Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Intent/Methodology
4
The JPSU Train
5
Key Commentary/Recommendations
7
JPSU Construct:
Strategic Level
Operational Level
Tactical Level
Terminology
Vital Ground
Summary of Key Recommendations
10
Commentary:
Report on CDS Directed Review of Care for the Ill,
Injured and
Transitioning
11
Background
11
Methodology
12
A Natural Inflection Point
14
Development
The Posting Process
19
Stresses
20
Command Philosophy
21
Chain of Command
21
Command and Control Structure
23
Client Management
30
Medical
32
Policies and Processes
33
Support
35
Branding, Culture and Stigma
35
Summary of Key Recommendations
36
Way Ahead
37
Conclusion
1/38
38
Document Summary
38
2/38
4. This is not to take away from or disrespect the author of the CDSs Report
the JPSU is a labyrinth of unorthodox terminology, nonsensical structure,
civilianization, co-op arrangements, infighting, doctrinal misapplications and a
host of other pitfalls for anyone trying to navigate it. The JPSU in its present
form is eight-years in the un-making starting with a solid concept, its
leadership embarked on a path that initiated a series of investigations, media
reports and unease of unit commanders as the reputation of the struggling unit
became known.
3/38
Intent
12. The intent of this document is to add some clarity to Gen. Andersons
review to be used in conjunction with the accompanying spreadsheet. The
commentary provides an educated unbiased perspective uninfluenced by, or
obligated to, any of the parties affected by this issue. With this it provides an
additional tool to make corrective decisions/input to address/discuss this
regrettable situation before it worsens or becomes something we try to justify in
hindsight (ref. C.).
Methodology
13. The Report on CDS Directed Review of Care for the Ill, Injured and
Transitioning was carefully read and compared with the authors experiences as
a senior member of the JPSU, Eastern Ontario Region.
14. Upon finding irregularities in the Report, the author supplied several
historical JPSU emails to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Ombudsmans
Office in advance of this document to provide a source for the following
commentary. These emails are referenced in the accompanying spreadsheet.
15. Gen Andersons findings were transferred to this document and are
italicized in Times New Roman, font 10. The text may be annotated with a
4/38
highlighted number (1) or bolded and will have a corresponding number and
comment following. An example of both follows:
11. The JPSU structure was established (originally as a project) in 2008 to
(1) care for the influx of ill and injured from operations in Afghanistan that
was overwhelming the Rear Parties of parent units
16. The italicized text from the CDS Directed Review of Care for the Ill, Injured
and Transitioning was then annotated with paragraph-by-paragraph
commentary starting at Methodology.
17. A Thoughtful Second Looks commentary will be in Calibri Body, font 11
format as below:
Para 11. Commentary:
(1) The first posted-in members of the JPSU were from
the former support system the Service Personnel
Holding List (SPHL). Upon transferring these injured
members, the JPSU became fully-tasked almost instantly.
There were no transfers from rear-parties at that time,
they came later.
18. This format is maintained throughout the Report and is similar to that
employed the attached Phase spreadsheet (ref. G.) which has a column
dedicated to additional commentary in a different font.
The Joint Personnel Support Unit (JPSU) Train.
19. According to Gen Andersons Report, the JPSU Train jumped the CAF
Doctrinal rails almost as soon as it left the station:
This violates a fundamental tenet of military command doctrine that states
line and staff functions must be clearly delineated. Furthermore, a
distinct and unambiguous chain of command that coherently integrates
strategic, operational, and tactical headquarters and elements needs to be
in place.
20. The JPSU Train was a new concept at departure, not refined or equipped for
the long-journey on which it embarked, but once started the only time it slowed
was to pick up military injured and ill. Since 2009 the JPSU Train has been
bumping along its own rails, making up its own rules, language, structure,
communications, operations and CoC along the way. It went unimpeded until a
series of investigations, complaints and reviews caught up with it. It was a
rough ride for all involved and now it sits mired, a great concept but still
unrefined, far off CAF Doctrinal Rails.
5/38
21. Now that the JPSU train has stopped, a series of Courses of Action (COAs)
can be considered to salvage it and the situation. Gen. Andersons COAs make
the best of where the train lies mired, accepting, and even expanding, on its
unique characteristics. This COA may have consequences that negatively affect
the success, or even acceptance of the JPSU by military commanders.
22. The JPSU/IPSCs civilianize military terms and replaces them a unique
language of its own. For example, Ive crafted the below statement using
terminology from Gen. Andersons Report:
From the desk of the DCSM Rep and JPSU/IPSC lead: Service Manager Bob Dixon: The Service
Providers of the Joint Personnel Support Unit (JPSU), Integrated Personnel Support Centre (IPSC),
now located in the Black Bear Soldier Support Building, will be relocating to the new Vimy House
at the Pembroke Mall.
This move is deemed necessary as 5% of the clients associated with our Military Customer-Base have
issues attending the present on-Base location. (Were also considering a new civilian dress policy for
our in-house Military Service Providers to compliment the move to the Mall).
Given the increased distance of Vimy House from CFB Petawawa there will be an equitable increase
on the Client Tax Rate to our Military Customers. Our new rotation of In-House Military Service
Providers are struggling with the present In-House Client work-load and have requested an increase
on the Military Customers Client Tax as well, something Im now considering.
Our current JPSU/IPSC Service Providers serve 300 in-house Military Clients from our Military
Customer-Base, 60 walk-in Military Clients, 20 Retire-Based Clients and 12 Family-Based Clients
from our Non-Military Customer-Base per-day. On a positive note, Ive just learned through the
DCSM Services Manager Network that Services Managers now have Tactical Level oversight of the
largest military unit in Canada!
23. While the above takes place with the JPSU Train sitting mired a full eightyears off the CAF Doctrinal Rails in its own JPSU/DCSM made wilderness, CAF
Commanders remain firmly on those Doctrinal Rails observing it. And as the
CAF Commanders view the mired JPSU Train in the distance, knowing their
injured troops are aboard it, Im certain theyre wondering: What the hells
going on out there; how the blazes did they get there and what on earth are
they saying!?
24. Rather than working in-situ where the JPSU Train lies mired and
accepting, integrating or expanding on the obscure characteristics of the
JPSU/IPSC in its self-made wilderness, A Thoughtful Second Look applies
known and battle-tested Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineering
(RCEME) doctrine to the task: Recovery and Repair.
25. The following COAs recommend Extricating the JPSU/DCSM Train from
where its mired, putting it back on the Doctrinal Rails, Recovering it to the
station, Repairing the Train, Modify it using Lessons Learned, Provisioning it
and then turn it over to CAF Leadership fueled-up, serviced, ready and raring to
go as JPSU Train Mk2. This time however, it will be run as a train should be run,
with proper engineers, conductors, rules, communications, and passengers,
6/38
fully serviced, in fine-tune and back on the doctrinal rails with the rest of the
Canadian Armed Forces.
Key Commentary/Recommendations.
26. Rather than go through a complex situation and lengthy document at the
start, the Key Commentary and Recommendations in broad-strokes are as
follows:
JPSU Construct
27. Strategic Level.
7/38
based on a Platoon light but without a higher level of leadership. The IPSC
Services component is also light and has no leadership component. The Platoon
Commander and Services Manager are two separate entities without a position
to unite them or provide a conduit to their Regional Headquarters.
Commentary: There are no formal command relationships between the
Support Platoon, the Services Section, and the IPSC Service Partners. In some
instances, this has led to friction, in other locations, a smooth and effective
modus vivendi has been established and in all instances effectiveness is a
direct correlation of interpersonal relationships - this is no way to run a chip
stand much less a military unit.
Recommendation: The IPSC (a term that will be amended) must be changed
to a Company structure with an Officer Commanding, a Headquarters staff and
adequate Services staff (led by a Services Manager(s)) and a Platoon(s) (led by
Platoon Commander(s)). The IPSC must be staffed appropriately to ensure
services and leadership are made available to the recently released, serving
soldiers, sailors, airwomen and airmen, military families and veterans in their
AOR.
Summary: Construct.
30. With the above recommendations, the JPSU becomes a recognizable and
proven construct from top-to-bottom with a solid chain-of-command in-place.
Terminology.
31. The DCSM/JPSU/IPSC employs some of the most confusing and nonconforming terminology in the CAF. In doing so, it adds to stigma, skepticism,
and general misunderstanding of the Mission of the JPSU. That said, the term
JPSU has been used for eight-years, is recognizable and should remain inplace.
Strategic Level.
Joint Personnel Unit (Formation)
Operational Level.
Joint Personnel Support Unit (JPSU)
Tactical Level.
JPSU Detachment (Det): Location
9/38
staff applied for JPSU positions from the RegF and were required to component
transfer to be able to fill a JPSU position there was no option of filling a JPSU
position as a RegF in 2009 it was a sound and logical practice.
35. The use of select PRes (incl. RegF willing to transfer) staff allows the CAF to
carefully screen applicants and choose those who best suit the JPSU Mission.
The former logic for a successful RegF candidate having to component-transfer
to PRes was rock-solid. It was done to avoid the issues that now plague the
JPSU and resolve the host of challenges bought on by employing RegF staff.
36. While Gen. Andersons report provides recommendations to ensure select
RegF staff are chosen, what is missing is that the JPSU will have to go through
the recruiting / interview / selection / posting / training processes incessantly. A
newly posted-in RegF member will take time to get their bearings, then they will
have to receive specialized training. While they are receiving this training, their
positions will be vacant. When they are finally comfortable in their position and
properly trained, they will be posted-out and the process begins again. This will
stress the entire JPSU structure from top-to-bottom, staff and supported
personnel.
37. The preceding challenges do not apply to the PRes model once you have
PRes on staff, they become a stable force that can lead, learn, train and, most
importantly, get to know and support their injured/ill charges throughout their
convalescence and transition. This continuous interaction is an enormous
benefit to the injured or ill member going through what can be a traumatic
period, and something only time, stability, and leadership can provide.
38. One of the points brought forward by Gen. Anderson in using RegF staff was
that the civilian staff has now become the more stable workforce in the IPSC
and should be the de facto lead of the IPSC. I disagree. If that logic was applied
strategically, every unit in the CAF would be managed by civilian staff. The
JPSU must be supported by a stable military staffing structure.
39. While the JPSU is not a typical unit, it is a CAF Unit, and as Gen. Anderson
rightly points out, the largest unit in the CAF. To have a unit of close to 2000
CAF soldiers, sailors, airwomen and airmen overseen by a series of civilian
Service Managers is, to me, not a great idea.
Summary: Staffing.
40. The recommended use of Regular Force (RegF) personnel brings with it
tremendous disadvantages over the use of Primary Reservists (PRes) for the
specialized role of the JPSU. Almost all the commentary Gen. Anderson raised in
his report can be mitigated by the employment of suitable PRes personnel.
With a reversion to a select, experienced, trained and stable PRes military
component, the majority of the issues raised by using RegF are immediately
resolved.
Summary of Key Recommendations.
11/38
Para 1. Commentary: (1) The DCSM/JPSU failed to keep pace with support
challenges as they were anticipated and/or as they developed in real-time.
Therefore the proper ability and capacity to care for our ill and injured faltered,
staggered and lurched rather than leaped. The expected increase in the
number of supported personnel, the realization of those expectations, and the
requests for proportionate increases in staff are well documented. However the
DCSM/JPSU HHQ refuted the advice of its mid-level leadership and restricted any
attempt of improvements to staffing, training and policy. (2) The resulting
extraordinary efforts of the Regional staff are without question, but they are
also without cause. The Regional staff were left to their own professional, moral
and ethical standards to succeed where their strategic leadership failed them.
This was not so much a case of planned or natural evolution but of constant
reaction, damage control and concession. (3) Not to mention a host of ongoing
investigations and media reports on the JPSU.
2. Two weeks after assuming command, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) directed an immediate
and focused review of the Joint Personnel Support Unit (JPSU) construct to determine whether or
not changes need to be made to the system in order to better care for our ill, injured, and
transitioning. He tasked Brigadier-General David J Anderson, currently the CDS Liaison Officer to
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon to conduct this review on his behalf, over
a two to three week period, with a mandate to deliver a verbal brief to the Armed Forces Council
Executive, as well as a written report.
12/38
3. In concert with Chief of Military Personnel (CMP), a Terms of Reference (TOR) for the review was
developed (attached at Annex A). A Review Team was established, including BGen Anderson, the CMP
Command Chief CWO, CWO Thibault, and the Associate Director of Canadian Forces Morale and Welfare
Service (CFMWS), Mr Mike Ward. The Review Team was tasked with making observations and
recommendations in the following areas:
a.
b.
c.
d.
The mandate, functions, structure and manning of the JPSU, the Regional HQs, and the Integrated
Personnel Support Centres (IPSCs);
The relationships between the ill and injured member and both their former chain of command and
the JPSU / IPSC;
The relationship with supported and supporting chains of command; and
Integration with partners (VAC, Royal Canadian Legion, CF Health Services, etc)
to ensure comprehensive, focussed and consistent support.
Para 4. Commentary: (1) This statement has quite a different flavour than
para 1 and comes across as more accurate. (2) It is hoped that if during the
search for the ground-truth a circumstance should reveal itself to which the
assignment of blame or responsibility is warranted, that it will be acted upon.
With the truth comes the responsibility to act, and if that truth reveals a
miscarriage (in policy, leadership, action) then it must be addressed or
the results can be catastrophic, something the CAF has been through before (ref
A, B.).
METHODOLOGY
Para 5. (Note. Para 5 is missing on this particular document)
6. The Review Team was tasked with conducting a holistic review of the function of providing
support to our ill and injured. It was further directed in the TOR to approach the review from the
13/38
perspective of both the soldier and their originating chain of command, as well as from that of the
JPSU / IPSC structure and function. In essence this allowed the team to view the problem through
the lens of the client, the customer, and the service provider.
Para 6. Commentary: From Para 1 to Para 5 the report has changed its tone
from time for a review to include terms such as assignment of blame,
problem and responsibility. If there is a predetermined problem with the
JPSU that impacts or influences this Report, it would be helpful to know where
this information originated and have it placed plainly in the text rather than
beginning with a glowing statement of the CAFs capacity increasing by leaps
and bounds.
7. In order to ensure that the review incorporated both geographical and cultural factors, Regular
Force and Reserve perspectives, as well as Service-specific and functional factors (field force versus
training establishments), the Review Team visited IPSCs and JPSU Regional HQs in Esquimalt, Edmonton,
Winnipeg, Toronto,(1) Petawawa, Trenton, Kingston, Valcartier, St Jean and Ottawa.
Para 7. Commentary: (1) Four of the ten visited sites are from my former
Region (Eastern Ontario Region) which gives this document added weight. It
would have been worthwhile to have visited the most remote militia unit
available to ascertain if knowledge of the JPSU had reached them. Regardless,
the fact that with eight-years of effort, knowledge of the JPSU had not
effectively reached even the main Bases is telling. Furthermore, the
responsibilities in JPSU Eastern Ontario Region included 33 Brigade Group and
the Canadian Rangers, something that was not mentioned in Gen Andersons
Report.
8. At each location, the review Team met with IPSC staff, representatives of the CFHS as well as
partner organisations, and (1) soldiers (clients) either posted to, served by, or having been processed
through the IPSC, in both individual interviews and collective town hall sessions. Additionally, a
number of soldiers - serving and retired - individually came forward to offer their views on the system. The
Review Team also consulted with representatives of the chain of command, as well as (2) Director
Casualty Support Management (DCSM) personnel, representatives of the Surgeon General, and finally
with the Commanding Officer of the JPSU.
Para 8. Commentary: (1) In this para begins the DCSM/JPSU terminology with
the definition of client finally revealing itself (a soldier). A grand component of
the issues plaguing the JPSU is unnecessary civilianized terminology. (2) Another
issue comes to the surface in para 8 in that the separate interviews noted with
the JPSU CO and DCSM are actually interviews with the same person (the DCSM
and CO JPSU are one-and-the-same). This underscores the confusion
surrounding the JPSU/DCSM/IPSC structure/CoC/Communications. (Note. I hope
that they also met with Regional HQ staff and military families and their
omission in para 8 is an oversight).
14/38
9. Given the varied background of those interviewed, the Review Team was able to garner input from a
wide range of perspectives. Moreover, the internal structure of the Review Team allowed concurrent
analysis at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. BGen Anderson viewed the issues through a
strategic lens, focused on those elements of (1) the problem that can be addressed by the CDS and other
departments. (2) CWO Thibault focused on those issues that could be solved within the CMP structure
and authorities, and Mr Ward was hence able to focus on those things that were within the purview of
CFMWS and DCSM / JPSU. Although this report necessarily focuses on strategic level
recommendations, elements of the operational and tactical will also be reported on, especially where quick
and ready solutions are at hand.
The structure had gone through eight years of organic and reactive
growth to its system, processes, structure and mandate;
b.
c.
d.
e.
With new command teams in both CMP and CDS, it was evidently
time to conduct a thorough review of the system in place for caring
for our ill, injured, and transitioning members.
Para 10. Commentary: (1) This Review happened amid a storm of controversy
and attention focused on the JPSU and after years of controversy. (2) The
system had reached a crisis point, not an inflection point, and had to be acted
upon. This review, much like the JPSU, is reactive and I recommend a tactical
15/38
DEVELOPMENT
Para 11. Commentary:
16/38
(1)
The first posted-in members of the JPSU were from the former (failed)
support system the Service Personnel Holding List (SPHL). Upon transferring
these injured members to the JPSU, the JPSU became fully tasked almost
instantly. Transfers from rear-parties came later.
(2)
(3)
(4)
Yes, a 34% increase since 2011, but the staff had not increased since
2009 and I expect there was a few hundred-percent increase since that time. In
2014, the DCSM/CO reported to Parliament and issued a glowing report of the
JPSU (ref E), which is at odds with the problem statement.
(5)
JPSU
12. Mission. The JPSU mandate is to respond to requests for support and report to the chain of
command on issues of concern raised by ill and injured CF personnel. Its mission is to:
Through an integrated and individual-centric service delivery model, ensure the coordination and
facilitation of standardized, high quality, consistent personal and administrative support during all
phases of recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration on return to service or transition following
release, for all injured and ill Canadian Forces members and former members, their families and the
families of the deceased
Para 12. Commentary: That is arguably one of the most expansive Mission
Statements ever produced in the history of the Canadian Armed Forces (see
spreadsheet for an edited version).
13. Organizational Structure. The JPSU is the largest unit in the CAF, with over 1700 personnel on
strength. Headquartered in Ottawa, it has 8 Regional HQs, to which are assigned a total of 24 IPSCs and
8 IPSC Satellite Centres, as follows:
17/38
a.
b.
Alberta and Northern Canada Region (Calgary, Cold Lake, Edmonton, Wainwright, Yellowknife)
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island Region (Charlottetown, Gagetown, Moncton)
h.
Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador Region (Gander, Greenwood, Halifax, St. John's,
Sydney
with the most restrictions to carry out their mission in the CAF;
JPSU HQ / DCSM
14. (1) The JPSU HQ is responsible to CO JPSU for the efficient delivery of programs and services to
the ill and injured. (2) It is co-located with the Directorate of Casualty Support Management (DCSM)
which provides policy oversight and manages programs for the ill and injured, and transition services for
all Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members. (3) DCSM has technical / professional authority over all
Service Sections in the IPSCs, whereas JPSU Regional HQs are direct reports to CO JPSU.
(3) IPSC Services Sections should be part of the Regional IPSC construct under
control of the Regional HQ. The Services direct oversight, communications and
control by the Strategic Level (DCSM) made it difficult for the RHQ to manage its
own IPSCs. (DCSM/JPSU are one and the same).
15. The CO JPSU and Director DCSM are dual-hatted a single individual holds both line and staff
positions, and is responsible for both policy development and advice, and program delivery. As DCSM, the
individual is the point man for families of the fallen, all MINQUIRIES, the hot issue of day, and testimony to
Standing Committees. As CO JPSU, the same individual is the Commanding Officer of the largest unit in
the CAF, with over 1700 subordinates, of which approximately 1400 are clients.
The Services Section is the actual deliverer of services, and has a direct technical / professional
link to DCSM. The positions are predominantly civilian personnel, the vast majority of whom
have prior military service. The Section is responsible for:
(1) Return to Work coordination
19/38
20/38
a.
(1) The process for posting a soldier to the JPSU is initiated by the parent unit CO. Once a
soldier is posted to an IPSC from his or her parent unit, a line serial is freed up in that unit to
allow the posting in of another soldier.
b.
The posting recommendation is reviewed and commented on by an MO, the OC of the JPSU
Regional HQ, and Director Military Careers (D Mil C). The final authority for the posting rests
with D Mil C and more specifically, with the Career manager (CM) of the losing trade /
branch, and not the CM for the Ill and Injured (who only assumes responsibility for th file once
the member is posted to the JPSU). Although an Administrative Review (AR) is conducted for
each case (in itself an onerous and time-consuming administrative process), the CM lacks the
medical and command perspective of the individual and the specific circumstances that the
BSurg and CO have. In essence, they would be over-turning not just a command decision, but
also a medical recommendation.
c.
The member is permitted to request a posting to the JPSU through his chain of command, but the
request is not binding. An MO can make a recommendation for the CO to consider a posting to
the JPSU, but it is also not binding.
d.
A soldier can be posted to a JPSU on a first Temporary Category (TCAT), or subsequent TCATs.
It has increasingly become the norm for Unit COs to postpone the JPSU posting process until the
Base Surgeon (BSurg) makes a recommendation for a PCAT, or even until a PCAT is directed.
e.
Once posted to the JPSU, the soldier now becomes a (2) client, and is under command of CO
JPSU. Although there are informal structures in place in some locations to maintain contact
between the parent unit and the JPSU / IPSC, in most cases the client loses contact with his
parent unit.
f.
Many of the members posted to the JPSU do so from an IR posting. As IR moves are treated as
normal cost moves, and CMs are faced with severe restrictions on the number of cost moves
allocated to manage their healthy branch or trade population, they are loathe to use a cost move
to reunite a member posted to the JPSU with their families. (3) In as many as 50 cases, we have
essentially stranded members to conduct their transition and healing apart from their family
and support network.
Para 18. Commentary: (1) Unless its been amended recently, the process
for posting a member to the JPSU is initiated by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)
through Canadian Armed Forces General Order, (CANFORGEN) 114/11. 114/11
directs Commanding Officers who have injured members requiring a
convalescence of six-months or more that they shall post them to the JPSU.
(2) They are not clients, but injured/ill soldiers, sailors, airwomen and airmen.
This term is an intrusion to the military model and shows the influence of the
JPSU / Services / DCSM / IPSC terminology. (3) Thats 50 families that suffered
needlessly as poor policy prevented getting these people back home. Its also
illogical to have an injured person on Imposed Restriction (IR) yet unable to fill
the position required of IR. This underscores the requirement of a Not
Withstanding authority for JPSU Regional Commanders to sort out this type of
situation in good time.
STRESSES
19. The existing JPSU system is under some severe stresses, as follows:
21/38
a.
The client base has increased over the last two years by 34%, but staffing and other resources
have either remained static or actually been reduced.
b.
The transition from predominantly visible to non-visible injuries demands different services, and
poses unique administrative and disciplinary challenges.
c.
Over the last three years there has been a large increase in the types and complexity of benefits
offered from a wide range of partners. This has made it very difficult for clients to navigate
through the various programs and incentives, and that is often exacerbated by the effects of some
mental health injuries on the ability to concentrate and process new information.
d.
The case management approach to care and the transition planning model both require inputs
from a number of sources, including Nurse Case managers, IPSC Services, the Support Platoon,
VAC, Family Liaison Officer, etc. Despite a formal process that allows clients to indicate their
willingness for full disclosure of their medical details to all parties, there exists strong
institutional resistance from the Health Services to do so, which hampers effective holistic case
management.
e.
Given that the benefits available to a member who releases under a 3b Medical release are
substantially higher than under a normal end of service release, we should anticipate an increase
in 3b release, and hence an increase in the number of clients handled by the IPSCs and their
partners.
f.
Although the JPSU construct originally envisioned a significant percentage of soldiers who
would heal and return to full duty (RTD), this is no longer the case. Given that most clients are
now posted to the JPSU only upon a recommendation of Permanent Category (PCAT), the vast
majority of IPSC clients are now transitioning out of the military vice returning to duty.
g.
It is accepted that there is some abuse of the IPSC system by some soldiers. This is very hard to
quantify, and anecdotal observations from both staff and other clients range from 5-50%. The
truth is probably somewhere in the 5-15% range.
h.
The above two items contribute to an erosion of the credibility of the IPSCs and the JPSU
structure writ large in the eyes of both the chain of command (the customer) and the members
themselves (the clients).
i.
All of these factors create significant stresses on the staff of the IPSCs, and this is manifesting
itself with a substantial amount of turnover, some cases of burn-out, and a surprising number of
staff who transition to becoming clients of the IPSCs. In essence, the staff are the ones that bear
the burdens of the stresses on the system.
COMMAND PHILOSOPHY
21. Although there is a chapter in the CDS Guidance to Commanding Officers on the JPSU system, there
is no clear statement of CDS intent that articulates the priority that CDS will place on the care of the ill,
injured and transitioning. As a result, there are no exemptions from existing policies and procedures, as it
is not clear that this is a command imperative.
Recommendations
Issue a CDS CANFORGEN that articulates the priority that the CDS will place on the ill and injured
Issue CDS direction that directs a review of internal policies to ensure that the ill, injured and transitioning
are accorded the benefit of the doubt: in essence, a statement that says that a tie goes to the runner.
23/38
a.
(2) The C of C is relatively unsighted to the great work that is being done by the IPSCs, and
predominantly views an IPSC as the place where a soldier goes to release, vice a unit that
provides the optimal conditions for a soldier to heal and RTD.
b.
(2) The C of C lacks trust in the IPSCs to provide suitable supervision, leadership, and care for
their ill and injured.
c.
(3)The C of C has often used the IPSC as a dumping ground for their more problematic
soldiers
d.
(2) The C of C frequently resists posting their ill and injured to the JPSU in the usually mistaken
believe that they can look after their troops better. Often as not, postings only happen once a
soldier is on PCAT, at which point the most likely result is release of the member.
e.
(2) The C of C has expressed frustration at their lack of access to their soldiers once posted to
the JPSU. Conversely, many of the clients in the IPSCs expressed disappointment that their
unit did not maintain contact with them, leaving them to feel abandoned by the C of C.
f.
(3) Some soldiers have indicated that they see the IPSC as a safe haven and they mean
from the C of C. A unit is not always the best place to recover from an injury especially a nonvisible injury. The command climate can be as supportive as possible, but all it takes is one illplaced and insensitive comment by a co-worker or lower level supervisor to stigmatize the
soldier and their injury.
g.
(3) There are equally soldiers who consider the IPSC to be a dumping ground, and they resist
the self-perceived stigma attached to the unit, and believe that a posting to the JPSU inevitably
means that they will be released. All have expressed concern over the loss of environmental
allowances (and especially Land Duty Allowance) upon posting to the JPSU.
h.
(2) A number of soldiers predominantly with non-visible injuries - stated that if they had just
been allowed to go the IPSC after their first TCAT, they would probably be ready to RTD, and
that they just need a break from the unit and to take a knee for 4-6 months. By the time they
actually got posted to the JPSU, they had lost faith in the C of C, and had no intention of
attempting to RTD.
i.
(2) The C of C mistrust of the IPSC and the perception that it is where a soldier goes to release
essentially stigmatizes the IPSC as well as a soldier that is posted there and by extension, their
injury, especially if it is non-visible.
Para 22. Commentary: (1) Technically, the CDS through CANFORGEN 114/11
is the initiating point of the JPSU posting process. (2) The perception by CAF
Commanders are well-founded and accurate. (3) If these statements are
accurate, there is a huge problem in the senior leadership of the CAF.
Recommendations
24/38
Develop a communications plan that better informs the chain of command of the purpose of the
JPSU, emphasizing the task to maximize the number of soldiers that RTD, and focus on
destigmatizing the process
Encourage the C of C to consider early posting to the JPSU as early as a first TCAT in order to
allow soldiers to heal
Reconsider the policy on Environmental Allowance and specifically LDA. Soldiers who continue to
serve in an LDA designated units receive LDA, even if they are unable to deploy to the field, whereas
those who are posted to the JPSU lose that allowance. This is a disincentive to early posting to allow
for healing.
Allow the JPSU posting process to be initiated not just be the CO, but also by the BSurg or the
member themselves. Once the process is initiated, all levels of it must be completed, irrespective of
the Unit CO recommendation. This will favour the idea of an IPSC as a place to heal, and empower
both the soldiers and the Medical Officers.
No longer permit D Mil C and the losing Branch / Corps CM to have the decision-making authority
for posting to a JPSU. At the very least, any review should be conducted by the CM for the Ill and
Injured due to their familiarity with the particular needs of those members, and ideally either the
recommendation of the CO / BSurg is accepted without interference, or a separate review body
incorporating CMP, the losing Service, and CFHS could be established.
Direct a one-time program, using year-end money, to relocate all of the stranded JPSU members
currently on IR but posted to an IPSC apart from their families.
Establish a separate pool of cost moves specifically to facilitate to transition or healing of members
posted to the JPSU.
Formalize links between the parent unit and the IPSC to foster an ongoing sense of ownership from
the C of C, and belonging from the members. Options include Liaison Officers in the IPSC or JPSU
Regional HQ, or amending the JPSU command and control structure to more formally incorporate
the C of C.
Para 24. Commentary: (1) It actually detracts from the task of putting on
brunch it is a ridiculously overstretched task for a unit including for a single
person double-hatted as a Director and CO.
25/38
25. JPSU Regional HQs. A detailed literature review and individual interviews with JPSU Regional staff
suggest that there is no clearly defined and widely accepted understanding of the function of the JPSU
Regional HQs, which leads to the following issues:
a.
Tasked in the original Master Implementation Plan with provid(ing) regional oversight and
guidance to the IPSCs within their Area of Responsibility the Regional HQ do not actually seem to
have any explicit authorities, and have little if any authority to reassign resources such as funding or
staffing from one IPSC to another. This leads them to be not much more than a (1) mailbox in many
instances. Moreover, they have little if any control over either Services Sections or IPSC Service
Partners, so they essentially supervise the Support Platoons and their clients in the various assigned
IPSCs.
b.
Although also tasked in the MIP with being responsive to the local Base Commanders and Unit
Commanding Officers, the tyranny of distance and the span of control given the number of
customer units makes this a very difficult mandate to achieve, unless it is focused at the Wing / Base /
Formation level, freeing up IPSCs to establish and maintain local relationships.
c.
The Regional HQs do not appear to have established and maintained contacts with the regional
counterparts representing the IPSC Service Partners at the local level. This includes VAC, OSSIS,
and outreach to regional business organisations to generate Return to Work (RTW) opportunities.
Para 25. Commentary: (1) RHQs have become a mailbox because the
JPSU/DCSM/DCSM Ops /JPSU Ops routinely bypass the RHQs to go directly to the
Tactical (IPSC) Level and vice-versa. This effectively keeps the RHQ (Operational
Level) out-of-the-loop. To add to this, the DCSM/JPSU CO employs a policy where
any posted-in member of the JPSU can contact the Strategic Level directly
without having to go through their Section Commander, much less their RHQ.
By 2012 some RHQs were tasked with over 500 people (in some cases
dispersed over multi-Provincial areas) and usually consisted of a Command
Team (Major (OC) and MWO (Sgt-Maj)), an Adjutant (Captain), a Clerk (WO) and
a Staff Car. It remains arguably one of the most under-staffed, under-ranked,
under-empowered, under-funded and bypassed elements employed in CAF
history.
26. IPSCs. (A) On the whole, the IPSC structure is appropriate, and effective if appropriately staffed
and resourced. Indeed, as the tactical face of the organization and the ultimate deliverer of effects, they
are essentially the Vital Ground of the entire enterprise. The following observations were made:
a.
(1) There are no formal command relationships between the Support Platoon, the Services Section,
and the IPSC Service Partners. (2) In some instances, this has led to friction, in other locations, a
smooth and effective modus vivendi has been established and in all instances effectiveness is a
direct correlation of interpersonal relationships.
b.
The Services Section is predominantly manned by civilian employees, although the vast majorities are
retired military members. (3) Given the nature of their employment conditions, they provide and
become the continuity within the IPSC. It is also the Services Section that coordinates the delivery of
the vast majority of effects, and (4) they have a direct technical / professional reporting relationship
with DCSM which they leverage to great advantage.
c.
The Support Platoon is the military element of the IPSC. All (5) clients in an IPSC are under the
command of the Support Platoon Commander, who is the (6) de facto leader of the IPSC. Many of
26/38
the Support Platoons across the country have more clients than they can reasonably be expected to
manage, with (7) client bases running from 50-160 members, often with only one supervisor due to
staffing shortfalls (which will be discussed later in the report). (8) This leader to led ratio must be
reduced to increase effectiveness of control.
d.
Although every client in an IPSC has individual and often quite disparate circumstances, they
basically fall into (9) two categories: those that want to return to duty, and those that want to get out
of the military. Each of those categories have very differing needs, but at present they are not
divided that way, mostly due to a lack of Support Platoon staff.
Para 26. Commentary: (A) The above paragraph is in conflict with the rest of
this document (and in some cases with itself). It begins stating the structure is
appropriate, and effective and then details why it isnt either of those.
(1) The IPSC is a JPSU HHQ/DCSM model forced upon Regional Headquarters
(RHQ), primarily to control the civilian (Services) staff in the IPSCs. While
the IPSC is a sub-unit of the RHQ, internally it is controlled by nobody,
and externally not even by its own RHQ. Instead the IPSC Services and
Military staff were encouraged to get along by the Strategic Level (JPSU
HHQ/DCSM) and the RHQ staff were tasked essentially as bystanders and
conflict resolution staff at the Operational Level.
(2) It states that in all instances effectiveness is a direct correlation of
interpersonal relationships. It is for this reason that somebody is
normally in charge of a group of people this provides a person to build
cohesiveness, ensure the unit Mission is maintained and to solve interunit disagreements. Mission effectiveness shouldnt be based on the luckof-the-draw of having good inter-personal relationships it should be
based on sound leadership and teamwork. Even at the first leadership
level (Master Corporal - MCpl) there is someone in charge that people
can turn to, be it the MCpl or a Sergeant. The IPSC has nothing like that,
and it is an extremely large sub-unit. The IPSC model is a remarkable
non-structure unique in the CAF (or anywhere for that matter). There was
also a trend for the civilian staff to disassociate themselves from the JPSU
itself - at times stating that IPSC Services was a separate entity even
from the co-located Support Platoon. Services often stated the Support
Platoon was the JPSU component of the IPSC which to Services was just
another unit grouped in among the other supported units.
(3) Granted this is true, the Services now have continuity, however the same
held true for the military staff until the JPSU HHQ/DCSM changed the
staffing philosophy from select Reservists to a standard Reg Force Posting
cycle, disrupting the unit right across the board.
(4) In many ways the civilian staff's "direct technical / professional reporting
relationship with DCSM which they leverage to great advantage" wasn't
so much leveraged, but nurtured from the top down while the military
component scrambled to keep up with unknown (to them) developments.
Add to the mix that there was no single person that spoke for the IPSC,
well then it was a very confusing situation for everybody.
27/38
(2) When its the truth it isnt a stigma, its an unpleasant reality. By going the route
they did, JPSU HHQ/DCSM created a system even worse than the one it replaced
(the SPHL). The JPSU turned from a great beginning into something
questionable through mismanagement. Being posted to a unit that was in
permanent crisis that called you a client instead of who you were a soldier
does not instill confidence.
Recommendations
Separate the line position of CO JPSU and the staff position of DCSM to avoid the disadvantages of
dual-hatting the same individual.
Devolve the vast majority of administrative, financial and disciplinary authorities from CO JPSU to
the Regional OCs in order to reduce CO JPSU workload and increase responsiveness to the Regional
HQs and IPSCs.
Develop a robust and commonly understood TOR for the Regional HQs
Direct Regional HQs to focus outreach at the Wing / Base / Formation level, to include presence at
command councils and O Groups
Direct Regional HQs to establish regional partnerships with IPSC Service Partners as well as
business organisations.
Consider reviewing the internal command structure within an IPSC, such that the Services Manager
becomes the de facto leader vice the Support Platoon Commander.
Retain the technical / professional links between IPSC Services Sections and DCSM, irrespective of
any other C2 changes
Consider organizing the IPSC with two streams clients who want to stay in, and those who want to
get out.
Direct a wholesale review of the C2 structure in order to involve the C of C in the ongoing care of the
ill and injured, with a specific goal of destigmatizing the IPSCs and increasing the likelihood of
soldiers returning to duty.
Convene a CMP-led SOPG with input from the Services, CFHS, and JPSU / IPSC staff to consider
the following potential Courses of Action:
o
29/38
Enhanced Status Quo. Establish JPSU as a formation (separate from DCSM), and appoint
JPSU Regional OCs as COs. Direct formal relationships between CO Regional JPSUs and
regional service formations (Divisions, Fleets, etc)
This option is the least disruptive, but is also less likely to induce cultural change
and foster C of C involvement
Chain of Command Centric. Disband JPSU HQ. Place JPSU Regional HQs under
command of the existing CAF Regional Command Structure (JTFP, JTFW, JFACC, JTFC,
FOIE, JTFA).
This option places the onus for care of the ill and injured squarely upon the C of C
and will permit local reallocation of resources to best suit the regional needs for
their respective JPSU. It maintains the IPSCs within the sphere of Regional JPSUs.
It is the most disruptive option.
Hybrid. Maintain JPSU HQ (separate from DCSM) and allocate JPSU Regional HQs
OPCOM or OPCON to Regional Service Formations (ie JPSU Prairie to 1 CAD, JPSU
Alberta to 3 Div) and IPSCs OPCON or TACON to formations and bases (ie Edmonton to 3
CDSG, Kingston to CFB Kingston).
This option induces C of C involvement at the regional and tactical level (IPSCs),
while maintaining national command of JPSUs.
28. As has been previously stated, it quickly became evident to the Review Team that the IPSCs are the
Vital Ground of the entire enterprise, and the IPSCs and their staff are providing an essential and
necessary service with compassion and dedication. It became equally clear that the IPSCs are doing so
within a restrictive policy environment, and, most critically, while dramatically under-staffed. The
following observations were made:
a.
30/38
Under-staffing is chronic at the IPSCs (with 35 of 150 Pres positions currently unfilled), and this is
causing significant attrition and burn-out, particularly in the Support Platoons. Either the demand
needs to be reduced / attenuated, or staffing must be increased. Given that it has been established
that we can expect an increase in the number of members served by / posted to the JPSU, it is unlikely
that demand will be reduced. On one large Base with a military population of 8,000, there is a single
staff member in the IPSC Support Platoon who has 160 personnel under command, without any other
subordinate staff on yet another large base, with assistance from the customer units, a ratio of 1:45
has been maintained, significantly reducing the burn-out / turnover rate.
b.
Selection and screening processes are in place at the national level, but they are not always followed.
With the evolution of military staffing from 100% Reservists to predominantly Reg F by 2017,
selection will be of paramount importance. It is also imperative that quality personnel are posting in,
with no perception of a lessening of career potential.
c.
While the transition to (1) Reg F personnel will assist with continuity and reduce staffing swirl, there
remains a requirement for some Pres staff, to reflect the service conditions and experiences of the
clients. This is especially the place in IPSCs such as Toronto.
d.
Many of the clients stated that constant changes in military staffing made it very difficult to navigate
through the return to work (RTW) or RTD process. Continuity of staffing is key. This fact was
highlighted by the significantly higher RTW rate in Valcartier, which has the most stable staffing
levels of all IPSCs visited.
e.
All of the Services Section positions are manned by civilian personnel. A substantial percentage of
those positions are currently unfilled, and the filling of these positions has not been prioritized.
Given the leanness of the Services structure, this means that in many cases there simply isnt anyone
to provide services to the clients, or there are inordinately long delays in acquiring assistance.
f.
Although a formal training plan has been established as recommended in the 2013 Ombudsman
Report, the staff has indicated that it is inadequate. A number of courses have been developed,
including Orientation, Support Platoon Staff, Designated Assistant, and Unit RTW coordinator.
While helping improve staff capability, a thorough evaluation is required to ensure content is meeting
the need.
g.
With the exception of Valcartier, none of the IPSCs have trained professional transition experts who
are skilled / experienced at assisting members in preparing for transition to a civilian career. It is
counter-intuitive to expect a former military member who is working as a DND civilian at an IPSC to
be able to offer much advice on the skills required to succeed in the civilian workplace. The
Valcartier model of employing professional transition counselors is improving the transition process,
and is clearly worth CAF-wide emulation
Para 28. Commentary: (1) How can employing a RegF model (which must be
continually rotated) add continuity over a PRes model which does not? There is
a PRes Platoon Commander at one IPSC who has been in-place since 2009 that
would have been (at a minimum) three-rotation cycles of a RegF person. The
JPSUs original staffing model using highly-experienced, vetted Reservists (many
with substantial Regular Force experience) was a system that suited the Mission
of the JPSU perfectly. The proposed system (reversion to Regular Force) is a
huge step-backward and complicates staffing the JPSU dramatically. To properly
staff the JPSU using the proposed (Reg F) system, the search for suitable
candidates will be endless rather than limited (for a non-rotating PRes staff).
When a Regular Force member is rotated-out, all the training they received that
is unique only to JPSU Ops is rotated-out with them. This makes the JPSU-based
Training as endless as the search for suitable candidates. The entire JPSU has
been allowed to deteriorate and its staff and posted-in personnel have paid
dearly because of the shift to a RegF staffing model.
A component of the transition of any soldier to civilian life should be a detraining module where a soon-to-be civilian can be given their civilian
31/38
(1) Establish a benchmark for Support platoon Staff to clients of no greater than 1:30. This will
mean establishing and manning section Commander positions in the Support Platoons
(2) Establish a customer tax. Parent formations / Bases should be tasked with providing
reinforcements to the IPSCs it is after all their people that are being cared for.
(3) Reinforce and strengthen the screening and selection process, to include interviews with JPSU
Regional OCs, much akin to posting to CFLRS.
(4) Incentivize the posting of high quality staff through the application of bonus merit points on
promotion board SCITs, as is currently the case with Recruiting positions
(5) Establish an asymmetric staffing model that ensures that there is PRes staff representation in
locations with significant numbers of Pres clients.
(6) Direct that Posting to the JPSU will be for a minimum of 2 years, and preferably 3 years. Local
reinforcements through a customer tax must be for a minimum of a year.
(7) Direct ADM HR (Civ) to establish a priority hire process for civilian vacancies in the JPSU.
(8) Conduct a bottom-up review of the training program with significant input from the current IPSC
staff to better meet their training needs.
(9) Hire or out-source the career transition function to ensure an effective level of support for
transitioning members.
32/38
example, I point to CDS email 7.2, where the Sergeants Major (a highly
experienced PRes annuitant) contract expired weeks before his
replacement (RegF) was scheduled to arrive. This meant his replacement
(from a hard-Navy trade posted-to an Army Base) had no handover (less
the one the (now civilian veteran Sgt-Maj) did on his own accord). This
put the entire Regions staff and posted-in members at risk.
(6) Once again, there was a perfectly suitable system in-place that has
some annuitants still in-place today in the JPSU for eight-years. Why
anyone would want to replace this system by a far less suitable, highly
complex, unstable, administratively burdensome, expensive and
ultimately unworkable system (which in many ways resembles the SPHL),
is a mystery.
(7) Concur and make these permanent positions.
(8) Somewhat concur but normally training requirements originate at
the top to suit the needs of the staff this is done by a Needs
Assessment and is fairly straight-forward.
(9) Somewhat Concur, if SA isnt lost on the transitioning member.
CLIENT MANAGEMENT
29. There are a number of directives from JPSU HQ that govern the management of clients within the
IPSCs, but the Review Team found that these directives are being unevenly applied, and in some cases, not
at all. (1) Moreover, the transition to a predominantly non-visibly injured client base has created new
dynamics not originally envisioned when the JPSU was established. The following observations were
made:
a.
The triage system is not synchronized. The IPSC uses a system of colour coding (red, yellow, green)
that is designed to reflect both the medical and administrative complexities of the case, whereas the
Nurse Case Managers and CFHS uses a binary complex vs non-complex convention based solely on
the medical situation. The two systems have no point of common reference, and there is no
established mechanism for synchronizing the two systems.
b.
Self-starters thrive in the IPSC environment. They make either getting better or preparing for
transition their job, and apply themselves assiduously to the process. Most clients however struggle
with lack of direction and are unable or ill-equipped to chart a clear path to success. There are no
mechanisms that allow the success stories to share their knowledge or to encourage others
indeed there is very little interaction between the clients at all, even though they are all members of
the same unit.
c.
(2) There are two types of soldiers that are in the IPSC: those that want to stay in the military, and
those that want to get out. Each of these groups has differing needs and motivation. At present, due
mostly to under-staffing, they are not grouped in that manner, which means that staff must master two
different sets of processes and policies.
d.
The staff at the IPSC has encountered difficulties in the maintenance of discipline. Many of the
clients have Medical Employment Limitations that restrict the wearing of uniforms or appearance at
a military facility, which is not necessarily conducive to the maintenance or normal discipline.
The nature of their injuries or circumstances often precludes the application of normal minor
punishments. This leaves the staff with little if any recourse to maintain discipline without
exacerbating the clients medical progress.
33/38
Recommendations
(1) Develop a national and synchronised triage system that reflects medical, administrative and
psycho-social aspects of each case.
(2) Establish a system of peer mentors that pairs the new arrivals with those already some way along
the process of healing, RTD or transition.
(3) Group clients according to their goals: to RTD or to transition. This will allow Section
Commanders to develop expertise in one of the two processes.
(4) Establish a series of best practices and techniques that enforces discipline without hampering
medical recovery.
34/38
Nurse Case Managers are the Critical Vulnerability within the system. They coordinate the medical
care for their clients (of whom approximately 60-70% are also posted to the JPSU), and are the
primary interface with the IPSCs. There are only 66 Nurse case managers in the CAF, and although
the ideal Nurse to case ratio is 1:50, many are dealing with in excess of 100 cases. There are clear
signs of strain within the system due to overwork, and a lack of common understanding within the
CFHS and the chain of command of the vital role that Nurse Case managers play.
b.
There are regional and local stresses to the system. Petawawa lacks ready access to Mental Health
professionals, and Kingston is dramatically short of Case Managers.
c. The PCAT review process is currently overwhelmed, with a 10 month waiting period for a PCAT
recommendation from a BSurg to be reviewed by Director medical Policy (D Med Pol). The current
policy is for every recommendation to be reviewed, in order to maintain standard application across
all elements of the CAF. This is a 100% Quality Assurance process that maintains full control at the
expense of efficiency. At the request of the Review Team, D Med Pol reviewed their process, and
determined that currently only 5% of recommendations are being over-turned, and are now
considering some amendments to their approach.
d.
Once a PCAT is confirmed, and any representations by the member have been made, the policy states
that a medical release will occur in 6 months or less, granting the member the option of releasing
earlier. Many transition plans include education and courses, but clients are not entitled to sign up
for them until their release date is finalized and 6 months is frequently insufficient time to complete
necessary transition training, depending on the start date of classes etc.
35/38
Reinforce Nurse Case managers through increased staffing, using the target of 1:50 as the basis for hiring
and assignment. Conduct periodic gatherings of the Nurse Case Managers to focus on best practices and
to provide a platform for acknowledgement from the CofC
Fund contracted Mental Health professionals in Ottawa, and provide transport to and from Petawawa.
Prioritize the hiring of Nurse Case Managers in Kingston.
Establish a policy of representative sampling of PCATs to maintain standardization but decrease the
turnaround time, and devolve the authority for PCAT for the remainder of files to the B Surg.
Increase the time window for release once a release message is received from 0-6 months to 0-12 months,
and devolve the authority to elect the date to Individual Transition Plan Team, which includes the Nurse
Case Manager, Services Manager, Pl Comd, and the client.
Many members have received release message with dates that fall just short of critical milestones of
service, such as 10, 20, 25 and 35 years of service. Some of these milestones have a financial impact
in terms of access to pension, but as importantly, these milestones have an emotional element as well.
Failing to recognize this does a disservice to those who have loyally served.
b.
Currently, allocation of cost moves to the JPSU for the ill, injured and transitioning is the
responsibility of the losing CM. This places the onus on a CM with little understanding of the
specific requirements of the JPSU client to weigh the value of that posting against the moves required
to manage the trade or branch.
Establish a policy for determination of a release date that acknowledges the import of significant
milestones. A reasonable accommodation would be to favour the member within a 100 day window
of the strictly interpreted release date.
Establish a separate cost move funding envelope for the movement of JPSU personnel, under the
control of CM for Ill and Injured. Fund it generously, and favour the client in the considerations
the tie will go to the runner.
36/38
a.
Infrastructure for the IPSCs vary greatly from location to location. The JPSU has a detailed
infrastructure plan on place, but it may be inadequate due to the VAC decision to increase its
footprint in most IPSCs.
b.
It was evident to the review team that off-site locations have many advantages. Many clients and
staff interviewed stated that on-Base IPSCs are intimidating to a large number of clients and
reporting-in can contribute heightened anxiety/stress. IPSCs that are located in off-Base
accommodation (such as Kingston) offer perception of a neutral/non-military environment that
enhances client support.
c.
Many clients lack DWAN access as they are either not required or not able to attend military
facilities.
d.
The current process for approval for reimbursement of costs for attending medical appointments is
cumbersome and uneven, and we are essentially asking the members to sort out their own
transportation.
e.
Maintaining contact with a large and disparate client base is problematic for the IPSC Support
Platoons and Services sections. Face to face meetings are critical, but often difficult to arrange.
Para 33. Commentary: (A) That is one incredibly conflicted statement given
the prior conclusions in this document and at odds with earlier statements in
this report.
2.
a. A closer look should be taken at IPSC Petawawa (with the absence
of Base elements in the building), the Eastern Ontario RHQ is a
suitable design (both BFA). VAC is a valuable component of an IPSC
but also one that can be expanded to locations off-base to better
serve veterans. IPSC-based VAC locations on CAF Bases are perfect
for serving or soon to be transitioning military members.
b. Off base should be the exception to the rule the IPSC in Kingston
was a desperate measure as there were no suitable Base buildings
available. The vast majority of persons using the JPSU do not have
limitations regarding going on Base, and on-Base locations allow
people not posted to the JPSU to conveniently use their services as
walk-ins. There is also the perception of the CoC that needs to be
taken into account and the stigmatizing effect of having a military
unit (JPSU) located in a mall.
c. Thats because it so alarmingly under-manned that it is difficult to
accomplish.
Recommendations
37/38
(1) Off-Base IPSC accommodations should be leased to meet the needs of most IPSCs.
(2) Field a dial-in capability for IPSC clients.
(3) Allow the use of Skype for face to face interviews, and equip all IPSCs with the capability.
(5) Purchase a van for each IPSC and satellite staff for the specific purpose of transporting members
to medical appointments, and direct the supported chain of command to provide a dedicated driver.
IPSC and JPSU are very precise doctrinal titles that serve strategic audiences and IPSC Service
Partners well, but does nothing to enhance brand identity of the IPSC with either soldiers or CofC.
b.
In many case, when soldiers or the C of C expressed concerns with the services provided at the
JPSU / IPSC, their issues were just as likely to be with VAC, CFHS, or SISIP. Although an integrated
services model is efficient, it leads to integrated blame.
IPSC and JPSU are both JPSU, they are just saddled with confusing
terminology that should be changed to reflect known
terminology/structure (JPSU and JPSU Detachment).
Because of this, the IPSC is internally adrift so direction and advice comes
from all sides a confusing situation
Recommendations
Consider renaming the IPSCs in concert with any planned change to the C2 structure. The clients of the
IPSCs made a number of suggestions, such as Warrior Transition Center. Branding along the lines of
Fisher House may be appropriate: such as The Vimy Center.
(1) Issue a CDS CANFORGEN that articulates the priority that the CDS will place on the ill and
injured.
(2) Issue CDS direction that directs a review of internal policies to ensure that the ill, injured and
transitioning are accorded the benefit of the doubt.
(3) Develop a communications plan that better informs the chain of command of the purpose of the
JPSU.
(4) Allow the JPSU posting process to be initiated not just be the CO, but also by the BSurg or the
member themselves.
(5) No longer permit D Mil C and the losing Branch / Corps CM to have the decision-making
authority for posting to a JPSU.
(6) Direct a one-time program, using end-year money, to relocate all of the stranded JPSU
members currently on IR but posted to an IPSC apart from their families.
(7) Separate the line position of CO JPSU and the staff position of DCSM. Devolve the vast majority
of administrative, financial and disciplinary authorities from CO JPSU to the Regional OCs.
(8) Direct a wholesale review of the C2 structure.
(9) Reinforce the IPSCs with increased staffing.
(10) Accelerate hiring of civilian staff to fill current shortfalls.
(11) Reinforce Nurse Case managers through increased staffing.
(12) Consider renaming the IPSCs in concert with any planned change to the C2 structure.
(13) Purchase a van for each IPSC and Satellite Center to provide transportation to medical
appointments.
(11)
Concur.
(12)
(13)
This recommendation serves to show the dire situation at the JPSU.
Getting a van is a task befitting the rank of Corporal. In the case of the
JPSU, it has been passed to the Commanding General of the Canadian
Armed Forces for action in a General Order.
WAY AHEAD
36. The following immediate way ahead is recommended:
Issue a CDS CANFORGEN that clearly states the importance of care for our ill, injured and
transitioning, and incorporates the following points:
o Direction that policy be interpreted in favour of the member.
o Direct CMP to issue a Master Implementation Plan that will act on the recommendations of
the report.
o Direct those policy and administrative changes that can be enacted without reference to
external agencies.
o As an indicator of immediate change and using end-year money, direct the purchase a van
for each IPSC location, and post the JPSU members currently stranded on IR.
40/38
a sober second review is conducted using the points Ive put forward and the
information from the yet-to-be released upcoming Ombudsmans Report.
CONCLUSION
36. (1) The JPSU and its personnel are to be congratulated for their extraordinary work in caring for
our most vulnerable. To their great credit, they have succeeded (2) despite structural, cultural and policy
impediments. Having said that, the care of our soldiers is both a command and a moral imperative, and
we can and must do better. This report highlights a number of changes that will allow us to do exactly
that.
their wait and trials are at an end and that they can soon receive support
services and military leadership from what the JPSU was always meant to be.
Barry Westholm
42/38