SOME DOCTRINES FROM SC DECISIONS PENNED BY JUSTICE

ROBERTO ABAD
by Dox Populi on Sunday, October 23, 2011 at 3:31pm
SOME DOCTRINES FROM SC DECISIONS PENNED BY JUSTICE ROBERTO ABAD

Reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from
that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically
governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. This rule applies only to reprobate of a will. In reprobate, the local
court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the
matter can be established. (In Re: In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Ruperta Palaganas with
Prayer for the Appointment of Special Administrator Manuel Miguel Palaganas & Benjamin Gregorio
Palaganas vs. Ernesto Palaganas, G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011; J. Abad)

Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. Vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050. April 12, 2011.
Moot and Academic Principle; Exceptions. (J. Abad)
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of
the Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Jose Marcel Panlilio, et al. vs. Regional Trial Court, et al., People of the Philippines and Social Security System,
G.R. No. 173846, February 2, 2011
Corporate rehabilitation; feature. (J. Abad)
Corporate rehabilitation connotes the restoration of the debtor to a position of successful operation and
solvency, if it is shown that its continued operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover
more, by way of the present value of payments projected in the rehabilitation plan, if the corporation
continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated.It contemplates a continuance of corporate
life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful
operation and solvency, the purpose being to enable the company to gain a new lease on life and allow its
creditors to be paid their claims out of its earnings. A principal feature of corporate rehabilitation is the
suspension of claims against the distressed corporation.

Social Security System vs. Efren Capada, et al., G.R. No. 168501, January 31, 2011.
Collection of accrued wages; two-fold test. (J. Abad)
After the Labor Arbiters decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the employee may be barred from
collecting the accrued wages, if it is shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was
without fault on the part of the employer. The two-fold test in determining whether an employee is barred
from recovering his accrued wages requires that (1) there must be actual delay or that the order of
reinstatement pending appeal was not executed prior to its reversal; and (2) the delay must not be due to
the employers unjustified act or omission. If the delay is due to the employers unjustified refusal, the
employer may still be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the Labor Arbiters
Decision.

Commissioner of Customs vs AGHFA Incorporated, G.R. No. 187425, March 28, 2011
Tariff and Customs Code; Bureau of Customs; liability for lost shipment. (J. Abad)
The owner is entitled to recover the value of its lost shipment based on the acquisition cost at the time of
payment. In the case of C.F. Sharp and Co., Inc. vs Northwest Airlines, Inc., the Court ruled that the rate of
exchange for the conversion in the peso equivalent should be the prevailing rate at the time of payment. In
said case, the Court cited the case of Zagala vs. Jimenez and said that under Republic Act No. 529, as
amended by RA No. 4100, stipulations on the satisfaction of obligations in foreign currency are void. Thus
payments of monetary obligations, subject to certain exceptions, must be discharged in the currency which
is the legal tender in the Philippines. However, since RA No. 529 does not provide for the rate of exchange for
the payment of foreign currency obligations incurred after its enactment, the Court held in a number of cases
that the rate of exchange for the conversion in the peso equivalent should be the prevailing rate at the time
of payment. Also, in the case of Republic of the Philippines represented by the Bureau of Customs vs UNIMEX
Micro-Electronics GmBH, which involved the seizure and detention of a shipment of computer game items
which disappeared while in the custody of the Bureau of Customs, the Court upheld the decision of the Court
of Appeals holding that the petitioners liability may be paid in Philippine currency, computed at the
exchange rate prevailing at the time of actual payment.

Microsoft Philippines, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 180173, April 6, 2011.
National Internal Revenue Code; value-added tax; claim for credit or refund of input value-added tax; printing
of zero-rated. (J. Abad)
Taxpayer insists that Sections 113 and 237 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and Section 4.108-1
of Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 7-95 do not provide that failure to indicate the word zero-rated in the
invoices or receipts would result in the outright invalidation of these invoices or receipts and the

disallowance of a claim for tax credit or refund. Sections 113 (A) and 237 of the NIRC provide for the
invoicing requirements for value-added tax (VAT) registered persons. Related to these provisions, Section
4.108-1 of RR No. 7-95 enumerates the information which must appear on the face of the official receipts or
invoices for every sale of goods by VAT-registered persons. At the time taxpayer filed its claim for credit of
VAT input tax, RR No. 7-95 was already in effect and it required, among others, that the word zero-rated be
imprinted on the invoice covering zero-rated sales. It also provided that only VAT-registered persons are
required to print their tax identification number followed by the word VAT in their invoices or receipts and
this shall be considered as a VAT invoice. All purchases covered by invoices other than a VAT invoice shall
not give rise to any input tax. The invoicing requirements for VAT-registered taxpayer as provided in the NIRC
and revenue regulations are clear. A VAT-registered taxpayer is required to comply with all the VAT invoicing
requirements to be able to file a claim for input taxes on domestic purchases for goods or services attributed
to zero-rated sales. A VAT invoice is an invoice that meets the requirements of Section 4.108-1 of RR No. 795. Contrary to taxpayers claim, RR No. 7-95 expressly states that purchases covered by invoices other
than a VAT invoice shall not give rise to any input tax. Taxpayers invoice, lacking the word zero-rated, is
not a VAT invoice, and this cannot give rise to any input tax. The subsequent enactment of Republic Act No.
9337 [amending the NIRC] on 1 November 2005 elevating provisions of RR No. 7-95 into law merely codified
into law administrative regulations that already had the force and effect of law. Such codification does not
mean that prior to the codification the administrative regulations were not enforceable.

Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. vs. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 166838, June 15, 2011
Local Government Code; real property tax; certificates of title as evidence of location.(J. Abad)
While a certificate of title is conclusive as to its ownership and location, this does not preclude the filing of an
action for the very purpose of attacking the statements therein. As the Court proclaimed in the case of De
Pedro vs Romasan Development Corporation: [W]hile certificates of title are indefeasible, unassailable and
binding against the whole world, including the government itself, they do not create or vest title. They
merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. That cannot be used to protect a usurper from the
true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither do they permit one to
enrich himself at the expense of other. Although it is true that Pasig is the locality sated in the transfer
certificates of title of the subject properties, both taxpayer and the municipality of Cainta aver that the
metes and bounds of the subject properties, as they are described in the certificates, reveal that they are
within Caintas boundaries. This only means that there may be a conflict between the location as stated and
the location as technically described in the certificates. Mere reliance therefore on the face of the certificates
will not suffice as they can only be conclusive evidence of the subject properties locations if both the stated
and described locations point to the same area. The Antipolo regional trial court, wherein the boundary
dispute case between Pasig and Cainta is pending, would be able to best determine once and for all the

precise metes and bounds of both Pasigs and Caintas respective territorial jurisdictions. The resolution of
this dispute would necessarily ascertain the extent and reach of each local governments authority, a
prerequisite in the proper exercise of their powers, one of which is the power of taxation.

Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. vs. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 166838, June 15, 2011.
Local Government Code; real property tax; local government unit entitled to collect. (J. Abad)
Under Presidential Decree No. 464, or the Real Property Tax Code, the authority to collect real property
taxes is vested in the locality where the property is situated. This requisite was reiterated in Republic Act No.
7160, or the Local Government Code. Thus, while a local government unit is authorized under several laws to
collect real estate tax on properties falling under its territorial jurisdiction, it is imperative to first show that
these properties are unquestionably within its geographical boundaries. The Court cited the case of Mariano,
Jr. v Commission on Elections which stated that the importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial
boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they
define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires.
Clearly therefore, the local government unit entitled to collect real property taxes from Sta. Lucia must
undoubtedly show that the subject properties are situated within its territorial jurisdiction; otherwise, it would
be acting beyond the powers vested to it by law.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Mirant (Philippines) Operations, Corporation, G.R. No. 171742; Mirant
(Philippines) Operations, Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 176165; June 15, 2011.
National Internal Revenue Code; requisites for claiming tax credit or refund of creditable withholding taxes.(J.
Abad)
The requisites for claiming a tax credit or a refund of creditable withholding tax are as follows: (1) the claim
must be filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue within the two-year period from the date of the
payment of the tax; (2) it must be shown on the return that the income received was declared as part of the
gross income; and (3) the fact of withholding must be established by a copy of a statement duly issued by
the payor to the payee showing the amount paid and the amount of the tax withheld.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Mirant (Philippines) Operations, Corporation, G.R. No. 171742; Mirant
(Philippines) Operations, Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 176165; June 15, 2011.
National Internal Revenue Code; irrevocability of option to carry-over excess income tax payments. (J. Abad)

The last sentence of Section 76 of the National Internal Revenue Code, stating that [o]nce the option to
carry-over and apply the excess quarterly income tax against income tax due for the taxable quarters of the
succeeding taxable years has been made, such option shall be considered irrevocable for that taxable period
and no application for cash refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate shall be allowed therefor, is clear in
its mandate. Once the corporation exercises the option to carry-over and apply the excess quarterly income
tax against the tax due for the taxable quarters of the succeeding taxable years, such option is irrevocable
for that taxable period. Having chosen to carry-over the excess quarterly income tax, the corporation cannot
thereafter choose to apply for a cash refund or for the issuance of a tax credit certificate for the amount
representing such overpayment.

People of the Philippines vs. Hermie M. Jacinto, G.R. No. 182239. March 16, 2011
Rape; principles in conviction. (J. Abad)
In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape, the following well-entrenched
principles shall be considered: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but
more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of
rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized
with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Necessarily, the
credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim may be sufficient to convict the accused. More so,
when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of the examining physician.

People of the Philippines v. Jimmy Alverio, G.R. No. 194259,March 16, 2011.
Rape; determination of guilt.(J. Abad)
The following are the principles with which courts are guided in determining the guilt or innocence of the
accused in rape cases: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is
difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove the charge; (2)
considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the
testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence of the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness
of the evidence for the defense.

People of the Philippines v. Alberto Bacus Alcuizar, G.R. No. 189980, April 6, 2011.
Evidence; chain of custody rule. (J. Abad)

To remove any doubt or uncertainty about the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must
definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the
accused-appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession under R.A. 9165 fails. The chain of custody rule
requires that the marking of the seized items should be done in the presence of the apprehended violator
and immediately upon confiscation to ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidence. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to
it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received, and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure
that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain
to have possession of the same. Indeed, it is from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence
from which a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as
that seized from the accused.
Verily, the failure of the police officers to mark the dangerous drugs immediately after their seizure and the
vague recollection of SPO1 Agadier concerning the custody of the drugs from the residence of appellant up
to the time it was submitted to the crime laboratory constitute a huge and significant gap in the chain of
custody which substantially affects the identity of the corpus delicti.

People of the Philippines v. Florante Relanes alias Dante, G.R. No. 175831, April 12, 2011.
Evidence; denial and alibi; positive identification by victim.
(J. Abad)
Appellants defense of denial and alibi should be dismissed outright in light of his positive identification by
the victim AAA. It is an established jurisprudential rule that denial and alibi, being negative self-serving
defenses, cannot prevail over the affirmative allegations of the victim and her categorical and positive
identification of the accused as her assailant. Denial and alibi must be proved by the accused with clear and
convincing evidence; otherwise, they cannot prevail over the positive testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters. The assertion of appellant that he was in Manila on January 9, 2003, does not
inspire belief since it remained uncorroborated by clear and convincing evidence that he was really in Manila
when the last rape was committed.

Bureau of Customs v. Peter Sherman, et al, G.R. No. 190487, April 13, 2011.
Public prosecutor; power of direction and control over prosecution of criminal cases.(J. Abad)

It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department of the government whose
principal power and responsibility is to insure that laws are faithfully executed. Corollary to this power is the
right to prosecute violators. Thus, all criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are
prosecuted under the direction and control of public prosecutors. In the prosecution of special laws, however,
the exigencies of public service sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors from different
government agencies to assist the public prosecutor; but this designation does not detract from the public
prosecutor having control and supervision over the case.
The participation in the case of a private complainant, like petitioner, is limited to that of a witness, both in
the criminal and civil aspect of the case. As petitioners motion for reconsideration of the challenged CTA
Resolution did not bear the imprimatur of the public prosecutor to which the control of the prosecution of the
case belongs, the present petition fails.

Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, et al., G.R. No. 190259. June 7, 2011.
Local governments; principle of local autonomy. (J. Abad)
The claim of petitioners in this case that the subject proclamation and administrative orders violate the
principle of local autonomy is anchored on the allegation that, through them, the President authorized the
DILG Secretary to take over the operations of the ARMM and assume direct governmental powers over the
region. The Supreme Court held that in the first place, the DILG Secretary did not take over control of the
powers of the ARMM. The SC observed that after law enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM
into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner
Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession
found in Article VII, Section 12, of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the
ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. In short, the DILG
Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.

Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 177131. June 7, 2011.
Commission on Audit; jurisdiction over Boy Scouts. (J. Abad)
The issue was whether or not the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) fall under the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit. The BSP contends that it is not a government-owned or controlled corporation; neither
is it an instrumentality, agency, or subdivision of the government. The Supreme Court, however, held that
not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private
corporations as there exists another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are
otherwise known as public corporations. These corporations are treated by law as agencies or
instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic

viability but to a different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and
objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its departments or offices. As
presently constituted, the BSP is a public corporation created by law for a public purpose, attached to the
Department of Education Culture and Sports pursuant to its Charter and the Administrative Code of 1987. It
is not a private corporation which is required to be owned or controlled by the government and be
economically viable to justify its existence under a special law. The economic viability test would only apply if
the corporation is engaged in some economic activity or business function for the government, which is not
the case for BSP. Therefore, being a public corporation, the funds of the BSP fall under the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit.

Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 169913. June 8, 2011.
Administrative cases; due process. (J. Abad)
Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is putting the subject property under the coverage
of the agrarian reform program; hence, their right to due process of law was violated. The SC agreed. The
importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program cannot be
underrated, as non-compliance with it violates the essential requirements of administrative due process of
law. If the illegality in the issuance of the CLTs is patent, the Court must immediately take action and declare
the issuance as null and void. Accordingly, there being no question that the CLTs in the instant case were
improperly issued, for which reason, their cancellation is warranted. The same holds true with respect to
the EPs and certificates of title issued by virtue of the void CLTs, as there can be no valid transfer of title
should the CLTs on which they were grounded are void.

Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 169913. June 8, 2011.
Local government; power to classify lands. (J. Abad)
Petitioners in this case contend that the subject property is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform
program in view of the enactment of City Ordinance No. 1313 by the City of Iligan reclassifying the area into
a residential/commercial land. Unconvinced, the DARAB, in its Decision, noted that the record is bereft of any
evidence that the city ordinance has been approved by the HLURB, thereby allegedly casting doubt on the
validity of the reclassification over the subject property. The Supreme Court agreed with petitioners that the
property is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program. Ordinance No. 1313 was enacted in 1975.
Significantly, there was still no HLURB to speak of during that time. It was the Task Force on Human
Settlements, the earliest predecessor of HLURB, which was in existence at that time. The Task Force was not
empowered to review and approve zoning ordinances and regulations. As a matter of fact, it was only on
August 9, 1978, with the issuance of Letter of Instructions No. 729, that local governments were required to

submit their existing land use plans, zoning ordinances, enforcement systems and procedures to the Ministry
of Human Settlements for review and ratification.

Re: Petition for radio and television coverage of the multiple murder cases against Maguindanao Governor
Zaldy Ampatuan, et al., A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC/A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC/A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. June 14, 2011.
Right to fair trial v. freedom of the press. (J. Abad)
On the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, the Court found that
prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances
test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused to a fair trial is
not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to
a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a biasfree decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the
deprivation of the right to a fair trial.