INFERENCE

3.6.1 My second reason for objecting to this kind of approach is that, if one is going to
introduce looseness into our talk about conduct, it is as well to make clear in just what
this looseness consists; and I am myself far from clear what is being proposed. Let us
admit for the sake of argument that we are at liberty, if we please, to treat principles
like 'Never say what is false' as rules of inference; we have then to ask, in what respect
these rules of inference differ from the ordinary rules of logic. I have already given my
own answer, that they differ in the same way as scientific laws differ from rules of
logic, because they are about matters of substance, not about words -- though in this
case the matters of substance are not matters of fact, but of what we should do. The
answer given by the type of theory which I am criticizing is, that these rules of
inference are looser than the rules of logic. Thus, if I say 'This is false, but say it', I am
not contradicting myself, but only breaking the looser rule to the effect that the
inference
S is false.
Do not say S.

is 'in general' valid. It could be argued in favour of this way of treating the matter that
we do often say 'Don't say S, because it's false', which presumably rests upon an
inference like that just set out; but that this cannot be a strict entailment, because I
would not ordinarily be said to contradict myself if I said 'S is false, but say it'.
We have therefore to inquire what can be meant by saying that a rule is 'in general'
valid, but not universally. It sounds sensible to say that the rule 'Never say what is
false' is a rule of this sort; for in fact we do think it right to observe it in the majority of
cases, but we also think it right to break it in exceptional cases in the interests, for
example, of tact, the winning of wars, or the preservation of innocent people from
homicidal maniacs. Now I can think of at least two ways in which a rule or principle
can be incompletely rigorous. The first way is when the rule lays down that a certain
kind of action is in certain circumstances to be done, but it is understood that it is
sufficient if it is done in the great majority of instances; exceptions are allowed if they
are not too numerous in proportion to the total number of cases. An example of such a
principle would be the principle that undergraduates must not take a week off work
during term; clearly if once or twice during his career an undergraduate, whose
industry is otherwise exemplary, takes some time off, even a week, we think no harm of
it; but if he takes every week off, or even the majority, he probably gets into serious
trouble. It is clear that the principle about not saying what is false is not of this
character, because we do not say 'It doesn't matter your saying what is false
occasionally, so long as you don't do it too often'.