CBC vs.

Ortega
Facts:
Vicente Acaban won in a civil case for sum of money against B & B Forest Development Corporation. To satisfy the
judgment, the Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the B & B Forest Development Corporation
with the China Banking Corporation (CBC). Accordingly, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of
the trial court and served on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. Liong was ordered to inform the Court
whether or not there is a deposit in the CBC of B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit,
to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. CBC and Liong refuse to
comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor by invoking the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1405 ( Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) which allegedly prohibits the disclosure of any information
concerning to bank deposits.
Issue:
Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court processes garnishing the bank
deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.
Held:
No. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into deposit of B & B Forest Development
Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the
defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for the
purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any
withdrawal until further order. It is sufficiently clear that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into
bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed
there is no real inquiry in such a case, and the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely
incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to
enable debtors to evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of
converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank. (China Banking Corporation vs Ortega, G.R. No.
L-34964, 31 January 1973)

Astorga vs Villegas
In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of
the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to
disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five
members of the city police force who had been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under
authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for Mandamus, Injunction
and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction to compel Villegas et al and the
members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the SC). In his
defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor
of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said
rd

law passed the 3 reading in the lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it
to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor
amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such
deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The
bill was then sent back to the lower house and was thereafter approved by the latter. The bill was sent to the
President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate
President, sent to the lower house for approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was
in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly
approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and
invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the concernedsignatures does
not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is
conclusive proof of a bills due enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other
errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill
No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts
and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal
discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but
were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not
asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted
and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when
they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was

never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous
bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended
by the law-making body.

Bengzon vs Secretary of Justice

Juan Bengzon was appointed as Justice of the Peace in 1912 in Lingayen, Pangasinan. Upon reaching 65 years of
age in 1933 he would have to retire in accordance with the law. He later sought to claim gratuity pursuant to Act
4051 An Act to provide for the payment of retirement gratuities to officers and employees of the Insular
Government retired from the service as a result of the reorganization or reduction of personnel thereof, including
the justices of the peace who must relinquish office in accordance with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight
hundred and ninety-nine, and for other purposes.
Section 7 thereof specifically provides that gratuity may be availed of by justices like Bengzon but that provision
has been vetoed by the governor-general. Bengzon said the veto is beyond the power of the governor-general
hence he filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Secretary of Justice to implement the gratuity provision of
the said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bengzon is entitled to the gratuity provision of the Retirement Gratuity Law.
HELD: No. The governor-general in vetoing the said item of the law has acted within his power; for this is also in
compliance with the Organic Act. Section 19 of the former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916,
established the practice for the enactment of a law, including the sanctioning of the veto power by the GovernorGeneral. Specifically it provided:
The Governor-General shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill, but the
veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
The SC then is constrained to rule against Bengzon and to hold that the veto by the Governor-General of section 7
of Act No. 4051 was in conformity with the legislative purpose and the provisions of the Organic Act.

Araneta v Dinglasan
G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949
Tuason, J.:
Facts:
1. The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued by virtue of CA No. 671 or the Emergency Powers
Act. CA 671 declared a state of emergency as a result of war and authorized the President to promulgate rules and
regulations to meet such emergency. However, the Act did not fix the duration of its effectivity.

2.

EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, Araneta, is under prosecution
in the CFI for violation of the provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition.

3.

EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the
Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes.
Both officials refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the
Philippines is forbidden by this EO.

4.

EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to
June 30, 1950, and for other purposes was assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, elector, and
president of the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines
from disbursing the funds by virtue of this EO.

5. Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in connection with the national elections in 1949.
was questioned by Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the Court to prevent "the
respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect
YES.
1.

2.

The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it became inoperative when Congress met
during the opening of the regular session on May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued
without authority of law . The session of the Congress is the point of expiration of the Act and not the first
special session after it.
Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December
24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the
operation of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second appropriating funds for
election expenses in November 1949, were therefore declared null and void for having been issued after
Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects. This is
based on the language of Act 671 that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers
of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or
other causes brought on by the war.

University of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 64 Case Digest

FACTS:
Herein respondents Camilo Pea and Domingo Cajipe (and seven others) were administratively charged and
investigated by a UP-PGH Investigating Committee for grave misconduct and dishonesty and infidelity in the
custody of public documents" in their capacity as Assistant Cashier and Special Disbursing Officer and Collection
Officer, respectively, of the PGH.
After several hearings, the Board of Regents adopted a resolution approving the report of the committee and
fixing a penalty of dismissal for the respondents. Herein respondents then filed a petition for injunction in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, seeking to restrain the UP President from dismissing them and nullify the findings
of the investigating committee. They claimed that, as civil service employees, the power to dismiss them did not
belong to the UP President but to the Civil Service Commissioner, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Board of
Appeals. The respondents also filed a supplemental petition for injunction, impleading the Board of Regents of the
UP and the Director of the PGH as additional respondents. The trial court granted the both original and
supplementary petition.

Herein petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals but the trial court's decision was sustained. Hence, the
instant petition for Review by Certiorari by the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
WON the dismissal of the respondents by the Board of Regents was final, or requires further action by the Civil
Service Commission.
RULING:
Legislature has established specific exceptions to the exclusive authority of the Civil Service Commissioner, by
lodging in various entities, the power over their employees. One instance is the UP Charter, Section 6(e), which
vested in the Board of Regents, the power to appoint, to fix employee compensation and to remove them for
cause after an investigation and hearing. The existence of these exceptions to the general jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commissioner is also confirmed by the Civil Service Law of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260).
Pursuant to the authority granted to the President of the Philippines by R.A. No. 51, PGH was transferred from the
Office of the President to the University of the Philippines by virtue of E.O. No. 94. The act of the Chief Executive in
transferring the Philippine General Hospital from the Office of the President to the University of the Philippines
clearly evinced the intention to place the Hospital employees under the administrative power of the University in
matters of their discipline, suspension or removal, on a par with the other employees of the University. Had the
intent been otherwise, the 1947 Executive Order No. 94 would have excepted or reserved the disciplinary power of
the
Commissioner
of
the
Civil
Service
over
the
transferred
employees.
Ultimately, which is important is that the provisions of Article XII, Section 4, of the Constitution that "no officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law," as well as the
due process clause of the Bill of Rights, should be fully observed and implemented; and the record is clear that in
the case of herein respondents, no deficiency exists on this score. Pursuant to the express precept in the University
charter [in its Section 6 (e)], the herein respondents were investigated by a committee of the University and the
committee recommended their dismissal after mature deliberation. Before the proceedings were closed, these
respondents manifested that they had no complaints regarding the procedure adopted, and were satisfied with
the way the investigation was conducted; and the Court of Appeals also explicitly stated in its decision that it did
not
find
any
violation
of
the
substantive
rights
of
the
respondents.
Whether the final decision should be made by the Civil Service Commissioner, and on appeal by the Civil Service
Board of Appeals, or by the President of the University and its Board of Regents, does not in any way impair any of
the substantial rights of the respondents. However, the autonomy necessary to the fulfillment of the educational
and academic mission of the University demands that the administrative decision of its authorities be made final as
to its employees, there being no statutory or administrative provision to the contrary. Thus, the President and
Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines possess full and final authority in the disciplining, suspension
and removal of the civil service employees of the University, including those of the Philippine General Hospital,
independently of the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals.
The writ of certiorari applied for is granted, and the decisions under appeal are reversed and set aside.