case of Tanchanco vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court regarded as valid


and binding on the government the immunity it gave former National Food
Authority Administrator, Jesus Tanchanco, for all culpable acts of his during
his service in the Marcos government, which would include possible
prosecution for any illegal wealth that he might acquire during that service.
The Court did not regard such immunity in contravention of the state policy
on recovery of ill-gotten wealth under the auspices of the Marcos regime.

The last sentence in paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement that enjoined


Disini to provide truthful information or testimony, despite the guarantee
not to be compelled to testify against Herminio, merely emphasized the fact
that such concessions did not affect his obligation to provide truthful
information or testimony in the two Westinghouse cases. The grant of
immunity to Disini against being compelled to testify in other cases against
Herminio was quite clear and did not need any interpretation.

A contract is the law between the parties. It cannot be withdrawn except by


their mutual consent. This applies with more reason in this case where petitioner
Disini had already complied with the terms and conditions of the Immunity
Agreement. To allow the Republic to revoke the Agreement at this late stage will run
afoul of the rule that a party to a compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it had
enjoyed its benefits.
The Court should not allow respondent Republic, to put it bluntly, to double cross
petitioner Disini. The Immunity Agreement was the result of a long drawn out
process of negotiations with each party trying to get the best concessions out of it.
The Republic did not have to enter that agreement. It was free not to. But when it
did, it needs to fulfill its obligations honorably as Disini did. More than any one, the
government should be fair.

Rights involved in Criminal Proceedings


1.
2.
3.
4.

Right to Substantive and Procedural Due Process


Presumption of Innocence
Right to be heard by himself and Counsel
Right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him
5. Right to have a speedy, impartial and public trial
Roquero vs. Chancellor of UPManila
Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
FACTS
Petitioner Wildredo G. Roquero is an employee of UP-Manila assigned at the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH) Security Division as Special Police Captain. Private respondent Imelda O. Abutal is a
Lady Guard of Ex-Bataan Security Agency who was applying for a position in the security force assigned

at UP-PGH. That Capt. Wilfredo Roquero of UP Manila Police force, sometime in Arpil 1996, while
conducting an interview on Ms. Imelda Abutal, an applicant for position of Lady Guard of Ex-Bataan
Security Agency to be assigned at UP-PGH, proposed to her that if she agreed to be his mistress,
Roquero would facilitate her application and giver her permanent position, that despite Ms. Abutals
rejection of the proposal. He still insisted on demanding sexual favor from her. Hence, he is liable for
GRAVE MISCONDUCT. Petitioner was then placed under preventive suspension for 90 days,
simultaneous with appearing to the Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT). Thereafter, the
prosecution presented its only witness the respondent. The prosecution however failed to submit its
formal offer of evidence within the period agreed upon. it was only after five years that the prosecution
submitted the required document, hence the delay in the disposition of the case.

ISSUE
Whether the failure of the ADT to resolve Roqueros Motion violated the constitutional right of
Roquero to a speedy disposition of cases.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION Roquero
Motion to dismiss on the ground that:
d. The prosecution had not formally offered its evidence
e. That the unfounded charges in the administrative complaint were filed just to harass him
f. That he is entitled to a just and speedy disposition of the case
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION
d. Alleged that a formal offer of documentary exhibits had been filed on 24 January 2004, of which a
copy thereof was received by Atty. Lee, petitioners counsel, However petitioner has not filed his
comment to said formal Offer
e. The formal offer could not be prepared by another counsel until all the TSN have been furnished
to the counsel that replaced Atty. Flor.
f. That Stenographer, Jaimie Limbaga, had been on and out of the hospital due to a serious illness,
thus the delay in the filing of the prosecutors Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits.
COURT
While it is true that administrative investigations should not be bound by strict adherence to the technical
rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings the same however should not violate
the constitutional right of respondents to a speedy disposition of cases.
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 16. All person shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all
proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a
case may demand expeditious action by all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a
long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is
the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a
speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the

assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The
concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

RULING
Doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that
may be considered and balanced are as follows:
(1) the length of delay;
(2) the reasons for the delay;
(3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
Applying the doctrinal ruling vis-a-vis the factual milieu of this case, the violation of the right to a
speedy disposition of the case against petitioner is clear for the following reasons:
(1) the delay of almost five (5) years on the part of ADT in resolving the motion of petitioner, which
resolution petitioner reasonably found necessary before he could present his defense;
(2) the unreasonableness of the delay; and
(3) the timely assertions by petitioner of the right to an early disposition which he did through a
motion to dismiss. Over and above this, the delay was prejudicial to petitioners cause as he was under
preventive suspension for ninety (90) days, and during the interregnum of almost five years, the trial of
the accusation against him remained stagnant at the prosecution stage.
The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was
intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice by our
judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner
that is in accord with the established rules of procedure but must also be promptly decided to better serve
the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people
guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 22 March 2007
and Resolution dated 1 February 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87776 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) of the University of the
Philippines-Manila, Atty. Zaldy B. Docena, Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara, in their capacities as
Chairman and Members of the ADT respectively, are hereby ORDERED to DISMISS the administrative
case against Capt. Wilfredo G. Roquero for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of
cases so ordered.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN
FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

FACTS:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan),
a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the
military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess
to his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo andand Petition
for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of
Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, etal. The writs
were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case
during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of
Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of
Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen.
Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt.
Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac (Palacpac),
Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan. The petition prayed for the following reliefs:
a. The issuance of the writ of amparo ordering respondents to desist from violating
Rodriguezs right to life, liberty and security.
b. The issuance of an order to enjoin respondents from doing harm to or approaching
Rodriguez, his family and his witnesses.
c. Allowing the inspection of the detention areas of the Headquarters of Bravo Co., 5th
Infantry Division, Maguing, Gonzaga, Cagayan and another place near where Rodriguez
was brought.
d. Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to them regarding any report on
Rodriguez, including operation reports and provost marshall reports of the 5th Infantry
Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
prior to, on and subsequent to 6 September 2009.
e. Ordering records pertinent or in any way connected to Rodriguez, which are in the
custody of respondents, to be expunged, disabused, and forever barred from being used.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:

Respondents therein averred:

a. The Court of Appeals properly dropped then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a party-respondent,
as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.
b. Petitioner had not presented any adequate and competent evidence, much less substantial evidence, to
establish his claim that public respondents had violated, were violating or threatening to violate his rights
to life, liberty and security, as well as his right to privacy. Hence, he was not entitled to the privilege of
the writs of amparo and habeas data or to the corresponding interim reliefs (i.e. inspection order,
production order and temporary protection order) provided under the rule on the writ of amparo and the
rule on the writ of habeas data.
ISSUE:
1. Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on the basis of the presidential
immunity from suit.

2. Whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or


accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
COURT:
1. NO. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal
liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining
responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing.
As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit,
even for acts committed during the latters tenure; that courts should look with disfavor upon the
presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the
vindication of a right. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent of the
framers is clear that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.
(The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term
during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons
within or beyond the power of the incumbent.)
Therefore, former Pres. GMA cannot use such immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that
would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for
the abduction of Rodriguez
2. YES. The Supreme Court held that the President may be held responsible or accountable. To
hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must
obtain: (a) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior
and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; (b) the superior knew or had reason to know
that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and (c) the superior failed to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
The President, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control
over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command
responsibility doctrine. On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although
international tribunals apply a strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, the same may
nonetheless be established through circumstantial evidence. In the Philippines, a more liberal
view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge. Knowledge of the
commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when: (a) the acts are widespread
within the government officials area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or regularly
committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office
personnel are involved. As to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that
as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the President has the power to effectively
command, control and discipline the military. The Supreme Court held, however, that aside from
Rodriguezs general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish former President
Arroyos responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear
attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or
security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial Review in G.R. No. 191805 and DENY the
Petition for Review in G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION.
The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt.
Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin
Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.
This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to
take the appropriate action with respect to any possible liability or liabilities, within their respective legal
competence, that may have been incurred by respondents Gen. Victor Ibrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt.
Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and
Lt. Col. Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ are ordered to submit to this Court the results of
their action within a period of six months from receipt of this Decision.
In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the directives mandated in
this Decision and in the Court of Appeals are enforceable against the incumbent officials holding the
relevant positions. Failure to comply with the foregoing shall constitute contempt of court.
SO ORDERED.

Dante Tan vs People

Dealing with the issues of speedy trial and double


jeopardy.
DANTEs POSITION is misplaced!

Facts:
Panel of Prosecutors filed before the RTC of Pasig. (Three (3) informations
against Dante Tan.
1. Criminal Case No. 119830 pertains to allegations that petitioner employed
manipulative devises in the purchase of BestWorld Resources Corporation (BW)
shares.
2. Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 involve the alleged failure of
petitioner to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a sworn
statement of his beneficial ownership of BW shares. DOJ Chief Prosecutor filed a
motion for consolidation. Petitioner was arraigned on 16 January 2001, and pleaded

not guilty to the charges. Petitioner moved to dismiss Criminal Case 119830 due to
failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. He was claiming for his right
to speedy trial. The prosecution opposed the Motion, insisting on its claim that the
parties had an earlier agreement to defer the trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 until
after that of Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832, as the presentation of evidence
and prosecution in each of the five cases involved were to be done separately. RTC
ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case 119830. Hence Appeal to the CA. CA
reinstated Criminal Case 119830 and for RTC to conduct further proceeding.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Decision and filed a motion for
inhibition of the Justices who decided the case.

PETITIONERs Contention:
1. Due to failure of both parties to present evidence in one of the cases for the
span of 2 years in which he is involved, his right to speedy trial has been
violated.
2. Consequently, his right against double jeopardy has been violated because of
the CAs reinstatement of Tans case notwithstanding his prior dismissal on
the said case

PROSECUTIONs Contention:

1. Claim that the parties had an earlier agreement to defer the trial of Criminal
Case No. 119830 until after that of Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832, as the
presentation of evidence and prosecution in each of the five cases involved
were to be done separately. RTC ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case
119830. Hence, no violation of Tans Right to Speedy Trial
2. His dismissal and subsequent reinstatement by the CA does not violate his
Right against Double Jeopardy because the dismissal there was also by virtue
of agreement between the parties and not a dismissal based on the merits of
the case

Issues:
1. WON the petition for Certiorari violated Tans right against double jeopardy
2. WON Criminal Case 119830 was correctly dismissed by the Trial Court on the
ground of violation of Tans right to speedly trial.
3. WON the Court gravely abuse its discretion.

HELD:
We first resolve the preliminary issues. In an attempt at having the instant petition
dismissed, petitioner contends that the certificate of non-forum shopping attached
to the Peoples appeal before the Court of Appeals should have been signed by the
Chairman of the SEC as complainant in the cases instead of Acting DOJ Secretary
Merceditas N. Gutierrez.

Petitioners argument is futile. The Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining the
authority of Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas Gutierrez to sign the certificate of nonforum shopping of the petition for
Certiorari before said court. Section 2, Rule110 of the Rules of Court leaves no room
for doubt and establishes that criminal cases are prosecuted in the name of the
People of the Philippines, It is the DOJ, through its prosecutors, which is authorized
to prosecute criminal cases on behalf of the People of the Philippines, the DOJ is
best suited to attest whether a similar or related case has been filed or is pending in
another court of tribunal. Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N. Gutierrez, being the
head of the DOJ, therefore, had the authority to sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping for Criminal Case No. 119830, which was filed on behalf of the People of
the Philippines.

An accuseds right to have a speedy, impartial, and


public trial is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section
14(2) of Article III of the Constitution.
This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious,
capricious andoppressive delays,
its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from
the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt
determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. In determining
whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of
delay; (b) the reason for t
he delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to
the defendant. x x x.
From the initial hearing on 27 February 2001 until the time the prosecution filed its
formal offer of evidence for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832 on 25 November
2003, both prosecution and defense admit that no evidence was presented for
Criminal Case No. 119830. Hence, for a period of almost two years and eight
months, the prosecution did not present a single evidence for Criminal Case No.
119830.
The question we have to answer now is whether there was vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delay. To this, we apply the four-factor test
previously mentioned.
Petitioners objection to the prosecutions stand that he gave an implied
consent to the separate trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 is belied by the
records of the case. No objection was interposed by his defense counsel when
this matter was discussed during the initial hearing.
Petitioners conformity thereto can be deduced from his non-objection at the
preliminary hearing when the prosecution manifested that the evidence to be
presented would be only for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832.

His failure to object to the prosecutions manifestation that the cases be tried
separately is fatal to his case. The acts, mistakes and negligence of counsel bind his
client, except only when such mistakes would result in serious injustice.
In fact, petitioners acquiescence is evident from the transcript of stenographic
notes during the initial presentation of the Peoples evidence in the five BW cases
on 27 February 2001, herein quoted below: During the same hearing, the People
manifested in open court that the parties had agreed to the separate trials of the
BW Cases: The transcript of stenographic notes taken from the 3 April 2001 hearing
further clarifies that only the two cases against Dante Tan were being prosecuted:
For the reasons above-stated, there is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that
the prosecution is guilty of violating petitioners right to speedy trial.
Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but generally refers to
capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction
. Any capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment in dismissing a criminal case is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is true in the instant case. There is also no
merit to petitioners claim that a reversal of the RTCs Order dismissing Criminal
Case No. 119830 is a violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy
which dismissal was founded on an alleged violation of his right to speedy trial. The
constitutional protection against double jeopardy shields one from a second or later
prosecution for the same offense. Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution
declares that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense, providing further that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for
the same act.

For double jeopardy to attach then, the


following elements in the first criminal case
must be present:(a) The complaint or
information or other formal charge was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction;(b) The court had jurisdiction;
(c) The accused had been arraigned and had
pleaded; and (d) He was convicted or
acquitted or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused.
Among the above-cited elements, as to the with the fourth element,
conviction or acquittal,

or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express


consent of the accused.
This element is crucial since, as a general rule, the dismissal of a criminal
case resulting in acquittal, made with the express consent of the accused or upon
his own motion, will not place the accused in double jeopardy.
This rule, however, admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of
evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial.
From the foregoing, it follows that petitioner cannot claim that double jeopardy
attached when said RTC order was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Double
jeopardy does not apply to this case, considering that there is no violation of
petitioners right to speedy trial.

DISPOSITORY PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed 22 February 2006
Decision and 17 July 2006Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 83068 are hereby AFFIRMED. The instant case is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City for further proceedings in Criminal Case No.
119830 with reasonable dispatch.
SO ORDERED

LEJANO vs PEOPLE:
Right against Double Jeopardy.
GR: Right against Double Jeopardy. Acquittal in a criminal case cannot be
reinstated again.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion,
resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or
2. when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the
decision by special civil action of
Certiorari under Rule 65
Facts:
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the CA and acquitted accused, namely: Hubert
Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael Atchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada,
and Gerardo Biong on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Thereafter, complaint Lauro Vizconde, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it
"denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably
regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case
in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage

of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecuti
on witnesses."
LEJANOs CONTENTION:
Due to the grave abuse of discretion of the prosecution in the treatment and care of the evidence
of which they are being prosecuted, their acquittal is based on the merits of the case. Hence, the
case against them cannot be reinstated because it will violate their right against double jeopardy.
PROSECUTIONs Contention:
Lejanos dismissal fall on the exceptions on the rule of right against double jeopardy
which are exceptional and narrow as:
3. when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss
of jurisdiction, or
4. when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by
special civil action of
Certiorari under Rule 65
Issue:
Whether or not a judgment of acquittal may be reconsidered.
RULING:
No, as a rule a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered for it places the accused under
double jeopardy. On occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible, but the
grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely
abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of
such cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of
Certiorari under Rule 65. Although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions,
he has been unable to bring pleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. He did not
specify that violations of due process and acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the
Court supposedly committed. Vizconde did not also alleged that the Court held a sham review of
the decision of the CA. What the complainant actually questions is the Court's appreciation of the
evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses' credibility. That the court committed
grave error in finding Alfaro as not a credible witness. The complaint wants the court to review
the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such evaluation which is not
constitutionally allowed and therefore, the judgment of acquittal can no longer be disturbed.
DISPOSITORY PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December
15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio
Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada
and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful
cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections,


Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is DIRECTED to report the action he has taken to this Court within five
days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

BENJAMIN B. BANGAYAN, JR., VS. SALLY GO BANGAYAN


FACTS:
Sally Go-Bangayan filed a complaint for bigamy against Benjamin Bangayan and Resally
Delfin. On March 7, 1982, Benjamin, Jr. married Sally Go in Pasig City and they had two
children. Later, Sally learned that Benjamin, Jr. had taken Resally as his concubine whom he
subsequently married on January 5, 2001 under the false name, Benjamin Z. Sojayco.
Benjamin, Jr. fathered two children with Resally. Furthermore, Sally discovered that on
September 10, 1973, Benjamin, Jr. also married a certain Azucena Alegre in Caloocan City.
After pleading not guilty, Benjamin and Resally both filed their motions for leave to file a
demurrer to evidence. Benjamin, Jr. filed his Demurrer to Evidence, praying that the criminal
case for bigamy against him be dismissed for failure of the prosecution to present sufficient
evidence of his guilt. His plea was anchored on two main arguments: (1) he was not legally
married to Sally Go because of the existence of his prior marriage to Azucena; and (2) the
prosecution was unable to show that he and the Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr., who married Resally,
were one and the same person. RTC dismissed the criminal case against Benjamin, Jr. and
Resally for insufficiency of evidence. Sally Go elevated the case to the CA via a petition for
certiorari. The CA promulgated its Decision granting her petition and ordering the remand of the
case to the RTC for further proceedings. The CA held that the following pieces of evidence
presented by the prosecution were sufficient to deny the demurrer to evidence: (1) the existence
of three marriages of Benjamin, Jr. to Azucena, Sally Go and Resally; (2) the letters and love
notes from Resally to Benjamin, Jr.; (3) the admission of Benjamin, Jr. as regards his marriage to
Sally Go and Azucena; and (4) Benjamin, Jr.s admission that he and Resally were in some kind
of a relationship. CA further stated that Benjamin, Jr. was mistaken in claiming that he could not
be guilty of bigamy because his marriage to Sally Go was null and void in light of the fact that he
was already married to Azucena. A judicial declaration of nullity was required in order for him
to be able to use the nullity of his marriage as a defense in a bigamy charge.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION:

Benjamin, Jr. filed his Demurrer to Evidence, praying that the criminal case for bigamy
against him be dismissed for failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence of
his guilt. His plea was anchored on two main arguments: (1) he was not legally married to
Sally Go because of the existence of his prior marriage to Azucena; and (2) the
prosecution was unable to show that he and the Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr., who married
Resally, were one and the same person.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:

A complaint-affidavit was filed by respondent Sally Go-Bangayan (Sally Go) accusing


petitioners Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin, Jr.) and Resally de Asis Delfin (Resally)
of having committed the crime of bigamy.
Sally Go, on the issue of whether or not she has the authority to question the order
granting the demurrer to evidence in a criminal case, counters that as the offended party,
she has an interest in the maintenance of the criminal prosecution against petitioners and
quotes Merciales v. Court of Appeals[25] to support her position: The right of offended
parties to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives them of due process has
always been recognized, the only limitation being that they cannot appeal any adverse
ruling if to do so would place the accused in double jeopardy. Moreover, the OSG and
the OCP had impliedly consented to the filing of the petition before the CA because they
did not interpose any objection.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners right against double jeopardy was violated by the CA when it reversed
the December 3, 2003 RTC Order dismissing the criminal case against them.
COURT:
YES. Double jeopardy had already set in.
A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and the trial court is
required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough
to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the court finds that the
evidence is not sufficient and grants the demurrer to evidence, such dismissal of the case is
one on the merits, which is equivalent to the acquittal of the accused. Well-established is the
rule that the Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting
the accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence because to do so will place the
accused in double jeopardy. The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking
his right against double jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the
prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its case against the accused or where
the trial was a sham. In this case, all four elements of double jeopardy are doubtless present.

Valid information for the crime of bigamy was filed against the petitioners, resulting in the
institution of a criminal case against them before the proper court. They pleaded not guilty to
the charges against them and subsequently, the case was dismissed after the prosecution had
rested its case. Therefore, the CA erred in reversing the trial courts order dismissing the case
against the petitioners because it placed them in double jeopardy. An acquittal by virtue of a
demurrer to evidence is not appealable because it will place the accused in double jeopardy.
However, it may be subject to review only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court showing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The March 14, 2006 Decision and the May 22,
2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December
3, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No.
C-66783, granting the Demurrer to Evidence of petitioners Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr. and
Resally de Asis Delfin and dismissing the case against them is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.