Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
3 | 2015
Index: 287210
CENTRAL EUROPE
EDUCATION
History on Trial
An interview with Lev Gudkov
POLITICS Divining Putins Intentions Valenta with Friedman Valenta | Simulated Democracy? Ditchev
ECONOMY Euro, I Find You Very Attractive. Yours, Lithuania. Mauricas | The Use of EU Funds in Poland Kozak
CULTURE Surrealism Rules Eternal Majmurek | Stalins Laughter Kaczorowski
No 3 | 2015
Advisory Board
Walter Isaacson (co-chairman), Michael antovsk (cochairman), Yuri
Andrukhovych, Piotr Buras, Krzysztof Czyewski, Josef Joffe, KaiOlaf
Lang, Zbigniew Peczyski, Petr Pithart, Jacques Rupnik, Mariusz
Szczygie, Monika Sznajderman, Martin M. imeka, Michal Vaeka
Editorial Board
Tom Klvaa (chairman), Ludk Bedn, Adam ern, Martin Ehl,
Roman Joch, Jan Machek, Kateina afakov, Tom Vrba
Editors
Aleksander Kaczorowski (editor-in-chief ), Maciej Nowicki (deputy
editor-in-chief ), Robert Schuster (managing director)
Tra n s l at o r s
Tomasz Biero, Klara Velicka
Published by
Aspen Institute Prague o. p.s.
Palackho 1, CZ 11000 Praha
e-mail: office@aspeninstitute.cz
www.aspeninstitute.cz
Year IV
No 3/2015
ISSN 18056806
Aspen Institute Prague
The ideas expressed in the articles are authors own and donot
necessarily reflect theviews of the editorial board or of the Aspen
Institute Prague.
Contents
F O R E W O R D Radek picar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
E D I T O R I A L Aleksander Kaczorowski. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11
15
19
25
29
39
46
54
59
63
68
ECONOMY
Euro, IFind You Very Attractive. Yours, Lithuania. Zygimantas Mauricas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Use of EU Funds in Poland Marek W. Kozak. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Waiting for the Impact Robert Schuster. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Russias Economy: AChanging Trend Vladislav Inozemtsev. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C O M M E N T Martin Ehl. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
71
75
79
82
88
C U LT U R E
Stalins Laughter Aleksander Kaczorowski. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Whats Old Is New Benjamin Cunningham. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
ARecipe for Religion Patrycja Pustkowiak. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Surrealism Rules Eternal Jakub Majmurek. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
APhilosophical Marshmallow Tomasz Stawiszyski. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Oblivion and Photographs Wojciech Stanisawski. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Letters Laima Vince. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Laima Vince Does Us Both an Injustice Peter Jukes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Dear readers,
We are living in atime when formal education is accessible to more individuals than ever
before. It is considered akey to personal and
social development, and prosperity. However,
education is also facing significant challenges
brought by the digital era. Therefore we have
decided to devote this Aspen Review issue to
the topic of education.
In an interview with Maciej Nowicki, French
historian and philosopher Marcel Gauchet
expresses his disillusion with the current
understanding of education and knowledge.
He explains that educational institutions have
lost much of their former great privileges
which were based on access to information
and books. Today, the teaching of knowledge
has been devalued and schools and teachers
have lost their once influential position
in society. Gauchet therefore calls for the
rethinking of the concept of education and for
areturn to some of the values, expectations,
and behaviors of the past.
According to sociologist Frank Furedi,
education in Europe is regarded instrumentally as atool for producing skilled citizens
who will fit the demands of the labor market.
However, in its own right, education is entirely
underappreciated. Needless to say, passing of
RADEK PICAR
Executive Director
Aspen Institute Prague
EDITORIAL
ALEKSANDER KACZOROWSKI
COVER STORY
The Dangers
of Processed Education
Frank Furedi
Both the so-called progressives and the conservative
educators regard education instrumentally. That is why
they regard the knowledge content of education as far
less significant than the teaching of skills.
the Department of Education into the Department for Children, Schools and Families, and the
Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills.
The excising of the word education was by no
means aFreudian slip. It indicated the lack of
cultural affirmation in policy-making circles for
educationparticularly academic and knowledge
based leaning. What it also indicates is that over
the decades, education has been transformed
into an instrument of public policy for achieving
objectives that are entirely external to it. In current
times education is expected to put right the failures
of adult society. Consequently education is meant
to transform apathetic youngsters into responsible citizens. Education is used to promote social
mobility, multiculturalism, responsible sex, sound
financial behavior, emotional well-being as well as
to provide youngsters with avariety of key skills.
The instrumental transformation of education
into ameans for achieving apolicy objective
means that it is rarely appreciated as something
that ought to be valued in its own right. The
most disturbing symptom of this instrumental
turn education takes is that its principal function is identified as the provision of skills. The
teaching of knowledge is frequently devalued
11
tempting to become one sided. The very distinction between knowledge and its application
can easily harden into polar opposite contrast,
which is not particularly helpful. However, one
can distinguish between knowledge (accomplished through learning principles, concepts
and facts) and skills (which refers to the capacity
to use that knowledge and apply it in specific
contexts). In reality the two are inextricably tied
up, since the gaining of knowledgeparticularly of deep knowledgerequires such skills
as the capacity to conceptualize, compare and
to engage critically.
Education unleashes a dynamic process
whereby greater depth of knowledge is achieved
through applicationusing the power of abstraction or experiment. At the same time the act of
application is contingent on the kind of knowledge to be tested. And it is through the acquisition of knowledge that sensitivity is gained into
the context of its application. Contrary to the
priority that the EU attaches to skills acquisition,
it is knowledge that provides children with the
capacity to conceptualize, compare and abstract.
Knowledge is logically prior to analytical skills and
such skills require acontext in aspecific domain
of knowledge. The logical priority of knowledge
does not mean that skills are unimportant or even
less important. It simply means that disciplinary
knowledge provides the intellectual and cultural
foundation for the exercise of what Aristotle
called phronesisthe virtue of practical thought.
The criticism of the knowledge model
of education is often communicated through
statements that explicitly question the authority
of knowledge. This pedagogic devaluation of
a knowledge based curriculum is fuelled by
apowerful anti-intellectual ethos that self-consciously refuses to take ideas seriously. From this
perspective knowledge is simply reducible to facts
and information. Accordingly, the acquisition of
knowledge is presented as akin to memorizing
facts. Hence the misleading representation of
knowledge acquisition as aform of rote learning.
12
13
14
FRANK FUREDI
Knowledge Belongs
to the Past
Humanism was based on the assumption that you
need to know things in order to exist as ahuman
being. Today anindividual exists regardless of any
culture orknowledge acquiredsays Marcel Gauchet
inaninterview with MaciejNowicki
MARCEL GAUCHET
In the past the school was based on transmitting a certain portion of knowledge to
astudent who remained passive. In the new
school the student is much more active. Whatis
wrong with that?
At first glance, nothing is wrong. Its just that
we have gone too far. We have behaved in such
away as if it was enough to make this change
15
16
17
MACIEJ NOWICKI
18
Moscow to Bologna:
The (Re-)Sovietization of
European Higher Education
Aviezer Tucker
19
20
The Communists
attempted to limit the
size of the professional
educated middle class.
The European planners
attempted to increase
the size of the middle
class. Ironically, both
types of central planners
chose to achieve these
diametrically opposed
goals by the same means.
The Soviet and European central planners
had diametrically opposed goals for their social
engineering. The Communists attempted to limit
the size of the professional educated middle class.
TheEuropean planners attempted to increase
the size of the middle class. Ironically, both
types of central planners chose to achieve these
diametrically opposed goals by the same means:
assaulting high culture, contracting the humanities and languages, expanding and encouraging
engineering, radically dumbing down the level of
education, limiting or eliminating altogether basic
research, basing education on learning by rote
with little or no space for creativity, and imposing
state appointed managers to force these measures
through and achieve quantitative targets. If such
21
22
23
24
AV I E Z E R T U C K E R
25
26
27
28
J A N S OWA
MICHAELANTOVSK
MICHAELANTOVSK
29
30
History on Trial
Todays Russia is implementing the idea of happy
forgetting about the past. The point is not to traumatize the
young generation with unpleasant episodes of historysays
Lev Gudkov in an interview with Filip Memches
LEV GUDKOV
32
Has that confusion of history teachers dating back to the early 1990s continued to this
day? Perhaps nothing really changed when
Putin became president for the first timethe
imperial or nationalist cause is not astrategy,
but an accident?
Of course, the confusion is the starting
point. And obviously it was not planned. This
is asocial effect of the collapse of the Soviet
system. However, efforts were made then to strategically exploit this confusion. And there is no
accident here. This is adeliberately maintained
tendency. It is part of government policy. Special
commissions were established, the content of
history teaching was ideologically homogenized.
The point is not to present the students with
acomplicated picture of history, but to educate
33
The violent or even drastic course of the economic transition in the 1990s hit at the Russian
public sector. Has it not lead to aweakening
of the prestige of the teaching profession and
has it not encouraged nihilistic sentiments
among educationists, which could also affect
their attitude towards the past?
As far as nihilism is concerned, Iwould not
agree with you. Still the prestige of the teaching
profession has indeed fallen very low, mostly
because of very poor wages. Many people have
given up working in the educational system.
Inthe middle of the last decade, teachers salaries
went up significantly, especially in large cities,
where demonstrations against Putins regime
were taking place. And now it is fair to say that
the corporation of schoolteachers, and specifically their loyalty, was bought by the regime in
this way.
34
FILIP MEMCHES
35
WA LT E R I S A A C S O N
36
W A LT E R I S A A C S O N
37
39
40
41
42
keeping 20,000 men on the peninsulasufficient for aquick strategic surprise conquest with
an aura of legality. Sixty percent of the Crimean
population were native Russians; the Ukrainian
army was rag-tag.
And America? Just as the weak U.S. response
to Czechoslovakia had conditioned the invasion
of Afghanistan, the weak response of Bush and
Obama to Georgia, conditioned the invasion of
Crimea. Moreover, while Putin had some respect
for W, he had little for Obama. Hillarys silly reset
gimmick! Obamas back step from his own red
line in Syria! Divided Congress! Nation wearied of
large, costly invasions as Russia had been during
its own Afghanistan war.
The final key was strategic surprise. Once
again, new Olympic Games turned into perfect
maskirovka. But while cheering his athletes and
hosting U.S. security, furnished in the wake of
Chechen terrorism, Putins mind was on Kyiv and
Crimea.
Detected by aU.S. satellite, new, large and
nonstop maneuvers should have rung all the
warning bells. But U.S. intelligence simply could
not envision aCrimean invasion. Thus February
27 replayed August 20, 1968, Prague. Then, it was
fit young men disguised as tourists, who flew
to Prague, accessed weapons from the Russian
embassy, took over Prague airport, and called in
the invasion forces. Now it was the little green
men without insignia who did likewise after taking
over government buildings and Simferopol airport.
Why no insignia? To plausibly deny that these
were Russian soldiers. After all, Putin, still cautious
at this point, couldnt be wholly positive that the
paper tiger in the White House wouldnt suddenly
grow claws like Jimmy Carter after the 1979 Afghan
invasion.
43
44
D R . J I R I VA L E N TA
1 http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/leni-friedman-valenta-and-jiri-valenta-arm-ukraine-and-impose-energy-sanctions-344368.html
45
First, it should be explained why revolutionand not civil war. Doubtless, over the
past year Ukraine has seen an escalation of
intercommunal violence, with citizens of the
same country killing each other. Atypical civil
war twentieth-century style implies the principled clash of opposing collective subjectivities,
when two truths cannot find acompromise.
The Maidanites are all about distinctive subjectivity, political ideals, and social program. What is
the distinctive truth of their armed opponents,
their alternative program for Ukraine? There is
no such program and no interest in Ukraine, as
the leaders of Donetsk and Luhansk republics
explicitly announced their ultimate goal to secede
and join the Russian Federation. To this, one can
respond with an example of the archetypal civil
war of the nineteenth centurythe U.S. Civil War,
which was about secession from afederation.
This historical parallel only underscores the inappropriateness of the civil war model to analyze
Ukrainian events: did American Confederates
dream about joining, say, Mexico? Separatism
is an understandable cause for arebellion, why
should it be masked by something else?
The notion of bourgeois-democratic revolution is occasionally employed when discussing
46
Maidan and post-Maidan political developments, primarily because the most visible
public figures associated with the movement
belong to the educated middle-age, middleclass stratum. The appeal of the classical formula
is understandable, but in the modern world,
bourgeois-democratic revolution can be used
only as ametaphor rather than an analytical
category. It was coined and developed by
Marxist ideologues and social scientists in the
nineteenth century specifically to denote the
radical transformation of society from feudalism
to capitalism. Maidan took place in asociety
with acapitalist market economy and an institutionalized political democracy. Instead of
amonarch, it overthrew alegitimately elected
president and expressed distrust of the parlia-
47
48
Ukrainian revolution is
postcolonial because
it not only set out
to overthrow the
political and economic
hegemony of atyrant
but also released the
forces of societal selforganization.
We know that this is anew phenomenon
because it largely ignores or creatively recodes
the readily available historical precedents and
symbols. The readily available political symbolism
and historical mythology of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) plays asurprisingly marginal
role in the country at war. The free subjectivity of
Euromaidan revealed itself in its arbitrary appropriation of the famous UPA greeting Glory to
Ukraine! Glory to the heroes! without feeling
obliged to import the whole complex of twentieth-century identity-fixed nationalism associated
with the UPA legacy. When Russian propaganda
attempted to troll new Ukrainians as Banderites for repeating the old fascist slogan, they
responded creatively, not reactively. Ukrainian
Jews immediately produced the meme Yid-Banderite and actually developed it into asocial
identity that many proudly accepted. This is just
one episode in aseries of creative responses
to Russian propaganda that demonstrate more
than agood sense of humor: the identity-indifferent, value-oriented imagined community of
new Ukraine is capable of accommodating any
sluron its own terms. The most recent example
49
50
With the revolution of 2014, the postmodernism in Ukraine ended. We still donot know
how to conceptualize this new reality. From
the outside, this brave new world looks like
high Modernity (but not compromised by the
Eros of the state and the supremacy of the
national body): with self-sacrificial heroes,
collective improvisations, and complex forms
of self-organization. Most importantly, even the
most radical social and personal experiments
manifestations of emancipated subjectivityare
perceived without the familiar postmodern sneer
51
Several authorsparticularly Sergei Zhuk, Yaroslav Hrytsak, and Anna Veronika Wendland
express their frustration over the stance taken
vis--vis Ukraine by professional historians and
public intellectuals in the United States, Russia,
and Germany. It seems that the main reason
for this frustration results from encountering
an explicit refusal of very intelligent people to
put their minds to work rigorously. Such is the
effect of the Ukrainian postcolonial revolution:
the main adversary of the self-expression of
subjectivity is not another subjectivity, but its
absence.
This probably explains the otherwise
inexplicable solidarity of West European and
Russian left-wing activists not with the Ukrainian
anti-kleptocratic popular uprising with astrong
anticolonial component, but with explicitly
imperialist and chauvinist Russian aggression.
This is what makes quite anumber of American
historians side with Putins regime: they are in
the business of identities, and when pressed to
choose between familiar scenarios structuring
their field and conceptual revolution brought
about by Ukrainian events, they choose stability
(not unlike their Russian counterparts). Otherwise, they would have to reconsider their ideas
of what constitutes Russianness and Jewishness,
fascism and nationalism, revolution and reaction. They forget that operating with conventional categories and models is only part of the
institutionalized scholarly process. The other
part is essential for preventing the process from
succumbing into shallow performativity: those
conventions should be revised and reconfigured
from time to time.
The position of Russian scholars on Ukraine
is the least interesting to analyze, as they donot
try to preserve even the status quo in the face
of rapidly changing reality, but wholeheartedly
succumb to excessive archaism and intellectual scarcity. With rare exceptions, the level of
expertise on Ukraine has deteriorated in Russia
to astate beyond any intellectual relevance.
52
General public discourse in Russia demonstrates the same fundamental lack of intellectual productivity and distinctive personal
subjectivity. The dominant discourse explains
everythingfrom the Ukrainian crisis to Russian
domestic problemsthrough the trope of
foreign agency, whether the United States,
cunning Kremlin manipulators, or aliens from
outer space.
The problem is not that amajority of Russians
hate Ukraine and believe the state propaganda
of unheard of idiocy and crudeness (which is
possible only because they want to believe it).
The tragedy (for Russia) is that they are doing
this for no personal reason, just because these
people have no subjectivity as members of
society, beyond immediate personal interests.
It is in this perspective that the seemingly
strange slogan of the Russian opposition politician Aleksei Navalny should be perceived: The
Final Battle between Good and Neutrality. Only
through the prism of Ukrainian revolution can
the opportunist tactics of Navalny be best
understood: his readiness to cooperate with
nationalists, liberals, and communists is but
asoft version of the creative hybridity of new
Ukrainians that gradually transforms the political sphere in the country. Thus, the personal
choice of Russo-Yid-Banderites received official
political sanction recently when the chairman of
the Ukrainian parliament, Alexander Turchinov,
proposed that newly elected MPs should take an
oath during the swearing-in ceremony simultaneously to three respectful representatives of
different parts of Ukraine: the ex-member of
the pro-Russian Party of Regions and Jewish
activist Efim Zviagilskii, the leader of Crimean
Tatars Mustafa Dzhemilev, and Yuri Shukhevych,
son of the supreme commander of the Ukrainian
Insurgent Army and leader of the Organization
of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). This decision has
nothing to dowith political correctness,internationalism, or multiculturalism, because there
are no fixed groups to claim representation on
I LYA G E R A S I M O V
1 Russian original: nichego (V. Sorokin. Den oprichnika. Moscow, 2008. P.141). The 2011 English edition translates the answer as Itll be
all right, which is misleading.
53
What Would
an Annan Plan for Ukraine
Look Like?
Iannis Carras
54
decision. Cyprus would have two federal parliaments, the first with members elected proportionately according to the population of the
relevant communities, the second split equally
between the two communities. ASupreme Court
would serve as the final arbiter, resolving constitutional differences. This would be made up of
three judges from each of the two communities
and three foreign judges.
External guarantees: the Annan Plan stipulated that Cyprus maintain special ties of
friendship with Greece and Turkey, respecting
the balance in Cyprus established by the Treaty
of Guarantee. It also stated: Until the accession
of Turkey to the EU, the United Cyprus Republic
shall not put its territory at the disposal of international military operations other than with the
consent of Greece and Turkey [].
Security: the Annan plan would have
dissolved all Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
units. Turkish, Greek and British troops on
the island would however have remained for
aconsiderable duration, and in small numbers
indefinitely. AUN contingent would also have
remained on the island. There were no provisions
to balance Turkeys natural dominance in the air.
If Cyprus serves as
avalid historical
analogy, it is worth
asking whether
proposed solutions for
the resolution of the
Cyprus conflict over the
last forty years provide
any lessons for Ukraine.
Relevant Differences
As with all potential historical analogies,
there are both similarities and differences
between Cyprus and Ukraine. Cyprus had
been acomponent part of the Ottoman Empire
between 1571 and 1878, which is for not much
longer than Ukraine of the Russian Empire and
the Soviet Union. On any possible count, the
percentage of Russian Ukrainians (let alone
Ukrainians speaking Russian as afirst language)
is higher than that of Turkish Cypriots. The latter
constituted 18% of the population of Cyprus
in 1960. Further, there can be no doubt about
boundaries of aRepublic of Cyprus, as these
are determined by the sea.
At the same time, the Annan Plan was built
upon aseries of negotiations stretching back to
55
56
57
58
IANNIS CARRAS
Simulated Democracy?
Ivaylo Ditchev
Democracy today is instrumentalized, making it on one
hand more manageable and secure, on the other, more
suspect and irrelevant
Iwill call it the principle of instrumentalization. Social practices emerge as agenuine effort,
implying risk and uncertainty, and no one questions their authenticity. At the next stage the
technique starts to be mastered, so that control
and predictability rise. But in the same time the
practice loses its aura, suspicions emerge as to
hidden interests and strategies, so that finallyat
the zenith of its technical excellencethe practice starts to decline strangely. Thus Greek art was
gradually emptied of its existential depth in the
Hellenistic period, royal court intrigues become
routine and obsolete during modern era, communist rituals degenerate into wooden language.
Iwill argue that democracy today has instrumentalized, too, making it on one hand more
manageable and secure, on the other, more
suspect and irrelevant. It used to be abattleground during the first modernity, having cost
many human lives, and the freedom of opinion
was certainly one of the most important issues,
censorship prevailing more often than not.
Sometime in the 80s (earlier in the US, later
in Eastern Europe) democracy became stabilized around aspecific type of instrumentalized
public debate, due both to the decline of radical
ideological alternatives and to the proliferation
of private media, where opinions are skillfully
promoted and juxtaposed without putting the
system at risk.
59
60
Resulting from
the avalanche-like
organization of the
information flow is the
tendency to occupy
all possible positions
in any public debate.
It is as if opinion has
been liquefied, if not
gasified, and tends to fill
in all pockets of agiven
volume.
the topic, and even when having chosen an aggressive style, they donot impose their point of view
on the debating citizens, politicians or experts.
The aim is to operate an identification between
the eye of the camera or microphone and the
audiencethose laypersons who are supposed
to be shocked, amused, intrigued, or outraged
by the discussion. What is the implication of such
sort of staging? Democratic battles are deployed
before us as afascinating spectacle that we need
to watch, evening after evening. Rate, vote, take
sides, send messages, win prizes. In short, the
citizen becomes aconsumer of the political show.
The last example is linked to the Web 2.0
revolution. It seems that democratic participa-
61
I V AY L O D I T C H E V
1 Or even wars, as it was the case with Al Jazeera and the second Gulf War.
62
63
by Communists. Similarly politically neutral narration can be found on the webpage of Buchenwald
Museum: April 11. The SS flees, but before the
fighting is over, inmates of the camp resistance
occupy the tower and take charge of order and
administration in the camp.5
Evidently, communists involvement in the
underground resistance at Buchenwald lost its
appeal in contemporary perspective. Nevertheless, immediately after the war this fact was
not only recognized but also effectively used in
promotion of corresponding memory narrative
on the struggle of communist antifascists against
Nazis. The camp was perceived as asymbol of
political victims who were also heroic fighters
and played essential role in memorialization
of the Second World War among anti-fascist in
many European countries. Buchenwalds key
role in the formation of international memory
of former concentration camps inmates was officially confirmed in 1948, when the International
Federation of Former Political Prisoners (FIAPP)6
declared the April 11 as The International Day of
Former Political Prisoners and The International
Day of the Deportees.7 Later it was renamed into
the Day of International Solidarity of Liberated
Political Prisoners and Fighters by the successor
of FIAPPInternational Federation of Resistance
Fighters (FIR). In those days, April 11 was aday
with profound international anti-fascist connotation, which could be proudly communicated
across the East-West divide. With the beginning
of Cold War and the rising tensions between the
Western and Eastern blocs, the political prisoners
organization, such as FIAPP/FIR, lost their influence in the West. Buchenwald memory and the
symbolism of April 11 were gradually reduced to
the communist milieu.
In GDR, Buchenwald was entitled the role
of major pantheon to heroic resistance fighters
and the self-liberation of the camp became the
focus of amemorial complex (1958).8 Buchenwald,
asite of official pilgrimage and ceremonies, stood
for antifascism and to some extent was called to
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65
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N E L LY B E K U S
1 http://ria.ru/spravka/20140411/1003173402.html
2 http://www.calend.ru/holidays/0/0/1007/
3 The complex on the Poklonnaya Gora occupies 135 hectares on which the Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War, three temples
and the Victory Monument are located.
4 http://deti-uzniki.ru/
5 http://www.buchenwald.de/en/463/
6 The FIAPP (Fdration Internationale des Anciens Prisonniers Politiques) was founded by representatives of organizations of political
prisoners and resistance fighters from 17 European countries from East and West in February 1946 in Warsaw.
7 Barcellini Serge. Sur deux journes nationales commmorant la dportation et les perscutions des annes noires . In: Vingtime
Sicle. Revue dhistoire. N45, janvier-mars 1995, p.79.
8 Sarah Farmer, Symbols that Face Two Ways: Commemorating the Victims of Nazism and Stalinism at Buchenwald and
Sachsenhausen, Representations, No. 49, Winter, 1995, pp. 97119, 102.
9 Peter Monteath, ADay to Remember: East Germanys Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Fascism, German History Vol. 26, No.2,
pp. 195218, p.200.
10 Gilad Margalit, Guilt, Suffering, and Memory, Germany Remembers Its Dead of World War II. Bloomington & Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press, 2010, 129.
11 Philipp Auerbach was president of Reparations Office in Bavaria and member of BVN in 1950.
12 Aleida Assmann, Europes Divided Memory p.2542.
13 Ibid.
14 http://www.un.org/en/holocaustremembrance/index.shtml
15 http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/21516
16 TheSiege of Leningrad lasted from September 8, 1941 till January 27, 1944.
17 M. Paker and B. Strth, Introduction In AEuropean memory? ed. by M. Paker and Bo Strth, NY: Berghahn Books, 2010, 11.
67
MARTIN M. IMEKA
68
MARTIN M. IMEKA
69
71
72
73
Z YG I M A N TA S M AU R I C A S
74
75
Is it like that?
According to areport on the state of implementation of cohesion policy programs 20072013
in Poland until July 6, 2015, 301,700 formally correct
applications were submitted with atotal value of
(national and EU funds) PLN 613.3 billion (EUR
147.4 billion).1 106,100 contracts were signed in
the amount of 410.5 million PLN (EUR 98.7 billion),
including PLN 288.4 million (EUR 69.3 billion) of EU
funds, which amounts to 102.7 percent of EU funds
for 20072013. Expenses considered as eligible
(in accordance with the requirements and regulations) amounted to PLN 342.8 billion (EUR 82.4
billion), and the EU co-financing was PLN 243.2
billion (EUR 58.5 billion). In terms of absorption
capacity, we are undoubtedly at the forefront of
the EU countries.
What effects did we achieve? According to
data on the website of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Development Effects of European funds
(accessed June 12, 2015) the outcomes for the
period 20072013 were as follows: In the area of
labor and entrepreneurship, 413,200 jobs were
created and 30,900 enterprises and 258 business
environment institutions received support; R
& D and innovation: the number of supported
organizations and projects: 1,413 universities and
research units, 642 research centers, 2,955 innovative ideas; 3,722 technologies implemented;
information society: 55,806km of broadband
network, 214,000 of households received funding
for Internet access, 5,834 new services; transport: 11,500km of roads (from national to local),
1,633km of built or modernized railway lines,
2,633 purchased or upgraded municipal transport fleet vehicles; environmental protection: 499
sewage treatment plants (no information available
whether they were built or modernizedMWK),
24,200km of modernized or built sewerage system,
6,900km of built or upgraded water mains, 715
investments in renewable energy sources, 1,756
investments in energy efficiency. This presentation
describes the state at the end of April, based on
contracts signed rather than executed.
76
It is clear that the vast majority of the information cited above regards the number of contracts
signed or organizations supported. It does not
regard the effects, perhaps with the exception
of the 413,200 jobs created (but it is not applicable, for it describes promises from contracts
rather than facts). On this basis, it is difficult to
talk about results.
It seems that this is due to several reasons.
First, not many members of the public have
noticed that in afew very eventful years we have
moved from the era of industrial economy to
77
M A R E K W. K O Z A K
1 Unless otherwise stated, the value of the euro in the article was calculated on the basis of Table No. 107/A/NBP/2015 dated June 5, 2015,
when 1 EUR = 4,16 PLN.
2 Hryniewicz J.T., 2004, Polityczny i kulturowy kontekst rozwoju gospodarczego (Political and cultural context of the economic
development), Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar
3 Zaucha J. & Cioek D. Brodzicki T. & Gazek E., 2014, Wraliwo polskich regionw na wyzwania gospodarki globalnej (Vulnerability
of Polish regions to global economy challenges), [in:] Gawlikowska-Hueckel K., Szlachta J. (red.), Wraliwo polskich regionw
nawyzwania wspczesnej gospodarki. Implikacje dla polityki rozwoju regionalnego, Warszawa: Oficyna a Wolters Kluver business.
4 R.K. Merton, 1998, entry succession of goals, [in:] International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 11 (Sills D.L., editor),
TheMacMillan Co & The Free Press
5 Opolski K. & Modzelewski P.,2011, The use of evaluation in the process of designing a strategy, [in:] A. Haber, M. Szaaj (eds),
Evaluation at strategic level of governance, Warszawa: Ministry of Regional Development and Polish Agency for Enterprise
Development.
78
79
80
ROBERT SCHUSTER
Managing Editor
Aspen Review Central Europe
Photo: Kamila Schusterov
81
Russias Economy:
AChanging Trend
Vladislav Inozemtsev
82
83
May It Be Reversed?
Every time acountry faces an economic crisis,
its government tries to step in for softening the
impact of the market forcesbut in Russian case
it seems terribly difficult due to both the economic
structure and the ideological approaches of the
countrys leadership.
One major challenge comes from the nature
of Russian economy on the micro-level. As one
knows, in the times of crisis the governments prefer
to ease taxes and to soften the financial policy in
order to provide more money to the businesses to
encourage then to invest, to lower prices and therefore to counter the shrinking consumer demand.
This strategy actually worked well from the beginning of the 1930sbut few may understand why
it is not working in Russia these days. The answer,
however, is rather simple. To make sure money will
work one must possess ahealthy private sectorif
its in place, the government orders will create more
production and jobs. This was the case of the New
Deal policies that were so successful in fighting the
Great Depression: back then the American government spent $4.2b (that corresponds to $190b in
current US dollars) for accomplishing 34 thousand
different projectsroads, dams, bridges, airfields,
schools and hospitals) which were all build in less
than eight years by private construction companies and at the lowest possible costs. Russia these
days is simply incapable of replicating thison the
one hand, the government declines to grant the
contracts on the competitive basis to the most able
companies, on the other hand, there are actually
too few contractors who can dothe job since the
economy is too strongly controlled by the state.
Therefore the money disbursed only enriches
the loyal entrepreneurs, boosts corruption and
pushes up construction costs while not producing
meaningful results. Up to this day, the Russian
government channeled RUB 930 billion (around
84
85
Russia now enters akind of aBrezhnev-era stagnation, where the non-development may even be
portrayed as the much-wanted stability President
Putin proclaims as both his major goal and his
greatest achievement.
So the normality of crisis may become the first
reason it will not be dealt with seriously. Butthe
second reason looks much more important and
much more challenging. Since both crises of 2008
and 2014 erupted at the time of downturn in the
oil market and at the time of political quarrels
between Russia and the West (in the first case it
was alocal war in Georgia, in the secondthe
conflict in Ukraine), the ruling elite in Moscow is
trying (and will continue to try) to attribute the
economic problems to the external factors (so,
either to international financial crisis of 2008 or to
the hostile Western actions of 2014). The second
case is even more beneficial for the government
since it presupposes akind of aggression that the
West undertook against Russia (even if it looks
crazy, what the ordinary Russian dweller hears
these days is particularly this very formula). Ifone
believes that the crisis is due to the Wests attempt
to counter Russias rise from its knees and is artificially orchestrated to make Russia keep low profile,
the natural feeling will be to support ones government and to put all the thoughts about economic
hardships aside. Therefore, Iwould argue that while
the economic crisis that begun in Russia in 2014 will
definitely turn into along and chronic one, it will
not undermine Putins popularity and produce any
significant political challenges to the regime. The
Russians understand quite well that their leaders
are not to be blamed for the falling oil prices, and
at the same their national pride will not allow them
to criticize the president in atime which is largely
considered to be atime of war that the whole world
quite suddenlyand for sure without any rational
causedeclared on the Russian Federation.
Iwill reiterate: this may be the only one point
where Idoagree with the Russian traditionalist
thinkers saying that Russia is not Europe. Russia
actually is not Europe because here the worsening
86
V L A D I S L AV
INOZEMTSEV
1 See: I 2015 , :
, 2015, cc. 3, 4, 37 (On the current economic situation in the Russian Federation in the 1st quarter of 2015,
Moscow, The Ministry for economic development, 2015, pp. 3, 4, 37 [in Russian]).
2 Calculated by the author, see: , . : , 2014, 16 , . 67
(Inozemtsev, Vladislav. How the oil has transformed Russia in: Vedomosti, 2014, December 16, pp. 67 [in Russian]).
3 See: http://www.kaig.ru/rf/debtgdp.pdf, site retrieved June 9, 2015.
4 See: e, . : : , 2014, 1 , . 5
(Inozemtsev, Vladislav. The presentiment of default: what may be done with the corporate debts in: RBC, 2014, December 1, p.5 [in Russian]).
5 See: , . : , 2015, 29 , . 7
(Prokhorov, Mikhail. Five observations and ideas for the upcoming crisis in Kommersant, 2015, January 29, p.7 [in Russian]).
6 See: , . e, . : , 2015, 3,
. 7686 (Zubov, Valery M. and Inozemtsev, Vladislav. The surrogate investment system in: Problems of Economics, 2015, No 3, pp.
7686 [in Russian]).
7 See: e, . : , 2015, 9 , . 3 (Inozemtsev, Vladislav.
Will we live under Brezhnevs rules in: Moskovskij Komsomolets, 2015, June 9, p.3 [in Russian]).
8 See: (Dmitry Medvedev answers to the questions of
the journalists of five TV-channels [in Russian]: (http://www.rg.ru/2014/12/10/tv.html), site retrieved June 14, 2015.
9 For more detail on this see: Ioulia Joutchkova & Vladislav Inozemtsev. La logique non conomique de Vladimir Poutine : Politique
etrangere [Paris], 2015, No 2, pp. 3951.
87
MARTIN EHL
Arms Manufacturers
AreComing Back into Fashion
88
MARTIN EHL
way they are treated though. Two major helicopter manufacturers, Sikorski and AgustaWestland, have invested huge sums into purchases
of two traditional Polish manufacturers only to
lose in the tender for the supply of multipurpose machines. The third participant, Airbus, won
notwithstanding the fact that it had barely started
building its assembly line in d.
The flagship company of the Polish arms
industry, the newly created PGZ holding, which
brings together the most important state-controlled companies in the defense sector, is para-
Different approaches
chosen in the Czech
Republic and Poland
manifest well what
the risks are in the
sector that has entered
agrowth period, given
current geopolitical
tensions.
Here it is important to distinguish between
two things: domestic state contracts and the
quality of machinery production, and of its
specific segmentarms manufacturing. Aswith
its experience in car manufacturing, the Central
Europe has atradition in arms production as
well. This tradition is the strongest in the Czech
Republic, but Slovakia does not lag behind
too much. Take the case of Grand Power, the
company of Jaroslav Kuracina, who is successful
with his own original pistol design abroad,
but not at home. It bears the evidence of the
potential in arms manufacturing. The Czech
way of privatization then appears to be as the
better way forward; as the old socialist weapon
89
90
Aleksander Kaczorowski
Stalins Laughter
Milan Kundera,
TheFestivalofInsignificance.
Translated by Linda Asher,
Harper2015.
In Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev you can find
astory of how Stalin once boasted about his
hunting feats among his associates. He went
hunting and saw 24 partridges in a tree. He
decided to shoot them all, but as bad luck would
have it, he had only 12 rounds of ammunition.
Sohe killed half of the birds, went home for spare
bullets, returned under the tree in afew hours
and massacred the remaining dozen.
Khrushchev and other men did not quite
know how to react to this unlikely story. Only
in the restrooms Khrushchev reportedly howled
with rage: He lied, he lied! His companions,
washing their hands in the sink, were spitting
with contempt. It didnt even occur to any of
them that the host was simply joking. For no one
around knew any more what ajoke was,this
is how aprotagonist of Milan Kunderas most
recent mini-novel comments on this strange
story.
The Festival of Irrelevance is ahundred pages
long meditation on Stalins anecdote, quoted
above. The Soviet leader is joking, but none of
his listeners can appreciate the joke. Kalinin (the
guy who gave his name to Kaliningrad) is only
thinking about making it to the toilet in time (for
he has chronic incontinence problems). Stalin
knows about itStalin knows everythingso
deliberately, as ahoax, he is prolonging his story.
So successfully, that the unfortunate Kalinin wets
his pants.
92
93
by the way, are aware that they are only Kunderas invention) nothing has meaning. Toget an
ersatz meaning, one of them untruthfully tells the
people around him that he suffers from an incurable disease. Another is immersed in agonizing
ruminations about his mother, who abandoned
him when he was achild (this part of the novel
was published by Kundera afew weeks ago in
the form of ashort story called The Apologiser
in the New Yorker).
All this in vain. In their world the only way
to overcome the everyday routine are (like in
pagan Greece) weekend orgies (this genuine
festival of irrelevance for the societies of Western
civilization).
According to Kundera the symbol of this
world and of this change is the fashion, started
in the beginning of our millennium, for walking
around with an exposed nave. Youll recognize
the beloved buttocks among hundreds of others.
But it is impossible to identify the women you
love by their navels. All navels are similar, says
one of the characters. Under this sign we are
all, without exception, soldiers of sex and every
single one of us is contemplating not abeloved
woman, but asmall hole in the belly [], which
says nothing about the woman possessing it, it
says something about which this woman is not.
This something is of course, the fetus. Kunderas characters are in mortal fear of reproduction,
generally they donot have children, and if they
do, they are bad parents or they abandon their
offspring. Okay, but what does it have to dowith
Stalin? Well, the dissidents in the Soviet Union and
other Communist Bloc countries discovered that
self-sacrifice was away of rescuing ones individuality. They rotted in gulags and prisons, they often
paid for their behavior with their lives, but they
definitely endowed these lives with ameaning.
Kunderas characters perceive such an attitude as
an illusion, which Havel interpreted as an expression of Kunderas personal discouragement with
communism. Kundera consistently rejected the
role of adissident, seeing it as athreat of ultimate
94
ALEKSANDER KACZOROWSKI
Benjamin Cunningham
95
96
97
98
BENJAMIN CUNNINGHAM
Patrycja Pustkowiak
99
Hubbard quickly realized that such treatment of society was not quite what he had
meant, because once the patient was cured, the
source of revenue would vanish. And as areligious
leader he could not only enjoy tax privileges, but
also offer aproduct for which there is always
ademand: salvation.
Psychotherapy focuses on the past and the
functions of the brain, while we are more interested in human immersion in the presentso it
is rather areligion, and not ascience of the mind,
he concluded. It is difficult to believe that transforming his specious cosmological theories into
acoherent system of beliefs went so smoothly and
brought him so many followers. In fact, Hubbard
only saw through our desires, embarrassing, but
common. Which one of us would not want to be
an operating thetan, that is someone who is able
to control reality and function without physical
support and help? Which one of us would not
want to combine business with pleasure, that is
to meet Tom Cruise and John Travolta, and at the
same time be guaranteed to achieve salvation
after death? Scientology really means putting
such very simple truths into an unusual wrapping.
The promise to acquire the skills of
controlling yourself, and in a while also the
entire world (Scientology promises its followers
the acquisition of miraculous abilities, such as
influencing the thoughts and actions of other
peopleas the famous motto has it, Scientology makes the capable more capable),
was combined by Hubbard with the modern
madness, that is the celebrity culture and aspirations of ordinary mortals to it. Thus, Scientology
is divided into three levels: between the first
level, composed of ordinary people recruited
in the street, and the third level of the clergy,
the so-called Sea Organization (Sea Org), there
is also an intermediate levelasmall number
of famous followers. They work on their spiritual development, as well as on techniques
allowing them to successfully invade Hollywood,
in special Celebrity Centers in Los Angeles and
100
PAT R YC J A P U S T K O W I A K
101
102
The combination
of revolutionary
utopian energies
and fascinations with
the artefacts of the
past, optimism of the
liberated imagination
and anihilistic,
disenchanted look at
reality, is the source
of the movements
popularity in Central
and Eastern Europe.
Toyen and tyrsk were members of
a painting movement called Artificialism, its
manifesto proclaiming adesire for poetry which
would fill the gaps between forms of reality
and [] liberate reality from itself.3 The program
of looking for poetry in everyday things and of
implementing apolitic utopia in reality bring
both these currents close to surrealism. The same
can be said about the interests of Devtsilfolklore, astrology, eroticism and leftist politics. This
allows us to look at the adoption of the surrealist
cause by the Czechs not as an act of imitation,
but as an encounter of two movements aspiring
103
Asimilar libertarian and libertine spirit permeates the film by Jaromil Jire called Valerie and Her
Week of Wonders (1970). It is an adaptation of
Nezvals 1932 novel, atribute to gothic novel and
penny romances. In fabulous settings we observe
the story of agirl exploring her femininity, her
fantasies revolving around the theme of family,
kinship and sexuality. In adreamlike way the
characters fade into other people, successive
masks drop away and palimpsests of identity are
revealed. The whole work praises the infantile,
the sensual, the erotic, the irrational. The villains
of the story are figures representing parental,
religious and economic power.
According to Jonathan L. Owen, the film is not
only an attempt at reviving the forgotten avantgarde tradition, but also at taking up adiscussion
with the utopian ideas of the moral revolution
of the 1960s.8 Both these things were not well
received in Prague two years after the invasion
of the Warsaw Pact forces. The critics violently
attacked Jire, but were careful not to blame
Nezval for this filmfor Nezval, although dead
by then, was still part of the official canon.
Asimilar eruption of anarchic content and
surrealist imagination is offered by Daisies (1966)
by Vra Chytilov, afilm articulating the other
utopian ideals of the decade: the feminist ones.
This portrait of two women who are liberated
from the reality principle and enter the screen
as adestructive and at the same time liberating
force, is still invoked by feminists and cinema
historians in the region.
Daisies were adversely received in the 1960s
by the still living veterans of surrealism, who
charged the film with superficial use of surrealist stereotypes and of decorative cynicism.9
The veterans of surrealism looked much more
favorably at the films of the Czech New Wave
artists such as Ivan Passer, Milo Forman and Ji
Menzel. Alison Frank argues10 that these films,
although seemingly realist, are akin to surrealism in their fascination with the poetry hidden
in everyday life, in the ambiguity of everyday
104
105
JAKUB MAJMUREK
1 See Piotr Piotrowski, Awangarda w cieniu Jaty: Sztuka w Europie rodkowo-Wschodniej w latach 19451989, Rebis, Pozna 2005, pp. 5152.
2 Quoted in: Leszek Engelking, Surrealizm, underground, postmodernizm: Szkice oliteraturze czeskiej, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu
dzkiego, d 2001, pp. 1011.
3 Quoted in: ibid., p.18.
4 Quoted in: ibid., p.10.
5 Lenka Bydovsk, Against the Current: The Story of Surrealist Group of Czechoslovakia, Papers of Surrealism, Issue 1/Winter 2003, p.7.
6 Quoted in: Leszek Engelking, Surrealizm, underground, postmodernizm, op. cit., p.23.
7 Iwrite more extensively about his artistic work in: Jakub Majmurek, Spiskowcy rozkoszy, Dziennik Opinii, http://www.
krytykapolityczna.pl/artykuly/film/20121218/spiskowcy-rozkoszy.
8 Jonathan L. Owen, Avant-Garde to New Wave: Czechoslovak Cinema, Surrealism and the Sixties, Berghan Books, Oxford 2011, p.161.
9 Alison Frank, Czech Surrealism and Czech New Wave Realism: The Importance of Objects, Kinema: ajournal for film and audiovisual
media, http://www.kinema.uwaterloo.ca/article.php?id=494&feature, p.3 (page numbers as in the printout).
10 Ibid.
11 Quoted in: Jonathan L. Owen, Avant-Garde to New Wave, op. cit., p.162.
12 See Kuba Mikurda, Kamila Wielebska (eds), Dzieje grzechu. Surrealizm w kinie polskim, Ha!Art, Krakw 2010.
13 About Crossley as ametaphorical figure of the Other and its connections with Eastern Europe Iwrite more in: Jakub Majmurek, Crossley,
Nasz brat, in: Skolimowski. Przewodnik Krytyki Politycznej, Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, Warszawa 2010.
106
Tomasz Stawiszyski
A Philosophical
Marshmallow
Walter Mischel, Test Marshmallow.
O poytkach pyncych
zsamokontroli, trans. Agnieszka
Nowak, Smak Sowa, Sopot 2015
1.
Although the affinities between alchemy and
contemporary academic psychology donot go as
far as Carl Gustav Jung dreamed more than half
acentury ago, you can still find unmistakable
similarities between the two disciplines. And
Idonot mean acertain vagueness and arbitrariness of psychological theories and interpretations or their relentless volatilitythe history
of psychology is, after all, ahistory of beliefs
constantly abolishing each other, and so far none
of them has managed to find apermanent place
in this very demanding market of ideas. What
Imean is the search for the philosophical stone,
that isto use psychological terminologysuch
auniversal principle describing (or determining)
the functioning of the human mind so well, that
its discovery would provide akey for comprehensive understanding of all (or at least most)
processes in the human psyche. Of course, you
cant exclude the possibility that such aprinciple
will eventually be identifiedbut for the time
being the search is going on and the catalogue
of potential ultimate solutions is constantly
swelling. Thus, to mention afew 20th century
examples, sexually defined libido was the philosophical stone for Sigmund Freud, for Jung it was
collective unconsciousness, for the behaviorists
107
108
2.
3.
Individuals who scored high in the marshmallow test, when you look at their professional
career in the really broad context, for example
encompassing the huge financial crisis which hit
the United States afew years ago (and which is still
taking its toll), have not always proven capable of
adequately assessing the situation. On the contrary,
convinced of their infallibility (it is afeature of incorrigible optimists, adds Mischel with some fondness), were often unable to accurately predict the
potential negative consequences of their moves,
and aselfishly conceived profit, the basis of their
motivation, repeatedly proved to be apainfully
too narrow aperspective. And although Mischel,
hoping to understand the failure of the project
of optimism and self-control, makes an ample
use of the publications of such people as Daniel
Kahnemann, where the latter analyses anumber
of cognitive fallacies to which all brain users are
prone, this simple reduction of the complex web of
economic, social, and political factors to psychology
leads to adeeply disappointing result.
109
affiliations, claiming to be an objective description of the world free from any illusions.
Equally interestingand also, in a sense,
a hostage of this liberal rationalizationis
Mischels attempt at maintaining a vision of
acohesive, self-directed actor. Although neuroscience to alarge extent confirms the suppositions
of Freud, regarded as one of the main destructors
of Cartesian notions of the mind, Mischel tries to
reconcile these two mutually exclusive concepts,
looking for such techniques of mental training
which would allow for asuccessful taming of the
obvious heterogeneity of our impulses, proclivities and sub-personalities. And so, he on the one
hand admits that self-control usually works selectively in agiven individual (he quotes many examples of well-known figures who led adouble life:
fully controlling themselves in one and surrendering to the wildest temptations in the other),
but on the other hand he constantly attempts to
rescue the homogeneity of the self, looking for
110
TO M A S Z S TAW I S Z Y S K I
Wojciech Stanisawski
111
112
113
114
Thomas Kizny did agigantic work as adocumenter, reaching dozens of private and institutional collections to acquire, reproduce and
describe photographic films from several decades
ago. The second part of the challenge he was
faced with was even more daunting: how can you
supplement and visually comment on the scene
from Mamzelle Nitouche and dokhodiagas on
abier, when there is and probably will be no new
collection or testimony: the museum is gone, the
archives are closed again, the last witnesses are
reaching the end of their days?
The photographer chose perhaps the most
elementary move, considering that the human
mind has always been fascinated by parallelism:
we have all kinds of parallel lives and parallel
histories. Whenever possible, Kizny tried to stand
in the same place where the reporter from the
1930s had stood. And he did not aspire to have
aperfect frame like Marcin Dziedzic, one generation younger Polish photographer, who last year,
on the 70s anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising,
prepared several photomontages, very precisely
superimposing photographs of well-known
Warsaw streets from August 1944 and the summer
of 2014 (www.teraz44.pl). The documenter of the
Gulag allowed himself to move afew steps away,
to climb into atruck and helicopter.
First he looked at the faces. But not at the
faces of inmates from that time: only eye-sockets
and jaws remained of them. Alluding to the
poignant images of Solovki prisoners, the Gulag
mugshots (Viktor Fedorovich Khorodchinsky,
born in 1913, poet; arrested at the age of fifteen,
prisoner of Solovki camp in 19291931, one year
after his release again imprisoned in Solovki,
executed in 1937), Kizny photographs todays
W O J C I E C H S TA N I S AW S K I
115
Letters
In response to:
Revisionism and Resurrection from 4/2013 issue
To the Editors:
116
117
LAIMA VINCE
118
119
No 3 | 2015
3 | 2015
Index: 287210
CENTRAL EUROPE
EDUCATION
History on Trial
An interview with Lev Gudkov
POLITICS Divining Putins Intentions Valenta with Friedman Valenta | Simulated Democracy? Ditchev
ECONOMY Euro, I Find You Very Attractive. Yours, Lithuania. Mauricas | The Use of EU Funds in Poland Kozak
CULTURE Surrealism Rules Eternal Majmurek | Stalins Laughter Kaczorowski