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A safe and stable environment is one of the key pillars behind Singapores success. This will continue to be so.
The Government has invested heavily to maintain safety and security: from the efforts at our border checkpoints, to
hardening of potential targets and to building up the preparedness and resilience of our communities. While we will
continue to put in place the necessary measures and infrastructure to protect Singapore and its people, the wider
communitys involvement and contribution are equally vital.
Every person, business and building owner can take a direct responsibility to ensure their own safety and security. Our
strength lies in us leveraging on the people to embrace a security mindset, both in preventing and mitigating a terrorist
attack, and very importantly to practice it in our daily activities.
The Guidelines for Enhancing Building Security in Singapore (GEBSS) is a comprehensive compilation of international
best practices in building security that can be applied to Singapore. It provides the building and construction community
with practical information and guidelines on how they can take personal action to enhance the security of their buildings.
Developers, engineers, architects and security managers will find the guidelines relevant.
A salient point made in the publication is the importance of incorporating security considerations from the very beginning
of the building design process. This way, the cost of security is greatly minimised and the architectural vision of the
building can be preserved. Indeed I think you should plan for security as the building is being designed, as it is almost
always more costly to retrofit a building to implement security measures after it has been built.
I encourage the building and construction community to study this publication and use it actively to enhance the security
of buildings in Singapore. Your efforts in doing so would be a direct and invaluable contribution to the safety and security
of Singapore and our people.
Page 1
Page 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword
Table of Contents
Perimeter Design
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Stand-Off Distance
5.1.2 Perimeter line
5.1.3 Clear Zone
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5.5
Security posts
5.5.1 Introduction
5.5.2 Pedestrian security posts
5.5.2A Introduction
5.5.2C Standards
5.5.2D Design of Security Posts
5.5.3 Vehicle Entrance Security Post
5.5.3A Introduction
5.5.3B Design of Vehicle Entrance Security Post
5.6 Landscaping
5.6.1 Introduction
!
5.6.3 Design of Landscaping
5.6.4 Example of Design
5.7 Security Lighting
5.7.1 Introduction
5.7.2 Security Lighting - Perimeter Line and Entrances
5.7.2A Introduction
"
5.7.2C Illumination Standards
5.7.2D Design of Security Lighting
5.8 Positioning of car parks and critical utilities
5.8.1 Introduction
5.8.2 Positioning of Car Parks
5.8.2A Introduction
5.8.2B Design of Car Parks
5.8.3 Positioning of Critical Utilities
5.8.3A Introduction
5.8.3B Design of critical utilities
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6.5 Windows
6.5.1 Introduction
6.5.2 Blast Protected Windows
6.5.3 Ballistic Protected Windows
6.5.4 Forced Entry Protected Windows
6.5.5 Combined Protection of Windows
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6.6 Doors
6.6.1
6.6.2
6.6.3
6.6.4
6.6.5
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Building Faades
6.1 How To Use This Chapter
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6.2.2 Standards for Blast Resistance
6.2.3 Standards for Forced-Entry Resistance
6.2.4 Standards for Ballistic Resistance
6.3 Building Walls
6.3.1 Introduction
6.3.2 Pre-Cast Load Bearing Walls
6.3.3 Non-Load Bearing Wall Panels
6.3.4 Light Walls
6.4 Curtain Walls
6.4.1 Introduction
6.4.2 Fully Framed Glass Curtain Walls
6.4.3 Point Supported or Other Curtain Wall Systems
6.4.4 Stone or Metal Finished Light Walls
Introduction
Blast Protected Doors
Ballistic Protected Doors
Forced Entry Protected Doors
Combined Protection For Doors
Page 5
Building Structure
7.1 Introduction
"
7.3 Design Criteria
7.3.1 The Blast Load
7.3.2 General Guidelines
7.4 Progressive Collapse Prevention
7.4.1 The Systematic Approach
7.4.2 The Localised Approach
7.4.3 Column Protection
7.4.4 Wall Protection
7.4.5 Beam Protection
7.4.6 Slab Protection
8
Security Systems
8.1 How To Use This Chapter
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Page 6
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9.2 Parking
9.2.1
<
9.2.3
9.2.4
Introduction
Design of a Car Park
Example
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Page 7
Appendix A
Sample of Security and Safety Design Requirements for Buildings: For Tendering Purposes
1
Engagement & Scope of Security and Protective Design/Blast Consultant(s)
2
Assessment Process
3
Security and Protective Design Plan Submission Stages
4
Site Planning and Design Considerations for Crime Prevention
5
Site Planning and Design Considerations for Vehicular Threats
6
Site Planning and Design Considerations for Parking
7
Site Planning and Design Considerations for External Circulation
8
Architecture and Interior Design
9
Structural Design
10 Mechanical Design
11 Electrical Design
12 Chemical, Biological & Radiological Protective Measures
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Appendix B
General Security Guidelines for Hotels
Introduction
Security Rings
1 Deterrence
2 Pro-active Security
3 Perimeter Security
4 Access Control
5 Security Command & Control Rooms
6 Emergency Plans & Procedures
Concluding Remarks
125
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126
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127
129
130
130
Appendix C
General Security Guidelines for Shopping Malls
Introduction
The Security Concept
Security Rings
1 Deterrence
2 Pro-active Security
3 Perimeter Security
4 Access Control
5 Security Command & Control Rooms
6 Emergency Plans & Procedures
Concluding Remarks
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136
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Page 8
1
1.1
1.2
1.2.1 BACKGROUND
Financing terrorism may be cheap but a terrorist attack
anywhere is a very disruptive and potentially destabilising force.
News reports and press statements from governments tell us that
there are many types of costs, direct and indirect, associated
with a terrorist bomb attack. Other than the loss of precious
human lives and injuries suffered, there are also business
losses, cost of rebuilding, insurance payouts, shattered investor
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are just a small sample of the many costs that businesses, and
governments, have to deal with in the wake of a terrorist bomb
attack on or in the vicinity of their establishment.
The September 11 terrorist (9/11) attacks in 2001, which
cost the terrorists US$500,000 to stage, claimed 3,000 lives and
the total losses of life and property cost insurance companies
approximately US$40 billion. This direct cost pales in comparison
to the indirect costs. Shopping centres and restaurants across
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buildings (such as the Sears Tower in Chicago) were evacuated;
planes were grounded; and the stock market ceased trading for
four consecutive days. The effects were not only felt in New York.
The Florida tourist industry was also badly affected where the
total tourism activity had been reduced by one-third, or about
US$20m per day. An APEC Tourism Working Group statement
said that falls in tourism arrivals since 9/11 had varied from a few
percent in some member economies such as Thailand, 10% in
Singapore and up to 21% in Taiwan. Given the average direct
contribution from tourism of over 5% of GDP across the APEC
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economies is substantial.
Closer to home, the Oct 2002 Bali Bombing, which cost
the terrorists approximately US$20,000 to stage, claimed the lives
of around 200 innocent people and devastated Indonesias US$6
billion tourism industry. The Indonesian stock market crashed
and the Bali tourist economy, which contributes about 5% of the
countrys GDP, came to a halt. Overall, the attack resulted in a 2
percent drop in Indonesian GDP for 2002.
More recent attacks in the region have shown that
terrorists continue to actively pursue their terror campaigns and
the targets are now commonly hotels or resorts. The attack on
the Islamabad Marriott Hotel in Sep 2008, co-ordinated attacks
in Mumbai in Nov 2008 which included 2 hotels, The Taj Mahal
Palace & Tower and The Oberoi Trident and the Jul 2009
bombings in Jakartas JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotels are
just a few such examples.
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to cripple economic activity and recognise that the shockwaves of
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impact. Certainly, such attacks would undermine businesses and
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Page 9
1.2.3
ASSUMPTION
1.2.4
The threats as illustrated in Table 1 : Possible TerroristRelated Threats, are derived from the adversarys ideology,
capability and modus operandi, and have been used to determine
This table illustrates possible scenarios to be considered. Actual threats to any particular buildings may vary on a case-by-case basis.
Page 10
1.2.5
ACHIEVING AESTHETICS
While building prohibitive structures may enhance
security, it can also cause the complex to lose its aesthetic
appeal, making it look like a fortress. However, many solutions
available today meet the objective of raising the level of security,
yet blend in very well into the architectural design. The best
time to assimilate elements of building security will be during the
planning and design stages of the development life cycle. Indeed,
effective building security design can be factored in as early as
the conceptual design stage. This will not be at the expense of
the architectural vision envisaged by the building owners. It is
possible to design-out security risks while still preserving the
essence of the design.
MAINTAINING BUILDING FUNCTIONAILTY
Building functionality can be maintained if security
design is taken into account from the early stages of the building
development life cycle. For example, the failure of a main transfer
beam led to the progressive collapse of a substantial portion of
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. In fact,
most of the structural damage, and a vast majority of the fatalities
were caused by this progressive collapse, and not by the direct
effect of the bomb blast.
Page 11
Page 12
2
2.1
The project concept as well as the design and planning cases, incorporating this notion into the building design
stages of the building development are key milestones to considerations will provide a better secured facility at no additional
incorporate security considerations into the architectural layout, cost.
the structural aspects as well as the mechanical and electrical Stand-off refers to the distance from the building to a potential
systems of the building development. At the project concept threat and not the distance from the building to the perimeter of
stage, key issues to be considered include but are not limited the lot (although in many cases the two align). This requires a
to site selection and location, the building type, dimensions, preliminary assessment of the current and foreseeable threats.
positioning and orientation within the lot, landscaping as well as
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important deliberations include but are not limited to the structural which rapidly expands as a hemispherical pressure wave from
scheme, characteristics of the envelop walls and facades, the source of the explosion. The nature of the shock pressure is
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a sudden rise of pressure and rapid exponential decay, followed
congregation areas.
by a longer and smaller negative phase.
Relating to physical security issues during the initial An explosive charge detonating very close to the structure
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effective way to achieve the required security level at minimal over a local area.
cost. Studies have demonstrated that the implementation of
For example, if the lot has a public road that runs along
security elements at the preliminary design stage according to
it,
the
building
positioning should try to maximise the distance
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for protection of the facility, by relating to the security aspects (Figure 1: Stand-off distance).
early on, architects and planners will be able to blend the
required protection elements into the design of the facility thereby
ensuring a minimum aesthetic impact. This could also assist the
architect to avoid any compromise in his vision or design of the
facility in favour of security elements. Such compromises are
typically sources of tension between the architect and the security
planners if security aspects are only considered at a later stage of
the project.
The following sections of this chapter relate to general
design, structural and system issues which should be addressed
regardless of the security level.
2.2
GENERAL ARCHITECTURAL
CONSIDERATIONS
Page 13
2.2.2
BUILDING ORIENTATION
2.2.4
2.2.3
PERIMETER LINE
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line separating secure and non-secure areas as it is the last
obstacle preventing a vehicle from approaching within dangerous
proximity of the building.
The perimeter line should be designed to assist in
preventing such threats by ensuring that they will not endanger
vulnerable areas. This line can be achieved in many ways
depending on the protection level required, and the layout of the
building. A more detailed discussion on perimeter lines can be
found in Chapter 5.
Page 14
2.2.5
2.2.6
2.3
GENERAL STRUCTURAL
CONSIDERATIONS
Page 15
2.3.2
The ability of the structure, faade or object to resist
blast pressure given all the above parameters is a function of the
material composition of the structure, and the section properties
of the main structural elements, the structural spans and the
connection details. These structural design guidelines should be
considered during the initial structural design phase to minimise
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these features will provide a much more robust structure and
increase the probability of achieving a low potential for progressive
collapse.
During the design and planning stage, the public faade
should have a simple structural scheme consisting of a beam/
column system or even pre-fabricated load bearing panels. Arising
from the studies of the Oklahoma City attack, it is recommended
that placing large transfer beams carrying the faade opposite
public areas that are accessible by vehicles be avoided. It is
recommended that internal primary structural elements be placed
behind the public faade, which acts as a form of shielding.
2.3.1
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local failure from element to element, eventually resulting in the
collapse of an entire structure or a disproportionately large part
of it. Progressive collapse occurs, for example, when the loss of
one column results in the collapse of a disproportionate portion of
the building. This was illustrated in the bombing of the Alfred P.
Murrah building in Oklahoma City on 19 Apr 1995. The majority of
the 168 fatalities were due to the partial collapse of the structure
rather than the result of the direct blast effects.
STRUCTURAL REDUNDANCY
2.3.4
2.3.5
Page 16
2.4
Page 17
3
3.1
3.2
Page 18
3.3
CONSTRUCTION METHOD
Page 19
3.3.3
STRUCTURE CATEGORY
Structural engineers are advised to take the protection
,
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In this section, the construction method and the envelope
on the overall structure category (see Table 5). If the appropriate
construction method cannot be clearly selected from the above walls are combined in a table to represent a structure category for
table, it is recommended to choose one level down the list (with any given building.
1 being the weakest type of construction and 4 the strongest).
Once the structure category has been established, the
In other words, when in doubt, always choose a category which
design
and
construction team can then review the Protection
will result in a stricter or more comprehensive protection solution.
Recommendation Tables (PRT) for the proposed building category
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ENVELOPE WALL
the building.
The buildings envelope wall plays a major part in the
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The way that the tables are constructed allow the
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forced entry and many other crime and terror related threats. The design methods and the costs related to special protection
building envelopes materials and construction also determine the elements like perimeter wall, windows, doors, parking area
extent of fragmentation in the event of a blast.
and more. For example, by selecting a perimeter wall of 20cm
concrete with small windows rather than a light brick wall with
From the security point of view, the more desirable ,
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envelope wall would be constructed of reinforced concrete (with with very little effect on the budget.
or without cladding) and include small, protected windows. This
Table 5: Building Structure Categories
type of wall requires a minimum of security design but is usually
not the type of wall favoured by architects. If any other envelope
wall is considered, the architect should consider the protection
In-situ
requirements for each wall system before deciding on any
Structure
Pre cast
Pre-cast load
column,
proposed system. This is even more important for faades that
column &
Steel
bearing walls
beams &
beam
face open public areas. It is strongly recommended to consider
slabs
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Envelope
Walls
There are protection solutions for almost every type of faade,
1
2
3
4
1A
2A
3A
4A
Large
windows
above 25%
1B
2B
3B
4B
Medium
windows
10% - 25%
1C
2C
3C
4C
Small
windows less D
than 10%
1D
2D
3D
4D
walls
If the desired design option does not appear in this table, the
closest option should be selected keeping in mind that whenever
in doubt, a more conservative grouping should be selected. This
ensures that the building is not under-protected.
Page 20
4
4.1
4.2
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for small buildings or buildings with a very low occupancy that
serve as commercial, residential or any other use. By very low
I. Select the Building Category from Table 2: Building (S, L, M, occupancy, it is assumed that the building has one or two storeys
and contains no more then 10 people in it at any one time. It
H, Y) (Section 3.2).
is therefore assumed that the building requires only minimal
II. Select the Building Structure Category from Table 5: Building protection and security since its risk level can be considered
Structure Categories (A1, A2. D3, D4) (Section 3.3.3) having low. Despite the low occupancy, if the design team considers the
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building to be particularly threatened for whatever reason, it may
Methods) (Section 3.3.1) and envelope walls (Table 4: Envelope choose to relate to a higher category (L or M) with the associated
higher level of protection.
Walls) (Section 3.3.2).
To use the Protection Recommendation Tables (PRT):
IV. The rows in the table for the selected building structure category
determine the protection elements that are recommended or
required.
II. Find the column that represents the desired buidling structure
category (a combination of construction method and envelope
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III. Look down the column and wherever indicated with the symbol
+, the protection element for that row should be included in the
design.
IV. Combining all the protection elements indicated will form the
recommended protection envelope for the building.
Some of the protection elements will be referenced as
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of protection needed for each building category. In this case,
the user should consult security advisers, the relevant authority
or alternatively, choose the most relevant protection level to the
project.
For more details on each of the protection elements,
refer to the relevant section in Chapter 5 to Chapter 9.
Page 21
Page 22
NOTE:
In this PRT table (Category S), there are critical protection elements that are HIGHLY RECOMMENDED to be included in the
buildings design. In this case, it is highly recommended to design every building to incorporate the items highlighted in the above
table in RED/BOLD.
Page 23
4.3
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with a low occupancy. By low occupancy it is assumed that the category (a combination of construction method and envelope
density of people in the building is less than one person per 30 m2 walls as detailed in Section 3.3).
on average or less than 100 people in a relatively large building
(for example each room in the building holds an average of only III. Look down the column and wherever indicated with the
one person at a time). Despite the low occupancy, if the design symbol +, the protection element for that row should be included
team considers the building to be particularly threatened for in the design.
whatever reason, it may choose to relate to a higher category (M
or H) with the associated higher level of protection.
IV. Combining all the protection elements indicated will form the
recommended protection envelope for the building.
Page 24
Page 25
NOTE:
In this PRT table (Category L) there are critical protection elements that are HIGHLY RECOMMENDED to be included in the
buildings design. In this case, it is highly recommended to design every building to incorporate the items highlighted in the above
table in RED/BOLD.
Page 26
4.4
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with a medium occupancy. By medium occupancy it is assumed
that the density of people in the building is less than one person
per 10 m2 and more than 1 person per 30 m2 on average, or less
then 1000 people in total. If the design team believes that more
than 250 people will congregate in a single area of the building at
any time, it is recommended to select a higher category of H with
the associated higher level of protection.
To use the table below:
III. Look down the column and wherever indicated with the
symbol +, the protection element for that row should be included
in the design.
IV. Combining all the protection elements indicated will form the
recommended protection envelope for the building.
For more details on each of the protection
recommendations, refer to the relevant section in Chapter 5 to
Chapter 9.
Page 27
Page 28
NOTE:
In this PRT table (Category M) there are critical protection elements that are HIGHLY RECOMMENDED to be included in the
buildings design. In this case, it is highly recommended to design every building to incorporate the items highlighted in the above
table in RED/BOLD.
Page 29
4.5
III.Look down the column and wherever indicated with the symbol
The table below is meant for buildings with a high +, the protection element for that row should be included in the
occupancy. By high occupancy, it is assumed that there are more design.
than 1000 people in the building and/or more than 1 person to
every 10 m2
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IV. Combining all the protection elements indicated will form the
lower occupancy locations which would otherwise be assigned recommended protection envelope for the building.
Category M or L but may require a higher level of protection.
For more details on each of the protection
To use the table below:
recommendations, refer to the relevant section in Chapter 5 to
Chapter 9.
I. In each row of the table, a protection element is listed.
II. Find the column that represents the desired buidling structure
category (a combination of construction method and envelope
walls as detailed in Section 3.3).
Page 30
Page 31
NOTE:
In this PRT table (Category H) there are critical protection elements that are HIGHLY RECOMMENDED to be included in the
buildings design. In this case, it is highly recommended to design every building to incorporate the items highlighted in the above
table in RED/BOLD.
Page 32
4.6
III. Look down the column and wherever indicated with the symbol
+, the protection element for that row should be included in the
design.
IV. Combining all the protection elements indicated will form the
recommended protection envelope for the building.
For more details on each of the protection
recommendations, refer to the relevant section in Chapter 5 to
Chapter 9.
Page 33
Page 34
NOTE:
In this PRT table (Category Y), all protection elements are critical and it is highly recommended to include them in the building design.
Page 35
PERIMETER DESIGN
5.1
INTRODUCTION
5.1.2
PERIMETER LINE
5.1.3
CLEAR ZONE
STAND-OFF DISTANCE
Page 36
5.3
5.2
5.3.1
PERIMETER LINE
INTRODUCTION
Page 37
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would be at risk from a terrorist-related attack, building owners
should adopt a prudent approach. For example, most buildings
will require basic perimeter line measures such as establishing
a vehicle anti-ramming line and infrastructure pipes. Other
measures such as anti-intrusion fences, blast shielding walls and
establishing a ballistic perimeter line would be for buildings that
have been assessed to require higher levels of security.
The objective of this section is to provide a basic understanding
of perimeter defence issues. This will enable architects to
make decisions about the types of fence, wall or line necessary
for any building, based on knowledge and understanding of
the relevant design points and buildings characteristics as
described previously in Chapter 3. The sections will discuss the
various protection levels to be achieved and describe various
architectural possibilities and design considerations for each of
these categories.
Page 38
5.3.2
5.3.2A INTRODUCTION
The aim of a vehicle anti-ramming perimeter line is to
prevent unauthorised vehicles from entering the building/ facility
boundary and coming close to the building/ protected facility.
This line can also be designed as a combined protection element
to also prevent pedestrian intrusion.
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ramming perimeter line is to reduce the number of locations
where a vehicle can penetrate the perimeter line. This can be
affected by ensuring that the perimeter line is not close to any
roads or any other area which allows vehicles to approach.
Page 39
Page 40
Table 11B: Corresponding Standards for SD-STD-02.01, ASTM F2656-07 and PAS68:2007
* This data was extracted from Table 1: Impact Condition Designations of the ASTM F2656-07 document, titled Standard Test
Method for Vehicle Crash Testing of Perimeter Barriers.
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Security Barriers.
Notes:
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ramming the barrier at 80km/h from penetrating more than 1 metre past the barrier line (PU50 to C40 under ASTM F2656-07; or 2
500-80 to 1 500-48 under PAS68:2007 would also fall within this criteria).
Page 41
VEGETATION
WATER
The effectiveness of bodies of water or water features
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value in slowing vehicles and as a deterrent is obvious. For this
reason, it is best to use them in situations where the stand-off
distance available is relatively large. For example, cars and light
trucks will be limited to speeds of approximately 40 km/hr by wide
bodies of water 15-20 cm deep. Bodies of water 90 cm deep
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body of water is uneven or contains several deep trenches, the
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the uneven ground under the water further impedes possible
movement speeds.
In addition, water features such as fountains or pools
may be used as barriers if additional structural components are
built in.
Page 42
Page 43
TERRAIN/GRADE LEVEL
Terrain features such as retaining walls, natural steps,
or large rocks may provide effective barriers to vehicles. Grade
level differences can also be built in to the landscape design as
another form of barrier.
5.3.2F
FABRICATED BARRIERS
BOLLARD
Page 44
5.3.3
INFRASTRUCTURE PIPES
5.3.3A INTRODUCTION
Ducts, channels, drain and sewage infrastructure can all
be used to perpetrate attacks against buildings and installations.
Such pipe works could either be used to penetrate a building/
facility, or could be used as a hidden location for inserting an
explosive device or hazardous materials.
These infrastructure elements are a necessity to the
buildings functioning and therefore cannot be eliminated. It is
therefore critical to ensure that they do not become a hazard.
The openings, access or vents to these infrastructure
elements may often be at the perimeter line or beyond (e.g. rain
drainage pipes in a perimeter fence), on the street (e.g. sewage
manholes that lead into the buildings sewage system), or they
can be incorporated into the building itself (e.g. air intake ducts).
WALLS
Walls that are structurally reinforced can be used
effectively as part of a vehicle anti-ramming perimeter. These
may consist of retaining walls, plaza edges, an extension of a
buildings architecture or as the base of a fence. For such walls,
it is vital that the foundation be continuous, and be specially
designed to withstand the forces of a ramming vehicle according
to the SD-STD-02.01 K4 standard or the equivalent ASTM F265607 or PAS68:2007 standard. Such walls may typically be used in
combination with other barrier types.
Standards
There are no internationally recognised security standards that
are relevant to the protection of sewage or drainage access
pipes.
Picture: U.S. GSA
Page 45
5.3.4
VI.
Drainage ditches, culverts, vents, ducts, and other
openings that pass through a perimeter and which are greater
than 25 cm in diameter should be protected by securely fastened
welded bar grilles. The addition of grilles or pipes to culverts or
other drainage structures must be coordinated with the engineers
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additional maintenance resulting from the installation can be
taken into account.
VII.
Manhole covers 25 cm or more in diameter must be
secured to prevent unauthorised opening. They may be secured
with locks and hasps, by welding them shut, or by bolting them to
their frame.
ANTI-INTRUSION FENCE
5.3.4A INTRODUCTION
A pedestrian anti-intrusion perimeter line is designed
to prevent unauthorised persons from entering the site and
approaching the building. It is also possible to combine this line
with other protection elements in order to prevent the ramming of
vehicles. This section will relate only to fences.
An intrusion of a person can be stealthy and silent or
forced and noisy. The ranges of possible threats include:
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be breached under any circumstances, the planning and design
of an anti-intrusion perimeter line at the initial stages should focus
on causing the maximum delay for an intruder to give reaction
forces adequate time to respond.
An anti-intrusion fence can be designed and built per
project or can be purchased as an off-the-shelf product. In many
cases, the fence will be combined with a detection system in order
to detect the intruder as well as to delay him. In some cases, the
fence line can be virtual, with an intrusion detection system but no
physical presence. This can only be done when there is a large
buffer zone which allows the response team time to intercept the
detected intruder.
5.3.4B TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Page 46
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is hollow 4 mm 5 X 5 cm. The distance between bars should
be no greater than 10 cm. Due to the weight of the fence and
the desired heavy duty performance, it is particularly important to
plan the pole foundation properly.
The fence can be produced with or without the top part
angled outward but it is important to make sure that no element
of the fence design or location will allow an intruder to use it as
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a ramming car. As stated previously, combining fence types can
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fence type can be fully upgraded to a smart fence.
Page 47
Page 48
FENCE OPTIONS
SMART FENCES
Page 49
5.3.5
5.3.5A INTRODUCTION
The purpose of a blast shielding wall is to reduce the load
levels on areas of the buildings structural elements and external
faade as a result of an explosion. A blast shielding wall is often
used when it is not possible to establish an acceptable stand-off
distance between a potential blast and the target building, and
when the hardening of the structural elements and the faades is
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the architects and engineers to use building methods, materials
and products (walls and windows) that would otherwise not be
feasible.
Reducing loads on the building walls is achieved by two means:
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building.
II. Creating a shadowed area that will reduce the loads on the
building.
It is important to note that generally speaking the spherical
blast wave that is projected from the blast will hit the shielding
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the barrier and the wall of the building. The pressure however,
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on the building.
Page 50
Page 51
5.3.6
5.3.6A INTRODUCTION
Page 52
5.4
5.4.1
Page 53
PEDESTRIAN ENTRANCES
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for communication (which may be at a distance) between the
people entering and those responsible for approving access.
5.4.2A INTRODUCTION
A vehicle anti-ramming entrance is used to prevent
unauthorised vehicles from entering the premises. A combination
of elements may be used to also prevent the intrusion of
pedestrians.
A vehicle getting within close proximity of the building or
gaining access to an underground or multi-storey car park is one
of the main threats which needs to be prevented. The range of
possibilities for perpetrating threats using a vehicle is wide and
can include:
I. A vehicle carrying a large explosive device driven by a suicide
bomber.
II. A vehicle ramming into a building or a group of people.
III. A vehicle carrying assailants used as a carrier to break through
the perimeter line.
IV. A vehicle crashing into the perimeter by accident.
At the early stages of project planning, consideration
should be given to optimising the number of entrances and most
importantly, positioning them at the least vulnerable locations.
For maximum protection, the vehicle anti-ramming
entrance needs to be placed as far from the building as possible.
However, as far as possible, it should be established within the
propertys boundary line/building lot as otherwise, approval from
the appropriate authorities (e.g. SLA, URA, LTA) would need to
be sought for any barriers proposed to be installed outside the
boundary line/building lot.
Vehicle anti-ramming perimeter entrances may
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hours, but still need to provide access to pedestrians.
Page 54
5
Please refer to ASTMs website to obtain the ASTM F2656-07
Standard test method for crash testing of perimeter barriers
(http://www.astm.org/Standards/F2656.htm).
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Page 55
* This data was extracted from Table 1: Impact Condition Designations of the ASTM F2656-07 document, titled Standard Test
Method for Vehicle Crash Testing of Perimeter Barriers.
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ramming the barrier at 80km/h from penetrating more than 1 metre past the barrier line (PU50 to C40 under ASTM F2656-07; or 2
500-80 to 1 500-48 under PAS68:2007 would also fall within this criteria).
Page 56
III.
The foundation requirements of the proposed barriers
should be considered early on since an underground car park
beneath the barrier line could limit the choice.
IV.
Consideration should be given to any requirements for
pedestrian access as well as the vehicle anti-ramming criteria.
ARM BARRIER
An arm barrier provides protection from vehicles but not
from pedestrians. There are many arm barriers available, but
not many meet anti-ramming standards and in order to provide
adequate protection, they will usually be equipped with an
internal cable. The barrier needs to be fully closed to provide the
protection level. If there is a roof above the barriers, the height of
the opened gate should be considered.
XI.
Safety Options/Features. Active barrier systems are
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intended purposes. Warning devices (visible colours and patterns,
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used to mark the presence of a barrier and enhance its visibility to
drivers. Vehicle detector safety loops and road plates chequered
for good traction can also enhance safety.
XII.
Proposed screening equipment should be based on the
ability to discover threat devices according to the relevant threat
level (e.g. if the threat to the building is a large bomb hidden in a
car boot, a screening system to search the underside of a vehicle
will not be effective).
Page 57
RETRACTABLE BOLLARDS
Automatic retractable bollards provide protection from
vehicles but not from pedestrians. They are useful because
of their relatively fast operation cycles and can therefore be
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5.4.4A INTRODUCTION
5.4.3
ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIERS
5.4.3A INTRODUCTION
An administrative barrier prevents an unauthorised
vehicle with no hostile intention from entering the premises
accidentally and is used for the administrative arrangement of
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required, or a sliding gate if it is to serve as a pedestrian barrier
as well.
Standards
There are no internationally recognised security standards that
are relevant for administrative barriers.
Page 58
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XIII.
In case of an interlocking system, the area between
the barriers should be used as the security screening point and
preferably should be outside the perimeter line. Every attempt
should be made to avoid locating this area under populated or
vulnerable parts of the building.
XIV.
If there is no choice but to locate the screening area
under parts of the building, the whole area must be strengthened
in such a way as to contain any possible attack that could take
place there.
XV.
In all cases it is recommended that the entrance be
located in an area that will prevent any potential incident from
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an entrance could be left unoccupied to avoid an explosion at the
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V.
The different security requirements for during and after
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Cycle Time / Pass-through Rates. The device passthrough rate should be consistent with the desired entry
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Reliability/Maintenance. Reliability is an important factor
in selecting gates or turnstiles. The systems failure modes
should ensure that the barrier will fail in a predetermined position
(open or closed) based on security and operational requirements.
Backup generators or manual override capabilities are needed to
ensure continuous operation during power failures or equipment
malfunction.
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issues should be resolved at early stages.
IX.
Safety Options/Features some gate systems are
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purposes. Warning devices should be used to mark the presence
of a gate.
X.
It is recommended to plan for the possible upgrade of
each entrance to an interlocking system. Even though this may
not be required for current threat levels, it may be necessary in
the future.
Page 59
5.4.5
5.4.5A INTRODUCTION
Loading docks and service access areas are a necessity
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Page 60
Page 61
* This data was extracted from Table 1: Impact Condition Designations of the ASTM F2656-07 document, titled Standard Test
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ramming the barrier at 80km/h from penetrating more than 1 metre past the barrier line (PU50 to C40 under ASTM F2656-07; or 2
500-80 to 1 500-48 under PAS68:2007 would also fall within this criteria).
Page 62
5.4.6
5.4.6A INTRODUCTION
An interlocking system for a vehicle entrance is used to
ensure that an authorised vehicle entering the premises is not
tailed by an unauthorised vehicle which takes advantage of the
open barrier to slip in after the authorised vehicle.
Page 63
5.5
SECURITY POSTS
5.5.1
INTRODUCTION
5.5.2A INTRODUCTION
As seen in Section 5.4.4 a pedestrian entrance can be one of
the most vulnerable and critical locations within a site because it
performs three main functions:
Administrative admission / information.
Access control.
Security screening.
For these reasons, a pedestrian security post could be
considered as a sensitive location which may be subjected to
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Page 64
5.5.2C STANDARDS
BLAST RESISTANCE STANDARDS
Due to the fact that the guard post is usually on the front line,
it is almost impossible to provide it with full protection due to its
proximity to the potential threat. Therefore it is recommended to
use medium level as standard.
5.5.2D DESIGN OF SECURITY POSTS
The following factors should be considered in the design
of a security post:
I. Security post positions on the perimeter which are securing the
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vision and tactical control of the area under their responsibility.
FORCED ENTRY STANDARDS
A standard level of forced entry is determined according
to the following three criteria:
The accessibility of the area to a potential intruder both in
terms of the length of time that an intruder can stand and work
to gain entry without being disturbed, and in terms of physical
accessibility.
The importance of the site.
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in Singapore:
Page 65
5.5.3
5.5.3A INTRODUCTION
A vehicle entrance is one of the most vulnerable and
critical locations within a site. For that reason, designing an
effective security post at this point has a major effect on the future
protection level provided to the site. As the vehicle entrance point
is usually on or close to the building lot line, design mistakes are
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achieved. Vehicle entrance security booths are in common use in
a wide range of developments. They typically perform three main
tasks:
5.6
LANDSCAPING
5.6.1
INTRODUCTION
5.6.3
DESIGN OF LANDSCAPING
Zone 1 (see diagram) is the first 2 metres adjacent to the structure. Within
Zone 1 there should be no planted material or landscape feature that is
taller than 15 centimetres.
Zone 2 starts 2 metres from the structure and extends to 10 metres from the
structure. Within Zone 2 there should be no planted material or landscape
feature that is taller than 50 centimetres or wider than 40 centimetres.
Plants should be selected that do not obscure more than 20% of the ground
in any place. Plants may be taller than 50 centimetres at full maturity as
long as they do not have a horizontal density that obscures more than 10%
of the ground and wall systems in any place. Plants or landscape features
may be clustered to create planters or monuments as long as they do not
obscure visibility of more than 10% of the ground or wall systems in any
place and do not create hiding places for a package
VI. The entrance to the vehicle security post should be from the
inner area and not from the outside.
VII. If the security post is on the building line, it should be carefully
considered if access is needed both between the security post and
the screening area and between the security post and the inner
building area. This should be avoided or where unavoidable, a
high level of forced-entry protection must be installed.
VIII. A security control room, if it exists, should be able to override
the access control systems operated by the vehicle entrance
security post.
IX. The vehicle entrance security post should have enough
allocated space to house all screening equipment for both
currently planned and future options.
Page 66
5.6.4
EXAMPLE OF DESIGN
5.7.2
5.7.2A INTRODUCTION
Lighting along the perimeter line, together with other
alarm and surveillance systems is a basic tool in the detection
of intruders into an installation. The lighting around the entrance
points of an installation is often critical to the proper operation of
access control. The lighting types and coverage should therefore
be designed carefully based on the intended security screening
methods at the site.
5.7
SECURITY LIGHTING
5.7.1
INTRODUCTION
Page 67
Page 68
ENTRANCES
I. All vehicle and pedestrian entrances to the facility should have
appropriate lighting.
II. Lighting at manned entrances must be adequate to identify
people, examine credentials, inspect vehicles entering or
departing the facility premises through designated control points
(vehicle interiors should be clearly lit), and prevent anyone from
entering unobserved into the premises.
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environmental conditions.
IV. Lighting intensity at entrances should be planned to ensure
that drivers arriving at the facility can readily recognise the
premises and see where to drive their vehicle.
V. Lighting should not be placed in such a way as to blind the
driver.
VI. Security posts at entrance points should have a reduced level
of interior lighting to enable the security guards to see better,
increase their night vision adaptability, and avoid inward viewing.
VII. The control for the lighting system should be in a secured
area, preferably in the security control room.
5.8
5.8.1
INTRODUCTION
Page 69
5.8.2A INTRODUCTION
Car parks constitute a relatively simple opportunity to
introduce large quantities of explosives to a buildings vicinity
or to its sensitive and vulnerable areas. Limiting or restricting
parking can help to keep threats away from a building, however
in dense urban environments such as Singapore, parking spaces
in close proximity to the building, and underground parking are
common. Mitigating the risks caused by parking in close proximity
can be achieved by creative design measures, including parking
regimes, perimeter buffer zones, barriers, structural hardening
and other architectural and engineering solutions. Operational
measures may also be necessary to inspect or screen vehicles
entering car parks.
5.8.2B DESIGN OF CAR PARKS
5.8.3
5.8.3A INTRODUCTION
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the shock of an explosion. Some of these utilities may be critical
for safely evacuating people from the building or to the emergency
response to an attack. Their destruction could cause damage
that is disproportionate to other building damage resulting from
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or smoke ventilation systems not functioning can be much higher
than the direct results of the explosion.
5.8.3B DESIGN OF CRITICAL UTILITIES
The following factors should be considered in the design
of critical utilities:
I. Plan the utilities to be underground, concealed, and protected.
II. Provide redundancy to life saving utility systems.
IV. Locate the main fuel storage away from areas that can be
easily accessed.
II. Parking areas should be separated by at least 20 meters 0,,
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from utility rooms, utility mains and service entrances, including from the outside of the building thereby limiting the need for
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suppression water mains, cooling and heating mains, etc.
VI. Locate garbage containers as far away from the building as
III.Parking under the building is not recommended but if possible.
unavoidable, the building should be hardened for blast and if
vehicle access close to major structural elements is unavoidable,
the major structural elements must be protected against blast.
IV. The design of the car park should limit damage to adjacent
areas and vent explosive forces to the exterior of the building.
VIII. Route critical or fragile utilities so that they are not on exterior
walls or on walls shared with mailrooms, loading docks etc.
Page 70
BUILDING FAADES
6.2
6.2.1
DEFINITIONS
6.1
Page 71
6.2.2
Blast Resistance
6.2.3
Forced-entry Resistance
6.2.4
Ballistic Resistance
Page 72
6.3
BUILDING WALLS
6.3.1
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
In-situ reinforced concrete walls are the most costeffective method of protection in the building industry. The
highest level of protection is achieved when construction
methods, details and materials are according to those required
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Todays construction methods favour the use of pre-cast load
bearing elements rather than in-situ reinforced concrete walls. It
is therefore critical that the same guidelines for wall strengthening
are followed for pre-cast elements where protection is required
for high blast loads.
DESIGN OF PRE-CAST LOAD BEARING WALLS
Standards
All relevant Singapore building codes and standards must
be followed. If there is a contradiction between these
guidelines and the building code, the latter should prevail.
Page 73
6.3.3
INTRODUCTION
Non-load bearing wall panels should be supported
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can provide resistance to high blast loads. In general, the
standard connection details currently used in the building industry
are adequate to provide resistance to medium blast loads.
The above-mentioned resistance only relates to the
panel and not for the supporting building components. In the
event of an explosion, blast loads on the panels will be transferred
to the supporting elements of the building and therefore adequate
consideration must be given to them as well.
Page 74
6.3.4
LIGHT WALLS
EXAMPLE OF DESIGNS
INTRODUCTION
Light walls or light metal walls are used mainly for
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are sensitive to vertical loads and may not be able to support
more solid structures. They can also be used as internal light
metal walls placed behind external curtain walls which would not
otherwise provide the necessary level of protection (See Section
6.4 for more information). The protection capabilities of light walls
are limited in the following ways:
Blast resistance is limited to low pressure. If the light walls
need to resist higher pressure, special details will need to be
applied.
Forced entry resistance is limited however it is possible to add
special details to increase its resistance.
Resistance to bullets and other projectiles is very limited, but
special materials may be applied to increase protection either as
cladding or as an inner layer.
DESIGN OF LIGHT WALLS
Standards
All relevant Singapore building codes and standards must
be followed. If there is a contradiction between these
guidelines and the building code, the latter should prevail.
There is a wide range of options for light walls but in
general, a metal faade of a building has a low resistance to blast
loads, projectiles and forced entry. It is recommended that where
higher levels of protection are required, a custom designed wall
can be used (possibly as a second layer behind the external
faade), which can be designed to provide either blast, ballistic or
forced entry protection:
I. Blast resistance. Custom designed walls can meet the full
range of blast loads thereby compensating for the low level of
protection typically provided by light walls.
II. Forced entry. Custom designed walls can meet the full range of
forced entry requirements.
III. Ballistic resistance. Custom designed walls can meet the full
range of resistance requirements to bullets and other projectiles.
6.4
CURTAIN WALLS
6.4.1
INTRODUCTION
Page 75
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of protective glazing is to prevent or reduce
casualties and damage in case of an attack against the building
or its vicinity. In the event of an explosion, attempt at forced entry
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glass debris from the damaged faade can cause many casualties
because of its hazardous nature. The creation and impact of
such debris, termed secondary fragmentation, can be effectively
controlled by means of protective glazing materials.
6.4.3
INTRODUCTION
Glass facades which are not fully framed are attached
to the building structure with metal hangers that are connected
to the glass by point supports. These systems provide relatively
poor protection. Point supported systems are not capable of
withstanding high blast pressure loads. The supports concentrate
the blast forces at the four corners of the glazing and as a result,
there are large stress concentrations in the glass corner supports.
Instead of absorbing energy (by bending), the components of
point supported systems can turn into large projectiles with high
energy. These types of glass facades do not provide a high level
of protection against forced entry and in order to achieve higher
protection levels, special designs and glass systems must be
used.
Where a higher level of protection is needed, secondary
protection systems can also be added to the glass faade to
enhance the protection levels without touching the original curtain
wall.
Page 76
6.4.4
INTRODUCTION
Transparent or decorative walls, constructed of light
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buildings. These wall systems are relatively weak and provide
little protection against most threats including blast or forced entry.
There are two major ways to enhance its protection capabilities:
To specially design it for protection with stronger materials and
connection details.
To add an extra protection layer behind the standard faade.
The protection layer can be designed as a decorative feature like
wooden bars or a steel mesh.
A stone or metal panel faade can be designed to
withstand blast or forced entry by using materials with a steel or
concrete backing, which have been fully tested and approved, and
specially design connections. Any such design must be tested by
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to be able to withstand the expected force and impulses. The
architect will usually not be limited in his faade design since
the protection elements, which are typically on the inner parts
of the faade, will not interfere with the exterior aesthetics of the
building.
Page 77
6.5
WINDOWS
6.5.1
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
STANDARDS FOR GLAZING HAZARD PROTECTION
There are many commercially available windows which
meet different protective levels. Only windows which have
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should be used. The test report must be attached to the detailed
installation drawings enabling installation and supervision in line
with the testing method. Without clear and approved construction
drawings, it is impossible to validate the installation of the protected
windows. Although most of the blast protected commercial
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case of emergency. It is recommended to place the windows
which can be opened (whether they be protected or unprotected)
in less populated areas.
Page 78
Page 79
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
6.5.3
INTRODUCTION
There are many commercially available bullet resistant
windows which meet different protective levels. Only windows
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laboratory should be used. The test report must be attached
to the detailed installation drawings enabling installation and
supervision in line with the testing method. Special care should
be taken at the connection of the ballistic protection, the wall and
its supporting frame. Without clear and approved construction
drawings, it is impossible to validate the installation of the
protected windows.
DESIGN OF BALLISTIC PROTECTED WINDOWS
The protective components of the bullet resistant windows
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most common method of providing ballistic protection in windows
is by combining thick glazing with steel plates which are used to
protect the connecting details to the supporting frame. The test
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with the steel corner protection to ensure that identical products
are installed on site. Some commercial windows use aluminium
or ceramic materials instead of steel plate which is acceptable
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Standards
The European EN standard should be used.
Refer to Chapter 6.2.4 for details.
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some can be opened either for maintenance or in an emergency.
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because the connection detail to the supports will only involve one
frame. Windows which can be opened usually require two frames
one for the glazing and one for the connection to the supporting
element. While tilt, tilt/turn or sliding windows are available, such
windows will only meet the protective criteria when the windows
are closed and fully locked.
Page 80
GUIDE SPECIFICATION
GLASS-CLAD POLYCARBONATE
Each unit of glass should be designed for applications where
ballistics performance is primary and optical characteristics are
secondary.
The protected side of window is a mar resistant polycarbonate
with the Threat Side a glass surface.
Each unit should have a nominal overall thickness of 1.25.
APPLICABLE STANDARDS
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Page 82
6.5.4
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
DESIGN OF FORCED ENTRY PROTECTED WINDOWS
The protective components of the forced entry windows
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common method of providing forced entry resistance in windows
is by combining the glazing itself, the connection details between
the glazing and the sub-frame, and the locking mechanism to the
frame of the wall (in the case of opening windows). The test
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mechanism (in the case of opening windows) and the wall
connection of the frame.
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and electric). For every protection level, there is different set of
tools and time limits by which the technicians have to open a
window of a predetermined size. The difference in the standards
is that the US DOS standard is based on a manual set of tools
(mainly against the attack of a massive unorganized mob)
whereas the EN standards are based on the use of electric tools
assuming a smaller and more organized group attempting forced
and silent entry. The project team must make the decision on the
standard that is more suitable for the building in question.
Standards
The US Department of State 12-FAH-5 standard or the
European standard ENV 1630: 1999 should be used.
Refer Chapter 6.2.3 for details.
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be opened are usually designed for maintenance or emergency
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protected windows where the relevant connection details are
limited to one frame only. Where a window opens, it usually
includes two frames one frame for the glazing and one frame
for the connection to the supporting element. While tilt, tilt/turn
or sliding windows are available, such windows will only meet the
protective criteria when the windows are closed and fully locked.
Page 83
DESIGN CRITERIA
See the relevant sections in each of the protected window types:
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
6.5.5
INTRODUCTION
Windows can be designed to meet a combined level
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be designed to resist blast loads as well as forced entry and
ballistics. Many designers and manufacturers tend to forget that
in most cases, it is desirable for bullet resistant windows to also
be able to withstand blasts. The addition of blast protection to
6.6
DOORS
bullet resistant windows is usually not complicated and the small
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against many more threats than just ballistic ones. Another
6.6.1
INTRODUCTION
example of a combined system is a forced entry grill which when
External doors are used mainly for pedestrians, cars and
installed behind basic blast protected windows can provide both
forced entry protection and can be used as a catcher system cargo to enter the building. They can be transparent (made of
glass or other material), single or double and in any shape or
against high blast loads.
size. Doors are an important factor in the overall protection of
Most protected windows can be designed with all three the building, especially against forced entry threats. Doors are
protection capabilities. It is advisable at the design stage to check less important for the envelope protection against blast or ballistic
the differences in costs and appearance of using multi-protection threats, since they cover only a very small percentage of the
faade. They do, however, have a major role in the protection of
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the most vulnerable locations of the building. The main protection
and security roles of doors are:
Page 84
Standards
All relevant Singapore building codes and standards must
be followed. If there is a contradiction between these
guidelines and the building code, the latter should prevail.
Contradictions between the security guidelines and safety
standards can usually be resolved, For example, an external
door with a panic device which is used for evacuation can
serve also as a forced entry protected door by means of a
magnetic lock system.
The objective of this section is to provide basic protection
design guidelines to enable architects to make decisions about
which doors and building materials to use for any given facility,
based on knowledge and understanding of the relevant design
points and the buildings characteristics as described in Chapter
2. This section relates to all building doors both internal and
external, but the emphasis is on external doors.
6.6.2
INTRODUCTION
There are many commercially available blast doors
which meet the various standards for blast loads. Doors can be
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an approved laboratory. The test report must include detailed
installation drawings allowing for the doors to be installed
and checked against the tested product. Without approved
construction drawings, which include clear details of the protected
connections, it will not be possible to validate the installation of the
protected doors as an equivalent product to the tested sample.
Blast protected doors should be considered for all
exterior doors where blast overpressures may produce conditions
hazardous to people behind them. As blast protected doors are
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they are installed when they are facing crowded areas. If this
is not possible, then a catcher system or partitions should be
installed behind the doors.
Doors may be hinged, sliding, double-leaf or any other
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of each of these door types which have been tested and approved.
Doors can be set in concrete walls, installed as part of a curtain
wall design (typically glass doors), installed as part of a special
steel wall, or used in many other ways to complete the overall
protection of the faade.
6.6.3
INTRODUCTION
Page 85
6.6.4
INTRODUCTION
Forced entry resistance is a basic attribute of every
door. The many doors which are commercially available differ
in their levels of protection. In order to select the correct door, it
is necessary to decide the level of protection required at every
door location in the building. In general, a higher protection level
will be required at the outer envelope doors or special locations,
with the level of protection decreasing as you move towards the
middle of the building.
There are many commercially available forced entry
protected doors which meet the various protective levels. Forced
entry resistant doors can be used only if accompanied by a test
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report must include detailed installation drawings which will allow
the doors to be installed and checked against the tested product.
Special care should be taken at the connections between the wall
Page 86
DESIGN CRITERIA
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
Rigid polystyrene
foam blocs
2/16 (3 mm)
thick plate
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
6.6.5
INTRODUCTION
Doors can be designed to meet combined levels of protection,
for example entry doors in a secured building will typically be
required to withstand forced entry, blasts and ballistics. The level
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chosen by the project team according to the recommendations in
these guidelines. In most cases, it is desirable for ballsitic doors
to also be able to withstand blasts such as those created by hand
grenades and small explosive devices.
Page 87
7
7.1
BUILDING STRUCTURE
INTRODUCTION
7.2
7.3
DESIGN CRITERIA
7.3.1
of:
The distance from the centre of the explosion to the building.
The type and quantity of explosive material used.
The structure of the explosive device and its casing/housing.
The ability of the structure, faade or object to resist the
blast pressure, is a function of:
The structural materials.
The section properties of the main structural elements.
The structural spans and the connection details.
The blast load is characterised by an overpressure
shock wave which rapidly expands as a hemispherical pressure
wave from the source of the explosion. The nature of the shock
pressure is a sudden rise of pressure and rapid exponential
decay, followed by a longer and smaller negative phase.
At greater distances the peak pressure rapidly and
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area of the building is larger and more structural members will
be exposed to the overpressure. The load on the building will
appear as a concentric ring of differing load intensity.
Page 88
7.4.1
7.3.2
GENERAL GUIDELINES
7.4
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local failure from element to element, eventually resulting in the Category M and H buildings.
collapse of an entire structure or a disproportionately large part
of it. Progressive collapse occurs, for example, when the loss
of one column results in the collapse of a portion of the building.
There are two general approaches to design against progressive
collapse. The systematic approach considers the building as
a whole while the localised approach focuses on strengthening
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Page 89
7.4.2
COLUMN PROTECTION
Page 90
Page 91
WALL PROTECTION
This section considers a detonation of an explosive
charge at a distance of 3 metres or greater from a load-bearing
wall constructed of reinforced concrete, however, a load bearing
pre-fabricated wall could also be considered. A distance of 1-3
metres is considered a close detonation.
CONCEPT SOLUTIONS FOR WALL PROTECTION
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energy applied to the wall. It is recommended to shield the load
bearing walls.
Detailing Shear reinforcement, double mesh arrangement,
vertical and horizontal continuity in the supports and details are
all equivalent to the reinforcement details of the standard home
shelters in Singapore. The wall should be supported against the
slabs and a mechanical support is recommended to allow the
direct shear forces to be applied to the supporting slab edges. A
bite of 10cm or more is recommended. If mechanical support
is not possible, the wall should be connected by means of shear
studs that will transfer the applied horizontal forces to the slabs.
Page 92
BEAM PROTECTION
This section considers a detonation of an explosive
charge at a distance of 3 metres or greater. A closer distance will
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CONCEPT SOLUTIONS FOR BEAM PROTECTION
Geometry - It is recommended that beams are positioned
internally behind the external wall, thereby enabling the external
wall faade to shield it. If this is not possible, the beam should
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design transfer beams or columns and leaving them exposed as
was demonstrated during the Oklahoma City event. However,
exposed transfer beams may be designed but it is advisable for
calculations to be undertaken by physical protection experts who
can take into account the effects of blast loads.
Page 93
7.4.6
SLAB PROTECTION
This section considers a detonation of an explosive
charge at a distance of 3 metres or greater. The main slab to be
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slab may be exposed to high lifting forces.
CONCEPT SOLUTIONS FOR SLAB PROTECTION
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shield the slab. If this is not possible, the external wall faade
should be designed from standard wall panels such as a nonload bearing prefabricated wall panels with small openings. Light
frangible faade such as non-protected curtain wall, will not shield
the slab and lifting of the slab is possible.
Detailing Double mesh arrangement, continuity in all the
supports should be equivalent to the reinforcement details of Civil
Defence (CD) home shelters.
Page 94
SECURITY SYSTEMS
The objective of this chapter is to provide basic security Security systems are usually used for the following purposes:
design guidelines that will enable architects and electric system
engineers to make the right decisions when choosing the Detect illicit activities or intrusions.
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Warn designated security personnel of hostile activity and/or
when deciding on its positioning throughout the building.
breaches of security to the building.
Technical and electronic systems such as CCTV and
alarm systems are part of every modern building plan and are Monitoring of activity in sensitive or vulnerable locations.
considered basic. These security systems which are installed
Recording activities for future investigations.
throughout the building usually consist of:
Base points, which receive and process all the input gathered
by their systems end point (e.g. CCTV matrix, alarm system).
Deterrence.
8.1
Page 95
8.2
8.2.1
INTRODUCTION
The security command control room is the nerve centre
of security operations for a building and should receive and
provide vital information to and from the security personnel on Collecting all the data required in order to formalise a clear and
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routine and emergency situations.
The data received and presented should relate to, among other
things, any regular and irregular activities, crowd concentrations
An effective control room that focuses on relevant and security related incidents. The data should be collected
threats can make the difference between a proper response during both routine and emergency situations.
and chaos, once an incident has been initiated.
A buildings security operation should be aimed at both
crime and terror prevention. The level of effectiveness in which
crime and terror prevention operations are carried out is greatly
dependant on the capabilities of the control room and its operating
staff.
A typical control room should contain all of the main
operating stations of the security systems installed throughout
the building. The control room should also contain sub-stations
of several of the buildings management systems such as the airconditioning and lift control systems. Some of these substations
should have overriding authority over the main station, whereas
others can have regular operating capabilities or should be limited
to view only.
The following systems should be included in a security
control room:
8.2.2
8.2.3
GENERAL
I.
It is recommended to design the control room as a
dedicated unit (i.e. that it will not serve a dual purpose as both a
security control room and an access control guard post).
II.
The security control room should have a direct connection
to or integrated with the buildings management systems that are
considered to be critical or security related (e.g. air conditioning
systems). This is meant to enable the security control room staff
to override or control these systems when the situation requires
it10.
III.
Protection and backup of all critical systems is required
in order to allow the security systems to continue operating
during emergency situations in which the security control room is
damaged and during events of power failure.
Page 96
IV.
The security control room plays a critical role in a buildings
security deployment. It is therefore recommended to design its
protection in a robust manner. The purpose of these measures
is to make the security control room able to withstand an attack
either against the building it occupies or a direct attack against
the security control room and continue to function both during
and after the emergency. The entrance to the security control
room should be equipped with an access control system and
forced entry. These measures are meant to ensure that no
un-authorised persons will gain access to the security control
room.
V.
The lighting in the control room should be designed in a
way that will ensure that it does not cause glare on the various
monitors. For this purpose, it is recommended that the control
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The security control room should be equipped with a
working surface that is positioned in way that will allow the security
control room operator to have a good view of the monitors.
VII.
The security control room should be equipped with
emergency power and lighting to enable it to continue to function
during power failures.
VIII.
The security control room should be equipped with
a climate control system. This is meant to help create a more
comfortable working environment that will assist the security
control room operators to stay alert, especially during night-time
and long shifts.
IX.
The security control room should be supplied by at least
two separate power lines. One dedicated to security systems
while the other for administrative purposes.
III.
The monitors should be located in a way that allows the
person in the control room to perform his regular duties (phone,
log book, access control) and monitor the cameras without
interference.
IV.
All data received by the systems (CCTV, alarm, access
control) should be recorded for post incident investigation. The
required recording rate (FPS), the recordings resolution, and
the period that the recordings are stored for, should follow the
guidelines in Section 8.7. It is important to note that issues
pertaining to data storage have implications both on operational
matters (e.g. face recognition) and on administrative matters (e.g.
amount of space required for holding the equipment).
ALARM
I.
Indication of alarms, transferred to the security control
room, should appear in the most accurate way possible. Alarm
indications are required to relay the exact location of the breach
or event to the security control room operator. Each indication
should also be accompanied by a visual picture of the location
where the breach or event is taking place.
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
X.
When planning the security control room, there is a need
to designate an area for administrative proposes. This area
should be planned and positioned in a way that will ensure that
any activities conducted within do not interfere with the security
control rooms regular operation and in emergencies.
XI.
The control room should be equipped with a dedicated
phone line that has a direct external line.
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EQUIPMENT ROOM
I.
It is recommended to place other electrical equipment
used by the security control systems that are located in the
security control room, in an adjoining but separate room.
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allow cabling to be installed.
III.
A concentration of electrical equipment in a closed room
can cause the temperature in the room to rise considerably. The
rise in temperature may even damage the electrical systems
causing them to fail. It is therefore recommended to install climate
control systems in the equipment room.
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control room and its adjoining equipment room (where applicable)
must be of a kind that, if operated, will not cause damage to the
electrical equipment.
V.
It is recommended that both the security control room
and (where applicable) the adjoining equipment room, should not
have water pipes running through them.
Page 97
8.3
8.3.1
VI.
When designing a non-matrix intercom system for
access control, it is important to make sure that the systems
cabling enables communications between the unit installed at the
access point and the units installed both at the access control
point and the security control room.
VII.
Most intercom systems need to undergo maintenance on
a regular basis. It is therefore recommended to install them at a
location that will allow for the maintenance work to be conducted
in a convenient manner.
VIII.
Exterior intercom units should be protected against
environmental conditions such as temperature, humidity and rain.
IX.
Exterior intercom units should be designed with antivandalism measures.
X.
Intercom units that are installed at vehicle entrances
should be designed in a way that will not require drivers to exit
their car in order to operate them. For example a call initiator
can be connected to a detector that operates it as soon as a car
approaches the designated area.
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window openings could potentially stop radio communication
with emergency responders who are inside the building. With
the installation of cell enhancers, communication by radio among
emergency responders becomes possible between the interior
and exterior of the building and within the building between the
different storeys including basement levels.
Standards
The system should comply with the relevant construction
and electricity related standards.
8.3.4
8.3.3
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
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levels should be set after taking into consideration the noise
levels of the operating environment (e.g. an intercom located on
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installed in a room).
II.
The applied levels of both volume and background
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distance that the users will be from the unit while operating it
(e.g. an intercom used by drivers in their cars requires a different
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entrance).
III.
It is recommended to combine intercom units employed
for use in access control, with CCTV coverage, and proper
lighting. This will enable the security personnel to screen incoming
persons in a more effective manner.
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system for security purposes, it is important to check whether
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adequate for use in the buildings environment.
V.
Electric infrastructure might create interference with
the intercom systems audio signals. This occurs if the two
systems are positioned too close to each other. It is therefore
recommended to maintain proper separation between intercom
lines and other electric lines.
Page 98
8.4.3
I.
A building should always have one PA system that can
be controlled from the security control room.
II.
Access to the PA system should be provided to the
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Figure 128: Combined video/ intercom/ access control unit
Desk
Videophone
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Desk Unit
III.
The system should include pre-recorded messages in all
relevant languages covering the required response to the various
attack scenarios.
IV.
The speaker coverage should be complete and cover
each and every room.
V.
The system should be easy to operate under emergency
situations.
Switchboard
Access
Controller
Electric lock
Standards
The system should comply with the construction and
electricity related standards.
Door
videophone
Unit
Master Unit
8.4
8.4.1
INTRODUCTION
8.5
ALARM SYSTEM
8.5.1
INTRODUCTION
Page 99
8.5.2
8.5.3
I.
The type of detector that is to be used should only be
determined after all location (e.g. indoors, outdoors etc.) and
environmental (e.g. humidity, temperature etc.) issues have been
taken into consideration.
II.
An alarm system should include several types of
detectors.
III.
Cabling for alarm detectors should always be installed in
a protected manner.
IV.
It is recommended to avoid installing detectors with a
relatively high false alarm rate. A high false alarm rate (more
then one false alarm per week for the whole system) will reduce
the effectiveness of the system and add to the probability that a
true alarm will be ignored.
V.
The display unit should provide clear information as to
which zone and detector were set off. A smart system should
clearly display the zone and detector on a computerised map of
the protected site. A standard system may display the information
on the keypad unit.
Page 100
VI.
Alarm systems should have two sets of detectors
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are supposed to be permanently closed (e.g. emergency exits),
and (b) day/ night detectors, that are installed on doors that are
regularly opened during day/ activity hours but closed during after
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manner. The two sets of detectors should be designed to sound/
give out different types of alarms at different situations (e.g. a
buzzer during the day and siren at night).
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inputs received from the detectors (e.g. sounding different alarms
for different amount of weight applied to weight sensors).
VIII.
An alarm system should include a dialler so that it would
be able to alert response forces in case of a breach. A siren or
other alarm element should be considered.
IX.
Magnetic or mechanical switches that are installed on
window frames are an effective tool to make sure that windows
are closed after hours. However, it must be noted that they are
not able to detect situations in which the windows glass is broken.
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equipment.
XI.
All external openings that can be reached by people
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ground level openings and those openings that can be reached
by climbing.
XII.
It is recommended that an independent expert in the
Standards
The system should comply with the construction and
electricity related standards.
8.5.4
EXAMPLES
Page 101
8.6
8.6.1
Access control is the ability to determine who may and The measures must still facilitate access to the building by
the disabled.
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a fundamental principle of access management, and an important
aspect of any effective security system. When applying access
When designing an access management plan, developers
control, the following issues need to be taken into account:
should analyse which areas and assets need to be protected by
access control measures. After deciding which areas and assets
The number of entrances to the building/installation should should be protected, the proper measures need to be selected
and deployed. Entry-point screening is typically employed at the
be minimised.
Identifying and deciding areas to which access should be entrance to secure/ non-public areas. This type of screening can
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limited.
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physical screening (e.g. people, bags, vehicle, etc.), x-ray
screening, weapons detection measures, explosives detection
protection and safety systems.
measures, and chemical/ biological agent detection measures.
Page 102
8.6.4
EXAMPLES OF DESIGN
Camera
Door closer
Card readers.
Control panels for opening doors.
Electromagnetic locks.
Electric locks.
Emergency escape buttons (glass break).
Open door detectors (magnetic switches).
Access control management software.
Access control management stations.
A door closer.
8.6.2
Intercom
switch
Access Controller
8.6.3
I.
All external doors that are used on a regular basis but
should be closed to the general public would require access
control.
II.
All access controlled doors should be equipped with a
closer.
III.
If in doubt, infrastructure should be prepared to
allow access control measures to be deployed, as adding the
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IV.
The main entrance doors should be equipped with an
automatic locking mechanism allowing external guards to lock the
doors if an emergency situation occurs outside.
V.
A door that is supposed to be protected against forced
entry must be equipped with an electromagnetic lock rather than
an electric lock.
Standards
The system should comply with the construction and
electricity related standards.
8.7
CCTV SYSTEM
8.7.1
INTRODUCTION
Page 103
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8.7.3
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
CAMERAS
I.
The CCTV system should consist of multiple cameras
distributed throughout the building to give comprehensive
coverage of all common areas11
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II.
Cameras in common areas should be situated where
they cannot be easily evaded, damaged or obscured and should
be clearly visible to members of the public. Where headroom is
restricted and cameras may obstruct public passage, cameras
should be mounted in recesses so as to avoid the possibility of
injury to members of the public.
III.
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IV.
All cameras should provide colour images to maximise
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offenders.
V.
Cameras should be suitable for internal or external use
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IV.
An authentication mechanism should be included to
ensure the integrity of all recordings by allowing for detection
of any alteration or tampering (e.g. watermarking). This should
include the recording of the camera ID and date and time
(synchronised from a single source), which must not be adjustable
by the operator.
QUALITY OF RECORDED IMAGES
I.
Images captured by the CCTV cameras should be
recorded using digital video recorders (recommendation subject
to change with future advancements in technology).
II.
The footage collected by each camera should be
recorded at a minimum of 6 frames per second (for indoor) or
12 frames per second (for outdoor). In addition, the capability to
record from selected or designated cameras in real time mode at
25 frames per second would be useful.
III.
The recording equipment should be able to record colour
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Page 104
IV.
The recorded image should at all times be accurate,
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normal lighting. For reduced lighting or emergency lighting
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PLAYBACK FACILITIES
I.
The CCTV system should provide for the playback,
removal or transfer of any image from any camera recorded up to
28 days prior (in a controlled environment).
EXPANSION CAPABILITY
I.
The installed CCTV system should be designed to
allow for future expansion or additional capacity with minimum
disruption to the working system.
COVERAGE AT KEY AREAS
I.
Common Areas Comprehensive coverage throughout
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behaviour. This includes general access areas such as main
entrance lobbies, street areas, pavements, car parks and vehicle
boarding and alighting points such as taxi stands, bus-stops and
vessel docking points within the developments boundaries. For
hotel premises, coverage should include to the lobby, front desk,
concierge, entrance/exit points and corridors. General views
should meet a minimum image height at Detection (10%R) level
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II.
Entrances & Exits - All external public access doors,
emergency exits and vehicle entrances/exits (e.g. at the gantry
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a clear, unobstructed image of all persons entering/exiting
through them (frontal view). The cameras must be mounted at a
suitable height (e.g. where they cannot be evaded, damaged or
obscured) looking towards, rather than down at the doorway or
driver, and meet a minimum image height of Enhanced Detection
(20%R) level. For buildings with sizeable open areas included
in its boundary, the minimum image height would be Recognition
(50%R) level.
III.
Lifts For lifts which act as alternate entry and exit points
to the building, frontal view of the lift doors for people entering the
building and general views of the associated lift lobby areas are
to be monitored at Enhanced Detection (20%R) level.
IV.
Checkpoints For locations that involve security checks
or registration before people are granted permission to proceed
further into the building like checkpoints and ticket issuance
counters, the CCTV system should capture the frontal view of
people at Recognition (50%R) level.
8.7.4
II.
Notices strategically located around the building should
V.
Sensitive areas These include rooms or open areas be provided to inform members of the public that the CCTV
that house important and critical equipment, documents, system is being continuously monitored and recorded.
property and people e.g. warehouses, locker facilities, etc. In
particular, cameras should also cover facilities involving monetary
transactions, such as at banks, money changers and ATM
machines locations. Cameras at these areas should be installed
with a minimum image height of Enhanced Detection (20%R).
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upon activation of the alarm, trigger the display of the image of
the relevant camera(s) automatically on a dedicated monitor.
Page 105
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security personnel. They should rudimentarily be taught what to
IV.
If the same proprietor owns adjacent buildings, it would look out for and be able to react when a potential incident occurs,
be useful for each buildings CCTV system to include the capability to monitor the event accurately and not lose information that
could be pertinent to any future investigation.
of accessing images from the adjacent locations as well.
V.
To facilitate incident management by Emergency
Agencies during a crisis situation, it would be good to provide
capabilities for the Emergency Agencies mobile command post
to retrieve live images for remote viewing. This could include up
to 3 video output channels and one control port extended to, and
terminated at the room housing the buildings viewing facilities.
VI.
The storage facilities for the CCTV systems should
be capable of keeping the recordings in a secure environment
protected from excessive moisture and dust, with preventive
measures against unauthorised removal or viewing of the
recordings. The location of the recording and storage facilities
should be decided on a local risk assessment which takes into
account security and crime-related risks, and should be sited in the
inner parameter of the building and away from vehicular access.
If the location of these facilities is located in the inner parameter
of the building but still deemed to be high-risk (e.g. open to public
access), then it is recommended that the room be built with
adequate reinforcement/protection to withstand the explosion
of a 10kg TNT or equivalent charge (with fragmentations) at a
distance of 5 meters away.
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Procedures (SOPs) in place for reference and to conduct regular
refreshers to ensure that the CCTV operating staff are familiar
with the SOPs.
8.7.5
ESSENTIAL SUPPORT
POWER SOURCE
I.
Uninterruptible power supply (UPS) with at least 30
minutes of backup capacity should be provided for the CCTV
system.
II.
The CCTV system should feature an alert system for
loss of power or image due to technical failure.
LIGHTING FOR CCTV
I.
The building should be provided with adequate lighting
24/7 to ensure that quality coloured images for facilitating
monitoring, investigation and prosecution are captured.
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In the event of lighting failures, the CCTV system should
the requirements of the CCTV system (e.g. in terms of the be capable of producing images that will enable evacuation of
maximum number of concurrent feeds).
the building to be effectively managed under emergency lighting
conditions.
USE OF THE CCTV SYSTEM
MAINTENANCE AND AUDIT OF CCTV SYSTEM
I.
Within the CCTV viewing facility, the operator should be
able to select any camera picture for display on any monitor at any I.
The CCTV system should be supported by a maintenance
time or alternatively to set up a scanning sequence as desired. regime that ensures the operational requirements are consistently
The dwell time of the scanning sequence should be adjustable.
met and availability of all parts of the system are maximised.
System availability should be set at 95% over a 12 month time
II.
The camera selection control system should allow rapid frame.
selection of any camera using minimum manual effort and be
consistent across the CCTV network.
II.
The quality of the visual and recorded images should
be monitored and compared to a set of auditing standards,
III.
The CCTV system should include a default settings implemented by the buildings Security Manager. Any deterioration
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auto reset to their original position after a pre-determined time
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24 hours, or sooner if the fault results in serious loss of CCTV
IV.
Any one user selecting a live image (feed) should not coverage.
preclude other users selecting the same live image (feed), or any
other live images (feed) on the same system.
IV.
The buildings Security Manager should also be
responsible for auditing the correct implementation of the CCTV
V.
For viewing of recorded images, the recording equipment system to meet the operational requirements and identify any
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forward, rewind, record, stepping frame, visual search forward
& reverse, speed search and stop.
VI.
The camera ID and the date and time should be displayed
on monitors in a single imposition and for the recorded image
be located where it is least likely to obscure or interfere with the
image of the main subject.
VII.
The numbering of cameras and the associated recording
sequence should be carefully planned in order to facilitate both
the rapid and seamless tracking of targets movement and the
speedy retrieval of recorded images.
Page 106
8.7.6
CATEGORIES OF VIEW
I.
Fields of view required for CCTV systems are described
by four categories of view as follows:
a)
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the available screen height. Following an alert an observer can,
after a search, ascertain with a high degree of certainty whether
or not a person is visible in the pictures displayed to him.
b)
Enhanced Detection (ED)- Following an alert
an observer can, after a search, ascertain with a high degree
of certainty whether or not a person is visible in the pictures
displayed to him. It must be noted that Enhanced Detection
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least 50% of the screen height, viewers can say with a high
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beyond reasonable doubt.
II.
The categories are measured by relating the views to
the image height of a standard test target 1.6 m high. When the
8.7.7
REFERENCES
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London Underground Limited - Station Surveillance
said to be 100%R., where R is the abbreviation of Rotakin. I.
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CCTV Standard (Reference No: 2-03066-004, version A3, dated
July 2005);
as follows:
a)
b)
c)
d)
II.
Video Surveillance System (VSS) Standard For Bus
Interchanges (Version 3.0, dated July 2006);
III.
Video Surveillance System (VSS) Standard For Mass
Rapid Transit (MRT) Stations (Version 3.0, dated July 2006);
IV.
Building a Building Security Code (BSC) Framework in
Singapore (Version 7.0, dated 18 Aug 2006);
Page 107
8.8
SECURITY LIGHTING FOR CCTV
SYSTEMS
This section discusses the lighting requirements
for security systems including CCTV. For general lighting
considerations, please see Section 5.7.
8.8.1
INTRODUCTION
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seen. From a security point of view, lighting that is strategically
placed can increase the effectiveness of CCTV systems and
guard work while reducing the chance of criminal acts occurring
in the illuminated area. The basic level of lighting should allow the
security deployment (CCTV and guards) to identify a human face
from a distance of about 10 metres.
8.8.4
If the area is intended to be used during the hours of
darkness, the lighting system should provide adequate visibility
for the intended night time operation. Pedestrian walkways, back
lanes and access routes open to public areas should have a basic
level of lighting. Inset spaces, signs, entrances and exits should
be adequately lit so that CCTV coverage would provide a clear
picture.
Security lighting is employed in order to increase the
visibility around perimeter lines, buildings, and sensitive locations.
It is a security management tool that is applicable in almost all
environments within an urban development. Proper lighting
can greatly improve the combined operation of other security
systems, particularly CCTV and other surveillance measures,
and therefore it must be designed to compliment these systems.
8.8.2
I.
Lights located in vulnerable locations should be protected
against vandalism by means of vandal resistant materials and
design.
II.
Lighting design should take into account the various
current and future obstructions that may cause light to be blocked
(e.g. various types of vegetation, such as trees).
III.
Design proposals should take into account the possibility
of night time outdoor activities and should specify the type,
location and intensity of the various lighting elements that will be
installed.
IV.
Lighting should be equally spread out, reducing contrast
between shadows and lightened areas. It is recommended to
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with higher wattage. This will help reduce the creation of deep
shadows and will help avoid excessive glare.
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heights that enable easy maintenance and replacement.
VI.
The lighting plan should locate areas that may be
shadowed and light them up.
VII.
Lighting at manned entrances must be adequate to
identify persons, examine credentials, inspect vehicles entering
or departing the facility premises through designated control
points (vehicle interiors should be clearly lighted), and prevent
anyone from entering unobserved into the premises.
VIII.
The lighting illuminating the buildings entrance should
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extreme environmental conditions (e.g. heavy downpour).
IX.
Security posts at entrance points should have a reduced
level of interior lighting to enable the security guards to see his
surroundings while minimising the adversarys ability to look
inside the posts.
X.
The controls of the lighting systems should be positioned
in a secured area, preferably in the security control room.
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support the CCTV coverage.
XII.
Cones of illumination should overlap to provide coverage
in the event of bulb burnout.
XIII.
Lighting should be arranged so as to create minimal
shadows and minimal glare.
XIV.
Lighting should be turned on automatically by clock or
photoelectric cell.
8.8.3
STANDARDS
Page 108
8.8.5
EXAMPLE
Page 109
9.1
9.2
PARKING
9.2.1
INTRODUCTION
Page 110
9.2.2
I.
Critical infrastructure areas such as the emergency water
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electricity supply must be protected from catastrophic events in
the car park as consequences of a general or targeted attack
against them. It is recommended to position these areas in
known or resident designated parking areas if it is not possible to
position them away from all the parking areas.
II.
II.
When planning and positioning areas in the site during
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between the car park and the location of any potential dense
crowds (such as conference rooms) or sensitive areas. This
is relevant not only for underground car parks belonging to the
building, but also to any neighbouring underground car parks that
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EXAMPLE
9.3
Standards
All standards and guidelines against progressive collapse
(see Chapter 7.4) are recommended for car parks. In the
building core and in populated areas, it is imperative that
these standards be followed.
PARKING LOCATIONS
I.
Parking alongside primary structural elements should be
prohibited. If that cannot be achieved, parking along the primary
structural elements should be limited to screened vehicles
of trustworthy people such as residents or management. In
all cases, a physical barrier is required to maintain a distance
between the vulnerable element and the nearest parking location.
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critical areas such as the Fire Control Centre (FCC), water
tanks or other key areas should be prohibited. If that cannot be
achieved, parking near these areas should be limited to screened
vehicles of trustworthy people such as residents or management.
In all cases, a physical barrier is required to maintain a distance
between the vulnerable element and the nearest parking location.
9.3.1
INTRODUCTION
Pedestrian entry and/or exit areas and lobbies are
one of the most vulnerable areas in a building as these would
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be the places where an attacker will try to enter the building.
above or beneath a populated area should be limited to screened
For architectural and aesthetic reasons, the entrance lobby is
vehicles of trustworthy building tenants.
typically a wide and open area with a glass facade. The principal
recommendations in this section are relevant for every opening
that separates the inner part of the building (the secured area)
from public or unsecured areas.
Page 111
9.3.2
9.3.3
Page 112
9.4
LOADING DOCKS
9.4.4
EXAMPLE OF DESIGN
9.4.3
Upper Floor
building line
Standards
There are no special standards or regulations for loading
dock areas, however there are standards which apply to the
equipment as detailed in Chapter 5 to Chapter 8.
Page 113
9.5
9.5.1
9.6.3
9.6.4
EXAMPLES OF DESIGNS
Standards
There are no special standards or regulations for garbage
and waste disposal areas, however there are standards
which apply to the equipment as detailed in Chapter 5 to
Chapter 8.
9.6
9.6.1
INTRODUCTION
Page 114
9.7
9.7.1
INTRODUCTION
EXAMPLE OF DESIGN
Standards
There are no special security standards or regulations for
VIP holding rooms, however there are standards which
apply to the equipment and procedures as detailed in
Chapter 5 to Chapter 8.
9.7.2
9.8
PROTECTED ROOMS
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9.8.1
INTRODUCTION
should be a key or card access system that can open all doors
within the building to facilitate bomb sweeps. The main entry way
Most modern buildings will have rooms with special
is recommended to be via a double-door interlocking entry hall
with forced entry resistant capabilities on the inner door. There protection and security needs. This can be as a result of the function
should also be CCTV and intercom equipment to cover both of the room or the importance of the equipment, information
it holds. This includes computer rooms, communication rooms,
doors (see Chapter 8 for details).
or the treasury room. In many cases, a room can be designed
Note that all the walls and openings of the VIP holding room to be multi-purpose. This is particularly relevant for buildings
should provide 15 minutes forced entry resistance (see where rooms may change their function over the course of time.
The purpose of this section is to give the design team the basic
Section 6.6.5 for design details).
characteristics for protection of such rooms in the building.
The VIP holding room should be without windows. If this
is not possible, all exterior windows or glass faades in the room
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room is located (see Chapter 6 for design details) as follows:
9.8.2
9.8.3
Page 115
The main entry way is recommended to be via a doubledoor interlocking entry hall with forced entry resistant capabilities
on the inner door. There should also be CCTV and intercom
equipment to cover both doors (see Chapter 8 for details). All
exterior windows or glass faades in the room should be blast
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(see Chapter 6 for design details) as follows:
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alert against intruders or an attempted break-in. Areas containing
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for authorised personnel.
Standards
All recommendations in this section must comply with the
safety and building regulations standards and other legal
requirements.
9.9.3
EXAMPLE
9.10
AIR-CONDITIONING SYSTEM
9.10.1
INTRODUCTION
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to an alarm system.
If safes are to be placed in the protected room either now
or in the future, this should be considered during the design stage
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Standards
All accepted building and safety standards must be applied
in the design and all relevant guidelines in this document
should be followed. If there are major contradictions
between the two, the national standards should always
prevail and the security and protective design/blast
consultant(s) should be informed.
9.9
9.9.1
INTRODUCTION
Page 116
9.10.3
9.11.3
Page 117
APPENDIX A
SAMPLE OF SECURITY AND SAFETY DESIGN
REQUIREMENTS FOR BUILDINGS: FOR
TENDERING PURPOSES
PART 1: PROCESS
1
a.
The Developer shall engage a security and protective
design/blast consultant(s) (hereafter called the Consultant) to
incorporate comprehensive provisions for building security from
the onset of the buildings conception. The Consultant shall
submit and show relevant experience, track records, curriculum
vitae, and in cases involving sensitive projects, have the
necessary security clearance. Although the Consultant does not
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shall clearly demonstrate the ability to communicate effectively
with the developer for the duration of the contract.
b.
The Consultant shall prepare a preliminary security and
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comprise an assessment and analysis of asset values, threats
and hazards, vulnerabilities and risks of the building, and blast
analysis should be conducted for the relevant areas. The plan
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to, but not limited to, the design of the following:I.
II.
III.
c.
The Consultant shall work closely with the architects
and engineers to develop the requirements of the security
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implementation in the project as well as subsequent operation
and management of the building.
d.
The Consultant shall work closely with the relevant
government agencies to ensure that the security and protective
design plans are adequate to address the threats and hazards,
vulnerabilities and risks to the building.
2
ASSESSMENT PROCESS
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The Consultant shall consider the following threats that have
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Page 118
c.
Vulnerability Assessment
Vulnerability is any weakness that can be exploited by an
aggressor, or, in a non-terrorist threat environment, make an
asset susceptible to hazard damage. The Consultant shall
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identify the vulnerabilities of building functions, systems, etc. The
Consultant shall rate the vulnerabilities and justify the basis for
the ratings.
d.
Risk Assessment and Management
The Consultant shall evaluate the risks using a threat-vulnerability
matrix. The Consultant shall rate each of the risks and justify the
basis for the ratings. The Consultant shall identify the top risks
where measures are necessary to mitigate the vulnerabilities and
reduce the risks.
III.
TERRITORIAL REINFORCEMENT. The master plan
should incorporate the provision of clear boundaries between
public and private areas. This could be achieved by using physical
elements such as fences, pavement treatment, art, signs, good
maintenance, landscaping, etc, to express a sense of ownership
by legitimate users and create territorial reinforcement. The space
or area being reinforced should have clear legibility, transparency
and directness to discourage potential offenders because of the
users familiarity with their environment.
5
I.
STAND-OFF DISTANCE. The appropriate distance
from unscreened vehicles to the building should be considered
to protect it against vehicular threats. A buffer zone around the
building to unscreened vehicles could be created using design
features such as street furniture, urban landscape design and
bollards that can function as vehicle anti-ramming barriers.
II.
PERIMETER PROTECTION ZONE. This can be
achieved with the installation of perimeter barriers or layers of
barrier systems (e.g. planter boxes, natural landscape designs)
that meet the US DOS K4 standard or equivalent ASTM F265607 or UK BSI PAS68:2007 standard12. Consideration should be
given to limiting the speed of approaching vehicles with good
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offsetting vehicle entrances as necessary from the direction of a
vehicles approach (to force a reduction in speed).
III.
PERIMETER VEHICLE SCREENING. The provision
of space for vehicle screening shall be considered and located
at an appropriate distance away from the building. The vehicle
screening bays shall include design features that can stop
vehicles, prevent them from leaving the screening area, prevent
tailgating and reject vehicles that fail the screening.
12
Page 119
II.
VEHICLE CIRCULATION. In order to ease congestion,
consideration should be given during the master planning of the
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multiple ingress and egress roads to the various car park areas,
drop-off points and service areas. This should be developed in
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to the LTA for approval (if applicable). The TIA Report shall also
take into consideration the time taken to screen vehicles entering
the building.
III.
PEDESTRIAN CIRCULATION. Consideration during
the master planning of the building should provide footpaths
that are suitable for dealing with large crowds arriving from busstops and MRT stations (if applicable). This should also include
segregating pedestrians from the vehicles leaving the location.
IV.
PERIMETER ACCESS CONTROL.
Consideration
should be given to pedestrians circulation routes during the
master planning of the building to concentrate activities towards
designated access controlled points (or portals) and away from
secured areas.
V.
BUS STOPS AND TAXI STANDS. Consideration should
be given to the location of bus stops, taxi stands and coach bays.
These should be located at an appropriate setback distance from
the building.
8
a.
I.
BUILDING SHAPE. The shape of the building can have
a contributing effect to the overall damage to the structure caused
by a bomb blast. Re-entrant corners and overhangs shall be
avoided as they are likely to trap the shock wave and amplify the
effects of the blast. If curved surfaces are used, convex shapes
shall be preferred over concave shapes. In general, simple
geometrics should be preferred.
II.
OFFICE AND ROOM LOCATIONS
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I.
EFFECTIVE SITE LIGHTING LEVELS. Consideration that the occupant(s) are secure and cannot be seen from the
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and pedestrian entrances and for vehicular and pedestrian face courtyards, internal sites or controlled areas. If this is not
circulation areas. Consideration should be given to providing possible, suitable obscuring glazing or window treatment should
perimeter lighting that is continuous and on both sides of the be provided, including blast and ballistic resistant glass, blast
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to support CCTV coverage.
III.
MIXED OCCUPANCIES. Function rooms for VIPs use
b.
Site Signage
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housed with other users. If they are co-located together, the
I.
EFFECTIVE SIGNAGE. Confusion over site circulation, public areas should be separated from the sensitive areas.
parking and entrance locations can contribute to a loss of site
security. The master planning should incorporate a signage IV.
PUBLIC TOILETS AND SERVICE AREAS. Areas that
strategy that considers off site and entrance signage, on-site escape surveillance or allow individuals or items to be hidden
directional, parking and cautionary signs for vehicle and persons. should be avoided. Public toilets, service spaces or access to
Consideration should be given to provide electronic signboards vertical circulation systems (e.g. stairways/ lifts/ elevators) should
that allow various messages to convey important information about be avoided in any non-secure areas, including the queuing area
arrival direction, measures in place, etc. It is also recommended before screening at public entrances.
that signs should generally not be provided to identify sensitive
areas.
V.
LOBBIES. This space is designed to separate the
secure and non-secure areas at the point of entry. It does not
c.
Landscaping
include access to vertical circulation systems. Access should be
controlled between the separate secure and non-secure areas
I.
EFFECTIVE AND AESTHETIC. Consideration should with space provided for screening equipment to conduct checks,
be given to landscaping design elements that are attractive including turnstiles, walk through metal detectors, or other
and welcoming as they can be used to enhance security. For ^ * *
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access. It is recommended that the master plan avoids creating area should be located within the secure area. Mechanical
landscaping that permits concealment of criminals or obstructs ductwork, piping and main electrical conduit runs should not
the view of security personnel and CCTV.
extend into the non-secure area.
a.
Site Lighting
Page 120
VI.
HIGH RISK LOBBIES (E.G. SPACE FOR QUEUING).
These points of access will need to be designed or operated in
accordance with the appropriate level of risk. High risk areas
should be enclosed in blast and fragment resistant construction.
The installation of features, such as trash receptacles or
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high risk non-secured areas should be avoided. The structure
for high risk lobbies should be distinctly separated from the rest
of the building, but it can be located within the building setback
space. The area should be designed to mitigate the effects of
a blast on primary vertical or lateral bracing members. The air
pressure in high risk lobbies should be maintained at positive,
relative to the exterior, so that contaminated air can be expunged
manually by opening the external doors.
VII.
LOADING AND UNLOADING BAY AREAS. The
installation of critical utilities and services such as main switch
board, water tank, standby fuel or generator adjacent to the
loading/ unloading bays should be avoided. These areas should
be an appropriate distance from critical utilities and services. The
recommendation for lobbies would apply at these areas as this
space is designed with secure and non-secure areas. It should
be separated from the access to the parking spaces (if any).
The area should be designed to limit damage to adjacent areas
and vent explosive forces to the exterior of the building. There
should be space for screening equipment to conduct checks on
all incoming deliveries.
VIII.
RETAIL AND F&B SPACES. These areas should be
arranged, designed and operated such that products and staff
are subject to the appropriate screening process. Retail and
F&B spaces should preferably be accommodated within the
lobby, instead of within the main building. These areas should be
designed to mitigate the effects of a blast on primary vertical or
lateral bracing members.
IX.
STAIRWELLS.
Stairwells required for emergency
egress should be located as remotely as possible from areas
where blast events might occur. Where possible, stairs should
not discharge into lobbies, parking or loading areas.
X.
MAILROOM. The mailroom should be located away
from main entrances, areas containing critical services, utilities,
distribution systems and important assets. In addition, the
mailroom should be located at the perimeter of the building with
an outside wall or window designed for pressure relief. It should
have adequate space for explosive disposal containers. An area
near the loading dock may be a preferred mailroom location.
The mailroom should be built to withstand a blast due to a mail
or parcel IED. The air handling unit for the mailroom should be
stand-alone.
b.
Interior Construction
I.
UNSECURED AND SECURED AREAS. Unsecured
building areas should be located exterior to the main building
structure where possible. Unsecured and secured areas should
be separated horizontally and vertically using buffer zones and/or
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CRITICAL BUILDING COMPONENTS. The location of
the following critical building components should be located at an
appropriate distance from any main entrance, vehicle circulation,
parking or maintenance area depending on the structural
treatment of the area.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
x.
xi.
III.
EQUIPMENT SPACE. Public and employee entrances
should include space for possible future installation of access
control and screening equipment.
IV.
ROOF ACCESS. Locking systems should be designed
to limit roof access to authorised personnel.
V.
MATERIAL USED. The use of non-structural elements
such as false ceilings and metal blinds should be limited. If need
be, lightweight non-structural elements can be used to reduce
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or system above for strength can also be used.
VI.
EGRESS ROUTES. Egress routes should not be
clustered together in a single shaft or location but be separated
and spread out. The use of glass along primary egress routes
and stairwells should be kept to a minimum.
9
STRUCTURAL DESIGN
Robustness
Structural Systems
Page 121
II.
SHEAR CAPACITY. Primary members and/or their III.
Floor System
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achieved before failure. Brittle shear failure shall be avoided to
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III.
CAPACITY FOR REVERSING LOADS. Primary
members and their connections shall be designed for possible
load reversals caused by blast effects.
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above does not cause subsequent progressive collapse.
IV.
REDUNDANCY. Where possible, redundant load paths
shall be incorporated in the vertical load carrying systems to
ensure alternate load paths are available in the event of the
failure of structural elements.
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areas (e.g. lobbies, loading docks and mailrooms) should be
considered. Heavily occupied areas should not be located
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cannot withstand localised breeching caused by package bombs
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TIES. An integrated system of ties in perpendicular
directions along the principal lines of structural framing shall
serve to redistribute loads during catastrophic events.
IV.
Interior Columns
VI.
DUCTILITY. Members and their connections shall
be designed to maintain their strength while undergoing large
deformations. Ductile plastic design concepts such as strong
column weak beam together with appropriate detailing should be
adopted.
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under Exterior Frame (mentioned above) should apply to interior
columns as well.
VII.
MATERIALS. Due consideration should be given to
materials selection from the view point of ductility and brittleness.
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designed to contain the explosive effects within the unsecured
areas. Ideally, unsecured areas should be located adjacent to the
building exterior so that the explosive pressure may be vented
outward as well.
e.
Structural Elements
Exterior Frame
V.
Interior Walls
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adequately supported laterally. Anchorage at the top and bottom
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of the wall.
II.
Windows
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the supporting wall should be capable of resisting the breaking
pressure of the window glass. The window glass should fail
before the frame, anchorage or supporting wall system.
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conventional loads should be used. The type of glass used
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post-tensioned systems shall be designed for load reversals
the interior pane needs to be laminated. Tempered glass should
arising from blast effects.
be avoided for external windows as it is 4 times stronger than
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consideration should be given to mitigate punching shear failure
at the columns. Continuous bottom reinforcement shall be
provided across the columns to retain the slab in the event of
punching shear failure.
Page 122
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MECHANICAL DESIGN
-inch. The minimum silicone sealing around the inside glass
a.
Emergency Functions
perimeter should be a -inch, with a minimum tensile strength of
20 psi (138 kPa).
I.
GENERAL. All emergency functions should be located
away from high-risk areas in protected locations with restricted
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access. Do not place them near structurally vulnerable areas
net curtains and catcher systems should be considered and used
(such as transfer girders). Harden and/or provide physical buffer
where applicable.
zones for the enclosures around the emergency equipment,
controls and wiring. Provide redundant and separated emergency
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systems as well.
be retained by the frame, be caught by catcher systems, or exit
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Ventilation System
III.
Doors
I.
AIR-INTAKES. Air-intakes should be located as high as
practical to limit access to the general public. For buildings of
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more than 4 stories, air-intakes should be located on the fourth
against the door frame/jam. The door frame anchorage should
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have a lateral capacity greater than door leaf itself.
the roof or as high as practical. Locating air-intakes high on a wall
is preferred over a roof location. Sloping vent guards should be
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installed to prevent injection of foreign objects into the air-intake
a master key should have access to all doors, windows or
system.
receptacles (including service and utilities areas).
II.
SURVEILLANCE. For public access areas, there
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should be securing and monitoring of all air diffusers and return
along designated egress routes.
air grilles. Air-intake locations, fan rooms and other mechanical
rooms should also be under security surveillance and tied to the
IV.
Louvres
alarm system.
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EGRESS ROUTES. Positive pressurisation of egress
the supporting structure has a lateral capacity greater than that of
routes, stairwells and vestibules is recommended.
the element.
c.
Utility Protection
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UTILITIES AND FEEDERS. Utility and feeder systems
of the louvers.
should be located at least 30 metres away from loading bays,
lobbies, parking areas and other high risk areas.
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anchored into the structure behind the louvres.
II.
INCOMING UTILITIES. Within the building and property
lines, incoming utility systems should be concealed (underground).
V.
Cladding
These systems should not be located at vehicle screening points
or at high risk areas (e.g. lobbies, loading bay, parking areas).
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panel thickness that is acceptable for conventional loads.
d.
Water Supply
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WATER TANKS. The water tanks should be located in
be designed to resist the ultimate lateral resistance of the panel.
a secured area and inaccessible to the general public or staff.
Mandatory requirements for security of water storage tanks for
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potable water supply in buildings are stipulated in the Public
transmission path into the main structure as practical to minimise
Utilities Act, Public Utilities (Water Supply) Regulations and the
shear and torsional response.
Singapore Standard CP 48 Code of Practice for Water Services.
In addition, CCTVs should be installed to monitor activities in
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vertical load-carrying members should be avoided. Instead, the
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ELECTRICAL DESIGN
VI.
Venting
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explosive forces and gases from the interior spaces to outside
of the structure. An example is the use of blow-out panels and
window systems that provide protection from external blast
pressure but fail or vent internal blast pressure.
a.
I.
EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM.
Redundant
emergency power systems remotely located from each other
should be provided. The emergency power distribution feeders
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redundant routing paths to enhance reliability. Emergency
distribution panels should be located in rooms separate from the
normal power system and hardened where possible.
Page 123
II.
FUEL STORAGE. Fuel storage tanks should be
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enclosures. Their access should be restricted and protected.
Fuel piping within the building should be located in hardened
enclosures, and redundant piping systems should be provided to
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stations should be located away from public areas and monitored
by CCTV.
VI.
ELECTROMAGNETIC DOORS. 1200 lbs Electromagnetic locks should be used for all exterior doors. The magnetic
switches should be able to be de-activated during emergency to
facilitate evacuation. In order to detect possible intrusion when
the switches are de-activated, CCTV cameras should be installed
to monitor the movement at the egress points. As an added
security feature, these doors should only open from inside the
building.
III.
TRANSFORMERS. Transformers should be located
inside the building and away from public access. Multiple
transformers should be located remotely from each other to
enhance their reliability should one transformer be damaged by
an explosion.
VII.
DURESS ALARM OR ASSISTANCE STATIONS. Call
buttons should be provided at key public areas and areas that are
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Lighting
VIII.
MONITORING SYSTEMS. Physical/ electronic security
and monitoring system as well as backup power should be
provided.
I.
LIGHTING. There should be adequate environmental
12
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL & RADIOLOGICAL
lighting to enhance building security and complement CCTV
PROTECTIVE MEASURES
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exit signs should be provided with integral battery packs. Non- I.
ACCESS RESTRICTION & SURVEILLANCE. Restrict
slip phosphorescent treads should also be used.
access to critical ventilation equipment such as AHUs and to
mechanical control rooms. Diffusers and return air-grilles in
public areas, as well as air-intakes and mechanical control rooms
should be secured and under surveillance.
c.
Communications and Security Systems
I.
BACKUP COMMUNICATIONS. The building could
have a backup communication system or telephone service to
maintain communications in case of an incident. The preferred
alternative is to have a base radio communication system with
antennas installed in the stairwell, and portable sets distributed on
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systems as well as back up power provision.
II.
RADIO TELEMETRY.
Distributed antennas could
be located throughout the facility if required for emergency
communications through wireless transmission of data.
II.
HVAC SYSTEMS. Zone HVAC systems and isolate
HVAC zones in unsecured areas. Each zone should have its
own AHU and duct system. Isolation of the return air system (i.e.
no shared returns) is also recommended. Incorporate fast acting,
low-leakage shut off dampers in the HVAC systems.
III.
SAFE ZONES. Create safe zones using enhanced
III.
SPARE CONDUITS. Empty conduits and power outlets
should be considered for possible future installation of security
control equipment, Smart Card Technologies or other security
solutions.
V.
HIGH RISK AREAS. Lobbies, loading docks and
mail rooms, etc, are considered high risk areas. They should
be located outside the main building footprint and be provided
with separate HVAC systems with isolated returns capable of
100% exhaust. In addition, these areas should be maintained
IV.
OPERATIONAL COMMAND CENTRE (OCC), FIRE at a negative pressure relative to the rest of the building but at
COMMAND CENTRE (FCC) AND SECURITY COMMAND a positive or neutral pressure relative to the outdoors. Their
construction should be air-tight with vestibules and air-locks if
CENTRE (SCC). The SCC and OCC may be co-located. The
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chain of command should be carefully pre-planned to ensure the to be activated upon suspected internal CBR release should also
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Secure the information links between the SCC, OCC and FCC.
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be carefully designed and employed to maximise effective
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CCTV SYSTEMS. A colour CCTV surveillance system
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with recording capability should be provided to view and record
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activity at the perimeter of the building, particularly at primary potential to integrate detection systems at a later stage.
entrances/exits, and VIPs enclosure. A mix of monochrome
VII.
POSITIVE PRESSURISATION. The HVAC design
cameras should be considered for areas that lack adequate should create a slight overpressure of 5 to 12 Pa within the
illumination for colour cameras. The system should be capable building environment relative to the outdoors. The design should
of archiving high resolution CCTV footage for 30 days. Intelligent q
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CCTV (i-CCTV) should be installed for space designed for secure against external release of CBR agents.
and non-secure areas e.g. lobbies, unloading bays. For details,
AIR-TIGHTNESS. In order to maintain the desired
please refer to the guidelines for CCTV Systems at Section 8.7 VIII.
pressure
relationships between HVAC zones and limit the
of the Guidelines for Enhancing Building Security in Singapore.
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structure and its boundaries (e.g. doors, windows, walls, etc)
should be designed to be as airtight as practical.
Page 124
APPENDIX B
GENERAL SECURITY GUIDELINES FOR
HOTELS
INTRODUCTION
Twin bombings at Jakartas JW Marriott Hotel and RitzCarlton Hotel (July 2009, 9 dead, 53 injured);
Bomb attacks in Balis Jimbaran (near Four Seasons Hotel)
and Kuta areas (Oct 2005, 23 dead, 129 injured);
The attack outside the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta (August 2003,
12 dead and over a hundred wounded);
The attacks against tourists in Bali (October 2002, 202 dead,
many more wounded, and October 2005, 26 dead and more
than a hundred wounded).
II.
The assurance of failure this is aimed at convincing the
adversary that his planned actions are doomed to fail, thus giving
him no gain.
Deterrence is both an aim and a by-product of a security plan,
and can be achieved with little or no extra cost.
When relating to deterrence in the protective security arena, the
measures employed are usually aimed at making the adversary
think that he is doomed to fail.
The assurance of failure is created both by deploying robust
and clearly recognisable security measures and by cultivating a
reputation of tight, effective security deployment.
Page 125
Two important measures in achieving and maintaining a proactive security operation are pro-active minded audits and red
teaming exercises. These should be focused on testing and
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assuring pro-active security measures. They help to evaluate the
that the defender is usually in an inferior position vis--vis the level of preparedness and pro-activeness of the tested security
attacking terrorists. This is primarily as a result of the routine deployment. They also help to focus the security unit on the need
nature of security work combined with the relatively low number for applying pro-active security, by showing that the security
of attacks taking place which together tend to make security regulator puts an emphasis on these measures.
deployment defensive and reactive.
3.
PERIMETER SECURITY
The attacker has the advantage of initiative on his side. He is able
to choose the time, place and modus operandi of the attack. He When planning perimeter security for hotels, special emphasis
can abort the attack or postpone the attack if he believes that he must be given to the various entrances and exits to the building
is in a disadvantageous situation.
and especially to the main entrance.
2.
PRO-ACTIVE SECURITY
Page 126
Preparations for such a rise in threat levels may take time and
thus the industry must prepare itself in advance for making the
necessary increase in its security deployments strength.
I.
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intelligence (recce)
III.
IV.
V.
II.
IV.
Training the security staff with the necessary skills (e.g.
correct use of technological screening equipment, pedestrian and
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a) Security Guards
During periods of heightened threat or in any situations where it
may be deemed necessary, a manned outer security perimeter
for the hotel may need to be created. In certain situations based
on threat assessments, the Singapore Police Force may deploy
resources, if they deem it to be necessary, for this purpose or may
require hotels to put in place the necessary security guards.
The perimeter security should consist of at least two armed
guards who should be stationed at the entrance and the exit to
the hotel driveway on a 24 hour basis. These guards should be
responsible for stopping an attack before the assailants reach the
hotel premises.
ACCESS CONTROL
13
Page 127
Hotels must train their security staff and other personnel with
the skills needed to detect suspected IEDs.
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members should be encouraged to be aware of terror related Reccomendations for elevated threat levels:
threats and to alert the hotels security unit of any suspicion they
might have regarding a guest or a visitor.
Suspicious packages should be screened using the X-Ray
and explosive detectors in a protected area away from the
The hotel should also develop a system of background screening
hotels guests or main building structure.
of staff and hotel staff should be encouraged to look out for and
report suspicious behaviour of colleagues as well as guests.
Reccomendations for high threat levels:
The details of suspicious guests or staff may be sent to the
Singapore Police Force for checks and follow-up actions (if
necessary).
II.
III.
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company and the ordering store, prior to entering the loading
bay area and being accepted by the hotel.
Page 128
e. Vehicle Access
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Vehicle access routes in the vicinity of the hotel usually exist for
three main reasons:
I.
II.
III.
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II.
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Procedures) to be taken during each of the various
emergency situations that could arise. This enables the
security staff to initiate an effective security response
to a variety of emergency situations quickly.
V.
VI.
VII.
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of vehicles wishing to enter.
CCTV MONITORING
The tendency in hotel security planning is to design CCTV
systems for crime prevention and insurance reasons. Security
managers should not overlook the importance of deploying antiterror CCTV coverage throughout the hotel and its perimeter (for
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guidelines).
Another issue to remember when planning the CCTV monitoring
scheme is that the security personnel operating the security
control room have a limited ability to cover monitors.
In order to avoid overloading the security control room operators
with information, and thus making the CCTV monitoring ineffective,
it is recommended that each operator cover a maximum of 8
monitors that supply an image of at least 10.
Page 129
6.
Armed assaults.
II.
Emergency escape
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IV.
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IV.
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VI.
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VIII.
Page 130
APPENDIX C
GENERAL SECURITY GUIDELINES FOR
SHOPPING MALLS
INTRODUCTION
In Singapore, both the booming tourist industry and the hot climate
combine to make our major shopping malls important centres for
economic activity. The large and prosperous shopping malls,
hosting thousands of shoppers daily, can be seen as symbols
of Singapores economic success. The impact of a major terror
attack against one of these malls would be severe and would
probably cause serious damage to the countrys economy.
An analysis of terror attacks in the modern era show that terrorist
organisations have frequently targeted shopping malls in their
terror campaigns. In the terror campaign against Israel, which
began in September 2000, the Palestinian terror groups had
attacked shopping malls in Israels cities, one example being
the attack which took place at the Sharon Shopping Mall in sea
side city of Netanya in December 2005. In this attack, a suicide
bomber from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad detonated himself at
the entrance to the mall after his entrance was blocked by security
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The IRA had also targeted shopping malls and commercial
centres in the past with the VBIED attack against the shopping
centre in Manchester on the 15th June 1996 being the most
prominent example. In this attack, over 200 people were injured
despite the warning given by the IRA close to detonation.
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can be used as places for concealing IEDs.
Page 131
SECURITY RINGS
1.
DETERRENCE
1. Deterrence
2. Pro-active security
3. Perimeter Security
4. Access Control
5. Security command and control room
6. Emergency Procedures
Page 132
2.
PRO-ACTIVE SECURITY
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the defender is usually in an inferior position in relation to the
attacking terrorists. This is primarily as a result of the routine
nature of security work combined with the relatively low number
of attacks taking place, that tend to make security deployment
defensive and reactive.
The attacker has the advantage of initiative on his side. He is able
to choose the time, place and modus operandi of the attack. He
can abort the attack or postpone the attack if he believes that he
is at a disadvantage.
On the other hand, a security guard will usually be passive to his
surroundings and only once an incident has occurred or been
reported will he move into an active mode. Analysis of terrorist
attacks in recent years show that the passive nature of some
security operations have contributed to their failure in preventing
and defeating attacks.
The solution to the apparent inferiority of the defending force can
be found in its inherent advantages. The security force can usually
afford better training for its personnel. The security team must be
able to take advantage of the fact it is operating on home ground;
this enables them to have an intimate and detailed knowledge
of their terrain which can provide them with tactical superiority
during the adversarys intelligence gathering as well as during an
attack.
Pro-active security is a tool for enhancing the security units
advantages while minimising those of the potential attacker. It is
made up of:
I.
A PRO-ACTIVE MINDSET - the security guards must
be educated to have a hunter mentality, that is to say that they
need to constantly seek out the potential attacker, screening
their surroundings for suspects and irregularities. This will enable
the security deployment to potentially detect the terrorists prior
to an impending attack. Even if the terrorists are not detected
before they attack, the pro-active mindset will enable the guards
a smoother shift from routine to emergency mode.
II.
A PRO-ACTIVE DEPLOYMENT the security
deployment must be outward facing; its various sensors must be
directed to detecting possible approaching threats. The practical
application of this type of deployment is the positioning of
perimeter guards and the direction of CCTV coverage at possible
terrorist deployment areas.
III.
A PRO-ACTIVE COMMAND the security management
must lead the pro-active efforts. Security managers must be
trained as commanders, leading their security unit by example.
Security commanders must be available to their team at all times
(equipped with a mobile radio), carry arms, if the unit is an armed
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IV.
PRO-ACTIVE SPECIALISED TRAINING the security
guards and commanders must receive training in the various
skills that will enable them to detect terrorists and pre-attack
reconnaissance. Two important measures in achieving and
maintaining a pro-active security operation are pro-active minded
audits and red teaming exercises. These should be focused
on testing and assuring pro-active security measures. They help
to evaluate the level of preparedness and pro-activeness of the
tested security deployment. They also help to focus the security
unit on the need for applying pro-active security, by showing that
the security regulator puts an emphasis on these measures.
3.
PERIMETER SECURITY
14
Page 133
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Suspects will be physically screened using metal detectors
reconnaissance
and their handbags should be searched visually or screened
III.
Deterring potential attacks
using a hand-held metal detector.
IV.
Providing advanced warning and reporting
possible approaching threats
Relevant screening equipment should be available.
V.
Responding to alerts given from the command
post
At elevated threat levels:
VI.
Providing the initial security response to the
attack
Security guards need to be posted at each entrance to
visually screen all people entering the mall. Any suspects
General recommendations for elevated threat levels:
and a pre-determined percentage of random individuals will
be physically screened using hand-held metal detectors and
A minimum number (to be determined) of randomly picked
their bags will be visually searched.
shoppers need to be checked per hour by the perimeter
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to enable a concentration of effort for access control at the
open entrances if resources are limited.
In addition to the armed exterior presence at the entrances,
frequent patrols (two per hour) should be operated around
At high threat levels:
the perimeter.
4.
ACCESS CONTROL
Page 134
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unloaded from the trucks at the loading docks matches
the details of the delivery as is written on the delivery
papers. The match should be according to number of
parcels and their size.
III.
Drivers that are not regulars or drivers that
seem suspicious should be questioned by the security
15
Page 135
VIII.
Protection and backup of all critical systems this
is meant to allow for the security systems resilience during
emergency situations in which the security control room will be
damaged.
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routine and emergency situations in order to assist the IX.
Access control for the control room itself, preventing undecision makers to make the right decisions based on authorised entry.
facts.
The formulation of the command and control room should
correspond with these tasks.
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VII.
Direct connection or integration with the shopping malls
management systems that are considered critical or security
related this is meant to enable the security control room staff
to override or control these systems when the situation requires.
The most critical system that must be controlled by the control
room is the public address system.
16
17
In many cases security and safety systems are connected and interact
and therefore it is necessary that the command post have the capabilities
to operate both.
Page 136
Emergency procedures should cover modern terrorist attack SAFE HAVENS AND ESCAPE ROUTES
scenarios such as:
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installation which provide certain levels of physical protection for
the residents from threats during possible and actual emergency
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situations. In many threat and emergency scenarios, the safest
place to be is in a safe haven within the building rather than trying
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to escape. These should be considered in a mall as well, although
(e.g. a VBIED explosion followed by an armed assault).
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emergency plan because the concept is against the nature of a
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crowd.
whilst they are dealing with the wounded.
Identifying and incorporating safe havens into the buildings
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emergency planning is one of the main responsibilities of a
a chemical agent via the buildings ventilating systems). shopping malls security manager. The security manager needs to
give clear and simple instructions to the malls shoppers regarding
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the use of these safe havens. These instructions must include
the following:
clear criteria that determines in which situations the shoppers
must go to the safe havens. Safe havens are especially critical
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in a situation whereby evacuation routes may be inaccessible
following a terror attack.
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consideration the threats and risks estimated for the shopping
(management,
shopping
mall
security
team, mall according to possible terror scenarios. Special care should
maintenance, sales people etc.) during and after the
be taken to ensure that they do not pass through areas that are
emergency situation a special focus should be put on
considered hazardous in an emergency situation. The escape
assigning a team to assist shoppers in need.
routes should be planned in accordance with and in coordination
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clearly in all areas of the mall in all major languages spoken in the
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mall. Evacuation is ordered when the danger to the occupants is
greater within the mall/complex than it is outside it.
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relevant scenarios.
Emergency and evacuation procedures must be allowed to be
initiated immediately without having to await permission from
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within and outside the malls management structure?
permission to evacuate the mall in life threatening situations is
not advisable due to the time constraint.
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The above appendix of general security guidelines for shopping
malls provides generic recommendations for security solutions for
shopping malls that if implemented will enhance security levels.
The appendix includes many general recommendations according
to the different security rings presented. The overarching concept
of the appendix, which will greatly facilitate the implementation of
the recommendations, is that by correctly preparing and training
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measures, they will become a force multiplier in anti-terrorism
preparedness.
18
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Page 137