2011 CASE DOCTRINES IN REMEDIAL LAW

Prepared by Glenn Rey Anino

Palaganas vs. Palaganas, 640 SCRA 538 , January 26, 2011

Civil Law; Probate Proceedings; Wills and Succession; Our laws do not prohibit the probate of
wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and
allowed in the countries of their execution.But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills

executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed
in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction.
Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where
he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.

Same; Same; Same; The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been
allowed and probated in the country of its execution.Our rules require merely that the petition

for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional
facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of
the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court,
the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of
the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is
sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The
rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the
country of its execution.
Bermudo vs. Tayag-Roxas, 641 SCRA 423 , February 02, 2011

Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estates; The rationale behind this multi-appeal mode is to
enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is
resolved by the court and held to be final.Atty. Bermudo points out that Roxas remedy for

contesting the RTC order of execution against her should be an ordinary appeal to the CA. He
invokes Section 1, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which enumerates the orders or
judgments in special proceedings from which parties may appeal. One of these is an order or
judgment which settles the account of an executor or administrator. The rationale behind this
multi-appeal mode is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and
distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final. But the earlier award in Atty.
Bermudos favor did not settle his account as administrator. Rather, it fixed his attorneys fees
for the legal services he rendered in the suit contesting Roxas right as sole heir. Consequently,
Section 1 (d) of Rule 109 does not apply.
Do-All Metals Industries, Inc. vs. Security Bank Corp., 639 SCRA 39 , January 10, 2011

Actions; Docket Fees; Plaintiffs failure to pay the additional filing fees due on additional
claims does not divest the court of jurisdiction it already had over the case.On the issue of

jurisdiction, respondent Bank argues that plaintiffs failure to pay the filing fees on their
supplemental complaint is fatal to their action. But what the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely
the filing fees for their Supplemental Complaint. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs
action from the moment they filed their original complaint accompanied by the payment of the
filing fees due on the same. The plaintiffs non-payment of the additional filing fees due on
their additional claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the case.

Same; Ex Parte Hearings; Evidence; Witnesses; An ex parte hearing which had been properly
authorized cannot be assailed as less credible.The Bank belittles the testimonies of the

petitioners witnesses for having been presented ex parte before the clerk of court. But the ex
parte hearing, having been properly authorized, cannot be assailed as less credible. It was the
Banks fault that it was unable to attend the hearing. It cannot profit from its lack of diligence.

Lease; Damages; Even if the lease has already lapsed, the lessor has no business harassing
and intimidating the lessee and its employees.While the lease may have already lapsed, the
Bank had no business harassing and intimidating the Lims and their employees. The RTC was
therefore correct in adjudging moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees
against the Bank for the acts of their representatives and building guards.

Actions; Supplemental Complaint; Docket Fees; A supplemental complaint is like any

complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon its
filingthe rules do not require the court to make special assessments in cases of
supplemental complaints.As to the damages that plaintiffs claim under their supplemental

complaint, their stand is that the RTC committed no error in admitting the complaint even if
they had not paid the filing fees due on it since such fees constituted a lien anyway on the
judgment award. But this after-judgment lien, which implies that payment depends on a
successful execution of the judgment, applies to cases where the filing fees were incorrectly
assessed or paid or where the court has discretion to fix the amount of the award. None of
these circumstances obtain in this case. Here, the supplemental complaint specified from the
beginning the actual damages that the plaintiffs sought against the Bank. Still plaintiffs paid
no filing fees on the same. And, while petitioners claim that they were willing to pay the
additional fees, they gave no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the same. They
merely said that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC had not assessed them for it.
But a supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a
complaint need to be paid upon its filing. The rules do not require the court to make special
assessments in cases of supplemental complaints. To aggravate plaintiffs omission, although
the Bank brought up the question of their failure to pay additional filing fees in its motion for
reconsideration, plaintiffs made no effort to make at least a late payment before the case
could be submitted for decision, assuming of course that the prescription of their action had
not then set it in. Clearly, plaintiffs have no excuse for their continuous failure to pay the fees
they owed the court. Consequently, the trial court should have treated their Supplemental
Complaint as not filed.

Same; Same; Same; It is not for a party to a case, or even for the trial court, to waive the
payment of the additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaintonly the Supreme
Court can grant exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts and these exemptions
are embodied in its rules.Plaintiffs of course point out that the Bank itself raised the issue of
non-payment of additional filing fees only after the RTC had rendered its decision in the case.
The implication is that the Bank should be deemed to have waived its objection to such
omission. But it is not for a party to the case or even for the trial court to waive the payment of
the additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaint. Only the Supreme Court can
grant exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts and these exemptions are
embodied in its rules.

Lu vs. Lu Ym, Sr., 643 SCRA 23 , February 15, 2011

Remedial Law; Certiorari; Proper mode to challenge an interlocutory order is through a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65; The Urgent Motion cannot be a substitute for the
remedy of a special civil action for certiorari.While it is true that the Lu Ym father and sons

questioned the admission of the aforesaid amended complaint before this Court, the same
was done only through an Urgent Motion. Under the Rules of Court, the proper mode to
challenge such an order, which undoubtedly is interlocutory, is through a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65. This procedural defect, therefore, bars the Court from ruling on the
propriety of such admission. We cannot take cognizance of proceedings before the RTC
unless they are brought before us through the proper mode of review. To be sure, the Urgent
Motion cannot be a substitute for the remedy of a special civil action for certiorari.
Consequently, the amended complaint admitted by the RTC stands.

Same; Actions; Moot and Academic; Courts do not entertain a moot question; An issue
becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value.It is settled that courts do not

entertain a moot question. An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy, so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value.
This Court, therefore, abstains from expressing its opinion in a case where no legal relief is
needed or called for.

Same; Same; Same; Exceptions where courts will still decide moot and academic cases.It is

true that we have held in a number of cases that the moot and academic principle is not a
magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will
still decide cases otherwise, moot and academic if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and, fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review. However, not one of the enumerated exceptions
obtains in the instant case. Thus, a denial of the instant petition is warranted.

Same; Injunctions; Petition should be denied for the sole reason that the act sought to be
enjoined is already fait accompli.The RTC decision on the merits of the case gives this Court
more reasons to declare the mootness of the instant petition. It must be recalled that the
motion to lift the receivership was filed before the RTC ancillary to the principal action, and
what was sought to be enjoined was the hearing on that particular motion. With the decision
on the merits rendered by the RTC, albeit still on appeal, there is nothing more to be enjoined.
More importantly, the RTC ordered that the receivers cease from performing their functions
and that a management committee be created. Clearly, these supervening events mooted the
petition. Time and again, we have declared that a petition should be denied for the sole reason
that the act sought to be enjoined is already fait accompli.

Same; Same; Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedom
of action of the defendant and should not be granted lightly or precipitately; It should be
granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency
demands it.In the instant case, John and LLDC failed to satisfy the above requisites. Except
for their claim of nullity of the RTC decision because of insufficient payment of docket fees, no
evidence was offered to establish the existence of a clear and unmistakable right on their part
that must be protected, as well as the serious damage or irreparable loss that they would

suffer if the writ is not granted. It has been consistently held that there is no power, the
exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound
discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case than the issuance of an injunction. It is the
strong arm of equity that should never be extended unless to cases of great injury, where
courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages. Every court
should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedom of action of the defendant
and should not be granted lightly or precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is
fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it.

Same; Docket Fees; Court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the
prescribed fees.A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the

prescribed fees. The importance of filing fees cannot be gainsaid for these are intended to
take care of court expenses in the handling of cases in terms of costs of supplies, use of
equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, and others, computed as to man-hours
used in the handling of each case. Hence, the non-payment or insufficient payment of docket
fees can entail tremendous losses to the government in general and to the judiciary in
particular.

Same; Same; The test in determining whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation by ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought.The

Court had, in the past, laid down the test in determining whether the subject matter of an
action is incapable of pecuniary estimation by ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation. However, where the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, the money claim being only incidental to or
merely a consequence of, the principal relief sought, the action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.

Same; Estoppel; If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge
the courts jurisdiction in the same case; To rule otherwise would amount to speculating on the
fortune of litigation which is against the policy of the Court.Well-established is the rule that
after vigorously participating in all stages of the case before the trial court and even invoking
the trial courts authority in order to ask for affirmative relief, John and LLDC are barred by
estoppel from challenging the trial courts jurisdiction. If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a
court, he cannot thereafter challenge the courts jurisdiction in the same case. To rule
otherwise would amount to speculating on the fortune of litigation, which is against the policy
of the Court. Thus, even if, indeed, the docket fees paid were inadequate, this allegation having
been raised for the first time on appeal, should be disallowed.

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, 643
SCRA 90, February 15, 2011

Courts; Separation of Powers; Mandamus; The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the

Court setting time frames be set for the executive agencies to perform their assigned tasks
pursuant to earlier decision of the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under Art. VIII
of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the
adjudicative function of the Court, not an encroachment by the Court over executive powers

and functions.The case is now in the execution phase of the final and executory December
18, 2008 Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate
the quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance
with said decision and to monitor the execution phase. In the absence of specific completion
periods, the Committee recommended that time frames be set for the agencies to perform
their assigned tasks. This may be viewed as an encroachment over the powers and functions
of the Executive Branch headed by the President of the Philippines. This view is misplaced.
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power
under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part
of the adjudicative function of the Court. None of the agencies ever questioned the power of
the Court to implement the December 18, 2008 Decision nor has any of them raised the alleged
encroachment by the Court over executive functions. While additional activities are required of
the agencies like submission of plans of action, data or status reports, these directives are but
part and parcel of the execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Same; Same; Same; With the final and executory judgment in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), the writ of continuing mandamus issued in MMDA means
that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the Courts orders, the Court
exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment.The

submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of

Procedure for Environmental cases: Sec. 7. Judgment.If warranted, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ of continuing mandamus requiring respondent to perform an act or series
of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied and to grant such other reliefs as may be warranted
resulting from the wrongful or illegal acts of the respondent. The court shall require the
respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the progress and execution of the judgment,
and the court may, by itself or through a commissioner or the appropriate government agency,
evaluate and monitor compliance. The petitioner may submit its comments or observations on
the execution of the judgment. Sec. 8. Return of the writ.The periodic reports submitted by
the respondent detailing compliance with the judgment shall be contained in partial returns of
the writ. Upon full satisfaction of the judgment, a final return of the writ shall be made to the
court by the respondent. If the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the
satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. (Emphasis supplied.) With the
final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in MMDA
means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the Courts orders, the
Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment
[Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, 643
SCRA 90(2011)]
University of Mindanao, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 643 SCRA 562 , February 21, 2011

Remedial Law; Certiorari; Interlocutory Orders; Denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being
interlocutory, cannot be questioned by certiorari; An interlocutory order may be assailed by
certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, Court however generally frowns upon this
remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders.The denial of a motion to dismiss or to

quash, being interlocutory, cannot be questioned by certiorari. It cannot be the subject of

appeal, until a final judgment or order is rendered. An interlocutory order may be assailed by
certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this
remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing

interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the
administration of justice, but will also unduly burden the courts.

Same; Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; By grave abuse of discretion is meant
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough.By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so
patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

Same; Appeals; Findings of the Court of Appeals (CA) that the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Company (PDIC) substantially complied with the requirements for an appeal must be
respected; with the exception of Section 1(b), the grounds for the dismissal of an appeal are
directory and not mandatory, and it is not the ministerial duty of the court to dismiss the
appeal.The findings of the CA that the PDIC substantially complied with the requirements for
an appeal must be respected. There can be no grave abuse of discretion attributed to it more
so since the grounds for dismissing an appeal under Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court
are discretionary upon the CA. This can be gleaned from the very language of the Rules which
uses the word may instead of shall. In De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 383 SCRA 216 (2002), we
held that Section 1, Rule 50, which provides specific grounds for dismissal of appeal,
manifestly confers a power and does not impose a duty. Moreover, it is directory, not
mandatory. With the exception of Section 1(b), the grounds for the dismissal of an appeal are
directory and not mandatory, and it is not the ministerial duty of the court to dismiss the
appeal. Based on the RTCs findings as well as its own independent assessment of the PDICs
appeal, it was discretionary on the CA whether or not to dismiss the appeal. In ruling to accept
the PDICs appeal, such action does not constitute capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Time and again, the Court has ruled that dismissal of appeals on purely technical
grounds is not encouraged.In sum, this Court finds that the CA did not act with grave abuse

of discretion when it denied petitioners motion to dismiss. In the absence of abuse of

discretion, interlocutory orders such as a motion to dismiss are not the proper subject of a
petition for certiorari. Time and again, this Court has ruled that dismissal of appeals on purely
technical grounds is not encouraged. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very
rigid and technical sense, for they have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial
justice. Judicial action must be guided by the principle that a party-litigant should be given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to
lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. When a rigid application of the rules tends
to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their
operation.
Parel vs. Heirs of Simeon Prudencio, 644 SCRA 496 , March 02, 2011

Remedial Law; Judgments; Execution; Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets
at naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable controversies with finality.Unjustified

delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposing
justiciable controversies with finality. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the
issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. All that remains is the

execution of the decision which is a matter of right.

Same; Same; Same; Instances Where a Writ of Execution may be Appealed.Banaga v.

Majaducon, 494 SCRA 153 (2006), however, enumerates the instances where a writ of
execution may be appealed: 1) the writ of execution varies the judgment; 2) there has been a
change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; 3) execution is
sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; 4) it appears that the
controversy has never been subject to the judgment of the court; 5) the terms of the judgment
are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or 6) it appears that the
writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is
issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied,
or the writ was issued without authority.

Same; Same; Same; The inherent power of the court carries with it the right to determine every
question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution.The Court ruled in Mejia v.

Gabayan, 455 SCRA 499, 512 (2005): x x x The inherent power of the court carries with it the
right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution. The
court may stay or suspend the execution of its judgment if warranted by the higher interest of
justice. It has the authority to cause a modification of the decision when it becomes imperative
in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. The court is also vested
with inherent power to stay the enforcement of its decision based on antecedent facts which
show fraud in its rendition or want of jurisdiction of the trial court apparent on the record.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Same; Same; Same; Exceptions that have been previously considered by the Court as meriting
a relaxation of the rules in order to serve substantial justice.There are exceptions that have

been previously considered by the Court as meriting a relaxation of the rules in order to serve
substantial justice. These are: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (2) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a
lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (6) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Air Ads, Incorporated vs. Tagum Agricultural Development Corporation (TADECO), 646 SCRA
184 , March 23, 2011

Actions; Pleadings, Practice and Procedure; Forum Shopping; The plaintiff or petitioner is not
precluded from filing a similar action in order to rectify the defect in the certification against
forum shopping where the court states in its order that the action is dismissed due to such
defect, unless the court directs that the dismissal is with prejudice, in which case the plaintiff
is barred from filing a similar action by res judicata.Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, defines the effect of the failure to comply with the requirements for the
certification against forum shopping, viz.: xxx The first sentence of the second paragraph
expressly provides that the dismissal of a petition due to failure to comply with the
requirements therein is without prejudice unless otherwise provided by the court. Accordingly,
the plaintiff or petitioner is not precluded from filing a similar action in order to rectify the
defect in the certification where the court states in its order that the action is dismissed due to
such defect, unless the court directs that the dismissal is with prejudice, in which case the
plaintiff is barred from filing a similar action by res judicata. In the context of the aforequoted

rule, the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 73418, being without any qualification, was a dismissal
without prejudice, plainly indicating that Air Ads could not be barred from filing the second
petition.

Same; Same; Same; Although the Rules of Court declares that the failure to comply with the
requirements of Section 5 of Rule 7 on certification against forum shopping shall not be cured
by amendment, nowhere does the rule prohibit the filing of a similar complaint or pleading
following the dismissal without qualification of the earlier one.Indeed, Air Ads options to

correct its dire situation included the refiling, for, although the Rules of Court declares that the
failure to comply with the requirements of Section 5 of Rule 7 shall not be cured by
amendment, nowhere does the rule prohibit the filing of a similar complaint or pleading
following the dismissal without qualification of the earlier one.

Same; Same; Amendment of Pleadings; The substitution of the third party complaint could not
produce the effect that an amendment of an existing pleading produces.Air Ads urging that

the filing of the substitute third party complaint effectively superseded the third party
complaint impleading it as third party defendant ostensibly harks back to Section 8 of Rule 10
of the Rules of Court, which states that the amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it
amends. However, the substitution of the third party complaint could not produce the effect
that an amendment of an existing pleading produces. Under Section I, Rule 10, of the Rules of
Court, an amendment is done by adding or striking out an allegation or the name of any party,
or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or
description in any other respect. A perusal of the original and the substitute third party
complaints shows that their averments are substantially the same; and that the substitute
third party complaint did not strike out any allegation of the prior one. [Air Ads, Incorporated vs.
Tagum Agricultural Development Corporation (TADECO), 646 SCRA 184(2011)]

Monasterio-Pe vs. Tong, 646 SCRA 161 , March 23, 2011

Appeals; Pleadings, Practice and Procedure; The appeal under Rule 45 contemplates that the
Regional Trial Court rendered the judgment, final order or resolution acting in its original
jurisdiction, not where the assailed Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) were
issued in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, in which case appeal should be by way of a
Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 42.It bears emphasis that in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may
be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court. It is a settled rule that in the exercise
of this Courts power of review, it does not inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence
presented, consistent with the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. In the instant case, a
perusal of the errors assigned by petitioners would readily show that they are raising factual
issues the resolution of which requires the examination of evidence. Certainly, issues which
are being raised in the present petition, such as the questions of whether the issue of physical
possession is already included as one of the issues in a case earlier filed by petitioner Anita
and her husband, as well as whether respondent complied with the law and rules on barangay
conciliation, are factual in nature. Moreover, the appeal under Rule 45 of the said Rules
contemplates that the RTC rendered the judgment, final order or resolution acting in its original
jurisdiction. In the present case, the assailed Decision and Order of the RTC were issued in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, petitioners pursued the wrong mode of appeal
when they filed the present petition for review on certiorari with this Court. Instead, they should
have filed a petition for review with the CA pursuant to the provisions of Section 1, Rule 42 of

the Rules of Court.

Actions; Pleadings, Practice and Procedure; Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping; The settled
rule is that the execution of the certification against forum shopping by the attorney-in-fact is
not a violation of the requirement that the parties must personally sign the samethe attorneyin-fact, who has authority to file, and who actually filed the complaint as the representative of
the plaintiff, is a party to the ejectment suit.It is true that the first paragraph of Section 5,

Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, requires that the certification should be signed by the petitioner
or principal party himself. The rationale behind this is because only the petitioner himself has
actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in different
courts or agencies. However, the rationale does not apply where, as in this case, it is the
attorney-in-fact who instituted the action. Such circumstance constitutes reasonable cause to
allow the attorney-in-fact to personally sign the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. Indeed, the
settled rule is that the execution of the certification against forum shopping by the attorney-infact is not a violation of the requirement that the parties must personally sign the same. The
attorney-in-fact, who has authority to file, and who actually filed the complaint as the
representative of the plaintiff, is a party to the ejectment suit. In fact, Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court includes the representative of the owner in an ejectment suit as one of the
parties authorized to institute the proceedings. In the present case, there is no dispute that
Ong is respondents attorney-in-fact. Hence, the Court finds that there has been substantial
compliance with the rules proscribing forum shopping.

Ejectment; Settled is the rule that the right of possession is a necessary incident of
ownership.In any case, it can be inferred from the judgments of this Court in the two

aforementioned cases that respondent, as owner of the subject lots, is entitled to the
possession thereof. Settled is the rule that the right of possession is a necessary incident of
ownership. Petitioners, on the other hand, are consequently barred from claiming that they
have the right to possess the disputed parcels of land, because their alleged right is predicated
solely on their claim of ownership, which is already effectively debunked by the decisions of
this Court affirming the validity of the deeds of sale transferring ownership of the subject
properties to respondent.

Same; Unlawful Detainer; A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance
or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise
that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him; The one-year period within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can
be filed should be counted from the date of demand, because only upon the lapse of that
period does the possession become unlawful.Respondent alleged in his complaint that
petitioners occupied the subject property by his mere tolerance. While tolerance is lawful, such
possession becomes illegal upon demand to vacate by the owner and the possessor by
tolerance refuses to comply with such demand. Respondent sent petitioners a demand letter
dated December 1, 1999 to vacate the subject property, but petitioners did not comply with the
demand. A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy
against him. Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the one-year period within which a
complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the date of demand,
because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful.
Respondent filed the ejectment case against petitioners on March 29, 2000, which was less
than a year from December 1, 1999, the date of formal demand. Hence, it is clear that the

action was filed within the one-year period prescribed for filing an ejectment or unlawful
detainer case.

Sales; When the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.Article 1498 of the Civil Code provides

that when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. In the instant case, petitioners failed to
present any evidence to show that they had no intention of delivering the subject lots to
respondent when they executed the said deed of sale. Hence, petitioners execution of the
deed of sale is tantamount to a delivery of the subject lots to respondent. The fact that
petitioners remained in possession of the disputed properties does not prove that there was
no delivery, because as found by the lower courts, such possession is only by respondents
mere tolerance.
Yambot vs. Tuquero, 646 SCRA 249, March 23, 2011

Criminal Procedure; Certiorari; Probable Cause; Advincula v. Court of Appeals, 343 SCRA 583
(2000), cannot be read to completely disallow the institution of certiorari proceedings against
the Secretary of Justices determination of probable cause when the criminal information has
already been filed in court.Similar to the present case, in Advincula, respondents Amando
and Isagani Ocampo filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals
questioning the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice which had earlier led to the filing of
Informations against them in court. The Court of Appeals granted the Petition and set aside
the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. In reversing the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
we applied the rule that certiorari, being an extraordinary writ, cannot be resorted to when
other remedies are available. The Court observed that respondents had other remedies
available to them, such as the filing of a Motion to Quash the Information under Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, or allowing the trial to proceed where they could either file a demurrer to
evidence or present their evidence to disprove the charges against them. At the outset, it
should be made clear that the Court is not abandoning the foregoing ruling in Advincula.
However, Advincula cannot be read to completely disallow the institution of certiorari
proceedings against the Secretary of Justices determination of probable cause when the
criminal information has already been filed in court. Under exceptional circumstances, a
petition for certiorari assailing the resolution of the Secretary of Justice (involving an appeal of
the prosecutors ruling on probable cause) may be allowed, notwithstanding the filing of an
information with the trial court.

Criminal Law; Libel; Elements; The following elements constitute libel: (a) imputation of a
discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the
person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice.Libel is defined as a public and malicious

imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status or circumstance tending to discredit or cause the dishonor or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Consequently, the following
elements constitute libel: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b)
publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d) existence of malice.
The glaring absence of maliciousness in the assailed portion of the news article subject of this
case negates the existence of probable cause that libel has been committed by the PDI staff.

Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; Malice; Words and Phrases; A newspaper should not be
held to account to a point of suppression for honest mistakes, or imperfection in the choice of
words. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure
the reputation of the person defamed and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable
harm.A newspaper should not be held to account to a point of suppression for honest
mistakes, or imperfection in the choice of words. While, indeed, the allegation of inappropriate
sexual advances in an appeal of a contempt ruling does not turn such case into one for sexual
harassment, we agree with petitioners proposition that the subject news articles author, not
having any legal training, cannot be expected to make the fine distinction between a sexual
harassment suit and a suit where there was an allegation of sexual harassment. In fact, three
other newspapers reporting the same incident committed the same mistake: the Manila Times
article was headlined Judge in sex case now in physical injury rap; the Philippine Star article
described Judge Cruz as (a) Makati judge who was previously charged with sexual
harassment by a lady prosecutor; and the Manila Standard Article referred to him as (a)
Makati judge who was reportedly charged with sexual harassment by a lady fiscal. The
questioned portion of the news article, while unfortunately not quite accurate, on its own, is
insufficient to establish the element of malice in libel cases. We have held that malice
connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation
of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is
present when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.

Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Fair Commentaries; Privileged Communication; The concept
of privileged communication is implicit in the constitutionally protected freedom of the press,
which would be threatened when criminal suits are unscrupulously leveled by persons wishing
to silence the media on account of unfounded claims of inaccuracies in news reports.In

Borjal v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 1 (1999), we held that [a] newspaper especially one
national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events and developments in which
the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or
another on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps
within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general community. Like fair
commentaries on matters of public interest, fair reports on the same should thus be included
under the protective mantle of privileged communications, and should not be subjected to
microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. The concept of privileged
communication is implicit in the constitutionally protected freedom of the press, which would
be threatened when criminal suits are unscrupulously leveled by persons wishing to silence
the media on account of unfounded claims of inaccuracies in news reports. [Yambot vs.
Tuquero, 646 SCRA 249(2011)]
Ochoa vs. China Banking Corporation, 646 SCRA 414, March 23, 2011

Mortgages; Foreclosure of Mortgage; Act No. 3135; Venue; The extrajudicial foreclosure sale
of a real estate mortgage cannot be made legally outside of the province in which the property
sold is situated.The extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a real estate mortgage is governed by
Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Sale
of Property Under Special Powers Inserted In or Annexed to Real-Estate Mortgages. Sections
1 and 2 thereof clearly state: Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in
or attached to any real-estate mortgage hereafter made as security for the payment of money
or the fulfillment of any other obligation, the provisions of the following sections shall govern
as to the manner in which the sale and redemption shall be effected, whether or not provision
for the same is made in the power. Sec. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the

province in which the property sold is situated; and in case the place within said province in
which the sale is to be made is the subject of stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place
or in the municipal building of the municipality in which the property or part thereof is situated.
The case at bar involves petitioners mortgaged real property located in Paraaque City over
which respondent bank was granted a special power to foreclose extrajudicially. Thus, by
express provision of Section 2, the sale can only be made in Paraaque City.

Same; Same; Same; Venue; Actions; Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court (Venue of Actions),
cannot be made to apply to a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure because the provisions of
Rule 4 pertain to venue of actions, which an extrajudicial foreclosure is not.The exclusive

venue of Makati City, as stipulated by the parties and sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court, cannot be made to apply to the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure filed by
respondent bank because the provisions of Rule 4 pertain to venue of actions, which an
extrajudicial foreclosure is not. Pertinent are the following disquisitions in Supena v. De la
Rosa: Section 1, Rule 2 [of the Rules of Court] defines an action in this wise: Action means an
ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Hagans v. Wislizenus does
not depart from this definition when it states that [A]n action is a formal demand of ones legal
rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. xxx. It is clear
that the determinative or operative fact which converts a claim into an action or suit is the
filing of the same with a court of justice. Filed elsewhere, as with some other body or office
not a court of justice, the claim may not be categorized under either term. Unlike an action, an
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is initiated by filing a petition not with any
court of justice but with the office of the sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made.
By no stretch of the imagination can the office of the sheriff come under the category of a
court of justice. And as aptly observed by the complainant, if ever the executive judge comes
into the picture, it is only because he exercises administrative supervision over the sheriff. But
this administrative supervision, however, does not change the fact that extrajudicial
foreclosures are not judicial proceedings, actions or suits.

Same; Same; Same; Same; With respect to the venue of extrajudicial foreclosure sales, Act No.
3135, as amended, applies, it being a special law dealing particularly with extrajudicial
foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages, and not the general provisions of the Rules of
Court on Venue of Actionsstipulated venue is relevant only to actions arising from or related
to the mortgage, such as a complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages.With

respect to the venue of extrajudicial foreclosure sales, Act No. 3135, as amended, applies, it
being a special law dealing particularly with extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate
mortgages, and not the general provisions of the Rules of Court on Venue of Actions.
Consequently, the stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is relevant only to actions arising
from or related to the mortgage, such as petitioners complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure,
Sale, and Damages. [Ochoa vs. China Banking Corporation, 646 SCRA 414(2011)]

Boac vs. Cadapan, 649 SCRA 618, May 31, 2011

Writ of Amparo; Evidence; Witnesses; Judicial Notice; The Court takes judicial notice of its
Decision in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 568 SCRA 1 (2008), which assessed the
account of Manalo to be a candid and forthright narrative of his and his brother Reynaldos
abduction by the military in 2006, there is no compelling reason for the Court, in the present
case, to disturb its appreciation in Manalos testimony.The Court takes judicial notice of its

Decision in the just cited Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, 568 SCRA 1 (2008), which
assessed the account of Manalo to be a candid and forthright narrative of his and his brother
Reynaldos abduction by the military in 2006; and of the corroborative testimonies, in the same
case, of Manalos brother Reynaldo and a forensic specialist, as well as Manalos graphic
description of the detention area. There is thus no compelling reason for the Court, in the
present case, to disturb its appreciation in Manalos testimony. The outright denial of
petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. thus crumbles.

Same; Parties; Habeas Corpus; The exclusive and successive order mandated by Section 2 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo must be followed since the order of priority is not without
reasonto prevent the indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions for amparo which may
even prejudice the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.Petitioners finally

point out that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen do not have the requisite standing to file the
amparo petition on behalf of Merino. They call attention to the fact that in the amparo petition,
the parents of Sherlyn and Karen merely indicated that they were concerned with Manuel
Merino as basis for filing the petition on his behalf. Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo provides: The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person
or entity in the following order: (a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse,
children and parents of the aggrieved party; (b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral
relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in
default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or (c) Any concerned citizen,
organization, association or institution, if there is no known member of the immediate family or
relative of the aggrieved party. Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen failed to allege that
there were no known members of the immediate family or relatives of Merino. The exclusive
and successive order mandated by the above-quoted provision must be followed. The order of
priority is not without reasonto prevent the indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions
for amparo which may even prejudice the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.

Same; Same; Habeas Corpus; In a habeas corpus proceeding, any person may apply for the
writ on behalf of the aggrieved party.The Court notes that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen

also filed the petition for habeas corpus on Merinos behalf. No objection was raised therein
for, in a habeas corpus proceeding, any person may apply for the writ on behalf of the
aggrieved party. It is thus only with respect to the amparo petition that the parents of Sherlyn
and Karen are precluded from filing the application on Merinos behalf as they are not
authorized parties under the Rule.

Presidency; Presidential Immunity; Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure
of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no
need to provide for it in the Constitution or lawit will degrade the dignity of the high office of
the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as
such.The Court finds the appellate courts dismissal of the petitions against then President

Arroyo well-taken, owing to her immunity from suit at the time the habeas corpus and amparo
petitions were filed. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or
actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to
provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.
Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and
anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties

imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.
xxx Parenthetically, the petitions are bereft of any allegation that then President Arroyo
permitted, condoned or performed any wrongdoing against the three missing persons.

Writs of Amparo; Command Responsibility; The evolution of the command responsibility

doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats; Command
responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity, and thus a substantive rule that points
to criminal or administrative liability.Rubrico v. Macapagal Arroyo, 613 SCRA 233 (2010),

expounded on the concept of command responsibility as follows: The evolution of the

command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and
armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, command responsibility, in its simplest terms,
means the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of
the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict. In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The
Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing
the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his
subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated,
command responsibility is an omission mode of individual criminal liability, whereby the
superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent
or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (citations omitted; emphasis in
the original; underscoring supplied) It bears stressing that command responsibility is properly
a form of criminal complicity, and thus a substantive rule that points to criminal or
administrative liability.

Same; Same; An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal
liability of individuals or entities involved, and neither does it partake of a civil or administrative
suitrather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of action to
government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of
aggrieved individuals.An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain

the criminal liability of individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or
administrative suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of
action to government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security
of aggrieved individuals. Thus Razon Jr. v. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), enlightens: [An
amparo proceeding] does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least
accountability, for the enforced disappearancefor purposes of imposing the appropriate
remedies to address the disappearance (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Responsibility and Accountability, Explained.Tagitis

defines what constitutes responsibility and accountability, viz.: xxx. Responsibility refers
to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the
remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and
civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other
hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the
level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have
failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our

primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and
his liberty and security are restored. (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Same; Same; While the concept of command responsibility does not apply in amparo cases to
determine criminal liability, it may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those
accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an
amparo court would issuein such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal
responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect
the rights of the aggrieved party.Rubrico categorically denies the application of command

responsibility in amparo cases to determine criminal liability. The Court maintains its
adherence to this pronouncement as far as amparo cases are concerned. Rubrico, however,
recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in amparo cases to
instances of determining the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that are dutybound to abate any transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. If
command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at
most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the
duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court
to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights
covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be
pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a
prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if
there be any. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) In other words, command responsibility
may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable individuals that
have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In
such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint
the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.

Same; Same; Statutes; Republic Act No. 9851 (RA 9851); Republic Act No. 9851 is the
substantive law that definitively imputes criminal liability to those superiors who, despite their
position, still fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent
or repress the commission of illegal acts or to submit these matters to the competent
authorities for investigation and prosecution.The legislature came up with Republic Act No.
9851 (RA 9851) to include command responsibility as a form of criminal complicity in crimes
against international humanitarian law, genocide and other crimes. RA 9851 is thus the
substantive law that definitively imputes criminal liability to those superiors who, despite their
position, still fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent
or repress the commission of illegal acts or to submit these matters to the competent
authorities for investigation and prosecution.

Same; Same; The appellate court erred when it did not specifically name the respondents that
it found to be responsible for the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and
Merino.The Court finds that the appellate court erred when it did not specifically name the
respondents that it found to be responsible for the abduction and continued detention of
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. For, from the records, it appears that the responsible and
accountable individuals are Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac, Arnel
Enriquez and Donald Caigas. They should thus be made to comply with the September 17,
2008 Decision of the appellate court to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino should be dismissed for lack of
merit as there is no showing that they were even remotely accountable and responsible for the
abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.

Same; Writs of Execution; There is no need to file a motion for execution for an amparo or
habeas corpus decision.Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a

motion for execution for an amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty
and security of a person is at stake, the proceedings should not be delayed and execution of
any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as possible since any form of delay, even for
a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to immediately protect.
Same; Same; The Rules of Court only find suppletory application in an amparo proceeding if
the Rules strengthen, rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writa motion for
execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy being offered by an
amparo proceeding.The Solicitor Generals argument that the Rules of Court supplement the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo is misplaced. The Rules of Court only find suppletory application in
an amparo proceeding if the Rules strengthen, rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of
the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with dilatory motions in view of the urgency in securing
the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Suffice it to state that a motion for execution
is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy being offered by an amparo
proceeding.

Same; Same; Summary Procedure; The appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to
immediately release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino was not automatically executory; Summary
proceedings, it bears emphasis, are immediately executory without prejudice to further
appeals that may be taken therefrom.The appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to
immediately release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino was not automatically executory. For that
would defeat the very purpose of having summary proceedings in amparo petitions. Summary
proceedings, it bears emphasis, are immediately executory without prejudice to further
appeals that may be taken therefrom. [Boac vs. Cadapan, 649 SCRA 618(2011)]
Ermita vs. Aldecoa-Delorino, 651 SCRA 128, June 07, 2011

Special Civil Actions; Prohibition; Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but
not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions.Holy Spirit Homeowners Association v.

Defensor, 497 SCRA 581 (2006), expounds on prohibition as a remedy to assail executive
issuances: A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in
the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when
said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are
accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or
ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions.

Remedial Law; Certiorari; Certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct
its assigned errors; Exceptions.Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless
a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an
opportunity to correct its assigned errors. This rule, however, is not without exceptions. The
rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the order is a
patent nullity, as where the court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in
the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the

same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests
of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d)
where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial
court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity
to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

Same; Preliminary Injunction; The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a

pending case rests on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance thereof.It is well
to emphasize that the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests
on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance thereof. In the present case, however,
where it is the Government which is being enjoined from implementing an issuance which
enjoys the presumption of validity, such discretion must be exercised with utmost caution.

Same; Same; Even if it is a temporary and ancillary remedy, its issuance should not be trifled
with, and an applicant must convincingly show its entitlement to the relief.Indeed, a writ of
preliminary injunction is issued precisely to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable
injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied or adjudicatedto
preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. Still, even if it is a
temporary and ancillary remedy, its issuance should not be trifled with, and an applicant must
convincingly show its entitlement to the relief.

Same; Same; Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP) must

show that it has a clear and unmistakable right that is violated and that there is an urgent
necessity for its issuance.It is thus ineluctable that for it to be entitled to the writ, the APMP
must show that it has a clear and unmistakable right that is violated and that there is an urgent
necessity for its issuance. That APMP had cause of action and the standing to interpose the
action for prohibition did not ipso facto call for the grant of injunctive relief in its favor without
it proving its entitlement thereto.

Same; Same; Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP) was

seeking protection over future economic benefits which, at best, it had an inchoate right to;
Tariff protection is not a right, but a privilege granted by the government and, therefore,
Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP) cannot claim redress
for alleged violation thereof.Contrary to public respondents ruling, APMP failed to adduce
any evidence to prove that it had a clear and unmistakable right which was or would be
violated by the enforcement of E.O. 486. The filing of the petition at the court a quo was
anchored on APMP and its members fear of loss or reduction of their income once E.O. 486 is
implemented and imported plastic and similar products flood the domestic market due to
reduced tariff rates. As correctly posited by petitioner, APMP was seeking protection over
future economic benefits which, at best, it had an inchoate right to. More importantly, tariff
protection is not a right, but a privilege granted by the government and, therefore, APMP
cannot claim redress for alleged violation thereof.

Same; Same; Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance
of injunction where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with
reasonable accuracy; What includes an irreparable injury.Respecting the element of

irreparable injury, the landmark case of Social Security Commission v. Bayona, 5 SCRA 126
(1962), teaches: Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the
issuance of injunction where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured
with reasonable accuracy (Crouc v. Central Labor Council, 83 ALR, 193). An irreparable injury
which a court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing
kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by conjecture,
and not by any accurate standard of measurement (Phipps v. Rogue River Valley Canal Co., 7
ALR, 741). An irreparable injury to authorize an injunction consists of a serious charge of, or
is destructive to, the property it affects, either physically or in the character in which it has
been held and enjoined, or when the property has some peculiar quality or use, so that its
pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the owner of the loss thereof [Ermita vs. AldecoaDelorino, 651 SCRA 128(2011)]
Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation vs. Bonifacio, 651 SCRA 327, June 08, 2011

Land Titles; Quieting of Title; In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not only to place
things in their proper places, and make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable,
respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever
has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter
fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the
property.Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon, doubt,

or uncertainty affecting title to real property. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property
or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title. In such action, the competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not only to place
things in their proper places, and make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable,
respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever
has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter
fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property.

Same; Same; Requisites.In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two

requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest
in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Same; Same; Elements.The cloud on title consists of: (1) any instrument, record, claim,

encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is in truth and in
fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable; and (4) may be prejudicial to the title
sought to be quieted. The fourth element is not present in the case at bar.

Same; Same; An action to quiet title is characterized as a proceeding quasi in

rem.Significantly, an action to quiet title is characterized as a proceeding quasi in rem. In an

action quasi in rem, an individual is named a defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is
to subject his interests to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem
deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to
operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not

to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgment therein is
binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.

Same; Same; Declaratory Relief; A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for
ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately
available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before
they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of
wrongs.An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of

the instruments involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for
declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or
compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may
be entertained before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers.
A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not
reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a
form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations,
an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.

Same; Same; Same; The nature of the relief in an action for declaratory relief is that the
judgment in the case can be carried into effect without requiring the parties to pay damages or
to perform any act.In the present case, petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title after it
was served a notice to vacate but before it could be dispossessed of the subject properties.
Notably, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 43034, had earlier set aside the Order which
granted partial partition in favor of Eleuteria Rivera and the Writ of Possession issued pursuant
thereto. And although petitioners complaint is captioned as Quieting of Title and Damages, all
that petitioner prayed for, is for the court to uphold the validity of its titles as against that of
respondents. This is consistent with the nature of the relief in an action for declaratory relief
where the judgment in the case can be carried into effect without requiring the parties to pay
damages or to perform any act. Thus, while petitioner was not able to demonstrate that
respondents TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera constitutes a cloud over its
title, it has nevertheless successfully established its ownership over the subject properties and
the validity of its titles which entitles it to declaratory relief.

Lucas vs. Lucas, 650 SCRA 667, June 06, 2011

Actions; Pleadings, Practice and Procedure; An order denying a motion to dismiss is an

interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves
something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the meritsas such,
the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil
action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors
of judgment.Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of the trial court were orders
denying respondents motion to dismiss the petition for illegitimate filiation. An order denying
a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a
case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the
merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned
in a special civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the
subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In a number of

cases, the court has granted the extraordinary remedy of certiorari on the denial of the motion
to dismiss but only when it has been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. In the present case, we discern no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss.

Same; Jurisdiction; A petition directed against the thing itself or the res, which concerns the
status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries
in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.An action in personam is lodged against a person

based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the
person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject
that persons interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed
against the thing itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for
adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in
rem. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for
the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court,
provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either
(a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody
of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the
court is recognized and made effective.

Same; Same; Filiation; Due Process; A petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in
remby the simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition,
the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case; If at all, service of summons or notice is
made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but
merely for satisfying the due process requirements.The herein petition to establish

illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple filing of the petition to establish
illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the
proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection
of any sort to the right sought to be established. Through publication, all interested parties are
deemed notified of the petition. If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the
defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for
satisfying the due process requirements. This is but proper in order to afford the person
concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. Hence, failure to serve
summons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case,
the lack of summons may be excused where it is determined that the adverse party had, in fact,
the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. We find that the due process requirement
with respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that he has participated in the
proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the petition to
establish filiation.

Same; Same; Same; A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.To address
respondents contention that the petition should have been adversarial in form, we further hold
that the herein petition to establish filiation was sufficient in form. It was indeed adversarial in
nature despite its caption which lacked the name of a defendant, the failure to implead
respondent as defendant, and the non-service of summons upon respondent. A proceeding is

adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and
afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. In this petitionclassified as an action in
remthe notice requirement for an adversarial proceeding was likewise satisfied by the
publication of the petition and the giving of notice to the Solicitor General, as directed by the
trial court.

Same; Same; Pleadings, Practice and Procedure; Cause of Action; Elements; A fact is essential
if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action
inadequate.The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section 1,

Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which requires the complaint to contain a plain, concise, and
direct statement of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is
essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action
inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains the following elements: (1)
the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.

Same; Same; Same; Paternity; Evidence; A party is confronted by the so-called procedural
aspects in a paternity case during trial, when the parties have presented their respective
evidencethey are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the
proceedings; A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in
the initiatory pleading.The statement in Herrera v. Alba, 460 SCRA 197 (2005), that there are

four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face
has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these socalled procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective
evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the
proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation
that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie casethe first procedural aspect in a paternity
caseis therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading. Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss
the lack of a prima facie case vis--vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as
yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under
the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that no such order has yet
been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for hearing.

Same; Same; Same; Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing; Paternity; Searches and Seizures;
In some foreign states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under
their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be
valid, hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in
civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause; The same condition precedent
should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment
suitsthus, during the hearing on the motion for Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) testing, the
petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a

show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of the
test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under their
Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid.
Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana
eloquently explainedAlthough a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional

prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper
showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must
be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions
have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have
almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can
constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as
a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the
moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to
voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants
issuance of a court order for blood testing. The same condition precedent should be applied in
our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the
hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or
establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
Del Rosario vs. Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc., 651 SCRA 414, June 08, 2011

Actions; Admissions; Judicial Admissions; Words and Phrases; A judicial admission is one so
made in pleadings filed or in the progress of a trial as to dispense with the introduction of
evidence otherwise necessary to dispense with some rules of practice necessary to be
observed and complied with.A judicial admission is one so made in pleadings filed or in the

progress of a trial as to dispense with the introduction of evidence otherwise necessary to

dispense with some rules of practice necessary to be observed and complied with.
Correspondingly, facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admissions of the plaintiff and
binding upon him. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are
conclusive as against the pleader.

Same; Ejectment; Words and Phrases; Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer,
Distinguished.This Court, in Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 372 (1994),

differentiated the distinct causes of action in forcible entry vis--vis unlawful detainer, to wit:
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any
land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer,
one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to
hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is
illegal from the beginning and the only issue is who has the prior possession de facto. In
unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or
termination of the right to possess and the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for
in such action, the defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of
action is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession.

Same; Same; Same; Forcible Entry; The words by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth
shall include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon
real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession, therefrom.The words by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth shall include every situation or condition under
which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had
prior possession, therefrom. The foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion of
the original possessor by a person who has entered without right. The act of going on the
property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of

force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. The employment of force, in this case,
can be deduced from petitioners allegation that respondent took full control and possession
of the subject property without their consent and authority.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Stealth and Strategy, Explained.Stealth, on the other hand, is

defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or
remain within residence of another without permission, while strategy connotes the
employment of machinations or artifices to gain possession of the subject property. The CA
found that based on the petitioners allegations in their complaint, respondents entry on the
land of the petitioners was by stealth xxx. However, stealth as defined requires a clandestine
character which is not availing in the instant case as the entry of the respondent into the
property appears to be with the knowledge of the petitioners as shown by petitioners
allegation in their complaint that [c]onsidering the personalities behind the defendant
foundation and considering further that it is plaintiffs nephew, then the vice-mayor, and now
the Mayor of the City of Roxas Antonio A. del Rosario, although without any legal or
contractual right, who transacted with the foundation, plaintiffs did not interfere with the
activities of the foundation using their property. To this Courts mind, this allegation if true,
also illustrates strategy.

Same; Same; Forcible Entry; Where the plaintiffs maintained that the defendant took
possession and control of the subject property without any contractual or legal basis, the
foundation of their complaint is one for forcible entry.In forcible entry, one is deprived of
physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth. [W]here the defendants possession of the property is illegal ab initio, the summary
action for forcible entry (detentacion) is the remedy to recover possession. In their Complaint,
petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession and control of the subject property
without any contractual or legal basis. Assuming that these allegations are true, it hence
follows that respondents possession was illegal from the very beginning. Therefore, the
foundation of petitioners complaint is one for forcible entrythat is the forcible exclusion of
the original possessor by a person who has entered without right. Thus, and as correctly
found by the CA, there can be no tolerance as petitioners alleged that respondents possession
was illegal at the inception. Corollarily, since the deprivation of physical possession, as alleged
in petitioners Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy and force, this
Court finds that the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible Entry
and not the instant suit for unlawful detainer.

Same; Same; Same; Prescription; Where the action for forcible entry was filed beyond one year
from dispossession, the Complaint failed to state a valid cause of action.Petitioners likewise
alleged in their Complaint that respondent took possession and occupancy of subject property
in 1991. Considering that the action for forcible entry must be filed within one year from the
time of dispossession, the action for forcible entry has already prescribed when petitioners
filed their Complaint in 2003. As a consequence, the Complaint failed to state a valid cause of
action against the respondent.
Home Guaranty Corporation vs. R-II Builders, Inc., 652 SCRA 649, June 22, 2011

Remedial Law; Actions; Jurisdiction; In Atwel v. Concepcion Progressive Association, Inc., 551
SCRA 272 (2008), and Reyes v. Hon. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142, 561 SCRA
593 (2008), which involve SCCs trying and/or deciding cases which were found to be civil in
nature, this Court significantly ordered the dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction

instead of simply directing the re-raffle of the case to another branch.The record shows that,

with the raffle of R-II Builders complaint before Branch 24 of the Manila RTC and said courts
grant of the application for temporary restraining order incorporated therein, HGC sought a
preliminary hearing of its affirmative defenses which included, among other grounds, lack of
jurisdiction and improper venue. It appears that, at said preliminary hearing, it was established
that R-II Builders complaint did not involve an intra-corporate dispute and that, even if it is,
venue was improperly laid since none of the parties maintained its principal office in Manila.
While it is true, therefore, that R-II Builders had no hand in the raffling of the case, it cannot be
gainsaid that Branch 24 of the RTC Manila had no jurisdiction over the case. Rather than
ordering the dismissal of the complaint, however, said court issued the 2 January 2008 order
erroneously ordering the re-raffle of the case. In Atwel v. Concepcion Progressive Association,
Inc., 551 SCRA 272 (2008), and Reyes v. Hon. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142, 561
SCRA 593 (2008), which involved SCCs trying and/or deciding cases which were found to be
civil in nature, this Court significantly ordered the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction instead of simply directing the re-raffle of the case to another branch.

Same; Same; Same; While it is, consequently, true that jurisdiction, once required, cannot be
easily ousted, it is equally settled that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the
payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees.Even then, the question of the Manila RTCs

jurisdiction over the case is tied up with R-II Builders payment of the correct docket fees
which should be paid in full upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates
an action or proceeding. While it is, consequently, true that jurisdiction, once acquired, cannot
be easily ousted, it is equally settled that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon
the payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees. Already implicit from the filing of the
complaint in the City of Manila where the realties comprising the Asset Pool are located, the
fact that the case is a real action is evident from the allegations of R-II Builders original
Complaint, Amended and Supplemental Complaint and Second Amended Complaint which not
only sought the nullification of the DAC in favor of HGC but, more importantly, prayed for the
transfer of possession of and/or control of the properties in the Asset Pool. Its current
protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, no less than R-II Builders in its opposition to
HGCs motion to dismissadmitted that the case is a real action as it affects title to or
possession of real property or an interest therein. Having only paid docket fees corresponding
to an action where the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation, R-II Builders cannot
expediently claim that jurisdiction over the case had already attached.

Same; Same; Same; A case for rescission or annulment of contract is not susceptible of
pecuniary estimation although it may eventually result in the recovery of real property; In
determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought; Determination must be done on a case-to-case basis, depending on
the facts and circumstances of each.In De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 94 (1998),

this Court had, of course, ruled that a case for rescission or annulment of contract is not
susceptible of pecuniary estimation although it may eventually result in the recovery of real
property. Taking into consideration the allegations and the nature of the relief sought in the
complaint in the subsequent case of Serrano v. Delica, 465 SCRA 82 (2005), however, this
Court determined the existence of a real action and ordered the payment of the appropriate
docket fees for a complaint for cancellation of sale which prayed for both permanent and
preliminary injunction aimed at the restoration of possession of the land in litigation is a real
action. In discounting the apparent conflict in said rulings, the Court went on to rule as follows
in Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation v. Hon. Pablo C, Formaran, 578

SCRA 283 (2009), to wit: The Court x x x does not perceive a contradiction between Serrano
and the Spouses De Leon. The Court calls attention to the following statement in Spouses De
Leon: A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an
action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought.
Necessarily, the determination must be done on a case-to-case basis, depending on the facts
and circumstances of each. What petitioner conveniently ignores is that in Spouses De Leon,
the action therein that private respondents instituted before the RTC was solely for annulment
or rescission of the contract of sale over a real property. There appeared to be no transfer of
title or possession to the adverse party xxx. (Underscoring Supplied)

Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction over any case is acquired only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and jurisdictional.In obvious evasion of said

directive to pay the correct docket fees, however, R-II Builders withdrew its Amended and
Supplemental Complaint and, in lieu thereof, filed its Second Amended Complaint which, while
deleting its causes of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession of
the entire Asset Pool, nevertheless prayed for its appointment as Receiver of the properties
comprising the same. In the landmark case of Manchester Development Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (1987), this Court ruled that jurisdiction over any case is acquired
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and jurisdictional.
Although it is true that the Manchester Rule does not apply despite insufficient filing fees
when there is no intent to defraud the government, R-II Builders evident bad faith should
clearly foreclose the relaxation of said rule.
Republic vs. Peralta, 653 SCRA 629, July 06, 2011

Lease; Ejectment; Contractual stipulations empowering the lessor to repossess the leased
property extrajudicially from a lessee whose lease has expired are valid.Petitioner argues

that a judicial action is not necessary to evict respondents and intervenors from the leased
military quarters because their contracts of lease have long expired. Petitioner adds that the
contracts of lease specifically authorized petitioner to extrajudicially take over the possession
of the leased military quarters after the expiration of their contracts. Contractual stipulations
empowering the lessor to repossess the leased property extrajudicially from a lessee whose
lease has expired have been held to be valid. Being the law between the parties, they must be
respected.

Same; Same; Military Personnel; Bonifacio Naval Station, a military facility or reservation that
is subject to special military regulations commensurate to the requirements of safety and
protection of military equipment and personnel, is outside the commerce of man and the lease
of quarters to military personnel in the service is merely incidental to their military
service.Respondents and intervenors, who are no longer in the military service, are

occupying quarters in the Bonifacio Naval Station, a military facility or reservation that is
subject to special military regulations commensurate to the requirements of safety and
protection of military equipment and personnel. The naval facility is outside the commerce of
man and the lease of quarters to military personnel in the service is merely incidental to their
military service. Such lease is not an ordinary lease of a residential or commercial building.
Upon retirement of the military personnel, their quarters have to be occupied by the military
personnel in the active service who replace them.

Same; Same; There is considerable authority in American law upholding the validity of

stipulations authorizing the use of all necessary force or reasonable force in making reentry upon the expiration of the lease.In Viray v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 198 SCRA 786

(1991), we pointed out that there is considerable authority in American law upholding the
validity of stipulations authorizing the use of all necessary force or reasonable force in
making re-entry upon the expiration of the lease. We stated: Although the authorities are not in
entire accord, the better view seems to be, even in jurisdictions adopting the view that the
landlord cannot forcibly eject a tenant who wrongfully holds without incurring civil liability, that
nevertheless, where a lease provides that if the tenant holds over after the expiration of his
term, the landlord may enter and take possession of the premises, using all necessary force to
obtain the actual possession thereof, and that such entry should not be regarded as trespass,
be sued for as such, or in any wise be considered unlawful, the landlord may forcibly expel the
tenant upon the termination of the tenancy, using no more force than necessary, and will not
be liable to the tenant therefor, such a condition in a lease being valid.

Same; Same; Where the lessees agreed to abide by the regulations of the military facility,
judicial action is no longer necessary to evict them from the military quarters.Since

respondents and intervenors agreed to abide by the foregoing regulations of the military
facility, judicial action is no longer necessary to evict respondents and intervenors from the
military quarters. Respondents and intervenors authorized petitioner to extrajudicially take
over the possession of the leased military housing quarters after their retirement. This is also
in line with the policy of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Navy to provide
military quarters for the exclusive use of military personnel who are in the active service.
Burgos vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 653 SCRA 512 , July 05, 2011

Writ of Amparo; The Court resolved to hold in abeyance our ruling on the merits in the Amparo
aspect of the present case and refer this case back to the Court of Appeals (CA) in order to
allow Lt. Baliaga and the present Amparo respondents to file their respective Comments on the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) Report within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of this Resolution.After reviewing the evidence in the present case, the CA

findings and our findings in our June 22, 2010 Resolution heretofore mentioned, including the
recent CHR findings that Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., (Lt. Baliaga) of the 56th Infantry Battalion, 7th
Infantry Division, Philippine Army is one of the abductors of Jonas, we resolve to hold in
abeyance our ruling on the merits in the Amparo aspect of the present case and refer this case
back to the CA in order to allow Lt. Baliaga and the present Amparo respondents to file their
respective Comments on the CHR Report within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of this Resolution. The CA shall continue with the hearing of the Amparo petition
in light of the evidence previously submitted, the proceedings it already conducted and the
subsequent developments in this case, particularly the CHR Report. Thereafter, the CA shall
rule on the merits of the Amparo petition. For this purpose, we order that Lt. Baliaga be
impleaded as a party to the Amparo petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA). This directive to
implead Lt. Baliaga is without prejudice to similar directives we may issue with respect to
others whose identities and participation may be disclosed in future investigations.

Same; The Court resolved to require General Roa of The Judge Advocate General (TJAG),
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at
the time of our June 22, 2010 Resolution, and then incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, to show
cause and explain, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
Resolution, why they should not be held in contempt of this Court for defying our June 22,
2010 Resolution.Section 16 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that any person who

otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court may be punished for
contempt, viz.: SEC.16.Contempt.The court, justice or judge may order the respondent
who refuses to make a return, or who makes a false return, or any person who otherwise
disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court to be punished for contempt. The
contemnor may be imprisoned or imposed a fine. Acting on the CHRs recommendation and
based on the above considerations, we resolve to require General Roa of TJAG, AFP, and the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our June 22, 2010 Resolution, and
then incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, to show cause and explain, within a non-extendible period
of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, why they should not be held in contempt of
this Court for defying our June 22, 2010 Resolution.

Same; Habeas Corpus; In light of the new evidence obtained by the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) that positively identified Lt. Baliaga as one of the direct perpetrators in the
abduction of Jonas and in the interest of justice, the Court resolved to set aside the Court of
Appeals (CAs) dismissal of the habeas corpus petition and issue anew the writ of habeas
corpus returnable to the Presiding Justice of the CA who shall immediately refer the writ to the
same CA division that decided the habeas corpus petition.In light of the new evidence

obtained by the CHR, particularly the Cabintoy evidence that positively identified Lt. Baliaga as
one of the direct perpetrators in the abduction of Jonas and in the interest of justice, we
resolve to set aside the CAs dismissal of the habeas corpus petition and issue anew the writ
of habeas corpus returnable to the Presiding Justice of the CA who shall immediately refer the
writ to the same CA division that decided the habeas corpus petition (CA-GR SP No. 99839).
For this purpose, we also order that Lt. Baliaga be impleaded as a party to the habeas corpus
petition and require himtogether with the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP; the incumbent
Commanding General, Philippine Army; and the Commanding Officer of the 56th IB at the time
of the disappearance of Jonas, Lt. Col. Felicianoto produce the person of Jonas and to show
cause why he should not be released from detention.

Same; Same; Contempt; Types and Nature of Contempt; The charge of filing a false return
constitutes improper conduct that serves no other purpose but to mislead, impede and
obstruct the administration of justice by the Court.In Montenegro v. Montenegro, 431 SCRA

415 (2004), we explained the types and nature of contempt, as follows: Contempt of court
involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront
to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. It is defined as disobedience to
the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. The power to punish
contempt is inherent in all courts, because it is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the courts; and,
consequently, to the due administration of justice. xxx Contempt, whether direct or indirect,
may be civil or criminal depending on the nature and effect of the contemptuous act. Criminal
contempt is conduct directed against the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting
judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court
into disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt is the failure to do something
ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is
therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order was made. If the
purpose is to punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if to compensate, then it is civil.
[emphasis supplied] We agree with the CA that indirect contempt is the appropriate
characterization of the charge filed by the petitioner against the respondents and that the
charge is criminal in nature. Evidently, the charge of filing a false return constitutes improper
conduct that serves no other purpose but to mislead, impede and obstruct the administration
of justice by the Court. In People v. Godoy, 243 SCRA 64 (1995), which the CA cited, we

specifically held that under paragraph (d) of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice constitutes criminal contempt.

Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; A criminal contempt proceeding has been
characterized as sui generis as it partakes some of the elements of both a civil and criminal
proceeding, without completely falling under either proceedingits identification with a
criminal proceeding is in the use of the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, to the
extent that criminal procedure is consistent with the summary nature of a contempt
proceeding; In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the
burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.A criminal

contempt proceeding has been characterized as sui generis as it partakes some of the
elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, without completely falling under either
proceeding. Its identification with a criminal proceeding is in the use of the principles and rules
applicable to criminal cases, to the extent that criminal procedure is consistent with the
summary nature of a contempt proceeding. We have consistently held and established that the
strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt;
that the accused is afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases; and
that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. Contempt, too, is
not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and
the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. The
presumption of innocence can be overcome only by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
which means proof to the satisfaction of the court and keeping in mind the presumption of
innocence that precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that for which it is given. It is
not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged
is more likely true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable
certainty and moral certaintya certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and
conscience of those who are to act upon it.
Montemayor vs. Millora, 654 SCRA 580, July 27, 2011

Remedial Law; Judgments; Finality of Judgment; Well-settled is the rule that a decision that
has attained finality can no longer be modified even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law.At the outset, it should be stressed that the October 27,
1999 Decision of the RTC is already final and executory. Hence, it can no longer be the subject
of an appeal. Consequently, Jesus is bound by the decision and can no longer impugn the
same. Indeed, well-settled is the rule that a decision that has attained finality can no longer be
modified even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law.

Same; Same; Same; Principle of Immutability of Final Judgment; Except for correction of
clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, or
where the judgment is void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has
become final and executory.To stress, the October 27, 1999 Decision of the RTC has already

attained finality. Such definitive judgment is no longer subject to change, revision,

amendment or reversal. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend,
modify or alter the same. Except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is void, the judgment can
neither be amended nor altered after it has become final and executory. This is the principle of
immutability of final judgment.

Civil Law; Debt; Liquidation of Debt; A debt is liquidated when its existence and amount are

determined; A debt is considered liquidated, not only when it is expressed already in definite
figures which do not require verification, but also when the determination of the exact amount
depends only on a simple arithmetical operation.A debt is liquidated when its existence and

amount are determined. It is not necessary that it be admitted by the debtor. Nor is it
necessary that the credit appear in a final judgment in order that it can be considered as
liquidated; it is enough that its exact amount is known. And a debt is considered liquidated, not
only when it is expressed already in definite figures which do not require verification, but also
when the determination of the exact amount depends only on a simple arithmetical operation.
Lorenzo Shipping Corporation vs. Distribution Management Association of the Philippines,
656 SCRA 331, August 31, 2011

Contempt; Words and Phrases; In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience
to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by
disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its
proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body, while in its restricted and more usual
sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court; There
ought to be no question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to impose
silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to
preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution.Contempt

of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its
broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative
or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent
language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the
respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a
despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is
generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts. The power to punish
for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be specifically granted by statute. It lies at
the core of the administration of a judicial system. Indeed, there ought to be no question that
courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum
in their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their
officers from the approach and insults of pollution. The power to punish for contempt
essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement
of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due
administration of justice. The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect
of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution
of the courts would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

Same; Kinds of Contempt.Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which

is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of
justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the
lawful process or order of the court.

Same; Due Process; The inherent power of courts to punish contempt of court committed in
the presence of the courts without further proof of facts and without aid of a trial is not open to
question, considering that this power is essential to preserve their authority and to prevent the
administration of justice from falling into disreputesuch summary conviction and
punishment accord with due process of law; In contrast, the proceedings for the punishment
of the contumacious act committed outside the personal knowledge of the judge generally
need the observance of all the elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written charges,
and an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before guilt is adjudged and sentence

imposed.The punishment for the first is generally summary and immediate, and no process

or evidence is necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae. The inherent power of
courts to punish contempt of court committed in the presence of the courts without further
proof of facts and without aid of a trial is not open to question, considering that this power is
essential to preserve their authority and to prevent the administration of justice from falling
into disrepute; such summary conviction and punishment accord with due process of law.
There is authority for the view, however, that an act, to constitute direct contempt punishable
by summary proceeding, need not be committed in the immediate presence of the court, if it
tends to obstruct justice or to interfere with the actions of the court in the courtroom itself.
Also, contemptuous acts committed out of the presence of the court, if admitted by the
contemnor in open court, may be punished summarily as a direct contempt, although it is
advisable to proceed by requiring the person charged to appear and show cause why he
should not be punished when the judge is without personal knowledge of the misbehavior and
is informed of it only by a confession of the contemnor or by testimony under oath of other
persons. In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less summary than the first. The
proceedings for the punishment of the contumacious act committed outside the personal
knowledge of the judge generally need the observance of all the elements of due process of
law, that is, notice, written charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges
before guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The word summary with respect to the punishment for
contempt refers not to the timing of the action with reference to the offense but to the
procedure that dispenses with the formality, delay, and digression that result from the
issuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence,
listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a
conventional court trial.The word summary with respect to the punishment for contempt
refers not to the timing of the action with reference to the offense but to the procedure that
dispenses with the formality, delay, and digression that result from the issuance of process,
service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments,
awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a conventional court trial.

Same; The exercise of the summary power to imprison for contempt is a delicate one and care
is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions.The court may proceed upon its own

knowledge of the facts without further proof and without issue or trial in any form to punish a
contempt committed directly under its eye or within its view. But there must be adequate facts
to support a summary order for contempt in the presence of the court. The exercise of the
summary power to imprison for contempt is a delicate one and care is needed to avoid
arbitrary or oppressive conclusions. The reason for the extraordinary power to punish criminal
contempt in summary proceedings is that the necessities of the administration of justice
require such summary dealing with obstructions to it, being a mode of vindicating the majesty
of the law, in its active manifestation, against obstruction and outrage.

Same; Classes of Contempt; A criminal contempt consists in conduct that is directed against
the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully assailing or
discrediting the authority and dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act; A
civil contempt consists in the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or judge in
a civil case for the benefit of the opposing party therein; In general, the character of the
contempt of whether it is criminal or civil is determined by the nature of the contempt involved,
regardless of the cause in which the contempt arose, and by the relief sought or dominant
purpose.Proceedings for contempt are sui generis, in nature criminal, but may be resorted to

in civil as well as criminal actions, and independently of any action. They are of two classes,
the criminal or punitive, and the civil or remedial. A criminal contempt consists in conduct that
is directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially, as in
unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority and dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a
duly forbidden act. A civil contempt consists in the failure to do something ordered to be done
by a court or judge in a civil case for the benefit of the opposing party therein. It is at times
difficult to determine whether the proceedings are civil or criminal. In general, the character of
the contempt of whether it is criminal or civil is determined by the nature of the contempt
involved, regardless of the cause in which the contempt arose, and by the relief sought or
dominant purpose. The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is
primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.
Where the dominant purpose is to enforce compliance with an order of a court for the benefit
of a party in whose favor the order runs, the contempt is civil; where the dominant purpose is
to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court, and to protect the interests of the general
public, the contempt is criminal. Indeed, the criminal proceedings vindicate the dignity of the
courts, but the civil proceedings protect, preserve, and enforce the rights of private parties and
compel obedience to orders, judgments and decrees made to enforce such rights.

Same; Misbehavior means something more than adverse comment or disrespect; A person
should not be condemned for contempt where he contends for what he believes to be right and
in good faith institutes proceedings for the purpose, however erroneous may be his conclusion
as to his rightsto constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or
improper purpose.Mis behavior means something more than adverse comment or
disrespect. There is no question that in contempt the intent goes to the gravamen of the
offense. Thus, the good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered.
Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does not clearly show on its face that it is
contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good faith, is within his rights, the presence
or absence of a contumacious intent is, in some instances, held to be determinative of its
character. A person should not be condemned for contempt where he contends for what he
believes to be right and in good faith institutes proceedings for the purpose, however
erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights. To constitute contempt, the act must be
done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.

Same; The Court has long recognized and respected the right of a lawyer, or of any other
person, for that matter, to be critical of the courts and their judges as long as the criticism is
made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels.We have long recognized and
respected the right of a lawyer, or of any other person, for that matter, to be critical of the
courts and their judges as long as the criticism is made in respectful terms and through
legitimate channels. We have no cause or reason to depart from such recognition and respect,
for the Court has long adhered to the sentiment aptly given expression to in the leading case of
In re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562 (1970): xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and
criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the
criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is
especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the
courts actuation are thrown open to public consumption. xxx Courts and judges are not
sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the
executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society,
nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve. Wellrecognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and

judges.xxx

Same; The test for criticizing a judges decision is whether or not the criticism is bona fide or
done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.The test for
criticizing a judges decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in
good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Viewed through the
prism of the test, the Sea Transport Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and
did not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents were not guilty
of indirect contempt of court. In this regard, then, we need to remind that the power to punish
for contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and
only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect
without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. As judges we ought to exercise
our power to punish contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the
end in view of utilizing the power for the correction and preservation of the dignity of the Court,
not for retaliation or vindictiveness.
Maglana Rice and Corn Mill, Inc. vs. Tan, 658 SCRA 58, September 21, 2011

Remedial Law; Appeals; A petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth; There is a
question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on
certain state of facts; There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsehood of alleged facts.The issue is obviously a factual one because it requires

the ascertainment of which driver was negligent. As such, the appeal fails, for a petition for
review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question, to be one of law, must not
involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any
of them. Indeed, there is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises
as to what the law is on certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.

Same; Same; Exceptions to the limitation of an appeal by certiorari to only questions of

law.Although the Court has recognized several exceptions to the limitation of an appeal by

certiorari to only questions of law, including: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) when in
making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion, this appeal does not come under the exceptions.

Same; Same; Frivolous Appeals; Meaning of a Frivolous Appeal; A losing party has no right to
prosecute a frivolous appeal.A frivolous appeal is one where no error can be brought before
the appellate court, or whose result is obvious and the arguments of error are totally bereft of

merit, or which is prosecuted in bad faith, or which is contrary to established law and
unsupported by a reasoned, colorable argument for change. It is frivolous, too, when it does
not present any justiciable question, or is one so readily recognizable as devoid of merit on the
face of the record that there is little, if any, prospect that it can succeed. A losing party has no
right to prosecute a frivolous appeal, because he and his counsel are not relieved from the
obligation to demonstrate persuasively even when appeal is a matter of right the substantial
and reversible errors committed during the trial.

Same; Costs of Suit; Cost of Suit Explained.Corpus Juris Secundum explains the concept of

costs of suit thusly: Costs are certain allowances authorized by statute or court rule to
reimburse the successful party for expenses incurred in prosecuting or defending an action or
special proceedings. They are in the nature of incidental damages allowed to indemnify a party
against the expense of successfully asserting his rights in court. The theory on which they are
allowed to a plaintiff is that the default of defendant made it necessary to sue him, and to a
defendant, that plaintiff sued him without cause.
De Guzman vs. Tumolva, 659 SCRA 725, October 19, 2011

Construction Industry Arbitration Commission; Appeals; Factual findings of construction

arbitrators are final and conclusive and not reviewable by this Court on appeal.There is no

doubt that De Guzman incurred damages as a result of the collapse of the perimeter fence.
The Contractor is clearly guilty of negligence and, therefore, liable for the damages caused.
xxx As the Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from this factual finding by the CIAC,
as affirmed by the CA. It is settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally
accorded not only respect, but also finality, especially when affirmed by the CA. In particular,
factual findings of construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not reviewable by this
Court on appeal.

Civil Law; Damages; Actual Damages; In determining actual damages, one cannot rely on mere
assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must depend on competent proof and
on the best evidence obtainable regarding specific facts that could afford some basis for
measuring compensatory or actual damages.CIACs award of actual damages, however, is
indeed not proper under the circumstances as there is no concrete evidence to support the
plea. In determining actual damages, one cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations,
conjectures or guesswork, but must depend on competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable regarding specific facts that could afford some basis for measuring compensatory
or actual damages.

Same; Same; Temperate Damages; Temperate damages may be allowed in cases where from
the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the court
is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary loss.Nevertheless, De
Guzman is indeed entitled to temperate damages as provided under Article 2224 of the Civil
Code for the loss she suffered. When pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount cannot,
from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty, temperate damages may be recovered.
Temperate damages may be allowed in cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof
of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party
suffered some pecuniary loss. Undoubtedly, De Guzman suffered pecuniary loss brought
about by the collapse of the perimeter fence by reason of the Contractors negligence and
failure to comply with the specifications. As she failed to prove the exact amount of damage

with certainty as required by law, the CA was correct in awarding temperate damages, in lieu of
actual damages.

Same; Same; Moral Damages; The award of moral damages must be anchored on a clear
showing that she actually experienced mental anguish, besmirched reputation, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings, or similar injury.The award of moral damages must be anchored
on a clear showing that she actually experienced mental anguish, besmirched reputation,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings, or similar injury. There could not have been a better
witness to this experience than De Guzman herself. Her testimony, however, did not provide
specific details of the suffering she allegedly went through after the fence collapsed while she
was miles away in the United States. As the CA aptly observed, the testimony of the OWNER
as to her worry for the safety of the children in the orphanage is insufficient to establish
entitlement thereto. Since an award of moral damages is predicated on a categorical showing
by the claimant that she actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings, it must be
disallowed absent any evidence thereon.
People vs. Mirto, 659 SCRA 796, October 19, 2011

Criminal Law; Theft; Qualified Theft; Elements of the Crime of Theft; Theft is qualified under
Art. 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), when it is, among others, committed with grave
abuse of confidence.The elements of the crime of Theft are: (1) there was a taking of

personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was without the consent
of the owner; (4) the taking was done with intent to gain; and (5) the taking was accomplished
without violence or intimidation against the person or force upon things. Theft is qualified
under Art. 310 of the RPC, when it is, among others, committed with grave abuse of confidence.

Same; Same; Same; Elements of Qualified Theft Committed with Grave Abuse of
Confidence.The elements of Qualified Theft committed with grave abuse of confidence are

as follows: 1. Taking of personal property; 2. That the said property belongs to another; 3. That
the said taking be done with intent to gain; 4. That it be done without the owners consent; 5.
That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things; 6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

Same; Same; Same; Money received by an employee in behalf of his or her employer is
considered to be only in the material possession of the employee.The duty to collect

payments is imposed on accused-appellant because of his position as Branch Manager.

Because of this employer-employee relationship, he cannot be considered an agent of UCC
and is not covered by the Civil Code provisions on agency. Money received by an employee in
behalf of his or her employer is considered to be only in the material possession of the
employee.

Same; Same; Same; Penalties; Considering that accused appellant is convicted of four (4)
counts of Qualified Theft with corresponding four penalties of reclusion perpetua, Art. 70 of
the Revised Penal Code on successive service of sentence shall apply; Despite the four
penalties of reclusion perpetua for four counts of Qualified Theft, accused-appellant shall
suffer imprisonment for a period not exceeding 40 years.In fine, considering that accusedappellant is convicted of four (4) counts of Qualified Theft with corresponding four penalties of
reclusion perpetua, Art. 70 of the RPC on successive service of sentences shall apply. Art. 70
pertinently provides that the maximum duration of the convicts sentence shall not be more
than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed

upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of
those imposed equals the said maximum period. Such maximum period shall in no case
exceed forty years. Applying said rule, despite the four penalties of reclusion perpetua for four
counts of Qualified Theft, accused-appellant shall suffer imprisonment for a period not
exceeding 40 years. [People vs. Mirto, 659 SCRA 796(2011)]
Balao vs. Macagagal-Arroyo, 662 SCRA 312, December 13, 2011

Writ of Amparo; Extralegal Killings; Enforced Disappearances; Meaning of Extralegal Killings

and Enforced Disappearances.The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated on October

24, 2007 amidst rising incidence of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It was
formulated in the exercise of this Courts expanded rule-making power for the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, albeit limited to these
two situations. Extralegal killings refer to killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances
are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention, or abduction of a person by
a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or
indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty
which places such person outside the protection of law.

Same; Same; Same; Such documented practice of targeting activists in the militarys counterinsurgency program by itself does not fulfill the evidentiary standard provided in the Amparo
Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.We hold that such documented practice of

targeting activists in the militarys counter-insurgency program by itself does not fulfill the
evidentiary standard provided in the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance. In
the case of Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 630 SCRA 211 (2010), the Court noted that the
similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those
surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry
sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. Accordingly, the
trial court in this case cannot simply infer government involvement in the abduction of James
from past similar incidents in which the victims also worked or affiliated with the CPA and
other left-leaning groups.

Same; Same; Same; The inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an

amparo proceeding does not by any measure preclude impleading military or police
commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their
direct or indirect acquiescence.Subsequently, we have clarified that the inapplicability of the
doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure,
preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in
the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. Commanders may
therefore be impleadednot actually on the basis of command responsibilitybut rather on
the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.

Same; Same; Same; Definition of Responsibility and Accountability.In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,

606 SCRA 598 (2009), the Court defined responsibility and accountability as these terms are
applied to amparo proceedings, as follows: xxx Responsibility refers to the extent the actors
have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action
or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the

responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the
measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

Same; Same; Same; Reports of top police officials indicating the personnel and units they
directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation or equal
detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken to search for the victim.In view of

the foregoing evidentiary gaps, respondents clearly failed to discharge their burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of Jamess abduction. Such ineffective
investigation extant in the records of this case prevents us from completely exonerating the
respondents from allegations of accountability for James disappearance. The reports
submitted by the PNP Regional Office, Task Force Balao and Baguio City Police Station do not
contain meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. In
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), the Court observed that such reports of top police
officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to investigate can never constitute
exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of the
activities undertaken to search for the victim. In the same case we stressed that the standard
of diligence requiredthe duty of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary
diligencecalled for extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights
and in the consequent handling and investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearance cases.

Same; Same; Same; Presidential Immunity; The trial court clearly erred in holding that
presidential immunity cannot be properly invoked in an amparo proceeding.As to the matter
of dropping President Arroyo as party-respondent, though not raised in the petitions, we hold
that the trial court clearly erred in holding that presidential immunity cannot be properly
invoked in an amparo proceeding. As president, then President Arroyo was enjoying immunity
from suit when the petition for a writ of amparo was filed. Moreover, the petition is bereft of
any allegation as to what specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate
petitioners protected rights.

Same; Same; Same; A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection
order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the
party seeking the order.An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or
strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before
making a decision. A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order
is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party
seeking the order. In this case, the issuance of inspection order was properly denied since the
petitioners specified several military and police establishments based merely on the allegation
that the testimonies of victims and witnesses in previous incidents of similar abductions
involving activists disclosed that those premises were used as detention centers.