1 | Wills and Succession Case Digest

Art. 810 Holographic Will

Roxas vs. De Jesus

Facts:

Pet. Simeon Roxas filed for a probate proceedings on the

Holographic Will of his Sister Bibiana Roxas De Jesus.
The holographic will was written on the decedents
notebook on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24. The letter-will was
addressed to her children and it was entirely written and
signed in the handwriting of the decedent. The will is dated
Feb./61 and states: This is my will which I want to be
respected although it is not written by a lawyer.

The decedent children testified and recognized that the

will was written by their mother as they recognized her
handwriting as well as her signature.

The respondent opposed to probate on the ground that it

was not executed in accordance with the law as it was not
dated as required under Art. 810.

The will was filed for probate however the same was
opposed by the respondents on the ground that it was
undated and that even if it was so dated, the date was
entered within the testamentary disposition in the 2nd page
which more or less would be considered as only the date
of agreement between testator and the beneficiaries.

Issue: Whether the HW was complied with in accordance with

Art. 810.
Held: Yes.
The law does not specify a particular location where the date
should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the
date should be placed in the will itself and executed in the
hand of the testator.
The will was not an agreement but a unilateral act of Labrador
who plainly knew that what he was executing was a will. The
act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as
the testators instruction or decision to be followed reveal that
Labrador was fully aware of the nature of the estate property to
be disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act as
a means to control the disposition of his estate.

Issue: Whether the date Feb./61 appearing on the

holographic will is a valid compliance with Art. 810.
Facts:

Held: Yes.
If the testator, in executing his will, attempts to comply with all
the requisites, although compliance is not literal, it is sufficient
if the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by such
requisite is actually attained by the form followed by the
testator.
1.
2.
3.

No evidence of bad faith and fraud in the execution.

There is no question that the HW was entirely written,
dated and signed by the testatrix herself and in language
known to her.
There is no question as to its genuineness and due
execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the
genuineness of the HW of their mother and that she had
the testamentary capacity at the time the execution of the
will

G.R.: The date of the HW should include the day, month, and
year of its execution
Exception: If there is no fraud, bad faith, undue influence and
pressure and the authenticity of the will is established (i.e.
defect is on the date presented) the HW is valid and should be
allowed under the principle of Substantial Compliance.
In Re: Labrador vs. CA
Facts:

Seangio et.al. vs. Reyes et.al.

On Mar. 17, 1968, a HW was executed by Melencio

Labrador. The alleged HW was written, signed and dated,
although the date was placed on the 2nd page (consists of
3 pages) on the first paragraph which states and this day
in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning
and assigning the respective assignment of the said
fishpond, and this being on the month of Mar. 17 th day, in
the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine
is followed. xxx

PR filed for a petition for the settlement of the estate of

Segundo Seangio. This was opposed by the petitioner on
the ground that Segundo left a HW dated Sept. 20, 1995,
disinheriting one of the PR, Alfredo Seangio, for cause.
Hence a petition for probate on the HW was filed by
petitioners before the RTC.

The PR moved for the dismissal of the probate

proceedings on the ground that purported HW does not
contain any disposition of the estate of the decedent and
that the will only show an alleged act of disinheritance by
the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else.

Issue: Whether the document executed by Segundo can be

considered as a HW.
Held: Yes.
Segundos document, although may initially come across as a
mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of
the HW will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by
the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa
can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and
while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters
property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of
disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in
the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favour
of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
A fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator,
expressed in form and within the limits prescribed by law, must
be recognised as the supreme law of succession. All rules of
construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that
intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary
to law, morals and public policy that it cannot be given effect.

2 | Wills and Succession Case Digest

Probate of Holographic Will

court refused to probate on the reason that the will itself

was not presented.

Azaloa vs. Singson

Facts:

Pet. Filed for probate of the HW of Fortunata Vda. De

Lance. Pet. testified that he saw the HW 1 month, more or
less, before the death of the testatrix and that it was
handed to him. He also testified that it was the signature
and the handwriting of the testatrix and to reinforce his
statement, he presented the mortgage, SPA, GPA and
Deed of Sale including the affidavit to for comparison
purposes of the testatrix signature and handwriting.

The probate was opposed. The lower court denied the

probate as it failed to present 3 witnesses who would
declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of
the testatrix.

It was alleged by the proponent that after the decedent

returned from her last trip, she manifested the desire to
make a will, however, she does not want her husband to
know and that she intend it to be a secret. Vicente
consulted with the petitioner who was at that time
preparing to take his bar examination and suggest to
execute a HW. Vicente then relayed the suggestion to the
decedent. During the execution of the alleged will, Felina
Esguerra (daughter of Vicente) was present and after the
decedent executed her will, Felina was invited to read it.
On the afternoon the same day, Primitivo Reyes visited
the decedent and the latter allowed him to read her will.
Also Socorro Olarte and Rosario Gan Jimenez, visited the
decedent and again allowed them to read the will.

It was also alleged that when the decedent was in the

hospital, the will was kept inside the purse and this was
entrusted by the decedent to Felina. Ildefonso asked for
the purse from Felina, hence she immediately gave it to
him, this was however returned to him. On the next day,
Ildefonso again asked for the purse, she gave it to him but
she already read it for the second time before she
delivered it to him.

Ildefonso Yap averred that on the date of the execution of

the HW (Nov. 5, 1951) the decedent was already at the
hospital and that he and Mrs. Bantique are constantly at
her side and that there was never an execution of a HW.

The court refused the probate since it is improbable that if

the intention of the testatrix was to kept it a secret, then
why is it she allowed Felina to be there during the
execution and allowed Reyes, Olarte and Jimenez to read
the same. Furthermore, if she really intend to conceal it
from her husband, then why is it kept on the purse and
carry it on the hospital.

Issue: Whether Art 811 mandatorily require the production of 3

witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of the HW.
Held: Case is remanded back to court of origin to adduce
additional evidence (expert testimony) since no 3 witnesses
was presented and that the court find it necessary to present
the expert testimony.
In ordinary testaments, the presence of at least 3 witnesses at
the execution of the ordinary wills is made by law essential to
their validity. Where the will is Holographic, no witnesses need
be present (during the execution Art. 810) and the rule
requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed
merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.
The law however foresees the possibility that no qualified
witnesses may be found hence it provides for resort to expert
evidence to supply the deficiency.
The resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words if
the court deemed it necessary. Where the prescribed number
of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their
testimony that the will is genuine. On the other hand, if no
competent witnesses is available, or none of those produced is
convincing, the court may still in fact is should, resort to
handwriting experts. The duty of the court, in fine, is to exhaust
all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much as
interested as the proponent that the true intention of the
testator be carried into effect.

Issue: May a HW be probated upon the testimony of witnesses

who have allegedly seen and who declare that it was the
handwriting of the testator.

Gan vs. Yap

The expert cannot testify, because there is no way to compare

the alleged testament with other documents admittedly, or
proven to be, in the testators hand. The oppositor will,
therefore, be caught between upper milestone of his lack of
knowledge of the will or the form thereof, and that neither
millstone of his inability to prove its falisity. In conclusion, the
court and the oppositor would practically be at the mercy of
such witnesses not only as to the execution, but also to the
contents of the will.

Facts:

Fausto Gan instituted a probate proceeding on the HW of

Felicidad Esquerra Yap. The said HW contains disposition
of the decedents property mostly bequeathing her property
in Pulilan, Bulacan to her relatives. While her property in
Manila to her husband but subject to a condition that her
husband shall build a Health Center with material cost
worth in not less than P60,000.
Ildefonso Yap (Husband) opposed to the probate on the
ground that his wife did not executed a HW. The lower

Held: No
When the will itself is not submitted, these means of
opposition, and of assessing the evidence are not available.
And then the only guaranty of authenticity - the testators
handwriting has disappeared.

Issue: Sec. 46, Rule 123 of the Rules of Court allow

secondary evidence on lost/destroyed notarial will. Is this rule
applicable to HW?

3 | Wills and Succession Case Digest

Held: No. The execution and contents of a lost/destroyed
HW may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses
who have see and/or read the will.
The court will not distribute the property of the deceased in
accordance with his HW, unless they are shown his
handwriting and signature

Even a mimeograph or carbon copy; or by other similar means,

if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the
deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate
court.

Ratio:

Facts:

Holographic Will
The only guarantee
of
authenticity is the handwriting
itself.
Loss of HW entails the loss of
the only medium of proof
If
oral
testimony
were
admissible only one man
could engineer the fraud
(feasibility of forgery). Page
25 for scenario
May receive anything on the
account of the will
In case of a lost HW, the
witnesses would testify as to
their
opinion
of
the
handwriting
which
they
allegedly saw, and opinion
which cannot be tested in
court, nor directly contradicted
by the oppositors, because
handwriting itself is not at
hand.

Notarial Will
The
testimony
of
the
subscribing/instrumental
witnesses
Loss of NW, the subscribing
witnesses are available to
authenticate.
It is quite hard to convince 3
witnesses (4 with notary)
deliberately lie as their lies
could
be
checked
and
exposed
They cannot receive anything
on account of the will.
In case of lost NW, the 3
subscribing witnesses would
be testifying to a fact which
they saw, namely the act of
the testator of subscribing the
will.

Rodellas vs. Aranza

Facts:

The proponents of the HW of Ricardo Bonilla instituted a

probate proceeding. This was opposed, among others that
the alleged HW itself (original) and not an alleged copy
must be produced.

The oppositors again moved to dismiss the probate after

the same was consolidated and averred that
lost/destroyed HW cannot be proved by secondary
evidence unlike NW. The motion was however dismissed..

A MR was filed, this time the lower court ruled that once
the original copy of the HW is lost, a copy thereof cannot
stand in lieu of the original.

Issue: Whether a HW which was lost or cannot be proved by

means of a photostatic copy
Held:
G.R.: If the HW has been lost or destroyed and no other copy
is available, the will can not be probated because the best and
only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is
necessary that there be comparison between sample
handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will.
Exception: A photostatic copy of the HW may be allowed
because comparison can be made with the standard of writing.

Codoy vs. Calugay

Respondents instituted a probate proceeding on the HW

of Matilde Seno Vda. De Ramonal. This was opposed by
the petitioners on the ground that the will was a forgery
because of the repeated dates incorporated or appearing
on the will after every disposition is out of the ordinary and
that if it was indeed the testatrix executed the will, she
should have placed it at the bottom after the dispositions
and not every after disposition and assuming she indeed
executed it, it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence.

Respondents presented 6 witnesses and various

documentary evidence. The HW was denied for
insufficiency of evidence and lack of merit
Witnesses Testimony
Presented documents for the purpose
of
laying
comparison
on
the
handwriting of he testatrix.
Generosa Senon
Election registrar of CDO. Presented to
identify the signature of the deceased
in voters affidavit, which was not even
produced as it was no longer available
Matilde
Ramonal What she merely saw was preBinanay
prepared receipts and letters of the
deceased (from rental collection),
which she either mailed or gave to her
tenants. She did not declare that she
saw the deceased sign a document or
write a note. She was also in
possession of the HW.
Fiscal
Rodolfo He is merely supposing that signature
Wagay
of the decedent because it is similar to
the signature of the project partition
which he has made
Mrs.
Teresita She testified that she processed the
Vedad
application of the deceased for pasture
permit and was familiar with her
signature.
Evangeline
Only declare that she is familiar with
Calugay
the decedent handwriting as she lived
with her since birth. She never declare
that she saw the deceased write a note
or sign a document.
Augusto Neri

Issue: Whether Art. 811 is mandatory or permissive.

Held: Mandatory. The word shall connotes a mandatory
order.
The will was found not in the personal belongings of the
deceased but with one of the respondents, who kept it even
before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms.
Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as
early as 1985, or five years before the death of the deceased.

4 | Wills and Succession Case Digest

There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the
signature and the handwriting of the deceased with other
documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime.
The only chance at comparison was during the crossexamination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners
asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which
contained the signature of the deceased with that of the
holographic will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the
former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the
authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.

seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of

mind can neither be given effect because she failed to
authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full
signature.

A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that

the strokes are different when compared with other documents
written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of
the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes,
retracing and erasures on the will.

Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan,

who became American citizens executed their last will and
testament on Aug. 23, 1979 and Aug. 27, 1979
respectively. The will were executed in Syracuse, New
York where they reside. The will contained provision on
presumption of survivorship (in case it cannot be
determined as who died first, it is presumed that the
husband predeceased the wife).

On Jan. 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family

perished when they were trapped by the fire that gutted
their home. Dr. Rafael Cunanan Jr., appointed as
substitute executor and trustee in Joses will, filed for a
separate probate proceedings of the wills with the
Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York
which was later admitted to probate.

Evelyns mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate

in RTC Malolos, Bulacan. Judge de la Llana issued an
order, directing the issuance of letters of special
administration in favour of Salud.

Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir

according to New York law. He contended that since the
wills were executed in New York, New York law should
govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and
his brothers and sisters were Joses heirs and so such
entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which
Salud failed to give.

Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn,
and that the two wills were in accordance with New York
law. But before she could present evidence to prove the
law of New York, the reprobate court already issued an
order, disallowing the wills.

Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August

30, 1978, and the signatures in several documents such as the
application letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980,
and a letter dated June 16, 1978, the strokes are different. In
the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes,
evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of
the holographic will.

Art. 816 - Will of an alien

Vda. De Perez vs. Hon. Tolete
Facts:

Kalaw vs. Relova

Facts:

Gregorio Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir of his

deceased sister Natividad Kalaw, filed a petition for the
probate of her HW. This was opposed by Rosa Kalaw
because according to her, her name was first written prior
to
Gregorio
Kalaw
and
that
this
alteration/correction/insertion was made without the proper
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as
provided under Art. 814.

Rosa posits that the HW, as first written should be given

effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir

The probate was denied. Although it was found that the

handwriting, signature and insertion was that of the
testatrix.

Issue: Whether the HW should be admitted to probate

although the alterations and/or insertions or additions were not
authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix.
Held: No. Art. 814 is clear and explicit, it requires no
necessity for interpretation.
When a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations
made by the testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted
under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby invalidated as a
whole, but at most only as respects the particular words
erased, corrected or interlined.
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute
had only one substantial provision, which was altered by
substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration
did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full
signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will
is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains
in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the
Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the

Issue: Whether the reprobate of the wills be allowed.

Held:
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were
American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon
compliance with Art. 816 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by
New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills
which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as
follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the
foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign
country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been
admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign
tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country

5 | Wills and Succession Case Digest

on procedure and allowance of. Except for the first and last
requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon
which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by
the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them
On Lack of Notice to Joses Heirs
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching
on a very glaring fact petitioner has always considered
herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because
she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan,
she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the
proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only
impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose
order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party.
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of
a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an
original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court,
Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will
probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will"
or a will that is presented for probate for the first time.
Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76,
which require publication and notice by mail or personally to
the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the
petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to
petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place
for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice
of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed
to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees
of the testator, . . . "

Held: Yes
Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by
foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been
probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A
foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article
816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is
abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the
place where he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a
will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the
jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c)
the probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e)
if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the
person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact
of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death
in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such
province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will
has already been allowed and probated in the country of its
execution.
Reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and
allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where
the will is presented for the first time before a competent court.
Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of
Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter rule
applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to
the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges
as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its
jurisdiction over the matter can be established.

Palaganas et.al. vs. Palaganas

Art. 817 - Formalities for will executed by aliens in the

Philippines

Facts:
In re estate of Johnson

Ruperta Palaganas, a Filipino who became a naturalized

US citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and
testament she executed in California, she designated her
brother, Sergio Palaganass, as the executor of her will for
she had left properties in the Philippines and in the US.

Ernesto Palaganas, another brother of Ruperta, filed with

the RTC Malolos, Bulacan a petition for probate of
Rupertas will. This was opposed by the nephews of
Ruperta on the ground that Rupertas will should not be
probated in the Philippines but in the US. Furthermore,
they contend that the wills executed by foreigners abroad
must first be probated and allowed in the country of its
execution before it can be probated in the Philippines.

The RTC admitted for probate Rupertas will. On appeal,

the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad

may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been
previously probated and allowed in the country where it was
executed.

Facts:

Emil Johnson was born in Sweden but emigrated to the

US and lived in Chicago, Illinois from 1893 to 1898. He
was also married to Rosalie Ackeson and few months after
their marriage, Ebba Ingeborg was born. Emil embarked to
the Philippines as a soldier in the Army of the US. After he
was discharged as a soldier, he continued to live in the
Philippines. Hs wife obtained a divorce decree. A little later
Johnson appeared in the US on a visit and on Jan. 10,
1903, procured a certificate of naturalization at Chicago.
He then returned to the Manila where he prospered in
business and continued to live until his death.

While in the Philippines, he entered into marital relations

with Alejandra Ibanez whom he had 3 children.

On Sept. 9, 1915, Emil executed a HW which was

executed in accordance with the laws of the State of
Illinois. Emil died on Feb. 4, 1916 in Manila.
The HW was signed by himself and 2 witnesses instead of
3 witnesses as required by the Philippine law.

6 | Wills and Succession Case Digest

A petition for probate was filed before the CFI Manila

which the latter after due publication and examination of
the witnesses declared the HW as legal and admitted to
be admitted to probate.

The attorneys of Ebba moved for the annulment of the

probate on the ground that the will was not executed in
accordance with Illinois Law and that the decedent was
not a resident of the State of Illinois.

Issue: Whether Sec. 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not

applicable to wills of aliens residing in the Philippines.
Held: It is applicable.
Will made here by alien. A will made within the Philippine
Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country,
which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or
country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be
proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may
be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and
shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws
of these Islands.
The words "another state or country" include the United States
and the States of the American Union, and that the operation of
the statute is not limited to wills of aliens. It is a rule of
hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of
low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can
never control against the intelligible meaning of the written
words.
It results that if Emil H. Johnson was at the time of his death a
citizen of the United States and of the State of Illinois, his will
was provable under this section in the courts of the Philippine
Islands, provided the instrument was so executed as to be
admissible to probate under the laws of the State of Illinois.
Issue: Whether the testator was not a resident of the Stet of
Illinois.
Held: He is a national of Illinois.
The naturalization laws of the United States require, as a
condition precedent to the granting of the certificate of
naturalization, that the applicant should have resided at least
five years in the United States and for one year within the State
or territory where the court granting the naturalization papers is
held; and in the absence of clear proof to the contrary it should
be presumed that a person naturalized in a court of a certain
State thereby becomes a citizen of that State as well as of the
United States.
It is noteworthy that the petition by which it is sought to annul
the probate of this will does not assert that the testator was not
a citizen of Illinois at the date when the will was executed. The
most that is said on this point is he was "never a resident of the
State of Illinois after the year 1898, but became and was a
resident of the city of Manila," etc. But residence in the
Philippine Islands is compatible with citizenship in Illinois; and
it must be considered that the allegations of the petition on this
point are, considered in their bearing as an attempt to refute
citizenship in Illinois, wholly insufficient.
The evidence adduced upon this point in the trial court consists
of the certificate of naturalization granted upon January 10,
1903, in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, in connection

with certain biographical facts contained in the oral evidence.

The certificate of naturalization supplies incontrovertible proof
that upon the date stated the testator became a citizen of the
United States, and inferentially also a citizen of said State. In
the testimony submitted to the trial court it appears that, when
Johnson first came to the United States as a boy, he took up
his abode in the State of Illinois and there remained until he
came as a soldier in the United States Army to the Philippine
Islands. Although he remained in these Islands for sometime
after receiving his discharge, no evidence was adduced
showing that at the time he returned to the United States, in
the autumn of 1902, he had then abandoned Illinois as the
State of his permanent domicile, and on the contrary the
certificate of naturalization itself recites that at that time he
claimed to be a resident of Illinois.
Now, if upon January 10, 1903, the testator became a citizen of
the United States and of the State of Illinois, how has he lost
the character of citizen with respect to either of these
jurisdictions? There is no law in force by virtue of which any
person of foreign nativity can become a naturalized citizen of
the Philippine Islands; and it was, therefore, impossible for the
testator, even if he had so desired, to expatriate himself from
the United States and change his political status from a citizen
of the United States to a citizen of these Islands. This being
true, it is to be presumed that he retained his citizenship in the
State of Illinois along with his status as a citizen of the United
States. It would be novel doctrine to Americans living in the
Philippine Islands to be told that by living here they lose their
citizenship in the State of their naturalization or nativity.
This is in accordance with that provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which says
that every citizen of the United States is a citizen of the State
where in he resides.
Issue: Whether the will was executed in conformity with the
statutes of the State of Illinois.
Held: Yes.
The trial judge no doubt was satisfied that the will was properly
executed by examining section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of
Illinois, as exhibited in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's Annotated
Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he may have assumed
that he could take judicial notice of the laws of Illinois under
section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have
erred in taking judicial notice of the law of Illinois on the point in
question, such error is not now available to the petitioner, first,
because the petition does not state any fact from which it
would appear that the law of Illinois is different from what the
court found, and, secondly, because the assignment of error
and argument for the appellant in this court raises no question
based on such supposed error.
Art. 818 Joint Wills
In re: Will of Bilbao
Facts:

Victor Bilbao jointly executed his will with his wife Ramona
Navarro on Oct. 6, 1931. The will executed contained a

7 | Wills and Succession Case Digest

provision for transmission of property and survivorship
among the spouses.

A petition for probate was filed but this was opposed by

Filemon Abringe on the ground that the will is a reciprocal
or mutual will which is prohibited by law.

The trial court denied probate.

Contention:
The Art. 669 of the Civil Code has been repealed by Sec. 614
and 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190.
Issue: Whether the court erred in not finding that a joint and
reciprocal will particularly between husband and wife is valid
under the new law

Facts:

A joint and reciprocal will executed by the spouses Isabel

V. Florendo and Tirso Dacanay on October 20, 1940.
Isabel V. Florendo having died, her surviving spouse Tirso
Dacanay is seeking to probate said joint and reciprocal
will, which provides in substance that whoever of the
spouses, joint testators, shall survive the other, shall
inherit all the properties of the latter, with an agreement as
to how the surviving spouse shall dispose of the properties
in case of his or her demise.

The relatives of the deceased Isabel V. Florendo opposed

the probate of said will on various statutory grounds.

Issue: whether or not the said joint and reciprocal will may be
probated in view of article 669 of the Civil Code

Held: No.
Held: No
We believe and hold that the provision of the Code of Civil
procedure regarding wills have not repealed all the articles of
the old Civil Code on the same subject matter, and that article
669 of the Civil Code is not incompatible or inconsistent with
said provision of the Article 669 of the Civil Code is still in
force.

Reiterated the ruling in the preceding case.

Art. 821 Disqualified Witnesses
Gonzales vs. CA

The provision of article 669 of the Civil Code prohibiting the

execution of a will by two or more persons conjointly or in the
same instrument either for their reciprocal benefit or for the
benefit of a third person, is not unwise and is not against public
policy. The reason for this provision, especially as regards
husbands and wife is that when a will is made jointly or in the
same instrument, the spouse who is more aggressive, stronger
in will or character and dominant is liable to dictate the terms of
the will for his or her own benefit or for that of third persons
whom he or she desires to favor. And, where the will is not only
joint but reciprocal, either one of the spouses who may happen
to be unscrupulous, wicked, faithless, or desperate, knowing
as he or she does the terms of the will whereby the whole
property of the spouses both conjugal and paraphernal goes to
the survivor, may be tempted to kill or dispose of the other.
Considering the wisdom of the provisions of this article 669
and the fact that it has not been repealed, at least not
expressly, as well as the consideration that its provisions are
not incompatible with those of the Code of Civil Procedure on
the subject of wills, we believe and rule that said article 669 of
the Civil Code is still in force. And we are not alone in this
opinion. Mr. Justice Willard as shown by his notes on the Civil
Code, on page 18 believes that this article 669 is still in force.
Sinco and Capistrano in their work on the Civil Code, Vol. II,
page 33, favorably cite Justice Willard's opinion that this article
is still in force. Judge Camus in his book on the Civil Code
does not include this article among those he considers
repealed. Lastly, we find that this article 669 has been
reproduced word for word in article 818 of the New Civil Code
(Republic Act No. 386). The implication is that the Philippine
Legislature that passed this Act and approved the New Civil
Code, including the members of the Code Commission who
prepared it, are of the opinion that the provisions of article 669
of the old Civil Code are not incompatible with those of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
Dacanay vs. Florendo

Facts:

Isabel Gabriel executed her last will and testament on Apr.

15, 1961. It was executed under the formalities required
by law. Matilde Orobia (Piano teacher to the grandchild of
the testatrix), Celso Gimpaya (Driver of the testatrix) and
Maria Gimpaya (housekeeper) stand as the instrumental
witnesses of the will.

PR Lutgarda Santiago (niece of the testatrix) filed a

petition for probate of the will of the testatrix. This was
opposed by the Pet. Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales on several
grounds.

The trial court disallowed the probate of the will. On

appeal, the CA allowed the probate. Pet. filed a MR.

Contention:
1. It was contended, among others, that the CA erred in
holding that the will was executed and attested as required
by law when there was absolutely no proof that the 3
instrumental witnesses were credible witnesses.
2.

To be a credible witness, there must be evidence on

record that the witness has a good standing in his
community, or that he is honest and upright, or reputed to
be trustworthy and reliable.

3.

The term credible is no synonymous with competent

under Art. 820 and 821 of the Civil Code and still not be
credible as required by Art. 805 of the same code.
The term credible as used in the Civil Code should
receive the same settled and well-known meaning it has
under the naturalization law.

4.

Issue: Whether the credibility of the instrumental witnesses is

material to the validity of a will.
Held: No.

8 | Wills and Succession Case Digest

Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the
witness testify initially or at any time during the trial as to his
good standing in the community, his reputation for
trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness
in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by
the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in
Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the
soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his
answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18
years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or
competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not
blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the
satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the
disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. We reject
petitioner's contention that it must first be established in the
record the good standing of the witness in the community, his
reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty
and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of the
witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the
opposing party.

probate of the will they have attested. We, therefore, reject

petitioner's position that it was fatal for respondent not to have
introduced prior and independent proof of the fact that the
witnesses were "credible witnesses that is, that they have a
good standing in the community and reputed to be trustworthy
and reliable.
Art. 830 Revocation of Wills
Maloto vs. CA
Facts:

Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and

nephews. Believing that the deceased did not leave a will,
they commenced an intestate proceeding for the
settlement of their aunts estate.

While the intestate proceeding was in progress, the four

executed an agreement of extrajudicial agreement
wherein they agreed to divide among themselves equally
the estate of their aunt. This was presented and approved
by the court.

Three months later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, discovered a

document which happened to be the last will and
testament of Adriana Maloto. In the said will, although the
four (Panfilo, Felino, Aldina and Constancio) were named
as heirs, Aldina and Constancio shares on the estate was
much bigger than what they had agreed in the
Extrajudicial Settlement.

Aldina and Constancio, together with other devisees and

legatees, filed a MR for the annulment of the proceedings
and allowance of the will. The trial court however denied
the motion but on appeal to the CA, the CA allowed the
allowance of the will. The CA ruled that Adriana Maloto
had no intention to revoke when she allegedly ordered
Guadalupe to burn the will. The animus revocandi was not
sufficiently proven.

On the 4th contention

Under the Naturalization Law where the law is mandatory that
the petition for naturalization must be supported by two
character witnesses who must prove their good standing in the
community, reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness,
their honesty and uprightness. The two witnesses in a petition
for naturalization are character witnesses in that being citizens
of the Philippines, they personally know the petitioner to be a
resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by the
Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable
and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications
necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in
any way disqualified under the provisions of the Naturalization
Law.
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not
character witnesses for they merely attest the execution of a
will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said
execution.
rd

On the 3 contention
In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an
instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute, that
is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends
On the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief
and conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth.
"Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be
a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what
he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness
upon a given matter because he is competent, but may
thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his
testimony." In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental
witnesses in Order to be competent must be shown to have the
qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of
the disqualifications under Article 821 and for their testimony to
be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it
is not mandatory that evidence be first established on record
that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or
that they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy
and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the
contrary is established otherwise. In other words, the
instrumental witnesses must be competent and their
testimonies must be credible before the court allows the

Issue: Whether the will was revoked by Adriana.

Held: No.
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like
burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective
revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus
revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that
the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may
be performed by another person but under the express
direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes
without saying that the document destroyed must be the will
itself.
In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke,
may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite
alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the
necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will
and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied
by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or
cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another
person in his presence and under his express direction. There
is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these
requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by
Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established

9 | Wills and Succession Case Digest

to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For
another, the burning was not proven to have been done under
the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not
in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were
one in stating that they were the only ones present at the place
where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located in
which the papers proffered as a will were burned.
Nowhere in the records before us does it appear that the two
witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and Eladio Itchon, both
illiterates, were unequivocably positive that the document
burned was indeed Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we think,
believed that the papers she destroyed was the will only
because, according to her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the
other hand, obtained his information that the burned document
was the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his
testimony on this point is double hearsay.
Gago vs. Mamuyac

Atty. Perfecto Gabriel presented for allowance the will of

Simeon Naval which was executed on Feb. 13, 1915. The
allowance was denied on the ground that the will was not
sign in the presence of 3 witnesses and the 2 witnesses
did not sign it, in the presence of the each other.

The nieces and legatees of the decedent filed another

allowance for the will which was executed by the decedent
on Oct. 31, 1914. This was opposed by Monica, Rosa and
Cristina (all surnamed Naval) on the ground that the
existence of the will on subsequent date has its effect of
revoking the previous will.

The trial court admitted the will dated 1914 and ordering
its allowance.

Issue: Whether the 1914 will should be allowed probate.

Facts:

Held: Yes.

Petitioner filed a petition for probate of the will of Miguel

Mamuyac which was executed on July 27, 1918. This was
opposed by the reason that, the will was already annulled
and revoked since the testator executed another will on
April 16, 1919. The lower court denied the probate of the
will.

Another petition for the probate of Miguel Mamuyac

executed on April 16, 1919. Again, this was opposed on
the ground that was presented was merely copy of the will
and according to the witnesses presented the will was
revoked on Dec. 30, 1920. Jose Fenoy, who typed the will
in 1919 testified that the will executed in 1919 was in
possession of Miguel Mamuyac and that this was
cancelled by Miguel. Carlos Bejar also testified that he
saw Miguel Mamuyac executed another will on Dec. 30,
1920. Narcissa Gago somehow corroborated the
testimony of Jose Fenoy and also testified that the will in
1919 could not be found. Hence, the petition for probate
was denied.

Article 739 of the Civil Code provides that a former will is by

operation of law revoked by another valid subsequent will, if
the testator does not state in the later will his desire that the
former should subsist wholly or partly. In harmony with this
provision of substantive law, we find section 623 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, which provides that no will shall be revoked,
except by implication of law, otherwise than by some will,
codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills.

Issue: Whether there is a valid revocation of the will

Held: Yes.
Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in
the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption
is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same
was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises
where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will
and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed
that such will has been destroyed by any other person without
the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the
presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while
varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the
circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by
proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent
to revoke it.
Samson vs. Naval
Facts:

Therefore, according to the legal provisions, in order that the

will of February 13, 1915, that is, the first document presented
as the will of the deceased Simeona F. Naval, could have the
effect of revoking that which was presented afterwards by the
petitioners as executed by the same deceased on October 31,
1914, that is, on a date previous to the execution of the first, it
was necessary and indispensable that the later will, that is, that
first presented for allowance, should be perfect or valid, that it,
executed as provided by lay in case of wills.
The revocatory clause contained in a document, like the
present, which contains provisions proper of a will, as those
relating to legacies and distribution of the properties of the
testator after his death as well as the appointment of
executors, is not matter extraneous to the will, but merely a
part thereof, intimately connected with it as well as with the will
or wills, the revocation of which is declared in said clause; in
short, the desire of the testator declared in the revocatory
clause is related to the desire of the same testator expressed
in the provisions of the testament in which said clause is found
and to that which he might have expressed in the testaments
which he may have previously executed. There is such relation
between the revocatory clause and the will which contains it,
that if the will does not produce legal effects, because it has
not been executed in accordance with the provisions of the
law, neither would the revocatory clause therein produce legal
effects. And if, in the present case, the so-called will of the
deceased, Simeona F. Naval, dated February 13, 1915, was
not duly executed by her as her last will and testament, ad
declared by the court in its decision of November 19, 1915, in
case No. 13386, for which reason its allowance was denied,
neither may it be maintained that the revocatory clause
contained in said will is the expression of the last will of said

10 | W i l l s a n d S u c c e s s i o n C a s e D i g e s t
deceased. The disallowance of the ill, therefore, produced the
effect of annulling the revocatory clause, not exactly because
said will was not executed in such from that it could transmit
real and personal property, as inaccurately alleged by the
appellant, Monica Naval, to be the court's finding, upon which
said assignment of error is based, but because it was proved
that said will was not executed or signed with the formalities
and requisites required by section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, a cause which also produces the nullity of the
same will, according to section 634 of said law; and of course
what is invalid in law can produce no effect whatever.

instrument intended to revoke a will with a present intention to

make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the
old, and the new disposition is not made or, if made, fails to
effect for same reason.
The failure of the new testamentary disposition, upon whose
validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the nonfulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the
revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at
some time a will in place of that destroyed will not render the
destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is
dependent upon the valid execution of a new will.

Molo vs. Molo

Facts:

Mariano Molo died on January 24, 1941 without leaving

any forced heir either in the descending or ascending line.
His wife Juana Molo (petitioner) survived him, and by his
nieces and nephew Luz, Gliceria and Cornelio, all
surnamed Molo (oppositors-appellants). The latter were
the legitimate children of a deceased brother of the
testator.
Mariano left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918
and another executed on June 20, 1939. In both the 1918
and 1939 wills Juana was instituted as his universal heir.
The latter will contains a clause, which expressly revokes
the will executed in 1918.

Juana Molo filed in the CFI a petition seeking the probate

of the will executed in 1939. The court rendered a decision
denying the probate of said will on the ground that the
petitioner failed to prove that the same was executed in
accordance with law.

In view of the disallowance of the will, the widow filed

another petition for the probate of the will executed by the
deceased on August 18, 1918. The oppositors filed an
opposition to the petition contending that, notwithstanding
the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocatory clause is
valid and still has the effect of nullifying the prior will of
1918. Likewise, regardless of the revocatory clause, said
will of 1918 cannot still be given effect because of the
presumption that the testator himself deliberately revoked
it.

The will of 1918 was admitted to probate.

Issue: Whether the 1918 will shall be admitted for probate.

Held:
A subsequent will containing a clause revoking a previous will,
having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed
in conformity with the provisions of law as to the making of
wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will,
inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void.
The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is usually applied
where the testator cancels or destroys a will or executed an

Even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will

by the testator could be presumed from the failure of the
petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have
the effect of defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact
that it is founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939
has been validly executed and would be given due effect.
The theory on which the principle of dependent relative
revocation is predicated in that the testator did not intend to
die intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest when he
executed two wills on different occasions and instituted his wife
as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to
his intention of dying testate.
Diaz vs. De Leon
Facts:
The testator, shortly after the execution of the first will in
question, asked that the same be returned to him. The
instrument was returned to the testator who ordered his
servant to tear the document. This was done in his presence
and before a nurse who testified to this effect. After some time,
the testator, being asked by Dr. Cornelio Mapa about the will,
said that it had been destroyed.
Issue: Whether the will was revoked by the testator
Held: Yes.
The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the
established fact that the testator was anxious to withdraw or
change the provisions he had made in his first will. This fact is
disclosed by the testator's own statements to the witnesses
Canto and the Mother Superior of the Hospital where he was
confined.
The original will herein presented for probate having been
destroyed with animo revocandi, cannot now be probated as
the will and last testament of Jesus de Leon.