Artculo internacional

Guido Canchari Obregn

Analista poltico y comunicador
Political analyst and Communicator
Peruano.
Magster en Ciencias Polticas por la Pontiicia Universidad Catlica del Per (PUCP) y
tiene estudios de doctorado en esa disciplina
en esa casa de estudios. Es tambin licenciado en Ciencias de la Comunicacin por la
Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos
(UNMSM).
Se ha desempeado como periodista poltico
en varios medios de comunicacin de Lima.
Actualmente es subgerente de Comunicaciones y Prensa de la Oicina Nacional de Procesos Electorales.
Ha escrito el libro Elecciones Presidenciales
en Amrica Latina (1978-2010) Mayora Relativa o Doble Vuelta?, coeditado por la UNMSM y la oicina en Lima del Instituto Nacional
Demcrata (NDI).

Peruvian
He has a Masters degree in Political Sciences from the Pontiical Catholic University of
Peru (PUCP) and has Ph.D. studies in that
same profession from this university. He
also has a B. Sc. Degree in Sciences of the
Communication by the Main National University of Saint Marks (UNMSM).
He has worked as political newsman in
several communications means of Lima.
Currently, he is the assistant to manager of
Communications and Press of the National
Ofice of Electoral Processes.
He has written the book Presidential Elections in Latin America (1978-2010). Relative
Majority or Double Turn? Co-edited by the
UNMSM and the ofice in Lima of the National Democratic Institute (NDI).

Reforma electoral en el Per. Entre el discurso

y los hechos
Electoral reform in Peru. Between the discourse and the
facts

inicios del presente ao, y de cara a las elecciones

generales de 2016, se inici en el Per una campaa
impulsada por los organismos electorales, con el apoyo
de la sociedad civil y un sector de la academia, para
promover cambios a las reglas electorales que permitieran superar los vacos y lmites de la Ley de Partidos
Polticos vigente desde hace ms de 10 aos. Sin embargo, meses despus y ad portas de la convocatoria a las
nuevas elecciones, dos de los aspectos ms importantes de la agenda planteada entonces, el fortalecimiento
de la democracia interna y un mayor control sobre las
finanzas partidarias, no haban sido aprobados.

t the beginning of the present year, and facing

the 2016 general elections, in Peru a campaign
promoted by the electoral organisms started, with
the support of the civil society and a sector from the
academy, to promote changes to the electoral regulations
that allow to overcome the emptiness and the limits of
the Law of Political Parties that is valid since more than
10 years ago. However, months later and as a result of
the convocation of the new elections, two of the most
important aspects of the agenda formulated then, the
strengthening of the internal democracy and a greater
control over the party finances, had not been approved.

Cmo explicar la aprobacin de algunas reformas

electorales sobre otras? Cmo entender las expresiones de los lderes polticos a favor de estas reformas y
la conducta de sus bancadas parlamentarias en contra
de las mismas? Bajo qu circunstancias podra darse la
aprobacin de tales modificaciones?

How could we explain some of the electoral reforms

over others? How to understand the expressions of
the political leaders in favor of these reforms and the
conduct of the parliament parties against them? Under
what circumstances could take place the approval of
such modifications?

January 2016 Electoral World Magazine

47

Para intentar dar respuesta a estas preguntas revisaremos la agenda de la reforma electoral mnima propuesta por los entes electorales, las modificaciones a la Ley
de Partidos Polticos que finalmente fueron aprobadas,
las que quedaron pendientes, y evaluaremos cul es la
importancia o no de estos cambios a las reglas de juego
electoral.

In order to try to give response to these questions we

will review the agenda of the minimum electoral reform
proposed by the electoral entities, the modifications
to the Law of the Political Parties that were finally
approved, which were left pending and we will
evaluate which one is the importance or not of these
changes to the electoral game rules.

La agenda mnima

En febrero de 2015, los tres organismos electorales del

Per, el Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (JNE), la Oficina
Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE) y el Registro
Nacional de Identificacin y Estado Civil (Reniec), con
el apoyo de la Defensora del Pueblo, la Asociacin
Civil de Transparencia, la oficina en Per de Idea
Internacional, el Programa de Naciones Unidas para
el Desarrollo (PNUD), el Consejo de la Prensa Peruana
y el representante local de la Organizacin de Estados
Americanos (OEA), emitieron el pronunciamiento
Compromiso por la Reforma Electoral.

The minimum agenda

In February of 2015, the three electoral organisms
of Peru, the National Jury of Elections (JNE), the
National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE) and the
National Registry of Identification and Civil Status
(Reniec), with the support of the Ombudsman Office,
the Civil Association of Transparency, the Office in
Peru of International Idea, the Program of the United
Nations for the Development (PNUD), the Council of
the Peruvian Press and the local representative of the
Organization of American States (OAS), emitted the
statement: Commitment for the Electoral Reform.

En ese documento se propuso al Congreso de la

Repblica, compuesto por una sola cmara, una agenda
de ocho modificaciones a las reglas de juego electoral,
para ser discutidas y aprobadas en el periodo legislativo que iniciaba en marzo del presente ao, a efectos de
ingresar a las elecciones generales del 2016 con mejores
reglas electorales. Dicha agenda comprenda:

In that document it was proposed to the Congress of

the Republic, composed by only one chamber, an agenda of eight modifications to the electoral game rules,
to be discussed and approved in the legislative period
that started in March of the present year, to the effect of
entering the general elections of 2016 with better electoral regulations. Such agenda included:

Impedir que postulen a cargos de representacin popular a personas condenadas por delitos
dolosos.
Que los candidatos declaren en sus hojas de vida
sus sentencias y procesos judiciales en curso, as
como sus ingresos, bienes y rentas.
La instalacin de un mecanismo que proporcione
informacin sobre los antecedentes de los precandidatos y los financistas de campaa.
La participacin alternada de hombres y mujeres
en las listas electorales.
La prdida de curul de los congresistas desaforados.
Elecciones internas partidarias supervisadas por
los organismos electorales
Financiamiento pblico directo para evitar la infiltracin de dinero de procedencia ilcita; as como
rendicin de cuentas con sanciones efectivas.
Mejorar las normas sobre la revocatoria y los plazos de cierre del padrn electoral.

En trminos estrictos, no se trataba de una agenda de

reforma electoral de envergadura que, por ejemplo,
implicara un cambio en el modelo de representacin, ya
sea mayoritario, mixto o proporcional; sino de un listado de modificaciones menores, vinculadas a las reglas
electorales, el sistema de partidos y el sistema poltico
en general.
48

To hinder that persons that are convicted of crimes

can be postulated to positions of popular elections.
That the candidates declare in their life resumes
their sentences and ongoing judicial proceedings,
as well as their incomes taxes, properties and
assets.
The installation of a mechanism that provide information over the precedents of the pre-candidates
and the financers of campaign
The alternation participation of men and women
in the electoral lists.
The losing of positions by the congresspersons
with jurisdiction.
Internal party elections supervised by the electoral
organisms.
Public direct financing to avoid the infiltration of
money of illicit source; as well as accountability
with effective sanctions.
To improve the norms over the revocation and the
terms of closing of the electoral roll.

In strict terms, it does not have to do with an agenda

of very large electoral reform, in such a way that, for
instance, it would imply a change in the model of
representation, either a majority, mix or proportional
model, but instead of a minor modification list, linked
Electoral reform in Peru. Between the discourse and the facts

Reforma electoral en el Per. Entre el discurso y los hechos

Esta agenda obedeca a algunas preocupaciones generadas por las particularidades de la poltica local en la
que no es raro que el periodismo descubra que algunos candidatos electos como congresistas o autoridades
regionales o municipales, tienen sentencias condenatorias en sus antecedentes o que han falseado su declaracin jurada de hoja de vida. Tampoco que debido a esos
u otros hechos terminen desaforados de sus cargos.
Pero este listado de modificaciones legales tambin
inclua dos aspectos relevantes para el incipiente sistema de partidos y el sistema poltico peruano en su
conjunto: la preocupacin por los bajos estndares
democrticos de las elecciones internas, en un contexto
de enorme desconfianza ciudadana en los partidos; y el
temor de una posible infiltracin de recursos ilcitos en
la campaa electoral, considerando, particularmente, la
fuerte presencia del narcotrfico y la minera ilegal en
algunas zonas del pas.
Emitido el citado pronunciamiento, y a pocos das del
reinicio del periodo parlamentario de marzo, los lderes
polticos, congresistas, lderes de opinin y acadmicos

De izquierda a derecha. Mariano Cucho Espinoza, jefe

de la Oicina Nacional de Procesos Electorales de Per;
Francisco Tvara, presidente del Jurado Nacional de
Elecciones; y Jorge Irrivaren, jefe del Registro Nacional
de Identiicacin y Estado Civil.

to the electoral rules, the party system and the political

system in general.
This agenda obeyed to some concerns generated by
the particularities of the local politics in which it is
not rare that the journalism discover that some elected
candidates such as congresspersons and regional or
local authorities, have guilty verdicts in their police
records or that have made false their sworn oath of
their resume. Neither that due to this nor other facts,
end up without jurisdiction for their positions.
But this list of legal modifications also included two
relevant aspects for the incipient system of parties and of
the Peruvian political system as a whole: the concern by
the low democratic standards of the internal elections,
in a context of great citizen mistrust in the parties; and
the fear of a possible infiltration of illegal resources in
the electoral campaign considering, particularly, the
strong presence of the drug trafficking and the illegal
mining in some zones of the country.

From left to right: Mariano Cucho Espinoza, chief of the

National Office of Electoral Processes from Peru; Francisco
Tavara, president of the National Jury of Elections;
and Jorge Yrivaren, chief of the National Registry of
Identification and Civil Status.

49

se pronunciaron a favor de esta agenda mnima de

reformas, entendiendo que un Congreso que estaba en
su ltimo ao de mandato difcilmente podra abordar
reformas electorales y polticas de mayor envergadura,
como el restablecimiento del Senado, o que la eleccin
de los congresistas se realice en la misma fecha de la
segunda vuelta electoral de los comicios presidenciales.

Reformas prioritarias?

Iniciada la legislatura de marzo, cules fueron las

reformas aprobadas? La mayora de especialistas consultados sobre la importancia de esta agenda mnima
coincida en que dos aspectos centrales de esta reforma
que no podan ser dejados de lado, eran institucionalizar los mecanismos de democracia interna, que actualmente son muy endebles; y fortalecer la transparencia
de las finanzas partidarias, ante la carencia de un marco
regulatorio que establezca infracciones y sanciones efectivas. Sin embargo, ocho meses despus de iniciado el
debate,esas dos iniciativas no haban sido aprobadas.
En el primer tema, la propuesta consista en que las
elecciones internas de los partidos se realicen de manera simultnea, en fecha nica, bajo el mecanismo un
militante un voto, y que todo el proceso, desde la elaboracin del padrn, organizacin de los comicios y la
resolucin de controversias, sea supervisado por los
organismos electorales. Con la legislacin vigente, la
democracia interna en los partidos es una completa ficcin: una asamblea de delegados puede elegir a todos
los candidatos y, por si fuera poco, una quinta parte de
la lista de los mismos puede ser designada directamente por el rgano que el partido decida.
Aunque la ley contempla tambin que la relacin de
candidatos puede ser electa con el voto de todos los afiliados, e incluso con la participacin de los no afiliados,
la mayora de partidos ha preferido encargar esa tarea a
una asamblea de delegados, en detrimento de la participacin de las bases partidarias.
En el segundo aspecto, la iniciativa contemplaba hacer
efectivo el financiamiento pblico directo a los partidos
con representacin parlamentaria y establecer un cuadro de infracciones y sanciones efectivas ante el incumplimiento de la obligacin de transparentar la actividad
financiera partidaria. Actualmente, algunos partidos
polticos incumplen, sin ninguna consecuencia legal
efectiva, su obligacin de rendir cuenta de sus ingresos y gastos de campaa electoral y de funcionamiento. Y quienes s lo hacen no necesariamente reportan el
movimiento financiero real existente.
Pese a que la ONPE, organismo encargado de la supervisin de las finanzas partidarias, ha detectado diversas incongruencias en los reportes financieros de los
50

Once the mentioned pronouncement is emitted, and a

few days after the parliament period of March was restarted, the political leaders, congresspersons, opinion
and academic leaders made a pronunciation in favor of
this minimum agenda of reforms, understanding that
a Congress that was in its last year of mandate could
hardly address electoral and political reforms of largerscale, such as the re-establishment of the Senate or that
the election of the congresspersons would take place in
the same date of the second electoral turn of the presidential elections.
Priority reforms?
Once the March Legislature started, which were the
approved reforms? The majority of specialists consulted over the importance of this minimum agenda
coincided with two central aspects of this reform that
could not be left aside, which were to institutionalize
the mechanisms of internal democracy, which currently
are very weak; and to strengthen the transparency of
the party finances, facing the lack of a legal framework
that establishes infractions and effective sanctions.
However, eight months after this debate started, those
two initiatives had not been approved.
In the first theme, the proposal consisted on the fact that
the internal elections of two parties could take place in
a simultaneous way, in the unique date, under the one
militant, one vote mechanism, and that all the process,
since the elaboration of the electoral roll, organization
of the elections and the resolution of controversies,
could be supervised by the electoral organisms. With
the in force legislation, the internal democracy in the
parties is a complete fiction: an assembly of delegates
can elect all the candidates and, as if that were not bad
enough, a fifth part of their list can be directly assigned
by the organ that the party would decide.
Although the law also contemplates that the relation of
candidates can be elected with the vote of all the affiliates, and even with the participation of the ones that are
not affiliated, the majority of the parties have preferred
to assign that task to an assembly of delegates, in detriment of the participation of the party bases.
In the second aspect, the initiative contemplated to
make effective the public direct financing of the parties with parliament representation and establishing a
table of effective infractions and sanctions before the
non-compliance of the obligation of making transparent the financial party activity. Currently, some political parties do not comply, without any effective legal
consequence, their obligation of accountability of their
incomes and expenditures of electoral campaign and of
operation. And those that indeed do it, not necessarily
report the real current financial movement.
Electoral reform in Peru. Between the discourse and the facts

Reforma electoral en el Per. Entre el discurso y los hechos

partidos omisiones, datos inexactos, aportantes simulados, etc.-, estas no constituyen infracciones contempladas en la ley que acarreen sanciones. En Per solo
son sancionables los aportes financieros en exceso o
de procedencia prohibida (del Estado, de gobiernos
extranjeros o congregaciones religiosas).
Por esa razn, se esperaba que estas dos reformas,
en materia de democracia interna y finanzas partidarias, fueran las que ms atencin tuvieran de parte del
Congreso, en virtud de su importancia y al compromiso
expresado por los lderes de los partidos y los propios
congresistas de discutir y aprobarlas, para ser aplicadas
en las elecciones presidenciales y parlamentarias del 10
de abril de 2016. Sin embargo, las primeras reformas
aprobadas fueron otras, que no tenan ese grado de
urgencia e importancia o que no haban sido parte de
esa agenda mnima.
As, por ejemplo, fue iniciativa del propio Congreso de
la Repblica eliminar la reeleccin de las autoridades
regionales y municipales, bajo el argumento de que el
intento de permanecer en el cargo por ms de un periodo podra generar corrupcin. Esta modificacin legal
gener controversia debido a que no solo no puede probarse esa supuesta causa-efecto, sino porque el remedio
planteado podra ser peor que la enfermedad. Tambin
porque el Congreso se niega a aplicar a s mismo esa
medida, como lo plantearon las asociaciones de gobernadores regionales y de alcaldes.

Debate entrampado

La propuesta de reforma formulada por los organismos

electorales, sin embargo, tuvo un amplio apoyo a nivel
de los medios de comunicacin, lderes de opinin,
especialistas en la materia y la ciudadana expresada

In spite of the fact that ONPE, organism in charge of the

supervision of the party finances, have detected diverse incongruities in the financial reports of the parties
omissions, inaccurate data, simulated donors, and so
on- these do not constitute infractions contemplated in
the law that would incur in sanctions. In Peru, only the
excess financial contributions or from illegal precedence are sanctioned (from the State, from foreign governments or from religious congregations).
Due to this, it was expected that these two reforms, in
matter of internal democracy and party finances, were
the ones that had the most attention by the Congress, in
virtue of their importance and the commitment expressed by the two leaders of the parties and of the own
congresspersons to discuss and to approve them, to be
applied in the presidential and parliament elections of
the 10th of April of 2016. However, the first reforms
approved were others, that did not have that level of
urgency and importance or that had not been part of
that minimum agenda.
In this way, for instance, it was initiative of the Congress
of the Republic per se, to eliminate the reelection of
the regional and local authorities, under the argument
that the attempt to stay in the position for more than
a period could generate corruption. This legal modification generated controversy due to the fact that not
only it was impossible to prove that cause-effect proposal, but instead because the remedy formulated could
be worse than the illness. Also because the Congress
does not accept to apply to itself that measure, as it was
suggested by the associations of regional governors
and mayors.
Trapped debate
The proposal of reform formulated by the electoral
organisms, however, had a broad support at the level
of the communications means, opinion leaders, specialists in the matter and the citizenship expressed in the
polls. In this way, in the polls, around 80 per cent was
pronounced in favor that the ONPE and the other electoral organisms be in charge of supervising the internal
elections and that a more effective legal control to the
party finances could be imposed.

Hemiciclo del Congreso unicamerical del

Per, donde se debati parcialmente la
agenda mnima de reformas electorales.
Chamber of the Congress (unicameral) of
Peru, where it was partially debated the
minimum agenda of electoral reforms.

51

Modificaciones a las reglas electorales realizadas entre marzo y octubre de 2015

Reforma

Antes

Ahora

La solicitud de revocatoria de una autoridad municipal o regional no necesitaba ser fundamentada.

La solicitud de revocatoria de una autoridad tiene que ser

fundamentada. .

La revocatoria se poda solicitar desde el segundo ao

Ley de Participacin de mandato.
y Control Ciudadanos
La ley ordenaba nuevas elecciones si proceda la
revocatoria.

Podr realizarse solo al tercer ao de mandato de las autoridades ediles y regionales.

No habr nuevas elecciones como consecuencia de la
revocatoria.

Las autoridades revocadas eran reemplazadas luego Las autoridades revocadas sern reemplazadas por los que
de las nuevas elecciones
queden en la lista o por los accesitarios.
No reeleccin de
autoridades regionales y municipales

Los presidentes regionales y alcaldes podan reelegirse de manera indefinida.

Los presidentes regionales cambian de denominacin a

gobernadores regionales y ya no pueden reelegirse. Lo
mismo sucede con los alcaldes provinciales y distritales.

Ley
del
vaco

Los congresistas que reciban una sentencia firme

por un delito como trfico ilcito de drogas, terrorismo, trata de personas o lavado de activos, podan
ser desaforados pero su escao era ocupado por su
accesitario.

Los legisladores que tengan sentencia firme por delitos

de trfico ilcito de drogas, terrorismo, trata de personas y
lavado de activos, sern desaforados y su partido no los
podr reemplazar por su accesitario.

escao

Ley de la ventanilla
nica

Los partidos polticos tenan que averiguar por ini- La ventanilla nica informar a los partidos sobre los
ciativa propia los antecedentes de las personas que antecedentes de las personas que quieran postular a cardeseaban postular por su agrupacin.
gos de eleccin popular en temas como: rdenes de captura
nacional e internacional vigentes o pasadas, antecedentes
de sentencia condenatoria con calidad de cosa juzgada por
delito doloso en el exterior, as como sobre deudas originadas por tributos, contribuciones, tasas municipales y el
registro de deudores alimentarios.
Los candidatos no estaban obligados a consignar
informacin sobre sus sentencias condenatorias.

Hoja de vida

Se dispone la obligacin de los candidatos de incluir en sus

hojas de vida la relacin de sentencias condenatorias por
delitos dolosos, demandas por violencia familiar, as como
su declaracin jurada de bienes y rentas.
El Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (JNE) puede retirar las
candidaturas, hasta diez das antes de las elecciones, de
quienes no incluyan dicha informacin en su hoja de vida.

JNE poda denunciar penalmente a los que consigna- El JNE podr remitir al Ministerio Pblico los casos de
ban informacin falsa en su hoja de vida
informacin inexacta en la hoja de vida detectados para
que proceda conforme a sus atribuciones.
El Registra Nacional de Identificacin y Estado Civil El Reniec podr verificar en determinados casos la veraci(Reniec) poda verificar la veracidad del domicilio de dad del domicilio consignado por los ciudadanos.
Ley contra el voto los electores en determinados casos.
trashumante
(voto
"golondrino")
No haba multa para quienes no actualicen sus datos La ley dispone que la multa aplicable a quienes no actualien el documento nacional de identidad (DNI).
cen sus datos en el DNI, luego de ms de 30 das, sea equivalente a 0.3% de la UIT

Fuente: elaboracin propia

52

Electoral reform in Peru. Between the discourse and the facts

Reforma electoral en el Per. Entre el discurso y los hechos

Modifications to the electoral regulations carried out between March and October of 2015

Reform

Before

Now

The request of revocation of a local or regional

authority did not need to be substantiated.

The request of revocation of an authority must be substantiated.

The revocation can be requested from the second

Law of Participation year of mandate
and Citizen Control
The law ordered new elections if the revocation
was approved

It could only take place on the third year of mandate of the

councilors and regional authorities.
There will not be new elections as a consequence of the
revocation.

The revoked authorities are replaced after the The revocation authorities will be replaced by the ones that are
new elections
left in the list or by the alternates.
No reelection of The regional presidents and mayors could be The regional presidents change the denomination to regional
regional and local reelected in an indefinite way.
governors y they could not be reelected. The same happens
authorities
with the provincial and district mayors.
Law of the empty
position.

The congresspersons that received a firm sentence for a fault such as drug smuggling, terrorism,
human trafficking or asset laundering, could lose
their jurisdiction but their positions would be
occupied by their alternate

The legislators that have a firm sentence due to drug smuggling, terrorism, human trafficking and asset laundering
could lose their jurisdiction and their party could not replace
them by their alternate.

Law of the Unique

window

The political parties had to find out by their own

initiative the backgrounds of the persons that
wanted to be postulated by their groupings.

The unique window will inform the parties over the precedents of the persons that want to be postulated to positions of
popular election in themes such as: orders of current or past
national and international capture, background with condemnatory sentence in quality of judged thing by the intentional
crime overseas, as well as debts originated by tributes, contributions, municipal taxes and the registry of food debtors.

It was not mandatory for the candidates to It was established the obligation that the candidates had to
consign information over their condemnatory include in their life resumes the relation of condemnatory sensentences
tences due to illegal faults, complaint due to domestic violence,
as well as their sworn declaration of properties and patrimony.
Life resume

The National Jury of Elections (JNE) could withdraw the candidacies, up to ten days previous to the elections, of those that did
not include such information in their life resume.
The National Jury of Elections could criminally The National Jury of Elections will be able to send to the Public
file a lawsuit to those that consigned false infor- Ministry the cases of inaccurate information in the life resume
mation in their life resume.
detected in order to proceed according to their attributions.

Law against the

nomadic
vote
(golondrino vote)

The National Registrar of Identification and The Reniec could verify in certain cases the veracity of the resiMarital Status (Reniec) could verify the veracity dence consigned by the citizens.
of the residence of the electors in certain cases.
There was not a fine for those that did not update The law establishes that the applicable fine to those that would
their data in the National Document of Identity not update their data in the National Document of Identity,
(DNI)
after more than 30 days, is the equivalent to 0.3% of the UIT.

Source: The authors own elaboration

53

en las encuestas. As, en los sondeos cerca del 80 por

ciento se pronunci a favor de que la ONPE y los dems
organismos electorales se encarguen de supervisar las
elecciones internas, y de que se imponga un control
legal ms efectivo a las finanzas partidarias.
Y a pesar de que se gener una presin meditica para
que el Congreso debatiera y aprobara esas dos reformas, en la Comisin de Constitucin y en el pleno de
ese poder del Estado, se aprobaron normas que, por el
contrario, iban abiertamente en sentido inverso a las
modificaciones planteadas.
A modo de ejemplo, en vez de institucionalizar
los procesos de democracia interna partidarios, el
Congreso aprob elevar de 20 a 25 por ciento el nmero
de candidatos de la lista que pueden ser designados
directamente por la cpula partidaria, sin necesidad
de una eleccin interna. Esa medida, ampliamente
criticada, permita a los partidos no solo elegir sus listas
de candidatos mediante una asamblea de delegados, sin
participacin directa de los afiliados, sino que adems
le otorgaba el poder a la cpula partidaria de elegir a
voluntad a una cuarta parte de la lista, en el orden que
dispusiera. En los hechos, una contrarreforma.

Elecciones internas del Partido Aprista Peruano, realizadas

con apoyo de la ONPE, en la ciudad de Piura.

54

And in spite of the fact that a media pressure was

generated in order to get that the Congress would
debate and approve these two reforms, the Commission
of Constitution and in the full session of that State
power, norms were approved that, on the contrary,
were openly in the opposite sense to the modifications
proposed.
As an example, instead of institutionalizing the process
of internal party democracy, the Congress approved to
raise from 20 to 25 per cent the number of candidates
of the list that can be directly assigned by the party
leadership, without the need of an internal election.
This measure, broadly criticized, allowed the parties not
only to elect from their lists of candidates by means of
an assembly of delegates, without direct participation
of the affiliates, but also it granted the power to the
party leadership of electing at their will a fourth part of
the list, in the order that they would want to. In reality,
it was a counter reformation.
Likewise, it was approved a regulation to make effective
the direct public financing to the political parties
with representation in the Congress that currently
is not applicable due to the fact that it is subject to

Internal Elections of the Peruvian Aprista Party, carried out

with the support of the ONPE, in the city of Piura.

Electoral reform in Peru. Between the discourse and the facts

Reforma electoral en el Per. Entre el discurso y los hechos

Asimismo, se aprob un dictamen para hacer efectivo el

financiamiento pblico directo a los partidos polticos
con representacin en el Congreso que actualmente no
se aplica por estar sujeto a la disponibilidad de la caja
fiscal-, el cual, sin embargo, contena un artculo que
eliminaba la sancin a aquellas organizaciones que no
rindieran cuentas de sus finanzas partidarias anuales.
Dicha medida, constitua un retroceso en materia de
transparencia de las finanzas partidarias.
Lo paradjico de estos dos dictmenes fueron los argumentos empleados para justificarlos. En el primer
caso, se argument que se ampliaba el porcentaje de
candidatos designados directamente para enriquecer
las listas, con personalidades de muy alto nivel que
no quieren someterse al trmite de una eleccin interna. Sin embargo, a juicio de especialistas en la materia,
la norma apuntaba a ampliar el espacio en las listas a
aquellos que estuvieran dispuestos a aportar ms dinero a las campaas o pudieran atraer ms votos hacia el
partido. En el segundo, se argument que no se eliminaba ninguna sancin por incumplir con la presentacin de los informes financieros, que tal interpretacin
era equivocada y que no se iba a permitir a los organismos electorales imponer su criterio al Congreso.
Si el objetivo inicial de la campaa por la reforma
electoral mnima fue que las principales modificaciones se aplicaran para las elecciones generales de 2016,
ese objetivo fracas. Ello debido a que los temas ms
importantes, democracia interna y financiamiento partidario, fueron dejados al final; y cuando an haba la
oportunidad de aprobarlos, se introdujeron otros temas
al debate, se postergaba la sesin por falta de qurum o
se incluan modificaciones, que lejos de mejorar la propuesta la desnaturalizaban. Del tal forma que se puede
constatar una clara distancia entre el discurso poltico a
favor de esas reformas y los hechos.
Entonces, cmo explicar la aprobacin de algunas
reformas electorales sobre otras? En perspectiva se
puede concluir que las modificaciones aprobadas por el
Congreso fueron aquellas que menos afectaban el inters de la mayora de las dirigencias de los partidos polticos ni ponan el riesgo el status quo. Consideramos
que la aprobacin de estas dos reformas claves, el fortalecimiento del control financiero de los partidos y de
la democracia interna, se tendr que dar bajo un mayor
nivel de presin ciudadana o cuando su aplicacin no
sea inmediata; es decir, que se apliquen a futuro, lejos
de la actual coyuntura electoral para que los partidos
con capacidad de aprobarlos no sientan que pueden
perder las ventajas que tienen en el actual estado de las
cosas. Solo as se puede esperar que den luz verde a la
aprobacin de estas reformas.

the availability of the fiscal box which, however,

contained an article that eliminated the sanctions to
those organization that did not offer accountability of
their yearly party finances. Such measure, constituted
a backward action matter of transparency of the party
finances.
The paradox of these two regulations were the arguments used to justify them. In the first case, it was
argued that the percentage of candidates assigned
directly to enrich the lists with personalities at the
top level that do not want to go through the formality of an internal election could be included. However,
in the opinion of specialists in the subject, the norm
pointed out to broaden the space in the lists to those
that were willing to include more money in the campaigns or that could attract more votes to the party. In
the second aspect, it was argued that no sanction was
eliminated for breaking the rule with the presentation
of the financial statements, that such interpretation was
wrong and that it was not going to be allowed that the
electoral organisms could impose their criterion to the
Congress.
If the initial objective of the campaign for the minimum
electoral reform was that the main modifications would
be applied for the general elections of 2016, that objective failed. This due to the fact that the more important
themes, internal democracy and party financing were
left to the end; and when it was still the opportunity to
approve them, other debate themes were introduced,
the session due to the lack of quorum was postponed
or modifications that were far from improving the proposal, but instead, de-naturalize them, were included.
In this way, it was possible to find a clear distance between the political discourse in favor of those reforms
and the facts.
Then, how could we explain the approval of some
electoral reforms over others? In perspective, it can
be concluded that the modifications approved by the
Congress were those that neither affected much the
interests of the majority of the leaderships of the political parties, nor those that put at risk their status quo.
We think that the approval of those two key reforms,
the strengthening of the financial control of the parties
and of the internal democracy, will have to take place
under a greater level of citizen pressure or when their
application does not have to be immediate. In other
words, that they could be applied in the future, far from
the current electoral situation, so that the parties with
capacity to approve them, do not feel that they can lose
the advantages that they have in the current status of
the issues. Only in this way could it be possible that
they would give green light to the approval of these
reforms.
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