Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
155109
Facts:
The Labor Arbiter found the strike of the Union was illegal in violation of the
CBA agreement of no strike and no lockout provision; and that the Union officers be
deemed to have forfeited their employment. But the Union members, without proof of
having committed illegal acts during the strike, were ordered reinstated without
backwages. Union members filed motion for immediate reinstatement but the Arbiter did
not act on the motion. The Company did not reinstate them. Both parties appealed the
Arbiters decision.
Issue:
Ruing:
The Court held that the strike was illegal for violating the no strike and no lockout
CBA provision. Since the strike was illegal, the Union Officers can be terminated from
employment. But rank and file Union members who merely participated in the strike
should have been reinstated.
Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that the decision of the Labor Arbiter
reinstating a dismissed employee shall be immediately executory pending appeal. Thus,
the Company is liable for accrued backwages until the eventual reversal of the order of
reinstatement by the NLRC.
recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will
render nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing the employment of
workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to
protect and alleviate the plight of the working class. Verily, to allow petitioners to simply
invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial
determination of the foreign principals liability before petitioner can be held liable
renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile.
(2) No. It is hornbook principle that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has
the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in
this case, petitioners failed to discharge.
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only
be alleged; they must be proven. The documents presented by the petitioner, whether
taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that respondent was validly
terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of
submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and
translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what
petitioners submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of the
translations of the MOA and the termination letter which does not prove at all that
Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti
laws, respondent was validly terminated.
(3) Yes.
Under the express provision of RA 8042 on money claims, if the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and
directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily
liable with the corporation or partnership for the money claims and damages.
Varorient Shipping v. Flores, G.R. No. 161934
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not Flores execution of Receipt and Quitclaim barred him from
claiming further sickness wages.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive
less compensation than what a worker is entitled to recover nor prevent him from
demanding benefits to which he is entitled. Quitclaims executed by the employees are
thus commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims
for the full measure of the workers legal rights, considering the economic disadvantage of
the employee and the inevitable pressure upon him by financial necessity.
Since illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) can be committed by any person,
even by a licensed recruiter, a certification on whether Ocden had a license to
recruit or not, is inconsequential. Ocden committed illegal recruitment as
described in said provision by receiving placement fees from the complainants
and failing to reimburse/refund to them the amounts they had paid when they
were not able to leave for Italy, through no fault of their own.
b. Yes. While it is true that the law does not require that at least three victims testify
at the trial, nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving
that the offense was committed against three or more persons. In this case, there is
conclusive evidence that Ocden recruited Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidans sons,
Jeffries and Howard, for purported employment as factory workers in Italy.
(2) Yes. The very same evidence proving Ocdens liability for illegal recruitment also
established her liability for estafa. It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042 in relation to the Labor
Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence
or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation
is caused to the offended party or third person. Both of these elements are present in this
case.
People v. Yabut,
G.R. No.115719-26
Facts:
Fernando Cortez was acquitted by the RTC of the crime of 8 counts of estafa but
convicted him of illegal recruitment in large scale; while his co-accused and common-law
wife, Irene Yabut remained at large. Cortez appealed his case arguing that having been
acquitted of the crime of estafa, he should likewise be acquitted of illegal recruitment in
large scale.
Issue:
Ruling:
The Court held that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be
charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa
under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment
is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial
for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for
offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa does not bar a
conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that ones acquittal of
the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.
clearly show unity of action towards a common undertaking. Hence, conspiracy is evidently
present.
HELD:
YES.
The Supreme Court agree with the appellate court that the same pieces of evidence which
establish appellants liability for illegal recruitment in large scale likewise confirm her
culpability for estafa.
The crime of illegal recruitment is defined and penalized under Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as follows:
SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether
for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated
under Article 13 (f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed
so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, x x x:
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and
accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of
their business shall be liable.
In order to hold a person liable for illegal recruitment, the following elements must concur: (1)
the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement"
under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of the Labor Code (now Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042) and (2) the offender has
no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers. In the case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third element is added:
that the offender commits any of the acts of recruitment and placement against three or more
persons, individually or as a group. All three elements are present in the case at bar.
Inarguably, appellant Chua engaged in recruitment when she represented to private complainants
that she could send them to Taiwan as factory workers upon submission of the required
documents and payment of the placement fee. The four private complainants positively identified
appellant as the person who promised them employment as factory workers in Taiwan for a fee
of P 80,000. More importantly, Severino Maranan the Senior Labor Employment Officer of the
POEA, presented a Certification dated December 5, 2002, issued by Director Felicitas Q. Bay, to
the effect that appellant Chua is not licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas
employment.
The Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the trial court and
appellate court. The prosecution witnesses were positive and categorical in their testimonies that
they personally met appellant and that the latter promised to send them abroad for employment.
In fact, the substance of their testimonies corroborate each other on material points, such as the
amount of the placement fee, the country of destination and the nature of work. Without any
evidence to show that private complainants were propelled by any ill motive to testify falsely
against appellant, we shall accord their testimonies full faith and credit. After all, the doctrinal
rule is that findings of fact made by the trial court, which had the opportunity to directly observe
the witnesses and to determine the probative value of the other testimonies, are entitled to great
weight and respect because the trial court is in a better position to assess the same, an
opportunity not equally open to the appellate court. The absence of any showing that the trial
court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the
result of the case, or that its assessment was arbitrary, impels the Court to defer to the trial courts
determination according credibility to the prosecution evidence.
Appellant cannot escape liability by conveniently limiting her participation as a cashier of
Golden Gate. The provisions of Article 13(b) of the Labor Code and Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042
are unequivocal that illegal recruitment may or may not be for profit. It is immaterial, therefore,
whether appellant remitted the placement fees to "the agencys treasurer" or appropriated them.
The same provision likewise provides that the persons criminally liable for illegal recruitment
are the principals, accomplices and accessories. Just the same, therefore, appellant can be held
liable as a principal by direct participation since she personally undertook the recruitment of
private complainants without a license or authority to do so. Worth stressing, the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 is a special law, a violation of which is malum
prohibitum, not mala in se. Intent is thus, immaterial and mere commission of the prohibited act
is punishable.
Ruling:
The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are: (1) the
accused engages in acts of recruitment and placement of workers defined under Art. 13(b)
or in any prohibited activities under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused has not
secured a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or overseas;
and (3) the accused commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons, individually
or as a group. Even if accused did no more than "suggest" to complainants where they
could apply for overseas employment, his act constituted "referral" within the meaning of
Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code.
The Court held that presentation of the receipts acknowledging payments is not
necessary for the successful prosecution. As long as the prosecution is able to establish
through credible testimonial evidence that the accused has engaged in illegal recruitment,
a conviction of the offense can very well be justified.
Romero v. People
GR 171644
November 23, 2011
Facts:
Delia Romero, promised the complainants employment in Israel in exchange of a sum of money
as processing and transaction fee. The complainants gave the required amount but were not able
to work abroad. They demanded from petitioner the return of their money but the latter refused
and failed to do so. Finding that the petitioner were not authorized to recruit for overseas
employment as checked with the DOLE Dagupan, they filed a complaint of illegal recruitment.
Romero was convicted by the lower court of illegal recruitment. On her appeal, she said that CA
erred in affirming the trial court's reliance on a mere certification from the DOLE Dagupan
District Office that she does not have the necessary licence to recruit workers for abroad. She
claims that the prosecution committed a procedural lapse in not procuring a certification from the
agency primarily involved, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
Also, petitioner insists that the certain amount of money paid to him must not be given any
credence due to the absence of any receipt or any other documentary evidence proving such.
Issue:
Is there illegal recruitment despite the following:
(a) Certification showing that the alleged recruiter is not authorized came from POEA
and not from DOLE
(b) No receipt as to the amount of money paid to the alleged recruiter
Ruling:
(a) Yes. The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely:
(1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to
lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes either
Labor Law Case Digests
any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13
(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.
Under the first element, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority is any person,
corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in
recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has
been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary. Clearly, the creation
of the POEA did not divest the Secretary of Labor of his/her jurisdiction over recruitment
and placement activities.
(b) Yes. The failure to present receipts for money that was paid in connection with the
recruitment process will not affect the strength of the evidence presented by the
prosecution as long as the payment can be proved through clear and convincing
testimonies of credible witnesses.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROSARIO "ROSE" OCHOA,
Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 173792 August 31, 2011
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
FACTS:
The Information filed before the RTC of Quezon City charging Ochoa with illegal
recruitment in large scale. Three other Informations were filed before the RTC this time
charging Ochoa with three counts of estafa, committed separately upon three private
complainants Robert Gubat (Gubat), Cesar Aquino (Cesar), and Junior Agustin (Agustin).
Ochoa stated under oath that she was employed by AXIL International Services and
Consultant (AXIL) as recruiter on December 20, 1997. AXIL had a temporary license to
recruit Filipino workers for overseas employment. Ochoa worked at AXIL from 8:00 a.m.
to 5:00 p.m. and was paid on a commission basis. She admitted recruiting private
complainants and receiving from them the placement and medical fees. Ochoa claimed
though that she remitted private complainants money to a person named Mercy, the
manager of AXIL, but AXIL failed to issue receipts because the private complainants did
not pay in full.
RTC rendered a Decision finding Ochoa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
illegal recruitment in large scale and three counts of estafa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused can be held liable for the crimes of illegal recruitment and
estafa?
HELD:
YES. The Court find no reversible error in the assailed Court of Appeals decision.
It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave
complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send
complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their
money in order to be employed.44 All eight private complainants herein consistently
declared that Ochoa offered and promised them employment overseas. Ochoa required
private complainants to submit their bio-data, birth certificates, and passports, which
private complainants did. Private complainants also gave various amounts to Ochoa as
payment for placement and medical fees as evidenced by the receipts. Despite private
complainants compliance with all the requirements Ochoa specified, they were not able
to leave for work abroad. Private complainants pleaded that Ochoa return their hardearned money, but Ochoa failed to do so.
Regardless of whether or not Ochoa was a licensee or holder of authority, she could still
have committed illegal recruitment. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 clearly provides
that any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority may
be held liable for illegal recruitment for certain acts as enumerated in paragraphs (a) to
(m) thereof. Among such acts, under Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, is the
"[f]ailure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the
deployment does not actually take place without the workers fault." Ochoa committed
illegal recruitment as described in the said provision by receiving placement and medical
fees from private complainants, evidenced by the receipts issued by her, and failing to
reimburse the private complainants the amounts they had paid when they were not able to
leave for Taiwan and Saudi Arabia, through no fault of their own.
Under the last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall
be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in a large scale, that
is, committed against three or more persons individually or as a group. Here, there are
eight private complainants who convincingly testified on Ochoas acts of illegal
recruitment.
In view of the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution, the Court uphold the
verdict of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that Ochoa is guilty of illegal
recruitment constituting economic sabotage.
The Court also affirm the conviction of Ochoa for estafa committed against three private
complainants. The very same evidence proving Ochoas criminal liability for illegal
recruitment also established her criminal liability for estafa.
It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment
under Republic Act No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Aringoy was liable for the crimes of illegal recruitment and
trafficking in persons.
Ruling:
The Court held that the broad definition of recruitment and placement, as
provided by article 13 (b) of the Labor Code, even the mere act referring someone for
placement abroad can be considered recruitment. Such act of referral, in connivance with
someone without the requisite authority of POEA license, constitutes illegal recruitment.
The Court ruled that through the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and
Relampagos, Lolita was recruited and deployed to Malaysia to work as a prostitute. Such
conspiracy could be deduced from the manner in which the crime was perpetuated each
of them played a pivotal role, and evinced a joint common purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest.
PNB vs Cabansag
GR 157010, 6/21/2005
Panganiban
FACTS:
In late 1998, [herein Respondent Florence Cabansag] arrived in Singapore as a tourist. She
applied for employment, with the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank. At the time,
the Singapore PNB Branch was under the helm of Ruben C. Tobias, a lawyer, as General
Manager, with the rank of Vice-President of the Bank. She applied for employment as Branch
Credit Officer, at a total monthly package of $SG4,500.00, effective upon assumption of duties
after approval. Ruben C. Tobias found her eminently qualified and wrote on October 26, 1998, a
letter to the President of the Bank in Manila, recommending the appointment of Florence O.
Cabansag, for the position.
On December 7, 1998, Ruben C. Tobias wrote a letter to Florence O. Cabansag offering her a
temporary appointment, as Credit Officer, at a basic salary of Singapore Dollars 4,500.00, a
month and, upon her successful completion of her probation to be determined solely, by the
Bank, she may be extended at the discretion of the Bank, a permanent appointment and that her
temporary appointment was subject to certain terms and conditions.
Cabansag accepted the position and assumed office. In the meantime, the Philippine Embassy in
Singapore processed the employment contract of Florence O. Cabansag and, on March 8, 1999,
she was issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, an Overseas
Employment Certificate, certifying that she was a bona fide contract worker for Singapore.
Barely three (3) months in office, Tobias told Cabansag that her resignation was imperative as a
cost-cutting measure of the Bank. Tobias, likewise, told Cabansag that the PNB Singapore
Branch will be sold or transformed into a remittance office and that, in either way, she had to
resign from her employment. She then asked Ruben C. Tobias that she be furnished with a
Labor Law Case Digests
Formal Advice from the PNB Head Office in Manila. However, Ruben C. Tobias flatly refused.
Florence O. Cabansag did not submit any letter of resignation.
On April 16, 1999, Ruben C. Tobias again summoned Florence O. Cabansag to his office and
demanded that she submit her letter of resignation, with the pretext that he needed a Chinesespeaking Credit Officer to penetrate the local market, with the information that a Chinesespeaking Credit Officer had already been hired and will be reporting for work soon. She was
warned that, unless she submitted her letter of resignation, her employment record will be
blemished with the notation DISMISSED spread thereon. Without giving any definitive answer,
Florence O. Cabansag asked Ruben C. Tobias that she be given sufficient time to look for
another job. Ruben C. Tobias told her that she should be out of her employment by May 15,
1999.
However, on April 19, 1999, Ruben C. Tobias again summoned Florence O. Cabansag and
adamantly ordered her to submit her letter of resignation. She refused. On April 20, 1999, she
received a letter from Ruben C. Tobias terminating her employment with the Bank.
On January 18, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of the Complainant and
against the Respondents. PNB appealed the labor arbiters Decision to the NLRC. In a
Resolution dated June 29, 2001, the Commission affirmed that Decision.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision in favor of Florence
Cabansag.
Issues:
1. W/N the arbitration branch of the NLRC has jurisdiction
2. W/N the arbitration of the NLRC in the NCR is the proper venue
3. W/N Cabansag was illegally dismissed
Ruling:
1. Labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from
employer-employee relations including termination disputes involving all workers,
including OFWs. Here, Cabansag applied for and secured an OEC from the POEA
through the Philippine Embassy. The OEC authorized her working status in a foreign
country and entitled her to all benefits and processes under our statutes. Although she
may been a direct hire at the commencement of her employment, she became an OFW
who was covered by Philippine labor laws and policies upon certification by the POEA.
When she was illegally terminated, she already possessed the POEA employment
certificate.
2. A migrant worker refers to a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been
engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident; to
be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker.Here, Cabansag was a Filipino,
not a legal resident of Singapore, and employed by petitioner in its branch office in
Singapore. She is clearly an OFW/migrant worker. Thus, she has the option where to file
her Complaint for illegal dismissal. She can either file at the Regional Arbitration Branch
Labor Law Case Digests
where she resides or the RAB where the employer is situated. Thus, in filing her
Complaint before the RAB office in Quezon City, she has made a valid choice of proper
venue.
3. The appellate court was correct in holding that respondent was already a regular
employee at the time of her dismissal, because her three-month probationary period of
employment had already ended. This ruling is in accordance with Article 281 of the
Labor Code: An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be
considered a regular employee. Indeed, petitioner recognized respondent as such at the
time it dismissed her, by giving her one months salary in lieu of a one-month notice,
consistent with provision No. 6 of her employment Contract.
FACTS:
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of performing
artists to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with the introduction of the
Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and
train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the secretary
of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which included an Artists Record Book which a
performing artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent
Managers of the Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to
travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM
intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.
HELD:
Labor Law Case Digests
The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police
power. Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed
Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to
demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public
welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists,
particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a
total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to high risk destinations, a
measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very
least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational
and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared
for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this
scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
Issue:
Ruling:
Whether or not the assailed provisions of the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 were constitutional.
The Court declared the challenged provisions of R.A. 8042, constitutional.
The Court held that "the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield
to the loftier purposes targeted by the government into every contract is read provisions
of existing law, and always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the
agreement deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare.
The equal protection clause is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited
to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not
require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. The equal protection clause does
not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on real and substantial
HELD:
The questioned law is constitutional and the accused is guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment.
Appellant's reliance on People vs. Panis is misplaced. The issue in Panis was whether, under the
proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment could be committed only "whenever
two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee.
"As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to
provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the
individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with
two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is
made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring (of) workers."
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and
placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) will constitute
recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely
lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer
of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them
shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be
deemed" create that presumption.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur. First, the offender has no valid
license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers. Second, he or she undertakes either any activity within the meaning of
"recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34 of the Labor Code.38 In case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third
element is added: that the accused commits said acts against three or more persons, individually
or as a group.
In this case, the first element is present. The certification of POEA states that appellant is not
licensed or authorized to engage in recruitment and placement.
The second element is also present. Appellant is presumed engaged in recruitment and placement
under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code. Both complainants testified that appellant promised them
employment for a fee. Their testimonies corroborate each other on material points: the briefing
conducted by appellant, the time and place thereof, the fees involved. Appellant has not shown
that these witnesses were incited by any motive to testify falsely against her. The absence of
evidence as to an improper motive actuating the principal witnesses of the prosecution strongly
tends to sustain that no improper motive existed and that their testimony is worthy of full faith
and credence.
Nelly Agustin and spouses Dan and Loma Goce were charged with illegal
recruitment involving economic sabotage against 8 private complainants. Agustin
contends that she merely introduced the complainants to the spouses Goce, and that there
was no proof of conspiracy among her and the spouses Goce.
Issue:
Ruling:
The Court held that it was from Agustin that the applicants learned about
the fees they had to pay and the papers that they had to submit. It was after they had
talked to her that they met the accused spouses who owned the placement agency. Being
an employee of the Goces, it was therefore logical for Agustin to introduce the applicants
to said spouses, they being the owners of the agency. As such, appellant was actually
making referrals to the agency of which she was a part. She was therefore engaging in
recruitment activity.
There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of having the ability
to send a worker abroad. It is undisputed that appellant gave complainants the distinct
impression that she had the power or ability to send people abroad for work such that the
latter were convinced to give her the money she demanded in order to be so employed.
TC convicted the accused, largely basing their decision on the previous decision rendered by
Paranaque MeTC, where the two complainants now absent had filed charges of estafa against
Miyake. The Court there had convicted Miyake.
Issue:
Whether or not Miyake is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale?
Ruling:
No, she is guilty of simple recruitment only. An evaluation of the evidence presented before the
trial court shows us that, apart from the adopted decision in the previous estafa case, there was
no other basis for said trial courts conclusion that illegal recruitment in large scale was
committed against all three complainants.
The distinction between simple illegal recruitment and illegal recruitment in large scale are
emphasized by jurisprudence. Simple illegal recruitment is committed where a person: (a)
undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice
enumerated under Articles 34 and 38 of the Labor Code; and (b) does not have a license or
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.
On the other hand, illegal recruitment in large scale further requires a third element, that is, the
offense is committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
In illegal recruitment in large scale, while the law does not require that at least three victims
testify at the trial, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was
committed against three or more persons. This Court agrees with the trial court that the evidence
presented sufficiently proves that illegal recruitment was committed by appellant against
Marasigan, but the same conclusion cannot be made as regards Generillo and Del Rosario as
well.
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as
Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7
days paid vacation leave per month.
On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment
contract upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by
the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer.
Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines,
serving only two months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twentythree days.
Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared
illegal.
Labor Law Case Digests
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA 8042.
Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on nonimpairment of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section
18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.
HELD:
On the first issue.
The answer is in the negative. Petitioners claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the
stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will
receive is not tenable.
The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the
impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to
regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs,
with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever
they may be employed.
On the second issue.
The answer is in the affirmative.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate
to economic security and parity.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs.
However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against,
and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment
contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar
disadvantage.
Labor Law Case Digests
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the
right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less
in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
One year into a 3-year employment contract in Saudi Arabia, Jasmin was found
dead in her apartment. Initial findings revealed that the cause of death was due to poising
and possible suicide. Upon repatriation, subsequent autopsy conducted by the NBI found
that the actual cause of death was due to violent physical injuries and ruled out suicide by
poisoning due to the negative findings of toxic substances.
The parents of the deceased sued for damages against the local recruitment
agency Becmen Service Exporters and Promotions and the principal employer Rajab
Silsilah Company. Becmen and Rajab insisted that Jasmin committed suicide by
poisoning and denied liability.
Issue:
Whether or not Becmen Service Exporters and Promotions can be held liable for
damages for the death of Jasmin Cuaresma.
Ruling:
The Court found that: Jasmins death was not work-relaled, having died in
her apartment and not at the place of work, hence not compensable; Jasmin did not
commit based on the autopsy report of the NBI and local health officers that Jasmin died
due to violent physical injuries and not due to poisoning.
The Court held Becmen solidarily liable with Rajab for damages based on
provisions of R.A.8042 upholding the dignity of migrant workers, and based on Article
19 and 21 of the Civil Code, ratiocinating:
Clearly, Rajab, Becmen and White Falcons acts and omissions are against public
policy because they undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of our OFWs
abroad, who are entitled to full protection under the law. They set an awful example of
how foreign employers and recruitment agencies should treat and act with respect to their
distressed employees and workers abroad. Their shabby and callous treatment of Jasmins
case; their uncaring attitude; their unjustified failure and refusal to assist in the
determination of the true circumstances surrounding her mysterious death, and instead
finding satisfaction in the unreasonable insistence that she committed suicide just so they
can conveniently avoid pecuniary liability; placing their own corporate interests above of
the welfare of their employees all these are contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy, and constitute taking advantage of the poor employee and her familys
ignorance, helplessness, indigence and lack of power and resources to seek the truth and
obtain justice for the death of a loved one.
filed the instant case before the NLRC for underpayment of salary for a period of one year and
six months, nonpayment of vacation pay and reimbursement of return airfare.
Issues:
(1) Is the respondent solidarily liable for money claims?
(2) Is the petitioners claim for underpaid salaries have prescribed?
Ruling:
(1) Yes. Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreignbased employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of
employment. This joint and solidary liability imposed by law against recruitment agencies
and foreign employers is meant to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and
sufficient payment of what is due him. This is in line with the policy of the state to protect
and alleviate the plight of the working class.
In addition,the signing of the substitute contracts with the foreign
employer/principalbefore the expiration of the POEA-approved contract and any
continuation of petitioners employment beyond the original one-year term, against the
will of petitioner, are continuing breaches of the original POEA-approved contract.
(2) No. The right to claim unpaid salaries (or in this case, unpaid salary differentials)
accrue as they fall due. Thus, petitioners cause of action to claim salary differential for
October 1989 only accrued after she had rendered service for that month (or at the end of
October 1989). Her right to claim salary differential for November 1989 only accrued at
the end of November 1989, and so on and so forth. The petitioner was forced to work
until April of 1993.
The petitioner has a right to be compensated for all months she, in fact, was forced to
work. To determine for which months petitioners right to claim salary differentials has
not prescribed, we must count three years prior to the filing of the complaint on May 31,
1995. Thus, only claims accruing prior toMay 31, 1992 have prescribed when the
complaint was filed on May 31, 1995. Petitioner is entitled to her claims for salary
differentials for the period May 31, 1992 to April 1993, or approximately eleven (11)
months.
The petitioner on his reply confirmed that they deployed Razon but the latter violated his
employment/training/dispatching contracts on June 25, 2000 by unlawfully escaping/running
away (TNT) from his company assignment without prior KFSMB authorization and
working/staying in unknown company/place.
The repatriation cost was paid by the petitioner under protest.
Thereafter the petitioner filed and action questioning the provisions of Omnibus Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, claiming
that it is illegal and violative of due process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject provisions of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations are illegal and
violative of due process.
HELD:
No. Petitioner's argument that Section 15 does not provide that it shall be primarily responsible
for the repatriation of a deceased OFW is specious and plain nitpicking. While Republic Act No.
8042 does not expressly state that petitioner shall be primarily obligated to transport back here to
the Philippines the remains of the deceased Razon, nevertheless, such duty is imposed upon him
as the statute clearly dictates that "the repatriation of remains and transport of the personal
belongings of a deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal
and/or the local agency." The mandatory nature of said obligation is characterized by the
legislature's use of the word "shall." That the concerned government agencies opted to demand
the performance of said responsibility solely upon petitioner does not make said directives
invalid as the law plainly obliges a local placement agency such as herein petitioner to bear the
burden of repatriating the remains of a deceased OFW with or without recourse to the principal
abroad. In this regard, we see no reason to invalidate Section 52 of the omnibus rules as Republic
Act No. 8042 itself permits the situation wherein a local recruitment agency can be held
exclusively responsible for the repatriation of a deceased OFW.
Nor the Court see any reason to stamp Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules as invalid for allegedly
contravening Section 15 of the law which states that a placement agency shall not be responsible
for a worker's repatriation should the termination of the employer-employee relationship be due
to the fault of the OFW. To our mind, the statute merely states the general principle that in case
the severance of the employment was because of the OFW's own undoing, it is only fair that he
or she should shoulder the costs of his or her homecoming. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042,
however, certainly does not preclude a placement agency from establishing the circumstances
surrounding an OFW's dismissal from service in an appropriate proceeding. As such
determination would most likely take some time, it is only proper that an OFW be brought back
here in our country at the soonest possible time lest he remains stranded in a foreign land during
the whole time that recruitment agency contests its liability for repatriation.
As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General Such a situation is unacceptable. This is the
same reason why repatriation is made by law an obligation of the agency and/or its principal
without the need of first determining the cause of the termination of the worker's employment.
Labor Law Case Digests
Repatriation is in effect an unconditional responsibility of the agency and/or its principal that
cannot be delayed by an investigation of why the worker was terminated from employment. To be
left stranded in a foreign land without the financial means to return home and being at the mercy
of unscrupulous individuals is a violation of the OFW's dignity and his human rights. These are
the same rights R.A. No. 8042 seeks to protect.
As for the sufficiency of standard test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards
the following: "public interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare," and
"simplicity, economy and welfare."
In this case, the Court hold that the legislature's pronouncements that Republic Act No. 8042 was
enacted with the thought of upholding the dignity of the Filipinos may they be here or abroad
and that the State shall at all times afford full protection to labor, both here and abroad, meet the
requirement and provide enough guidance for the formulation of the omnibus rules.