[G.R.

No. 152195. January 31, 2005]

PEDRO SEPULVEDA, SR., substituted by SOCORRO S. LAWAS,
Administratrix of His Estate, petitioner, vs. ATTY. PACIFICO S. PELAEZ,
respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 43758
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Danao City, Branch
25, in Civil Case No. SF-175.
On December 6, 1972, private respondent Atty. Pacifico Pelaez filed a complaint
against his granduncle, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., with the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Cebu, for the recovery of possession and ownership of his one-
half (1/2) undivided share of several parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration
(T.D.) Nos. 28199, 18197, 18193 and 28316; his undivided one-third (1/3)
share in several other lots covered by T.D. Nos. 28304, 35090, 18228, 28310,
26308, 28714, 28311, 28312 and 28299 (all located in Danao, Cebu); and for
the partition thereof among the co-owners. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. SF-175.
The eleven (11) lots were among the twenty-five (25) parcels of land which the
private respondents mother, Dulce Sepulveda, inherited from her grandmother,
Dionisia Sepulveda under the Project of Partition[2] dated April 16, 1937
submitted by Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. as the administrator of the formers estate,
duly approved by the then CFI of Cebu in Special Proceeding No. 778-0. Under
the said deed, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. appeared to be the owner of an undivided
portion of Lot No. 28199, while his brother and Dulces uncle Santiago
Sepulveda, was the undivided owner of one-half (1/2) of the parcels of land
covered by T.D. Nos. 18197, 18193 and 28316. Dulce and her uncles, Pedro and
Santiago, were likewise indicated therein as the co-owners of the eleven other
parcels of land, each with an undivided one-third (1/3) share thereof.
In his complaint, the private respondent alleged that his mother Dulce died
intestate on March 2, 1944, and aside from himself, was survived by her
husband Rodolfo Pelaez and her mother Carlota Sepulveda. Dulces grandfather
Vicente Sepulveda died intestate on October 25, 1920,[3] and Dulce was then
only about four years old. According to the private respondent, his grandmother
Carlota repeatedly demanded the delivery of her mothers share in the eleven
(11) parcels of land, but Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. who by then was the Municipal
Mayor of Tudela, refused to do so. Dulce, likewise, later demanded the delivery
of her share in the eleven parcels of land, but Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. still refused,
claiming that he needed to continue to possess the property to reap the produce
therefrom which he used for the payment of the realty taxes on the subject
properties. The private respondent alleged that he himself demanded the
delivery of his mothers share in the subject properties on so many occasions,
the last of which was in 1972, to no avail.
The private respondent further narrated that his granduncle executed an
affidavit[4] on November 28, 1961, stating that he was the sole heir of Dionisia

when she died intestate on June 5, 1921, when, in fact, the latter was survived
by her three sons, Santiago, Pedro and Vicente. Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. also
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[5] on July 24, 1968 over the property covered
by T.D. No. 19804 (T.D. No. 35090) in favor of the City of Danao for P7,492.00.
According to the private respondent, his granduncle received this amount
without his (private respondents) knowledge.
The private respondent prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in
his favor, thus:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. Declaring the plaintiff the absolute owner of ONE-HALF (1/2) portion of the
TWO (2) parcels of land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint;
2. Declaring the plaintiff the absolute owner of the ONE-THIRD (1/3) portion of
the NINE (9) parcels of land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint;
3. Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff the latters ONE-THIRD (1/3)
share of the SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY-TWO PESOS
(P7,492.00) representing the purchase price of the parcel of land described in
paragraph 3(a) of the complaint with interest thereon until the amount is fully
paid;
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. Ordering the partition and segregation of the ONE-HALF (1/2) portion
belonging to the plaintiff of the TWO (2) parcels of land described in paragraph
2 of the complaint;
2. Ordering the partition and segregation of the ONE-THIRD (1/3) portion
belonging to the plaintiff of the remaining EIGHT (8) parcels of land described
in paragraph 3 of the complaint;
COMMON TO THE FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION:
1. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff exemplary damages the amount of
which is left to the discretion of this Honorable Court;
3. Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff the latters share of the fruits
of the ELEVEN (11) parcels of land subject-matter of this complaint, the value of
which will be proven during the trial;
4. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff actual litigation expenses, the
value of which will be proven during the trial;
5. Ordering the defendant to pay attorneys fee in the amount of TWELVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00);
6. Granting to the plaintiff such other reliefs and remedies as he may be entitled
to in accordance with law and equity.[6]
In his answer to the complaint, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. admitted having executed a
deed of sale over the parcel of land covered by T.D. No. 19804 in favor of Danao
City, but averred that the latter failed to pay the purchase price thereof; besides,
the private respondent had no right to share in the proceeds of the said sale. He
likewise denied having received any demand for the delivery of Dulces share of
the subject properties from the latters mother Carlota, or from the private
respondent.

During the trial, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. died intestate. A petition for the
settlement of his estate was filed on May 8, 1975 with the RTC of Cebu, docketed
as Special Proceeding No. SF-37. His daughter, petitioner Socorro Sepulveda
Lawas, was appointed administratrix of his estate in July 1976. In compliance
with the decision of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals,[7] docketed as G.R.
No. L-45809 and promulgated on December 12, 1986, the deceased was
substituted by the petitioner.
To prove the delivery of Dulces share under the project of partition, the
petitioner presented the Affidavit of Consolidation she executed in October
1940 covering thirteen (13) of the twenty-five (25) parcels of land which were
deeded to her under the Project of Partition,[8] as well as the Order[9] dated
March 24, 1962 of the then CFI in Special Proceeding No. 778-R, denying
Carlotas motion for the reconstitution of the records of the said case, and for the
delivery of Dulces share in the eleven parcels of land. The court likewise
declared therein that Dulce, through her grandchildren and her mother, Carlota,
had already received her share of the estate from Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. as early
as January 10, 1938.
According to the petitioner, Dulce and Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. had a verbal
agreement wherein the eleven parcels of land covered by the complaint would
serve as the latters compensation for his services as administrator of Dionisias
estate. Thus, upon the termination of Special Proceeding No. 778-0, and
subsequent to the distribution of the shares of Dionisias heirs, Pedro Sepulveda,
Sr. then became the sole owner of Dulces shares.
The petitioner likewise adduced evidence that Santiago Sepulveda died
intestate and was survived by his wife, Paz Velez Sepulveda and their then
minor children.[10] It was pointed out that the private respondent failed to
implead Paz Sepulveda and her minor children as parties-defendants in the
complaint.
It was further claimed that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. declared the property covered
by T.D. No. 18199[11] under his name for taxation purposes since the beginning
of 1948.[12] It was likewise alleged that the eleven (11) parcels of land deeded to
Dulce under the Project of Partition had been declared for taxation purposes
under the name of Pedro Sepulveda since 1974, and that he and his heirs paid
the realty taxes thereon.[13]
On June 7, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment[14] in favor of the private
respondent. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff and against the defendant by declaring that the plaintiff is legally and
rightfully entitled to the one half (1/2) portion of the two (2) parcels of land
described in paragraph 2 of the Complaint and to the one third (1/3) portion of
the nine (9) parcels of land described in paragraph 3 of the complaint as co-
owner thereof, and ordering the partition and segregation of the said one half
(1/2) portion of the said two (2) parcels of land and of the said one third (1/3)
portion of the nine (9) parcels of land, and in the partition thereof, the
mechanics of partition outlined in Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court must be
followed (Magallon vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282); ordering the defendant Socorro

Lawas, as administratrix of the Estate of Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., to deliver to

plaintiff the latters one third (1/3) share of the P7,492.00 representing the
purchase price of the parcel of land sold to Danao City with interest of twelve
[per] centum (12%) per annum (Reformina vs. Tomol, 139 SCRA 260) from the
date of filing of the Complaint until the amount due to plaintiff is fully paid, to
pay attorneys fees to plaintiffs attorney in the sum of P10,000.00, and to pay the
costs. The counterclaim is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The trial court ruled that the private respondents action for reconveyance based
on constructive trust had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed; that
he was entitled to a share in the proceeds of the sale of the property to Danao
City; and that the partition of the subject property among the adjudicatees
thereof was in order.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA, which rendered judgment on
January 31, 2002, affirming the appealed decision with modification.
The petitioner now comes to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari,
contending that the appellate court erred as follows:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN THE INCORRECT APPLICATION OF ART.
494 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND IN UPHOLDING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
FINDING THAT A TRUST RELATIONSHIP WAS CREATED BETWEEN HEREIN
RESPONDENT AND PEDRO SEPULVEDA [SR.].
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE LAWS ON
PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES TO THE FACTS AS PROVEN IN THE CASE
AGAINST HEREIN RESPONDENT.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FINDING OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 25 IN DANAO CITY THAT PAYMENT WAS
MADE BY DANAO CITY FOR ONE (1) OF THE ELEVEN (11) PARCELS INVOLVED
IN THE CASE AND OF WHICH HEREIN RESPONDENT SHOULD BE PAID BY
PETITIONER ONE THIRD (1/3) OF THE PURCHASE PRICE.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AND A SHARE IN THE RENTS AND PROFITS OF THE ELEVEN (11)
PARCELS TO HEREIN RESPONDENT.
5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURTS FINDING THAT ATTORNEYS FEES ARE TO BE AWARDED AND EVEN
INCREASING THE AMOUNT THEREOF.[16]
The petition is granted for the sole reason that the respondent failed to implead
as parties, all the indispensable parties in his complaint.
As gleaned from the material averments of the complaint and the reliefs prayed
for therein, the private respondent, as plaintiff therein, sought the recovery of
the ownership and possession of the ten (10) parcels of land and the partition
thereof; and for the payment of his share in the proceeds of the sale of the
property which Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. sold to Danao City amounting to P7,492.00,
which Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. claimed was left unpaid. It appears that when the
private respondent filed the complaint, his father, Rodolfo Pelaez, was still alive.
Thus, when his mother Dulce Pelaez died intestate on March 2, 1944, she was
survived by her husband Rodolfo and their son, the private respondent. Under

Article 996 of the New Civil Code,[17] Rodolfo Pelaez, as surviving spouse, is
entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime
to each of the legitimate children who has not received any betterment. The
rights of the usufructuary are provided in Articles 471 to 490 of the old Civil
Code.[18] In Gamis v. Court of Appeals,[19] we held that:
Under articles 807 and 834 of the old Civil Code the surviving spouse is a forced
heir and entitled to a share in usufruct in the estate of the deceased spouse
equal to that which by way of legitime corresponds or belongs to each of the
legitimate children or descendants who have not been bettered or have not
received any share in the one-third share destined for betterment. The right of
the surviving spouse to have a share in usufruct in the estate of the deceased
spouse is provided by law of which such spouse cannot be deprived and which
cannot be ignored. Of course, the spouse may waive it but the waiver must be
express.
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides that in an action for partition,
all persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants.
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.- A person having the
right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed,
setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate
description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as
defendants all the other persons interested in the property.
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are
indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the
joinder of the said parties.[20] The mere fact that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. has
repudiated the co-ownership between him and the respondent does not deprive
the trial court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for partition, for, in
a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-
owner of the subject property; and, second, the conveyance of his lawful
shares.[21] As the Court ruled in De Mesa v. Court of Appeals:[22]
The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned
with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a
partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise legally proscribed and may be
made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This
phase may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the desired
partition either because a co-ownership does not exist or a partition is legally
prohibited. It may also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-
ownership does in truth exist, that partition is proper in the premises, and that
an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real
estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able
to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the
parties. In either case, whether the action is dismissed or partition and/or
accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and may be appealed by any party
aggrieved thereby.
The second stage commences when the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition ordered by the court. In that event, partition shall be effected for the

parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. This second phase may also deal with the rendition of the
accounting itself and its approval by the Court after the parties have been
accorded the opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by
the party or parties thereto entitled of their just shares in the rents and profits
of the real estate in question.[23]
In the present action, the private respondent, as the plaintiff in the trial court,
failed to implead the following indispensable parties: his father, Rodolfo Pelaez;
the heirs of Santiago Sepulveda, namely, Paz Sepulveda and their children; and
the City of Danao which purchased the property covered by T.D. 19804 (T.D. No.
35090) from Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. and maintained that it had failed to pay for
the purchase price of the property.
Rodolfo Pelaez is an indispensable party he being entitled to a share in usufruct,
equal to the share of the respondent in the subject properties. There is no
showing that Rodolfo Pelaez had waived his right to usufruct.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants.
Indeed, the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for
the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is not
before the court that the action should be dismissed. Thus, the plaintiff is
mandated to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that the absence
of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.[24] One who is a party to a case is not bound by any decision of the
court, otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to due process. Without the
presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court could not validly
render judgment and grant relief in favor of the private respondent. The failure
of the private respondent to implead the other heirs as parties-plaintiffs
constituted a legal obstacle to the trial court and the appellate courts exercise of
judicial power over the said case, and rendered any orders or judgments
rendered therein a nullity.[25]
To reiterate, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.[26] Hence, the trial court should have
ordered the dismissal of the complaint.[27]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 43758 and of the Regional
Trial Court are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to dismiss the
complaint without prejudice. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 83982 January 12, 1990

JESUS C. JAKIHACA, petitioner,
vs.
SPS. LILIA AQUINO and APOLONIO AQUINO, JOSE TORALDE, and HON.
EMMA CENIDOZA-ONA, respondents.
Romeo C. San Pedro for petitioner.
Juan R. Moreno for respondents.

PARAS, J.:
On September 10, 1986, petitioner Jesus Jakihaca filed an ejectment suit against
respondents-spouses Lilia Aquino and Apolonio Aquino, and Jose Toralde
before the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No.
616, on account of the latter's refusal to remove their houses which they have
allegedly illegally constructed without the knowledge and consent and against
the will of the former on a residential land situated in Buntong Palay, Ampid,
San Mateo, covered by TCT No. N-103650, despite verbal demand.
Initially, the matter was referred to the Barangay Captain of Ampid, San Mateo,
Rizal, for conciliation processes pursuant to the requirements of P.D. No. 1508.
But due to repeated refusal of respondents to appear before the Barangay
Lupon, the Lupon Chairman and Secretary thereafter issued a "certification to
file action."
Served with summons pursuant to the Rules on Summary Procedure, the
defendants on November 3, 1986 filed an answer with Special and Affirmative
Defenses alleging among others, that there was a verbal contract of tenancy
between the defendants and the former owner of the land in question which
they planted to fruit bearing trees and devoted the same primarily to rice and
corn products, and so therefore, they can not be ejected under the Land Reform
Law more particularly P.D. No. 1 from this land which they had occupied and
cultivated for more than ten (10) years with the consent of the former owner
Gloria Gener. In addition, they said that there is no showing that the case was
first brought to the attention of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for certification
that this case is proper for trial before said Court.
On December 22, 1987, the respondent trial court found that the private
respondents are not agricultural tenant-farmers of the land in question, either
through 'its former owner Gloria Gener or through the present owner-
petitioner Jesus Jakihaca that private respondents entered the premises some
10 to 20 years ago and built their houses thereon by tolerance from the former
owner Gloria Gener and as such they are bound by their implied promise that
they will vacate the land upon demand. Private respondents were ordered to:
(1) remove their respective houses on the portion of the land occupied by them
and surrender possession thereof to the petitioner; (2) pay the petitioner jointly
and severally the amount of P 3,000.00 for attorney's fees; and (3) reimburse
the petitioner for the cost of the suit. Their claim for moral and exemplary
damages was dismissed for lack of merit.
On appeal by the private respondents to the Regional Trial Court, said appellate
court on April 8, 1988 dismissed the case on the ground that the lower court

acted without jurisdiction as the complaint shows nothing when the verbal
demand to remove the houses on the lot of the petitioner was made on the
private respondents. (Decision of the RTC, p. 13, Rollo).
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal on April
21, 1988 which was denied on June 25, 1988. Not satisfied, this petition was
filed on July 12, 1988. On March 15, 1989, this Court in a minute resolution gave
due course to the petition.
Petitioner claims that the Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No.
616 for lack of jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court. On the other hand,
private respondents contended that the petition was filed out of time; that the
petition was filed with the wrong court; that the Municipal Trial Court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action; and that there was no
allegation in the complaint of prior physical possession of the land by the
petitioner.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The records show that the complaint explicitly alleged that "plaintiff verbally
asked the defendants to remove their houses on the lot of the former but the
latter refused and still refuse to do so without just and lawful grounds." (p. 44,
Rollo) Such is sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, in
accordance with the doctrine laid down in the case of Hautea v. Magallon, 12
SCRA 514, to wit:
An allegation in an original complaint for illegal detainer that in spite of
demands made by the plaintiff the defendants had refused to restore the land, is
considered sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of
previous demand.
As to whether or not the demand was brought within the one year period, this
We have to say. As a general rule, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
may be objected to at any stage of the proceeding even on appeal, but this is not
without exception. In the case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 30, cited in
Tejones v. Cironella, 159 SCRA 104, We held:
It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a
court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief to afterwards deny
that same jurisdiction to escape penalty. Upon this same principle is what we
said . . . to the effect that we frown upon the undesirable practice of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if
favorable and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction.
Nowhere in the Answer of respondents contain an allegation attacking the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court based on the issue on demand. Again, in
PNB v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 305, We held:
While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising
jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception thereto, they instead
invoke the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative
relief from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the case by cross-
examining respondent Planas. Upon that premise, petitioners cannot now be
allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction
of the court to which they had submitted themselves voluntarily. (p. 48, Rollo)

Another reason for the lower court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
as alleged by the respondents in their answer to the complaint filed with the
Municipal Trial Court, was that said court has no jurisdiction to try the case as
they are tenants-farmers and that as such they cannot be ejected from their
farmholdings without a certification by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform that
the case is proper for hearing. On the other hand, petitioners argue that when
the Municipal Trial Court required them to submit their respective position
papers, respondent did not raise this particular issue anymore but instead
centered on the issue of actual possession and the elements of forcible entry
and illegal detainer. Petitioners, in their position paper, attached the report of
Mr. Maines of the Agrarian Office which categorically states that there is no
evidence whatsoever to show that the subject land is devoted to the production
of rice and corn; that the occupants are not sharing with the present landowner,
hence, they are classified as illegal occupants; that the subject land is not
tenanted, not devoted to the production of palay and/or corn, hence, not
covered by P.D. No-27 or the Operation Land Transfer of the government (p. 47,
Rollo). Considering the report of said office, the assumption of jurisdiction by
the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal was proper.
Respondents contend that the petition was filed out of time. They allege that
when petitioner received the decision of the Regional Trial Court on April 20,
1988 and the appeal to this Court was filed only on July 12, 1988 or only after a
3 month period, such appeal was definitely outside the 15 day reglementary
period within which to appeal. Respondents added that the motion for
reconsideration filed with said Regional Trial Court did not stop the running of
the period within which to validly file his appeal. The instant case, being an
ejectment case was prosecuted under the Rule on Summary Procedure where it
expressly prohibits a Motion for Reconsideration. (Memorandum for private
respondents, p. 49, Rollo).
Respondents are in error. The Rule on Summary Procedure applies only in cases
filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Trial Courts, pursuant to
Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Summary procedures have no
application to cases before the Regional Trial Courts. Hence, when the
respondents appealed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court to the Regional
Trial Court, the applicable rules are those of the latter court.
Respondents likewise contend that the petition was filed with the wrong court.
Again, they are mistaken.
In the case of Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 643, We held that the final judgment or order of the
Regional Trial Court in an appeal from the final judgment or order of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, may be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review in
accordance with Section 22 of the Interim Rules, or to the Supreme Court
through a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court and Section 25 of the Interim Rules. Clearly, the petitioners filed
this appeal with a proper court.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated

April 8, 1988 and the order dated June 25, 1988 both of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, in Civil Case No. 415, are hereby SET ASIDE.
The decision of the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, dated December
22, 1987 in Civil Case No. 616 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 75676 August 29, 1990

MANUEL CO KENG KIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Fourth Special Cases
Division) and PLAZA ARCADE, Inc., respondents.
Rogelio L. Orio for petitioner.
Perfecto V. Fernandez for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
The legal issue raised in this petition is whether the notice to vacate required to
be served on the lessee under Section 2, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court in
order to confer jurisdiction on the Metropolitan Trial Court in an action for
ejectment, may be served by registered mail.
On February 23, 1982, a complaint for ejectment against petitioner Manuel Co
Keng Kian was filed by private respondent Plaza Arcade, Inc., alleging that
despite the expiration of the written contract of lease over a portion of the
ground floor of the former Manila Times Building, petitioner refused to vacate
the premises and to pay the monthly rentals notwithstanding receipt of several
letters of demand, the last of which was sent to petitioner by registered mail.
During the pendency of the trial before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
or on August 27, 1982, petitioner voluntarily vacated the disputed premises,
turning over the key to the clerk of court but without paying the accrued rent.
On May 17, 1984, the inferior court rendered its judgment dismissing the
ejectment case for lack of jurisdiction. It refused to give probative value to the
three letters of demand to vacate which were all sent to petitioner and which he
refused to receive. The court held that since none of the demand letters was
served (1) personally, or (2) by written notice of such demand upon a person
found on the premises, or (3) by posting such notice on the premises if no
person can be found thereon pursuant to the provisions of Section 2, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court, there was no valid demand. If none was made, the case came
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Metropolitan Trial
Court. Whereupon, it ordered Plaza Arcade, Inc. to pay petitioner P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees and another P5,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.
Plaza Arcade, Inc. appealed to the Regional Trial Court which initially reversed
the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, but on motion for reconsideration
by petitioner, affirmed the dismissal of the ejectment case in its order of October
9, 1985. 1
A petition for review was filed with the then Intermediate Appellate Court. In its
decision dated July 3, 1988 the Appellate Court overturned the appealed order
of the trial court which had earlier sustained the dismissal of the ejectment case.
Motion for reconsideration having been denied, the aforesaid decision of the
Appellate Court was elevated to this Court on a petition for review on certiorari.
In reversing the dismissal order, the Appellate Court took the lower courts to
task for taking a rather constricted view of Section 2, Rule 70, and declaring that
the service of demand letters to vacate on the lessee is strictly limited to the
three (3) modes enumerated therein. They failed to note the common practice

of serving said notices on the tenant by registered mail with return card so that
the registry receipt and the receipt thereof by the addressee through the return
card could be presented in evidence to prove the fact of delivery, in the event of
a litigation.
We agree and in our opinion the facts in the instant case indicate personal
service on the lessee. In arriving at this conclusion, we have been greatly aided
by respondent's citation of American cases which, by and large, represents a
practical, if not realistic, approach to the problem.
In the cases of Nunlist vs. Motter, 2 and Gehring vs. Swoll 3 the Court held that
where the notice to leave the premises is transmitted by registered mail with a
return card and thereafter the receipt bearing the signature of the defendant
was returned, a prima facie case is established of the fact of delivery of said
notice to the defendant personally by the Postal Office Department although he
refused to accept the same. 4 Indeed, notice by registered mail is considered an
effective service on the person concerned. It cannot be avoided by the mere
expediency of declining to accept delivery after notification thereof. The service
is deemed complete regardless of such refusal to accept if the addressee fails to
claim his mail from the postal office after the lapse of five (5) days from the date
of the first notice of the postmaster. 5
In conclusion, we stress that the notice to vacate the leased premises, required
by the Rules to be served on the tenant before a forcible entry or unlawful
detainer action can be commenced against him, may be served by registered
mail. This is a substantial compliance with the modes of service enumerated
under Section 2, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.
At this juncture it bears repeating that actions for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer are summary in nature because they involve a disturbance of social
order which must be abated as promptly as possible without any undue reliance
on technical and procedural rules which only cause delays. In the ultimate
analysis, it matters not how the notice to vacate was conveyed, so long as the
lessee or his agent has personally received the written demand, whether
handed to him by the lessor, his attorney, a messenger or even a postman. The
undisputed facts in the instant case show that the Manila Times Publishing
Company, through its manager, had informed petitioner that Plaza Arcade Inc.
was the new owner of the subject building; that on October 18, 1979, a demand
letter was sent to petitioner advising him to leave the premises but petitioner
refused to receive the letter; that a second demand on January 12, 1981 elicited
the same reaction; that a final demand dated November 16, 1981 was sent to
petitioner by registered mail which he again refused. And even on the
supposition that there was no personal service as claimed by petitioner, this
could only be due to petitioner's blatant attempts at evasion which compelled
the new landlord to resort to registered mail. The Court cannot countenance an
unfair situation where the plaintiff in an eviction case suffers further injustice
by the unwarranted delay resulting from the obstinate refusal of the defendant
to acknowledge the existence of a valid demand.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit and the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals reversing the dismissal order of the trial court is affirmed.

Civil Case No. 071279-CV is hereby ordered reinstated in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 7. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against
petitioner.
So ordered.




VICKY C. MABANTO, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-04-1533
Petitioner,


- versus - PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is an administrative complaint filed by Vicky Mabanto against Judge
Mamerto Y. Coliflores of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1,
Cebu City, charging him with Serious Misconduct, Inefficiency, Gross Ignorance
of the Law and Violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (R.A. No. 3019) in connection with her supersedeas bond in Civil Case No. R-
35618.

The antecedents are as follows:[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]

Complainant was the defendant in Civil Case No. R-35618 for ejectment.
Judgment was rendered against her and she appealed the decision to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City. She posted a supersedeas bond in the
amount of P45,000 to stay the execution of the judgment.

On February 17, 1997, the RTC resolved the appeal and remanded the case to
the MTCC for re-trial. Complainants counsel filed a motion to withdraw the
supersedeas bond.

On May 19, 1997, complainant learned from the Clerk of Court of
MTCC, Cebu City that respondent, in an Order dated September 23, 1996,
granted plaintiffs ex-parte motion to withdraw rental deposit under the bond
and release the same to plaintiff, hence, the latter withdrew it on said date.
Complainant claimed that respondent concealed from her and her counsel
plaintiffs motion to release the deposit under the supersedeas bond as they were
not notified of the motion or the approval of the same.

Respondent, in his Comment,[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] denied having
concealed from complainant and her counsel his Order dated September 23,
2006. Respondent stated that complainants counsel, Atty. Cynthia M. Matural,
was furnished a copy of the Order. He likewise explained that he directed the
release of the bond upon plaintiffs ex-parte motion because the bond would be
applied to the back rentals owing to the latter. He added that from the amount
of P45,000 withdrawn, P15,000 was returned to the court by plaintiffs on
September 25, 1996, which amount remained as complainants supersedeas
bond.

Complainant replied that she and her counsel never received a copy
of the aforestated motion and order. Her counsel filed several motions for the
release of the supersedeas bond expecting that the same was still intact.
Complainant likewise insisted that respondent had no basis for issuing the
assailed order because the purpose of the supersedeas bond is to guarantee the
performance of the judgment appealed from if affirmed by the appellate court,
and this did not happen in this case because the RTC remanded the case for re-
trial.

On January 10, 2005, the case was referred to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA).

In a Memorandum dated July 12, 2005, the OCA recommended that
respondent be fined in the amount of P2,000 to be deducted from his retirement
benefits. The OCA considered the fact that no malice attended respondents
action, and that the offense took place prior to the amendment of Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which imposes a heavier penalty for
gross ignorance of the law.

The Court finds the recommendation of the OCA to be well taken.

A supersedeas bond in ejectment cases is conditioned upon the
performance of the judgment or order appealed from in case it be affirmed
wholly or in part by the appellate court. It should therefore subsist as security
for the liability of the defendant to the plaintiff.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]

Section 19(2) (3), Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires that all
moneys deposited by the defendant to stay execution of the judgment shall be
held until the final disposition of the appeal, and shall be disposed of in
accordance with the provisions of the judgment. It likewise provides that the
plaintiff will be allowed to withdraw the money when the defendant agrees or
fails to oppose plaintiffs petition. The purpose of this is to avoid damage that the
defendant may suffer if plaintiff should be allowed to withdraw the money
deposited when the plaintiffs right to collect the money is in issue.[if
!supportFootnotes][4][endif]


Here, complainant failed to oppose the motion because of the lower
courts failure to inform her. Indeed, Mr. Jose Legaspi, Clerk of Court of MTCC,
Branch 1, Cebu City, stated that complainant was not notified about the motion
to release the supersedeas bond and the Order allowing the release of the bond.
The court interpreter, Ms. Rebecca L. Alesna, also confirmed that she prepared
the notice for complainant upon the instruction of respondent but due to
inadvertence, she was not able to send the same to the parties.[if
!supportFootnotes][5][endif]

Section 4, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court requires that adverse parties
be served copies of pleadings and processes. A motion without a notice of
hearing addressed to the parties is a mere scrap of paper.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
In Cui v. Madayag,[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] this Court held that motions that do not
contain proof of service of notice to the other party are not entitled to judicial
cognizance.

Without any proof of service having been made upon complainant,
respondent erred in granting the motion to withdraw the deposit under the
bond, and is, thus, guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge which is penalized
with either dismissal from service, suspension for three (3) months without
salary and benefits or a fine of not less than P20,000 but not more than P40,000.

The administrative offense, however, took place prior to the
amendment of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC on
September 11, 2001. In Dayawon v. Judge Maximino A. Badilla,[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif] Padua v. Judge Eufemio R. Molina,[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] Dizon v.
Judge Demetrio D. Calimag,[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] and Prosecutor Contreras v.
Judge Eddie P. Monserate,[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] citing gross ignorance of the law
but taking into account that no nefarious motive on the part of respondents had
been shown, this Court imposed a fine of P2,000 with a warning.

Thus, consistent with the sanctions imposed in the aforementioned
cases, this Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores is found GUILTY OF
GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for which he is FINED P2,000 to be deducted
from his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. MTJ-01-1381. January 14, 2002]

FR. ROMELITO GUILLEN, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTONIO K. CAON,
respondent.
D E C I S I O N
MELO, J.:
In Civil Case No. 185-H entitled, Barangay Lacasa, Hinatuan, Surigao del Sur, as
represented by Bebiana Sayson, Barangay Captain vs. Eloy Ampis, et al.,
Barangay Lacasa sought the eviction of 40 residents for illegally and unlawfully
occupying a 1- hectare land they claimed to own. In order to prevent said
residents from making repairs, improvements, or construction within the 1-
hectare land, Judge Antonio K. Canon, Presiding Judge of the 7th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Hinatuan-Tagbina, Surigao del Sur, issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction on December 27, 1996. The residents
allegedly continued to disobey said order, thereby prompting the court to issue
three separate orders of arrest all dated September 5, 1997, against 11
individuals for direct contempt. These arrest orders became the seed of the
present case.
In a sworn letter-complaint dated September 9, 1997, complainant Fr. Romelito
Guillen, parish priest of San Agustin, Barangay Poblacion, Hinatuan, Surigao del
Sur, in his capacity as representative of the Social Action Center of the Diocese
of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, charged respondent Judge Antonio K. Caon with
issuing unjust orders of arrest and with gross ignorance of the law relative to
the ejectment case. Complainant asserted that the orders of arrest against the
11 individuals, whose affidavits were included in his letter-complaint, were
defective since: 1) the 11 affiants, except for Abon Lebeste, were not among the
40 defendants in Civil Case No. 185-H; 2) the orders were issued without any
motion to cite affiants in contempt of court and were issued solely at the courts
instance; 3) the orders were issued without giving affiants notice that they
violated the courts orders and did not give them a chance to explain and defend
their actions; and 4) affiants merely initiated repairs on their nipa huts without
disturbing the status quo sought to be preserved by respondent. Complainant
further contended that respondent acted in an arbitrary and despotic manner in
causing the arrest of affiants who, as of the writing of the letter-complaint, were
still detained at the Municipal Jail of Hinatuan. Finally, complainant averred that
respondent is no longer physically an mentally fit to sit as presiding judge since
he is almost completely paralyzed, unable to write, speak, or walk unaided.
In his comment dated February 28, 1998, respondent admitted having issued a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on December 27, 1996 and the three
separate orders of arrest all dated September 5, 1997. He alleged that through
an affidavit filed by the Lacasa Barangay Council on September 5, 1997, he
found that defendants Julie Lisayan and Abon Lebeste had violated said writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, the former for having made major repairs
and improvements on her house, and the latter for having constructed a
concrete or hollow-block toilet. The Barangay kagawads, at their examination
following the filing of their joint affidavit, reported that Abet Antonio, Lino
Costan, Ely Engalan, Eme Suan, Maning Davenes, Celso Davenes, Ronnie

Capunong, Bellie Morales and Carlos Munion had also violated the
aforementioned order upon the prodding and inducement of Lisayan and
Lebeste.
Respondent claimed that these surrounding events were enough reasons for
affiants to be brought to court and to show cause why they should not be held
for contempt. He contended that since Civil Case 185-H is covered by the Rules
on Summary Procedure, the summary issuance of the warrants by virtue of the
affidavit filed by the Lacasa Barangay Council and the aforementioned
circumstances was justified and not unjust, arbitrary, or despotic. Respondent
further claimed that summary hearings were held in his chambers, and after the
parties had given their explanations on why they should not be held in
contempt, he concluded that only Lisayan and Lebeste had indeed defied the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and not the 9 other affiants.
Respondent subsequently lifted the orders of arrest against these 9 individuals,
while Lisayan and Lebeste were committed at the municipal jail for 3 days as a
punitive lesson for their defiance. Respondent also alleged that the imputation
made by complainant that affiants were all detained as of September 9, 1997 is
absolutely bereft of truth. In fact, the 9 individuals were not even arrested
despite the orders of arrest as seen in the indorsement warrant of arrest issued
by the warrant officer of the Office of the Chief of Police of Hinatuan-PNP and
duly confirmed by a certification from the officer-in-charge of the same office.
Lastly, respondent disputed complainants allegation that he is no longer
physically and mentally fit to maintain his position, claiming that he has been
regularly attending to his official duties in his station in Hinatuan every
Wednesday an Thursday, in his sub-station at Tagbina which is 27 kilometers
from Hinatuan, every Friday, and as judge-designate of the 8th MCTC of Bislig-
Lingap at Bislig which is approximately 55 kilometers from Hinatuan, every
Monday and Tuesday. Respondent claimed that he shuttles through the poor
third-class gravel road which is tattered with potholes riding in passenger jeeps,
or at times, even only on two-wheel motorcycles. Respondent argued that this
weekly travel through long distances cannot be made by one who is said to be
almost completely paralyzed.
Both complainant and respondent were required by the Court on February 21,
2000 to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on
the basis of the pleadings filed, but no response was made by them despite
proper service of notice. Further arguments were, therefore, deemed waived.
In the report and recommendation dated January 19, 2000 submitted by then
Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, it was pertinently observed that
respondent is liable for issuing unjust orders of arrest and of gross ignorance of
the law.
We agree.
Respondent is liable for issuing unjust orders of arrest in that he failed to
observe the proper procedure laid down in the Rules of Civil procedure,
specifically the provisions on contempt. It must be noted that affiants were
charged with direct contempt for having violated the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction issued by respondent. This is contrary to Section 1, rule

71 of the Rules of Court which defines direct contempt as, misbehavior in the
presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before
the same x x x.
Clearly, the supposed contemptuous acts of affiants fall under the definition of
indirect contempt as explained in the case of Industrial & Transport Equipment,
Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission (284 SCRA 144 [1998]), that:
There is no question that disobedience to a lawful writ, process, order,
judgment or command of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge
constitutes indirect contempt punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, respondent almost simultaneously issued the orders of arrest after
the members of the Barangay Kagawad filed their joint affidavit and gave their
oral report that the persons later disobeyed the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. This is in direct violation of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides:
After a charge in writing has been filed and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court
and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following
acts may be punished for indirect contempt....
The records of the case makes no mention of the fact that prior to the issuance
of the orders of arrest, affiants were given the opportunity to comment on the
charge.
Respondent tried to justify his actions by claiming that affiants were not
deprived of due process since a summary hearing was conducted in his
chambers wherein the individuals were given the chance to be heard on their
positions and justifications on why they should not be held in contempt. What
respondent fails to realize is that for indirect contempt charges, a different
procedure is laid down by the law. According to Section 4, Rule 71:
If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending
in the court, the petition for contempt shall be docketed, heard and decided
separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the
contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing an decision.
In the instant case, no docketing was done by respondent nor was a formal
hearing conducted as required. Veritably, assuming for the sake of argument
that a proper charge in writing accusing the affiants with committing acts
constituting indirect contempt was filed, this fact will not cure the proceedings
of the taint of irregularity because the record show that no previous hearing
was afforded to petitioner. To restate what was pointed out earlier, in cases of
indirect contempt, the contemnor may be punished only after a charge in
writing is filed and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself
or counsel, and without a hearing , an order citing a person in contempt violates
the persons right to due process (Salome D. Caas vs. Lerio C. Castigador, G.R. No.
139844, December 15, 2000).
Respondents actions also visibly indicate his lack of sufficient grasp of the law.
No less than the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful
to the laws and maintain professional competence (Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Code of
Judicial Conduct). Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge

displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the publics
confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law.
Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he owes the public and the
court the duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court
is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules must be at the palm of his hands. A judge
must be acquainted with legal norms an precepts as well as with procedural
rules (Jovenal Oporto, Jr. vs. Judge Eddie P. Monserate, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1109,
April 16, 2001). Thus, this court has consistently held that:
A judge is presumed to know the law an when the law is so elementary, not to
be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law (Agunday vs. Tresvalles, 319
SCRA 134 [1999]).
Verily, failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and the Rules
constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no one is excused, and surely
not a judge (De Austria vs. Beltran, 313 SCRA 443 [1999]).
However, with regard to the question of whether respondent caused the
detention of the 11 affiants as claimed by complainant, the Court finds for
respondent who has indubitably shown that 9 of 11 individuals were not even
arrested. Indeed, it can be plainly seen through the indorsement on the warrant
issued by the office of the chief of police of Hinatuan-PNP on September 8, 1997
that the 9 individuals were not arrested. This fact is further bolstered by the
certification given by the officer-in-charge of the Hinatuan-PNP on February 25,
1998 to the effect that the 9 individuals were never arrested or detained.
As regards respondents physical condition, inasmuch as both complainant and
respondent failed to present medical evidence to support their respective
claims, this Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the same.
Lastly, it is worthy to note that aside from the instant complaint, respondent has
six other administrative complaints currently pending before the Office of the
Court Administrator.
WHEREFORE, Judge Antonio K. Caon is hereby found guilty of issuing
unjust orders and of gross of ignorance of the law. He is ordered to pay a fine in
the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.


[G.R. No. 142649. September 13, 2001]
ANTONIO C. SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NELSON
BAYOT, as Presiding Judge, RTC, Pasay City, Branch 118, and T.N. LAL &
CO., LTD., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Challenged in the petition for review in this case is the Resolution[if
!supportFootnotes][1][endif] of 24 January 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No.
56549, which dismissed petitioners special civil action for certiorari for having
been filed out of time, as well as its Resolution of 13 March 2000, denying the
motion for reconsideration of the former.
The record discloses that private respondent T.N. Lal & Co., Ltd. filed a
petition for indirect contempt against herein petitioner, Antonio C. San Luis,
Administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-0480
and raffled to Branch 118 of said court. The action arose from the alleged failure
or refusal of petitioner to comply with the order of 7 April 1999 of Hon. Ernesto
A. Reyes, presiding judge of Branch 111 of said court in Civil Case No. 97-0423.
The order directed the LRTA to immediately restore the power supply of
private respondents sound system in all places, sites and locations in its area of
responsibility within 24 hours from receipt of the same.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the petition for indirect contempt on
the ground that it states no cause of action and private respondent, as petitioner
therein, was guilty of forum-shopping.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
On 15 July 1999, public respondent Hon. Nelson Bayot, presiding judge of
Branch 118, issued an order, a copy of which was received by petitioner on 9
August 1999, directing that the petition for indirect contempt, Civil Case No. 99-
0480, be transferred to Branch 111 for disposition and appropriate action, since
it was that branch which issued the order of 7 April 1999 and against which the
contemptuous act was committed; hence, Branch 111 was in a better position to
determine whether or not the order of 7 April 1999 had been violated.[if
!supportFootnotes][4][endif]
On 18 August 1999, petitioner moved to reconsider the 15 July 1999
order of Judge Bayot. The latter issued an order on 22 October 1999, stating
that the records of the case had already been transferred to Branch 111 and that
he believed the assailed order was correct and proper. Accordingly, he would
not act anymore on the motion for reconsideration.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] A copy
of said order was received by petitioner on 8 November 1999.
On 7 January 2000, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In the petition,
which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 56549, petitioner sought to annul Judge
Bayots orders of 15 July 1999 and 22 October 1999 on the ground that the latter
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion
when he did not act on petitioners motion to dismiss and motion for
reconsideration and, instead, transferred the case to Branch 111 of the court

below.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
In its Resolution of 24 January 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for having been filed out of time.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Forthwith,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration as well as a Motion to Admit
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and to Relax Strict Rules on Procedure,
both of which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution of 13 March 2000.[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Petitioner is now before us, asking for a liberal application of the
procedural rules. He raises the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND
MANDAMUS AND CONSEQUENTLY DISMISSED THE SAME FOR ITS FAILURE TO
FILE THE SAID PETITION ON TIME, OVERLOOKING THE FACT THAT THE
FAILURE TO FILE THE SAME WAS DUE TO AN HONEST MISTAKE AND HUMAN
ERROR IN COMPUTING THE PERIOD FOR FILING THE INSTANT PETITION BY
HANDLING COUNSEL.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE INSTANT CASE IS WARRANTED SO THAT
PETITIONERS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS
WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS COULD BE REINSTATED AND
PROCEED IN DUE COURSE IN ORDER NOT TO DEPRIVE
PETITIONER OF ITS [SIC] RIGHT TO PROSECUTE HIS CASE
BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS SO THAT IT CAN BE
DECIDED ON THE MERITS AND NOT ON ITS TECHNICALITY
ASPECT.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]

On the procedural aspect, we rule in favor of petitioner.

In finding that the petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed out of
time, the Court of Appeals applied Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended by the Resolution of 21 July 1998, which reads:
Sec. 4. Where petition filed. -- The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in
the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of
a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may
also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If
it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise
provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only
by the Court of Appeals.
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time
after notice of said judgment, order or resolution, the period herein fixed shall
be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition
within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any
event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time to file the

petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case
exceeding fifteen (15) days.
The Court of Appeals reckoned the counting of the 60-day period from
petitioners receipt on 9 August 1999 of a copy of the assailed 15 July 1999
order, considered the interruption of the running of the period by the filing on
18 August 1999 of the Motion for Reconsideration, and held that the remaining
period resumed to run on 8 November 1999, the date petitioner received the 22
October 1999 order. Accordingly, petitioner should have filed the petition on or
before 29 December 1999. He filed the petition only on 7 January 2000, or nine
days after the expiration of the period.
It must be pointed out, however, that Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure was subsequently amended in the Courts Resolution in A.M.
No. 00-2-03-SC, which took effect on 1 September 2000. As amended, said
section reads as follows:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. -- The petition shall be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the
denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or
omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined
by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction or in the Sandiganbayan if it is
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-
judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition
shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling
reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
Under this amendment, the 60-day period within which to file the
petition starts to run from receipt of notice of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration, if one is filed. In our decision in Systems Factors Corporation
and Modesto Dean vs. NLRC, et al.,[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] reiterated in Unity
Fishing Development Corp. and/or Antonio Dee vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[if
!supportFootnotes][11][endif] the new period was made applicable to pending cases, such
as in the case at bar. Settled is the rule that remedial statutes or statutes relating
to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new rights or take
away vested rights but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the purview of the
general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes. Procedural laws are
construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a
general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be
considered violative of any personal rights because no vested right may attach
to nor arise therefrom.
Conformably with Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended, the 60-day period of

petitioner to file the petition for certiorari should be counted from his receipt on
8 November 1999 of the Resolution of 22 October 1999, denying his motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the petition for certiorari having been filed on 7 January
2000, the last day of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals should not
have dismissed the same on ground of late filing.
In view of the foregoing, our next logical step would be to direct the
Court of Appeals to resolve on its merit CA-G.R. SP No. 56549 by determining
the issue raised therein on whether Judge Bayot committed grave abuse of
discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in transferring the case
for indirect contempt to Branch 111 of the court below. Such step would,
however, unduly prolong the disposition of the main action. We shall act on said
petition, considering that the lone issue raised is one of law.[if
!supportFootnotes][12][endif] It is already an accepted rule of procedure for us to strive to
settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to
bear the seeds of future litigation.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] If, based on the records,
the pleadings, and other evidence, the dispute can be resolved by us, we will do
so to serve the ends of justice, instead of remanding the case to the lower court
for further proceedings.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
In his petition for review on certiorari before the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 56549, petitioner contended that Judge Bayot committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing to act on his motion to dismiss the indirect
contempt case and on his motion for reconsideration, and, instead, referred the
case to Branch 111 of the court below, the court which issued the order subject
of the case for indirect contempt.
The pertinent rules on the matter are Sections 4 and 5, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, which read:
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. -- Proceedings for indirect contempt may
be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was
committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a
verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of
documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal
action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but
said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court
in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the
principal action for joint hearing and decision.
SEC. 5. Where charge to be filed. -- Where the charge for indirect contempt has
been committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher
rank, or against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such
court. Where such contempt has been committed against a lower court, the
charge may be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place in which the lower
court is sitting; but the proceedings may also be instituted in such lower court
subject to appeal to the Regional Trial Court of such place in the same manner

as provided in section 11 of this Rule.

In whatever context it may arise, contempt of court involves the doing of
an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affront to the
court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. As a matter of practical
judicial administration, jurisdiction has been felt to properly rest in only one
tribunal at a time with respect to a given controversy.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
Only the court which rendered the order commanding the doing of a certain act
is vested with the right to determine whether or not the order has been
complied with, or whether a sufficient reason has been given for
noncompliance, and, therefore, whether a contempt has been committed.[if
!supportFootnotes][16][endif] It is a well-established rule that the power to determine the
existence of contempt of court rests exclusively with the court contemned. No
court is authorized to punish a contempt against another.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule . . . is that
contempt proceedings are sui generis and are triable only by the court against
whose authority the contempts are charged; the power to punish for contempt
exists for the purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in
its presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders and processes and in
order that a court may compel obedience to its orders, it must have the right to
inquire whether there has been any disobedience thereof, for to submit the
question of disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the
proceeding of half its efficiency.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides, in effect, that a charge
for indirect contempt must be filed with the court contemned. Although this
provision is permissive in nature, in the event of concurrent jurisdiction over
cases of contempt of court, it would be a good practice to acknowledge the
preferential right of the court against which the act of contempt was committed
to try and punish the guilty party.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
On the basis of the foregoing disquisitions, we find and so hold that
public respondent Judge Nelson Bayot committed no error and did not act with
abuse of discretion in ordering the transfer of the petition for indirect contempt,
Civil Case No. 99-0480, to Branch 111 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
whose order was the subject of the contempt suit.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 24 January 2000
and 13 March 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 56549 are hereby SET ASIDE. For the
reasons set forth above, said case is ordered DISMISSED, and the orders of
public respondent judge dated 15 July 1999 and 22 October 1999 in Civil Case
No. 99-0480 are hereby AFFIRMED. The Presiding Judge of Branch 111,
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, shall forthwith conduct the appropriate
proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-0480, including the resolution of petitioners
motion to dismiss the case.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.


G.R. No. 177703 January 28, 2008
VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA, petitioners,
vs.
JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the November 30, 2006 Decision1 and April 30, 2007
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93570.
The relevant facts are culled from the records.
John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed Special Civil Action No. 03-0010 with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 254, Las Pias City (RTC) against Vilma G.
Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola (petitioners) for judicial partition of the
properties of decedent Fidel Arriola (the decedent Fidel). Respondent is the son
of decedent Fidel with his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony
is the son of decedent Fidel with his second wife, petitioner Vilma.
On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 383714 (84191) left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his
heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in
equal shares of one-third (1/3) each without prejudice to the rights of creditors
or mortgagees thereon, if any;
2. Attorney's fees in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS is
hereby awarded to be reimbursed by the defendants to the plaintiff;
3. Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.3
The decision became final on March 15, 2004.4
As the parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the land covered
by TCT No. 383714 (subject land), respondent sought its sale through public
auction, and petitioners acceded to it.5 Accordingly, the RTC ordered the public
auction of the subject land.6 The public auction sale was scheduled on May 31,
2003 but it had to be reset when petitioners refused to include in the auction
the house (subject house) standing on the subject land.7 This prompted
respondent to file with the RTC an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for
Contempt of Court,8 praying that petitioners be declared in contempt.
The RTC denied the motion in an Order9 dated August 30, 2005, for the reason
that petitioners were justified in refusing to have the subject house included in
the auction, thus:
The defendants [petitioners] are correct in holding that the house or
improvement erected on the property should not be included in the auction
sale.
A cursory reading of the aforementioned Decision and of the evidence adduced
during the ex-parte hearing clearly show that nothing was mentioned about the

house existing on the land subject matter of the case. In fact, even plaintiff's
[respondent's] initiatory Complaint likewise did not mention anything about
the house. Undoubtedly therefore, the Court did not include the house in its
adjudication of the subject land because it was plaintiff himself who failed to
allege the same. It is a well-settled rule that the court can not give a relief to that
which is not alleged and prayed for in the complaint.
To hold, as plaintiff argued, that the house is considered accessory to the land
on which it is built is in effect to add to plaintiff's [a] right which has never been
considered or passed upon during the trial on the merits.
In the absence of any other declaration, obvious or otherwise, only the land
should be partitioned in accordance to[sic] the aforementioned Decision as the
house can not be said to have been necessarily adjudicated therein. Thus,
plaintiff can not be declared as a co-owner of the same house without evidence
thereof and due hearing thereon.
The Decision of the Court having attained its finality, as correctly pointed out,
judgment must stand even at the risk that it might be erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court filed
by plaintiff is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.10
The RTC, in its Order dated January 3, 2006, denied respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration.11
Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari12 where he sought to have
the RTC Orders set aside, and prayed that he be allowed to proceed with the
auction of the subject land including the subject house.
In its November 30, 2006 Decision, the CA granted the Petition for Certiorari, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders dated August 30,
2005 and January 3, 2006 issued by the RTC, in Civil Case No. SCA 03-0010, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the sheriff is ordered to proceed with the
public auction sale of the subject lot covered by TCT No. 383714, including
the house constructed thereon.
SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its
Resolution14 of April 30, 2007.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the CA erred in holding that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for
contempt of court.
The assailed CA Decision and Resolution must be modified for reasons other
than those advanced by petitioners.
The contempt proceeding initiated by respondent was one for indirect
contempt. Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure for
the institution of proceedings for indirect contempt, viz:
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed
by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a

verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of
documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal
action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but
said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court
in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the
principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphases supplied.)
Under the aforecited second paragraph of the Rules, the requirements for
initiating an indirect contempt proceeding are a) that it be initiated by way of a
verified petition and b) that it should fully comply with the requirements for
filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions. In Regalado v. Go,15 we held:
As explained by Justice Florenz Regalado, the filing of a verified petition that
has complied with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleading, is
mandatory x x x:
This new provision clarifies with a regularity norm the proper procedure for
commencing contempt proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified
as special civil action under the former Rules, the heterogenous practice
tolerated by the courts, has been for any party to file a motion without paying
any docket or lawful fees therefore and without complying with the
requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the second
paragraph of this amended section.
x x x x
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu propio by
order of or a formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be
commenced by a verified petition with full compliance with the requirements
therefore and shall be disposed in accordance with the second paragraph of this
section.
x x x x
Even if the contempt proceedings stemmed from the main case over which
the court already acquired jurisdiction, the rules direct that the petition for
contempt be treated independently of the principal action. Consequently, the
necessary prerequisites for the filing of initiatory pleadings, such as the
filing of a verified petition, attachment of a certification on non-forum
shopping, and the payment of the necessary docket fees, must be faithfully
observed.
x x x x
The provisions of the Rules are worded in very clear and categorical language.
In case where the indirect contempt charge is not initiated by the courts, the
filing of a verified petition which fulfills the requirements on initiatory
pleadings is a prerequisite. Beyond question now is the mandatory requirement
of a verified petition in initiating an indirect contempt proceeding. Truly, prior
to the amendment of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, mere motion without
complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings was tolerated by the
courts. At the onset of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, such

practice can no longer be countenanced.16 (Emphasis ours.)

The RTC erred in taking jurisdiction over the indirect contempt proceeding
initiated by respondent. The latter did not comply with any of the mandatory
requirements of Section 4, Rule 71. He filed a mere Urgent Manifestation and
Motion for Contempt of Court, and not a verified petition. He likewise did not
conform with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleadings such as the
submission of a certification against forum shopping and the payment of docket
fees. Thus, his unverified motion should have been dismissed outright by the
RTC.
It is noted though that, while at first the RTC overlooked the infirmities in
respondent's unverified motion for contempt, in the end, it dismissed the
motion, albeit on substantive grounds. The trouble is that, in the CA decision
assailed herein, the appellate court committed the same oversight by delving
into the merits of respondent's unverified motion and granting the relief sought
therein. Thus, strictly speaking, the proper disposition of the present petition
ought to be the reversal of the CA decision and the dismissal of respondent's
unverified motion for contempt filed in the RTC for being in contravention of
Section 4, Rule 71.
However, such simplistic disposition will not put an end to the dispute between
the parties. A seed of litigation has already been sown that will likely sprout into
another case between them at a later time. We refer to the question of whether
the subject house should be included in the public auction of the subject land.
Until this question is finally resolved, there will be no end to litigation between
the parties. We must therefore deal with it squarely, here and now.
The RTC and the CA differed in their views on whether the public auction
should include the subject house. The RTC excluded the subject house because
respondent never alleged its existence in his complaint for partition or
established his co-ownership thereof.17 On the other hand, citing Articles 440,18
44519 and 44620 of the Civil Code, the CA held that as the deceased owned the
subject land, he also owned the subject house which is a mere accessory to the
land. Both properties form part of the estate of the deceased and are held in co-
ownership by his heirs, the parties herein. Hence, the CA concludes that any
decision in the action for partition of said estate should cover not just the
subject land but also the subject house.21 The CA further pointed out that
petitioners themselves implicitly recognized the inclusion of the subject house
in the partition of the subject land when they proposed in their letter of August
5, 2004, the following swapping-arrangement:
Sir:
Thank you very much for accommodating us even if we are only poor and
simple people. We are very much pleased with the decision of Presiding Judge
Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., RTC Br. 254, Las Pias, on the sharing of one-third
(1/3) each of a land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 (84191)
in Las Pias City.
However, to preserve the sanctity of our house which is our residence for more
than twenty (20) years, we wish to request that the 1/3 share of John Nabor C.
Arriola be paid by the defendants depending on the choice of the plaintiff

between item (1) or item (2), detailed as follows:

(1) Swap with a 500-square meters [sic] lot located at Baras Rizal x x x.
(2) Cash of P205,700.00 x x x.
x x x x.22
We agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition for
reasons postulated by the CA. We qualify, however, that this ruling does not
necessarily countenance the immediate and actual partition of the subject house
by way of public auction in view of the suspensive proscription imposed under
Article 159 of The Family Code which will be discussed forthwith.
It is true that the existence of the subject house was not specifically alleged in
the complaint for partition. Such omission notwithstanding, the subject house is
deemed part of the judgment of partition for two compelling reasons.
First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil Code, the
subject house is deemed part of the subject land. The Court quotes with
approval the ruling of the CA, to wit:
The RTC, in the assailed Order dated August 30, 2005 ratiocinated that since the
house constructed on the subject lot was not alleged in the complaint and its
ownership was not passed upon during the trial on the merits, the court cannot
include the house in its adjudication of the subject lot. The court further stated
that it cannot give a relief to[sic] which is not alleged and prayed for in the
complaint.
We are not persuaded.
To follow the foregoing reasoning of the RTC will in effect render meaningless
the pertinent rule on accession. In general, the right to accession is automatic
(ipso jure), requiring no prior act on the part of the owner or the principal.
So that even if the improvements including the house were not alleged in
the complaint for partition, they are deemed included in the lot on which
they stand, following the principle of accession. Consequently, the lot
subject of judicial partition in this case includes the house which is
permanently attached thereto, otherwise, it would be absurd to divide the
principal, i.e., the lot, without dividing the house which is permanently
attached thereto.23 (Emphasis supplied)
Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the subject house was built by
the deceased.24 Petitioners never controverted such claim. There is then no
dispute that the subject house is part of the estate of the deceased; as such, it is
owned in common by the latter's heirs, the parties herein,25 any one of whom,
under Article 49426 of the Civil Code, may, at any time, demand the partition of
the subject house.27 Therefore, respondent's recourse to the partition of the
subject house cannot be hindered, least of all by the mere technical omission of
said common property from the complaint for partition.
That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while we treat the
subject house as part of the co-ownership of the parties, we stop short of
authorizing its actual partition by public auction at this time. It bears
emphasis that an action for partition involves two phases: first, the declaration
of the existence of a state of co-ownership; and second, the actual termination of
that state of co-ownership through the segregation of the common property.28

What is settled thus far is only the fact that the subject house is under the co-
ownership of the parties, and therefore susceptible of partition among them.
Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as ordered by the
RTC is an entirely different matter, depending on the exact nature of the subject
house.
Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on his
exclusive property.29 Petitioners add that said house has been their residence
for 20 years.30 Taken together, these averments on record establish that the
subject house is a family home within the contemplation of the provisions of
The Family Code, particularly:
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or
by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their
family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution
and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
(Emphasis supplied.)
One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic
constitution of the family home from the time of its occupation as a family
residence, without need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial processes
provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of
the Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the
scope of the family home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family
resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the
subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it
stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner
Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20
years back.31
It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is
the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from
immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family Code, viz:
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for
as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply
regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit
following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the
physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing the following
restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot extra-judicially partition
it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor
beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heirs cannot judicially

partition it during the aforesaid periods unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been alleged by the parties; nor has
the RTC found any compelling reason to order the partition of the family home,
either by physical segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through
auction sale as suggested by the parties.
More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate
partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even
if the family home has passed by succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or
has been willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family
home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by
the law. The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home
cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the
family home.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subject
house and lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it
has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the parties herein. Decedent Fidel
died on March 10, 2003.32 Thus, for 10 years from said date or until March 10,
2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein,
the family home he constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no
compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and
order the partition of the property.
The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals33 that a claim for exception from
execution or forced sale under Article 153 should be set up and proved to the
Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Herein petitioners
timely objected to the inclusion of the subject house although for a different
reason.
To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA ruling that the subject
house is part of the judgment of co-ownership and partition. The same evidence
also establishes that the subject house and the portion of the subject land on
which it is standing have been constituted as the family home of decedent Fidel
and his heirs. Consequently, its actual and immediate partition cannot be
sanctioned until the lapse of a period of 10 years from the death of Fidel Arriola,
or until March 10, 2013.
It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no obstacle to the
immediate public auction of the portion of the subject land covered by TCT No.
383714, which falls outside the specific area of the family home.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the November 30, 2006
Decision and April 30, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED
in that the house standing on the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 383714 is DECLARED part of the co-ownership of the parties John Nabor C.
Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola but EXEMPTED from
partition by public auction within the period provided for in Article 159 of the
Family Code.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.


[G.R. No. 158971. August 25, 2005]
MARIANO Y. SIY, in his personal capacity, as well as in his capacity as
owner of PHILIPPINE AGRI TRADING CENTER, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ELENA EMBANG, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:
For resolution is private respondent Elena Embangs motion to cite Atty.
Frederico P. Quevedo, counsel of petitioner Mariano Y. Siy, in contempt of court
for delaying this case and impeding the execution of the judgment rendered
herein, in violation of Canon 12[1] and Rule 12.04[2] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
This case originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of
holiday pay and holiday premium pay filed by Embang against petitioner and
Philippine Agri Trading Center. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of Embang. The
dispositive portion of his September 29, 2000 decision[3] read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring [Embang] to be a regular
employee of the PHIL-AGRI TRADING CENTER and ordering the latter to
reinstate her to her former position and pay her backwages from the date of her
dismissal on February 18, 2000 until her reinstatement which computed as of
today amounts to P37,771.50 (P5881 x 6.5 months) plus 1/12 thereof or the
amount of P3,147.62 as corresponding 13th month pay for the period.
An additional award of 5% of the total award is also rendered since [,]
compelled to litigate [,] [Embang] had to engage the services of counsel.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On March 8, 2002, the Third Division of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the decision of the
labor arbiter with modification. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit and
the Decision dated September 29, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in [that Mariano Y. Siy] should be made jointly and severally
liable together with Phil. Agri Trading Center and that [Embang] is entitled only
[to] the ten (10%) percent of his awarded 13th month pay as attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.[4]
After the NLRC refused to reconsider its March 8, 2002 resolution, petitioner
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) by way of a petition for certiorari.
Finding the petition to be without merit, the appellate court dismissed the
same.[5] The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was likewise
denied.[6]
Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court
questioning the CAs decision (dismissing his petition) and resolution (denying
his motion for reconsideration). Since we found no reversible error on the part
of the appellate court, we denied the petition in our September 22, 2003
resolution. Petitioner sought a reconsideration of our resolution but we
resolved to deny the same with finality. Thereafter, entry of judgment was made

on December 30, 2003.

In accordance with the rules of procedure of the NLRC, Embangs counsel filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution dated February 16, 2004 before
the labor arbiter. Subsequently, Atty. Quevedo entered his appearance for the
petitioner and filed a comment to the motion for writ of execution.[7] He alleged
that Embang rejected the various offers of reinstatement extended to her by
petitioner; hence, she should be entitled to backwages only up to September 29,
2000, the date of the promulgation of the labor arbiters decision.
This was followed by a protracted exchange of pleadings and motions between
the parties.[8] Finding that his office was never informed by petitioner and
Philippine Agri Trading Center of any intention on their part to reinstate
Embang to her former position, the labor arbiter issued an order dated July 30,
2004[9] granting the February 16, 2004 motion and directing that a writ of
execution be issued.
Atty. Quevedo refused to be deterred. He filed an appeal with the NLRC on
August 12, 2004. He insisted that the labor arbiter committed grave abuse of
discretion in failing to specify in his order that the backwages should be
computed until September 29, 2000 only and that no backwages should accrue
thereafter because of Embangs refusal to be reinstated.
Embangs counsel moved to dismiss the appeal. He contended that the appeal
was not perfected because petitioner and Philippine Agri Trading Center did not
post the required cash or surety bond. Pending the resolution of the appeal,
Embang filed the instant motion to cite Atty. Quevedo in contempt of court.
By way of comment, Atty. Quevedo maintains that he did not delay the
execution of the decision but only sought the consideration of Embangs refusal
to be reinstated in any writ of execution that may be issued. He claims that such
refusal on Embangs part constituted a supervening event that justified the filing
of an appeal notwithstanding the finality of the decision. He also asserts that
an appeal was the proper remedy to question the July 30, 2004 order of the
labor arbiter.
Meanwhile, the Third Division of the NLRC issued a resolution[10] on February
28, 2005 resolving not to give due course to the appeal and to remand the case
to the regional arbitration branch for further proceedings. The NLRC held that
the July 30, 2004 order was not appealable. Despite the denial of the appeal,
however, Atty. Quevedo filed a motion for clarification/partial reconsideration
of the NLRCs February 28, 2005 resolution.
For his obstinacy in refusing to respect a final and executory judgment, we hold
Atty. Quevedo in contempt of court.
Contempt of court is disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its
authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or
disobedience of the courts orders but also conduct tending to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some
manner, to impede the due administration of justice.[11] Under the Rules of
Court, contempt is classified into either direct or indirect contempt. Direct
contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to
obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same.[12] Indirect contempt is

one not committed in the presence of a court.[13] It is an act done at a distance

which tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice.[14]
Atty. Quevedo should be sanctioned for indirect contempt. Indirect contempt is
committed by a person who commits the following acts, among others:
disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a
court;[15] any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt;[16] and any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice.[17]
We denied with finality the petitioners petition for review on certiorari almost
two years ago. But the decision of the labor arbiter (affirmed with modification
by the NLRC and upheld by the CA and this Court) remains unsatisfied up to
now because of Atty. Quevedos sly maneuvers on behalf of his client.
Once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is
laid to rest. The prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his victory
while the other party is obliged to respect the courts verdict and to comply with
it. We reiterate our pronouncement in Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals:[18]
well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even
if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of
the land.
The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of
justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not
deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must guard against any scheme
calculated to bring about that result and must frown upon any attempt to
prolong the controversies.
The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the
so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void
judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
This case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions. Contrary to Atty.
Quevedos contention, there existed no supervening event that would have
brought the case outside the ambit of the general rule on the immutability of
final and executory decisions.
Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment becomes final
and executory or to new circumstances which develop after judgment acquires
finality.[19] The refusal of Embang to be reinstated happened, assuming it really
happened, before the finality of our September 22, 2003 resolution, i.e., before
the decision of the labor arbiter as modified by the NLRC became final and
executory.
In fact, the issue of the alleged offer of reinstatement and Embangs rejection of
the same was not a new one and had already been passed upon by the courts.
Atty. Quevedo himself admits that petitioner brought the issue before the CA in
his June 6, 2002 petition for certiorari and December 3, 2002 memorandum.

The appellate court brushed it aside and found neither factual nor legal merit in
the petition. The matter was again raised in petitioners June 3, 2003 motion for
reconsideration which was denied on the ground that the basic issues had
already been previously considered by the court. Embangs alleged refusal to be
reinstated was also alleged in the petition for review on certiorari filed by
petitioner before this Court. We denied it for failing to show that a reversible
error had been committed by the CA.
Atty. Quevedos client was bound by the finality of our affirmance of the
modified decision of the labor arbiter. He should not have tried, under the guise
of a flimsy appeal to the NLRC, to reopen a case already decided with finality.
Nor should he have raised anew matters previously considered and issues
already laid to rest.
Atty. Quevedos act of filing a baseless appeal with the NLRC was obviously
intended to defeat the implementation of a final and executory decision.
Elementary is the rule that an order granting a motion for a writ of execution is
not appealable.[20] Thus, Atty. Quevedos deceptively innocent appeal constituted
either a willful disregard or gross ignorance of basic rules of procedure
resulting in the obstruction of justice.
By his acts, Atty. Quevedo has tried to prevent Embang from enjoying the fruits
of her hard earned legal victory. In effect, he has been tying the hands of justice
and preventing it from taking its due course. His conduct has thwarted the due
execution of a final and executory decision. By appealing an order which he
knew to be unappealable, he abused court processes and hindered the
dispensation of justice. His dilatory tactics were an affront to the dignity of the
Court, clearly constituting indirect contempt.
We note that the ground cited in the motion to cite Atty. Quevedo in contempt of
court was his violation of Canon 12 and Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. While a lawyers violation of his duties as an officer of the court
may also constitute contempt, the grounds for holding a person in contempt and
for holding him administratively liable for the violation of his lawyers oath are
distinct and separate from each other. They are specified in Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court. A finding of contempt on the part of a lawyer does not preclude the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions against him for his contravention of the
ethics of the legal profession. Thus:
x x x the power to punish for contempt and the power to disbar are separate
and distinct, and that the exercise of one does not exclude the exercise of the
other. A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate
the authority of the court; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary
proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the courts officer to continue in that
office, to preserve and protect the court and the public from the official
ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office. The principal
purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the
functions of the court [while that] of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the
Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as
much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.
Moreover, it has been held that the imposition of a fine as a penalty in a

contempt proceeding is not considered res judicata to a subsequent charge for

unprofessional conduct. In the same manner, an attorneys conviction for
contempt was not collaterally estopped by reason of a subsequent disbarment
proceeding in which the court found in his favor on essentially the same facts
leading to conviction. It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt cannot be considered
as a notice to show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of
law, considering that they have distinct objects and for each of them a different
procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid
down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the
practice of law are governed by Rules 138 and 139 thereof.
Although apparently different in legal bases, the authority to punish for
contempt and to discipline lawyers are both inherent in the Supreme Court and
are equally incidents of the courts basic power to oversee the proper
administration of justice and the orderly discharge of judicial functions. As was
succinctly expounded in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, et al.:
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases
like that before us here: the Courts inherent power to discipline attorneys and
the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of
the Bar is broader [than] the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court
may be committed both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court.
Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also
constitutes professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary
authority of the Supreme Court. Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the
Supreme Courts disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play
whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is charged also
constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does
not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The
disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to
the Courts exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a
professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to
share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes
in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or
impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional
misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and
contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.[21]
We therefore refer the complaint against Atty. Quevedos behavior to the
Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for an
investigation of his possible liabilities under Canon 12 and Rule 12.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Frederico P. Quevedo is hereby found GUILTY of
INDIRECT CONTEMPT for which a FINE of P30,000 is imposed upon him,
payable in full within five days from receipt of this resolution.
SO ORDERED.